

CHAPTER- 7

CONCLUSION

India's nuclear programme has evolved gradually. The process of making nuclear choice arose from India's own understanding of itself and the world order. In the initial phases, Indian nuclear programme was conceived as means of economic development. Atomic science and development assumed a significant role in the technological development and the modernization of the country. However the existence of threat from nuclear China and Pakistan covert nuclear programme is ascertained as a factor for India's nuclear choice. India opted for the policy of keeping its nuclear option open by refusing to sign NPT and CTBT on discriminatory grounds in late 1990's. India's decision to conduct nuclear test in 1998 and self declared as a nuclear weapon state is an important transition from its past stand on nuclear weapon for development purpose only. Rather it was a logical culmination of a decade long evolution of strategy which was influenced by increasing hostile security environment, biased nuclear regime and India's quest for nuclear identity.

The rationale behind India's need for nuclear weapon is to resist any nuclear coercion or blackmail, and therefore its utility is only for self-defence. Consequently India has articulated nuclear doctrine that ascertains the political role of deterrence for its nuclear weapons. India's nuclear doctrine attributes to NFU posture and considers nuclear weapons as a political weapon and not for war fighting. To deter its adversaries, is in fact the essence of Indian strategic culture. The NFU policy indicates the intention of India to maintain the strategic stability in the region and signals out to both its nuclear armed neighbours to follow the path of restraint.

The operational nuclear strategy as flow from India's nuclear doctrine provides the least risk option in a situation where nuclear weapons are present. India nuclear deterrence is premised on a small nuclear stockpile that is not on hair trigger alert thus make

it less possible for accidental use or miscalculation. Along with India's commitment towards no first use and if used for punitive retaliation then the nuclear doctrine in the first place seeks to limit the odd of nuclear use. Unlike any other nuclear power India is the only state that has doctrinal commitment to abolish the nuclear weapons. Universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is India's national security objective. India has pursued the goal of complete abolition of nuclear weapons in order to overcome security threat as well as to ensure greater prospect for international peace and stability.

Considering social constructivists emphasis on socially constructed nature of actor, the interaction between international actors, and developments of state interests and identity and how they change with interaction, has been taken as a base to assert how India's nuclear behaviour is motivated by a variety of interest rooted in her identity. India was among those nations in the world who feared weapon of mass destruction though realizing the potential use of nuclear power for development purpose. India has portrait herself as a peace loving country following the principle of non-violence and focused on development. India advocated universal nuclear disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons.

Both formal and informal mechanisms of the non-proliferation regime had restricted Indian nuclear development. The impact of regime is through the constitutive procedure of definition and categorization. A certain definition of proliferation as the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five NWS was enshrined as a global norm. India was aware of the inequality of this nuclear order. Since India had not tested by 1967, the regime made available only one identity—that of a NNWS, an identity India could not accept since it was engaged in establishing deterrence with China and Pakistan. As the regime became hegemonic, India was pressurized to conform to the behavior expected of a NNWS. Thus, the growing power of the regime became a hindrance to national interest as well as security issue for India.

India tried to escape being categorized either as a NNWS by testing a nuclear device or as a NWS by imputing peaceful purposes to the 1974 test. Global anti-nuclear norms were first tested in 1974 when India exploded a so-called peaceful nuclear device,

while accusing the NPT of establishing 'nuclear apartheid'. India regarded the NPT as a 'discriminatory treaty', imposing a different set of rules on nuclear states and non-nuclear weapons states that had different rights and obligations. India remained a critic of the international order embodied in the NPT, challenging it from outside while developing nuclear devices and keeping the nuclear option open until its second nuclear tests in 1998. India's 1998 test series was followed by a declaration by the PM Vajpayee that India is a nuclear weapon power India cannot simply declare itself a NWS on fulfilling certain technical requirements. This status is inter-subjective and is enforced through particular procedures. The official US response to India's self declaration was a direct rejection of India's nuclear status as a nuclear weapon state.

