Reasons and Action

Let us have a look back at Hume's earlier contentions. His theory of the passions is an investigation into the nature of the causes that move us to act. The direct and indirect passions, or in other words, the feelings we have about goods and evils, and those feelings we have about ourselves and others are conative in varying degrees. It is a natural disposition with us that we desire goods as such, and desire to move away from evils as such. Similarly, we desire to help those when we love or pity, and desire to harm those towards when we feel envious and malicious. Then there are the two principles of sympathy and comparison. Just as much we enter into the feelings of others, as we compare our own condition with the fortune of others. In sympathy the imagination operates on our social nature, while in comparison on the egocentric nature of our perceptions. The whole range of indirect passions is an outcome of the double operation of the principles of sympathy and comparison. The conative efficacy of the passions with regard to the goods and evils depends on our belief that we can achieve the desired state of affairs by the actions of mind and body. The direct passions, desire and aversion, can move the will on account of that belief. We knowingly give rise to mental and bodily actions. If we have a lively idea, for that matter, believe that goods may be achieved and that evils may be averted, our passions will move us to act. Our actions then proceed from our desires or motives. Our actions conform to our characters, or our

dispositions as human beings endowed with passions. Having the character as we do have, we are the causes of our own actions. Nothing separates our characters from our acts. Any spectator, to put it differently, having observed constant union of our character and our actions would feel a necessary relation between the two, and institute a causal relation between the two items of the life-history of the agent. We are moved to act only by our desire for what we feel to be good or by our aversion from what we feel to be evil. Good and evil, or pleasure and pain are the ultimate forms of our emotional or even sensitive reaction.

Now, granted that our actions are the expressions of our character (the word being an umbrella-word covering the range possible for human nature, of his education, his direct and sympathetic experience, his station in life, sex and interests) and our passions together with our belief in our abilities move us to action; it is significant to ask what is it to be moved or to have a motive? The question is on a higher level of language than the statement that our desires are the motives of our actions. Clarifying the question, 'what it is to have a motive?' can itself be a very engaging task, and it will not be my purpose in the present content. I would rather make some general observations.

To take an example: Othello killed Desdemona. It is often said that Othello killed her out of jealousy. The phrase 'out of' is a typical motive-stating expression. Other members of the family of motive-stating expressions are 'because', 'in order to so-and-so' etc. The phrasal form 'in order to so-and-so' is adequate

also for cases of acting with a purpose. In using these locutions we seek to explain actions and thereby try to specify what it is that motivated an agent to do what he did. Assigning motives to actions is giving a certain kind of explanation of the actions performed, and in giving motivational explanations we relate the actions to a special sorts of facts. My action of getting up early in the morning in order to catch the first train to London would find a motivational explanation in the statement that I got up early in the morning out of a desire to catch the first train to London. This suggests that to give a motivational explanation of an action is to explain it as in some way due to a 'want' or a 'desire' (we may overlook the subtle differences between the two notions). Motivational explanations often imply desire in the sense that in specifying motives for actions we refer to relevant desires or wants. If any desire or want motivates an agent to do an action then the desire can be said to be the agent's motive for acting in the manner he does. This way of formulating the problem of motivation is to formulate the problem as how motives give rise to actions. There is a sense in which one can be always motivated by some desire. The question 'what was P's motive for doing A?' (where P is a person and A an action) can be answered either by specifying some desire or using some desire-implying phrase. But the important point to bear in mind in this context is that it makes no sense to ask an agent, apart from reference to some particular action or a set of actions, what motives did he have, though it does make sense to ask what does one want most at a given time,

or what desires does one feel most keenly. Such questions do make sense in being asked because desires acquire the status of motives for particular actions, by virtue of the fact that they motivate the agent to perform those actions. Now the view that motivational explanations imply desire has been held by Hume, since he appears to believe that to have a motive is to feel a passion or have a desire. And this point of view is implied by his theory of the passions. He argues his case against the view that reason alone can be our motive for action. His argument presupposes his conception of the offices of reason and the passions, to a consideration of which we shall now turn.

If we could put the matter in a terminology borrowed from Kant, it would not be false to say that, for Hume, the notion of 'practical reason' is empty, or at best a rationalistic legend. Reason, by definition, is theoretical, and hence it could never be practical. Theoretical reason is demonstration, which is the meaning of 'reason' in the strict sense of the term. In a looser application the term includes 'probable knowledge'. In other words, knowledge is either demonstrative or probable. To reason is to form a judgment as to what is logically necessary or, if we might so say, naturally necessary. The domain of reason in the sense of demonstration consists of 'relations of ideas'. The paradigm of necessary knowledge or the system of a priori propositions, where knowledge solely consists in comparing the relations among our ideas is mathematics. On the other hand, probable knowledge consists in investigating causal relations among 'matters of fact'. Human nature manifests itself

under two operations, that of the understanding and of the passions; and the understanding, Hume tells us, "exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability" (op. cit.,p.413). The disjunction of demonstration and probability exhausts the operations of the understandings, and it is one of Hume's major contentions that in neither of the senses reason can cause any action. One of the characteristics of the demonstrative operations of the understanding is that they yield "a perfect exactness and certainty" (ibid., p.71). In what does the demonstrative operations of the understanding or reasoning consist? Hume says, "All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other" (ibid.,p.73). Comparison and discovery of relations is a common feature of both demonstrative and probable reasoning, except for the fact in the case of demonstrative operations we possess "a precise standard by which we can judge of the equality and proportion of numbers" (ibid., p.71), or in other words, we are solely concerned with relations. In probable reasoning we are concerned with "existences and objects", and that makes all the difference. The non-existential nature of demonstrative reasoning is put by Hume with a greater force and clarity in the following passage from the first Enquiry: "Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid for ever retain their certainty and evidence"(p.25). If Hume may be taken to equate the body of knowledge yielded by relations of ideas with the system of mathematical propositions, we may also say that their chief propor-

tics lie in analyticity and a priori concept formation: "Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe."

The two operations of the understanding have also been referred to by Hume as two kinds of truth. In Book II of the Treatise, he writes, "Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, considered as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (p.448). There is another statement in the Book III which should be mentioned before we make any comment about Hume's conception of reason. On page 463 he says that "the operation of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing ideas and the inferring of matter of fact". Now much would depend on whether he means by the two operation of the understanding, two kinds of perceptions or the two sorts of propositions that the human mind is capable of formulating. There is much reason for this consideration. In probable reasoning we have both the relations and the objects in relation, and in such cases the mental act of comparing is more a case of having a perception that formulating a proposition. If we care to take notice of Hume's own distinction between perceiving and reasoning much confusion could later be avoided. He says, "When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a more passive admission of the impressions thro' the organs of sensation."(ibid., p.73, italics not in the text). Now if probable reason-

ing is a case of having a perception, then 'reason' becomes an umbrella word, and much of Hume's supposedly anti-rationalist dialectic loses force, because, in a sense, formulation of an analytic proposition can scarcely be contended to be a motive for action, though reason as 'perception' can sometimes be. That probable or causal reasoning can influence actions is fully endorsed by Hume in different contexts. Belief, implied by causal reasoning, is, for Hume, a vivacious idea approaching the intensity of impressions, and thus "is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passion" (ibid.,p.120). In fact, the "manner our reasonings from causation are able to operate on the will and passions" (ibid., italics ours) is one of Hume's undertakings in the section entitled 'Of the influence of belief' in the Book I of the Treatise. If the evidence is acceptable, then it becomes a little puzzling to understand why Hume would say as he does that both the operations of the understandings, demonstrative and probable, are incapable of influencing action or becoming motives.

There is another aspect of Hume's denial of the view that probable reasoning or "inferring of matters of fact" can influence action. Such reasonings involve descriptive statements, and it has been argued by Hare in recent times that such statements do not have action-guiding force, action-guiding statements are statements about matters of substance, and as such they cannot be derived from self-evident principles. Does this thesis restate in a modern form Hume's view that neither demonstrative nor probable reasoning can influence action? If Hume is taken to hold that the two kinds of

truth or operations of the mind, namely, comparing of ideas and inferring of matters of fact are a distinction between the two kinds of propositions, then Hare's thesis appears to be a higher-order formulation of Hume's view. But even if the Hume-Hare conjecture is not admissible, one point remains valid, namely, that Hume appears to deny that causal reasoning, implying belief, can influence actions. And this he cannot do. Prima facie he claims that reason is merely the ability to make inductive and deductive inferences, and he contrasts reason with passions. This is his basic dichotomy. There are grounds for arguing that the ability to make inductive inferences is not unconnected with passions and often move people to act. His denial that causal or inductive reasoning can play such a role is inconsistent with his description of our passional life. I shall try to argue this point later.

Hume's concept of 'reason' as comprising both demonstrative and non-demonstrative operations of the understanding has been an unhappy formulation. That apart, what reasons does he give for his view that reasonings of the mathematical type as well as of the causal type cannot influence actions? Let us first take the reasons concerning mathematical or demonstrative operations of the understandings.

Hume's denial that demonstrative reasoning alone is ever the cause of any action is based upon the following considerations. The "proper province" of such reasoning "is the world of ideas" and "the will always places us in that of realities" (ibid.). The domains of "demonstration and volition" as he puts are "totally remov'd, from

each other", and hence no inference from one to the other can be made. Therefore, demonstrative reasoning does not influence any actions. The argument is analogous to the relation of the non-inclusion between classes. If two classes stand in the relation of non-inclusion, then the question of inferring any member of one class from a consideration of members of another does not arise. Mutual exclusion of the worlds of ideas and realities make it impossible for any traffic from the one to the other. But doubts can of course arise as to whether demonstration and volition could be so conceived. How far, the notion of total removal of volition from demonstration can be substantiated? Is not mathematics used in mechanical operations? Hume does not deny that, but he says that " 'tis not of themselves they have any influence". He explains his statement as follows: "Mechanics are the art of regulating the motions of bodies to some designed end or purpose; and the reason why we employ arithmatic in fixing the proportions of numbers, is only that we may discover the proportions of their influence and operation" (ibid., pp.413-14). In this example, demonstrative reasoning is shown to have a directive influence, i.e., "directs our judgment concerning causes and effects" (ibid.). Obviously, a directive influence is not a promptive influence, which is precisely what Hume is denying.

To say that reason can have a promptive influence as regards to our actions is to commit oneself to the view that men are rational qua agents. Hume does not consent to any such view. On the contrary, he puts it quite categorically that "There is implanted in

the human mind a perception of pain or pleasure, as the chief spring and moving principle of all its actions" (ibid., p. 118). That there can be no passion which is indifferent to the hedonic quality of experience is a basic fact or primitive assumption of our emotional life. Hume puts it as a "general maxim" that "no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (ibid., p.373). Our emotional reactions are geared to our experience and prospect for pleasure and pain and their sources. Why this is so is an illegitimate question, and if analysis of human nature is intended as the foundation of morality, the emotional reactions natural to man, i.e., the passions, will have to be considered as prime movers, or the promptive influences. Much of Hume's negative thesis that reason 'alone' cannot be a motive for action is directed against those who hold that men qua agents are rational beings, and men's agenthood consists in acting in accordance with such mental acts that may be called instances of a priori reasoning. A human agent acts reasonably.

Let us have a look at such arguments. Samuel Clarke holds that human understanding can comprehend entities such as "eternal and unalterable relations, respects or proportions of things, with their consequent agreements or disagreements, fitnesses...etc." (British Moralists, ed. D.D.Raphael, I, p.198). No empiricist would agree with this contention because of the unexamined hypothesis concerning the limit and extent of human understanding. Granted that human mind can comprehend such fitnesses and unfitnesses that are

eternal, it remains to be shown that the same "reason of things" (ibid.,p.199) does determine human will. When Clarke says "that the same reason of things, with regard to which the will of God always and necessarily does determine itself to act in constant conformity to the eternal rules of justice, equity, goodness and truth" (ibid.), he is making a theological statement. To say that the reason of things that determines God's will does also determine human will as well would be to make an empirical claim of undecided truth-value. And Clarke does not make it. On the contrary he makes a prescription, namely, that the reason of things that 'does' determine God's will "ought also constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules" (ibid.). Where does this prescription follow from? Obviously from the theological premise of the reason of things determining God's will. And even if the case of subordination of human will to that of God does not make the argument logically valid, unless of course the premise is a value generalization. (A prescription can be validly deduced from a value generalisation together with a factual premise. This is a fairly current view.) Clarke's intention seems to have been to assert an empirical claim that human will in fact determined by, what he calls, the reason of things, except for the fact that human beings "willfully and perversely allow themselves to be over-ruled by absurd passions, and corrupt or partial affections, to act contrary to what they know is fit to be done" (ibid.). To this Hume might have answered that acts of passion are not necessarily vile, as Clarke's

argument appears presuppose. In fact, Hume rejects the popular view that acts of passion are necessarily evil, and acts of reason are necessarily good. Clarke asserts, what Hume would remark as "popular declamations" of the "suppos'd pre-eminence of reason above passion" (op. cit.,p.413).

Clarke's intended isomorphism between assenting to the reason of things and acting according to that breaks up, on his own admission, "by the natural liberty of his will" (op.cit.,I,p.200), which he finds "inexcusable and ridiculous" (ibid.,I, pp.200-201). That reason obliges man in practice is affirmed by Clarke and does this by transforming mathematical predicates into moral evaluations. He seems to take it for granted that it is "the very same in action, as folsity or contradiction in theory" (ibid.,I,p.208). Mathematical, or for that matter, logical relations hold equally of practical commitments. For Hume, this alleged deduction of "the original obligations of morality, from the necessary and eternal reason and proportions of things" (ibid.,I,p.216) would itself be an illicit one. The concept of reason implied in Clarke's argument is so characterised by absoluteness and omnipotence that the logical distinction between the two kinds of assertions, the 'ought' and the 'is', is very easily transgressed. It is one thing to say that reason ought to determine human will, and it is quite another thing to hold that reason does in fact so determine. It appears difficult to decide as to whether Clarke intends to make an empirical claim or a prescription. As regards the empirical claim Hume would be sceptical about the potency of reason, qua theoretical, in its practical em-

employment. Reason cannot be both regulative and constitutive of human conduct, and since the theoretical-practical dichotomy cannot be overridden, Clarke's 'ought' scarcely be said to imply 'can'.

Closer to Hume was Thomas Reid; and though he was one of Hume's chief critics, yet he presents a case of a mitigated rationalist claim. Since there is no exercise of reason without judgment, for Reid, the theoretical operations of the mind are judgmental, though what he means by 'judgment' is nowhere made clear. He, further, holds that all reason is grounded on first principles that are self-evident, and such principles are available both in mathematics and in morals. Reid does not argue why first principles are to be self-evident, nor is it clear whether his self-evident first principles are analytic propositions. It would not be contrary to philosophical usage to hold that the denial of a self-evident principle yields a self-contradictory proposition. Ordinarily analycity of a statement is ascertained by the same criterion. But with Reid the role played by the self-evident first principles is slightly different in morals than in other sciences. "From such self-evident principles" he writes, "conclusions may be drawn synthetically with regard to the moral conduct of life; and particular duties or virtues may be traced back to such principles, analytically" (ibid., II , p.276). The statement has two parts, and we shall consider them separately. What does the phrase "synthetically" mean? Reason, for Reid as for other rationalists, is a principle of action, i.e., "a principle by which our actions ought to be regulated" (ibid., II, p.265); but he points out, it does not regulate actions directly. In acting morally

we are "acting according to reason" (ibid.,II, p.267. Kant would have said 'acting on reason'). Reason as a body of principles of action must be related to the will and intention of the agent, since Reid's concept of reason is embedded in the will as it is with Kant. For Reid, reason as principles of action "necessarily imply" (ibid.,II,p. 266) judgment inasmuch as they are rational; and the rational principles of action are distinguished from, what he calls, "animal principles, which imply desire and will, but not judgment" (ibid.). Now reason as the source of the principles of action must imply both judgment and desire and will, but qua rational, how can it so imply is not clear from Reid's account. He writes that the rational principles of actions "in all their exertions...require not only intention and will, but judgment or reason" (ibid.,II, p.309). This is a crucial statement, and needs be argued and defended by any rationalist. I do not believe that Reid actually does it, if I understand him aright. Of course, Reid has given an argument from the use of language. "To act reasonably" is a locution common in all languages. Aside from the correctness of such an empirical claim, he holds that to act reasonably is to have reasons for what one does. And the reasons must be good ones. Now what constitutes 'goodness' of a reason is by no means an easy affair to settle. Does a reason have to be 'good' from the agent's point of view, or from that of the spectator or the judge? Unless the questions are not, universal linguistic evidence above would not make the usage significant. In fact, Reid is appealing to "the commonsense of mankind", and he is assuming that human commonsense

guarantees significance of linguistic usages. Now the phrase "to act reasonably", it is claimed, is a universal usage; and since no thing can become a universal usage unless human commonsense did ensure its meaningfulness, hence the phrase is not devoid of meaning. Granted that an action A is reasonable is a meaningful assertion. Is the meaningful denomination of an action as "reasonable" implied by rational principles of action in logical independence from desire and will? An answer to this question will be decisive on the issue whether reason alone regulates human conduct. If it is a case that the rational and the animal principles (one implying judgment, the other desire and will) often cooperate, a Hume-like student of human nature, I suppose, would find it worth noticing. But those who like Reid and Kant hold that the active powers of man are at best rational, should hardly be in a position to make out anything of the natural cooperation of the two allegedly distinguished principles. Granted again that there are two principles, one 'rational' and the other 'animal', such that one implies judgment, while the other will and intention, but the mere coexistence of the two principles in human constitution does not prove that rational principles of action imply judgment as well as intention and will. The gap between the understanding and the will is left unbridged by Reid's argument. The cooperation of the two faculties is an ideal one, and the supposition that the former necessitates the latter which is an empirical claim remains undecided. The derivation of conclusions about the moral conduct of life 'synthetically' from self-evident principles seems to have no force as an answer to Hume's scepticism concerning reason as

the sufficient condition of human action.

The second part of Reid's statement, i.e., that particular duties can be "traced back" to the self-evident first principles of reason, can be disposed of briefly. If by "tracing back" is a logical operation, it could mean derivability. Now to say that particular duties are derivable from self-evident first principles of reason, it is equivalent to saying that the principles entail the duties concerned. But if the self-evident first principles are analytic propositions (and there seems to be no reason why they cannot be so construed) Reid's case amounts to what Hare criticises as 'Cartesianism in morals'[1]. Statements concerning particular duties or singular imperatives are substantive, i.e., they tell us about matters of substance, and as such cannot be derived from analytic or tautologous premises. Particular duties could of course be derived from universal value judgments; but whether the self-evident first principles of reason are coextensive with universal value judgments will remain an open question. If the self-evident first principles include universal value-judgments then of course the matter would be different.

