

THE NOTION OF BONDAGE AND LIBERATION IN SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL STUDY

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Among the Indian philosophical system, Sāmkhya philosophy represents one of the oldest traditions. Like the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Sāmkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. According to the Sāmkhya philosophers, though liberation is nothing but the absolute cessation of the three-fold sufferings, yet it can only be attained through the realisation of the discriminatory knowledge (vivekajñāna) between the puruṣa and the prakṛti.

We know that the relation of mere contiguity (sannidhāna) between the puruṣa and the prakṛti, as admitted in Sāmkhya philosophy, leads to the accomplishment of the bhoga and the kaivalya of puruṣa (being or embodied consciousness) in the apparent state of migration (saṁsāra). In the process of the phenomenal enjoyment and liberation through transcendence of the empirical, the assistance of the evolutes of prakṛti is required; hence their manifestation. In Sāmkhya philosophy, we know that the puruṣa conceives of the modes of the antaḥkaraṇa to be its own, and accordingly the I-usages of the embodied consciousness occur. However, the Sāmkhya śāstra being essentially an esoteric study of liberation, the focal issue lies in the ascertainment of the nature and the possibility of liberation of puruṣa through the attainment of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the prakṛti.

In Sāmkhya philosophy, puruṣa is essentially and eternally free (nityamukta). Evidently, the issue arises that how can we consider the possibility of liberation of the ever-liberated puruṣa? Further, how at all can the question of bondage arise in case of the unbound, immutable, unrelated puruṣa? Moreover, if at all any such bondages are to be admitted due to the apparent related-ness between the puruṣa and the prakṛti due to their proximity, what could be the nature of such bondages? Such critical issues and the related concerns regarding the emancipation from such bondages are the moot points of discussion and analysis in the current research paper. We now enter into the detailed critical analysis and exposition of the issues stated above following the respective Sāmkhyakārikās. In this context various arguments from the position of the Neo-Sāmkhya tradition as well as from Yoga and Buddhist philosophies, have been put forward wherever those have been found to be relevant.

I

Among the Indian philosophical system, Sāmkhya philosophy represents one of the oldest traditions. Like the other orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Sāmkhya system too considers liberation to be the highest goal of human life. According to the Sāmkhya philosophers, though liberation is nothing but the absolute cessation of the three-fold sufferings, yet it can only be attained through the realisation of the discriminatory knowledge (vivekajñāna) between the puruṣa and the prakṛti.

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consciousness) in the apparent state of migration (*saṃsāra*). In the process of the phenomenal enjoyment and liberation through transcendence of the empirical, the assistance of the evolutes of *prakṛti* is required; hence their manifestation. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, we know that the *puruṣa* conceives of the modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be its own, and accordingly the I-usages of the embodied consciousness occur. However, the Sāṃkhya *śāstra* being essentially an esoteric study of liberation, the focal issue lies in the ascertainment of the nature and the possibility of liberation of *puruṣa* through the attainment of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the *prakṛti*.

II

We know that according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, *puruṣa* is essentially and eternally free (*nityamukta*). Evidently, the issue arises that how can we consider the possibility of liberation of the ever-liberated *puruṣa*? Further, how at all can the question of bondage arise in case of the unbound, immutable, unrelated *puruṣa*? Moreover, if at all any such bondages are to be admitted due to the apparent related-ness between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* due to their proximity, what could be the nature of such bondages? This has been expressed by Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary as follows – ‘*puruṣaścedaḡuṇo’apariṇāmī, kathamasya mokṣaḥ? mucerbandhanaviśleṣārthatvāt, savāsanakleśakarmāśayānāṅca bandhanasamākhyanām puruṣe’apariṇāminyasambhavāt/ ataevāsya na saṃsāraḥ pretyabhāvāparanāmā’asti niṣkṛiyatvāt/ tasmāt ‘puruṣavimokṣārtham’ iti riktam vacaḥ*’.¹ These pivotal issues and the related concerns regarding the emancipation from such bondages are the moot points of discussion and analysis in the current research paper. We now enter into the detailed critical analysis and exposition of the issues stated above following the respective *Sāṃkhyakārikās*. In this context various arguments from the position of the Neo-Sāṃkhya tradition as well as from Yoga and Buddhist philosophies, have been put forward wherever those have been found to be relevant.

III

In the sixty-second *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa explicates the notion of the bondage and that of the liberation in the context of the essentially unbound *puruṣa*. The *kārikā* is as follows – ‘*tasmāṅna badhyate’addhā na mucyate nā’api saṃsarati kaścit/ saṃsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ*’². Here the main contention is that, that the *prakṛti* serves the purpose of the enjoyment and the liberation of *puruṣa*, is not exactly an appropriate manner of stating the essence of

the Sāṃkhya *śāstra*. The term ‘*mokṣa*’ is only applicable to those who are actually bound. The *puruṣa*, however, being essentially unbound, immutable and devoid of the three *guṇas*, - the question of its bondage and that of its volition towards liberation does not hold at all. Thus, the notions of bondage and liberation in Sāṃkhya philosophy occupies a unique character. In order to explicate the thesis that why at all the *puruṣa* cannot be bound, Vācaspati Miśra states the nature of bondage as follows – ‘*savāsanakleśakarmāśayānām bandhanasamākhyānām*’³ etc. The term ‘*vāsanā*’ means *saṃskāra*. ‘*Kleśa*’ means *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa*, *abhiniveśa*. ‘*Karma*’ refers to *dharma* and *adharma*. ‘*Āśaya*’ means the *citta*. When *kleśa*, *karma*, *āśaya* etc. are associated with the previous impressions (*saṃskāra*) then bondage (*bandhana*) takes place. Now the issue arises that if we consider the above sense of bondage, then the *puruṣa* can never be bound at all. The *puruṣa* being immutable, non-related etc. it cannot have any sort of association with *kleśa*, *karma*, *āśaya* or *saṃskāra*. Thus, the *puruṣa* never migrates nor is it ever bound. Migration (*saṃsāra*) is also understood as the cycle of birth, death and rebirth (*pretyabhāva*). The *puruṣa*, however, does not have any relation to birth or death. Thus, its question of migration does not occur. Now the question arises that the *puruṣa* being essentially non-related, indifferent, inactive, immutable, devoid of the *guṇas* etc. and accordingly being unbound and non-migratory, then the very tendency of *puruṣa* towards the attainment of liberation becomes meaningless. In apprehension of such objections from the opponents, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the sixty-second *kārikā* where he distinctly clarifies the notions of bondage, migration and liberation with respect to *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

The term ‘*addhā*’ in the *kārikā* means in actuality or in reality. That is, in actuality or in essence, ‘*na kaścit puruṣaḥ badhyate*’⁴ – that is, no *puruṣa* is bound in its true essence. So it does not migrate either. Consequently, it cannot have any possibility of attaining liberation. However, so far we have seen that the *prakṛti* becomes creative in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Such a notion is only apparent from the phenomenal point of view, which is not essentially or theoretically valid. Rather the actual thesis is that the *puruṣa* being unbound and non-migratory, all such empirical phenomena are located in *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* evolving in various forms in relation to the different beings undergo migration, bondage and eventually liberation. Thus, in essence bondage, migration and liberation are all none but the modes of the *prakṛti* itself. Bondage is the result of the transformation of the three *guṇas*.

Hence, that which is actually a mode of *prakṛti* appears to be there in the *puruṣa* due to the non-discrimination between the consciousness and the *buddhi* or *prakṛti*. So bondage *etc.* appear to be that of the *puruṣa*. However, such phenomenal bondage never touches or permeates the pure consciousness. It is merely a linguistic and cognitive mis-usage of the attributes of *prakṛti* to be that of the *puruṣa*, due to the non-apprehension of the discriminatory cognition between them.

This is further clarified by an analogy as follows – ‘*jayaparājayau bhṛtyagatāvapi svāminyupacaryete, tadāśrayeṇa bhṛtyānāstadbhāgitvāt, tatphalasya ca śokalābhādeḥ svāmini sambhavāt*’⁵. That is, in a battlefield it is the soldiers who actually experience the victory or the defeat, yet it is the king of the country who is attributed to be the victorious or the defeated one. The soldiers being in the relation of the server and the served with the ruler, though the result of the war actually belongs to them, yet it is imposed on or attributed to the ruler her/himself. Accordingly, the king enjoys the victory or aggrieves the defeat. Similarly, in case of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, though migration, bondage and liberation are actually there in *prakṛti*, yet due to its proximity with *puruṣa* and due to the resulting non-apprehension of the discrimination between them, all that is there in *prakṛti* appears to be housed in the *puruṣa*. The cognition and other modes of the *antaḥkaraṇa* which act as the causes of bondage are used as attributes of the *puruṣa*. Hence, empirically *puruṣa* is referred to as bound or liberated. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra, in his commentary, states that – ‘*bhogāpavargoyaśca prakṛtiगतयोरपि vivekāgrahāt puruṣasambandha upapādita iti sarvaṃ puṣkalam*’⁶. The phrase ‘*sarvaṃ puṣkalam*’ means that whatever has been established that is consistent and there is no contradiction in it. Now referring to the original issue of impossibility of the liberation of *puruṣa* due to its essential inert, unrelated nature, it can be asserted that these issues are not actually contradictory to the philosophical system concerned; rather they strengthen the position through further clarification. The bondage, migration and liberation are not the attributes of *puruṣa*, rather they are imposed on the consciousness at the empirical level; and most strikingly, the *prakṛti* becomes creative to serve the purpose of such imposed tendencies of *puruṣa* at the phenomenal level. Thus, the concept of liberation of *puruṣa* here means that the liberation of the consciousness from the imposed bondages and the imposed migratory qualities or attributes, while the *prakṛti* attains fulfilment by serving the above.

