Shared Sovereignty, Shared Survival: Ecological Federalism and the Reconstitution of Centre-State Dynamics in India

Abstract

The Indian Constitution envisions a delicate balance between Union and State powers, yet ecological crises like climate change, biodiversity loss, and environmental degradation have begun to strain traditional models of federalism. The following paper presents the concept of Ecological Federalism, proposing it as a novel framework to reinterpret Centre–State relations in the Anthropocene. Unlike fiscal or administrative federalism, ecological federalism situates environmental governance at the core of constitutional power-sharing, emphasising shared sovereignty over natural resources, collective responsibility for ecological commons, and cooperative mechanisms for environmental justice. The study interrogates how climate governance challenges, such as renewable energy transitions and carbon commitments, interact with federal structures. It critically examines biodiversity as a constitutional common, raising questions of inter-state and inter-generational justice. Furthermore, it assesses judicial interventions in environmental federalism, including river water disputes, forest rights, and pollution controls, to highlight the judiciary’s evolving role in balancing ecological responsibilities between Union and States. The central argument is that ecological imperatives necessitate a re-imagining of Indian federalism whereby moving from a model of competitive authority to one of cooperative sustainability. The paper focuses on whether ecological fragility should justify asymmetrical federalism, granting special constitutional protections to ecologically sensitive regions like the Himalayas, the Northeast, and coastal belts. Ultimately, the project envisions a constitutional jurisprudence where environment is not a residual subject but a foundational principle of federal design, positioning ecological federalism as a pathway towards sustainable governance and environmental justice.