

CHAPTER - 1

INTRODUCTION

Metaphor is primarily a poetic expression. Whenever we come across a metaphorical expression, it invariably sounds to us more poetical than ordinary language. For this reason, metaphor is considered as one of the vehicles of poetic expression. In Indian tradition, the use of metaphor is found in the Vedic literature as well as classical Sanskrit literature. Let us see what the rhetoricians mean by the term '*Kāvya*', in which metaphor plays a significant role. When we express anything metaphorically in our everyday life in ordinary language, we borrow the technique from the world of poetry consciously or unconsciously. The '*Kāvya*' itself has got some metaphorical meaning. Rhetoricians have interpreted "Metaphor" in different senses, - some in the sense of *Alamkāra* (rhetoric or embellishment), some in the sense of *Lakṣaṇā* (implicative meaning), some in the sense of *Vakrokti* (crooked utterance or deviation), and again some in the sense of *Dhvani* (suggestive meaning). In short, it can be said that all the

Ālamkārikas have adopted metaphor for poetic expression with a view to arousing *Rasa* (aesthetic pleasure). In the following pages, an effort has been made to trace the historical development of Indian Poetics and to bring out the role of metaphor in its various forms in producing aesthetic sentiment.

The terms '*Kāvya*' and '*Sāhitya*' are synonymous in Sanskrit rhetoric. '*Kāvyaṅprakāśa*' and '*Sāhityadarpaṅa*' are the names of the same type of books. In the very ancient period only the term '*Kāvya*' was used in Sanskrit. The term '*Sāhitya*' took the place of '*Kāvya*' during the medieval period. Both the terms '*Kāvya*' and '*Sāhitya*' mean poetry, drama and all forms of literary art.

We can learn from the *Ṛks* of the *Vedas* and the texts of the *Upaniṣads* the invaluable opinion of the ancients about the name and nature of poetry. The Vedic texts looked upon the poet as '*Ṛsi*'. The term *Ṛsi* means seer, i.e., one who sees the past, present and future through his transcendental vision. Such vision is just like a searchlight and all objects come within its focus.¹ So he can alone know the truth manifested in all objects. That is why *Ṛsi* is

described as *Kavi* in the *Upaniṣad*.² Thus, *Kavi* is regarded as *Krāntadarśī* as he possesses a very subtle, profound and penetrating consciousness. He was looked upon as the creator or maker in as much as he was the builder and fashioner. He embodied the principle of delight. He saw the principle of beauty in all things, was filled with utter ecstasy, raised the earth to the level of heaven, and established this principle of joy everywhere by the touch of his poetic genius. He creates a new world. The *Agnipurāṇa* says-

“Apāre kāvyasaṁsāre kavireva prajāpatiḥ

*Yathā vai rocate viśvaṁ tathedaṁ parivartate //”*³

The poet is indeed the sole creator in the infinite world of poetry. He transforms the world as it pleases him. In this matter, he is guided by his poetic vision. But how does he give his vision a concrete shape? He is also equipped with the power of word and the rhythm. In this inspired state, the poem is born.

Thus, all the aspects of poetry, namely its creation, manifestation and its effect on the readers have been dealt with in the Vedic concept of a poet. The poet had conscious control over

the word, - he had the *Vāk*, he knew the four levels of *Vāk*, - and *Vāk* chose to reveal herself to him.

The most significant example of *Kāvya* is Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*. This *Kāvya* sprang out spontaneously of the poet's heart filled with pathos. He says,

*“Pādabaddhokṣarasamaḥ tantrīlayaḥ samanvitaḥ
Śokārtasya pravṛtto me śloke bhavatu nānyathā //”*

Genuine great poetry cannot be made out of one's cleverness. It is rather a spontaneous emanation from *Rasa*-filled heart - “*Rasāveśavaiśadya-nirmāṇakṣamatva*”, i.e., an individual becomes endowed with the power of creativity arising from the expertisation achieved through the heart filled with aesthetic enjoyment. In other words, an individual saturated with the aesthetic pleasure is endowed with the expertisation of creating something original. In any piece of literary art, i.e., *Kāvya*, aesthetic enjoyment (*Rasa*) is the cornerstone. It is the aesthetic pleasure that controls the story, characterisation, style etc. The aesthetic pleasure, which arises from literary art, cannot be appreciated by all, but only by the

