Sagar Ananda, B.2022-09-152022-09-152022-030976-4496https://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4634In this paper, my aim is to analyze the theory of phenomenalism and its basic assumptions in the philosophies of Berkeley, Russell and Ayer. I will also analyze the way phenomenalism and its sense-datum theory has been opposed by Austin and Strawson. My main argument is that phenomenalism as a theory of reduction of the objects to sense-data can never be sustained because no such reduction is possible and that we can never give up the conceptual system in which the material bodies and persons are primary particulars.enPhenomenalismSense-dataSkepticismKnowledgeCertaintyReductionismOn phenomenalism: a critical anlysisPhilosophical Papers Journal of Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVIII, March- 2022, pp. 198-210Article