Berkeley and early wittgenstein on solipsism: a review

Abstract

This paper gives an exposition of the conception of solipsism of both Berkeley and early Wittgenstein followed by a critical assessment of the same. Both of them argue that solipsism is not different from realism. The difference lies in their methodological inquiry into the issue of solipsism. Berkeley believes in the epistemological-perceptual method, whereas Wittgenstein considers the method of logico-linguistic analysis to understand the sense of the world and life in his early work Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. Berkeley's philosophy of ‘subjective idealism’ is regarded as leading to the problem of the denial of the independent existence of anything beyond the knowing self or ‘I’. It is common knowledge that I exist in a world of various types of things and beings. This realistic position can hardly be denied by any philosophical doctrine. Similar is the case with Wittgenstein. His problem is more important than that of Berkeley. Wittgenstein deals with the problem concerning the relationship between language and the world. There is a sense in which Wittgenstein agrees with solipsism. One natural way of expressing the view of solipsism is to say “The world is my world.” In this sense, solipsism becomes the same as realism. In another sense, he disagrees with solipsism in so far as the whole of sayability centres on self, which is nowhere found in the world. So it is rather the philosophical self. This cannot be asserted to exist because there would be logical absurdity in doing so. Wittgenstein is right in saying that solipsism is correct in principle, but the difficulty with it is that it cannot be stated in language.