

WITTGENSTEIN ON PHILOSOPHY OF SILENCE

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Wittgenstein in the last line of his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (henceforth TLP) gives us an insight of *philosophy of silence*. The relevance of philosophy of silence makes prominence in Wittgenstein's TLP simply because he has attempted here to make the relationship between language and reality from a limited whole what he eventually termed as 'my language and my world'. It is his manufactured language and manufactured world where he finds everything within the language. As it is a limited whole, limited language, it cannot cover the whole world. Therefore, the validity is being questioned if one has attempted to grasp the whole world from the limited whole.

Wittgenstein in his TLP 5.6: says. "The *limits of my language* mean the limits of my world".¹ By drawing the limits of world, Wittgenstein admits two sides of the world, such as, inside (my language and my world) and outside or other side of the world. By the term 'my language', Wittgenstein means *propositional language* and by the term 'my world', Wittgenstein means *totality of facts*. Within the world (i.e., my world) everything is expressed either in the form of 'to be the case' or 'not to be the case' (two senses of proposition). What then can we say about the other side (outside the limits of my world) of the world? The other side of his world is *inexpressible* because we do not have legitimate language to express *what lies outside of the world*. As language is the only medium of communication and there is no language to communicate the other side of the world, it would be prudent for us *to remain silence about the other side of the world*. In this regard, Wittgenstein remarked in the last proposition of his TLP: 7, "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."²

For Wittgenstein, all propositions of his world are of equal value, they cannot express anything in the world other than *what is to be the case or not to be the case*. They cannot determine *the sense of the world*. The *sense of the world* must lie outside the world. For Wittgenstein, in the world everything as it is. Here everything happens as it does happen. In it no value exists and if it did exist, it would have no value. By the term 'value' Wittgenstein actually means 'higher value' or 'absolute value' that

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge, London and New York, 1921, p.56.

²*Ibid.*, p.74.

does not fall within *the limits of language* and hence it cannot be comprehended by propositional language. Here we can distinguish between two types of value, such as, *cognitive value* and *non-cognitive value*. The language of ‘my world’ determines cognitive value. Non-cognitive value is higher than cognitive value. It lies outside the world. In this regard Wittgenstein in his TLP: 6.41 remarked, “If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.”³ Accordingly, what lies outside the world would be *non-accidental*. What is accidental cannot be mystical and what is non-accidental would be mystical according to Wittgenstein. Thus, Wittgenstein took *mystical position* about the value that would lie outside the world. In this regard, Wittgenstein held in his TLP: 6.44, “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.”⁴ When we feel the world as a limited whole, mysticism comes forth. In such a case neither the question, nor the answer can be put into words. There is no role of skepticism in mysticism because in the later there is no relevance of the former. Wittgenstein remarked in his TLP: 6.51, “For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists and an answer only where something can be said.”⁵ Nothing can be said what lies outside of the world. There are things which at times cannot be put into words, but still they make *themselves manifest*. They are what Wittgenstein called mystical. For Wittgenstein, ethical, aesthetic, and religious matters cannot be expressed, cannot be verbalized but still they are worthy, not of ridicule but of the *deepest respect*. The language of proposition can be put into words. Naturally, the content of proposition cannot be mystical according to Wittgenstein. This is where the insight of the seventh proposition actually hinges on.

Was Wittgenstein a positivist?

Many commentators would say that Wittgenstein actually holds positivists’ position by drawing the line between what we can speak about and what we must be silent. The only difference is that logical positivists have nothing to be silent about. Positivism holds that what we can speak about is all the matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes *that all that really matters in human life is*

³*Ibid.*, p.71.

⁴*Ibid.*, p.73.