IV

As discussed so far, bondage, migration and liberation that are imposed or reflected on the consciousness, is considered to be owned by the *puruṣa*, whereas in reality these are nothing but the modes of *prakṛti*. In this context, the opponents might argue that – ‘*prakṛtigatā bandhanasaṃsārāpavargāḥ puruṣeṣu upacaryante*’⁷. That is, though it is clear that the bondage *etc.* of the *prakṛti* is imposed on the *puruṣa*, yet the question arises that why or how the *prakṛti* experiences bondage *etc.*?

In response to the above, it is mentioned in the *kārikā* that – ‘*rūpaiḥ saptabhireva tu badhnātyātmānamātmanā prakṛtiḥ/ saiva ca puruṣārthamprati vimocayatyekarūpeṇa*’⁸. *Dharma, adharmā, jñāna, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya* are the eight modes of *buddhi* or *mahattattva*. These modes act as instruments for the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* by controlling the subtle body (*liṅgāsarīra*). The eight modes of the *buddhi* include upward movement, downward motion, bondage *etc.* which are responsible for the enjoyment of *puruṣa*; then *vivekakhyāti* leads to the attainment of liberation. Thus, by serving the purpose of bondage and liberation of the *puruṣa*, the eight modes of *buddhi* attain fulfilment. The above *kārikā* states that among the eight modes of *buddhi*, apart from *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*, the other seven forms of the intellect, namely, *dharma, adharmā, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya* act as instruments towards the bondage and migration of the *prakṛti* itself. However, the *tattvajñāna* or the *vivekakhyāti* is distinct from the other seven modes of the *buddhi*, and hence, attributed as – ‘*ekarūpeṇa*’. On attainment of such distinctive cognition, the *prakṛti* eventually alleviates itself from both the bondage and the liberation, that is, relieves itself from serving the purpose of *puruṣa*. Further, once the discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) is obtained, the *prakṛti* does not have the tendency of serving the purpose of *puruṣa* anymore. Thus, the bondage *etc.* of the *prakṛti* is due to *dharma, adharmā* *etc.* It is because of the non-apprehension of the discrimination (*bhedāgraha*) between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* that such bondage *etc.* are imposed on *puruṣa*. Furthermore, due to the production of the *vivekakhyāti*, *puruṣa* is relieved of the imposed bondages. Thus, by the seven modes of *buddhi*, *prakṛti* finds itself in bondage to fulfil the imposed experience of bondage of *puruṣa*. And on the other hand, with the help of *jñāna*, that is, discriminatory cognition, *prakṛti* leads the

puruṣa towards liberation by destroying the cognition of the apparent non-discrimination between itself and *puruṣa*.

It is to be noted here that the term '*prakṛti*' refers to *buddhi*. This is because the intellect (*buddhi*) being the first product of *prakṛti*, *dharma*, *adharmā* etc. are all situated in *buddhi*. The sense of non-discrimination or oneness actually occurs between the *puruṣa* and the intellect. Thus, here the term '*prakṛti*' in the *kārikā* specifically refers to *buddhi*. Moreover, in Sāṃkhya philosophy, we do not differentiate between the cause and the effect in essence. It is, thus, perfectly consistent to refer to *buddhi* as *prakṛti*. Hence, it is established that theoretically there cannot be any bondage, migration or liberation of *puruṣa*. Rather all these are situated in, and are modes of the *prakṛti*, that is, that of the *buddhi* itself.

V

Further, one might ask that let us consider for argument's sake that the above form of the distinctive cognition is attained. But then how does that lead to the attainment of liberation? In response, the following *kārikā* has been put forward to clarify the above, as follows – '*evaṃ tattvābhyāsānnā'asmi na me nā'ahamityapariśeṣam/ aviparyayādviśuddhaṃ kaivalyamutpadyate jñānam/*'⁹. The term '*tattva*' in the above *kārikā* is indicative of the prime contention of Sāṃkhya philosophy. The main thesis of Sāṃkhya *śāstra* is the ascertainment of the discriminatory cognition between the *prakṛti* and the *puruṣa*. However, the mere distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* (*prakṛtipuruṣaviveka*) cannot act as the means towards liberation. Hence, by the admission of implication (*lakṣaṇā*) in the term '*tattva*' the intended meaning is to be understood. Here the term '*tattva*' refers to '*tattvajñāna*', that is, the cognition of the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It is held that when such discriminatory cognition is attained, then pure cognitions like 'I am conscious', 'I am not transmutable', 'I do not migrate', 'I am forever inactive', 'I do not possess agency of any action', 'I am not the possessor', 'I am not the agent' etc. are produced which are indicative of the essential solitary or non-related nature of the *puruṣa* or consciousness. It is important to note here that the above cognitions are indubitable and free from error. However, it is to be kept in mind that the mere production of the above discriminatory cognition (*sattvānyatākhyāti*) between the *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, would not situate it as an immediate and stable state of cognition. Rather the perfection of such cognition as the absolute means towards emancipation is to be achieved through practice. Further, if the practice is not performed with proper

care and devotion, and if it only continues for a short while, then the purpose of liberation would not be served. Thus, even if the discriminatory cognition is attained, it has to be practised and meditated upon with utmost devotion over ages and without any disruptions in-between. It is then that the cognition gets situated in its purest and most perfect form and hence, produces immediate perceptual cognition of the distinction between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Thus, through practice one can truly attain the discriminatory cognition between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* which is instrumental towards the ultimate liberation.

VI

It has already been stated that the ‘*tattva*’ in case of *tattvajñāna*, as referred to above, indicates *prakṛtipuruṣavivekakhyāti*. The cognition of such form which thus arises through devoted practice over ages is pure (*viśuddha*). In order to emphasise on the fact that such cognition is pure, that is, veridical, the term ‘*aviparyayāt*’ has been included in the *kārikā*. It is due to fallacies (*viparyaya*) and uncertainties (*saṁśaya*) that a cognition becomes non-veridical. Hence, the inclusion of the term ‘*aviparyayāt*’ in the *kārikā* is extremely significant in order to emphasise the veracity or the authenticity of the *tattvajñāna*. *Tattvajñāna* is essentially free from fallacies and uncertainties, and that establishes its purity or veracity (*viśuddhi*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa, however, does not mention about *saṁśaya* in the *kārikā*, but Vācaspati Miśra clarifies the notion of *viśuddhi* in case of *tattvajñāna* by ruling out the possibility of *saṁśaya* too apart from *viparyaya*. He states that – ‘*niyatam aniyatatayā gṛhṇan saṁśayo ’api viparyayah*’.¹⁰ That is, though in the *kārikā* it has only been mentioned that *aviparyaya*, which stands for infallibility or authenticity, yet the same is to be understood as the indicator of certainty too. In clearer terms, the term ‘*aviparyaya*’ refers to both certainty and infallibility. One might ask that how can the same term ‘*aviparyaya*’ refer to the absence of uncertainty and that of fallibility? To clarify, Vācaspati Miśra states that – ‘*niyatam aniyatatayā*’. That is, though it is true that *viparyaya* stands for ‘*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka niścaya*’, yet the very phrase ‘*niyatam aniyatatayā*’ indicates that when an object is apprehended in a form or in a sense which does not pertain to it and there is no certainty regarding that apprehension either, then those cases represent the instances of dubious cognition. So if we interpret *viparyaya* as ‘*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka jñāna*’ instead of ‘*tadabhāvati tatprakāraka niścaya*’, then the cases of dubious cognitions too could be accounted for by the term ‘*viparyaya*’. Thus, here the term ‘*aviparyaya*’ in the

kārikā could be considered to stand for *saṁśaya-viparyaya-śūnyatva*, that is, a cognition which is free from fallacies and uncertainties. *Tattvajñāna* being such that it represents the object of cognition as it is, and hence, it is devoid of any sort of errors or doubts. Accordingly, *tattvajñāna* is pure and veridical.

VII

In the above context, a question might be raised that in spite of attaining the perfect distinctive cognition by practising through ages, how could it be possible to eradicate the empirical migratory state (*saṁsāra*)? It is apprehended that false cognitions (*mithyājñāna*), produced out of illusory impressions (*mithyā saṁskāra*), are beginning-less (*anādi*) and infinite in number. Hence, the false impressions would continue to produce false cognitions, and consequently, migratory states (*saṁsāra*) in an unending procession. Thus, as long as the flow of illusory cognitions would continue, the transmigration of beings would also be unimpeded. Now the illusory impressions are positive entities. We know that if a positive entity is beginning-less, then it is devoid of destruction too. If the false cognitions arising out of beginning-less false impressions become indestructible, then even if the discriminatory cognition is produced, due to the prevalence of the illusory cognitions, transmigration will continue in its course. This would render the hard-earned discriminatory cognition to be inefficacious, and consequently, there would not be any volition towards its attainment. Emancipation is nothing but the eradication of transmigration forever. However, if the procession of transmigration due to false cognitions continue to exist, then the attainment of liberation would be impossible. In response to the above apprehension, Īśvarakṛṣṇa assures us that such a position never arises. This is because even though the illusory perceptions are beginning-less, yet when the pure and perfect discriminatory cognition, as admitted by the Sāṁkhya philosophers, is produced then the false perceptions are rendered powerless. The Sāṁkhya philosophical system does not admit *dhvaṁsābhāva*, that is, the absence of an object after its destruction. So it is not possible for them to admit the destruction of the illusory cognitions. However, with the production of the genuine isolatory cognition (*kevalajñāna*), the false impressions cannot produce illusory cognitions any further. Moreover, it is due to this reason that the absolute discriminatory cognition is held as solitary (*kevala*) cognition at this stage, as it is devoid of any relation to fallacies, uncertainties and falsities of cognition then.

