• • • • 

CHAPTER-I 

INTRODUCTION 

Section-! Philosophy and Psychology as interrelated diacipl1nes 

A& to the orig1n of Existentialism, Mary warnock writes, 

" we may be content to use the, term ' Existentialism' to cover a 

k1na of ph1loaoph1cal activity which floUl•iehe~ on the continent 

especially 1n the 1 S40a ana. 1950s, which can be shown to have 

certain common interests, common ancestry anu common presuppositions, 

ana which is now surticiently clearly a matter ot history to make a 
1 

general survey worth un~ertak1ng. " But as a matter ot tact Exls-

tent1al1&m ha(i i~s or1g1n lent;; betoz·e, as 1 t was tounaed by the 

DaniSh Philosopher SOren Kler.ltegaard. who was born 1n l8J.3 and <11ed 

1n 1855· It seems that warnock ~re refers to the origin ot 

Phenomenological .&xistentialism, that 1s, generally regarded as 

the proper type of ~1stent1al1sm as enunciated by Philosophers 

liKe Heiuegger { 1889- lCJ/6 ) ana. Sartre {1905- 1980). It is 

generallY accepted. that .Kler.ltegaard is the real founder of the 

h1stential1st movement wh11e Nietzsche {1844-1900) may be regarded 

as the founder of the atheistic trend of ~1stent1alist thought. 

The e.xistentialista, li.Ke the Analytical .£Jh1losophers anci Logical 

Positivists wantcu to ael.d something new to the ~oma1n of Phllosophy, 

Conta.. •2 

. _j 



-· • 2 . -• 

and. have expressed. many views on the nature o~ the wor1<1 anu human 

life ; such as, bein~,treea.om, Gc>d., human oeing ana. its relation 

with other beings 1n t:r.a.e worlC&., a.eath, C&.read. (anguish), nausea, 

abandonment ,sexuality etc. or which some are Phl.losophical and 

some Psychological. In existen11al18m, we see Ph11oeophy and. 

Psychology to have their place side by side , ana. from this it 

seems that the existentialists do not belong to that group who 

think that Psychology can and. ought to be stua.ied 1n complete 

separation trom Philosophy. They took philosophy and psychology 

as inter-related. a.ii:jcip11nt::s anu .ror thio reason, they did not 

leave aside psychology while discussing their philosophical views. 

Now it is necessary to conaid.er whether Philosophy and 

Psychology are inter-related discip11n~s or not. There was also 

a time when Psychology was looked upon merely as a bt·anch ot 

phllosovhy. The: relation between Philosophy and Psychology, then, 

was loo.ltec.i. upon as the same as between Philosop.hy and. its other 

branches. But modern Psychologists put rorwar<i the claim that 

Psychology should. be treated separately trom Ph1losopey • .Bet'ore 

entering into the arguments o.r the modern Psychologists 1n support 

ot their view, let us f'irst see what Psychology means. ~he word 

'Psychology ' has been derived .rrom the Greek words 'psyche' ,which 

means the soUl, ana 'Logos' rei'erz•1ng to Science. So the derivative 

Con td ••• 3 



-: 3 . -• 
meaning ot the word 'Psychology' ls the Science of the SoUl • Taking 

this s~nse in to cons1u.ei•~:~. tion, the ancient PhU osophers discussed 

the nature of soUl, the relation of soUl. and matter, GoO. and. his 

relation to soUl, iwmortal1ty of' soUl ,re-b1zoth,z·elat1on of' body 

with soUl etc. and brought all these under the subject matter of 

psychology. They defined psychology as the Science of the soUl • 

.Ancient Greek Philosophers liKe plato ana. Aristotle adm1tted the 

existence of soUl, though they differed about the nature of soUl. 

2 3 4 
.Even the moa.ern .Psychologists li!te ~tout, Me • .Dougall etc. 

th1n1t that though the question whether there is some separate 

mental entity beaia.ea the mental processes, is not the question of 

psychology, yet we muf:it aumlt the hypothesis of' mind. 1n order to 

make psychology possible. we can easily imagine mind. and. bo~ as 

separate entitles, out 1n reality they are inseparable. It 1a 

absurd to think of the acting human bOU.y without the existence 

of mind in 1 t, or the existence of mind minus body. The tarm 

' psychology' also reters to 'mind ' as the subject-matter of 

psychology. 'FSychology' without ' .Psyche' ls meaningless. Though 

the mind. or soUl is not sensible, yet we can mow mind through ita 

activitiea,1.e. th1nking,fee11ng ana. w1111ng. So we can say that 

psychology ls the study of the mental processes or of the processes 

of the mina. which thinks and feels thi·ough the vla-med.la of body and. 

