

## PREFACE

The present work entitled : 'The means of knowing a negative fact : A critical study on the theory of anupalabdhi in Indian Philosophy' is the result of an intensive and critical study on the theory of Anupalabdhi in Indian Philosophy. Regarding the means of knowing a negative fact there is difference of opinion among the scholars belonging to different schools of Indian Philosophy which is highlighted here followed by some critical and evaluative remarks.

The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals with some introductory remarks about the concept of negative fact and the means of knowing it as accepted by different systems of Indian Philosophy. In this connection the metaphysical presupposition of a particular system in advocating a particular theory as to the means of knowing a negative fact have been put forward. A clear distinction between a positive and a negative fact is made incidentally. The justification of describing the negation as a 'fact' is also given in short.

The second chapter deals with the concepts of Pramā and Pramāna with special reference to Indian Philosophy. That the

knowledge of a negative fact is Pramā and the means of knowing it is a Pramāna cannot be known unless we have a vivid idea about these concepts.

In the third and fourth chapters the views of the Advaita Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding the theory of Anupalabdhi as a Pramāna have been put forth respectively. It is to be noted that only these two schools have accepted it is a distinct form of Pramāna.

The Siddhāntapakṣa or Uttarapakṣa which is given in third and fourth chapters is questioned by other systems of philosophy who do not accept Anupalabdhi as a Pramāna. These Pūrvapakṣins have got their own reasoning for not accepting it as a separate Pramāna, but to incorporate it under perception and inference. Hence, the arguments forwarded by the Pūrvapakṣins are elucidated in the fifth chapter. In Indian Philosophical methodology no Uttarapakṣa is established without refuting the view of the Pūrvapakṣins. Hence, in the concluding chapter the views of the Pūrvapakṣins are sometimes critically evaluated and sometimes logically refuted. An effort has been made in this chapter to substantiate Anupalabdhi as a distinct form of Pramāna by refuting the opponent's view. Mostly I have tried to establish the Advaitin's and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka's position through some independent arguments which could have been forwarded by them. I have tried to give some supplementary arguments in favour of Anupalabdhi as

a distinct means of knowing a negative fact from my own standpoint, which may not be accepted by all the scholars. These arguments, though not accepted by all, might have some logical excellence in them, which I think, will be liked by the scholars in the field. If it is understandable to others, I would consider my labour as rewarded. In philosophical tradition no theory is final. Hence, each and every scholar in this field will be in a position to criticise my standpoint, which should not also be considered as final. I would like to have constructive critical and evaluative remarks for the betterment of my position which is given in this dissertation. Because, I believe that the realisation of truth is possible only through logical encounter with others ('vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ').

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