At this point there might again be an apprehension that the false impressions being beginning-less, they are strongly deep-rooted. However, it is to be kept in mind that the Sāṃkhya philosophers being *akhyātivādins*, do not admit falsity of cognitions, they only consider falsity of usages (*mithyāvyavahāra*). Now the discriminatory cognition attained through devoted practice over ages may be extremely strong or powerful, but it might not be deeply situated as it is produced through practice. To clarify it might be said that whereas the false impressions or illusory usages having their impact on beings are in a way innate, due to their beginning-less-ness, the attained *tattvajñāna* might not be that impactful on beings as it is learned through practise or is something which is acquired. Thus, the question arises that how or whether at all the discriminatory cognition would be able to eradicate the false impressions. The false impressions are infinite in number and the discriminatory cognition is one. So naturally the question arises that how will the *tattvajñāna* destroy the illusory perceptions and attain its solitary state. Vācaspati Mīśra himself raises the above opposition and responds to it as follows – ‘*yadyapi anādiḥ viśayavāsanā*’¹¹ *etc.* That is, the state of transmigration (*saṃsāra*) is there from time unknown or in other words, it is beginning-less. It is impossible to determine from when did the consciousness start considering the pleasure, pain *etc.* as its own, which are actually there in the intellect or are modes of the intellect. The consideration of pleasure, pain, agency, enjoyer-ship *etc.* as one’s own is referred to by the term ‘*saṃskāra*’. However, it is never possible to determine the time period of such apparent sense of identification between the consciousness and the intellect. This being the root cause of transmigration, it is consequently, beginning-less. Further, the imposition or ascription of one’s property on another is called incongruity (*viparyaya*). Though the ascription of the properties of *prakṛti* on *puruṣa* is incongruent and improper, yet such apparent imposition is to be admitted which leads to the notion of migration. Now such false ascriptions and illusory impressions are equivalent in Sāṃkhya system. Here the Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that though the false perceptions or impositions are beginning-less, yet the acquired discriminatory cognition is so powerful that it can eradicate those completely. This is because the discriminatory cognition is nothing but the purest and most perfect immediate perception of the essential nature of reality. Thus, it is potent enough to overpower the effects of the beginning-less imperfect cognitions. We know that if a cognition is infiltrated with fallacies, however, deep-rooted that notion might be, it is inevitably refutable (*bādhita*), and that is only a matter of time. A couple of instances would again help to explicate the matter more clearly. Say, there has been impermeable

darkness in a cave for thousands of years at a stretch, yet if someday a person enters the cave with a lamp lit in her/his hand, immediately, the cave is lit up and the age-old darkness is eradicated. Similarly, the effect of the invincible *tattvajñāna* uproots the illusory impressions produced due to the endless stream of *mithyāsaṃskāra*. Further another instance could be stated as follows – a person standing in her/his balcony perceives the bank of a nearby river. However, due to the glitter of the bright sunlight, the sands on the bank of the river appear to be shimmery. Hence, the person cannot discern it to be the bank of the river, and considers it to be the river water itself. Now such a notion might continue for days and months together. However, if one day the person comes down to the river bank and perceives on one's own that the shiny appearance is that of the sands of the bank of the river, and it is not the river water itself, then immediately, the previously held wrong notion is eradicated. Thus, it is evident that whenever a cognition is inherently false, irrespective of its source or duration, it is bound to be refuted by the correct knowledge sooner or later. Accordingly, the impact of the *tattvajñāna* eradicates the erroneous cognitions or usages produced due to the innumerable age-old *mithyāsaṃskāra*.

VIII

We know that the intellect or cognition is essentially transparent in nature due to the predominance of *sattva guṇa* in it. The cognitions of the principles are results of the specialised actions of the intellect, that is, '*tattvavastupakṣapātohi dhiyām svabhāvaḥ*'.¹² If the actual principle becomes the subject matter of the cognition, then such cognition is never produced further. The illusory perceptions and the false impressions do not possess the actual principles as their subject matter, rather they acquire their contradictory properties, and hence, even if such cognitions are extremely deep-rooted, they cannot stand resilient before the perfect immediate perception of the actual principles and their reality. Thus, once the absolute discriminatory cognition is attained and is well-situated over practise, then one could eventually be freed from migration. Hence, it is clear that the above apprehension of the acquired absolute cognition not being able to eradicate the beginning-less illusory impressions, does not hold anymore and it is aptly clarified.

Illusory perceptions are also referred to as fallacious, contradictory, invalid cognitions *etc.* because such cognitions are deviant in nature (*pracyutasvabhāva*). The reason for such deviations in cognition is the presence

of fallacies. When a cognition is free from fallacies, it expresses the true nature of an object, that is, the object as it is. Once such correct cognition is produced which expresses the object or reality as it is, then it is bound to eradicate all sorts of false impressions. The above position is evidently admitted by the orthodox schools of philosophy, since they hold that the *vedavākyas*, be it unauthored (*apauruṣeya*) or created by *Īśvara*, are of the above unquestionably veridical nature. However, it is interesting to note here that the above view point is not only admitted by the orthodox schools of philosophy, rather it is also accepted by the externalists (*bāhyavādins*). Now in response to the question that why the fallacious cognitions cannot impede the correct cognition of reality, Dharmakīrti in his text *Pramāṇavārttika* mentions that – ‘*nirupadravabhūtārthasvabhāvasya viparyayaḥ/ na bādhoyatnavattve’api buddhestatpakṣapātataḥ*’¹³. Here the term ‘*upadrava*’ indicates fallacies. It is due to fallacies that a cognition loses its veracity or authenticity. If a cognition is free from *upadrava*, that is, fallacies, then it represents the object as it is or in its true essence. Once such pure cognition is produced, then the endless stream of age-old illusory impressions is ripped off its functionality. Accordingly, the pure cognition can never be refuted. The term ‘*buddhestatpakṣapātataḥ*’ as stated above, puts forward the above stand.

The cognition or the intellect is always capable of acquiring the actual nature of object. Its tendency is to express the object as it is. Thus, fallacies cannot affect that potency of a cognition. To emphasise on this point Dharmakīrti has stated this view twice in his text, - once in the *pramāṇasiddhi prakaraṇa* and again in the *svārthānumāna prakaraṇa*. This establishes the fact that through utmost devotion and practice over ages, once the pure and perfect immediate perception of the reality is attained, none of the fallacies or false impressions could be functional anymore; they are removed forever. Then the false impressions too are rendered dysfunctional and cannot lead to the production of false cognitions or usages anymore. The discriminatory cognition thus produced, is essentially non-related to any fallacies *etc.*, and hence, it is never the case that the stream of the *tattvajñāna* and that of false cognitions continue parallel to each other. Rather once the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* is produced, only that cognition and its flow exist; this is why, the absolute cognition is referred to as solitary (*kevala*) cognition in the *kārikā* and moreover because of its non-related-ness to any sort of doubts or fallacies.

It is thus clear that the absolute discriminatory perception (*sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkārātmakajñāna*) is such that it pertains to the actual nature of the reality (*tattvaviṣayaka*), and is to be attained through devoted practice over ages and births. It is devoid of all sorts of fallacies, doubts *etc.* and hence, can never be refuted. Further it being of such pure nature, it leads to the eradication of the endless procession of the illusory impressions and its consequent erroneous usages. Thus, once such cognition is attained by an individual, one can never be affected by the illusory or erroneous perceptions any further. The individual being then perceives the reality in its true essence. The actual nature of the discriminatory perception thus attained is expressed in the *kārikā* as ‘*nāsmi*’, ‘*na me*’ and ‘*nāham*’. The term ‘*nāsmi*’ stands for the essential inactive nature of the self. This further shows that in Sāṃkhya philosophy, activity could only be a property of the insentient. Let us now explain how such a position is being proved. The term ‘*asmi*’ literally (as an *avyaya*) stands for the self (*aham*). Again if the term ‘*asmi*’ is used as a verb, then it being related with the root ‘*as*’, indicates an action. Now to explain how the phrase ‘*na asmi*’ refers to inactivity of the self, Vācaspati Miśra refers to the grammarians and states that the root verbs like, *kr*, *bhū* and *as* stand for actions. Thus, the root ‘*as*’ as applied in case of ‘*na asmi*’ clearly indicates the absence of any activity. Hence, the above phrase is to be interpreted as that which prevents the admission of any sort of activity, - internal or external, in connection to the self.