. Contd •• -4 



-: 4 ·­• 

tries to achieve some end. Now the question is : are Philosophy 

and Psychology 1nter-related ~1sc1P11nas ? 

Modern psychologists answer negatively. They op1ne that 

Psychology can be stua.ied as a branch or natural science and t~y 

claim to place it by tna slue or Physics, Chemiatry,Botany etc. 

They also th1nk that the relation between Philosophy and Psychology 

is exactly the same as that or Philosophy to these other sciences. 

According to them,Psychology as a natural science shou.l.d deal with 

with study of mental processes only with a view to discovering tb9 

laws ot their comb1nation and development and shoUld not make use 

or any explanatory hypothesis regard1ng the Ultimate nature of 

these processes or of mind.. To d.iscuss about the Ultimate nature 

of soUl or m1nd. is the task or Philosophy, not of Psychology. 

Philosophy must not a.1ctate to Psychology with regard to 1ts method, 

alm and content. 

Thls attitude or the majority of modern Psychologists 

has its stanci on the following ground5 : 

FIRSTLY , they argue that if wlth the help or the data supplied 

by observation and experiment, it is possible to lay down with 

accuracy and. precision tbe universal laws underlying phenomena 

1n all departments or the physical world, there is no reason why 

such laws can not also be formUlated with regard to the activities 

Contct. •• ·5 



-· • 5 ·­• 

ot livint?; organisms, mental states and processes. The introduction 

ot experlJ.uental methous 1n Psychology with brUliant success has 

added strength to the demand that Phychology should be com~letely 

separated from Philosophy. 

S.SCONDLY , t~ increasing .Knowleage ot the structure ot the nervous 

system incl.ud.1ng the brain and. ot the tunctions pertormed by its 

ditterent parts has led to the discovery ot a close relationship 

between mental lite anu its Physiological basis. AS a result,it 

has been possiole to study mental processes 1n close co-relation 

to Physiological processes with the help ot the exact methods 

employea 1n Science\ It is, t~retore, contended. that a Psychologist 

can oe com~letely inultterent to questions concerning the Ultimate 

nature ot mina. and. m1na-oody relation which may be reserved tor the 

metaphysician. In this connection, we may refer to Swam1 Abhedanand.a 'a 

view acout modern Psychology. ~wam1 .APhed.anana.a, in his book, 

'~ue Psychology', says that modern Psychology (western) teaches 

Psychology, " not in the sense ot' science ot the psyche or soUl, 

out in the sense ot Peysiolo~ical origin and. ordering ot the mind ... 

According to him, modern psychology is not true psychology," True 

Paychology recognizes the existence ot body, mind and s~Ul· But 

the modern Physiological Psychology admits the existence ot body only 

and nothing else •••••••" 5 

Contd. ·6 



-: 6 ·­• 

Now betore consiU.ering the arguments o:f the modern 

psychologists it is necessary to aiscuss the relationship 

between PhUosophy and other branch..,s ot natural science . 

aietapbysics is an enquiry into the u.l timate nature o.t' 

the universe as a whole. A science deals with a particular section 

o.t' the universe. A Scientist a.oes not enter into the !'acts belonging 

to the other tiela.s of enquiry. It is not his business to determine 

the Ul. timate nature o.t' the universe as a whole. Again, every 

science has its special methoct.s for the purpose or carrying on 

its 1nvesti~ations. So lon~ as a science confines its investigations 

strictly wit~ its own limits, the necessity of axam~ing the 

Ultimate validity of the assumptions which it makes does not, arise. 

But there arises a stage 1n the development ot every science when 

such an examination has to be undertaken, and it can be undertaken 

only by metaphysics. When it is :found that the categories used in 

one science come 1n conflict with those mact.e 1n another, there arise 

some problems which necessarily lead to some metaphysical questions. 