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1. See his The Language of Morals, p.39 : "Many of the ethical theories which have been proposed in the past may without injustice be called 'Cartesian' in character; that is to say, they try to deduce particular duties from some self-evident first principle...A Cartesian procedure in morals is as illusory as it is in science". And also on p.41 : "it might be said that a principle of conduct was impossible to reject, if it were self-contradictory to reject it. But if it is self-contradictory to reject a principle, this only be because the principle is analytic. But if it is analytic, it cannot have any content; it cannot tell me to do one thing rather than another".

That the principles of virtue are self-evident is a belief shared also by Richard Price. He holds also that "morality is capable of demonstration" (ibid.,II, p.187). The demonstrability of the principles of virtue consists in its self-evidence. He addresses himself to the question, "whether our moral ideas are derived from the understanding or from a sense" (ibid.,II, p.135) and his answer is that the moral ideas like 'right' or 'wrong' are simple ideas, and like any other simple idea, they are immediately perceived by the understanding. Price argues that "It is undeniable, that many of our ideas are derived from our INTUITION of truth, or the discernment of the nature of things by the understanding. This therefore may be the source of our moral ideas. It is at least possible, that right and wrong may denote what we understand and know concerning certain objects" (ibid.,II,p.142). In this passage Price is arguing as an intuitionist, and by taking the moral ideas to "denote" what we "know" or "understand" by the operations of the understanding, he would say that moral judgments are cognitive. We are not here concerned with Prices intuitionism, nor with the question whether or not moral judgments are cognitive. Such questions as Price has raised in the passage are those with which Hume is concerned in the Book III of his Treatise. One remark will suffice now, that Price holds just the opposite view of what is held by Hume, namely, that our moral ideas are derived from the understanding; and it is also remarkable that Price expresses his views not in categorical assertions, rather in modal expressions. But whatever may be the manner of his expression, this much is clear that Price is arguing to defend the demonstrability

of moral ideas, and if moral ideas are demonstrable, then some sort of a bridge could be said to have been between reason and conduct. Morality, for Price, is "a branch of necessary truth" (Ibid.,II,p.137) just as geometry is. Apprehension of necessary truth is intuitive, and by "intuition" Price means the mind's capacity of surveying its own ideas. Intuition is the source of our self-evident truths, or those body of propositions that are known a priori, analytic truths that are revealed to us by the mere operation of thought. What would be disquieting to Hume in this part of Price's teaching is not the idea of self-evident truths that are necessary and intuitively apprehended, for he himself accords such a status to what he calls the relation of ideas. Propositions expressing relations of ideas[1] "are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". Whether Hume differentiates intuition from deduction as Price (ibid.,II,p.160) does may be a point interesting enough in itself, but we can gloss it over.

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1. The concept of relations of ideas is a blanket term. It includes such bodies of knowledge as arithmetic and algebra together with geometry, to which Hume, in the Treatise, refused the status of a "perfect and infallible science" (p.71). Of course this point dropped in the Enquiry, and he classes geometry along aside arithmetic and algebra. Moreover, he uses intuition and demonstration interchangeably in the phrase "either intuitively or demonstratively" in the Enquiry, p. 25. Price, on the other hand, not only distinguishes intuition from demonstration, but even regards several propositions of geometry as intuitive, and yet non-demonstrative. See British Moralists, ed. D.D.Raphael, II, p.160. But is it not odd on Price's part to say that geometry is an instance of intuited self-evident truth, and yet some of its propositions may be not clear enough and thus need demonstration? How can a self-evident truth be unclear? Theorems are said to belong to axioms of a system, they are demonstrated, though not considered as self-evident.

But what Hume would positively not have it allowed is inclusion of moral ideas to the body of truths that are known a priori. Moral ideas, for Hume, are not barely relational, they are intentional. The identical relations obtain between parricide and the case of oak and the acorn; and yet one is judged by taking a moral point of view, and the other indifferently.

But does Price mean that the concept of practical reason is identical with that of 'reason' in general? If "morality is a branch of necessary truth", then "truth and morality should stand and fall together" (ibid., II, p.157). Price seems to offer two answers to the question. First of all, he holds that the thesis of demonstrability of morality is implied by the fact that the human will by its very nature requires the understanding to guide and determine it, and if such be the case, every act of the will should necessarily be implied by some judgment. The connexion between the two, qualities of actions and "discernment" of the qualities, obligation and judgment of the mind concerning it, is so close that Price says, "it is not very necessary to distinguish them" (ibid.,II, p.168). Thus, "an action which is under no influence or direction from a moral judgment, cannot be in the practical sense moral" (ibid.,II, p.195). The thesis of demonstrability of morality, if strictly formulated, would mean subsumption of moral principles and maxims "under the general self evident principles of morality" (ibid.,II, p.187). But this happy state of affairs does not ordinarily prevail, and Price, taking into account the dangers of "mistake to action" is led to his second answer. He admits that "if we consider the several moral principles singly...

we find that we must frequently be very uncertain how it is best to act" (ibid., II, p.188). We must make several considerations about the possible effects of the actions, "compare their respective influence and demands" (ibid.). But this is a contingent difficulty, and not theoretically or logically insuperable. "In reality", says Price, "before we can be capable of deducing demonstrably, accurately and practically, the whole rule of right in every instance, we must possess universal and unerring knowledge" (ibid.). This ideal condition is forbidden by our "finite understanding" alone. But this admission does in no way affect Price's central thesis : "Moral agents are liable to mistake the circumstances they are in, and consequently, to form erroneous judgments concerning their own obligations. This supposes, that these obligations have a real existence, independent of their judgments. But when they are in any manner mistaken, it is not to be imagined, that then nothing remains obligatory, for there is a sense in which it may be said, that what any being, in the sincerity of his heart, thinks he ought to do, he indeed ought to do, and would be justly blameable if he omitted to do, though contradictory to what, in the former sense, is his duty" (ibid.,II, p.190). To put the matter in brief, "The knowledge of what is right...will certainly be attended with correspondent,actual practice, whenever there is nothing to oppose it....The intellectual nature is its own law. It has, within itself, a spring and guide of action which it cannot suppress or reject." (ibid.,II,pp.194-5).

The statement of Price's position calls for a few explanations. Rational intuitionists do not accept that there is any fundamental

difference between moral and mathematical thinking. Price, though he is in sympathy with them, does not go the whole way with them. A rational intuitional like Wollaston, whom Hume mentions and criticises in his Treatise, identified morality and truth. To Price morality is a "species of necessary truth", and hence, practically speaking, 'truth' is of wider extent than 'right'. This difference is partially helpful in alleviating the charge that could be brought against any rational intuitionist, namely, that if moral and mathematical truths were identical in point of necessity, then how is it that we should ever be in doubt about what is right? It is a matter of common experience that we frequently are. But, as we have remarked earlier, this experience of uncertainty regarding casuistry, i.e., what a singular principle of conduct requires one to do in a particular case, does not affect the issue of the self-evidence of moral principles.

I have so far tried to consider the contentions of some of the British moralists concerning the nature and scope of reason vis-a-vis human conduct. I am well aware of the inadequacy of my treatment of such important thinkers as Clarke, Reid and Price, yet a consideration of their views on the practical relevance of reason was needed for my purpose. All the thinkers I have considered claim that reason can be practical in the sense that reason can cause action. A denial of this is intended by Hume. Another point worth noticing is that Clarke, Reid and Price could be called rationalists in the sense that they seem to be committed to a concept of man which is essentially rational, and the rational self of man is autocratic. This spiritual

autocracy, if I might say so, legislates for the rest of human existence. Any passional violation of the rational self's legislation alienates human existence from its essence, and since the rational essence of man is superior to the passional life of man, disobedience on passion's part of the legislations of reason may well be considered as a "fall". Apart from the difference in philosophical anthropology between the so-called rationalists and Hume, there is another aspect of their rationalism. They seem to suggest that actions can be true or false in the sense that actions follow, in the appropriate sense, from truth or self-evident principles as premises. That actions can have truth-value would be rejected by Hume. The essentially theoretical nature of reason, for Hume, precludes it to be connected with actions in such a way that if judgments are conclusions of reason, so could not actions. The rationalists, on the contrary, hold that practical matters are a species of theoretical matters. The notion of self-evidence, further, is not simple notion. If it is a psychological fact, then it can hardly applied to reason. If it is not analyticity, does it mean "infallible"? In that case even, self-evident principles cannot guide our conduct, since, Hume tells us in his Section "Of Scepticism with regard to reason", we may fall into error while applying infallible rules of demonstrative sciences. If by "self-evidence" is meant intuitive, non-rational or even unique, then it would be a different story. But when principles are rational and yet self-evident, what one is to understand? Are they ultimate and underivative, primitive and uninferable as well as synthetic, since they bear on practical matters? Or rather that self-evidence

as a property of propositions? In that case it can fairly be said that self-evident principles cannot have any practical import.

A related account is found in Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics. To say anything about Aristotle's example of the incontient man is to risk an interpretation. Since Anscombe's interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the practical syllogism, the problem has been variously stated and argued. Without hazarding any view, Aristotle's problem can, I believe, be put as follows. How from a general principle, a conclusion regarding an action or some sort of judgment which implies a commitment to action can be deduced. Anscombe points out that Aristotle never states the conclusion of a practical syllogism (see her Intentions, p.60). It appears that the conclusion is an action. However, it is clear that Aristotle thinks that acting incontinently is possible. There is nothing, says Aristotle, "to prevent a man's having both premisses (the major premise being a general principle, and the minor a statement of fact) and acting against his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premise and not the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be done" (op. cit., 1147a). The particular facts, Aristotle argues, come within the sphere of perception, and, further, that the knowledge the incontinent can possesses is not "scientific" knowledge, since the minor premise is a particular. It is the factual minor premise which is observed to the agent under a passion, and it the "appetite" which "is contrary, not the opinion — to the right rule" (ibid., 1147b). Aristotle's analogy for an agent's regaining knowledge is getting up from sleep, and this is very apt since in a state of sleep

a man can be said to have "knowledge in a sense and yet not having it" (ibid., 1147a). The importance of the "perceptible object" or, the subject of the minor premiss is such that it "determines our action". Now Aristotle's difference from the rationalists is evident, and his affinity to Price is no less clear. The difference lies in the fact that even if a syllogistic analysis of moral judgments be allowed, it is not a full-fledged rational business as the rationalists might suppose. The 'practical' syllogism does not possess the paradigmatic superiority as theoretical syllogism, for which alone the epithet "scientific" is reserved. In a practical syllogistic reasoning the conclusion is contingent and might not have been. There are philosophers who of course think that principles of conduct entail particular commands, and the entailment is rigorous. Practical reasoning is "calculative" and not purely "scientific" in Aristotle's sense of the term. Rational intuitionists of course do not accept this view, and Price, in spite of his admission, on encuistical grounds, that particular principles of conduct require separate treatment, would not agree with Aristotle that reason could be anything short of scientific in morals, because, for Price, it is "founded in truth and reason" (op. cit., p.179).

Finally, a general discontent remains about any form of rational intuitionism, and this is apart from the unsatisfactory account of the logical connexion between moral judgment (or, practical reason) and human action. What does intuition avail in moral matters? A rationalist might answer that by intuition we come to know what is right to do. If, as Price says, "Right and wrong...denote what actions

are" (ibid.,II,p.147) the predicates 'right' and 'wrong' then are descriptive terms. To intuit an action as right is to perceive a certain fact about the action, namely the action has the property of rightness (it does not matter whether the property is non-natural or natural. Moore's non-natural properties are albeit facts,though, facts of a different kind). To come to know that an action has a certain property is to perceive intuitively that something is the case. And, it would then be a commonplace to point out that how from such a perception an imperative could be derived? The rationalist might like to say that by saying that an action is right he wants to assert that the action concerned is such that it is right to do. But it would be to argue in a circle, a charge that Hume brought against Wollaston. Hume thought that the "whimsical system" of Wollaston was such that "it leaves us under the same difficulty to give a reason why truth is virtuous and falsehood vicious". He observed, "if you please, that all immorality is derived [the] falsehood in action, provided you can give no any plausible reason, why such a falsehood is immoral. If you consider rightly of the matter, you will find yourself in the same difficulty as at the beginning" (op.cit.,p.462 footnote). Needless to say that even Hume's famous declaration that 'ought' cannot be derived from 'is' was formulated in connexion with his critique of rational intuitionists.

We may now turn to a consideration of Hume's concept of reason and its office in moral matter. Hume's explicit pronouncements about reason as a discursive faculty we have already referred to.

We have noticed also that in some of the senses of the term 'reason', i.e., as a body of "demonstrative" or analytic knowledge and as a system of "probable" or synthetic knowledge Hume would accept it as a motive to action. To put Hume's central point in short, the distinction between propositions which have to do with relations of ideas and those which express, or purport to express, matters of fact is clear. The propositions which have to do with relation of ideas constitute the domain of 'reason' as a source of knowledge, or reason in its clearly analytic, discursive employment. Often, Hume uses the word 'Truth' in order to express the sense of 'reason' as a discursive, analytic body of knowledge also. I have in mind two passages of the Treatise. In one, Hume says, "Truth is of two kinds, consisting either in the discovery of the proportions of ideas, consider'd as such, or in the conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence" (p.443). In another passage, he tells us that "Reason is the discovery of truth and falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an agreement or disagreement either to real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact" (p.458). Truth or reason, when contrasted with passion, is characterized by being "representative". To say that truth or reason, on Hume's account, has a representative quality is to hold that it reveals a relation between itself and reality. That is, reason is not an original fact complete in itself. In asmuch as truth or reason is "a copy of any other existence", its products can be said to be either true or false. Products of reason represent or misrepresent "original existences" in the world of realities. An allied passage occurs in the Enquiry, on

page 35: "All reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and existence". 'Truth' or 'reason' or 'reasoning', as Hume uses them interchangeably, are notions essentially theoretical and a matter of propositions, hence the question of truth-value.

Now my point is that Hume uses the term 'reason' or its cognates in two very different senses, and this fact renders obscure the sense in which reason can be practical. This equivocation is very disquieting indeed. It is difficult to comprehend in what sense reason in the sense of relations of ideas can be "representative". Demonstrative certainty is non-substantive, i.e., "without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". A proposition from Euclid's geometry or mathematical propositions for that matter, are as non-substantive as the logical principle of <u>modus ponens</u>. Neither of them gives us any information about the way things are, and truth of each is obvious. If Hume would accept this, then he did have a notion of analytic reason. This notion of reason cannot of course be practical. But there is another notion of reason, I should like to say, "representative" properly so-called, which is non-analytic. When reason ascertains "the conformity of ideas of objects to their real existence" or we reason concerning matter of fact or existence, what we have is a notion of reason which is substantive. How can the two different senses of the term 'reason', one analytic and the other synthetic, be brought together under one designation? Reason in its synthetic function

does and can have practical import in deciding or choosing means towards achieving our desired ends. This is what I shall be concerned with showing. Sometimes the two passages I have cited above have been interpreted with a view to making a concept of reason pervasive through the theoretical-practical distinction. I believe R. Edgley's attempt has been one in that direction. This leaves, if I am not mistaken, Hume's critique of the rationalists' claim that reason can cause action unappreciated. Kemp Smith remarks that Hume's two notions of reason, analytic and synthetic, are equally "creative". This should not perhaps be true, since reason, when it is analytic, is "inert"; and precisely in taking this stand Hume is rejecting the claim of the rationalists.

Another word, in Hume, for what we call analytic reason, is 'knowledge', and we know how restrictive a use he puts the term into. Our assurance in knowledge is grounded in certain types of relations holding between ideas. Thus narrowly delimited, knowledge properly so-called is mathematical. Whatever falls outside the domain of certain types of relations of ideas or mathematics is not and cannot be any object of knowledge. All apprehension of matters of fact and existence is not knowledge at all. Assurance in this field is of a completely different nature. Hume has put it in clear terms that there is no path by way of knowledge to the world of realities, which concerns man as an active, passional being. Even mathematics gains its human relevance through its applicability to matters of utility. The closing section of Book II of the Treatise puts it in unmistakable words. Speaking of truth consisting in "the discovery of the pro-

portions of ideas, consider'd as such". Hume says that it is "not desir'd merely as truth, and ... 'tis not the justness of our conclusions which alone gives the pleasure....The truth we discover must also be of some importance" (Ibid., pp.448-9). All these considerations are I suppose enough to show that Hume's use of general terms like 'reason' or 'knowledge' misguides and obliterates valuable distinctions. His soundly saying that reason does not have practical import is an overstatement. 'Reason' as analytic, just as 'knowledge' as narrowly delimited, has nothing to do with the problems of human actions, their causes and motives. But reason as synthetic, though it yields no knowledge, does and can have an important bearing on practical matters. This reason alone can be creative.

For the moment let us concentrate on the analytic function of 'reason'. It was something like analytic or discursive reason that the rationalists were talking about and held that practical reason was either a "species" (Price) of it or identical with it. Hume's position has been that whatever is non-susceptible of agreement or disagreement in either of the two ways he speaks of (e.g., the passion, the predicates like 'right' etc.) is "incapable of true or false and can never be an object of our reason". Hume brings, we have seen, both demonstrative and non-demonstrative reasonings under one notion; it is unhappy, but we may for the time being put up with it. May be that he is formulating a generalized notion of reason, though it is only in his denial of the view that demonstrative reason functions as a director of the will his anti-rationalistic dialectic primarily

consists. Why demonstrative reasoning cannot be regarded as a spring and the guide of human actions? The answer to this question lies in taking note of the characteristics that reason in its analytic function possesses.

Hume's concept of reason is remarkable or significant from an historical point of view. It must be admitted that there is no universally agreed or uniquely correct sense of the word 'reason', though there is one particular sense of the word in which it is taken to designate a mental faculty or capacity. In this sense reason might be regarded as coordinate with, but distinguishable from passions or will. The issue debated upon by the rationalists and those who do not like to be so denominated is 'what can reason do?' Or in order to make the question look more sensible it could be rephrased as 'what are human beings in a position to do, in virtue of their possession of the faculty of reason?' Or simply, what, by means of reasoning, are we in a position to achieve? Historically reason has been contrasted with various other faculties of man, and it is particularly important to consider with what reason is contrasted. When reason is contrasted with experience, as Hume does, what we can achieve by reason is much narrowly circumscribed. But perhaps there is nothing empirical in this contrast. If it be held that reason is the faculty of grasping necessary connexions and granted that we know what necessary connections are, one can find Plato arguing that no necessary connexions are to be distinguished in the everyday world. Hume's position, in this respect, is that <u>strictly</u> necessary connexions are to be found only in the formal abstract relations between our

concepts, and hence, by implication, causal relations are not cases of necessary connections, and, finally, in the field of moral judgment reason is inactive. In a sense, the most significant statement about reason made by Hume is that it is a passive faculty. The view that reason is a passive faculty or principle goes much against the traditional claim held for the office of reason. Neither Greeks nor the latter day rationalists took reason to be a passive principle. The Heraclitean Logos, or the Platonic or the Aristotelean nous as near synonyms of reason are all active principles or potent creative powers. For the Stoics the principle of morality and that of rationality in the universe was Logos. For the Stoics the principle of morality was living in accordance with nature, and as the nature of man was to be rational and indeed nature as a whole was the rational product of Logos, living according to nature could be equated with living according to Logos. Logos was then the source of law and morality. It is no less interesting to note that Hume, in spite of his avowed Stoic sympathies would ascribe passivity to the faculty of reason.

