Defense of Frege’s ‘Third Realm’

Abstract

Frege’s semantic theory is known as sense-reference theory. This semantic theory is primarily associated with the concept of thought. His semantic theory is based on the identification of sense and reference of formalised language. As a referential semanticist, Frege attempted to ensure the meaning of language with regard to the concept of truth. Now, the concept of truth cannot be determined without the concept of thought. The concept of thought is an umbrella term comprising feelings, emotions, sentiments, descriptions, etc. According to Frege, philosophy, thought and language are intertwined with each other. For Frege, the problem of language is not associated primarily with the referential aspect of language, rather it is associated with the mode of presentation of language what he termed as sense. And while determining the sense of a sentence, Frege brings the concept of thought. Thoughts, for Frege, exist independently of human beings and it is for the humans to grasp the thoughts. They are timelessly true, something like Platonic ideas. Being a semanticist, Frege at the very outset of his philosophical career developed his anti-psychological position. To differ from Lockean ideas, he introduced context principle in his philosophy of language. Thoughts, for Frege, are neither physical nor mental. Unlike ideas, thoughts are objective. He admitted third realm as the locus of thought, which is comparable to but different from both physical and mental. The aim of this paper is to redeem Frege from some transgression by contemporary philosophers on his conception of third realm.