Browsing by Author "Bora, Mayank"
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Item Open Access Alethic Relativism and Faultless Disagreement(University of North Bengal, 2018-03) Shukla, Anumita; Bora, MayankItem Open Access Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism(University of North Bengal, 2020-03) Bora, MayankThe computational theory of mind for a few decades has been the ruling paradigm in the Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Sciences, and probably one of the most significant facets of the “cognitive revolution”. While it is believed that this is for a great part for good reasons, there are certain aspects, perhaps the most significant ones, of Mind and Cognition that may be far from being well understood within this paradigm. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (henceforth CRA) may be seen as providing reasons why this might be the case when it comes to Intentionality and Consciousness.Item Open Access Scope and Substitution(Northern Book Centre, 2022-01-01) Bora, Mayank; Das, Kanti Lal; Basak, Jyotish ChandraThe problem of substitution failure in propositional attitude reports, raised by Frege (1892), led to the rejection of the Millian understanding of names. Taking after Frege, many have assumed that substitution failure depends upon the relevant names occurring within the scope of attitude verbs. It is also assumed that attitude reports (with one attitude verb) have exactly two kinds of readings: a substitution resisting one, and a substitution allowing one. The two readings are widely taken to be due to a syntactical ambiguity because of which the concerned names may be read either inside or outside the scope of the attitude verb. The overall received wisdom then is that scope is of absolute significance for the issue of substitution failure. I try to bring out a third kind of reading of attitude reports that, as I shall argue, show the received wisdom to be misplaced.