Contrasted as reason is with experience, for Hume, the domain of reason is circumscribed to discovering necessary connexions among our concepts, or to put it differently reason exhausts the relations of ideas or truths that are "discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe". It is evident then that we cannot do or achieve much by reason. Hume's view about the passivity of reason follows from his very concept of it, the way it is contrasted and circumscribed. Let us

look at some of his characteristically scandalous statements. Reason, Hume says, is "inactive", "impotent" and its judgments are "calm and indolent" (op.cit.,p.457), it has no "original influence" and as such "incapable of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion or emotion" (ibid.,pp.414-15). What does Hume mean by saying that reason is impotent or a passive principle? Or, what does the passivity of reason consist in? Obviously, in its incapacity in producing any emotional state of mind: "Reason ...exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion" (ibid., p.417). It is worth noticing that Hume does not deny that reason is a self-exerting principle, but what he is insisting on is the fact that to be self-exerting is not necessarily to be able to produce any emotion, because no impulse arises from its exertion. When Hume says that reason of itself "can never produce any action, or give rise to volition" (ibid.,p.414) he can be said to put reason on an opposite footing of the causes of direct passions, namely the goods and the evils of life, because, he says that our "desire or volition" arises from our considering the pleasures and the pains. However insufficient Hume's views on this issue are owing to the scanty remarks that he has made (see the Treatise, pp.438-439) this much could be asserted with certainty that the will occupies a place logically posterior to the direct passions. The question of willing comes only if there could be desire or aversion. We resort to acting only in order to secure objects of desire or avoid pain. The logical priority of desire and aversion, or for that matter, the whole class of direct passions over the will relegates reason to the

role of an ineffectual angel. In an early part of the Book I of the Treatise Hume says, "that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect, when the one produces a motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of producing it" (p.12). The statement is significant, because reason could be said to produce any motion in the will only if it were conceived as inducing us to will any action. But according to Hume's scheme no causal relation can be instituted between reasoning and willing, since we will not because we reason, but because we experience direct passions. The will is only a part of the complex determining antecedents of our emotional life from which actions are derived. And since the will appears to be the last item in the set of antecedents, Hume often says that the will is the cause of actions (see Treatise, pages 439 and 400 for Hume's statements about the will). The motives "influencing the will", in a Humean manner of speaking, are our experiences of the passions, either direct or indirect.

Reason is incapable in a two-fold way, it can neither give rise to any volition, i.e., "impotent", and secondly, nor can it prevent volition. The first of the alternatives we have clarified, but what is it like preventing a volition? It may be noted that Hume does not much distinguish between preventing a volition and preventing a passion. In a passage on page 415, he speaks about "preventing volition", "retard[ing] the impulse of passion" or opposing a passion etc., much in the same sense, though there should have been a subtler difference between "impulses" and "passions". However, let us see what is it to "oppose" or retarding a volition or passion. In con-

nexion with his discussion about the object and the cause of the passions of love and hatred Hume has observed that they are "contrary" to each other. How passions can be "contrary" to each other only in a weak sense of the term. It could not be Hume's intention to assert a logical relation between the passions. The notion of contrariety if applicable to the phenomena of the passions must be otherwise understood. We could recall Hume's division of the indirect passions in accordance with their intensity into calm and violent ones. To divide the passion in accordance with their intensity is to divide them by their strong and weak sensations, or by the hedonic quality of the sensations of the passions. Love and hatred are "directly contrary in their sensation" (ibid.,p.330) in as much as "the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy" (ibid.,p.331). Here we get a notion of contrary passions, which may have the same object in common, i.e., "some sensible being external to us", as Hume says, and yet differ in their hedonic quality. In one sense contrary passions are those which differ in their sensations or hedonic qualities. There may be another sense in which passions could be said to be contraries. The passions may be so related that "one passion upon its appearance destroys the other, and they do not both of them exist at once" (ibid.,p.344). In this case, Hume tells us, the degree or the intensity of the passions "depends upon the nature of its object" (ibid.). To generalise the point, the passions can be contrary to one another either according to their sensations or hedonic qualities of agreeableness or uneasiness, or the nature of their objects.

But there may be a third possibility. It is possible to produce a contrary passion by intensifying the sensation, without changing the object. Hume uses this possibility in connexion with his view that an impression of a particular hedonic quality would produce to "contrary" passions according to its intensity. "The same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees", and he illustrates the point in the following way: "the passion of love or hatred depends upon the same principle. A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been. A weak impression, that is painful, is related to anger and hatred by the resemblance of sensations". (ibid., p.367) Now, having distinguished the possible senses in which the passions can be said to contrary to one another, namely, differing in hedonic quality or intensity, we may say that in order to retard a passion all that we are required is to produce a passion of different hedonic quality or intensity. And if this way of understanding the phenomenon of preventing or retarding passions be found unobjectionable, it must then needs be said that Hume's charge that reason cannot do it is somewhat trivial. Because the function of reason is as conceived by Hume that it is a tautology to say that reason being non-impressionistic in nature has nothing to do matters of impressions. It is something like giving a dog a bad name before hanging it. If 'reason' could have been otherwise conceived, it could have performed the functions that it is allegedly incapable of doing. For example, the Kantian

notion of 'practical reason'. Kant thinks that the moral law can be demonstrated a priori, because the will is rational and self-legislating as well. I do not for the present wish to defend any such position than suggesting that Hume's ascription of passivity to reason can hardly be looked upon as an adequate reply to all rationalists. 'Reason' has been conceived by Hume in so purely "speculative" (ibid.,p.457) a manner that it can scarcely be expected to achieve anything 'practical' or "to influence our passions and actions" (ibid.). The dichotomy between speculative and practical is so complete and mutually exclusive that to say "reason is not practical" is to imply tautologously that 'reason is speculative'.

But this trivialization may be one of Hume's strongest points as well. His whole argument is conducted in so rigorous fashion, that once it is acceded to that the office of reason lies in pure and simple discovery of relations among our concepts, everything appears to follow of necessity. Herein lies the methodological value of the trivialization. Now granted that reason is a passive principle which way shall we turn for the active one? And the answer to this question will take us to his concept of morality.

Morality is 'practical' in the sense that "morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions" (ibid.,p.457). It is, as Hume says, an "active principle". The notion of 'morals' as an active principle is nothing novel in the history of philosophy. Aristotle laid it down that the concept of the 'practical' is "concerned with any coming into being" (op.cit.,1143b). Though Hume does not distinguish, in the manner of Aristotle, between art or production, and-

fested in making something distinct from the act of production and doing something in which the end is no other than the act itself, yet Hume shares a large part of Aristotle's notion of the word 'practical'. One can say that it is a revival of Aristotelian ways of thinking against Platonism, for Descartes and some of the ethical intuitionists are more Platonist than Aristotelian. I would not like to insist on the similarities beyond a point, since differences between the two thinkers is as great as their affinities; on the contrary, I would content myself by pointing out that Hume is Aristotlean inasmuch as he admits and defends the separation of the domains of the speculative and the practical. Both of them protest against rationalising moral matters, though how far did they succeed in, of course, another matter. I believe following remarks of Aristotle would have been endorsed by Hume that "matters concerned conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept, but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation" (op. cit., 1103b). The decisional character of morality and the criterion of the 'practical' as that which influences conduct was emphasized by one of Hume's predecessors, Francis Hutcheson. According to Hutcheson motives of human actions are to be found in the passions and affections, from which the actions 'flow'. "Election", as he put it, i.e., "purposing to do an action" or "exciting to action"

(op.cit., I, pages 305 and 306) is different from 'reason', that is, "our power of finding out true propositions" (ibid.,p.307). Or in other words, the question 'what is the case?' is non-identical with the question 'what to do?' The primacy of feelings in morality is such that without presupposing the "instincts and affections" we can not even talk about "exciting reasons". The conclusion that "there can...be no exciting reason previous to affection" (ibid.,p.309) is reached by Hutcheson in course of his analysing the notion of conformity of actions to reason as a standard of evaluation. "Reasonableness in an action", Hutcheson held, is a common but "very confused" expression, and could not be supposed "the motive to election" (ibid., p.307). There is much in common between Hutcheson and Hume, for instance, that moral evaluation proceeds from a specific faculty or moral sense, without which "no explication can be given of our ideas of morality" (ibid.,p.318), that reason has a corrective role to play in our moral life, etc., and yet there are differences, which must not be overlooked. In particular, Hume appears more radical in his treatment of the question of allowing reason any determining influence in moral life than Hutcheson. For Hume, and as it has been for Hutcheson, moral evaluations are not cognitive assertions. But apart from the non-propositional nature of moral evaluations, the question whether reason can be a motive for actions is not as sharply debated by Hutcheson as it is by Hume. There is a difference between the two questions. Whether reason could be a motive for acting in certain ways, or whether reason can direct the will, is a question that can be asked from the agent's point of view. The question whether

reason can cause actions need not be strictly the agent's prerogative to consider. It can as well be considered from a general point of view. But when I say that the question is significant from the agent's point of view, I mean that since it is he who experiences the conflict between reason and passion, his way of resolving it should assume a significance not otherwise possible. Whether the conflict is real is another issue, just as saying that the conflict is not between reason in the demonstrative sense and the passion, rather between reason as calm passions and the violent ones. On the other hand, whether moral evaluations are conclusions of reason is a question peculiar to the spectator's point of view. In Hume these two questions are carefully differentiated and considered separately. That passions are active principles is conceived both by Hutcheson and Hume. Whether "reasonableness in an action" is to be supposed as "the motive to election, or the quality determining approbation" (ibid.,p.307) are two different issues which Hutcheson does not appear to be much aware of, though both he and Hume develop their positions in course of their criticism of the views of such philosophers as Samuel Clarke and Wollaston.

The juxtaposition of two unrelated faculties, that of reason and passions, one passive and the other active, leads Hume to assert his first thesis that the supposed conflict between them is due to a confusion. The confusion is two-fold. In the first place, it is a case of confusing reason as a faculty of demonstrative knowledge with a whole body of non-representative, "original", or "codi-

fication of existence" (op.cit.,p.415), and secondly, with a reason-like disposition called the calm passions. The latter instance of confusion has important consequences, namely, that of confounding reason proper as an active principle. The traditional image of reason, is marked by "calmness and tranquillity" (ibid.,p.417), and, therefore, whatever is calm and tranquil is mistaken for rational. Such judgment from "the first view and appearance" (ibid.) has been responsible for confounding the calm passions with reason.

Let us have a look at Hume's doctrine of the calm passions. Hume's division of the passions into calm and violent is in accordance with their intensity and cuts across his division of the passions into direct and indirect, which is proposed according to their origin. Now he has remarked that the division of the passions into calm and violent once is "vulgar and specious" (ibid.,p.276); and since the division has been intended to group the passions by their intensity, no prescriptions are then made in regard to preferring the calm passions to the violent ones. On the contrary, admitting the fact that the calm passions "often determine the will", Hume reminds us that "there are certain violent emotions...which have likewise a great influence on that faculty [the will]" (ibid.,pp.417-18). Again, the division between the calm and violent passions is not anything final, because calmness or violence of passions depends on the "object" of the passions. We have already taken note of Hume's view in this regard. Mention may be made of Hume's principle that he enunciates in connexion with his view of comparison, namely, "Every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it", and the fact that

"comparison may change the emotion without changing any thing in the object" (ibid.,p.374). It follows then that the intensity of passions is variable, and that a violent passion can become calm and vice versa. This is quite consistent with Hume's causal explanation of the passions. Another important fact to be borne in the mind is that Hume does not uphold any special doctrine of the calm passions as some of his commentators appear to have supposed. L.Rydd seems to argue that Hume's has a special doctrine of calm passions, and that the calm passions are rational in their import and operations. But she, arbitrarily enough, picks up instances of Hume's ambivalent use of the word 'reason' and bases her interpretation on a few notoriously ambiguous statements. What is more provocative is her thesis that determination by calm passions is identical with a kind of rational determination. What is more, she overlooks the fact that since calmness or violence of passions is variable intensities that could be causally initiated. "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (ibid.,p.419). And so far as the passions are the springs of action, a violent passion may be at times preferred to a calm one. "When we wou'd govern a man and push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions" (ibid.). Rydd has argued that the calm passions are to be specially recommended since this set of passions is geared to our view of the good and consequently "determined by judgment" (op.cit., p.150). But there is not much evidence in Hume that supports this contention. On the other hand, Hume says clearly that "both these

kinds of passions pursue good, and avoid evil" (*ibid.*). There are also the "circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent" (*ibid.*) together with the effects of custom and imagination.[1] In the light of these considerations it cannot then be said that the calm passions are the *only* motives to action, and for long that they are rational.

The calm passions are "vulgarly call'd" (*ibid.*, p.417) reason. But why are they so confounded? We have already had Hume's answer, and now propose to look into the matter a little more closely. Hume speaks of "certain calm desires and tendencies" like benevolence and the love of life etc., and "the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil consider'd merely as such" (*ibid.*, p.417. Compare also his remarks about the direct passions such as desire and aversion on page 439) that "produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation" (*ibid.*). Two points that Hume makes in the passage are important. That these passions are primarily conative, and hence they lead us to actions. Owing to their characteristically low intensity our experience of them is not so keenly felt as the ends towards which they are directed. For example, benevolence is more apparent in the appropriate acts born out of one's interest in the beloved or the sympathised person's fate than in the original delight felt by the sympathising agent. To put it in other words, a conative passion can be identified by the actions it leads to, and not by the

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1. Sections IV, V and VI of Part III of Book II of the *Treatise* are especially relevant in this context.

immediate experience of certain self-certifying passion like, say, pride or humility. There are good reasons to believe that even these passions are not as complete in themselves as they appear or Hume supposes them to be. I have argued this point earlier and I need not repeat it here. But there certainly can a distinction be made between more and less dispositional passions. The more dispositional a passion is, the less agitation it produces in the mind. And if this hypothesis be found unobjectionable, it could then be said that a conative passion is identifiable more in terms of the special feelings it evokes than by its intensity. Secondly, the characteristic low intensity of the conative passions is no guarantee that they might not be violent should the conditions change. It is the shift in the identity criterion of the conative passions that is responsible for their being mistaken for "determinations of reason". When the conative passions are calm they are mistaken for reason owing to similar sensations, i.e., calmness. But passions cannot be reason at the time when they are calm, and non-rational when they are violent, since it would be odd to suggest something like that. Passions and reason are diverse categories, and to take the one for the other is to commit a category mistake. To say that x is a passion and that it is calm does not entail that x is a "determination of reason", because rational determination forms no part of a passion's being designated or identified as 'calm'.

There are two senses of the words 'reason' or 'truth' that could be found in Hume's writings. In the strong sense the word, 'reason' means demonstrative reasoning and secondarily, probable

knowledge about matters of fact. But in the weak sense of the term, 'reason' is often explained as terms of feelings, or other sensible operations of the mind like imagination, belief etc. In a passage in Book I Hume speaks of reason as "a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls" (ibid., p.179). When Hume exhorts us to follow our "taste and sentiment" "not solely in poetry and music" "but likewise in philosophy" it becomes clear in a flash that 'philosophy' in the sense of serious thought about matters of fact, or for that matter "probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation" (ibid., p.103). Hume's view that "all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom" (ibid., p.149) is an evidence of the weak sense of the word 'reason', corresponding to the "world of realities" as opposed to the "world of ideas", which is the province of demonstration. The two classes of realities, one the object of the memory and the senses, the other of the judgment correlate to the weak and the strong senses of the word 'reason'. Hume does not always keep the two senses of 'reason' apart, and this has led many of his commentators to suppose that when he is speaking of 'reason' in its vector employment he must be talking about 'reason' in the strong sense of *a priori* deliberations of the understanding.

Hume's juxtaposing reason (in the strong sense, of course) and passion is achieved by designating the two faculties as inactive and active principles respectively. The active, though calm principles of actions or passions are related to such a family of expressions as "morality", "sense of morals" and "taste" or "sentiment". The non-reductivist dualism of reason and passion is renamed as the dualism

of sentiment and reason. Truths that can be demonstrated, are distinct and not reducible to even "belief" in "matters of fact and existence". If the two operations of the understanding are irreducible to one another, how much unrelated must be reason in the strong sense and the phenomena of the passions. The autonomy of morals may be, for Hume, a consequence of the irreducible distinctness of the domain of the passions from that of reason. By autonomy of ethics I understand the point of view that moral evaluations are grounded on the passional nature of man and are quite a distinct phenomena of human nature and as such must be understood in their own right and never be reduced to become affairs of reason and knowledge in the strong sense of the words. Hume's anti-rationalist dialectic is to a greater extent directed towards establishing some such point of view. If morality is not demonstrable it can be shown that there is a real and necessary distinction between reason on the one hand and passion and value on the other. In the Book I Hume does not exclude the phenomena of morals from the limits of human understanding, though certainly beyond the scope of reason. He refers to "those immense depths of philosophy" (ibid., p.263), i.e., the domains of the passions and morals only after a sceptical exposure of the powers and limits of reason. That the passions are mathematically unmeasurable[1] is a conclusion that reinforces the view that reason and morals are distinct spheres of human nature. After having spoken of the

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1. Hume discusses the possibility of conceiving the passions and their relation to one another after mathematical models, especially those of geometry in Part IV, Section V of the Book I of the Treatise. See pages 234 to 239. He finds all such attempts 'ridiculous'.

rules by which to judge causal phenomena and of any unavailable *a priori* or rational security. Hume remarks, "If this be the case even in natural philosophy, how much more in moral, where there is a much greater complication of circumstances, and where those views and sentiments, which are essential to any action of the mind, are so implicit and obscure, that they often escape our strictest attention, and are not only unaccountable in their causes, but even unknown in their existence?" (*ibid.*, p.175). This passage appears as if it were a prolegomenon to Hume's view that reason can never be a motive to the will. The careful distinction that Hume makes between the "decisions of morality" and "conclusions" of the understanding is an outcome of his scepticism concerning the power and office of reason. This distinction between reason and taste, says Kemp Smith, is done "for the first time in history" (*op.cit.*, p.199). And one of the consequences of the precise distinction is that in the moral sphere, taste is autonomous.

