Some Epistemological Problems of Indeterminate Perception

Abstract

In the present paper some epistemological problems of indeterminate perceptions are focused. There are already some pioneer work done on the topic yet here some other epistemological problems of indeterminate perception have been highlighted. To discuss indeterminate perception the definition of perception have to be discussed first. In Nỹāya Sūtra Maharshi Gautama formulated the definition of perception as Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānaṁ avyāpadeśyaṁ avyabhicāri vỹavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ. In this definition there is a defect of under-coverage. So, some other Navya Naiyāyikas like Gangeśa, Viśvanātha, Uddyotakara also have discussed on the definition of perception. There are some problems of nirvikalpaka perception in which one cannot have any concept or ‘dhāraṇā’ of an object. The truth of nirvikalpaka perception is not been determined. There is no relation between qualifier and qualificand. So, the question arises here- what is the proof of such type of perception? The Naiyāyikas also forwarded some solutions of the problems. It is to be said that when an object is not endowed with name, universal and definition, there is no question to accepting or rejecting it. Under this situation upekṣābuddhi arises. So nirvikalpaka perception is the producer of upekṣābuddhi. Like this, the Naiyāyikas forwarded some other solutions of problems of indeterminate perceptions.