connoisseurs (*Sahṛdayas*). A *Kāvya* can be truly appreciated by the *Sahṛdayas* alone. Those who enjoy a *Kāvya* (either in the form of poetry or drama) become happy or unhappy with the protagonist as they share his happiness or misery. This happiness or misery on the part of the audience cannot be suitably explained by any argument or logic. Let us take the example of Sītā, a character of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. She might be happy or unhappy, but there is no logical reason on the part of the audience behind their emotional involvement with her character and become happy or unhappy. Nevertheless, the emotional involvement on the part of the audience with the protagonist, however illogical it may appear to a logical mind, can be perceived in each and every case. It is quite rational to search for a cause of this particular effect, which cannot be found through ordinary sense organs and reasoning. It can be regarded as mysterious as the cause lies beyond the grasp of human intellect. In our mundane life, sorrow produces sorrow and fear follows fear; but in the world of poetry, we find pleasure arising from the painful and terrible situations.

In the cases of literary art, there works a sense of identity between the audience and the protagonist. This notion of identity emerges from the audience's self-involvement (*Ekātmatā*). Let us take for example the scene where Duṣyanta enjoys happiness in Śakuntalā's company. The spectator also experiences the same bliss as Duṣyānta does because, for the time being, he identifies himself with the protagonist. It is due to this identification that the spectator loses individuality for the time being and forgets his mundane life. This shows the mystic power of the aesthetic pleasure.

The real appreciator of a *Kāvya* is a connoisseur (*Sahṛdaya*). A *Sahṛdaya* possesses the capability to identify his own feelings with those of the poet. The poet creates a *Kāvya*. *Sahṛdaya* realises it and he recreates the *Kāvya* in his own self. As fire covers the dry wood, the aesthetic pleasure arising in one's heart engulfs his whole body. This aesthetic pleasure is produced if the object is appreciated by heart (*Hṛdayasaṁvādī*). (“*Yo'rtho hṛdayasaṁvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ / Śarīraṁ vyāpyate tena śuṣkaṁ kāṣṭhamivāgninā.*”)⁴

This may be argued why this-worldly pleasure is not aesthetic. This pleasure is not aesthetic because aesthetic pleasure must be impersonal, disinterested and universal in nature. When an individual becomes happy at the happiness of the dramatic character, his happiness or pleasure is not his own (i.e., arising out of his personal life) and so it is impersonal. This pleasure does not arise out of the fulfilment of his self-interest, so it is disinterested. Such feeling does not occur in the case of one individual only; rather it occurs in the case of all individuals. Therefore, it is universal. Complete absorption in the aesthetic pleasure makes a man forget his individual love, fear etc. There prevails a universal love, which is aesthetic pleasure. When a terrific scene is represented, it produces an aesthetic pleasure called '*Bhayānaka*'. We forget for some time that the fear experienced by us belongs to the dramatic character and we enjoy the universal character of fear that is free from other barriers like individualistic elements. This universalisation is the process of idealisation through which an individual moves from his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment.

The poet and audience must have capacity of idealisation. He can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure, which is enjoyed by others.⁵ As this pleasure transcends the limitations of personal interest, it is disinterested universal pleasure. A pleasure, which transcends this-worldly interest, is surely transcendental and hence mystic. As this-worldly pleasure arising out of this-worldly affairs like the birth of a son, attainment of prosperity etc. is not impersonal, disinterested and universal; it cannot be described as aesthetic.⁶ Aesthetic pleasure is the emotional mood revealed in a blissful knowledge free from all barriers. The great artist is also a great art critic – *Kavi* and *Sahṛdaya* is one and only the most sensitive critic can respond to the charm of great poetry. The artist is thus both an imitator and creator. The starting point is perhaps the imitation of life-experience but the artist's imagination ('*Pratibhā*', as it was called by Indian aestheticians) is a kind of *Dṛṣṭi* that helps him to see differently and transform. Such type of *Pratibhā* (intuition) is of two types: creative (*Kārayitṛī*) and appreciative (*Bhāvayitṛī*).