Hence it is quite clear that the different branches o.t' natural 

science can not be altogether separated trom metaphysics. They 

must be r.elatect. to the latter. 

Psychologists also tina. it necessary to make certaill 

assumptions regara.ing the subject-matter. o.t' their study. Thus 

Contd. •7 



-: 7 ·­• 

the FacUlty paychologists believe that the various ~orms 

of experiences which a person has are nothing out the 

activities parrormea by ait~erent ~acUlties belonging to 

t:M SOUl. • 

The ASsociationists like Hume, :.aarkeley, MUl, 

Ba1n etc assume that m1nd is noth1ng but a stream Of 

ideas and all mental life is to be expla1ned by reference 

to ·the action of ideas on one another. 

According to the Neo-realists like Holt ,.Marg1n, 

Ferry ,Russell, Alexana.er etc. ideas, thoughts ,perceptions 

etc.of which m1na is suppoaea to be composed and which 

are regaraea as bits of consciousness, are identical with 

the objects of the physical worla • 

.Again, the Behaviourists liKe Watson deny .the 

necessity of usin~ such term as 'm1na', 'consciousness' or 

any term which refers to mind or ~onsciouaness. To them 

minu is nothing out the sum-total of the re-actions maae 

by nervous system 1n response to stimUli operat1n.g on it. 

1'hey try to explain all the oehaviours of human being with 

the formUla, S ~ R (stimUlus_,. Response ) • According to 

watson,' ••••••••••••••• -The time seems to have come when 

psychology must discard all re~erence to consciousness, when 

Contd •• 8 



-: 8 :-

1t need no longer delude itse1!' into th1nJt1ng that it 1s 

maKing mental states the object or observation ••••••••••'• 

He goes !'urther ana says, 'It 1s possible to write a 

l,)sychology, to d.e.t'ine it •••••• as the "Science or behaviour", 

an~ never go back on the ae.t'inition : never to use the terms 

consciousness, mental states, ·mind., will ,imagery and. t~ 

liKe •••••••• lt can oe Q.one 1n terms or stimUlus and response, 

1n terms or habit !'ormation an~ the liKe •••••••••••• •6 It 1s 

metaphysics which can examine these hypotheses or notions 

concerning mind. anu. to test the u.l timate valict.ity ot these 

as~umptions made 1n connection with its nature and activities. 

Psychology must also, th~rerore, be related to metaphysics. 

That psychology can not be separated !'rom Philosophy 

becomes evident, w~n we consider the nature of meaning. The 

essential nature o!' consciousness cons 1sts in referring to or 

mean1ng_someth1ng. A conscious process is not merely somethlng 

that simply occm•s, but points to something outside it. It is 

because our thought processes have meanings that there is .tor 

us a common objective world. Ir there were no consciousness 

there woUld be no such thing as meaning. Thus Psychology as the 

Science or consciousness and Philosophy having meaning as its 

Con td. ••• 9 



-: 9 ·­• 

sUbject-matter are inseparably related. 

ThinKiill:{. is a .wcmtal process. A Psychologist can onJ.y 

give us a causal explanation of wby we actually thlnK as we 

ao. when we t~k, we reel that the movement of thou~ht is 

1mpe11ea. by an lmmant:Jnt necessity. Psychology whlch claims to 

be a merely descriptive science giv~s us an account or thought 

which muat be de.rective since it does not take th1s aspect o.r 

thinking process into account. So Psychology can never be thought 

or as an experimental natural science 1n the strict sense unless 

the particUlar metaphysical hypothesis with regard to the nature 

ot mind is true, ana. 1n maKing that aa.mission he implicitly 

becomes a metaphysician. 

Thus psychology is dependent upon phUosophy 1n a special 

sense. Philosophy must have the right to undertake a critical 

exa.wination of the methous employed 1n psychological invest1-

gatians, to point out the limitations una.er which they are to work • 

.But 11' Psychology is uependent upon Philosophy rrom 

one point or view,Ph1losophy also 1s dependent upon Pscychology 

from another point of view .lt we are to have .knowledge o.r reality 

at all,. we illUSt a.epena. upon experience anu that experience must 

be as broadbaaed as ~osslble. Mental states and processes are 

conta ••• lO 



-: 10 ·­• 

not merely important 1n themselves out they are alSO lmJ:)ortant, 

because it is only through tr~m that we can come 1nto contact 

with the external world. When we try to und.erstan<i the meanings 

at apace, time, matter, causality etc, we tina. that a particUlar 

mental process is essential oy which they come to ·oe mown. 