India had always adhered to the NPT provisions under Article I, III, and VI which is applicable to nuclear weapons states only. India has a sound non proliferation record, has abided by the nuclear safeguards and has vigorously pursued negotiations for global disarmament and remains committed to nuclear weapon free world.

India's posture against the CTBT is also characterized by a similar argument as of NPT. India rejected the CTBT and presented an argument that it was discriminatory in character and decisively flawed as test ban treaty locks in the capabilities of the nuclear weapons states without requiring a reduction or freeze on the quantity of their weapons. India claims its objectives for a test ban treaty have always been linked to eventual disarmament and the CTBT has failed to meet Indian concern.

Along with bias nuclear regime it was the economic backwardness that encouraged India to the nuclear path. The colonial experience and the Cold War politics led P.M Nehru to choose the path of non-alignment in foreign policy and self-reliance in economic policy. Nehru's vision of India as a modern economically developed nation was implemented by Bhabha of their plan to modernize the nation through the application of modern science. Atomic power seemed only route to modernize India. The 1974 test was immediately declared to be a "Peaceful Nuclear Explosion" because of the fear of economic

sanctions. Economic sanctions were also seen as a security threat because they have negative effect on economic and technical progress. India's strategy has been to counter them through indigenous capability, particularly in nuclear technology. The 1974 test, for instance, was seen as "part of an industrial plan aiming at eliminating the need for foreign aid" (Times of India, 1974). and a step towards "substantial step towards self-reliance."(Lok Sabha Debate 1974, p. 234)

In the 1990s, the international community began to expect that stronger economic relationships would restrain India's nuclear ambitions. If the nuclear program were accelerated the country would be isolated internationally, which would harm the economic interests of India. But, strikingly, this was the time that the government began to speed up the nuclear weapons program and started secret preparation for test. In 1995 ultimate disclosure and subsequent pressure from the US halted test preparations. The test was planned by the same Congress government who had liberalized the Indian economy.

The shift in discourse with economic liberalization facilitated the test. As the state withdrew from its developmental role, its regulatory role became more prominent. There was a dramatic u-turn in official state discourse. India emerged as a 'normal state', simultaneously participating in the global market and putting national security first (Sarkar, 1998, p. 1729). India's shift towards 'normalcy' helped reassure the world about the behavior of a nuclear India. India's extensive civilian nuclear power program, which can produce fissile material, help supplement the costs of a weapons program. However the historical Civil Nuclear Deal (2007) between India and US within a decade of India's 1998 nuclear test was possible because of US interest In India's expanding economy.

India's security perception vis-a vis China and Pakistan is very important to understand India's nuclearisation process. Prime Minister Nehru was determined not to use nuclear weapons for war fighting but at the same time he could not discard the possible need in future if India is threatened or blackmailed. This laid the foundation of India's nuclear programme. In the initial years India's nuclear programme was for peaceful use with no

military intentions. However India's defeat in 1962 border war with China and Chinese nuclear test in 1964 had serious impact on the Indian decision making process and India's stand on nuclear issues started shifting. India's (self) assertion of China (other) as an aggressor and an expansionist country with nuclear capabilities was reaffirmed by Chinese support to Pakistan during Indo-Pakistan war 1965 and 1971 when China threatened to open the second front. The threat of the two front war raised its head for the first time. In a hypothetical situation of nuclear asymmetry where a nuclear armed state threatens or blackmail non nuclear state without the fear of retaliation can be perceived as India subjected to Chinese blackmail. These perceptions aggravate India's march towards nuclear weapons as India embarked on its first attempt to acquire nuclear weapon capability through Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project.

India's (self) identification of Pakistan as a threat (other) can be perceived on the ground that, along with unsolved Kashmir dispute, which continues to be the bone of contentions between two neighbors. The development of Pakistan nuclear weapon programme which Pakistan consider as an "equaliser" against India's conventional military superiority has increased Indian suspicion. Emergence of Pakistan as a front line state in the war against Soviet force in Afghanistan in 1980's created a sense of apprehension but the most important aspect was the transfer of Pakistani's nuclear weapon programme from civilian ruler Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to military reestablishment headed by Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq altogether acquired more sinister dimensions.