When an individual shares the feeling of the hero, he becomes sensitive due to having his heart saturated with aesthetic pleasure generated within him through his self-involvement (*Ekātmatā*) as stated earlier. This situation being conditioned by *Rasa* (*Rasāveśā*) enjoins the individual with the power of creativity (*Nirmāṇa-kṣamatva*). This aesthetic pleasure that comes as a result of sharing the pathos of others in a drama, endows him with the power of creativity. On the other hand, pathos arising out of the sad demise of his dear one makes him handicapped instead of conjoining him with the power of creativity, which is called *Kārayitrī Pratibhā*. An individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure by sharing his own self with the character of the drama as he shares some common feeling existing in the dramatist and dramatic characters. This common experience is possible due to having the same feeling, because they are *Sahṛdayas* (literally, having common heart or sensitivity). When the hearts of the people are expanded having clear mind due to the habits of practising literature and gather the capability of being identified with the characters of the drama as described

(*Varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā*), they are called *Sahṛdayas*, as they all possess the same feeling.⁷

If the above-mentioned view of *Sahṛdayatva* is accepted, the aesthetic experience would be regarded as universal. The success of an art-object depends on its universalisation (*Sādhāranīkaraṇa*), which again depends on the concept of *Sahṛdayatva*. If each and every reader or audience has got the same sensitivity or feeling, there is a correspondence regarding the fact that is going on in all the hearts of the audiences (*Sakala-sahṛdaya-saṁvāda-sālitā*). It may also be called transparency of experience in all spectators. This phenomenon is otherwise described as 'one pointed concentration of all the audiences' (*Sarvasāmājikānām ekaghanatā*).⁸

This universalisation is possible through the melting of the state of being a knower (*Pramātrbhāvavigalana*). This can be explained in the following manner: a knower or *Pramātā* has got some elasticity through which he can extend himself. This may be called 'subjectification'. As a subject is no more confined within

himself and is extended to the objects after covering their essential characters, it is called subjectification of the object.

Universalisation (*Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*) is one of the characteristic features of aesthetic pleasure that leads a man to the world of creativity. After perceiving the separation of the curlew-couple, Vālmīki became very much moved and out of his grief, he created a *Śloka*. He had intense feeling of pathos in which he had lost himself. Due to this complete loss of personality, he had a sense of joy out of grief. This joyous experience of pathos provided him with the power of creating a *Śloka* spontaneously. Vālmīki's grief was not this worldly. If it were so, he would have some sympathy with the birds from which the creation of *Kāvya* would have been impossible. This worldly grief makes a man handicapped. When a poet's vision becomes very deep and clear, he will surely get an inspiration from within and the materials for writing a *Kāvya* (like characterisation, plot etc.) would follow automatically just as water overflows automatically from an over-filled jar. Thus, a poet's genius depends on the absorption of the aesthetic enjoyment and this absorption is endowed with capacity of creating a *Kāvya* spontaneously. When a

poet's heart is filled with emotion, it (emotion) spontaneously emanates itself in metrical form. This spontaneity comes only when there is no impediment (like personal interest etc.) for the realisation of aesthetic pleasure. This spontaneous emanation of poetry from a man, who was otherwise idle before having aesthetic absorption, again shows the mystic character of aesthetic pleasure. This spontaneous poetry is called *Śloka* because it arises out of the grief due to the separation of the curlew couple (*Krauñcadvandva-viyogothaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvamāgataḥ*).⁹

From the very ancient times, the union of words and meaning is regarded as *Kāvya*. In *Kāvya*, sense is expressed through language. In ancient poetic literature and in the works of old *Ālaṅkārikas* (rhetoricians), one could easily see the great importance attributed to this synthesis between *Śabda* (word) and *Artha* (meaning). Rhetorician Bhāmaha described *Kāvya* as '*Śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam*'. Following this view, Ācārya Rudraṭṭ said - '*Śabdārthau kāvyam*'. Ācārya Daṇḍin also described *Kāvyaśārīra* or body of literature as '*Iṣṭarthavyavacchinnā padāvalī*', i.e., the collection of words characterised by the desired meaning

capable of providing disinterested pleasure. From this it is clear that neither word nor meaning is separately regarded as *Kāvya*. *Kāvya* is only the synthesis of word and meaning. The word and meaning are complementary to each other. The word does not exist without meaning and meaning cannot be expressed without words. The ancient Indian culture looks upon *Śabda* and *Artha* as an inseparable pair representing the divine father and mother of the world. When the poet Kālidāsa invokes Pārvatī and Parameśvara for *Vāgartha-pratipatti*, i.e., introduction of the literature revealing ideal combination between a word and its meaning, he is only praying to our primordial parents to enable him to achieve a synthesis between *Vāk* and *Artha*. *Vāk* and *Artha* both are equally important in Poetics. Both are excellent (*Camatkāri*). A literature cannot be called a sublime literature if the charms of the words used in it transcend the charm of the meaning and the vice versa. There are charms of words in Jaideva's *Gītagovinda*, but the sense is not so charming. Again, Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīyam*, though excellent in sense (*Bhāraverarthogauravam*), lacks the charm of words. So, none of them can be treated as example of sublime poetry. There is no