PSychology studies these processes and. an accurate study or these 

processes throw much light on the Ultimate nes.t ura o:r mlnci. • 

.Man is endowed with the power or thinking. With the 

help or this thinking faculty, he tries to evaluate the objective 

validity of the iueals of truth, morality and beauty. The way 

1n which we actually think Ol' act Ol' :reel , is, 1n most cases, 

infl uencea:. by these ideals, and accordingly, there grows up 

the philosopny of Logic, the philosophy of Ethics or the 

Philosophy of Aesthetics or the philosophy of Art. Now Psychology 

as a science studies the mental processes like thinKing, feeling 

anu willing • .M1 accurate stuuy of these processes enriches 

philOBOi!hy by giving impoz•tant data or materials, and with 

the help of these materials the onward march o.f philosophy 

continues 1n ul.f.ferent a1ract1ons. 

we can there.fore, say that PhUoaophy a].so is 

d.epenaent upon psychology t.'or much or ita materials. So 

Gontd. ·11 



-: ll :-

Philosophy an~ Psychology are inter-relateu u1sc1pl1nes • 

.out we shou.la not forget that while philosophy has to build 

on Psychology ana the resUlts of' Psychological research, 

it must necessarily pass beyond psychology. 

Contd. .. ·12 



section-!! 

-· • 12 ·­• 

Claims ot Intellect ana Intuition as 
a source of .knowleage of Reality. 

Metaphysics, which is an integral part of Philosophy 

starts with the reflective distinction between ' appearance' 

ana 'reality'. The a.istlnction oetween things as they appear 

to us ana. things as they are 1n themselves , between 1 phenomena' 

ana. 'noumena' seems inevitable• Since reality may be different 

from what it apPears to be, the question that naturally agitates 

our mina is : have we no means o:f .Knowing reality or is the 

knowledge of 'Th1ngs-in-themselv~s•, i.e.auper-sensuous noumena 

possible ? 

In answer to tllis question we ar·e to ci.i:Jcu.ss first 

the C1i.fferent sources ot .lmowledge and then to judge the 

legitimacy of their claims as the sources ot the .knowledge 

of reality. 

The different theories of the sources of knowledge 

are Empiricism, Rationaliam,Or1ticism,Intu1tion1sm etc. 

TaKen strictly, Empiricism is the theory which 

hol.as that all human knowledge comes from sense-experience. 

'l'here are no innate ideas 1n our m1nu, and that whatever can 

not be verified. by sense experience is unreal. To tl'l..s .c:inp1ricists 

Contd. ·13 



-: 1.3 ·­• 

the methoa. ot: phUosoj,il:cy is inuuctive. VIi th tt~P help ot· 

~eneralisation from particUlar facts of experience we get 

the knowleC1ge ot: universal truths 1 even the law of causa-

t1on, the law of Iaentity, the law of contradiction etc. 

The materials of knowlauge are sensations ana. rc;flections. 

From sensation we get the knowlea.ga of the external world 

and by reflection we get the knowledge of our different 

mental states. The Empiricists a<lmit that sense-experience 

can not give us the knowledge of general concept and. un1-

versal truth. It is through gen~ralisat1on .from particUlar 

observed facts that we get the knowledge of them. Hence, 

1f ph1lOSOj,ihy 1s to g1ve us true knowledge about facts, 

1t must be based on sense-experience. 

In the history of western Ph1losopby the Sophists 

liKe Protagoz•as, Gorgeas etc.o.r ancient Greece are called 

mp~ricists, and as modern .lllap1ricists the names of Bacon 1 

LOcke 1 Berkeley 1 Hume etc. are note-worthy. 

