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Title: Wittgenstein On Denial of Privacy
Other Titles: Philosophical Papers, Journal of the Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, March-2020, pp. 38 - 42
Authors: Panigrahi, S. C.
Issue Date: Mar-2020
Publisher: University of North Bengal
Abstract: Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a part of his programme of attack upon the philosophical search for foundations is directed as an onslaught against selfknowledge. The sense of a sentence, according to Wittgenstein was given by its criteria. If so, then how is it possible to think of sentences without criteria? The possibility of self-ascription of psychological predicates is the question. The question raises several issues in philosophy, for example: the relation between the sense and the possibility of cognition, the nature of indexical expressions, the distinction between ‘I’, ‘he’ and ‘this’, logical form of ego-centric sentences in general, selfascription of psychological predicates, the other-ascription of psychological predicates etc. These issues are related to Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theses of self ascription of psychological predicates and to the problem of self-knowledge.
ISSN: 0976 – 4496
Appears in Collections:Philosophical Papers. Vol 16 (March 2020)

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