comparison between them and Kālidāsa's "*Meghadūtam*", "*Kumārasambhavam*" and "*Abhijñānaśakuntalam*". Similarly, Tagore's creation of poetry is not comparable to the poetry of Satyendranāth, Karuṇānidhan and Jatīndramohon. They are excellent because the importance of *Śabda* (word) and *Artha* (meaning) are equal in their creation of poetry. *Camatkāritā* (excellence) of both are *Anyūnāntirikta*, i.e., the place of meaning in a word and the vice versa is neither over extensive nor less extensive but accurate.

Observing this alliance of word and meaning, Ācārya Kuntaka said that they were like two friends who have equal quality and their beauty is enhanced by each other. Similarly, in poetry *Śabda* and *Artha* enhance the beauty of each other. Kuntaka called this characteristic as *Parasparaspardhī*, i.e., as if challenging each other. Genuine poetry is composed of the balanced synthesis of words and their meaning. S. Kuppuswāmī Śāstrī in his essay "Highways of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit" says - 'Genuine poetry is always looked upon as spontaneous emanation from a *Rasa*-filled heart. A beautiful heart clothes itself in a beautiful garb without any

conscious effort on the part of the poet. This is the highest test of true poetry'.

The relation of *Vācya* (denoted) and *Vācaka* (denoter), which are generally found in *Kāvya*, is not grammatical or logical. It is different from ordinary relation. *Ālamkārikas* widely differ in their opinions regarding the special characteristics of this special relation of *Vācya* and *Vācaka*, which transforms ordinary language into poetry.

Indian tradition glorifies Bharata, the reputed author of the *Nāṭya-śāstra* and the oldest writer of dramaturgy, music and kindred subjects, with the title of '*Muni*' and places him in the mythic age. Bharata's *Nāṭya-śāstra* gives us for the first time an outline of Poetics, which is probably earlier in substance, if not in date, than the earliest existing *Kāvya*.

In the *Nāṭya-śāstra* Bharata is principally concerned with Dramaturgy and allied topics, and deals with Poetics in so far as it applies to the theme in hand. In later poetic theories, Dramaturgy is taken as a part of the discipline of Poetics and the drama is

accordingly considered a species of the *Kāvya*. But there are reasons to believe that in older times Dramaturgy and Poetics formed separate disciplines; the former being probably the earliest in point of time as well as in substance. It seems, therefore, that the school of Dramaturgy had a separate existence from the orthodox school of Poetics. It is thus not surprising that Bharata should set apart, as he does a chapter of his work for dealing with the ornaments of poetry, so far as they apply to the drama (*Nātakāśraya*). While discussing the application of *Guṇas* and *Doṣas* to the drama, Bharata expressly designates them as *Kāvya-guṇas* and *Kāvya-doṣas* respectively. With reference to the *Alamkāras* he says *Kāvyaśyaite hyalamkārāḥ*, and, at the same time, makes it amply clear that he considers them only as embellishments of the dramatic speech.


Bharata opens the chapter on Poetics with the discussion of *Lakṣaṇas* that appear to be partly formal and partly material elements of poetry. He mentions thirty-six of them, devotes a considerable part of the chapter to their definitions; and the whole discipline appears to have received from them the designation of

Kāvya-lakṣaṇa. From his treatment, it appears that he considers *Lakṣaṇas* to be of great importance than *Alamkāras*, which are few in numbers. *Lakṣaṇa* is not only the ornament of *Kāvya-sārīra*, i.e., body of literature, but also a part and parcel of it. Although *Alamkāra* is also the ornament of *Kāvya-sārīra*, *Lakṣaṇa* is not included in the category of *Alamkāra*. *Alamkāra* enhances and modifies the beauty of poetry and it can be separated from the body of poetry; but *Lakṣaṇa*, which steepens the poetry in essential beauty, cannot be separated from the poetry. The difference between *Lakṣaṇa* and *Alamkāra* is so subtle that later on *Alamkāra* takes *Lakṣaṇa* within its own fold.

