Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.contributor.author	Bora, Mayank	-
dc.date.accessioned	2021-10-13T11:28:32Z	-
dc.date.available	2021-10-13T11:28:32Z	-
dc.date.issued	2020-03	-
dc.identifier.issn	0976 – 4496	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4129	-
dc.description.abstract	The computational theory of mind for a few decades has been the ruling paradigm in the Analytic Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Sciences, and probably one of the most significant facets of the “cognitive revolution”. While it is believed that this is for a great part for good reasons, there are certain aspects, perhaps the most significant ones, of Mind and Cognition that may be far from being well understood within this paradigm. Searle’s Chinese Room Argument (henceforth CRA) may be seen as providing reasons why this might be the case when it comes to Intentionality and Consciousness.	en_US
dc.language.iso	en	en_US
dc.publisher	University of North Bengal	en_US
dc.title	Intentionality, Understanding, And Symbol Grounding: Searle’s Chinese Room Argument and The Limits of Computationalism	en_US
dc.title.alternative	Philosophical Papers, Journal of the Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, March-2020, pp. 151 - 164	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US
Appears in Collections:	Philosophical Papers. Vol 16 (March 2020)

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