IX

In Sāṃkhya philosophy, we find that external activities like communicating, receiving *etc.* and internal activities like *adhyavasāya*, *abhimāna*, *saṃkalpa* and *ālocana* are the functions of the *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *manas* and *indriya* respectively. These transformations occurring inside the body are referred to as internal. Though Vācaspati Miśra has not clearly stated what is being referred to by the external activities, yet it could be held that the functions of the *karmendriya* could be considered as external. Now we know that these transformations are non-related to the self. However, agency cannot be accepted as devoid of all such relations. Thus, the self being devoid of all such relations can never be considered to be the agent. Hence, the structure of such cognition is ‘*nāham*’. The phrase is to be completed as ‘*aham iti kartṛpadam*’¹⁴, because the term ‘*aham*’ does not stand for the subject (*kartṛpada*). Thus, we have to reformulate it as – ‘*aham iti kartṛbodhakam padam*’. Now the term ‘*aham*’

clearly stands for the subject or the agent (*karṭṛbodhaka*), as is evident from our frequent usages. For instance, everyday parlances like, ‘*aham jānāmi*’, ‘*ahamjūhomi*’, ‘*aham dade*’, meaning that ‘I know’, ‘I perform sacrifices’, ‘I donate’ respectively, represent the above sense of *aham* as the subject or the agent. It is thus evident that if the term ‘*aham*’ stands for subject-hood or agency, then clearly ‘*nāham*’ means the absence of agency. Further it follows that inactivity (*niṣkriyatva*) *etc.* being the markers of non-agency (*karṭṛtvābhāva*), the phrase ‘*nāsmi*’ prevents any sort of activity or functionality on the part of the self, and consequently the non-agency of the self is established.

According to the above notion of non-agency of the self, as discussed above, now the structure of the cognition that entails, is of the form ‘*na me*’. The assertion ‘*na me*’ indicates the non-related-ness and indifference (*nirlepatva* or *asaṅgitva*) of the self. However, it might be argued that in spite of being the non-agent, the self could be related to the pleasure, pain *etc.* of others. In such cases then though there is absence of agency, yet due to the presence of enjoyer-ship (*bhokṛtva*), how would liberation be possible? It is because of such apprehension, it has been stated that the cognition of non-agency is not the ultimate; it should be followed by cognition of the form ‘*na me*’ or ‘*matsambandhi na kiñcit*’. That is, ‘due to the absence of agency, nothing is related to me’ and ‘I am not related to anything’. Since, the sense of ownership is due to the sense of agency, then in absence of any sort of agency, one would be devoid of any sense of ownership too. An individual who has attained the *tattvajñāna* conceives of oneself as the non-agent. S/he does not consider the pleasure, pain *etc.* located in the *antaḥkaraṇa* to be one’s own any further. The being then realises oneself to be indifferent and isolated, that is, *asaṅga* and *nirlipta*. Thus, in the *kārikā* we find that ‘*nāsmi*’ stands for ‘I am inactive’, ‘*na me*’ means that ‘there is nothing which is related to me’ and ‘*nāham*’ states that ‘I am non-agent’.

Vācaspati Mīśra, however, explains the above cognition in a different sequence because he holds that *puruṣa* initially considers itself as inactive. Then due to its inactivity realises its non-agency, and finally attains the cognition that due to its non-agency, it does not possess any ownership, that is, there is no object which is related to it, because only the agent can be the owner. He himself again provides another explanation to the above sequence in his commentary, as follows – ‘*athavā “nā’asmī” iti, “puruṣo’asmī, na prasavadharmā”/ aprasavadharmitvāccākarṭṛtvamāha – “nāham” iti/ akarṭṛtvācca na svāmitetyāha*

– “*na me*” *iti*’.¹⁵ It may be argued that the cognition of the form ‘*nāsmi*’ does not only indicate inactivity on the part of the *puruṣa*, rather it denotes non-agency too. Thus, the subsequent cognition of the form ‘*nāham*’ becomes futile, as it is a mere repetition of the sense of non-agency of the *puruṣa*. Thus, Vācaspati Miśra reinterprets the terms through a different sort of terminological analysis. Earlier the term ‘*nāsmi*’ has been considered as ‘*na + asmi*’, but Vācaspati Miśra analyses it as ‘*nā + asmi*’. The term ‘*nṛ*’ in the singular tense of the first case ending stands for ‘*nā*’. On attaining the *tattvajñāna*, the self realises itself as ‘*nāsmi*’, that is, ‘*aham nā-puruṣaḥ*’.¹⁶ The phrase ‘*nāsmi*’ stands for ‘*puruṣaḥ asmi*’. That is, the cognition that arises is of the form, - ‘I am *puruṣa*, but not creative’. Here the intended meaning is that once the self realises itself as the *puruṣa*, then it immediately it realises itself as the indifferent, solitary consciousness (*kūṭastha caitanya*) too. Further the cognitions of the form, ‘since I am the *puruṣa*, hence, I am neither immutable nor creative’, entails from the former realisation. The fact that an entity is immutable or non-creative entails the fact that it is a non-agent too. Thus, the following cognition ‘*nāham*’ establishes such. Furthermore, the realisation of the non-agency of the self leads to the consequent realisation of its non-relatedness (*sambandhaśūnyatā*) with anything as such, and accordingly, its sense of being the non-possessor (*asvāmitva*) arises. Thus, according to the above sequence, we find that the self on attaining the *tattvajñāna*, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*, realises itself as the inactive, non-agent, isolated consciousness. This is the fundamental essence of *puruṣa*, and accordingly, the realisation of such is nothing but the attainment of liberation.

X

In the above context, in *Yogasūtra* we find that – ‘*tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe avasthānam*’.¹⁷ The term ‘*draṣṭu*’ refers to the immutable passive onlooker or seer within the being, that is the pure consciousness. According to Patañjali, the realisation of the true essence of the core consciousness as distinct from the *citta* is the ultimate aim of our existence. It is then that we attain enlightenment, and consequently liberation. It is because of this reason that the *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra* is considered to be the pivotal cause of the liberation. Patañjali holds that each of our perceptions being veiled by the modes of the *citta*, we cannot attain the perfect cognition of the true nature of consciousness in the course of our empirical existence. For instance, if we wear a glass with a spot on it, then whatever we perceive would be tainted with that spot.

However, at the same time just as we need the pair of glasses for seeing the objects of the world, similarly, we need the assistance of the *citta* to perceive the *draṣṭu* in its true essence. Just as the spot on our glasses disturbs our vision of the empirical objects, the modes (*vṛtti*) of the *citta* too distorts our perception of the *draṣṭu*, but in spite of that the assistance of the *cittavṛtti* is necessary for the perception of the pure indifferent consciousness. In this regard, Patañjali puts forward a beautiful metaphor to explain the function of the *citta* in attaining the perfect cognition of the *draṣṭu*. He states that the *cittavṛtti* is like the waves in the water of an ocean, whereas the *draṣṭu* is like the ocean-bed. Just as one has to move through the waves of the water in an ocean to reach the ocean bed and see the aquatic life underneath, similarly the being has to go through the various forms of the *cittavṛtti* in order to eventually attain the clear and distinct perception of the core consciousness, that is, the *draṣṭu*.

Such form of the pure perception is held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers as *sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*, and it is this form of realisation that is instrumental to the attainment of liberation on the part of the being. In Sāṃkhya philosophy this has been referred to as the direct perception of the discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* (*sattvapuruṣānyatāsākṣātkāra*). This ultimate cognition has been attributed with three qualifiers in the *kārikā* – ‘*viśuddham*’, ‘*kevalam*’ and ‘*aparīṣeṣam*’. The first two qualifiers have already been discussed above. Now let us take a look at the third one. In order to bring out the significance of the third qualifier ‘*aparīṣeṣam*’, Vācaspati Mīśra raises an objection, - ‘*nanu etāvatsu jñāteṣvapi kaścit kadācidajñāto viśayo’asti, tadjñānaṃ jantun bandhayiṣyati*’.¹⁸ That is, one might argue that even after attaining the cognition of almost all the objects by practising the ultimate cognition, there might be some object which remains unknown. So there might remain ignorance about at least one object, and until and unless all the objects are known and the respective ignorance is destroyed how could liberation be possible? In response to such possible objections, the term ‘*aparīṣeṣam*’ has been added as a mark of the ultimate cognition. It is held that once such absolute cognition is attained, nothing remains unknown. The root cause of all the products that constitute the world, - the *prakṛti*, and the one contradictory in essence to it, - the *puruṣa*, when known in their original essences and their absolute contradiction is perceived, everything that is there naturally falls under the purview of such overpowering cognition, and hence, nothing remains unknown, which could further create any sort of bondage. In this context, it has been mentioned in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* – ‘*tattvābhyāsānneti netīti*

tyāgādivivekasiddhiḥ,¹⁹. In the commentary (*vṛtti*) to the said *sūtra*, Aniruddha states that – ‘*vivekaśca katham syādityatrāha – tattvābhyāsā/ aspaṣṭam/ śrutiśca* “*sa eṣa neti netyātmā ’agrhyo nahi grhyate, aśīryo nahi śīryate*”²⁰. Further in the commentary (*vṛttisāra*) to the above *vṛtti*, Vedānti Mahādeva states that – ‘*vivekaḥ katham syātyatrāha – tattvābhyāsāditi/ netinetīti tattvābhyāsāddehendriyādivailakṣaṇyainātmanaḥ punaḥ punaścintanāt tyāgāt samnyāsācca vivekasiddhiḥ vivekasākṣātkāraḥ/ tathā ca śrutiḥ - “athāta ādeśo neti netīti*”²¹ “*tyāgenaike amṛtatvamānaśuḥ*”²² *iti ca*’.²³

