Protection against Self-Incrimination – Principles and Practice - A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Application of the rule against self-incrimination is one of the important rights recognized under Article 20(3) in Part III of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court of India applied this principle in its full force and effect in M.P. Sharma v Satish Chandra.3 However, in some of the later judgments, application of this protection was diluted. The rationale of the judgments for not recognizing this constitutional protection in the later judgments is not convincing. Such a rationale is also contradictory to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in other judgments dealing with the rights and liberties of an individual. In United Kingdom, despite the strong demand for dilution or abandoning this protection, the courts have consistently upheld this protection. In United States of America also, this protection is recognized as one of the fine principle developed by the civilized society. Compelling an individual to be a witness against himself demean the dignity of the individual and such compulsion and reliance on it by the courts would have the effect of dispensing with the proof otherwise required for determining the guilt of an accused. In some of the later cases, the Supreme Court of India has recognized the importance of this protection and applied it. Tracing the history of this protection and its application in United Kingdom and United States America would help understanding the underlying principles for this protection. Comparison of the Indian experience with other jurisdiction would provide an opportunity for introspection and consider remedial measures.