Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism

dc.contributor.author	Bora, Mayank
dc.date.accessioned	2021-10-13T11:28:32Z
dc.date.available	2021-10-13T11:28:32Z
dc.date.issued	2020-03
dc.description.abstract	The computational theory of mind for a few decades has been the ruling paradigm in the Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Sciences, and probably one of the most significant facets of the “cognitive revolution”. While it is believed that this is for a great part for good reasons, there are certain aspects, perhaps the most significant ones, of Mind and Cognition that may be far from being well understood within this paradigm. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (henceforth CRA) may be seen as providing reasons why this might be the case when it comes to Intentionality and Consciousness.	en_US
dc.identifier.issn	0976-4496
dc.identifier.uri	https://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4129
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	University of North Bengal	en_US
dc.title	Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism	en_US
dc.title.alternative	Philosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, March-2020, pp. 151-164	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
periodical.editor	Padhi, Laxmikanta
periodical.name	Philosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy
periodical.pageEnd	164
periodical.pageStart	151
periodical.volumeNumber	XVI

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