The said autonomy is based on a rejection of the view that reason can determine the will. Let us look at Hume's conclusions to this effect. He observes that the two faculties, reason and passions do not conflict. "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason" (*op.cit.*, p.415). The statement is not as self-explanatory as it stands, because the word "combat" is ambiguous. Is it used in the logical sense of 'opposition'? Propositions are said to be 'contrary' or 'contradictory' to one another. Obviously such a relationship cannot be thought to exist between two faculties, those of reason and the passions. Two

classes are also sometimes spoken of as standing in relation of complements of each other. It is not certain whether reason and the passions could be interpreted as two classes with no common membership or any over-lapping area. Hume's remark to the effect that the passions cannot be interpreted according to models prohibits such a possibility, though 'reason' can perhaps be interpreted as a class of a priori propositions. It is possible, then, that Hume may have been speaking of 'combat' in a psychological sense. This seems to be a plausible view, since it is more understandable to say that one is suffering from psychological conflicts than saying that one is experiencing a conflict between reason and his passions. Psychological conflicts are of everyday occurrence, unless one is a Quixotic type of a person. What we call being in a state of indecision may be taken as an instance of a psychological conflict. Hamlet's utterance "to be or not to be" is an expression of psychological conflict, and no one would perhaps suggest that the Prince of Denmark was experiencing a conflict between reason as a faculty of demonstrative knowledge and his immediate suicidal impulses. On the contrary, it sounds sensible to say that Hamlet, to put the matter in Hume's terminology, was suffering from the original instinct of love of life and a suicidal impulse. There seems to be good reasons to suppose that in denying any conflict between reason and the passions Hume is simply trying to point out that in cases of psychological conflicts we have nothing to do with reason, properly so-called. His examples may help us elucidate the point further. When Hume writes, "Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole

world to the scratching of my finger" or, "to perfer...my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter," etc. (ibid., p.416) he is in fact illustrating what we ordinarily call psychological conflicts, which Hume proposes to explain in terms of his distinction between calm and violent passions. Hume's intention in denying that there cannot be any combat or conflict between reason and the passions may be stated as follows. It is worth asking what we as human beings can do, and also just what we cannot do, in virtue of our capacity for abstract reasoning. We can establish logically necessary truths, or deduce and demonstrate. The products of reason, in the strict sense, are the propositions of mathematics. But there are many other qualities like controlling irritation, or saying 'no' to an impulse, that are loosely described as rational. But Hume would say that none of these is an operation of pure reason. In problems of human action, reason is, by constitution, causally inert. The control of passion by reason is often spoken of by the moralists. Reason is also considered as the source of moral rules. Such ascriptions to reason are highly inappropriate. Saying 'no' to an impulse or curbing an irritation is certainly possible, but certainly not in terms of the inert thought of some premises and conclusions. A counterveiling passion, like self-interest or shame comes to our aid. Such passions may resemble reason in being unperturbing or, as Hume says 'calm', but they differ from it in being dynamic.

Kemp Smith has made a significant observation which brings out how the calm passions determine the will, and in this capacity often

mistaken for rational operations. Besides reason, "properly so-called" there is, says Kemp Smith, "a faculty supposed to be capable of determining moral distinctions and of justifying beliefs in regard to matters of fact and existence. This so-called 'reason' ... is merely a misnomer for instinctively determined sentiments and beliefs" (op.cit., p.288). There is no reason to doubt Kemp Smith's statement as a viable interpretative report of Hume's position; and if that be so, then the calm passions are "so-called 'reason'". Any conflict with this so-called reason and the passions are on an unsophisticated view appears as a conflict of reason properly so-called and the passions. That there are similarities of sensation between the so-called 'reason' and the reason properly so-called has already been pointed out. Now we may turn to Hume's account of the determining role of the calm passions in the content of the will.

In connexion with the effects of custom on the passions Hume notes two phenomena, a facility and an inclination. Any passion as such puts the spirits in agitation, whether it is agreeable or disagreeable. But a repeated experience of a passion or a set of passions loses its initial shock, "the novelty wears off, the passions subside; the hurry of the spirits is over; and we survey the objects [of the passions] with greater tranquillity" (op.cit.,p.423). And if it is way the calm passions originate, then they are what Wordsworth would have called "emotions recollected in tranquillity". The experience of calm passions imply a state of mind where there is no "morbid passions, no disquietude" (quoted by Basil Willey in his The Eighteenth Century Background, Pelican, 1972, p. 242). It

is not 'morbid' because Hume explains that the habitually experienced passions, if they are not disagreeable once, produces a tendency or inclination towards the object of the passions.[1] The facility of the calm passions is an important point. He writes that the "pleasure of facility does not so much consist in any ferment of the spirits, as in their orderly motion" (ibid., p.423, italics not in the text). And it is the "orderly motion" of the calm passions that lends it a reason-like dispositional quality, an activity, sometimes "so powerful as even to convert pain into pleasure, and give us a relish in time for what at first was most harsh and disagreeable" (ibid). Hume is in fact contrasting the dispositions followed by custom and those that "arise from novelty". The former are the calm passions, having lost their intensity owing to repeated experience, while the latter ones are violent. We can now better appreciate Hume's remark that the calm passions are able to determine the will in so far as they become "a settled principle of action" or "the predominant inclination of the soul" (ibid.,p.419). Hume's notion of the "strength of mind" also is based upon his idea that the calm passions can become settled principles of action."What we call strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (ibid., p.418). Which passions, the calm or the violent ones, would prevail in the mind of an agent in a given situation is a question that cannot be settled a priori. It could be answered only according to, Hume says, "the general character or present disposition

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1. Hume writes, "One can consider the clouds, and heavens, and trees, and stones, however frequently repeated, without ever feeling any aversion". Treatise, p.423. See also page 424.

of the person" (ibid.). Even our notion of duty could be construed as a considered opinion about the objects of the calm passions. Hence the conflict of reason so-called and the passions is actually "an opposition of passions" (ibid., p.421), calm and violent ones.

In order to round off Hume's notion of the calm passions as "reason so-called" a few points that emerge need be stated. That the distinction between the calm and the violent passions may not be as "vulgar", i.e., popular as Hume suggests. The passions that are calm are quite a sophisticated lot of emotions. A passion may be calm on two counts, one according to the nature of the object such that it fails to evoke sufficiently vivacious impressions or agitate the mind in a considerable degree of intensity. Again, a passion may be calm as a result of custom, its intensity is worn out so as to allow an unimpassioned view of its objects in a given situation, and determine our will since it has by now become a settled principle of action. It is the latter view of calmness of passions that is particularly germane to Hume in connexion with the alleged conflict of reason and passion. This point can be further illustrated. In Aristotle's practical syllogism, the inference, an action or an action-implying phrase, depends on the conjunction of a general proposition and a factual minor premise. The major premise may be a value judgment of universal import. But crucial role is played by the factual minor premise, which states whether a particular object does have or not the specific property. The conjunction of the two premises constitute what may be called the principle of decision. In cases of incontinence the content of the factual minor premise,

i.e., whether an object a has the property P, is obscured as the agent comes under the impulse of his immediate impressions, and he fails to take an objective view of the situation. Aristotle states the conditions which may obscure our vision with regard to qualities of an objects: "the influence of passions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it is evident actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of madness" (op.cit., 1147a). What Aristotle appears to make the case is that which Hume works out as the state of being under the sway of violent passions. The merit of the calm passions is that they generate a state of mind which enables the agent to consider the objects of desire with tranquillity and unhurried emotion. It may also be noted that, for both Aristotle and Hume, in order to be virtuous it is necessary to do certain things, but above all it is necessary to do them in certain state of mind. For Hume, the virtuous state of mind, we could say, is habitual, i.e., one in which the passions that prevail are calm.

What makes the calm passions reason-like is its "orderly motion" or tranquillity. But if one is not to judge things from their "first view and appearance", the calm passions are never reason properly so-called. Rydd has taken the calm passions as the rational determinants of conduct on the ground that their operations are determined by a "distant view or reflection" or according to the "real and intrinsic value" of an object. But given Hume's too narrow view of reason proper and the notion of the calm passion as explicated above, it could hardly be asserted, as she does, that a

passion, whereby we give preference to what is in itself preferable or in conformity with the real value of an object is rational in nature. If I understand Rydd's argument aright, it appears that her conclusions are largely unwarranted. She has argued that to be determined by a calm passion is to be determined according to the real and intrinsic value of an object or by a distant view or reflection is identical with rational determination. Such determinations are, it is true, determinations by judgment. But it is hardly true, for Hume, that to be determined by judgment is equivalent to being rationally determined. "Rational determination" is a strong expression, and its instances are to be found in logical entailments, and such relations can hardly be said to hold, for Hume again, in the moral sphere. Hume has a two-fold view of judgment. One view, the logical one, occurs in a footnote on page 96 of the Treatise, where he takes it in the sense of "the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which show the relation they bear to each other"(italics ours). Obviously, Hume has 'analyticity' in his mind in the passage cited. The other sense of 'judgment' is an expression of belief, a perception, the content of which is a "system of realities" (see pages 456 and 103 of the Treatise). The second view of 'judgment' does not rule out the possibility of holding counterfeit beliefs, and in that case determination by such judgments can scarcely be called rational determination. Granted that a judgment expresses a genuine belief, even then it will be a case of determination by "empirical reason" (Rydd's phrase, op.cit.,p.99) and not one of rational determina-

tion, in the strong sense. Hume has no quarrel with the rationalist on this issue. But the question that is important is whether Rydd's interpretation of calm passions as rational determinants of conduct solves any problem, either for the rationalists or for Hume. The question had troubled Hume, and besides his remarks in the Treatise, he makes his clearest statement in the second Enquiry: "Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another: and these decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection" (p.239, italics in the text). From the nature of the case calm passions may involve thought and the calculation of causes and effects, but this fact does not, in Hume's scheme, warrant the assertion that determination by calm passions is rational determination. Thomas Reid, in explicit opposition to Hume, maintained that the principle involved in acting in pursuance of what is good for the agent on the whole is a rational principle. He criticised Hume for abusing language by incorporating a rational principle under the category of passions. He was obviously referring to the calm passions. He argued that 'reason' is a correct, and 'calm passion' an incorrect, way of referring to a general determination to pursue what we know to be in our own interest, because the very existence of a general idea of what is good for me requires the exercise of reason and intelligence. It seems that Rydd has been working under an influence of Reid. This may not be an idle supposition.

What happens then to such locutions as 'reasonable or unreasonable actions'? Hume admits that actions can be "design'd and premeditated" (op.cit.,p.411), or for that matter, intentional actions presuppose certain beliefs on the part of the agent, and these beliefs or judgments accompany the passions that motivate him. Such beliefs or judgments are also called "opinion" (ibid.,p.409). But it should never be supposed that these judgments determine the will, they simply "accompany" (ibid.,p.416) the passions, which are the impulses to the will. Why should they accompany the passions at all? And Hume's answer appears somewhat as the following. When we are motivated by desire with regard to the ends of human life, we also look for the right means for attaining the ends. Desire and aversion do not rest at "the prospect of pain orpleasure from any object", says Hume, but in each case makes "us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect" (ibid.,p.414).[1] Motives are accompanied by causal judgments about ends and means. But in giving this account Hume is careful to note that the causal reasoning employed in the search for means cannot be taken as the motive, because, he says, "the impulse arises not from 'reason', but is only directed by it" (ibid.). What he means is that the reason-

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1. Discovery of causal relationship between the desired end and the means for its attainment is a contribution of 'reason', and accordingly human actions get a direction. Apprehension of causal relationship between our ends and means need not be two distinct moments of our practical life, as Hume's language might taken to suggest. Rather, he tells us that "reason is nothing but the discovery of this /causal/ connexion."

ing could not have been employed had we not already desired the end. The role of 'reason' in this case consists in making a "discovery" or in other words, in deliberating upon the courses of action or the right means for the attainment of the desired end, we come to form an opinion or a judgment of causal nature. But the discovery is simply a directive factor in bringing about the action. But the impulse or the desire for the end is logically prior to the discovering function of causal reasoning involved. Our actions or modus operandi of our attainment of ends might vary according to the discovery we make. A means that appeared suitable may be rejected after deliberation, but this does not entitle us to say that discovery made by causal deliberations is the motive of the action, or that it determines the will. The position so far seems quite straight forward. But there is one point that I would like to make before I pass on to other considerations about the relationship between judgments and action. Earlier I have remarked that Hume's inclusion of the non-demonstrative causal reasoning to the concept of reason was unsatisfactory. My chief reason for making the remark is that, for Hume, judgments of demonstration and those of probability are so sharply differentiated that to say that "the understanding exerts itself after two different ways and it judges from demonstration or probability" (ibid., p.443) is to flatten down the sophisticated difference between analytic and synthetic propositions. And it is all too important a distinction to be summarily grouped together. Two consequences follow from this grouping. (a) It might lead one to suppose that Hume, like Aristotle, considers synthetic (non-

demonstrative causal) reasoning to be a part of reason properly so-called or demonstrative reasoning. Aristotle's idea of practical wisdom is what I am referring to. He says, after distinguishing scientific and calculative intellect, that the latter "is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle" (op.cit.,1139b). And this is virtually to suffer a defeat at the hands of Socratic intellectualism. For Hume, if his grouping together of demonstration and probability is taken to suggest a similar view, it will amount to a betrayal of a revolution. Does not Hume say that he is out to rescue moral philosophy from the subversive doctrines of the rationalists? He compares his task to that of Copernicus on page 262 Causal reasoning is not, Hume has shown, an operation of tracing logical implications. But to allow to use expressions like 'reasoning' or 'reason' in a loose manner for what is denied to be reasoning or reason in their strict sense would be to encourage unwelcome ambiguity or equivocation. (b) There is another reason for my dissatisfaction. The two operations of the understanding are differently related to actions. I should say that demonstrative reasoning has practical application, as arithmetic has in accountancy, but the directive force of arithmetical conclusions depends on assisting us in making causal judgments. In engineering we use calculations to help us discover how to achieve certain ends, such as the rigidity of structures needed in the building of a bridge. In applied mathematics we use our calculations to some purpose or designed end. Just because we are interested in the ends themselves that discovery of causal connexions about them can affect our conduct. In non-demons-

trative reasoning the relation between discovery of means and actions is closer than in the case of mathematical applications. In the latter we interpret the variables and connectives as if mapping a practical situation, whereas in causal reasoning we are concerned with the individuals, i.e., the various possible means to an end. Reasoning in mathematics is constructing ideal models with uninterpreted variables, but in causal thought we are from the very beginning concerned with objects. It is essentially practical, which mathematical or abstract, demonstrative reasoning is not. This basic difference is much obscured by Hume's manner of speaking. May be that in both cases causal connexions are discovered in our own interest, yet there is a difference. Mathematical connexions may be causally interpreted, the non-demonstratively discovered ones are as such causal. Perhaps Hume, misleadingly enough, suggests that it is proper to talk of a faculty of understanding that has different operations. This is what Aristotle does; and is there any reason to believe that it could as well be Hume's intention? Or, does he intend to put forward a generalised meaning of 'reason'? In that case trenchancy of his arguments against the rationalists would be considerably lost. Again, causal reasoning has, for Hume, an alternative status; it is removed from the class of things decidable by demonstrative reasoning. When we are concerned with matters of fact, we do have to reflect on general rules, but such reflecting is not the type of reasoning we engage in mathematics. Ascription of alternative status to causal 'reasoning' hardly agrees with the suggestion of

subsuming demonstrative and non-demonstrative operations of thought as operations of one faculty. I do not say that it is altogether impossible, rather that it is difficult in view of the consequences that would follow.

Discovery of relations is regarded by Hume to be the function of all reasoning. This might be regarded as the generalised meaning of 'reason', the discovery of causation albeit its special work. Apart from this, what other ground could be there for assimilating non-demonstrative 'reasoning' to reason? Rational operations are characteristically calm; and usually whatever has this quality is reason-like, e.g., the calm passions. Now if the operations of non-demonstrative 'reasoning' can be shown to be similarly characterised by reason-like calmness as those of the calm passions, it may then be possible to say that the former is 'rational' in that special sense of the word. It can plausibly be suggested that Hume does something similar. What he has said about reason-like activities of calm passions is transferred on to the functions of causal reasoning. The viability of my suggestion will be evident if we compare the following passages. Speaking about causal or non-demonstrative reasoning in the domain of passions Hume writes, " 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience" (<u>op.cit.</u>, p.414). And now let us look at his definition of 'reason' as calm passions. "By <u>reason</u> we mean affections of the very same kind with the

former [violent ones] ; but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties....'tis often found, that the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution, are able to controul them in their most furious movements" (ibid., pp. 457-58). If we recall also the fact that in causal reasoning the principle of custom has an important role to play, we are left in no wonder to think whether there is a difference between the judgments of causal reasoning and the judgments of the calm passions, and neither of these two is properly speaking an "intellectual" faculty. It might be argued against our suggestion that probable reasoning is directive and not determining as the calm passions in respect of the will. But it may be pointed out that the calm passions in their reason-like function determine the will only when they prevails over the violent passions, otherwise they can have only a directive role to play.

To come back to the problem of judgments and actions. The judgments that accompany desire, when it exerts itself in action, may be either true or false, and since these judgments are causal, i.e., concerning matters of fact and existence, mistakes in making judgments concerning means would be factual. Hume uses the phrase "a mistake of fact" (ibid., p.460) in this content. Judgments, whether causal or analytic, have to do with "agreement or disagreement" of either relations of ideas or real existence. The terms 'true' and 'false' are truth values of judgments according to

their agreement or disagreement to "real relations of ideas" or "real existence" (ibid., p. 458). Further, the passions are not susceptible of judgmental relations like agreement or disagreement, owing to their non-representative character. Since the passions, says Hume, are "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions and actions" (ibid.), they cannot be said to either true or false. We find, then, truth or falsity of whatever sort, logical or factual are properties of judgments that accompany passions, and it is by an extension of the property of accompanying judgments that passions can be said to be either true or false. Hume sounds quite definitive on this point. He writes, "as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far they are accompany'd with some judgment or opinion".(ibid.,pp. 415-16) He produces an analogous deductive argument for the sense in which passions can be called reasonable or non reasonable. Judgments which direct our choice of means, if they are factually erroneous, frustrates the goal-oriented pursuits. That is, "a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable" (ibid.,p.416). Again, actions are caused under the direction of judgments, they can also be called reasonable or otherwise according to the truth or falsity of the directive judgments. In short, it is neither the passion nor the action "properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment".

(ibid.) Reasonableness or unreasonableness either of passions or of actions is only, by extension, a linguistic convention, a manner of speaking which is logically untenable.