⁵*Ibid.*, p.73.

precisely what we must be silent about. To me the position of TLP of Wittgenstein is *contra positivism* because unlike the positivism, Wittgenstein attempted to demarcate what can be said from what cannot be said and secondly, unlike the positivism, Wittgenstein asserts that the unsayable alone is important. Unlike logical positivism, Wittgenstein's TLP attempts to a sure philosophical footing ideas about humanity's relation to the godhead evident within the great religious traditions. In fact, his remarks on the unknowability of God are reminiscent of what we find in the book : “ Be not rash your mouth, not let your heart be hasty to utter a word before God, for God is in heaven, and you upon earth; therefore let your words be few.”⁶ Thus, Wittgenstein is cutting off any human attempt to become familiar with holy things. While sharing his view with Drury, Wittgenstein remarked, “Now I wouldn't for the life of me dare to say ‘how like God’. I wouldn't claim to know how God should act.” For Wittgenstein, there is *a certain human tendency to extend beyond our limits*, and to talk of things about which we should rightfully be silent and respectful. Just as Kant famously found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith, likewise the TLP of Wittgenstein sets a limit to what can be spoken *in order to respect the awesome power of the mystical*. While delivering lectures on ethics in 1929 to a Cambridge society known as ‘The Heretics’, Wittgenstein describes ethics as the inquiry into the meaning of life⁷ just as he had associated God with the meaning of life.⁸ Our language [my language] is woefully inadequate to handle *the glorious ineffability of the mystical*, which is beyond the world, beyond the humdrum or monotonous realm of states of affairs.

A human thrust or tendency is created against the limits of language [my language]. While correlating his idea with Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein remarks that *it is a perennial human urge and that there is a definite worth in the occasional breaking of the Tractarian silence. Thus, one should not fear of talking nonsense.* St. Augustine said, “What, you swine, you want not to talk nonsense! Go ahead and talk nonsense, it does not matter!”⁹ How can that which is nonsensical also be important?

⁶*Ecclesiastes* 5:2

⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures on Ethics*, 5.

⁸ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks*, 73, 74.

⁹*Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann*, ed., Brian McGuinness, trans., Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness, New York, 1979, p.69.

The importance of nonsense can be justified from *anthropological and transcendental interpretations*. From anthropological perspective, Wittgenstein calls ‘the mystical’ as a *creation of the human mind rather* than a genuine transcendental reality. It would reflect how our existence seems so futile and empty; how the world of facts fails to satisfy *our deepest desires*. Wittgenstein said, “The urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all.”¹⁰[NB 51; TLP; 6.52]The anthropological interpretation of the thrust against the limits of language highlights the *deep human desires and fragilities* that inform religion, yet it does not necessarily posit the presence of anything beyond the world. The *thrust is a purely human tendency*. While talking about transcendental interpretation, Wittgenstein is aware of a higher order of realities and is stressing human desire to gain communication with these realities. Here the image of language as ‘a cage’ is to be taken seriously. Our predicament is akin to that of people who have never left a prison in which they were born. Denied any experience of the outside world, *the only hint that there is something beyond the walls of their cage is a few cracks in the wall through which light occasionally glimmers*. On Engelmann’s analogy, we are marooned on an island, and spend our days obsessively babbling about what is beyond the horizon, something we have never known, nor can ever know- but is there none the less.

Wittgenstein this attempted to link God with the question of life’s meaning. For Wittgenstein, to believe in a God means to understand the questions about the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning. [NB 74] Thus for Wittgenstein, religious belief is intimately connected with the feeling that *the facts are not enough*, that there is something beyond the factual which is of *greatest significance*. The meaning of life cannot be found in the world [my world], that like God, meaning is located outside the humdrum order of facts. In this sense, Meaning and God are virtually identical. To say that God was in the beginning is to say that Meaning was in the beginning. Life is the drive toward Meaning, and life has emerged into self-conscious humanity. Wittgenstein now contends that God is the