Philosophers llk~ D6scartes, Sp1noza, Leibnitz etc. 

regard reason as ths source Of .knowledge. They are called 

Rationalists because they accept reason 1nsteaa of experi-

ence as the source Of Ph1losophical knowledge Both the 

Emp1ric1sts anu the Rationalists are opposed to authority 

contd. ·14 



-: 14 ·­• 

1n the sphere of philo~ophical stuay. FOr both, the aim of 

philosophy is th~ a·tta1nment ot: a system of universal and 

necessary pr1ncipl~s which are logically inter-related. 

But while tht: . .:!~:npiricists believe that philosophy can 

attain its obj~ct with the help o:r sense-experience only, 

the Rationalists deny this and hold that Phi1o~opby must 

be based on tho~ht or reason alone. Hence if' philosophy 

is to ~ivtl us ct:rtain ar!u universal knowled.ge14 it must 

be baseel. on such principles as are self'-evid.ent and are 

aosolutely certain. Thought or reason has 1n it some 

such ~If-evident and. necessary principles. These are 

natural to or inherent 1n reason. They are lnnate or 

a;priori truthS which lie implicit 1n the mina. from our 

bir·th and. prior to all experience. Philosophy must 

start from such self-ev1uent and a priori truths, and 

pass from these to others which necessar1ly follow 

t:rom them. So the method of Philosophy is ueductive. 

The difficUlties of Empiricism and Rationalism led 

Kant, the great German Philoso~her, to formUlate another 

theory, namely ' Criticism'. This mc::thod tries to .t'inel. 

out by analysis the cona.itions which make Jmowled.ge 

poss1o1e. ~ue knowledge consists of two characteristics-

Conta.. ·15 



-: 15 ·­. 

universality anu necessity. But rrom experience we never 

get necessity ana. universality. Accoruin~ to Kant,there 

are some apriori elements o:r human knowledge ana. these 

elements are true o:r all minas. Space,time,cau~ality, 

substantiality etc. &re such :rorma and iei.eas or categories 

wnich govern all knowledge oecause they are inherent 1n 

the .wina. of all r·atiOIJ.al beings liKe us. The Characteris-

tics or tz·ue knowledge universality ana. necessity, can 

only be expla.1nea. with the help. or these apriori elements. 

ACcOr<i1ng to Kant,knowlt::uge is a jo1I1t product 

or experience and reason. ~periences supply the data 

or· materials of' !mowleQge 1n the rozm ot sensations. 

Theoe ard interpreted by the mind through the applica-

tion of the apriori :forms anei. categories of space, time, 

substance, causality etc. It is in this way that we get 

the .lmOwl<:la.ge of the external world existing 1n space 

ana. time. But the worla. which we .Kllow can not be regarded 

as real 1n the strict sense. It is rather· a world which 

we construct out or the materials supfQiea. by sensations 

and by application o:r the i'orm ana. categories supplied 

by mina.. That is why ,Kant says,' Understanding makes 

Natlll'e' 7 148900 
Contd •• 16 0 8 NOV 2002 



-: 16 ·­• 

What we know is not reality as it is 1n-itself, 

out as it appeal's through our senses and the categories 

of our mind. or una.erstand.ing. we can not know anything 

except through sense-intuition and the categories. 

Therefore, according to this theory, we can never know 

Reality or things-in-tbamsel v..::s, a1 though the reason in 

us may be una.er the necessity of thinking of them. Our 

Knowledge is limited. to the world of phenomena or appea-
8 

ranees anei Reality remains t'or us 'unknown and unknowable 1 • 

.Beyonei phenomena there al'e, no ci.oubt, the noumena as the 

soUL•ces or sensation. But neither Science nor Philosophy 

enables us to know what they are. 

~nry Bergson, the t'amous French Philosopher, 

advocates lntuitionism as a theory or the source of 

Philosophical Knowledge He maintains that the veil 

oetween our min~ ana Reality which is supposed. to keep them 

apart ror all timas is of o~ own making. Our fall ure to 

get a glimpse of' the nature of Reality is the dependence or 

Philosophers on the traditional methoa.s of Philosophizing. 

