On phenomenalism: a critical anlysis

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4634

Full metadata record

DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Sagar Ananda, B.	-
dc.date.accessioned	2022-09-15T08:25:44Z	-
dc.date.available	2022-09-15T08:25:44Z	-
dc.date.issued	2022-03	-
dc.identifier.issn	0976-4496	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4634	-
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, my aim is to analyze the theory of phenomenalism and its basic assumptions in the philosophies of Berkeley, Russell and Ayer. I will also analyze the way phenomenalism and its sense-datum theory has been opposed by Austin and Strawson. My main argument is that phenomenalism as a theory of reduction of the objects to sense-data can never be sustained because no such reduction is possible and that we can never give up the conceptual system in which the material bodies and persons are primary particulars.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	University of North Bengal	en_US
dc.subject	Phenomenalism	en_US
dc.subject	Sense-data	en_US
dc.subject	Skepticism	en_US
dc.subject	Knowledge	en_US
dc.subject	Certainty	en_US
dc.subject	Reductionism	en_US
dc.title	On phenomenalism: a critical anlysis	en_US
dc.title.alternative	Philosophical Papers, Journal of the Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVIII, March- 2022, pp- 198 - 210	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Philosophical Papers. Vol 18 (March 2022)

Files in This Item:

File	Description	Size	Format
Philosophical papers. Vol. 18 (March 2022)_15.pdf	On phenomenalism: a critical anlysis	418.78 kB	Adobe PDF	View/Open

University Library, University of North Bengal