Hume's position appears somewhat as follows. Truth-values can be assigned only to judgments; and since judgments accompany actions assigning truth-values to them becomes possible by extension. Now passions are exerted in actions, one can ask whether 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' can be ascribed to them. Passions have objects, and if one experiences such a passion that is directed towards something which does not exist at all, in that case the passion, Hume would allow, can be said to be unreasonable. We can remark that there can be genuine passions without objects, existential dread, for instance. But fear of ghosts would of course illustrate Hume's point. Again it may also be the case that the supposed quality of an object of passion may be lacking. I mean that the judgment or belief about the object of passion is not true. One may jump up and be scared by the sight of a rat, supposing it to be a carrier of plague. If the rat be not a carrier of plague, one's fear may be called unreasonable. This point would go to strengthen Hume's view. But all cases, may not be so simple. Fear at the sight of a mice and fear at the sight of a cobra differ qualitatively, and one say that the former is unreasonable in a sense in which the latter is not. We do speak of unfounded fear. Similarly one hears about superstitious fear, neurotic fear or even abnormal fear. Except perhaps in cases of existential dread and neurotic fear which are passions without objects, for the rest there

are accompanying judgments or beliefs that are not true, and it is those judgments what render the passions unreasonable. At least Hume would argue in such a manner. He could also point to emotion-situations and their characteristic features. His causal view of emotion would oblige him to do that. But doubts may still persist, however strongly Hume might put his case. Fear experienced in dream may be called unreasonable, even though there is no proper false judgment accompanying it. Cases of unveridical perception can prove equally difficult. Macbeth's dagger is as threatening as one that is waved by a bandit. It is more disquieting to say that a wrongly chosen means can render a passion unreasonable. Acting out of love I might follow a course of action that fails to bring about my intention to make my friend happy. Does this entitle one to say that my love is unreasonable? Hume's specification of the senses in which a passion can be unreasonable is too narrow. His contention that causal inefficacy of the means alone can render a passion unreasonable does not sound convincing in all cases. He does not take adequate cognizance of the fact that passions can be reasonable also. To say that passions can be unreasonable does not prohibit saying that they can be reasonable as well.

To say that action is reasonable or unreasonable is to make an evaluation, and it is against such a contention that Hume has been arguing. The concept of reasonableness or unreasonableness of actions was upheld by rationalists like Reid, for whom it was not a mere figurative way of speaking but a viable thesis. Let me

make the point a little more clear. Hume seeks to keep two things separate: an assessment of conduct and a description of its antecedents. Among the antecedents of conduct are desire and judgments or belief about the desirability of the object of desire. By 'desirability' I mean 'desire-worthiness' or the prospects of pain or pleasure that an object of desire arouses in the mind of the agent. Hume puts a restriction on the use of epithets like 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' on the passion or the action that follows. His reason for imposing the restriction seems owing to the consideration that the epithets strictly speaking belong to the domain of judgments or beliefs, and hence the predicates that are cognate with the concept of 'reason' cannot have any legitimate application in another domain. His restriction is based on philosophical considerations. A passion can be called unreasonable only on the ground that it is accompanied by a false judgment, and even in this case the passion is called unreasonable only by extension, because, it is, in fact, the judgment, not the passion that is false or untrue, and therefore contrary to reason. The same restriction applies to actions, when they are to be assessed by the predicates in question. Hume writes, "These false judgments may be thought to affect the passions and actions, which are connected with them, and may be said to render them unreasonable, in a figurative and improper way speaking" (ibid., p. 459). When Hume says that such locutions are "improper" he obviously means that it is logically or philosophically improper. He is not suggesting a change in the linguistic usage. As expressions of ordinary language they

are quite harmless. But to assert there are connections, logical ones, between passions or actions and judgments is a logical howler. The plain man has the liberty of joining on with such extensions in his everyday linguistic usage, but to think that the linguistic usage is a guide to genuine opinion on the philosophical level is a sign of logical insalertness. Reid in his criticism of Hume missed this point. When he says that " 'to act reasonably' is a phrase common in all languages and therefore has a meaning" (op.cit., p. 266) he misses Hume's intention. Hume never denies the meaningfulness of ordinary language expressions, he is chiefly concerned with the logical validity of verbal formulations of the kind such as actions can be true or false, reasonable or unreasonable and so on. I shall consider this issue in a slightly different manner at the end of the present context. Till then I postpone expressing my own views on Hume's thesis that actions can neither be reasonable nor unreasonable.

When Hume denies any logical connexion between judgments and actions, he is anticipating a point made by Stevenson, that is, reasons or beliefs for or against ethical judgments function to influence attitudes, and they do it psychologically. A reason offered in support of an imperative may influence the person addressed only psychologically, it does not have any logical compulsion. This follows from Stevenson's more general thesis that only disagreements of belief are resolvable, not those of attitudes. The need for having correct belief about the situation in which one is acting has been accorded an importance by Hume, and following him, by Stevenson.

What does Hume mean by a reasonable judgment, or for that matter, a reasonable belief? Or, what is it that makes a belief reasonable? Much depends on what Hume means by 'belief'. His definition of 'belief' as "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression" (op.cit.,p.96)is emphatic on the manner in which a lively idea is formed. On the following page he says that "belief is somewhat more than a simple idea. 'Tis a particular manner of forming an idea". Further, Hume differentiates the authentic from a "counterfeit belief". What is it that marks off, what he calls, "serious conviction" from "counterfeit belief"? Mere feeling will not differentiate authentic from counterfeit beliefs, since it is equally present in both. But the phrase "serious conviction" is not enough enlightening. That some scene or picture carries with it the flavour of authenticity is not enough to ensure that it agrees with "real existence". That p is conceived in a certain manner does not entail that p is true. It can only lend some sort of a support to the proposition that p is likely to be true. Hume has discussed the question of differentiating "authentic" from "counterfeit" beliefs at the end of Section X of Part III of Book I of the Treatise and again in the Appendix (see pages 123 and 631). From the nature of his consideration of the problem it appears that he attached great importance to it. His definition of 'belief' refers to association of ideas with impressions, and he tells us that ideas are associated according to the principles of resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect. Of all these principles, cause and effect alone can enliven an idea to

produce belief. It is possible to say that the only reasonable belief is one which is founded on cause and effect. A reasonable belief has causal power. He makes this quite clear when he says that the objects the relation of cause and effect "presents are fixed and unalterable. The impression of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination as something solid and real, certain and invariable" (ibid., p. 110). The causal relation is "the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another" (ibid., p.89).[1] It turns out then that one could be said to have a reasonable belief, if, and only if, one's ideas are enlivened by being connected causally with a present impression. This appears consistent with Hume's view that beliefs or judgments that accompany passions are causal judgments, statements laying bare the causal connexion between the means and the end or the object of desire.

It may seem that according to Hume a reasonable belief is a true belief, at least that what is suggested by his talk about "just" inferences. But it may be doubted, and perhaps not without linguistic sensitiveness, that 'true' or 'false' are not cognate with 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable', or in any case they are not equivalent expressions. For Hume, actions can be called reasonable,

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1. Whether Hume could be said to be entitled to speak about 'just' or 'unjust' inferences is a question that cannot be settled now. I have benefitted by Professor W.H.Walsh's correspondence in clarifying my views about Hume's notion of 'reasonable belief'.

by extension only; according to reasonable beliefs actions are performed; and a belief can be called reasonable only if it enables one to make "just" inferences. It becomes then unavoidable to accept that a reasonable belief is one that is true. But the logic of the word 'reasonable' is not the same as that of the word 'true'. A true belief entails that it is a reasonable belief, but that a belief is reasonable does not logically imply that it is true. 'Reasonable' is logically a weaker expression than 'true', and a belief is said to be reasonable not always because it enables us making "just" inferences, but on the strength of evidence that one may have for entertaining it. Conditions that make a belief true are often waived in cases of having a reasonable belief. A high degree of probability or evidential support may go to recommend a belief as reasonable. The problem we are trying to state has a semblance of the epistemological question concerning 'knowledge' and 'belief'. As Austin remarked that to say 'I know' is to give one's warrant to something, and a warrant that is somehow different in degree from that involved in saying merely 'I believe'. Knowing is being in the appropriate position to certify or to give one's authority or warrant to the truth of what is said to be known. Likewise, to say that a belief is true is to make much stronger a claim than merely asserting that it is reasonable.

This somewhat lengthy digression was needed for clarifying the notion that an act can be called reasonable which one has reasons to do for. One can think of reasonable actions, even while agreeing with Hume that it is only in a stricter sense beliefs can be

said to be reasonable. The word 'reasonable', when applied to actions is not used in the same sense when it is used for beliefs, and the two senses are logically independent, for it is one thing to have reasons for acting and it is another thing to have reasons for believing. Kant's notion of maxims of action may be particularly helpful in this context. If an action could be accounted for by appealing to a maxim, no matter whether or not the maxim is a categorical imperative, the action could be said to be reasonable. Or in other words the reasons for acting are intended to answer the question why the agent did perform the action. Reasons for believing and reasons for acting should be different, since in the former we are concerned with truth and falsity, with entertaining the idea that something is the case; while in the latter our main concern lies in making something the case.

Thus far we get the following points: (a) That a true belief is different from a reasonable belief; (b) that reasons for believing are different from reasons for acting. The former are validating reasons, i.e., evidences determining the character of a belief, whether it is true or merely reasonable; the latter are justificatory reasons. One tends to offer justificatory reasons only in order to claim that what one did was what he thought right. Rightness of actions depends on the reasons for performing it. I use the word 'right' in a value-neutral sense, of course, meaning thereby, what the agent, in a given circumstance, thinks exactly the thing to do, and state why does he think so. It might be objected that my notion is too wide and it rules out the possibility

of any action being unreasonable. In a sense it does not, since one can always formulate or find out reasons on which one has acted. And the very concept of voluntary actions presupposes the fact that the agent can account for his performance. Anyway, what concerns us at the present moment is the question whether the distinction between reasons for acting and those for believing would be tenable on Hume's premisses. I believe it should be, because once it is agreed that a reasonable belief is not necessarily a true belief, there remains no possibility of erring by taking an action as reasonable in the sense a belief can be true. It runs counter to the rationalist view that actions can be reasonable or unreasonable in a fashion that propositions can be true or untrue. Since actions or their motivating causes, i.e., passions are not propositional entities, and hence the epithets appropriate to propositions cannot be applied to them. This point is made by Hume with great clarity and conviction. But his whole procedure implies a very strict concept of reason, and it might appear that there is also a consequent exclusion of all talk of reason as applied to conduct as illegitimate. Such a way of thinking would be taking Hume amiss. His logical concern leaves our everyday way of talking sufficiently unaffected and there seems to be no reason to believe that he was proposing a revision of linguistic usage, as Reid thought. The merit of Hume's discussion lies in pointing out that the justification of actions, by the nature of the case, must differ, in important respects, from logical proof and inductive arguments.

Another point of related interest is Hume's use of the word "discovery" in the context of the function of reason. He says, "Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood" or "it discovers the connexion of causes and effects" (ibid., pp. 458 and 459, italics not in the text). How to discover something is to find out what is the case. "Discovery" is an achievement word just as the word 'know' is. In this sense how can one discover what is not the case? When Hume includes 'falsehood' with 'truth' that reason discovers, and true with erroneous, or for that matter, mistaken causal relationships, he precisely appears to suggest as if falsehood could be discovered. If it be said, as Hume says, that reason informs us about the means of attaining our desired ends by 'discovering' causal connexions between them, and thereby influencing our course of action, one is just left to wonder how a discovery of falsehood could lead us to act. Of course, 'discovery' of a false causal relationship between a chosen means and the desired end can lead us to refrain from acting. If one happens to know beforehand that a particular means was unsuited to the attainment of one's desired end, one in all likelihood, will abandon the course of action or will not simply adopt it. On page 416 of the Treatise he says, "When in ~~o~~esting any passion in actions, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. When a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it." It is clear from this passage that it is only later

that we find that our means was ill-chosen, and by implication, that the belief which led us to choose that particular means was erroneous. An ill-chosen means is a late discovery. It cannot be that we come to know it beforehand, or pre-eventum, that the means we are going to adopt was defective. It does not make any sense to say so. It could not have been Hume's intention to ascribe plotinian causal inferences or unsound deductive reasoning to reason. If reason were to discover both truth and falsehood then in a sense it cannot by itself be a motive to the will. For it is the belief, seemingly reasonable on the basis of available evidence, that determines our conduct, not the truth of what we believe. Reason as a faculty of judgment is outside the domain of right, a passive, inert principle. But in a less strong sense of the term, reason as belief based on evidence, may and does influence conduct. When Hume says that our actions can be contrary to reason only in so far as they are false beliefs about the nature of an end or the means to that end, what he appears to suggest that the truth-value of a judgment has no causal power, it is our belief in the judgment that prompts to action. A false belief may appear to be reasonable to an agent, and he may act on it and fail to achieve the end, simply because what we call a "reasonable belief" does not entail that it is a 'true' belief, though the converse will always hold. It is one thing to say, post eventum, that an action was based on poor evidence, and it may be another thing to say that it was based on false belief. Considerations such as these have led some to recognise

a further distinction, belief in the truth of a proposition, and truth of a belief.[1] The belief in the truth of a proposition has important bearings on conduct, such that passions may "yield to reason". Hume writes, "I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases" (ibid., pp.416-17). In the example, it is the conviction about "the falsehood of that supposition" or, the belief that a certain proposition was not true that settles the matter. And should be it allowed to be said that the belief in the truth of a proposition is reason in a secondary sense, and Hume's example does seem to suggest such a possible interpretation, in that case, reason is not indifferent to conduct and does influence it, even "our passions yield to our reason without any opposition" (ibid., p. 416, italics ours). Of course, the primary sense of the word 'reason' is reserved for the faculty of judgment, which is concerned with truths of our beliefs. And it is in this special sense of 'reason', to be "contrary to reason" is to be inconsistent with some truth. That such a view is not unwarranted will be immediately realized if we recall Hume's equating 'reason' with 'truth' on page 415 of the Treatise : "nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has reference to it" (italics not in the text). In the sense of 'reason' as the belief

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1. Hume distinguishes between what is believed and believing it, between what he calls "the idea" and "the manner of conceiving" it, its force or vivacity. What can be true or false is what is believed, a proposition, something "representative", but believing is a psychological state. Often we call the former theoretical.

in the truth of a proposition, can it be argued, that reason does offer some opposition to passion? If the argument is valid, Hume's example can be taken as a counter-example of his own thesis that reason is an 'inactive' principle. But, the argument would not be valid on two grounds. First, for Hume, it is only a secondary sense of 'reason', and secondly, in the example, the passions "yield" instead of "opposing". For the rationalist, it would be a bloodless victory, if at all. Again, reason as discovery is concerned with truths of our belief, whether they are true or false. To say that truth of our beliefs does not influence our conduct but the beliefs do is not to imply that it is not important. There may be a greater likelihood that if a man's actions are based on a true belief he will succeed than if his actions were based on a false one. But whether our beliefs, be true or false, they can influence actions in an equal degree. The discovery view of reason opens up a dilemma. If our belief about the efficacy of a means is true, we are likely to succeed in achieving our end, and, if the belief is false, we may fail to realise our end. Either our belief about the efficacy of a means is true or it is false. Hence we may either succeed or fail to realise our end. It is our belief that such-and-such means is worth adopting together with the fact that the means leading to the end is desired by us are which motivate us to act, rather than the truth or falsehood of our belief. Our concern for the end becomes our motivation for acting, not the discovery of truth or falsity of our beliefs about the means. If the discovery view of reason is accep-

tially rationalistic, then in adopting it for him, Hume shows also that it cannot be a motive to the will. Theoretical reason is non-substantive, and actions concern us with matters of substance. Beliefs influence our conduct only when it arouses concern in us for our desired ends. If our beliefs are such that they interest us, or we are interested in what we belief, then our beliefs become practically potent. This is the teaching of Hume's account of sympathy and benevolence. In sympathising we come to have a belief about the other person's state of mind, and only if we are interested in the person's welfare, we go out of our way to help him. "The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant" (ibid., p. 429). In both the cases we have beliefs, and may be true beliefs, but its influence on our conduct depends on our feeling of concern for the content of the belief, i.e., only if we are intimately related with it. Only if, in other words, we are interested in what is believed, beliefs determine our conduct. This is a complicated process, and much depends on our view about the world, what we believe it to be, that affects us, not reason as such. If 'reason' means belief in the truth of a proposition, or beliefs about "matters of fact", then there is no reason why it should not affect us. And this, I think, Hume never denied. We are 'passionate' beings, in our actions as well as in our beliefs. It is the passions that determine the ends of conduct, since they are the incentives, and decide us in the "election" (a la Hutcheson) to this or that

action. Reason enters only as instrumental factor in enabling us in choosing the appropriate courses of action. "It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us" (ibid., p. 414).

The view that feeling determines all our ends, and reason makes these explicit and decides when and how they can best be attained has been criticized by Kurt Baier in his The Moral Point of View (Cornell University Press, New York, 1963). He dismisses Hume's whole position as "absurd" and "unsound". We shall see how far Baier's opinion is tenable. The first point made by Baier is that Hume's concept of reason is absurd, or rather, Hume holds "a false conception of the nature of reason" (The Moral Point of View, p. 259) and says that "he mean by the word 'reason' something that can make us do things" (ibid., p.260). Now obviously, this is not to meet Hume on his own ground, rather to start with an altogether different premise. Baier's concept of reason is dispositional, like Ryle's reduction of 'knowing that' to 'knowing how'. The causal power attributed to 'reason' as a faculty of judgment would not be admissible for Hume's position. Of course in a secondary sense of the word 'reason', i.e., in the sense of our beliefs about matters of fact, it can have causal power or the power to "make us to things". But whether 'reason' as a faculty of analytic or demonstrative knowledge could be looked upon as causative remains an open question. We had remarked earlier that there is no unanimous view of 'reason' and much depends on the set of entities

reason is contrasted with, or from what it is distinguished. Hume contrasts actions with propositions, for example, and hence the exclusion of doing from that is theoretical. The question what we can achieve by reason can be settled only on the considerations of the sort mentioned above. In the light of Taylor's full account of 'reason' his charge against Hume loses much force that it could have otherwise had. Taylor bases his whole argument that Hume's concept of reason is false on the issue that there is no empirical question concerning reason's causal potency as there is regarding the heart's "power to pump the blood through our veins?" (ibid., p. 260). The significance of asking an "empirical" question lies in our knowing the notions involved in the verbal formulation of the question, before we know the answer sought. There is no reason to suppose, as Taylor does, that in asking 'Does reason or does it not, have the power to move us in action?' we are ignorant of the meaning of the expressions like "moving us to action" and "reason". From our experience of emotive life we already know what is it to be moved to action, when for example, pity moves us to action, or when we feel desire or aversion. In the light of this experience we can significantly ask whether a faculty like reason which is concerned with analytic or demonstrative certainty of our ideas could be said to move us in the same way as pity, or desire, we experience, move us. Taylor appears to overlook the fact that Hume asks the question in the light of his theory of the passions, and if it be granted that the passions are causally efficient, then it follows that nothing that is not passion-like

in its office and nature can be said to have us.