¹⁰ *Notebooks 51, TLP: 6.52.*

world. In his NB 79 Wittgenstein remarks, “How things stand, is God. God is how things stand.”¹¹ Wittgenstein usually kept his religious and spiritual cards close to his chest. He was very selective to discuss about religious issues. He shared his beliefs in such matters only with tiny numbers of close friends, namely, Paul Engelmann, Drury. For Wittgenstein, in the presence of what is sacred and ineffable, we usually do best by retaining *a pious silence*. God is so much above all that one can say nothing. You worship him better through silence. In his *Lectures*, Wittgenstein holds that there are certain experiences which would constitute absolute value rather than relative or instrumental value. Such value gives insight into ‘the meaning of life’ and it suggests ‘what makes life worth living’. One of these experiences Wittgenstein speaks of is the experience of being ‘absolutely safe’, of being ‘safe in the hands of God’. In this regard, Russell Neili (1987) classifies or reads mystic experience of Wittgenstein into two types, such as, *Ecstatic Mystic Experience* and *Creation Mystic Experience*.¹² The Ecstatic mystic experience, the experience of ‘standing outside’ the world is clearly the more radical, more mind-bending and rarer of the two experiences. According to Wittgenstein’s biographer Ray Monk [1990] the ecstatic mystic experience has been considered by Wittgenstein throughout his life as ‘*paradigmatic of religious experience*’.¹³ The experiential foundations of ethics and religion involve ‘what is intrinsically sublime and above all other subject matters’. Wittgenstein goes on to say, “...our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, *natural* meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and out words will only express facts, as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water even if I were to pour out a gallon over it... I can only describe my feelings by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on ethics which really was a book on ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world.”¹⁴

For Wittgenstein, refuge or safe haven in the mystical provides for us a way to reflect upon our lives. He further suggests that ‘the mystical’ constitutes a

¹¹ *Notebooks*, 79.

¹² Neili, Russell, *Wittgenstein: From Mysticism in Ordinary Language*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1987, p.7.

¹³ Monk, Ray, *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius*, The Free Press, New York, 1990, p.51.

¹⁴ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures on Ethics*, p.7.

particular way of looking at the world, a particular way of responding to the facts encountered there. He attempts to turn from too narrow to widen one's view so that the entirety of the world is perceived. Here Wittgenstein's account of mystical coincides with aesthetic experience. Just as the mystical viewpoint captures the world holistically, so a work of art is 'the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*', seen, not from the midst of things but from outside.¹⁵ [NB 83]. Here the connection between the aesthetic and the mystical is crucial. We think that the clash between belief and unbelief is not a disagreement over the facts of the world; it is more akin to *a disagreement over aesthetic taste*.

It thus seems to me that Wittgenstein in his TLP took and defended a radical version of language that would divide and demarcate the world into two distinct parts, such as, accidental and non-accidental. He then claimed that any attempt to express in words anything of or about religion unavoidably results in nonsense. Some nonsense is important nonsense in compare to other and it may be termed as non-sense instead of nonsense.¹⁶ There is no possibility of elucidating of religious expression. In his "A lecture on Ethics", Wittgenstein remarked that any attempt to write or to talk about religion is 'to run against the boundaries of language'. In his words, "This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely, hopeless."¹⁷

Nonsense and Non-sense?

Wittgenstein makes it clear that as religion, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics lie on the other side of the limit, they are nonsense. It is not just philosophy and metaphysics that are nonsensical, but religion, talk about the meaning of life, talk about making sense of life, talk about the meaning of the world, talk about God, ethics, and aesthetics. All such talks are nonsense having no cognitive force and hence they belong to 'the mystical' and are nonsensical. Wittgenstein has identified such talk with *the meaning of life*. Accordingly, they could not be just plain old nonsense, but must be deep nonsense 'hinting at unsayable ineffable truths'.¹⁸ He thus classifies truth or knowledge into two categories, such as, *ineffable truth and non-*

¹⁵ *Notebooks*, 83.

¹⁶ Lazenby, J. M. *The Early Wittgenstein on Religion*, Continuum Studies in British Philosophy, 2006, p.64.

¹⁷ *Lectures on Ethics*, 11-12.

