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dc.contributor.authorBhattacharyya, Anureema-
dc.identifier.issn0976 – 4496-
dc.description.abstractThe prime focus of moral philosophy in the last four centuries had been the relation of facts to values, specifically the ethical values. The issue evolved and centered round the Humean view that ‘Ought cannot be derived from Is’. The naturalist philosophers attempted to define moral words like ‘good’ or ‘right’ in terms of natural properties. G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica criticized the naturalists’ intention of defining ethical terms with reference to factual properties. He elaborated the issue and preferred to consider moral terms as in-definable and which refer to some non-natural property knowable through intuition.en_US
dc.publisherUniversity of North Bengalen_US
dc.titleRoss’s Version of Ethical Intuitionism: A Study in The Light of Moore And Kanten_US
dc.title.alternativePhilosophical Papers, Journal of the Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, March-2020, pp. 201 - 208en_US
Appears in Collections:Philosophical Papers. Vol 16 (March 2020)

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