XI

It might further be asked that, - ‘*kim punaḥ īdrśena sākṣātkāreṇa sidhyati?*’²⁴ That is, how does the absolute discriminatory cognition, eulogized so far, help to serve the purpose of the *puruṣa*? In response Īśvaraḥ states that – ‘*tena nivṛttaprasavāmarthavaśāt saptarūpavinivṛttām/ prakṛtiṃ paśyati puruṣaḥ prekṣakavadavasthitāḥ svacchaḥ*’²⁵. The *triguṇātmikāprakṛti* is continually in the process of transformation (*niyatapariṇāmāśīlā*). It constitutes the very essence of the *prakṛti*. The transformation is of two types – *sarūpapariṇāma* and *virūpapariṇāma*. Here the term ‘*prasava*’ stands for *virūpapariṇāma*. The transformation (*prasava*) of *prakṛti* serves the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* which finally leads to the *vivekasākṣātkāra*. From time immemorial, the *prakṛti* has evolved as the *mahatetc.* till the gross elements are produced in a definite sequence. These products help to serve the enjoyment of *puruṣa*. Now that *prakṛti* itself leads to the production of the discriminatory cognition between itself and the *puruṣa* (*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*) when such cognition is meditated upon and practised with great care over ages. Thus, the *prakṛti* serves the purpose of liberation of *puruṣa*. The *prakṛti* does not have any more functionality other than these two, that is, serving the purpose of enjoyment (*bhoga*) and liberation (*apavarga*) of *puruṣa*. The term ‘*prasava*’ denotes the creativity (*kārya*) of *prakṛti*. The *prakṛti* maintains its creativity over ages in the course of the evolutionary manifestation of the world, and thus serves the purpose of enjoyment of *puruṣa* from time immemorial. With the attainment of the *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*, the *puruṣa* realises its freedom from any necessity of enjoyment, and continues to exist in its solitary (*kevala*) essence. Thus, the *prakṛti* then helps in accomplishing the second purpose of the *puruṣa*, that is, its liberation. We know that the *prakṛti* has two major purposes, - one is to produce the evolutes in order to serve the purpose

of enjoyment of *puruṣa*, and the other is to help in the production of *tattvajñāna* in order to help the *puruṣa* attain *vivekasākṣātkāra* that would eventually lead to its liberation. With the attainment of the *tattvasākṣātkāra* both the functions of the *prakṛti* are fulfilled. Thus, the *prakṛti* too is freed from its incessant functionalities. It then reverts to its primordial state, that is, its state of *sarūpapariṇāma*, and does not become creative anymore, since its purposeful functions have been fulfilled, and accordingly there remains nothing for it to create any further.

It is to be noted that as long as the discriminatory cognition is not attained, the *prakṛti* does not cease to transform. The attainment of the immediate perception which ceases the transformations of the *prakṛti* is of the form – ‘*tena tattvasākṣātkāreṇa prakṛtiḥ nivṛttaprasavābhavati*’²⁶. The discriminatory cognition leads to the cessation of the seven modifications of *prakṛti*, namely, *dharma*, *adharmā*, *ajñāna*, *vairāgya*, *avairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and *anaiśvarya*. These seven transformations being prior to *tattvajñāna*, continue to be modified until and unless *tattvajñāna* is produced. However, with the production of the discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*), modifications of the *prakṛti* into the above seven forms cease. Thus, the ultimate cognition, that is, *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti* or *vivekasākṣātkāra*, acts as the cause of cessation of the seven other transformations of *prakṛti*. This is precisely expressed by the term ‘*arthavaśāt*’ in the *kārikā*, that is, due to the power of the ultimate cognition the *prakṛti* ceases to transform into any other forms further.

XII

In accordance with the above discussion, an objection might be raised that among the above-mentioned seven forms of *prakṛti*, *vairāgya* acts as the cause of *tattvajñāna*. Hence, it is inappropriate to say that *vairāgya* acts as a cause of bondage or an impediment towards liberation. However, the *vairāgya* admitted by the Tauṣṭikas is considered as *atattvajñānapūrvaka*. The schools which admit either of the primordial *prakṛti*, *ahamkāra*, *indriya* or *mahābhūta* as the self (*ātman*) are referred to as the Tauṣṭikas. *Tattvajñāna* helps to destroy all that is against its nature, and hence, due to the eradication of the modes of *prakṛti* that are counter to *tattvajñāna* by the overpowering effect of the *tattvajñāna*, the *prakṛti* ceases to transform into *dharmā* etc. Thus, owing to the cessation of the cause, the effect is no longer produced.

When the *puruṣa* attains *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, *prakṛti* no longer evolves as the *mahat* etc. and consequently, transformations into the form of *dharmā* etc. also cease. It is at this moment, the inactive, pure *puruṣa* perceives the *prakṛti* in its almost primordial form as a mere witness or a detached observer. The term ‘*svaccha*’ in the *kārikā* significantly denotes the detached perception of *puruṣa*, which is free from all sorts of non-discriminatory cognition (*abhedābhimānasūnya*). When we refer to the *puruṣa* as *svaccha*, it denotes the unrelated-ness of the *puruṣa* with the three *guṇas*. The term ‘*svaccha*’ means the non-relatedness of the *puruṣa* with those states of the *buddhi* which are permeated by the modes of the *raja* and the *tama* *guṇas*. Thus, at this moment the *puruṣa* perceives the *buddhi* in its essence, that is, in its predominantly *sāttvika* form. Accordingly, the *prakṛti* is perceived as devoid of all modes of transformation of the *raja* and *tama* *guṇa*, and hence, there does not remain any sense of non-discrimination between the *buddhi* and the *caitanya*. Thus, the *puruṣa* attains its essentially pure (*svaccha*) existence. However, it is interesting to note here that though the term ‘*svaccha*’ indicates the non-relation or the attainment of the discrimination between the consciousness and the intellect, yet there remains an identity of the *puruṣa* with the transformation of *sattva* *guṇa* for a momentary period (*manāk*). Most importantly, it is due to this non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sattvagūṇavṛtti* that the *puruṣa* can perceive the *prakṛti* as devoid of or free from its seven other modes of transformation. That is why, the ultimate cognition is called *sattvapuruṣānyatākhyāti*, that is, the final discriminatory cognition between the self and the *sattvagūṇavṛtti*. The term ‘*manāk*’ in the statement ‘*manāksambhedaḥ asti eva*’²⁷ has got two senses. That is, the sense of non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sāttvikībuddhi* is existent only for a very short while, and such non-discrimination does not give rise to any further *samskāra*. Thus, the said non-discriminatory state is characterized by the above two features. Such non-discrimination between the *puruṣa* and the *sāttvikī buddhi* is instrumental for the perception of the discrimination (*bhedasākṣātkāra*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Liberation is attained by *puruṣa* on attaining the discriminatory perception, and hence, the above non-discriminatory state dissolves, and does not give rise to any *samskāra* either.

XIII

In the following *kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa further states that – ‘*drṣṭā mayetyupekṣaka eko drṣṭā’ ahamityuparamatyanyā/ sati samyoge’ api tayoh*

prajojanam nāsti sargasya/'²⁸. In introducing the commentary to the above *kārikā*, Vācaspati Mīśra shows some inconsistency in the previous contentions. In the previous *kārikā*, it has been mentioned that *prakṛti* is always in the state of transformation in order to serve the purpose of enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa*. Once the *puruṣa* attains the discriminatory cognition, the *prakṛti* ceases to transform. However, it cannot be claimed that the *prakṛti* ceases to transform immediately on the attainment of the *tattvajñāna* by the *puruṣa*, that is, 'nivṛttaprasavām iti na mṛṣyāmahe'.²⁹ If *vivekakhyāti* would have been the preventive towards the cause of transformation, then the above claim could have been accepted. However, in reality it is not so. *Vivekakhyāti* cannot act as an impediment towards the cause of transformation. This is because the cause of the evolution of *prakṛti* is the contact (*vilakṣaṇasamyoga*), that is, the proximity relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*.

It is clear so far that the said contact between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*, and the *vivekakhyāti* are not opposed to each other. Then naturally the question arises that the proximity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* being eternal, the cause of the transformation of *prakṛti* is also eternal, then how can the *prakṛti* cease to transform at all? Such transformation, further, is the natural potential of *prakṛti*, so it cannot be prevented by *vivekakhyāti*. Moreover, the relation of contact or proximity is there in both the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti*. Consequently, the enjoyer-ship of *puruṣa* and the enjoyable-ness of *prakṛti* are also retained, as these are the natural potentials of the consciousness and that of the matter respectively. Now even if the *tattvajñāna* is meditated upon and practised continuously with utmost sincerity, yet the properties of enjoyer-ship and that of enjoyable-ness can never be eradicated, as they are eternal in *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* respectively. So the relation between these capabilities being retained, there cannot be any reason for the *prakṛti* to cease transforming. Furthermore, if it is claimed that generating the objects of enjoyment and the ultimate discriminatory cognition being the two tasks of *prakṛti*, once these are accomplished, the *prakṛti* having no other purpose, ceases to evolve, even then that is not a very strong argument to establish the reason behind the cessation of the transformation of *prakṛti*. This is because there is no such claim that the task once performed by *prakṛti* could not be repeated by itself again. The intended claim is that whatever has been accomplished once, similar instances could be accomplished time and again. Thus, the question remains that, since the relation between the natural potentials of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* remains intact, and that relation being considered as the instrumental cause

of the evolution of *prakṛti*, why will there not be the production of other enjoyable commodities (*bhogāntara*) and even more strikingly, can it not produce other discriminatory cognitions (*bhedasākṣātkārāntara*) similar to the initial one?

