Empirical Insights into Leniency and Leniency Plus: Evaluating India's Cartel Deterrence Regime
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Type
Article
Date
Journal Title
Indian Journal of Law and Justice
Journal Editor
Biswas, Sujit Kumar
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of North Bengal
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Abstract
The Competition Law of India has been enacted with the goal of consumer welfare and consumer choice enshrined under Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India. Competition Act 2002 prohibits anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance and regulates combinations. Cartels are the horizontal agreements included under Section 3 of the Competition Act. Cartels are most distortive form of anticompetitive agreements that can hamper competition in the market and reduce consumer choice. To govern and break cartels Government of India introduced Leniency provision in India in 2009 however leniency incentives could not attract enough cartel members to come forward and self-report.
On 20 February 2024 ‘Leniency Plus Regulations, 2024’, have been enforced to strengthen the anticartel laws. This research seeks to study the efficacy of leniency regulations in India by studying and analyzing all the cases decided by Competition regulatory authority i.e. Competition Commission of India on Leniency. This research is a result of empirical method, where data collection involves the analysis of cases that are decided by the Competition Commission of India on cartels where leniency application had been filed.
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Edition
Volume
ISBN No
Volume Number
16
Issue Number
2
ISSN No
0976-3570
eISSN No
Pages
Pages
215 - 237