To add to India's agony, the growing China-Pakistan military alliance was seen as steps to counter India or rather restrain India. Chinese clandestine proliferation of know-how and design of nuclear bomb and sale of missiles to Pakistan was seen as a security threat to India. Pakistani weapon tested by Chinese in Lop Nor test site in 1990's heightened India's threat perception. India's articulations of these countries have created a self-fulfilling prophecy on the hostile intentions of China and Pakistan regarding the nuclear developments in these countries which drove India towards exercising overt nuclear option.

India's nuclear evolution is marked by confusion and uncertainty. Its engagement with international nuclear order started with the anti nuclear stand, opposing nuclear testing and advocating abolition of weapon of mass destruction. India was at foremost during the discussion to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and enthusiastically participated in the negotiations on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), but eventually decided not to sign the NPT in 1968 when it became apparent that it would become an unequal treaty.

The first nuclear test conducted by India in 1974 though officially termed as 'peaceful nuclear explosion', prompted the NPT members countries to set up the Nuclear Supply Group in 1975 in order to govern the supply of nuclear material and technology to non NPT members. The 1998 tests was seen as "a double setback" for peace in South Asia and for international efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and control of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Despite its past, today, India is well on its way to becoming an integral part of the international nuclear order, both in its strategic and civilian nuclear programs. Sustained nuclear dialogue with the United States began in 2005, when President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh began discussing nuclear cooperation. This engagement led to a new Indo-US partnership, which, in turn, redefined the Indian engagement with the international nuclear order. After years of sustained negotiations, India and the US announced Indo-US nuclear deal in 2005, and eventually signed it in October 2008. This nuclear deal virtually ended the Indian isolation in the global nuclear order.

The bargain that the two countries had struck was a useful compromise, India didn't have to give up its nuclear weapons to be part of the international nuclear order nor had the NPT to be rewritten to accommodate India. The culmination of the deal did not lead to the breakdown of the NPT system rather, the deal was rationalised on the grounds that it does not undermines but strengthens the nonproliferation regime both in India and United States.

The Indo-US nuclear deal symbolised transformation of India's nuclear identity, from a pariah to partner in nuclear non-proliferation. US President George Bush acknowledged India as a "responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" and thereby expressing an implicit recognition to India's nuclear identity which was further indorsed by other nations who have signed civil nuclear deal with India. As of 2016, 14 nations have signed civil nuclear deal, France, Russia, Canada, Kazakhstan United Kingdom, Australia and Japan to name few.

The next step for India's integration with the global nuclear order was its inclusion in the four export control bodies, out of which India has been included in MTCR and WA and Australian Group in 2017 except NSG. Though, India received NSG waiver in 2008 which felicitated civil nuclear agreements and cooperation with more than dozen countries.

India's inclusion is facilitated by its non-proliferation credentials and India fulfills the criteria to be inducted in these regimes. Getting membership to these influential strategic groups have placed India in a position to bargain its entry into NSG. India, as a responsible nuclear power, has on a number of occasions expressed its strong commitment to preventing proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. Its entry into the MTCR and the other three export control bodies allow India to live up to that commitment. Wassenaar Arrangement would also give India an opportunity to take leadership role in preventing these technologies going in hands of terrorists. These developments make India's case much stronger in the next plenary session of NSG in June 2018. India's accession into the global regimes, will go a long way in raising the credibility of both India as a responsible stakeholder and the regime as open and inclusive within the global nuclear order.

The two and a half decades of restraint exercised by India after exhibiting its nuclear capacity in 1974 until its second nuclear explosion in 1998 is itself an exceptional example. Building up on a record of nuclear restrained behaviour and a peaceful image of itself proved crucial in facilitating a positive image of India nuclear past. Moreover the

exceptional Indo-US deal asserted that India has drawn resourcefully on its history to complete the journey from nuclear rogue to nuclear partner. The nuclear deal virtually ended the Indian isolation in the global nuclear order. The bargain that the two countries had struck was a useful compromise, India didn't have to give up its nuclear weapons to be part of the international nuclear order nor had the NPT to be rewritten to accommodate India.