Baier's second objection is directed against Hume's contention that the ultimate human ends cannot be accounted for by reason. Baier says that Hume's concept of reason is 'unduly narrow', and with this remark I am in partial agreement. His second charge that Hume had a "confused conception of what it is to have and to find reason" (ibid., p. 261) is false. Hume never said that "the task of reason was to find reasons" (ibid.), rather his main task was to show that there must be some difference between logical proof and providing justificatory reasons for conduct. Baier's view is based on a wrong reading of Hume and he appears to take Hume as prohibiting a priori all talk of reason to conduct, which is far from the truth and this is what we have tried to show above. Hume was trying to point out that in its practical application reason can have a means-finding office, and this is by no means an unimportant task assigned to it. Secondly, in the light of our discussion about reasonable beliefs, it is possible to say that validating reasons are a different lot from justificatory reasons and Hume could hardly be said to have confused the two. One's reasons for acting in a particular way are one's reasonable beliefs about the objects that one desires or avoids to have. But a reasonable belief need not necessarily be a true belief, its workability is its criterion for its being relied upon or adopted. There is no belief reasonable as such, it is the agent, in respect of his set ends, who decides which means to adopt. This calculative procedure is so-called reason, but cannot be called reason, properly so-called.

As regards the notion of ends Baier holds that it is wrong to think that our ends are not capable of being determined or accounted for by reason. Baier's concept of 'reason' is such that there could be no dialogue between him and Hume. Hume's inquiry was primarily directed towards motivational explanation of human behaviour, and accordingly, given human nature as it is, and the constitution of the individual agent, it remains only to ask, why did the agent do what he did? An answer to such questions would be a motivational explanation, or a statement of explanatory reasons for the agent's action, i.e., reasons why he has any particular end. Baier insists on having an answer to the question whether his ends are in accordance with reason or 'justified from a rational point of view' (ibid., p.266). The chief difference between Hume and Baier lies in respect of their attitudes to hypothetical imperatives. Courses of action, according to Hume, are recommended by reason as means to an end determined by desire, but Hume points out that reason cannot command a course of action as an end itself. The force of the recommendations come, not from reason, but from the fact that certain ends are desired by the person. The recommendations are contingent and conditional. A means 'B' can be undertaken to be pursued only if an end 'E' is set before the agent, such that 'B' and 'E' are causally connected. Baier thinks that there can be ends not determined by desire, as Hume thinks, but by reason. He says that reason determines our ends in the sense that when we ask 'What shall I do?' we demand for rationally determined ends, or 'ends backed by reason'.

Now there are two things, reason recommending ends intrinsically worth pursuing and ends "backed up by reason". The first would not be admissible on Hume's premisses simply because, in consistency with his rigorous notion of reason, it does not come within the purview of reason to make any such recommendation. One may not hold such a view of reason but there cannot be any quarrel with it. As regards the second, let us take Baier's example. To the question "Shall I aim at becoming a doctor or an engineer?", one might like to answer 'a doctor' or 'an engineer' only if being a doctor or an engineer is more rewarding a course of action in a particular job-situation of a country. There is no reason to suppose that there is any absoluteness about one's being a doctor or an engineer. And the 'justificatory' reasons that might be adduced in backing up such decisions are simply a set of beliefs that appeals most to the agent in the context of his future employment prospect. And also what suits his natural expression. It is erroneous to suppose that Hume dismisses the possibility of either having or giving such reasons. Lastly, in what sense an end of the like sort can be 'determined'? Does the end 'follow' from the set of backing reasons. I do not think that it could be the case, on the contrary, the backing or supporting reasons are as contingent and conditional as the recommendation of reason in the case of hypothetical imperatives. What appears to me to be the 'justificatory' reasons may not so appear to others. My wife can always think that I have been in a wrong profession while I may enjoy complete job-satisfaction. Baier

remarks, "If he [the agent] adopts as his end what he has worked out to have the support of reason, then his end is determined, is accounted for, by reason in the most important sense of that phrase" (ibid). What this "important sense" is left unclear by Baier. A determination is either logical, i.e., that of entailment, or psychological. If Baier's "important sense" of determination of end by reason is 'justificatory' beliefs that appear to the agent as 'reasonable', then it is Hume's point that he is actually making. Hume speaks of two kinds of judgments that may accompany a passion, one that discovers causal connections between means and ends; and the other which "excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it" (op.cit.,p.459). The appropriateness of the object recommends itself to the passion for it, and the passion is aroused and informed about the proper object by a judgment. This is a case of determination of an end "backed up" by reason, which cannot claim anything better than psychological validity. The accompanying judgment can be said to determine or "backup" the end, i.e., the object of the passion or action in the sense that it produces the passion. But Hume reminds us that such judgments "may often be false" (ibid.). There is another case of our actions being determined by the end. On page 451 of the Treatise Hume says that "where the mind pursues any end with passion; tho' that passion be not deriv'd originally from the end, but merely from the action and pursuit; yet by the natural course of the affections, we acquire a concern for the end itself and are uneasy under any disappointment we meet with in the pursuit

of it". What Hume is speaking of as "a concern for the end itself" is not an implicit admission of deontology, rather a mistaken view of the situation, as if the passion was legislated by the end, or derived from it. There cannot be any exciting "reason" previous to our feeling of a passion for an object. This is Aristotelean wisdom in ethics that there are ultimate ends derived without a view to anything else. An end is an end not because of the reasons that back it up, on the contrary, the "reasons" are reasons, because there is an end to be supported. The passions are determined for us by our nature (this is consistent with Hume's doctrine of liberty) and they in turn determine for us the ultimate ends of conduct. Reason occupies itself solely with the means of their fulfilment. The different alleged roles of reason, exciting or justificatory do not change the situation. Mabbott has completely ignored Hume's characteristic use of the term reason in the sense of calm passions. If to have an end in the rational way is to say 'no' to our "violent" passions, to take "some distant view or reflexion", then calm passions do determine the will as if it were by reason. This particular use of 'reason' is significant in view of the fact that " 'tis not contrary to reason to prefer any acknowledged lesser good to any greater". Determination of ultimate ends cannot then safely allowed to be vested in the office of reason.

There is a misconception in Mabbott's account of Hume's position. In ascribing hedonism to Hume, he remarks "Pleasure to [Hume] thinks, is an ultimate end" (op.cit., p.266). The misconcep-

tion is based on a misunderstanding of Hume's theory of passions and the role of the concepts of pleasure and pain in the theory. Pleasure, and pain, for Hume, are sub-passional data of our emotive experience. The hedonic character of our experience is predetermined, and whether an object would be pleasurable or painful is not dependent on the will. It is a fact of human nature that in our experience we cannot be indifferent to the hedonic qualities of our sensations, and the question why some of them are pleasant or others are disagreeable cannot be properly answered. The apprehension of the hedonic character of sensations is categorical, that is to say, we cannot have any experience without becoming at the same time aware of its hedonic characteristics. But what is more important is how do we react to our hedonistically characterised experiences, and it is with this question Hume's theory of the passions start. For the reasons alluded above the passions do not include pleasure and pain, which are sensations. The passions are, properly speaking, our emotive reactions to the sensations with characteristic hedonic properties. On page 192 of the Treatise Hume describes pains and pleasures as arising "from the application of objects to our bodies" and the example that he gives is that of "the cutting our flesh with steel". The passions are posterior to such sensations. When pleasure or pain arise from contemplation, Hume usually speaks of "agreeable feeling" or "uneasiness". There is at least one express statement in which Hume recognises the vagueness of the concept of pleasure. "A good composition of meats and a bottle of good wine equally

produce pleasure; and what is more, their goodness is determin'd merely by the pleasure. But shall we say upon that account, that the wine is harmonious, or the music of a good flavour?" (op.cit., p. 472). It is the ambiguity of the term 'pleasure' obscuring the difference between a pleasurable sensation and the "sentiment of pleasure", which is chiefly responsible for committing Hume to a hedonistic position. But in spite of this, Kemp Smith has rightly pointed out for Hume, pleasure and pain "are merely the efficient causes, not the objects or ends of action" (op.cit., p.164). Our choice of ends may be influenced by hedonistic criteria, but it is directed or guided by our passions. Some of our passions may arise directly from our experience of pleasure and pain -- the direct passions like desire and aversion, some others arise when the hedonistically characterized experiences are accompanied by certain ideas involving some kind of reference to a self. And this is the most important point. To say that for Hume pleasure is the ultimate end is to ignore the sophisticated refinement of his theory of passions on the first instance, and, secondly, to misdescribe his position. These two are inter-related. Ardal has given a convincing argument to the effect that hedonism cannot be attributed to Hume. On Mair's ascription, it would follow that pleasure is an end of desire, but the case is just the reverse for Hume. Pleasure is a cause or as Ardal has put it, "the part-cause of a desire". I will first put Ardal's argument and then give another supporting illustration, which, I believe, he could have used effectively. Given that Hume describes the passion

of love as a desire for the happiness of the beloved person, together with the fact that he distinguishes between cause of a desire and end of a desire, it follows that if pleasure be the cause of the desire (or the passion) of love, it cannot be its end as well. Hume's distinction between a cause and an end of a desire occurs on page 367 of the Treatise. The distinction of a cause and an object of a passion is devised for allegedly non-conative passions like pride and humility, and the distinction is carried over to the discussion of conative passions like love and hatred. A re-statement of the distinction is given with a view to explaining the conjunction of desire and aversion with love and hatred. The re-statement admits a new distinction, i.e., of an end of desire, besides the cause and the object. Love and hatred, says Hume, "have not only a cause, which excites them, viz. pleasure and pain; and an object, to which they are directed, viz. a person or thinking being; but likewise an end, which they endeavour to attain, viz. the happiness or misery of the person belov'd or hated..." (op.cit., p. 367). By saying that pleasure is the cause of love Hume means that it is the "sensation" of the passion that matters, and the sensation given rise to by the qualities of the person (the object of the passion) in question leads us to desire his happiness for the "satisfaction" of the emotion of the passion. Now the "sensation" of the passion (conjoined as it is with desire) and the satisfaction that follows when the disposition is exerted are not identical items of the emotive scheme of our experience, and if they are not identical, it can in no way be allowed to be said that pleasure is the end of conduct.

I now come to give another example. There are certain passions in experiencing which we come to have a diminution of our own pleasure. Of such nature is the passion of envy, which is "excited by some present enjoyment of another which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own" (ibid., p. 377, italics not in the text). It might be said that the envious man seeks "to reap a pleasure from the comparison", but Hume makes an acute observation and says that the envied pleasure is "superior to our own"(ibid.). Does it sound plausible to say that granted that pleasure is an ultimate end, who would choose an inferior pleasure to one that is superior in comparison? It might be urged that people are envious, but in that case to choose less pleasure by comparison is also to choose the inevitable disagreeable feeling, which is inconsistent. Hence no one could be said to choose consciously both less pleasure and and disagreeable feeling all at once. It is one thing to say that as a matter of fact people feel envious and experience a diminished pleasure, and quite another thing to say that they choose it consciously. For an end is not worth its name unless it is a matter of conscious choice. It could also be argued that when an envious man compares his present pleasure with one of his inferiors the pleasure will be greater and such comparison may be sought as an end. But this can only be a makeshift arrangement, and not a proper case of an end, since "when the inferiority decreases by the elevation of the inferior, what shou'd only have been a decrease of pleasure, becomes a real pain" (ibid.). There may be another case against Baier's thesis. Hume's concept of benevolence affords an

example. Sympathy with another's present misery has an effect of disagreeable feeling in me, but perchance the intensity of the sympathized feeling is vivacious enough, instead of producing a greater degree of disagreeableness, I become interested in his fate and may, in consequence, go out of my way to relieve him of his pitiable condition. And before I might embark upon any relief project, I may experience "a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid., p. 386). In all this there is no suggestion that in sympathizing with him in this manner I hope to have pleasure as my end, since in spite of the fact that sympathy is an involuntary process, it is not blind, and in entering "deeply into the sentiment of others" we are certainly conscious of the emotive experience we undergo. Thus it may then be concluded that Dalor's view that according to Hume pleasure is an ultimate end is a misconceived one.

What then is the relation between reason and conduct according to Hume? It has sometimes been suggested that, for him, there is a gap between reality and reason. The attractiveness of the phrase recommends itself on a superficial level. A part of Hume's programme was directed towards a conceptual clarification of the question 'What is it to say that reason can be a motive to the will?' As a sequel to his doctrine of liberty Hume holds further that it is not analytic to say that reason is a motive. No motivating power could be attributed to reason. The concept of 'reason', strictly defined, is only demonstrative. Or to use his own term a faculty of

"discovery". There is, of course, room for applied reason in morals, but not for reason, properly so-called. And the faculty or rather the calm passions also called reason are more sensible than intellectual, though reason-like in its operations. To quote Hume on this point, "that reason, which is to oppose our passion and which we have found to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion" (ibid., p. 583). The word 'that' is significant, since the function of opposing passions is denied to reason properly so-called, though in its capacity of stating instrumental sufficiency of our means to an end can have the passions yielded to it, without opposition. Hume, in saying these things, is, in fact, making such subtler points. To oppose a passion is not necessarily to influence it, rather its converse. Passions, he tells us, acquire "new force and violence" (ibid., p.421) from opposition, and even if reason were to oppose the passions, it would have been morally inconsequential. What is morally significant is whether the passions could be influenced. To influence a passion is to cause some change in its direction and should this interpretation of 'influence' be not objectionable, the calm passions appear to fare better by virtue of their "active" nature and the reason-like power or capability of transcending the immediate impulses, in taking a "distant view" of emotive situations. There is another ground for favouring the determination of the will by calm passions, that is, they are habitual choices of our character, principles of action. Stability of choice determines the moral-worthiness of character.

On the other hand, reason is non-committal in case-stating, it neither approves or disapproves. In matters of fact and existence reason is a blind guide. Its criterion of self-contradiction trifles with the exactness of moral situation. For reason, "Any thing may produce anything" (ibid., p.173) provided it is not self-contradictory. These considerations, based as they are on a rigorously narrow conception of 'reason' which can be properly called 'theoretical', lead Hume not to look upon reason as the guide or the supreme legislator of human life.

But from this it does not follow that logic and ethics, reason and reality are left by Hume with a gap between them. His concept of human nature does not allow any such presupposition. It is true that "Morality...is more properly felt than judg'd of" (ibid., p. 470, the following lines refer to the calm passions which are mistaken for reason because of "our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other"). But does Hume say that morality is never judged of? In a supplementary passage he says that "nature by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel" (ibid.,p.183). Now, then, is the alleged gap bridged? We have already referred to the notion of "reasonable beliefs". Our reason giving activities are judgmental in the sense that our reasons for acting in a particular manner are based on our beliefs about matters of fact and existence. By choosing a particular course of conduct is guided by my belief, that seemed reasonable at the time of choosing the course of conduct, about the efficacy

of a particular means for a desired end. The question 'Why did I choose a particular course of action?' is answerable partly in terms of a certain set of beliefs that are related to the end in view, that is to say, had I not a particular set of beliefs that seemed reasonable to me at the time of choosing the course of action I would have chosen differently. When Hume says that judgments "obliquely" (ibid.,p.459) cause our actions by accompaning passions, what he seeks to bring home is the idea that judgments are the necessary conditions of our conduct, though not sufficient. A bare knowledge of causal relations between a course of action and an end do not influence the will, unless the end is desired by the agent. Thus a passion accompanied by a judgment together constitute both necessary and sufficient conditions of any action that may be described as goal-oriented or voluntary. But to say that judgment (reason) alone is sufficient to influence the will is "an abusive way of speaking" (ibid.) because no inference as to the character of an action can be made from the truth of a judgment or belief that accompanies a passion. The thesis of uninferability does not warrant a denial of any connexion between them. The distinction between opposing a passion and influencing the will has often been blurred or overlooked by the commentators. The phrases "conclusions of reason" and "decisions of morality" are not equivalent expressions. But this non-equivalence has been mistakenly interpreted in Hume's case as a romantic slogan for irrationalism in matters of conduct. Sartre invokes Hume in order to strengthening his view that choices or human actions are criterionless. This

is positively misleading. Hume, like Sartre, is no disappointed rationalist, even though, we should note, the former's description of his experience of epistemological vertigo is very close to the world of the latter. Hume is able to assume a social context and Sartre is not. Again, for Sartre, desires and passions appear to play no role in our choice of ends. There is, in fact, absence of an account of desires and emotions in Sartre, and this, I believe, is linked to his unwillingness to give causal explanations of human behaviour. Again, if Hume be said to have a notion of 'practical reason', it cannot be construed on Kantian lines. For Kant it is the will that is reason, and in legislating itself, reason becomes practical. Since the notion of rational will is inadmissible in Hume's context, the phrase 'practical reason', for him, would be primarily empty. It can be entertained only in a secondary sense of the term 'reason'. Or, it is not reason qua reason that the term would occur in the phrase 'practical reason', as far as Hume is concerned, rather as applied reason. In this role, it may do a lot of work as an efficient bureaucrat, and yet have to depend on the 'yes' or 'no' of the minister, the passions.

These considerations may help in clarifying another doubt, namely, if reason is perfectly 'inert' as Hume says, then does not he contradict himself in saying that reason together with something else, i.e., passion, could influence the will? How can a faculty which is originally conceived as inactive become active when it comes to operate with some other thing? Reason, as we have tried to indicate earlier, has no special impulse attached to

it, but when some judgments accompany our passions, conation properly speaking belongs to passions, and not to judgments. Judgments play an informing function, i.e., they disclose the proper means to be adopted in order to attain a desired end. And the disclosure consists no more than a 'discovery' that something or other is the case, but it never makes something the case. Seen in this light any such remark that actions can be effects of reason in conjunction with other emotions may appear misleading, unless one is sure about what he means by 'reason'. It is worthwhile to remind ourselves over again that the relation between reason and reality, is not logical, but psychological. The distinction that Hume makes between 'reason' and 'reality' does in no way imply a disconnection, provided we do not overlook his ideas about 'pure' and 'applied' reason.

I should like to make a passing reference to some views about the relationship between reason and the passions. Are there rational passions? For Plato the passion for order was one of the main features of reason. The feeling of reverence for the Moral Law, to Kant, is no less important. These are the passions peculiar to the life of reason. Can we say that the calm passions are rational? Hume would say 'no'. They are reason-like, though not rational. Ryle in his A Rational Animal (London,1962) has remarked that the ideas of rationality, reasonableness and reasons are internal to the notion of thinking that may be graded as intellectual work; and such thinking, he says, possesses self-correction as an essential element. Disciplined thinking is

self-corrective. Similarly, disciplined passions would be rational by virtue of embodying an element of self-correction. Ryle says nothing exceptionable so far his main contentions go. But should his view be taken to suggest that there is a set of passions that overlaps the domain of reason, then it would be to have Hume mistaken. Hume's account of the calm passions does make room for self-referential reactions independent of reason. Most of the jobs ordinarily assigned to reason are performed by the calm passions. A mention should also be made of general rules which, at the level of conduct, correct the variations in our sympathies. These are not rational rules. The phrase 'rational passion' may not be a happy one for Hume.