¹⁸ Nielsen, Kai and D. Z. Phillips, *Wittgensteinian Fideism?* SCM press, 2005, p.229.

effable truth. An ineffable truth is unsayable and inexpressible, but a non-effable truth is sayable and expressible. One is comprehended through silence and the other is comprehended through putting it into words. Nonsense can be shown but cannot be said. All such talks are vital to our sense of life touches on matters of value. According to Hacker, just as Kant circumscribed the bounds of language in order to make room for faith, Wittgenstein circumscribed the bounds of language in order to make room for ineffable metaphysical truths.¹⁹

They (nonsense) had nothing to say because there was nothing to say in the real sense of the term. James Conant²⁰ in “Must We Show What We Cannot Say” [1989] and Cora Diamond²¹ in *The Pluralistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind* [1991] distinguish between nonsense (bad) and non-sense (good) to understand Wittgenstein’s claim that some propositions are *nonsensical but important*. I think Pears (1971) position is particularly relevant here. Pears remarks, “By refusing to locate the truth of religions and morality within factual discourse, Wittgenstein was not rejecting them, but trying to preserve them.²² They are non-sense because they lack factual sense. But to make this point about them is not to condemn them as unintelligible. Rather it is to take the first step towards *understanding them*. I think this position of Wittgenstein made him distinct from Hume and logical positivism. According to Hume, metaphysical and religious sentences are false and according to logical positivism they are meaningless. When Wittgenstein asserts that religious expressions are nonsense, he has a different interpretation of sense in his mind. They are non-sense because they lack factual sense. I think the distinction between *plain nonsense* and *non-sense* is equally important. There are some religious and moral utterances which are successful in *conveying insights* and there are other religious and moral utterances which cannot do that. Those religious and moral utterances which are successful *in conveying insights* have been termed as *non-sense* and the rest has been termed as *plain nonsense*. As philosophy is not a body of

¹⁹ See Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein’, in *A Companion to the Philosophers*, edited by Robert L. Arrington, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p.344.

²⁰ Conant, James, ‘Must We Show What We Cannot Say?’ in *The Senses of Stanley Cavell*, ed., R. Fleming and M. Payne, Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1989.

²¹ Diamond, Cora, *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind*, Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1991.

²² Pears, David., *Wittgenstein*, 2ndedn, London: Fontana, 1971, p.57.

doctrine but an activity, as the type of philosophy is therapeutic in nature, one has to involve in talking nonsense for sense. For Wittgenstein, to say about nonsense is itself non-sense, an important non-sense. An important nonsense [illuminating nonsense, according to Hacker, 1986: p.18] which set out the limit of factual discourse is nonetheless nonsense, and like unimportant nonsense [unilluminating nonsense, according to Hacker] we must give it up. Wittgenstein of *TLP* aims at to uncover all nonsense, whether gibberish [unilluminating] or important [illuminating], as nonsense. There is a fundamental difference between gibberish, which detracts from living, and important nonsense, which helps us to live.

How can we say about religion, metaphysical issues if we do not have language? The language of *TLP* does not suit to express issues associated with higher value. Wittgenstein anticipated two different types of truth, such as, *necessary and a priori truth*. Tautologies are a priori necessary truth and hence they are devoid of *factual content*. All other truths are contingent, empirical and *a- posteriori* in nature. Accordingly, neither of these kinds of truth incorporates metaphysical, aesthetics, theological or religious truths. He then claims that all necessary truths are empty and all truths of substance are merely factual. Only empirical truths are significant. Traditional metaphysics and theology attempt to establish trans-empirical substantial truths. Such truth is almost impossible according to *TLP* view. Ethical and aesthetic truths were traditionally thought to hold no matter what the world is like. Thus, it seems clear that Wittgenstein's model that has been developed in his early work makes no room for traditional metaphysics, theology.

The pertinent question is: what do we actually try to express when we use words in religious and ethical expressions? In this regard Wittgenstein says, "I wonder at the existence of the world and I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens."²³ We feel safe in the hands of God, the creator of the world. Though the word 'absolute' as used in the sentence 'I feel absolutely safe' is nonsensical with regard to the tests of sense, but it makes sense to the speaker. How can Wittgenstein claim that they have any meaning at all? For Wittgenstein, to have the meaning of religious and ethical expressions we are to look *at the force of words* in the lives of those who use them.