Bergson is essentially an anti-intellectnalist. ~ 

holds that conceptual knowledge can never give us an insight 

Contd •• 17 



-: 17 . -. 

into the nature ot Reality.Concepts are only substitutes 

tor imme~iacy. However clear,uetinite anu precise t~ 

concepts may be, liKe moat substitutes they fall short of 

th61r originalS. If we d.epenei. solely or mainly on co'1cepts 

tor our Knowle ..Jge of the real nature of the world., we are 

bounu to be Ci.isappointea. DOes it mean that we have to 

aei.opt an agnostic attitude towards Reality and declare that 

it is unknowable? Not necessarUy, says Bergson. There is 

another way ot: coming into contact with Reality, a,na it is 

directly or immed.iately ap~ehenu1ng_Reality as it is in-itself. 

This is the famous Bergson ian method of Intuition. By 

'Intuition' Bergson unci.erstandS • A kind. ot: 1ntellec-

tual sympathy by which one places oneself within an 

object in o.rcLer to co1nciei.e w1 th what is unique in it 

9 
and consequently inexpressible •. It is an act which 

we perform tre quently. FOr example, when we .plunge 

ourselves in the depths of our own experience, we tee1 

ourselves most intimately within our own lite, that 1s to 

say, we intuit ourselves. When I intuit myself 1n this way 

I get a direct or immediate insight into myself. 

The barrier between 'I' as tba .Knower anei. 'me' as the .known 

Contd •• 18 



-: lb ·­• 

disappears, ana the two become one. This ~irect lnsight 

into myself is not meaiated by intellectual categori~s. 

This can not be even called KnOwledge because there is 

no distinction between subject and object, between subject 

and. predicate, between substance and. attrioutes, cause 

ana. effect etc. Bergson thinks that by constant practice 

and. concentration of effort we can perform th1s act of 

intuition ana apPly it to the so-called external world. 

also.It 1s possiole to have a d.irect ana immediate 

apprehension i.e .intuition of' the external world. just 

as 1t is possible to have such an a~prehens1on of our 

selr. The d..Yna.wic .keality which appears to us as a world 

of rinite th1n~s wl.th rl.xed. boWluary lines l.s called 

'&l.an Vi tal' or the ceaseless flux or ll.!'e by Bergson. 

Thererore, it is not by thought that cute up the moving 

flow or Reall.ty l.nto static concepts anu id.eas, but 

only by sl.n.kl.ng ueep l.nto our inmost bel.ng, and by be1ng 

one with it, we shall have an l..IWDed.iate experience or 

this basl.c r1ow of life within us. Wl.thout th1s 

"intellectual sympathy" we can have no metaphysical 

mowleU.ge 1.n the true sense. 

Contd. ·19 



-; 19 . -• 

Intuition is a power or consciousness near and more 

intimate to tne Knowleuge by identity. It, however, is liKely 

to be misinterpreteQ anQ mixea with other mental elements. 

Thdl'e are various types or Intuition proper to a.irrerent 

levels, vital, physical and mental. Bergson 'a intuition is 

typical or vital level. Bergson says·, " By intuition I 

mean instinct that becomes disinterested, selr-conscioua, 

capable ot rer1ecting upon its object ana enlarging it 

10 
ind.et'ini tely" • 

.For the ancient Ina.ian thinkers Philosophy is a 

a.irect experience or realization ot.' abso1 ute truth and 

. ~ 

Reality ( au-sana ) ana. not merely a .matter or intellectual 

unaerstanQing or or theoretical specUlation about truth 

anu Reality. They think that philosophy must be based on 

the exper.iences or the selr wl thin and the world outside us. 

These experiences may be either the normal experiences or 

ordinary men or the intuitive experiences or saints,aeera 

and prophets • 

~ong the Ina.ian systems or Philosophy the carvaka, 

Nyaya, Vaiaesika and Sankhya take ora.1nary experience as the 

Contd. •• 20 



-: 20 :-

basis of philosophy. But the systems like the Bauddha, the 

Jaina, the .Mimalli.sa anu. the. Vedanta hold that from ordinary 

experience we can not form any correct idea of Ultimate 

.keality. In thesl;! wattez·s we must uepena. on the intuitions 

of seers ana. saints who have a direct realization of such 

thln~s ana. whose experiences have been preserved for us in 

the s~iptures. Hence,stua.y of these scriptures ( ~avana) 
• 

initiates a stua.ent of Philosophy to the search of Ultimate 

truth. 