It is usually thought that the passions are non-neutral, hence one has to care for truth, consistency and clarity, and these pertain to the domain of reason. It is often argued that actions performed under the direction of reason are free or rational. Any such view would be based on a distrust of the passions. Sometimes we are affected by passions. Some of our passions do enslave us. Does this fact entitle us to infer that all our passions enslave? As a deductive argument it would be fallacious. Our use of the language of enslavement or irrationality in relation to the passions can only be limited to a narrow range of our actions that feels discernibly different from others. The evidence of enslaving passions cannot be used for a generalization about all passions. Again, supposing that all passions do not enslave, it does not follow that the passions that do not enslave are rational.

Some of Hume's commentators have attributed to him the view that the passions, strictly speaking, are not criticizable as reasonable or unreasonable. Such an attribution can be made only on the basis of partial evidence. Hume has said that when any passion motivates us to act, the passion becomes criticizable in two ways, in terms of the beliefs and judgments that accompany it. The truth or falsity of such beliefs and judgments make it possible to criticize the passion as reasonable or unreasonable. But this is not the whole story about the criticizability of the passions. There is much else besides the truth or falsity of the accompanying beliefs and judgments. The passions have objects, and the situations that give rise to the passions consist in apprehension and evaluation of the objects. Hume does not even deny that there can be reasons for one's apprehension and evaluation of the objects of one's passions. For example, on page 294 of the Treatise, he speaks about the "reason for" one's being proud. Criticizability has to do with all these.

It is often overlooked that to criticize a passion, say, when it is affected by a false judgment is only to point to "a mistake of fact" (ibid., p.439). Similarly, to say that a passion is affected by a true judgment would be to make a factual consideration. What is more important is to criticize a passion in terms of evaluations. The calm passions make such criticism possible, "when corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution" (ibid., p.437). In the Enquiry Hume has remarked, "Our affections, as a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain

measures of preference of one above another; and those decisions, [are] really the result of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?)" The passage occurs on page 239, without of course the italicized expressions. We find here an explicit statement to the effect that the passions can be criticized, i.e., declared "eligible" or otherwise only if there are normative constraints, or rules of conduct. And there can be such rules only if we are capable of taking "a general prospect" of the objects of the passions. On page 296 of the Enquiry, we are told again that by "a refinement of reflection" the passions can become "disinterested". Such passions are calm, and these, says Hume, constitute our "sense of beauty and deformity of actions" (ibid., p.276). All these go to show that the calm passions, when they prevail, subject other passions to criticism.

It has sometimes been contended that Hume has a special doctrine of calm passions that is stated in rationalistic terms, and that the disinterested calm passions are specially associated with the use of reason. The former is quite exceptionable, while the latter misrepresents Hume's intentions. I am not seeking to refute these views. I should rather make a brief statement about the reason-like operations of the calm passions.

There are in Hume two senses in which a passion can be called calm. First, a passion is calm if it be of low emotional intensity on a particular occasion. The second, and more important, is the sense in which a passion is called calm when it is associated with

a firm disposition, and in such cases it can be a stronger motive than a violent passion. When we view a situation objectively, there is aroused in us a passion directed towards this object. This passion also involves little emotional disturbance; and it may keep a violent passion in check. But the further important point in this context is that the calm passions, in the second sense, are evaluations. These passions are sometimes strengthened by reflection, though it need not be a necessary condition the passions to be calm. Reflection may add strength to the passions, which are already calm. Again, a calm passion, which is an evaluation, may acquire greater emotional intensity from attending passions without losing its identity. Beside adequately considering the objects of our desire, a calm passion forms an unbiased or "distant" view, or "a general prospect" of situations. It is the view, rather than the adequacy of conception, which is more significant.

A disinterested passion has a social relevance. To criticize a passion is to point to its "defect and uncommonness" (ibid.,p.480). This can be done only in the social context by taking an objective or a disinterested view. Our passions are social, and some of them, in particular, are directed towards other people. There are degrees of partiality attending the passions, and this has an influence on our social conduct. The passions thus are criticisable according as their "enlargement, or contraction" (ibid.). It is also possible to criticize "what is irregular and inconvenient" (ibid.,p. 489) in them according to social conventions. To criticize

a passion is either to approve or to disapprove of it. Approval and disapproval are calm passions. Approval and disapproval are not simple feelings but complicated sentiments. It should be a mistake to say that for Hume these are feelings that just occur. Approval or disapproval differ from simple reactions in the sort of way desire differs from an impulse. These are feeling worked up by and in evaluative thought.

What do we criticize when we praise or blame a person? First, not any single action of his, rather "the quality or character from which the action [his] proceeded" (ibid., p.575). Actions indicate the character of the agent. By 'character' Hume means the motivating passions, "the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive" (ibid., p.478). By the operation of sympathy, we can put ourselves in the position of the agent; and form an idea of his motivating passions. We then, secondly, "fix on some steady and general point of view...whatever may be our present situation" (ibid., pp.581-2). It is the view of the character of the agent that makes criticism of his passions possible. One can adopt the view with regard to oneself as well. The calm passion when it prevails over the violent is called "strength of mind" (ibid., p.418). Intersubjectively the critical function of the calm passions include, besides evaluating, "regulating and restraining", and even "correcting" (ibid., pp.492 and 582) other passions. The office of the calm passions is to adopt an objective, or intersubjective point of view. The adoption of this point of view can be accounted for in terms of the calm passions that are evaluations.

This is Hume's answer to the rationalists.

Does Hume propose to reserve the term 'reasonable' for criticizing a person for holding a true or false belief about a matter of fact; and 'unreasonable' for expressing disapproval of his character? It does not seem so. A man may be called reasonable even if he had acted on a false belief. For example, I hear that my friend is in trouble and I rush to his help. I discover also that my information or belief on which I acted is false, yet my action or my feeling of benevolence would be deemed reasonable. Hume would not disagree. Suppose again that a person prefers "the destruction of the whole world" by dropping hydrogen bomb. His belief in the destructive power of the nuclear weapon is true, still his preferring the destruction of the whole world would be eminently unreasonable. And Hume would endorse it. Hence criticizability of the passions is not tied to the truth or falsity of the beliefs accompanying the passions. It is another issue whether criticism of the passions as reasonable or unreasonable, or for that matter, evaluation is necessarily involved by the truth or falsity of beliefs. Reasonable or unreasonable as criticism of passions need not always have to do with reason in the sense of discovery of true or false beliefs. Passions are criticizable even on other grounds than being based upon a true or false belief about the nature of a situation or a true or false judgment about causal relationships. This is no less an indubitable Humean doctrine. The following remarks of Norp Smith are worth quoting in this context: "Each and every passion is in itself, no doubt,

perfectly legitimate. Reason can neither justify nor condemn it. But since life, especially social life, demands organization, we learn to govern our 'selfish' passions in the light of those general utilitarian considerations which constitute the rules or canons of personal prudence and of social justice. The controlling influences, however, are still to be found not in reason but in the passions...."(op.cit.,p.153). Norp Smith has made the foregoing remark in connection with what he calls the "the regulating power of reason". But is it reason as a demonstrative science that regulates our passional life? I have tried to show that it is the calm passions "co-called" reason.

On page 415 of the Treatise Hume has made an explicit reference to the view of reason that runs from Plato to Descartes. It is the traditional view of reason as the supreme legislator for human life, or that reason ought to guide our actions in preference to the passions.

Hume does not criticize the traditional view of reason, rather he has argued that in the human situation the legislative powers do not belong to reason as a demonstrative science. As actors we are passionally determined. Concerned even as it also is with truth or falsity of our beliefs about matters of fact and of causal judgments, reason has nothing to do with either producing or opposing any passion. A passion can only be opposed by a counter passion. In short, as no passion is produced by reason, none is controlled by it. Hence any talk of the combat of reason and passion should then be philosophically unsound.

Reason *alone* can never be a motive to action. The word "alone" is significant. Hume does not say that reason has no function. It has, he says, functions as well as limitations. In the field of matters of fact and existence with which our passions make us concerned, reason has a useful part to play. It is an ally, with a *directive*, though not a *determining* influence.

Reason and the passions cannot oppose each other. Reason, says Hume, has a "representative quality", while the passions are original existences. No passion "can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent" (*op.cit.*, p.415). No passion bears any reference to reason, and hence, no sense can be made of any talk of opposition between the two.

Hume intends "opposition" to stand for a strictly logical relation. It could mean 'contrary' as well. How his use of these words might be regarded as imprecise. If the relation of opposition can hold only among entities with "representative quality", how can there be any talk of a passion opposing another? A reasonable anger, for instance, is said to oppose an unreasonable one. "Nothing can oppose or retard the impulse of passion, but a contrary impulse" (*ibid.*, p.415). Here the word 'contrary' has hardly been used in the logical sense. Apart from the logicians' use of 'contradictory', 'opposition' and 'contrary', there is the ordinary man's sense of these terms. When the relationships signified by these terms are asserted to hold among the passions

(which have no "representative quality" in them) what one should mean is something like 'preventing', 'controlling','countering', or 'diminishing the intensity of a passion'. Hume has distinguished between influencing and opposing a passion. Beliefs about matters of fact and existence can and does influence our conduct, but cannot oppose it. A calm passion or a settled principle of action opposes a momentary impulse. On page 350 we are told that a passion can be "diminished", i.e., its intensity can be lowered by looking upon it in an objective manner. This shows again that a passion alone can adjudicate between the passions, and that the question whether a passion can be reasonable or unreasonable can hardly be settled without taking into account the whole range of human emotions, their roles and inter-relations.

The office of reason is limited in such a way that it can only affect our conduct as subservient to passions. Reason alone can never a motive to any action. But along with a motivating passion, it can exert a directive influence. It is never be a legislator, it can only "serve and obey" the passions. Hence the maxim, "Reason is, and ought only be a slave of the passions" (ibid., p.415).

Is to "serve and obey" to become a slave? Hume's maxim is far from being unambiguous. If it were intended as a shocker, we could have then ignored it, because much of the shock is derived from the rhetoric. If, on the other hand, his way of expressing himself has been with a view to declaring the autonomy of the passions, in that case too the use of the word 'slave' is indeed

loud. Is Hume advocating a reversal of the roles of reason and passion? This seems improbable, since he does not criticize the view that reason ought to be the guide of our conduct. Why should he then say that reason is a slave? Even the limitations of reason such as that it can never be a motive to action, or its incapability of "preventing" the will, etc., hardly justify employing the word 'slave'. On these considerations I should like to take the maxim as an over-emphatic statement concerning the autonomy of the passions with regard to the determination of the will.

What sense can be made of Hume's saying that reason "ought" to be a slave of the passions when it is already a slave? Does the 'ought' refer to the controversy as to whether reason does or does not make good its claims to sovereignty? Yes, but only in an oblique manner. Norp Smith is right in saying that the 'is' of the maxim is a sceptical contention. If I am not mistaken he is not quite explicit about the 'ought'. What then is it about? Ardal has suggested that the 'ought' is a terminological recommendation to the effect that in the context of criticizing human conduct we should use the word 'reason' in the sense only of truth or falsity of our beliefs about matters of fact and causal judgments. In other words, reason, when we criticize human conduct as unreasonable can only point to a "mistake of fact", and can neither approve nor disapprove of the said conduct. It is one thing to say that one's action is based on true or false belief, and quite another thing either to approve or to disapprove of it. In both cases

we might use the word 'unreasonable', but the criticism is not of same kind.

There is much that I care for in Ardal's suggestion. The passions, according to Hume's account, are evaluations. And seen in this light, the maxim that "Reason is, and ought only to be a slave of the passions" can with fairness be taken also as a remark about the independence of evaluation from factual considerations. One can advance explanatory as well as justificatory reasons for an action. The former sort of reasons do not compel anyone to give reasons of the latter sort. To say that somebody has acted in the manner he did because he held a true or a false belief, or relied on a true or a false causal judgment is not sufficient for saying that the action concerned is either reasonable or unreasonable. Justificatory reasons are of another sort. They are not theoretical, if we may say so, rather practical. An explanatory reason may be said to be concerned with the truth or falsity of one's beliefs or of causal judgments, and given these antecedent factors, one's actions or passions follow the course of the scheme of one's emotive life. It is only "afterwards", says Hume, "we seek for reasons upon which we may justify and establish the passion" (ibid., p.391). At this point the calm passions step in.

There can be no conflict between reason and passion in the philosophical sense. On page 459 of the Treatise Hume tells us that judgments of reason are our cognitive beliefs about matters of fact and their inferential relationships. Such judgments, or

for that matter, reason may excite a passion we already have by informing us of the existence of something which is the object of that passion; and may discover the connexion of causes and effects so as to afford means exerting our passion. Neither our beliefs about matters of fact nor those about relations of ideas have any motivational influence. Only a passion can directly move us to act. Excluded of course are cases where reason is in concert with a passion. The function of adjudicating on the issue as to which passion is to be modified, criticized, rejected or developed belongs to the calm passions. It is at this that any talk of "combat" can become meaningful. One should rather say 'talk of criticism'. The critical role assigned to the calm passions, marked as it is by calmness and tranquillity, and objective point of view, its reason-likeness is easily mistaken for reason, as if repatriated to another domain.

Hume's view that only a passion can move us to act is put forward as a strong claim. That reason by itself can have no motivational influence on action is also no less strong. On the question of having a motivational influence on action, reason is contrasted with the passions. The two are distinct. Something is said to hold with respect of the passions which does not hold with respect to reason. Hume's figure of the slave with respect to reason vis-a-vis passions has been interpreted to imply such a meta-ethical theory as emotivism. This meta-ethical theory is often explained as stating the contention that an evaluation is not a cognitive judgment, or the use of descriptive language does

not commit oneself to take any particular attitude. Hume in the present context is more concerned with actions rather than with attitudes. A non-descriptivist meta-ethical theory like prescriptivism would be nearer to Hume. But that would be another story.

I should like to make brief comments on the sort of claim Hume could have possibly intended in saying that reason alone can have no motivational influence on human actions.

Let me begin with the case for the passions. Suppose we can say that the passions alone can have a motivational influence on action. Now is it as a matter of fact or of necessity that passions have such influence? To say that the passions as a matter of fact have a motivational influence on action, would be a less controversial though a weaker claim, and hardly it could have been Hume's intention to say that. If on the other hand, the passions as a matter of necessity have a motivational influence on action, is this necessity logical? Hume says it explicitly that necessity is only a determination of mind produced by constant union, and "the union betwixt motives and actions" is regular and certain. In other words, it is logically possible for a passion by itself to motivate a person because there is experienced a constant union between motives (including passions, temper and situation, and character of agents) and actions. Human actions are passionally determined. This is what Hume calls "moral evidence" (ibid., p.404). Hume seems to have argued that it is possible that passions can have a moti-

vational influence on action because it is 'necessary' that they do. One might say that the necessity is only in relation to our experience of the constant union between the motivating passions and actions. It is a thesis of Hume's determinism that "all actions....have particular causes" (ibid.,p.412), and obviously the claim is a generalization with an almost 'necessary' force. When it is said that the motivating passions are such causes of actions, it can hardly be such a contention as that it is possible for (motivating) passions to have a motivational influence on action. The claim tends towards analyticity. But apart from it, since we cannot think of any other domain except the human one wherein the motivating passions do not cause actions, the claim that the passions alone can have motivational influence on action is a matter of necessity. Despite Hume's own avowal to the effect that there is no other mode of necessity than in the spectator's sense, it perhaps remains arguable if he can do without a claim of logical necessity.

Now about reason. It is not easy to understand if Hume makes an empirical or a logical claim in saying that reason alone can never be a motive to any action. Does he mean to say that reason of necessity cannot be a motive to action, or that reason not of necessity can be a motive to action? We have here two modal assertions. In the first alternative, the dictum that reason (by itself) can be a motive to action is denied, while in the second, it is the mode 'of necessity' is denied. The placement of the negation sign matters. The first alternative is

equivalent to saying that it is impossible that reason can be a motive to action. This would be a rationalist's despair, for the claim rules out a priori any possibility for reason having a motivational influence on action. In that way, it is a very strong claim indeed. The second alternative is equivalent to saying that it is possible that reason is not a motive to action. But the ambiguity of 'possible' is well known, and it does by no means disconfirm its sub-contrary, namely, that it is possible that reason is a motive to action. The claim that reason cannot have a motivational influence on action is then contingent. It is logically possible for one to have a cognitive belief and not to act up to it, just as it is also possible to have such a belief and to act up to it. Did Hume intend to prove a contingent claim? Should he mean what our second alternative says, it would become disquieting to believe that he intended to say merely that it was not impossible that either reason has or does not have a motivational influence on action. Such an intention hardly appears consistent with what he proposed to prove, i.e., that "reason alone can never be a motive to any action". If one wishes to do justice to the words 'alone' and 'never', should Hume not be taken to have intended something like our first alternative? It can always be possible for a person to make a judgment of reason and remain unaffected by it, unless of course he is concerned about the object of his desire or passion. Hume's is a causal account of human action, and therein must figure some reference to the agent's desires and motivating passions. To deny this would

be to imply, what may be called, causation of action by belief -- a position Hume would evidently reject. Hence his contention that cognitive beliefs are not causes of human actions.

Modal formulation of Hume's views namely, whether reason or the passions have a motivational influence on action, has just been a conceptual curiosity since it can be questioned if this was essential for his purpose. His so-called proof for the view that reason alone can never be a motive to any action is hardly demonstrative. Rather it is a case persuasively argued with the help of the figure of the slave: "Reason is the slave of the passions". The function of reason is limited to indicating the means whereby our desires may be satisfied. It is desires or direct passions that are the fundamental determinant of conduct. Generalizations such as these are supported with the help of the persuasive example. The generalizations are neither inductive inferences nor do they follow from the examples. But the force of the example cannot be denied in the reason, which may otherwise be formally unsound. Hume's use of the figure of the slave is almost paradigmatic. The only knowledge relevant to action, for Hume, is know how.[1]

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1. Knowledge is sometimes said to be valued for its own sake, and not as a means to an end. The pleasures of mathematical thinking may be an instance of it. Hume identifies love of truth with simple curiosity. The "discovery of the propositions of ideas, consider'd as such,..." he says, "is not desir'd merely as truth, and...'tis not the justness of our conclusions, which alone gives the pleasure". "The truth **are** we discover must also be of some importance". The pleasure of mathematical thinking, for Hume, "arises from utility". Treatise, pp. 448-450.

I should now like to turn once more to the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions with a view to stating what I consider to be Hume's final teaching on this point.

On page 176 of the Treatise we are told that human actions performed with a view to attaining desired ends "are guided by reason and design". Such actions are neither inadvertent nor results of mere habitual adaptation of means to ends. How does such a view square with Hume's remark that actions properly speaking are neither reasonable nor unreasonable? If goal-directed human actions are guided by reason and design, how can they be independent of considerations of reasonableness or unreasonableness? Hume has taken a too narrow view of reason, and consequently of reasonableness and unreasonableness. He keeps the question of reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions hooked on to the notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, or to true or false judgments.