To explicate it could further be stated that even on attainment of *vivekakhyāti* and its foundation through devoted practice, the innate potency of *bhokṛtva* of *puruṣa* and that of the *bhogyatva* of the *prakṛti* cannot be denied. Moreover, both the principles being eternal, their potencies are eternal too. Hence, simply stating that since the purposes of fulfilling the enjoyment and liberation of *puruṣa* have been accomplished by the *prakṛti*, the latter rests from its creativity, is not sufficient to explain the issue. It is true that fulfilling the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of the *puruṣa* are the two objectives of *prakṛti*, and nothing else, yet it does not sanction the fact that the *prakṛti* cannot perform the repetitive acts of creation in future. An action which has been performed once, can always be performed again, or at least actions similar to it. For instance, in our daily lives we find that after a pot has been produced, thousands of pots similar to it are repeatedly produced. Also, human beings after enjoying a particular piece of beauty or anything as such, enjoy things alike repeatedly. Hence, there cannot be any definite sanction that the creativity of the *prakṛti* cannot be staged again after the attainment of *vivekakhyāti*. Since the innate potencies of enjoyer-ship and being the enjoyable on the part of the consciousness and the matter respectively continue to exist, so by virtue of their relation of contiguity, it is only natural that the stream of *bhoga* and *bhedasākṣātkāra* would continue till eternity.

XIV

In response to the above stances and apprehensions, Īśvarakṛṣṇa maintains that '*dṛṣṭā mayā*' etc. That *prakṛti* which has not yet produced *vivekakhyāti*, can produce enjoyable commodities again and again, and it is perfectly acceptable. However, once the *prakṛti* has produced *vivekakhyāti*, it can no longer produce the enjoyable commodities nor can it be in the state of migration experiencing the enjoyable commodities. Thus, as the non-discriminatory cognition acts as the cause of the enjoyment, in the absence of such cognition, there cannot be any reason to propel enjoyment. Just as in the absence of a seed, the sapling cannot be grown, similarly in the absence of non-discriminatory cognition, there cannot be any question of enjoyment. Enjoyable commodities like, sound etc. are essentially of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, as these are nothing but the products

of *prakṛti*. Due to the sense of non-discrimination with the *prakṛti*, the *puruṣa* considers these enjoyable commodities as its own objects of enjoyment, - ‘*iyam madarthā*’. Such enjoyer-ship continues due to the prevalent sense of non-discrimination, and as long as such cognition persists, the *prakṛti* continues to evolve as the enjoyable. Now as apprehended above, it is important to note over here that, the discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti* or *bhedasākṣātkāra*) too could be generated time and again, if due to persisting sense of non-discrimination, the *puruṣa* considers the *prakṛti* as related to it or the *vivekakhyāti* thus generated to be of its own use or to be serving its own purpose. Then it is to be understood that the discriminatory cognition is not perfectly attained. However, in essence once *vivekakhyāti* is produced, all sorts of ignorance in the form of apparent non-discrimination *etc.* are eradicated. The self perceives the *prakṛti* as absolutely non-related to it, and hence, the tendency to experience the enjoyable commodities dissolve. The self, perceiving itself as absolutely distinct from the *prakṛti*, cannot consider the cognition of discrimination as its own either.

It is true that the enjoyable commodities and the discriminatory cognition, both are the products of *prakṛti*. However, that does not mean that the *prakṛti* would continue to produce them forever. The *prakṛti* becomes and remains creative as long as it serves the purposes (*puruṣārthas*) of *puruṣa*. The *puruṣārthas* in turn remain or are sought for, as long as there exists the sense of non-discrimination (*aviveka*). Once the *aviveka* is destroyed due to the discriminatory cognition, neither enjoyment nor liberation is considered to be an end (*puruṣārtha*). Thus, the *prakṛti* is no more induced to be creative. This has been expressed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the previous *kārikās* too, where he states that ‘*prayojanam nāsti sargasya*’. Here the term ‘*prayojana*’ indicates the volition of *prakṛti* to be creative. Enjoyment and liberation both constitute the purpose (*prayojana*). However, when the *puruṣa* attains *vivekakhyāti*, neither enjoyment nor liberation poses to be its end any more, and accordingly, the *prakṛti* too does not have any volition to be creative, as it is no longer required. Attaining the cognition of the form, ‘I am perceiving the *prakṛti* as absolutely distinct from myself’, the *puruṣa* realises its essential indifferent (*udāsīna*) state of existence. This is further endorsed by the term ‘*eka*’ in the *kārikā* which stands for *puruṣa*. On the other hand, ‘*anyā*’, that is, the *prakṛti* ceases to be creative due to its transformation of the form, ‘I have been perceived by the spirit (*puruṣa*)’. Consequently, in spite of the existence of the contact or the relation of proximity

between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* no further creation takes place, due to the absence of the cause, that is, the sense of non-discrimination (*aviveka*).

XV

In the *kārikā* ‘*tena nivṛttaprasavām*’, etc. it has been stated that the pure, inactive *puruṣa* perceives the *prakṛti* devoid of its seven modes of transformation (*saptarūparahitā*). However, the question arises that how does the *puruṣa* perceive the *prakṛti* at that time? This is because the *puruṣa* then has already achieved its end by attaining the discriminatory cognition. Now one who acquires such cognition and perceives itself as distinct from *prakṛti* and also perceives the *prakṛti* as absolutely distinct from itself, immediately attains absolute liberation. Further, when one is liberated, that *puruṣa* is devoid of a body. So the question comes up that how can the *puruṣa* perceive the *prakṛti* without possessing a body. Perception is dependent on the sense organs, and thus, in turn, it requires a body. Liberated *puruṣas* are devoid of bodies. However, the *puruṣa* who has attained the *tattvajñāna* is not liberated yet, since there might be residual sufferings in the form of *prārabdha karma* which have to be waned away through one’s empirical existence and experiences, for it to be destroyed forever. This necessarily presupposes the sustenance of a body even in case of a *tattvajñānī*. However, once the *vivekakhyāti* is obtained, the indiscernibility between the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* is eradicated. Hence, the ignorance (*avidyā*) or the *aviveka* is destroyed. Creation takes place due to the contiguity of the *puruṣa* and the *prakṛti* associated with the *avidyā* and its subsequent illusory impressions. Now once the *vivekakhyāti* is obtained, the ignorance of the form of *aviveka* along with its subsequent illusory impressions are eradicated. Accordingly, neither creation, nor all that is created can exist. On that logic, the body too being an object created out of the material principle can no longer exist. We know that ‘*nimittāpāye naimittikasyāpi apāyah*’, that is, the absence of the instrumental cause leads to the absence of the effect. That is, due to the eradication of the ignorance (*aviveka*), the objects created due to the assistance of the ignorance cannot exist either. So the absence of bodies in case of the liberated *puruṣas* continues to be an issue, and hence, the entire contention discussed so far comes to a question mark, as in neither of the cases, it is possible for the *puruṣa* to perceive the *prakṛti*.

In the above context it might be argued that ‘*tattvajñāne api na mucyate*’³⁰, that is, even after the attainment of *tattvajñāna*, *puruṣa* would not be completely liberated since, it has not yet experienced the results of all its previous actions.

Though *tattvajñāna* acts as the instrumental and final cause of liberation, yet the existing results of actions (*prārabdha karmaphala*) act as impediments towards liberation. Thus, an individual does not become liberated the moment after attaining *tattvajñāna*. Liberation is actually attained after the waning away of the results of the previous actions through experiences. The *tattvajñāna* cannot destroy all actions. So the natural question is that then how would the waning away of actions and their results be possible. Actions and their results could only be destroyed through sufferings and enjoyment, that is, through experiences (*bhoga*) only. Thus, even after attainment of *vivekajñāna*, if the results of previous actions await to be experienced, then one can attain liberation only after the destruction of those fruits of actions through experiences. In view of the above, the opponents might claim that the *tattvajñāna* then cannot be considered to be the instrument of liberation at all. It is mentioned in the *śāstras* that, ‘*nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakotiśatairapi*’³¹. That is, even if one acquires thousands of bodies over repeated births, the fruits of the actions that are already in store cannot be destroyed, until and unless they are waned away through sufferings and enjoyment. Now if such a view is admitted, then it is to be accepted that ‘*tattvajñānamna mokṣasāadhanam*’³². Further such admission would lead to the falsification of the claim previously made by the Sāṃkhya philosophers that the distinctive cognition of the products of *prakṛti* (*vyakta*), primordial *prakṛti* (*avyakta*) and consciousness (*jñā*) act as the instrument of liberation.