²³Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein*, 1996, p.42

Was Wittgenstein serious enough about religion?

Many would suspect that Wittgenstein was not serious enough about religious matters. I do not think so. To me, Wittgenstein was extremely serious about religious matters. Otherwise, he did not say anything about religion in his *TLP* and in ‘Lectures on Ethics’. What he inclined to say was that the language of *TLP* did not incorporate issues about religious matters. Religious matters or language cannot be expressed in the form of ‘to be the case’ or ‘not to be the case’. This is his position in his *TLP*. This does not make sense to say that he was disinterested about religious language and religious matters in his *TLP*. The only biasness that he portrayed in his *TLP* was his *overwhelming inclination towards propositional language*.

In his *TLP*, Wittgenstein conceives two different types of values, such as, *higher and not-higher*. A value which is deeply associated with the deepest problems of human life, with the meaning of human life is called higher value. Metaphysics, religion, ethics, aesthetics are entwined with each other and they are deeply rooted with the problems of human life. In this regard, Wittgenstein in his *TLP*: 6.41 asserts, “The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists – and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.”²⁴

Here I have to specify what Wittgenstein actually means by the term ‘value’. His understanding of the term ‘value’ is not at par with propositional or truth-functional value. Truth-functional value functions in the world ‘as it is’. It is not a priori. However, the ‘value’ that would determine the ‘sense of the world’ is a priori and it lies outside the world. In this regard, Wittgenstein made the distinction between *accidental and non-accidental value*. What happens within the world would be accidental and what lies outside the world or other side of the world would be non-accidental. What is non-accidental is higher. Propositions or propositional language cannot express anything higher. (*TLP*: 6.42). Therefore, it is impossible for there to

²⁴ *TLP*. 6.41.

be propositions of ethics. What is higher cannot be put into words. Accordingly, religion, ethics, metaphysics remain transcendental.

Concluding Remarks

Wittgenstein's life and work suggests the possibility of *a new spiritual attitude* based on 'wordless faith'. Intimation of the divine, rather than talk of the divine will be the heart of *wordless faith*. To me the religion of Wittgenstein's *TLP* is ascetic in the sense of denying oneself the rich tapestry of doctrinal expression. It encapsulates a stoic attitude and a particular way of looking at the world, seeing it as a miracle. In *TLP*, talk of God is denied for the pious reason that holiness is to be protected from linguistic distortion. Here I can remember Moore's concept of Naturalistic fallacy. For Moore, non-natural term cannot be defined with regard to naturalistic property. For example, the term *good* is non-natural. Accordingly, to define the term *good* with regard to natural term leads into Naturalistic fallacy. Very similar way, Wittgenstein asserts that what can be put into words is natural and what cannot be put into words is non-natural. Alternatively, it can be said that what is expressed within the limits of language and world has factual content and anything that has factual content has sense and would be treated as natural. What lies outside the world would be non-natural in the sense that it lacks factual content. Therefore, it cannot be put into words and any attempt to put it into words leads into mysticism. Wittgenstein conceives it as nonsense.

I think this position of Wittgenstein makes him distinct from those philosophical thinkers who were supposed to his close allies. In this regard Wittgenstein differs from Hume. Hume, being a radical empiricist, offers us a naturalistic account of philosophy. Hume claims that religious and metaphysical assertions are false because 'they contain nothing but sophistry and illusion'.²⁵ Wittgenstein does not think that religious and metaphysical assertions are false, rather he consider such statements as mystical and nonsense. To assert something as false is to put it into words. To assert something as false one has to put it into language. But for Wittgenstein, we cannot put religious and metaphysical assertions into words. They are inexpressible. What is inexpressible cannot be false, because to be a false, it

²⁵ Hume, *Dialogues and Natural History of Religion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. I quoted it from Brian R. Clack, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion*, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p.29.