Hume takes up this issue in Book III of the Treatise in connexion with his critique of such views that hold that moral distinctions are derived from reason. He argues that for any thing to become an object of reason is to be susceptible of agreement and disagreement. If a certain thing is referentially opaque, that is, it does not refer to any other thing, then no question of agreement or disagreement arises. Actions, together with passions, he tells us, are such entities that are "compleat in themselves", and no action can be said to be an object of reason,

or, for that matter, reasonable or unreasonable, since it does not imply a reference to any other actions. Whether such a thoroughly non-intentional view of actions is viable is open to question, just as his view about the non-intentionality of passions. As regards the latter, Hume has gradually veered towards a dispositional and intentional account. As to actions of course we have a different picture. But it can, I suppose, be pertinently asked if one gives up the notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, would one also have to maintain that actions are neither reasonable nor unreasonable? I do not think it would be the case. What is more interesting is that there is another notion of reason in Hume according to which actions can be said to be reasonable or unreasonable.

This is the notion of reason as causal explanation, and our goal-oriented behaviour may be said to be guided by it. One can speak of an action as reasonable if it be causally explicable in terms of reasons, i.e., the motives and intentions of the agent. An unreasonable action would be one that is uncharacteristic of the agent, given his motives and intentions. Hume does not explain what he really means by "reason" in the context above. But if it be possible to take the term to stand for desires, intentions, beliefs, situations and character of the agent, then reason would be assimilated to what may be called mental causes. Should this reading be permissible, then to say that our actions are "guided by reason" and also to say that actions are neither reasonable nor unreasonable would be to leave one certainly uneasy.

There is no denying the fact that given Hume's notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood, he is consistent in saying that actions are neither reasonable nor unreasonable.

The Indian philosophers of the Nyāya school had anticipated the Humean sort of argument when they said that actions are never properly speaking objects (viṣaya) of knowledge, or reason, of one as likes. To say that one can have a knowledge of actions is only a borrowed decoration - gauṇamukhena, a figurative way of speaking. Yet it is interesting to notice that yukta, the Sanskrit word for 'reasonable', according to the Nyāya philosophers, means related. An action, they say, if it is reasonable, is related to such causal factors or mental causes as the agent's desires, beliefs, characters and dispositions (saṃskāras) including and in part formed by his past actions. Reasonableness of an action is its causal explicability. To say that an action is reasonable would mean that it is possible to adduce reasons for the agent's having done it, or to state the mental causes which would explain the action. Mental causes like motives, dispositions, passions, etc., move men to action, and cause people to have the aims they do have. It is in conjunction with some desire or aim that a passion can determine action. We do sometimes attribute human actions to desire for this and that, and sometimes characterise actions as due to this or that passion. Often ordinary language does not make any systematic difference between reasons and causes. And in many cases the distinction between being determined by reasons and being determined by causes may be

impossible to draw. On this view there can be a sense in which actions may be called reasonable if some explanatory account is available for them.

So come back to Hume. It may fairly be objected that it is one thing to say that actions are guided by reason, while it is quite another thing to say that actions are produced or prevented by reason, taking the term 'reason' in the sense of the discovery of truth or falsehood. Guiding and determining are non-identical tasks. It may be one of the employments of reason to guide actions, it does never determine them. In other words, reason has, according to Hume, a directive, though not a determining influence on actions through our will. Let us call it the acting-guiding view of reason. If one takes the action-guiding view of reason an interesting point would emerge. To say that reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood is to imply that the action-guiding business of reason can only be asserting indicative sentences. Such sentences state or say that something is, or is not, the case. Now telling some one that something is, or is not, the case is not primarily intended to guide actions. There is another class of sentences, i.e., imperatives, which are primarily action-guiding. This is an influential contemporary view. The philosophers of the Mīmāṃsā school in India also hold a similar position. If an indicative sentence has action-guiding force, they said, it should rather be construed then as a disguised imperative. It turns out then that action-guiding need not be any task of reason vis-a-vis determination of the will. Hume, we have seen, assi-

ailates reasons to mental causes, and if that be the case, it seems possible to ask whether one can have a notion of reason, which would perform both the tasks of guiding and determining actions. This should be unexceptionable on Hume's terms. His view of mental causes of actions is such that they not only guide or direct our action, determine them as well; and thereby render actions reasonable or unreasonable in the sense of their explicability in causal terms.

Hume's thesis that actions do not imply any reference to other actions is grounded in his epistemological view that actions are simple impressions. It may be a conceptual point to say that entitative simplicity of actions implies their non-intentionality. I do not wish to consider this point in the present context. Rather, I should like to point out that actions, despite their simplicity, can hardly be taken to constitute a homogeneous collection. The concept of action extends over diverse human phenomena, from man's communicative enterprises such as speech-acts to a variety of his committed behaviour called moral, political and even economic actions. Again, such actions can become significant only in a non-solipsistic world. This means that the epistemological status of actions as simple impressions does not matter much in respect of their relevance in a social world, where we find ourselves either as agents or spectators.

The non-intentionality of human actions, as a thesis, can be taken to deny any logical relationship between actions.

Speech-acts are an important sub-class of human actions. Suppose a speaker makes a speech-act saying that he did not make another speech-act. Let us designate the two speech-acts as S_2 and S_1 respectively. Now our speaker makes S_2 or says that he did not say S_1. If he is lying, we have two real speech-acts such that they cannot be true together. If he is not lying, we have one real speech-act, and the other is intentional. In both the cases S_2 implies a reference S_1. We may consider another situation, which would illustrate the fact that the word 'consistent' is used for principles as well as human actions. Some one says to another person, 'What you say now is not consistent with what you said last week'. What comes into question is not only the consistency of the propositions asserted, but also of the two speech-acts made by the addressee. The use of the word 'consistent' in this case is not necessarily a metaphorical one. It is no less interesting that abstracted from social situations in which human actions are performed, any question concerning their intentionality tends to lose its significance. If any action implies a reference to another, this may itself be a matter pertinent to the situation or content in which it is performed.

Again, the social world, which is the domain of our actions, is a continuous world. And in such a world as this there may be no reason to suppose that actions are disparate. Some form of necessity binds them together. The action of forming a political party and the action of framing its constitution are related by what we may sometimes like to call 'historical necessity'. Politi-

cal and economic decisions often entail (in whichever sense of the term) actions that do imply a reference to one another. Such actions, had they been referentially opaque, would have remained inexplicable to political and economic spectators. Furthermore, according to Hume, 'necessity' lies in a determination of the mind of a spectator, if that be the way we have got to look at human actions, causal relationship between actions would also allow actions to imply a reference to other actions. There are regularities in human actions, and these occur in a governed manner. Should it be unexceptionable to allow that there are no radical discontinuities among actions, it could then be thought that these implied a reference to one another. This may not be a knock-down argument against Hume's view of actions, it is at least worth considering. If it be possible to hold that causal relationship operates on the level of motives and actions, it need not be absurd to say that such a relationship would be unubiquitous on the level of actions.

Human actions are identified by the world they bring about. An action is said to transform a given world into another. Let an action a_0 transform the p-world into the q-world. Similarly, another action a_1 brings about the r-world. To use von Wright's notation, a_0 is causally efficient for pTq, and a_1 for qTr. Now if the worlds pTq and qTr are not discontinuous, then actions a_0 and a_1, identifiable as these are in terms of a common social world, should not be referentially opaque. Hume himself admits that actions leave something behind in the actor, i.e., his

intentions, and actions arise from him, and in this way actions stand related to one another. Often do we take into account the agent's past actions in order to arrive at an estimate of his present actions. Ascription of responsibility, on Hume's terms, requires us to look for something "durable" in the agent; similarly, evaluation of actions in relation to the agent's conduct or character may not be made if his actions were isolated phenomena. Actions are inalienably related with actors on the one hand, and the social world on the other. To say that actions are simple impressions implying no reference to one another is to rob actions of their concrete social character. Any attempt to settle the questions concerning reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions solely on epistemological grounds, not only denies the possibility of a social science, but leaves the issue in a state of practical disquiet.

There are philosophers who have argued that human social behaviour is to be understood as rule-following behaviour. Human actions in social situations are meaningful actions. Meanings are attached to their actions by human agents, and as for the spectator, what matters is whether such actions are rule-following behaviour. The rules that govern human social behaviour are public, this implies that criteria are available for assessing human actions. It is also said that the relationship between rule-following and making behaviour intelligible to oneself or to others is conceptual, since it is a connexion of meaning. To borrow an example from H.L.A. Hart's <u>The Concept of Law</u>, the

connexion between the lights turning red and the cars stopping is conceptual, for in terms of the rules governing our behaviour on the road a red light means stop. This connexion of meaning is not causally explicable as is that between clouds and rains for instance. The intelligibility of our social life depends on the meaningfulness of our social actions, and if such of our actions are not referentially opaque, rather imply a reference to one another, it is because the relationship that holds between these is one of meaning.

Actions, according to the view sketched above, can be called reasonable or unreasonable only with reference to the rules governing human behaviour in social situations. What we are considering is what is expected of an human agent in a social situations, given the rules. On that view, there would moreover be no asymmetry between the agent's and the spectator's way of looking at actions, since, given the publicity of the rules and the fact that human actions are rule-following social behaviour, the only term on which we can understand ourselves are those on which other people can also understand us. The criteria of significance of actions is the logic of the social order.

All these point to an interesting matter. Hume also is aware of the importance of rules in society. On page 210 of the Enquiry we notice that he speaks about traffic rules. In another passage on page 239 we are told that rules of conduct are "the result of our cold passions, (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?)". It would not be to have Hume's remark mistaken

if it were said that in the passage cited he was endorsing some connexion between actions and the rules governing the actions. The calm passions are operationally reason-like and become settled principles of action. Reasonableness or unreasonableness of actions may then be a matter to be decided in reference to, what Hume calls, "our calm and general principles". When such principles determine our actions, these should be called "eligible" or reasonable, and unreasonable, if contrary to the determination. The rules that guide human actions in social situations, or social rules, may also be considered as principles of calm passions. Such rules are intersubjective or general; and Hume tells us on page 531 of the Treatise that general rules are formed by extending "our motives beyond those very circumstances, which gave rise to them". In a passage on page 583, it has been remarked that "a general calm determination of the passions...[is] founded on some distant view or reflexion". In this capacity the calm passions are reason-like, or so-called reason. There is another consideration which adds force to the intersubjective or a general nature of social rules. Advantages of language depends upon its allowing us to communicate with our fellow men, and for this purpose, a general rule of usage must be observed by people speaking the language. Similarly, there is in society a tacit agreement to abide by intersubjective standards if its members are to perform meaningful actions. It is a matter of convenience, or in Hume's terminology social rules are artificial.

To consider one of his own examples: "Waggoners, coachmen, and postilions have principles, by which they give the way". This means that, for Hume traffic rules are artificial. Now giving way by the traffic rules is a rule-guided action. Would Hume be prepared to say that there holds a conceptual relationship between the traffic rules and giving way according to them? A difficult question indeed to answer. Let us take another case. Borrowing money and paying back one's debt are actions guided by artificial rules, and each one of them implies a reference to the other. In that case, there might be no fair reason to suppose that these are conceptually unrelated. The unclarity about the logical status of artificial rules would have the issue left undecided. Even then, it appears that Hume would go a long way with those philosophers who argue for the intersubjective nature of social rules, and for rule-guidedness of human actions. He would even agree with them in holding that language is essentially social, though it may not be said with certainty if he would also say that human actions in social situations is essentially linguistic. He would rather say that learning a language is learning to share rules with others in a community, just as learning to behave meaningfully is to learn to behave according to public rules. On that score, he should concede that there are normative constraints of actions, and in this sense, actions can be reasonable or unreasonable, just as linguistic usage can be correct or incorrect. But in both the cases, for Hume, the primary consideration for having rules is the advantage or utility in view. Of course, in another way, it might be suggested that

given the social nature of the meaningfulness of human actions is defined in terms of the rules of social situations. We are inhabitants of a non-solipsistic world, our passions, which motivate us to act in social situations, are "social passions". Even pride, which Hume tells us in a "pure" emotion, is a "social passion" in Book III of the Treatise, and it is rightly so. Since if our passions be social passions, they would presuppose social standards of worthiness, and could only be experienced in a non-solipsistic world. (Hume's explicit statement in this regard occurs on page 491 of the Treatise: "Vanity is rather to be esteem'd a social passion". We might in this context overlook the subtle difference between pride as self-esteem and vanity as the desire of reputation. What is more important is the fact that both pride and vanity have the same qualification, circumstances and causes.) It seems arguable that given "human conventions" or "human society" (the phrases are Hume's), human actions in social situations would be rule-guided, and if that be the case as Hume also agrees, such actions would acquire meaningfulness by their being connected with one another in terms of the social rules. Hence the question of reasonableness and unreasonableness would not remain irrelevant to the doing of human actions. Hume's own story in Book III shows that his social philosophy does not appear at all places agree with his philosophy of the passions.

He treats the words 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' as cognates of 'truth' and 'falsity'. One might feel that he wishes the words to be differentiated from such words with commendatory force as 'laudable' or 'blameable'. But can we say of an action that it is

laudable and unreasonable? Something sounds unhappy about the conjunction. If 'reasonable' be primarily a descriptive epithet, by virtue of its being a cognate of 'truth', even then we cannot perhaps say that to commend an action as laudable is unrelated to its being reasonable or unreasonable. There is a sense in which to say that an action is reasonable is also to engage in commending it. Even if Hume consents to allow the use of the words 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable', he might yet maintain that these words behave in logical independence from such words as 'laudable' and 'blameable'. This would be consistent with his notion of reason as the discovery of truth or falsehood.

We have so far tried to bring forward the suggestions of two views implicit in Hume. According to one, we can use the words 'reasonable' etc., in the context of human actions only if these are causally explicable. This may be called the regularity view. The other states that reasonableness or unreasonableness of human actions is a matter to be decided only in the context of social rules. Meaningfulness of human actions in social situations is implied by their rule-guidedness. Let us call this the rule-guidedness view. Now what could be the relationship between rules and regularities in terms of Hume's philosophical position? The two views are not so incompatible as it might be supposed. An avowal of either of them need not entail a rejection of the other. Often display of regularities in human actions are used as evidence for the existence of rules. The regular aspect leads us to look for a meaning to actions. So Hume, in social situations and for

actions, regularity implies rules. On page 475 of the Treatise he tells us that "the actions themselves are artificial". This should mean that human actions in social situations become explicable in terms of the concepts available to the agents and spectators. Such concepts are the mirror-image of the social rules which shape their lives in their society. The artificial rules define the human society. And hence among human actions there holds a connexion of meaning. A tacit admission of this may be read into the following passage on page 490: "the actions of each of us have a reference to those of the other, and are perform'd upon the supposition, that something is to be perform'd on the other part. Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by an agreement or convention, tho' they have never given promises to each other" (italics not in the text). This characterization of human actions hardly suggests that the data of regularity are either unnecessary or illusory. Regularity is necessary, though not always sufficient for the explanation of human actions.

We are at the end of our study of Book II of Hume's Treatise where the relationship of reason to passions and action has been one of the most crucial issues raised by him.

Some of Hume's contentions in this regard have been harsh and loud. For example, his thesis that "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" would have appeared preposterous to Descartes, who, in his The Passions of the Soul, Article 50, wrote, "There is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well

discord, [illegible] over the passions'. In contentiously putting his figure of the slave against that of the sovereign, Hume was only betraying the fact that he was a true child of the Enlightenment. His insistence on the contention that reason neither influences nor will nor gives rise to moral judgments, nor determines our choices, is owing to his view that reason does not have any part in producing those associations of ideas by which men think and live. The Enlightenment was not an age of reason, but a revolt against rationalism, which consisted in exaggerated claims for man's power to control his passions. The analysis of passions was a celebration for the philosophers of this age. Diderot was convinced that without passion nothing could be done either in the arts or in the civilization as a whole. Alexander Pope (Essay on Man, II, 93-202) has devoted many lines of argumentation to showing that the motive or the principal determining force in man's life was not reason, but the complex of instincts and passions which make up our natural constitution. Pope had argued that all efforts, all activity spring from passion. The rehabilitation of the passions should be viewed as a part of the programme of the Enlightenments' rehabilitation of man as a natural creature: "man's as perfect as he ought".

I should like to say further that Hume dismissed reason as a motive to human actions without exalting unreason. The legacy of the Enlightenment's revolt against reason lay in the fact that it was also a revolt against anti-rationalism. To explore the limits of reason and the range of the passions does not oblige one to embrace

either unreasonable rationalism, or anti-rationalism. Hume's view concerning the relationship between reason and passion steers clear between the pre-Enlightenment misconceptions about the limits of reason and the range of the passions. On page 493 of the Treatise he has stated what may be called his 'passionate naturalism'. Hume writes: "Human nature being compos'd of two principal parts, which are requisite in all its actions, affections and understanding; 'tis certain that the blind motions of the former, without the direction of the latter, incapacitate man for society". This recalls Goya's obiter dicta. The sleep of reason, said he, begets monsters, and united with reason the imagination is the mother of all arts and the source of their wonders. Hume, too, no less wryly regrets man's susceptibility to irrational impulse.

His too narrow view of reason (i.e. inferring of logical relationships and our power of arriving at beliefs about causal connections) apart, Hume had to invoke other senses of 'reason'. These are non-theoretical, rather practical, general and philosophically idiomatic. A calm-passion, or a social rule is reason or reason-like in this respect. But why did he have to do this? Here is a lesson that we should learn from him. Matters of moral sciences are substantive, hence cannot be expected to be settled by logical analysis alone. The relationship of reason to human actions is one such issue. Human motivation does not occur in a vacuum, and actions are social phenomena. Whatever connexion reason may have with human actions is only to be ascertained in the

content of society. Reason and passion, or for that matter, actions, are distinct. And this is a matter of theory of knowledge. But it should not be forgotten that Hume, who insisted on the strictest possible separation of facts and values, also insisted on the social relevance of reason in its practical sense. Without keeping in view the image of the human agent as an interacting individual (in politics, economics and history -- the moral sciences for Hume) any attempt to settle the matter of the relationship between reason and passion or human motivation would succumb to a sort of epistemological schizophrenia. In a far more important sense than the truth or falsity of a belief about causal connections or matters of fact human actions can be reasonable or unreasonable. Despite his uneven emphases Hume does in no manner leave us in any doubt about this. The point of his anthropology is that man is a social person, and the science of man cannot dispense with the social perspective of human actions. In the closing section of Book III of the Treatise Hume has contrasted the functions of the anatomist with that of the painter. The former, it may be said, concentrates on what could be known, simplicity and logical analysis. The latter is more ambitious and seeks to be comprehensive. Human nature being what it is, simplicity and comprehensiveness are both necessary ingredients for a proper understanding of human nature, a point, which I submit, is well incorporated into Hume's anthropology in spite of its apparent ambiguities and obscurities.