7.1. SUMMARY ANALYSIS

The main objectives of this study is to examine the motives and dynamics of India's quest for nuclearization and to what extent threat perception factored in India's nuclear policy and to highlight the ways India's nuclear identity has been transformed and how it has transformed. India's threat perception is an important ingredient in determining the security parameters since India is surrounded by nuclear armed states like China and Pakistan. With socially constructed security discourse framework India's national interest and identity is transformed. Since the identity of state depends on its preference and its actions. Social identity can explain the choices made by states as interests and preferences of the states can also be explained by identities.

Discourse of India's nuclear policy

The newly independent India considered nuclear weapons to not only threatened global security but also human values. Such a worldview was put forward clearly by India's first PM Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru who took a pronounced stance in international institutions for total and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. At the same time, Nehru was equally aware of the importance of atomic energy in industrial development. In the meantime, the Indian scientists developed the technological means producing nuclear technology that can be used for peaceful purposes of meeting energy needs and industrial development. To a nation that just came out of 200 years of colonial domination, atomic energy symbolised modernity, national prowess and international leverage.

But in the aftermath of the India-China Border war, it became increasingly clear to India that the present nuclear strategy was not sufficient and thereby India started seeking

positive nuclear assurances from great powers. During the 1960s and 1970s the massive cost of a nuclear program prevented India from considering nuclear option. The security perception started developing in India with perceived Chinese and Pakistani nuclear threats. Shastri succeeded Nehru as the Prime minister of India. He followed a guarded approach towards India's nuclear programme, resisting domestic pressure within and outside his party and stuck to no weapons policy.

Under the leadership of Indira Gandhi, in May 1974 India conducted its first nuclear test. India garbed the tests under normative overtures by describing the 1974 tests as Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) and named it 'Smiling Buddha'. The magnitude of international reactions surprised India. To prevent the international sanctions and increasing cost of nuclear build-up India exercised nuclear restraint for next 24 years. It was the fear of economic sanctions and the huge cost of nuclear weapons programme, which prevented India from going nuclear out rightly. Furthermore, there were external pressures and also political costs of crossing the nuclear threshold.

India's nuclear programme was revived after the coming in power of the young Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1984. He allowed modernization of India's nuclear programme by giving a green signal to The 'Missile man of India' A.P.J. Kalam to start Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme in 1983. He continued the policy of nuclear ambiguity throughout the 1990s. The 1990s witnessed a time of political turmoil for Indian system wherein three governments changed within a span of six years. However, there was no drastic change in India's nuclear posture. It remained ready to explode and yet under the carpet.

Thus, from independence to 1998 nuclear tests, India's nuclear policy displayed four major elements - opposition to military use of nuclear weapons, time bound programme for complete and global nuclear disarmament, developing nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes and opposition to the discriminatory nuclear regimes and treaties. But at no point of time in India's nuclear history did India thought of giving up nuclear weapons.

India's elimination of nuclear weapons programme was subject to a total and universal nuclear disarmament.

During most of India's post-independence period the nuclear question was viewed as a taboo trade-off between its moral integrity as a non-nuclear weapons state on the one hand, and the pursuit of power politics on the other. But during the 1980s and 1990s, the choice was gradually reframed as the nuclear taboo was broken for the shackle of moral values attributed to the possession of nuclear weapons and the quest for an international recognition became evident.

The objective of India's nuclear diplomacy has radically transformed after the tests. Until 11 May, the purpose was to create and sustain the option to make nuclear weapons when needed. Since Pokhran II, the diplomatic task has been to defend India's nuclear deterrent, reduce the political and economic fallout of exercising India's nuclear option, and eventually gain international acceptance of its new status as a nuclear power (Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 225).