has to be expressible beforehand. We think Wittgenstein equally differs from logical positivism. Logical positivists with the principle of verification assert that religious and metaphysical assertions are meaningless. They are meaningless in the sense that they cannot be asserted as either true or false. Hence they are devoid of cognitive significance. Wittgenstein asserts that religious and metaphysical assertions are nonsense. They are nonsense in the sense that they lack sense. Thus, they are nonsense in an important sense. They may have sense in other sense. They are nonsense, but they are important nonsense. The question is: whether the term nonsense is at par with meaningless as used by logical positivists. We think that logical positivists took more stringent view against religious and metaphysical assertions. Wittgenstein does not take rigorous view about religious and metaphysical assertions. While attributing such assertions meaningless, Wittgenstein has in mind that ethics, religion and aesthetic have different value which is particularly needed to determine the value of the world; to determine the meaning of life, to equate God with the meaning of life. Accordingly, Wittgenstein reveals that religious and metaphysical assertions are extremely needed for determining the value of the world as well as to determine the meaning of life. Hume and logical positivists are no longer god-extricated man. But Wittgenstein has been regarded like the god-extricated man. Like the god-intoxicated man, Wittgenstein's sense of an eternal reality both pervading and yet transcending the world left him deeply dissatisfied with the paltry realm of facts. His main contention was to summon up a sense of *profound reality* uncharacterized by science, was as nothing. Thus, following Brian R. Clack, it may be concluded that Wittgenstein's early philosophy of religion deserves the name of *Logical Romanticism* rather than anti-logical positivism. In order to live happily, Wittgenstein was doing the will of God. He really wanted to say that all talk of God should be consigned to the realm of silence and only artistic creation can mediate what is higher. One might gain a felt sense of the meaningfulness of life through his artistic creation and aesthetic taste.

Further we think that mysticism is an important part of Wittgenstein's view. In fact, mysticism becomes the last refuge for the most cherished things in life, in fact for all values, 'for all that cannot be said and yet is of utmost importance to us'. Following Conant, we can say that Wittgenstein views mysticism as some form of 'last refuge'. In fact, it seems to me that Wittgenstein has the greatest and deepest

respect for the impulse to seek such refuge without textual support. He simply asserted that ‘the feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling’ and it would be utterly ineffable.

Thus to remain silence is the best possible means to *do higher and authentic philosophy*. Wittgenstein’s philosophy of silence suggests this. If we carefully go through the history of literature, we find that silence is the best possible means to have the sense of higher order of knowledge. However, Wittgenstein in his *TLP* suggests us to remain silence because he does not find any *suitable language* within the limited whole to express religious matters. Since we cannot express religious matters by means of language, how can we express them? We cannot. Therefore, it would be better for us to keep in silence. The pertinent question then is: Is silence a way of doing philosophy? Here I have two proposals. First, silence is a means of doing philosophy, and secondly, silence is a means of suspension of doing philosophy. The term ‘suspension’ is particularly relevant here. Wittgenstein for the time being suspends to discuss about what is mystical and nonsense because he does not have suitable language to grasp religious matters. However, in his later writings he opens up the matter again and instead of remaining silence, he then talks about religious matters with his close friends and students, namely, Drury and others. Alternatively, we can say that being a linguistic philosopher; Wittgenstein takes language as a philosophical method. Therefore, his philosophy is primarily concerned with the analysis of language. In this regard Wittgenstein employs therapeutic method. In his *TLP*, he draws the limits of language as well as the limits of the world. Within the limited world everything can be put into language and hence everything has sense. He then says that to grasp religious matters from the perspective of limited whole would cause mysticism. What is higher cannot be comprehended by means of what is lower. Any attempt to conceive the higher by means of lower would lead us mysticism and in turn make everything nonsense. In such a case the best possible means is to remain in silence. This is how Wittgenstein in his *TLP* and *Notebooks* develops philosophy of silence. The essence of philosophy of silence of Wittgenstein is not to think, but to look and reveal form the core of the heart. It has no end, it does not require any justification, epistemic or logical, and it does not require intellectualism. It banks on showing just as *a means of remaining silence*.