Free will debate: from illusionism to compatibilism Rajan

Abstract

The philosophy of free will is an old one. Like anything longstanding, it has been rehabilitated over time. Understanding this very fact; the present paper has three objectives, accordingly: to introduce the free will problem as it exists in recent philosophical debates; to explain how the idea of free will may be an illusion in the first place; and to speculate that critical conjecture on the same issue may help us to feel that to a great extent, we are free to take the free decision in life in order to feel that human existence may worn out the existential nihilism, and subsequently, may embrace meaningfulness. In short, we aim to explicate the contesting debate on free will and illustrate the metamorphoses in argumentive locations of illusionism and Compatibilism. Whether we believe it or not, the role of free will is a prerequisite in all courses of human ideas and action. In addition, it is also the reason that many thinkers have attributed it with the notion of ‘postulate’ without which human existence, values, and action loses their significance. In order to make this debate adventures, we aim to set a perfect balance between illusionism and indeterminism via the compatibilist position of free will. This deliberation will help us gain two results; on the one hand, it will defuse the temporary binaries available in the free will positions, and on the other hand, it will provide the philosophical locus on whether we are truly free or live under the canopy of fate.