Threat Perception vis-a-vis China and Pakistan

The threat perception is an important ingredient in determining the security parameters of any state specially one surrounded by nuclear states. India has fought conventional wars' in the past with its two nuclear armed neighbours China and Pakistan. Moreover, India found itself in a precarious situation where it was threatened by China's overt and Pakistan's covert nuclear capabilities with their common interests to deter India. India locates its rationale for the 1998 nuclear test in the so called threat from China heightened by alleged Sino-Pakistan strategic level nuclear and missile collaborations. The perception of oneself (India) with regard to other in this case China and Pakistan is seen in the light of India's nuclear quest.

China's ever rising economy and its aggressive political and military posture along with its nuclear modernisation and its unresolved border dispute adds to India's critical view of other that is China as a threat.

- India is conscious of the fact that China is a nuclear weapon state and maintains one of the world's largest armies.
- Its massive economic strength and its growing influence in international order.
- Its nuclear modernisation is rapidly transforming the technological quality and has the strength to reach strategic part of India.
- China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear programme and the sale of missiles and missiles technology to Pakistan also directly affects India's security.
- China has its nuclear weapons stockpiled in Tibet right along India China borders.
- China's no first use policy is view in suspicion as it clearly stated that its no first use policy is directed towards non nuclear weapon state and not applicable to nuclear possessor like India.

The other threat India perceives is from Pakistan, Pakistan has considered India as its enemy since the partition in 1947 and the evolution of Pakistan nuclear policy is driven by desire to match with India nuclear programme. India's security concern with regard to Pakistan revolves around on border dispute specially Kashmir issue, terrorism and failed diplomacy. Pakistan 'first-use policy' is seen as directed towards India to decrease India's conventional superiority.

India is conscious of Pakistan's nuclear capability which has equalizer effect on its conventional force.

- Pakistan's increasing nuclear arsenal is India specific and nuclear weapons in the hands of Pakistani military leaders who have repeatedly declared that they would resort to the use of nuclear weapons in a war with India if conventional defenses fail.
- Pakistan's mobilizes terrorist activities in India and the increasing violence in Kashmir due to cross border terrorism.
- Pakistan's intentions to engage India with unsettled border dispute specially Kashmir dispute.

- Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities and the fear of terrorist getting access to nuclear weapons in Pakistan adds to India's critical view of other that is Pakistan as a threat.

The security related motives in 1960's has been crucial in setting up the strategic parameters for India's nuclear build up. Several events like India's humiliating defeat in India-China war in 1962 followed up with first Chinese nuclear test of 1964, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 when China supported Pakistan and threatened India to open the second front along the Himalayan border. Gradually in 1970's China's clandestine involvement in the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme contrary to international standards laid down by NPT, emerged as a decisive factor in the national interest composition that determined India's nuclear course.

Identity factor for nuclear quest

The concept of identity is socially constructed and exists simply because actors ascribe specific meaning to them. Within the context of India's developing post-colonial identity, biased norms in the international framework have proved to be the vital component in its socially constructed understanding of its status in the world. India's strong emphasis on equality collided with the global nuclear order which formally materialized nuclear regime (Non Proliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) which explicitly restrict official nuclear status to five powers and thereby denies nuclear status to country like India.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime facilitated India's forging of non weaponised nuclear deterrence and its choice to go for overt nuclearisation in 1998. The regime's categorization of states into Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States structured the Indian quest for nuclear weapons. For instance India saw NPT as a victory of China and its perception of China was intensified by its recognition as a NWS identity by the non proliferation regime as China refused to enter into bilateral discussion with India on

nuclear issues on the ground that India was NNWS and raise the issue in multilateral forum. India learned that it would not be taken seriously unless India's nuclear status is unambiguous. By refusing to sign discriminatory NPT as a NNWS India denied the inferior position of nuclear have not states and decided to exercise its nuclear option and self declared as a nuclear weapon state after 1998 nuclear test. The perceived inherent injustice of the international nuclear order and its quest for nuclear identity was the major driving force for India's overt nuclearisation.