An individual acquires the cognitions of *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *jñā*, and with tremendous effort and practise also acquires the distinctive knowledge between them. Even then, however, the person cannot attain liberation, since her/his previous actions and their results are still in store for the person to go through that and experience those. When all the stored actions (*karma*) and its results (*phala*) are waned away through experience, then only one can attain liberation. Now such a state-of-affairs reduces the idea of attainment of liberation to nothing but utopia. The amount of actions and their impressions (*karmāśaya*) that have accumulated over ages, are impossible to be determined and eradicated. The term ‘*āśaya*’ means impressions (*saṃskāra*). The impressions acquired due to actions are *dharma* and *adharmā*. It is also impossible to determine when those actions would yield their fruits. So if it is held that after the destruction of such insurmountable amount of actions and impressions only one can attain liberation, then the attainment of such end appears to be practically impossible. Moreover,

which impression (*karmāśaya*) would fructify at what time, that is, whether in the present life or in the next life or in some other life after hundreds of years, there is no regulation to that. Thus, considering the above scenario, liberation not only seems to be an indefinitely far off end, rather it is reduced to a fiction. The individual would continue to perform actions and accordingly, there would not be any end to the impressions gathered due to the current actions along with the previously acquired ones. Hence, the stream of impressions being unending, liberation would never be attainable. An even more significant point is that there is no definite time-frame to determine which *karmāśaya* would produce the intended state of existence. Certain impressions might start bearing fruits from the current birth itself, whereas the other impressions might start fruition from the next birth, while others may even remain dormant for ages at a stretch and then be ready to produce the intended results of the actions performed perhaps hundreds of births ago. Thus, a person would be undergoing numerous rebirths to experience the fruits of the previous actions and along with that continue to perform further actions which in turn would again produce the respective impressions. Thus, along with the heap of impressions previously acquired, enormous amount of impressions would continue to add up to those. Consequently, the waning away of the entire impressions would never be possible and the hard-earned discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*) would be rendered meaningless.

XVI

In response to the above criticisms, Īśvarakṛṣṇa puts forward the following *kārikā*-‘*samyagiññānādhiḡamāt dharmādināmakāraṇaprāptaui tiṣṭhatisaṃskāravaśātcakrabhramivaddhrtaśarīraḥ*’³³. He states that one must have a clear knowledge of the nature of *tattvajñāna* first, before proceeding to raise objections. If one actually realises the nature and the power of *tattvajñāna*, the objections raised would simply dissolve. It is true that there are innumerable actions and their impressions stored over ages, and there is no definite regulation regarding their fructification, yet the power of the discriminatory cognition (*tattvajñāna*) is such that after its production it renders all the past impressions ineffective. They cannot further lead to fructification. Due to the strength of the ultimate cognition, the previous impressions are reduced to dysfunctional states just like a burnt seed which can never produce a sapling. The sense of non-discrimination or ignorance is the root cause of the fructification of the impressions. However, with the production of the perfect cognition

(*vivekakhyāti*), all sorts of ignorance are eradicated. Consequently, no new impressions are produced, the actions that are performed then are free from ignorance and hence, does not further add to the impressions, and accordingly, the previously acquired impressions of actions start to wane away. Due to the effect of *tattvajñāna*, the age-old impressions of actions are burnt out, which then lose their capacity to produce further impressions or to fructify into results. Thus, the tremendous power of the perfect knowledge renders all the impressions, generated due to ignorance, ineffective, however immense and deep-rooted they might be.

In the above context Vācaspati Mīśra refers to the analogy of the burnt seed and explicates how the discriminatory cognition eradicates the beginningless and unending stream of ignorant impressions. We know that seeds are sown on the ground after the ground is drenched by water. If the seed is intact, then on sowing it produces a sapling after some time. Now if the seed is burnt, then even sowing it on a fertile ground would not lead to the production of the sapling. Here the impressions (*karmāśaya*) are equivalent to the seeds. The intellect (*buddhi*) or the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as such is equivalent to the ground or the field. The *pañcakleśa* namely, *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveṣa* and *abhiniveśa* are like the water that is used to drench the ground. The intellect becomes active in the presence of these five *kleśas*, which in turn help the impressions to fructify. Those five modes (*kleśa*) being intact in the intellect from time immemorial, the impressions have continued to produce the fruits of enjoyment and sufferings in the intellect. However, when the *tattvajñāna* is produced, the intellect no longer remains active due to the eradication or burning down of the five *kleśas* by the perfect cognition. The intellect then exists as an infertile ground and the impressions can longer produce the fruits of actions leading to bondages of the individual.

Now in the first part of the *kārikā* it has been stated that due to the effect of the ultimate perfect cognition, the impressions no longer remain the causes of sufferings and enjoyment. The term '*karmāśaya*' stands for *dharmādharmā*. Such *karmāśaya* has been compared to the seeds. When the *tattvajñāna* reduces the *karmāśaya* to a state like that of a burnt seed, it can no longer lead to fructification. Again Vācaspati Mīśra holds that the *tattvajñāna* makes the intellect turn into a barren ground by burning out the *pañcakleśa* and hence, the intellect being free from ignorance, *dharmādharmā* cannot fructify further. Apparently there seems to be an inconsistency in the above two explanations held

by Vācaspati Mīśra in the context of the analogy of the burnt seed. Initially, it has been mentioned that the impressions become ineffective like the burnt seed, and hence, cannot fructify anymore. Again it has been stated that the intellect is reduced to an infertile ground by the *tattvajñāna*, and hence, the impressions cannot fructify any further. Now if the first explanation is admitted, then it is to be understood that in spite of the presence of the fertile or active intellect due to the *pañcakleśa*, the impressions themselves being like the burnt seeds, cannot fructify anymore and if the second interpretation is considered, then it is to be noted that the impressions in spite of remaining intact, cannot fructify. This is because the *tattvajñāna* turns the intellect into a dry land which is devoid of the *pañcakleśa* and hence, cannot remain active anymore. However, both the above positions have been admitted by Vācaspati Mīśra himself. Thus, in order to remove the apparent inconsistency, it could be said that we have to clearly understand the phenomenon of the impressions being reduced to a state like that of a burnt seed. The term ‘*dāha*’, which generally means burning, here refers to the act of eradication of all that is associated with ignorance. Thus, when it is referred to as burnt impressions *etc.*, it actually means that though the impressions are capable of fructification, yet due to the eradication of the associates of ignorance, which help in fructification, the impressions are rendered dysfunctional forever. Thus, the admission of the above interpretation of the analogy frees it from the apparent inconsistency referred to above. Hence, it can be claimed that due to the attainment of the perfect discriminatory cognition the impressions of the form of *dharmādharmā* lose their functionality and thus, the attainment of liberation of the knowledgeable individual (*tattvajñānī*) becomes possible.

XVII

In the present context, it is important to mention the views of Vijñānabhikṣu in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* and the commentary (*vṛtti*) of Aniruddha on the *sūtra*. Vijñānabhikṣu states that – ‘*niyatakāraṇāt taducchittirdhvāntavat/*’³⁴. Aniruddha states in his *vṛtti* to the above *sūtra* – ‘*bhavatvavivekāḍ bandhaḥ/ tathāpyavivekanāśārthaṃ dharmāṅgokaraṇāt tulyatvam/ anyathā sarvadā bandhaḥ syāt, ityat āha – niyata/ anvayavyatirekābhyām yasya tat kāraṇabhavagataṃ tadvyabhicāre sarvato’anāśvāsaḥ/ yathā dhvāntanāśāya prakāśaḥ, tathātrāpi vivekāḍavivekānāśaḥ/*. Thus, they both hold that ignorance (*aviveka*) itself is the bondage, that is, sufferings. To eradicate such ignorance, *dharmā**etc.* have been referred to. Otherwise the bondage would have continued to exist forever. The destruction of ignorance and its consequent bondage is

considered to be causally connected. Any sort of causal connection is established by the positive and negative concomitance (*anvayavyatireka*). In the above case too, that is to be done. For example, just as the rays of light destroy the darkness immediately, *vivekajñāna* too annihilates the ignorance immediately on its production.

Further, in the next *Sāmkhyasūtra* too, - '*pradhānavivekādanāvivekasya taddhāne hānam*'³⁵, it has been mentioned that due to the non-discrimination (*aviveka*) between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* there arises the sense of bondage (*bandha*). If the ignorance (*aviveka*) is destroyed, then all sorts of bondage due to the ignorance would also be destroyed. Since, *prakṛti* or *pradhāna* is the primordial cause, if the discriminatory cognition with that is attained, then the distinctive cognition with all other products of *prakṛti* will automatically be produced. This is because if there be no non-discrimination with the cause, then obviously there would not be any non-discrimination with its effects either. In the *ṛtti* to the above *sūtra* Aniruddha states that – '*vivekānmuktirityuktam/ ghaṭapaṭādīnām viveko'asmadādīnāmapyastīti sarvamuktiprasaṅga ityatrāha – pradhānā/ sarveṣāṃ mūlāṃ pradhānam, tasyāvivekādanāvivekasya sambhavaḥ/ padārthānāmanyō'anyaṃ bhavatvaviveko viveko vā, na tena bandhamokṣau, kintu pradhānavivekāvivekābhyām/ atastaddhāne pradhānavivekahāne sarvavivekahānam*'.

