Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism
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Article
Date
2020-03
Journal Title
Philosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy
Journal Editor
Padhi, Laxmikanta
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Volume Title
Publisher
University of North Bengal
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Bora, M. (2020). Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism. Philosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy, XVI, 151–164. https://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4129
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Abstract
The computational theory of mind for a few decades has been the ruling
paradigm in the Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Sciences, and probably
one of the most significant facets of the “cognitive revolution”. While it is believed
that this is for a great part for good reasons, there are certain aspects, perhaps the
most significant ones, of Mind and Cognition that may be far from being well
understood within this paradigm. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (henceforth
CRA) may be seen as providing reasons why this might be the case when it comes to
Intentionality and Consciousness.
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Volume Number
XVI
Issue Number
ISSN No
0976-4496
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Pages
Pages
151 - 164