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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Panigrahi, S. C. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-13T07:12:14Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-13T07:12:14Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2020-03 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0976 – 4496 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4120 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a part of his programme of attack upon the philosophical search for foundations is directed as an onslaught against selfknowledge. The sense of a sentence, according to Wittgenstein was given by its criteria. If so, then how is it possible to think of sentences without criteria? The possibility of self-ascription of psychological predicates is the question. The question raises several issues in philosophy, for example: the relation between the sense and the possibility of cognition, the nature of indexical expressions, the distinction between ‘I’, ‘he’ and ‘this’, logical form of ego-centric sentences in general, selfascription of psychological predicates, the other-ascription of psychological predicates etc. These issues are related to Wittgenstein’s non-cognitive theses of self ascription of psychological predicates and to the problem of self-knowledge. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of North Bengal | en_US |
dc.title | Wittgenstein On Denial of Privacy | en_US |
dc.title.alternative | Philosophical Papers, Journal of the Department of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, March-2020, pp. 38 - 42 | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
Appears in Collections: | Philosophical Papers. Vol 16 (March 2020) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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Wittgenstein On Denial of Privacy.pdf | Wittgenstein On Denial of Privacy | 612.35 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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