Now an important thing is to be kept in mind that liberation is not attained immediately on attaining the *tattvajñāna*, because due to the remaining impressions of the *prārabdha karma*, that is, the fruits of actions which are already being experienced, the individual qualified with the *tattvajñāna* continues to exist with the given body. In the current context, it may be mentioned that there are three types of actions (*karma*) - *sañcita*, *kriyamāṇa* and *prārabdha*. The actions which have already been performed at time immemorial are termed as *sañcitakarma*, meaning those which are in store or which have already been accumulated. The actions that are being performed now while experiencing the fruits of the *prārabdha karma*, are called *kriyamāṇakarma*, that is, actions which are in the act of being performed. However, if the current actions (*kriyamāṇakarma*) be something outstanding or something incredibly harmful, then its results might be experienced along with the results of the *prārabdha karma*; otherwise they are stored along with the other *sañcitakarma*. Among the *sañcitakarma* those actions which are ready to fructify are considered as

prārabdha karma and to enjoy or suffer the results of those actions, the current body of the individual is created and acquired. Now with the attainment of the *tattvajñāna*, the *kriyamāṇakarma* are not produced. Though the knowledgeable individual (*tattvajñānī*) continues to perform her/his own actions, yet those actions do not lead to the production of impressions or the consequent bondages anymore. This is because the actions of the *tattvajñānī* are no longer associated with the ignorance or its elements anymore. Thus, those activities are not really actions (*karma*) at all. More importantly, the previously accumulated actions (*anādisaṅcitakarma*) though capable of yielding results, will not do so ever again because the *tattvajñāna* have rendered all of them dysfunctional like a burnt seed. However, there is no way of avoiding the results of the *prārabdha karma* from being enjoyed or suffered. It is held that, ‘*prārabdha karmānāmbhogād eva kṣayah*’³⁶, that is, *prārabdha karma* or the action which have already started fruition, cannot be waned away other than by enjoying or suffering the fruits. Thus, the *tattvajñānīs* too have to maintain their bodies for a certain period until and unless all the fruits of their *prārabdha karma* are waned away through experience (*bhoga*).

The above notion has been explicated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the help of an analogy of the potter’s wheel, as stated in the *kārikā* as – ‘*tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāt cakrabhramivaddhṛtaśarīrah*’. A potter in order to create a jar turns the wheel with the help of a stick by means of her/his own volition and effort. This produces the spinning of the wheel, but even after the potter stops turning the wheel, it continues to spin for a while on its own due to the inertia of motion. Eventually when the inertia recedes, the spinning drops and finally the wheel stops. Similarly, in case of the *tattvajñānī*, due to the remnants of the impressions in the form of *dharmādharmā*, the fruits of the *prārabdha karma* have to be experienced till their waning, with the help of the current body. Thus, even on attaining *tattvajñāna* the embodied self has to exist for a while till all the *prārabdha karma* are destroyed. This is because, once the actions have started their fruition, they cannot be stopped any more until they get completely spent up through experiences. Such contention is proved by the *Brahmasūtras* and *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. The *Brahmasūtra*, ‘*bhogenā tu itare kṣapayitvā atha sampadyate*’³⁷, states that all those *dharmādharmā* and the respective sufferings (*pāpa*) and enjoyment (*puṇya*) which have already started to fruition, can only be eradicated through experiences (*bhoga*) and then only the *tattvajñānī* can attain liberation. Again the *Chāndogyamantra* states that ‘*tasya tāvat eva ciraṃ yāvat na vimokṣye*

*artha sampatsye*³⁸. That is, the attainment of liberation for a *tattvajñānī* is only that much distant as much time as s/he requires to wane away her/his *prārabdha karmaphala*. When the impressions and fruitions of all such actions are destroyed, the individual is freed from the body and attains absolute liberation (*videhakaivalya*). The *sañcita* and *kriyamāṇakarma* of the individual qualified with absolute knowledge (*tattvajñānī*) have already been destroyed by the effect of the absolute discriminatory cognition, and the remaining *prārabdha karma* is spent up by the experiences (*bhoga*) of sufferings and enjoyment. Thus, all sorts of *karma* and its impressions being destroyed or spent up, there remains no necessity of the body, and hence, the absolute knower (*tattvajñānī*) is freed from the body too. However, during the period of maintaining the body and experiencing the fruits of the *prārabdha*, the absolute knower becomes capable of perceiving the *prakṛti* in its almost primordial essence, that is, devoid of the modes of transformation, and thus the spirit or the consciousness exists as a mere detached witness. In this context Vedānti Mahādeva in his *vṛttisāra* of the *Sāṃkhyasūtra* 1/57 states that – ‘*nanu prakṛtipuruṣāviveka eva cet prakṛtisamyogadvārābandhahetuḥ, tayorviveka eva cenmokṣahetustarhi dehādyabhimānasattve’api mokṣaḥ syāt, sa ca śrutyādiviruddhastatrāha – pradhāneti/ puruṣe pradhānāvivekāt kāraṇādyo’anyāviveko buddhidehādyaviveko jāyate kāryāvivekasya kāryatayā anādikāraṇāvivekamūlakatvāt tasya pradhānāvivekahāne satyavaśyamityarthaḥ*’³⁹.

XVIII

Finally, in order to clarify all sorts of objections and inconsistencies raised so far, and to conclude his contention of the entire *Sāṃkhya śāstra* in an organised manner, Īśvarakṛṣṇa asserts that – ‘*prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivṛtau/ aikāntikamātyantikamubhayaṃ kaivalyamāpnoti*’⁴⁰. The apprehension was that if the absolute knower has to maintain his bodily existence in order to experience the remnants of the previous impressions then how would the individual attain absolute liberation? That is, *kadā tasya mokṣa bhaviṣyati?* One cannot be considered as liberated in the actual sense of the term, as long as the self is embodied. The final freedom from the body (*videhamukti*) is termed as absolute liberation. The absolute knower may be referred to as the *jīvanamukta*, as long as s/he maintains the body for the experience of the *prārabdha*.

Here the obvious question that comes up is that when will the absolute knower attain the absolute liberation. In response, Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that ‘*prāpte*

śarīrabhede’ etc. in the *kārikā*. The impressions of the previously accumulated actions (*anādisaṅcitakarma*) which have not yet fructified in this birth, have all been rendered ineffective like a burnt seed due to the effect of the absolute discriminatory cognition. The actions which had started to fructify, that is the *prārabdha*, are being experienced, that is, suffered or enjoyed through. Hence, they all are being spent up. Once all of that is destroyed through experiences, the body attains distinction from that. That is, the body too gets destroyed. The body gets destroyed immediately after the moment the *prārabdha* is completely spent up. Thus, the two purposes of *prakṛti*, namely, enjoyment or suffering, that is, *bhoga* and discriminatory cognition (*vivekakhyāti*) both are fulfilled. The distinctive cognition between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* has been attained and the residual experiences of *prārabdha* have been spent up, thus, there remains nothing else for the *prakṛti* to serve. Hence, it attains its fulfilment. All purposes being achieved, there remains no further volition in the *prakṛti* to serve the *puruṣa*. Thus, the *prakṛti* ceases to evolve, that is, it becomes *nivṛttaprasavā*. Consequently, the *puruṣa* attains the absolute (*aikāntika*) and irreversible (*ātyantika*) freedom (*kaivalya*) from the trifold sufferings. Also in *Sāṃkhyasūtra* - ‘*tatra prāptavivekasyānāvṛtṭiśrutih*’⁴¹, it has been stated that due to the discriminatory cognition, inevitable and absolute cessation of sufferings is obtained. In the *vṛtti* of the above *sūtra* Aniruddha states that – ‘*puruṣārthatvaṃ darśayati – tatra/ tatra - prakṛtipuruṣayoḥ prāptavivekasya vivekajñānādanāvṛtṭi śrutih “na sa punarāvarttate”*⁴² *iti/*’.

In conclusion, it may be stated that in *Sāṃkhyatattvavivecana* of Kṣemendra, we find that the Sāṃkhya philosophers are *abhāvamokṣavādins*. That is, liberation for them is not qualified by any other state of feelings like pleasure *etc.* The absolute cessation of sufferings is considered as liberation to the Sāṃkhya philosophers. There are some philosophical schools who consider liberation to be not only the cessation of sufferings, but the state of realisation of eternal pleasure (*nityasukhaupalabdhī*). They are known as the *sukhamokṣavādins*. However, according to Sāṃkhya philosophy, the realisation of pleasure, be it eternal (*nitya*) or fleeting (*anitya*), the realisation (*upalabdhī*) itself is always non-eternal (*anitya*). Hence, liberation is not a state of realisation of eternal pleasure, rather it is the state of absolute cessation of the trifold sufferings. This has been expressed as – ‘*darśanaśaktirahitasya kriyāśaktimataḥ pradhānasyāpi puruṣeṇa saṃyogaḥ mokṣārtha puruṣasya bhinnatvena vyaktāvvyaktapurusaḥjñāne jāte pradhānasya mokṣo bhavati/*

*nityasukhopalabdhirmokṣa iti cedupalabdherapi nityānitya
vivekagrastatvādasāram/ na ca
nityasukhagocarasyāvīdyādiyatkīñcidāvaraṇabhaṅga eva puruṣārthe/ vācyaḥ
sukhānubhavasyaiva puruṣārthatvāccaitanyanīyatvenāvaraṇasyāpi
asambhavācca/ mokṣe paramānandaśrutismṛtayastu-
mokṣasāstraparibhāṣāmātrā/ duḥkhamevāsti na sukham yasmāt tadupalabhyate/
duḥkhārtasya pratikāre sukhamśajñā vidhīyate// duḥkham kāmasukhāpekṣā
sukhamduḥkhātyayaḥ smṛtaḥ/ ityādismṛtibhirduḥkhanivṛttireva sukhatvena
paribhāṣitā/ .43*

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