Responsible Nuclear Behaviour

The NPT lays out the expected behavioural norms for its signatories which remain significant in understanding the nuclear responsibility. The treaty recognizes five permanent members as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) as they had tested their nuclear device before 1 January 1967 and the remaining other states are identified as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). NPT allocates different responsibility to NWS and NNWS, the nuclear haves have the responsibility to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms race and disarmament but have the responsibility to share the benefits of the peaceful use of atomic energy with have not states. On the other hand NNWS have the responsibility to not to produce nuclear weapon but retains the right to peaceful use of atomic energy for civilian purpose.

India first tested its nuclear device though a peaceful one in 1974 after seven years from the benchmark year of 1967 recognition as NWS, therefore India is not recognized as NWS but posses nuclear weapon after the nuclear weapon test in 1998. India has criticized the inherent injustice of the international nuclear regime categorization of nuclear have and nuclear have not and India has always opposed the discriminatory character of the treaty on the ground that the de facto nuclear weapon states have no constrains to vertical proliferation as NPT fails to focus on the universal nuclear disarmament and all other types of proliferation.

Although India has defied NPT and has been safeguarding its own nuclear programme, it has never sought to destabilize the non-proliferation regime by proliferating

nuclear weapons, material or technology. India has always and successfully maintained a distinction between non proliferation treaty and non-proliferation. As India's commitment to the three pillars of NPT namely non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament is commendable

India has voluntarily declared moratorium to further nuclear testing after 1998. India has abided by NPT, for example Article I obliged the NWS not to transfer nuclear weapons or any explosive device to other state and not to assist any state to manufacture these weapons. India has abided with the Article III of the NPT which prohibits diversion from civil use of nuclear energy to production of nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device and the parties to the treaty is required to abide by the guidelines of IAEA safeguard with regards to the transfer of nuclear materials, technology and equipments to other state. India agreed to implement the IAEA safeguards in 2009 which involved the separation of its civil and military facilities and has placed nineteen of its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguard. In accordance to Article IV of NPT India is committed to support NNSW parties to the NPT in their right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. This is noteworthy in light of the fact that Article IV is a core part of the bargain within NPT between NWS and NNWS.

As part of its nuclear policy India has taken up various steps to develop a voluntary nuclear export controls. India has passed several laws since 1960's but the most recent being Weapon of Mass Destruction and their Delivery System Act of 2005. India has additionally taken steps to prohibit the export of dual use items and has permitted the export of dual use items only under license. India has updated its Special Chemical, Organism, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SOMET) which is the list of dual use items to meet the standards of NSG and MTCR.

Nehru was the first leader to call for an immediate suspension of all nuclear weapons after US exploded its hydrogen bomb in 1954. Ever since then every successive Indian Government despite belonging to different parties have championed the call for worldwide nuclear disarmament. India was a passionate advocate of disarmament in the UN

and other forums and had taken numerous initiatives which were aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons.

In 1950's India had introduced several disarmament initiatives either on its own or jointly within various UN organs, These initiatives included: (1) a Draft resolution on "Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" to the General Assembly in 1948. (2) A Draft resolution on "Declaration on the Removal of Threat of a New War and the strengthening of Peace and Security among Nations" in 1949. (3) Standstill Agreements in 1954. (4) "Dissemination of Information on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the Effects of Experimental Explosions of Thermonuclear Bombs" in 1955. (5) "Cessation of All Explosions of Nuclear and Other Weapons" in 1956. (6) "Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear tests in 1959 and (7) a draft resolution on the "Directives on General and Complete Disarmament" in 1959.

Likewise from 1960's to 1970's India presented four disarmament initiatives to the UN. They were: (1) a draft resolution "Question on Disarmament in 1961. (2) a request for the agenda item "The Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests" in 1962. (3) "Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" in 1964, and (4) Resolution 2028 presented by India and seven other nations "A Treaty to Prevent the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" in 1965.

In 1988, PM Rajiv Gandhi came up with Action Plan for a nuclear free World at the third UN Special Session on Disarmament. The Action Plan covered all areas of disarmament including space weapons, conventional arms, chemical and biological weapons, concentrated on nuclear disarmament which was to be implemented within a time-bound framework.