The secona. step 1n Philosophical study, according 

to the ancient Inuian Philosophers ,is reasoning or z·ational 

Wla.erstanding ( manana ) • Here it is advised to examine 

thoroughly all experiences including the teachings of the 

scriptures anu see for oneself whether there is any 

contraa.iction 1n tha teachings of the s~iptures. A rational 

anu critical study of all experiences is thus necessary for 

the attainment of Ph11oaophical knowledge. 

But the realization of Pnilosophical truthS does 

not come by way of reasoning alone.By means of criticism 

and reasoning we can tina. out the errors in our experiences, 

Contd •• 21 



-: 21 :-

--
ana. 1n the ideas and. concepts baaed on them. But by mere 

reasoning we can neither know the truth nor realize it.For 

the realization of J:JhUosophical truths all lna.ian thinkers, 

excepting the Carva.Kaa, r·ecommend. moral purification, con-

templation ( nid.ia.hyasana ) and. concentration ( Yoga) as the 

necessary means. To them, these const-itute the moat important 

part of the methou of philosophy. All proors that have so far 

been given by phUoao}:)hers .in support 01, the truths of Philo-

BO.tJhy llike God.,aelt',i.IWllortality, :treedom_, .... etc. leave us as 

unconv1nced. as ever. What is necessary is a direct experience 

of these truths. And this must b~ atta1neu oy constant con-

templation of these truths. The truths of philosophy can not 

be verifieu 1n sense-experience ,nor can we prove them 

scientificallY• The only way 1n which they can be known by 

us is rational reflection on and constant contemplation of 

them. K·C·Bhattacharyya has trUly said., 1 Metaphysics,or more 

gen~rally,philosophy, is not only actual knowledge,but is 

not even literal thought ; an~ yet its contents are contem-

.Platca. as true 1n the faith that is is only by such contempla­

tion. that absolute truth can be known 1 •
11 

Conta. •• •22 



-· . 22 . -• 

S E C T I 0 N- III 

A como1nea. approach as found. 1n Bergson 

anu in ~istentialism. 

Intellect ana. intuition, as facUlties of knowledge, 

cannot oe a.iscarue<i outright. In In<iian Ph11osop.by, we see 

that the necessity of: both intellect and intuition has been 

strongly recommen~ed as a comoined methou of knowing the 

Reality. The necessity of ooth has been admitted also by 

l)r.S.RauhaKrishnan when he says,"••••••• no intuitive 

experience can oe the oasis of a philosophical truth unless 

intellect endorses. it, and that it is only if we mak~ 

intuition intellectual that there is any chance of 
12 

commWlicat1ng our intuitions to others". In .Bergsonian 

Philosophy also we see that his 'intellectual sympathy' 

does not exclua.e intellect as a faculty of knowledge, though 

he is the Chief exponent of Intuitionism. The introduction 

ot lntuitionism in his philoso~hy is no douot the starting 

point of a revo1 uti on in an age of apotheosis of reason and 

it is by this method that he wins a credit no less than any 

great· thinKer ot' the world.. Bergson defines intuition as 

" a kina. or intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself 

Con td ••• 2.3 



-: 23 . -• 

wit~ the ObJect 1n oraer to coinciae with what is unique 
lj 

1n it and. consequently inexpressible" • This lief'lnition 

makes intuition a f'abz·ication ot' intelligence , a part and 

parcel of' it. Here intuition is con:t'ined to the intellectual 

domain• His other aetinitions o!' intuition as 'intellectual 

expansion' or 'intellectual auscUltation' also prove that 

he ueslres to aistinguish intellect and intuition not as 

separate facUlties o:f knowledge out distinct within the same 

f'acUlty.In one of' his books he also tells us aoout the 

co-operation between :faith and reason,intuition and intellect. 