India is committed to moratorium on further testing, has announced a no first use policy and has declared her intention to participate in a FMTC in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Further India has undertaken to institute stringent export controls on nuclear and missile related technology. Like NWS who have advanced nuclear technological base, India has also adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 - UNSC Resolution 1540 imposes binding obligation on states to adopt domestic legislations to

prevent proliferation of nuclear. Chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent their illicit trafficking. India had adopted domestic legislation like 'The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act' in June 2004. Although India's multilateral disarmament diplomacy has been more mute and low profile, even though India continues to support efforts to discuss nuclear disarmament in the CD and has expressed her willingness to participate in any negotiations to limit and reduce nuclear weapon at appropriate time.

India's integrations into nuclear world order

Indian leaders had carefully constructed a responsible and restrained character of India's nuclear programme, even before the 1998 nuclear test. The long 24 years of self restrained after first nuclear test in 1974 was referred as a responsible behaviour of India who had refrain from testing and weaponization. Infact after the 1998 nuclear test, restraint became the bedrock of India's nuclear diplomacy. This can be asserted from the fact that the immediately after the test PM Vajpayee declared that India intentions have been and always will be peaceful and asserted that India's would be content with "minimum nuclear deterrent" and assured that India did not intend to build large nuclear arsenal unlike other nuclear states. Infact India would induct nuclear weapons into arm force only if it is necessary. India made it clear that it was not into any kind of arm race with any other country.

With the opening up of nuclear cooperation with the US and other countries it appears that India's status as a nuclear armed state has been recognized by the world. The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal in 2008 was the result of India's cautious diplomacy aiming to establish an identity of itself as a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons. This nuclear deal virtually ended the Indian isolation in the global nuclear order. The bargain that the two countries had struck was a useful compromise, New Delhi didn't have to give up its nuclear

weapons to be part of the international nuclear order nor had the NPT to be rewritten to accommodate India.

One of the major features of the contemporary nuclear order- apart the major treaty commitment of the NPT- is the existence of international nuclear cartels. These export control organizations have conventionally sought to confine India. Nonetheless, post-2008 India has been in negotiations to gain membership of various international export control regimes. The 2008 NSG waiver facilitate India to engage in civilian international nuclear trade and commerce. The waiver is exceptional mainly because it is the only such waiver granted by the NSG and is an acknowledgement of India's excellent non-proliferation record, despite being a non signatory to the NPT. India has abide by the NSG Guidelines and accordingly coordinate its export controls. After the 2008 waiver, India has inked several civil nuclear cooperation agreements with more than a dozen countries. India's decision to sign the 'Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation' (HCOC) on June 2, 2016 in Vienna, is yet another evident of India's exemplary record of non-proliferation which reassure India's commitments in working towards global disarmament (MEA 2016) The HCOC membership became instrumental in India's quest for MTCR membership, on June 27, 2016. As a producer and exporter of many items that comes under the control lists of Wassenaar Arrangement and India's adherence to the principles and norms of non proliferation has been well established. India also fulfilled all commitments that other NWS under NPT have met have facilitated India's membership to Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017.

Indo-US Nuclear Deal opened the door to world nuclear order. It was the recognition of India's impeccable record and unwavering commitment to non-proliferation, and India's willingness to contribute to the same cause which led the international community, including the NSG and the IAEA, to formally accept India into its fold in 2008. The next step for India's integration with the global nuclear order was its inclusion in the four export control bodies, out of which India has been included in MTCR and WA in 2016

and 2017 respectively. India is no more considered as a target of non proliferations and is regarded as a responsible partner to contain proliferation of weapon of mass destruction.

7.2. KEY FINDINGS AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES

- Ever since the emergence of independent India, India has laid emphasis on the values of peaceful co-existence, non-violence, and non-alignment and has been supporting and promoting these values. India favoured peaceful use of nuclear technology but was against military use. India advocated disarmament and non proliferation which is the reflection of India's commitment to these values.

- After 1998 nuclear test India voluntarily gave up nuclear testing, India's nuclear doctrine attributes to no first use policy while maintaining credible deterrence, India's adherence to NPT despite not being a party to the treaty is all embedded in its traditional values which have guided India's nuclear policy.

- The nuclear rivalry in South Asia consists of two dyads, India versus China and India versus Pakistan. Surrounded with both rival nuclear power India must contend with territorial dispute, history of war, periodic crisis and perceptions of mutual threat.

- India's nuclear status has not deterred China. Infact it has refused to recognise India as a nuclear state. A sort of 'cold war' rivalry between the two nuclear neighbours continues to effect its relations. China's rising defence budget rapid modernisation of its nuclear arsenal, its aggressive posture and military build-up in Tibet along the Indian border, and the strengthening of its strategic strike force have infact increased Indian apprehension.

- India's growing threat perception and security concern about China which is evident from the above analysis. Despite increasing bi-lateral ties and substantial economic cooperation between the two Asian giants China still remains a major threat to Indian security.

- The prospect of nuclear exchange between the two states is dim as both India and China have adopted the policy of minimum deterrence and have built their doctrines and

force posture around the concept of No First Use (NFU). Not to forget that that the nuclear armed states do not go to war not even conventional war because of the unacceptable risk of escalation as both India and China have the capability and potential to hurt each other.

- India's overt nuclearisation has neutralized its conventional military strength against Pakistan tested its nuclear weapon two weeks later. India and Pakistan continues to harbour rigid attitudes on Kashmir issue and has adopted dangerous tactics to counter each other. These include Pakistan's support to cross border terrorism against India and India's limited war doctrine to punish Pakistan. Both these strategies are escalatory in nature and could lead to war like situation in South Asia.

- China Pakistan alliance cannot be overlooked as its major purpose is to deter India. Apart from China's clandestine proliferation of technology, nuclear materials and warhead designs for the Pakistani bomb. China does not support India's bid for NSG membership until general rules are formulated to include other non members of NPT. This clearly indicated that China is keen to include Pakistan joining the group if India makes it to NSG and for this reason China prefers to wait for until conducive situation is created to facilitate Pakistan entry

- Trilateral nuclear risk negotiation is difficult in South Asia because China refuses to acknowledge India's nuclear status and not willing to enter into a nuclear dialogue with India therefore India should engage with bilateral nuclear risk reduction measures with Pakistan. If the bilateral relationship improves across a broader front then there is the possibility to engage China in bilateral or even trilateral nuclear risk reduction measures.

- The most significant acknowledgement of Indian responsible nuclear behaviour was a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between India and US in 2008 within a decade of India's nuclear test in 1998. India a not signatory of NPT was considered under US law for civil nuclear cooperation by modifying the requirements of Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which restricted nuclear exports to non NPT states.

- The IAEA and NSG waiver was given to India with regard to her non proliferation record and her adherence to NPT. India did not have to compromise with her

national and security interest. Resultantly it has opened new avenues of nuclear cooperation and trade with other countries.

- In the past India had blatantly opposed nuclear regime NPT and CTCBT on the ground that its discriminatory and in the name of disarmament and non proliferation the nuclear haves tried to repress nuclear developments of threshold nuclear states. India perceived this to be a threat to its national interest.

- India's non proliferation record and its adherence to NPT and the emergence of India as a major nuclear market and investment destination have changed the attitude of major nuclear countries and international nuclear regime.

- India membership to MTRC, WA and AC has facilitated to meet the electric power shortage which is required for her growing economy and industrial development. Now India is engaged with nuclear regimes for her benefit. It also indicated India's new attitude towards nuclear regimes.

- India has constructively worked on her strategies and portrayed her image of a responsible nuclear power without jeopardizing her national and security interest. India has not signed any treaty or agreements on discriminatory or unfavorable terms. The recent strict Civil Nuclear Liability Law of India is reflection of India's position of not compromising at any front.

The study asserts that while tracing the hallmarks in India's Nuclear Policy since independence, the threat perception vis-a vis China, Pakistan and the discriminatory international nuclear regimes has been the driving force for overt nuclearization and the nuclear weapons option was gradually converted from a national discourse to a strategic alternative by giving new political meanings to it by portraying itself to be a responsible nuclear power.

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