As he remarKs, "Cl.ialectic is necessary to put intuition to 

the proof', necessary also 1n oro.er that intuition shoUld 

14 
break into concepts ana so be propagateO. to other men" • 

From this remarK it is clear -that he admits the co-opel·atian 

of' intellect ana. intuition though their !'unctions are d.i.f.ferent 

the one theoretical and the other practical. Intuition has 

nothing to d.o with material problems ,so it is non4 pract1cal, 

whereas intelligence is practical 1n the sense that intelligence 

is constituted to act mechanically on matter which has no access 
/ 

to the problema o!' li:fe. The !'low of' lif'e is the .flow of' 

intuition and the inverted .flow resUlting in t~ proauction 

Contd. •24 



-: 24 ·­• 

of matter is tackled by practical intelligence. So we see 

that Bergson aumits intuition and intelligence as the two 

facUlties of knowleuge,one giving us the knowledge of the 

flow of life ana the other afording us the .Jmowleuge of matter. 

Bergson thinKs that intelligence occupies an intermediate 

status keeping instinct on ond side and intuition on the 

other. Intelligence, he says ,is the " only road leading 

15 
from the infra-intellectual to the supra-intellectual" 

That 1s to say ,1nstincti Vd .imowlecige ma,y be d.evel oped 1nto 

1n tu1 t1 ve one anu the path o:t: progress runs through the 

reign of intelligence. 

we, theret'ore, see that though ant1-1ntellectu.alist, 

Bergson is not true to hls Intuitionism of which he is so 

eloquent. In fact, Bergson knew that without reason or 

intellect no 1ntu1t1ve philoso~hy is ~ossible. That is why, 

th1s truth flnus 1ts exPression 1n his aeflnition of 'Intu1t1on' 

where he says, it is a Kind of 'Intellectual sympathy'. So, it 

is clear that Bergson's Intuitionism is not pure Intuitionism, 

rather it is a combined method of intellect and Intuition. 

Th1s combined. apProach 1s rouna 1n Existentialism also • 

Contd • •25 

... . ,, 



-· • ·­• 

Existentialism is generally supposed to be the Philosophy 

of emotions and actions. But it is also a lJhiloso_phy ot 

intellect or reason, because an analysis of huruan existence 

and emotional attitudes to lite and society as undertaken 

by the .c.Xistentialists, is not p·oasible without the 

exercise ot the intellectual or rational ~acUlty. However, 

the ~istentialists make use o~ reason tor explaining what 

they unuerstand oy existence ; but that is a part ot 

philoBo.Phical activity, anu they ao not hold that reason 

is necessarily a sour·ce or .knowleuge. 

The .illxistentialists have expressed the1r views 

regardlng hWLlan being, its relation with other beings 

1n the worlu, treeciom ot will, causation, the nature ot 

the worla. as a whole, existence etc. They give argUJJlen ts 

in support o~ their views ana try to refute the theories 

hela. oy othez·s anu are thus not quite ~ai thfu.l. to their 

creou or irrationalism. At the same time they put ~orward 

the claim that their fWldamenta.l. a.octr1nes are baseu on 

intuition or u1rect insight. B~siaes, belng confronted by 

tbe worlu, the Existentialists give us accounts or their 

suojective r~eline::.s ana emotions li.ice dread ,anguish,nauseo..., 

Con tci •• 26 



-· . ·­• 

1one11ness, abanuonment etc. They have described these 

su~jective :feelings and emotions, and this might not have 

been possible without the exercise of intellect or reason 

as a PhU oso_phical activity. J.l though as an existentialist 

.Klerlte_::gaard. base;:s his philosophy upon .t'eeling anCL intuition 

as a way of realization ot truth as subjectivity, he 1~ not 

antagonistic to reason, but he CLis-ap~oves abstract 

ICLealism which gives aosol U'te authority to pure reason. 

He maintains a harmony between reason ana. feeling or 

imagination and says that they should be unified. in simu.l tan city. 

16 
AS he says, " Science ••••••••••• are uni:fiea. in existence n 

He ci.ot:ls not deprecate tho~.Lght or reason, but says 

that reason should. be tinged with :feeling or emotion, 

reason shoUlu oe emotional, so to say. A reason, that is, 

totally dissociated from :feeling and emotion is a bad 

reason, that is, not reason proper. AS he says," And just 

as it is an •••••• &.o baa. aa 1 os1ng his reason". Reason 

mustoe concrete, not abstract, i.e. it must recognize the 

emotional aspect ot existence, otherwise it becomes a misnomer, 

having no connection with human lif'e and existence. 

Con td •• •27