The next critic Bhāmaha makes the grammatical connection of sound and sense his starting point. He defines Poetry as word and meaning taken together “*Śabdārthau sahitaḥ kāvyam*”.¹⁰ Later rhetoricians are of opinion that this definition is competent enough to differentiate a piece of poetic creation from the Vedic texts and historical works, because while in a work of poetic art sound and sense are of equal importance, in the Vedas and *Itihāsas* the sound and sense elements are of greater importance respectively.

172914

13 JUN 2005



Bhāmaha himself introduces the viewpoint of those, who regard the sound-element as of more importance and as such the figures belonging to sound as essential to the very existence of *Kāvya*. He also considers the viewpoint of those who hold the sense-element as of prime importance and consequentially, the figures belonging to sense confer the status of poetry upon a combination of sound and sense. He finally gives his own judgement that, as in a work of poetic art both the sound and sense elements are of equal importance and figures belonging to both are covetable in it. The decision of Bhāmaha shows equal prominence given to language and meaning in his system. Nevertheless, it betrays his greatest regard for the principle of embellishment, to signify which he uses the term *Vakrokti*. Bhāmaha's *Alamkāra* denotes the assemblage of poetic figures, like *Anuprāsa*, *Upamā* and the like and *Vakrokti* refers to a strikingness of expression that underlies all figures of speech. He thinks that in order to constitute a poetic expression an ordinary expression has got to deviate from its normalcy with a view to acquire charm. This deviating strikingness of expression is connoted by the term *Vakrokti* as opposed to *Svabhāvokti*, another *Alamkāra*.

Thus, *Vakrokti* is an essential principle of an *Alamkāra* and necessarily of *Kāvya* itself.

According to Daṇḍin, who was contemporary to Bhāmaha, lucidity, sweetness, richness and grandeur are the essential features that constitute poetry. To him poetry appears under the metaphor of a body of words determined by the sense, which it is desired to set out and the body is ornamented. The term *Alamkāra* here being used in most general sense to cover anything that lends beauty to the poems as ornaments do to the human body. Instead of a definition, he gives us only a description of *Kāvyaśarīra*. According to him *Kāvyaśarīra* is comprised of well-arranged words, expressive of an intended idea “*Śarīram tāvadiṣṭārthavyavacchinnā padāvālī*”.¹¹ He used the term ‘*Iṣṭa*’ to signify this desired sense and in explaining this his commentators say that, this is a charming idea. Although Daṇḍin recognises the necessity of a beautifying principle in *Kāvya*, he does not, like Bhāmaha, regard the individual poetic figures as the sole means of beautifying a *Kāvya*. In this connection, he introduces a dissertation on the two modes or kinds of poetic diction that are supposed to differ widely from each other. On the essential

of a poetic creation, the up-holders of *Vaidarbha-mārga* hold a completely different view from that followed by the champions of *Gauḍīya-mārga*. The former prefer grace and lucidity in *Kāvya* whereas the latter are much in favour of grandeur and verbosity. Daṇḍin shows partiality towards *Vaidarbha-mārga*, whose essence is said to consist in employment of ten *Guṇas*, enumerated by him and it is asserted that, a contrariety to these ten excellences is often traced in *Gauḍīya-mārga*.

“Śleṣaḥ prasādaḥ samatā mādhyamī sukumāratā /

Arthavyaktirudāratvamojaḥkāntisamādhayaḥ //

Iti vaidarbhamārgasya prāṇāḥ daśaguṇāḥ smṛtāḥ /

*Eṣāmi viparyayaḥ prāyo drśyate gauḍavartmani //*¹²

He defines an *Alamkāra* as a quality that imparts beauty to a poetic creation and maintains that, some of these *Alamkāras* are competent enough to differentiate these two types of poetic diction. This observation shows that Daṇḍin regards a *Guṇa* and an *Alamkāra* as identical in nature, both being means of the same beautifying principle. The only difference between them lies in the fact that,

while a *Guṇa* is an *Alamkāra* peculiar to *Vaidarbha-mārga*, a poetic figure is an *Alamkāra* common to both the types of diction.

The Doctrine of Daṇḍin found an echo and completion in those of Vāmana who is doubtless to be placed at the end of eighth century. Indeed, what is vague and unsystematic in Daṇḍin appears fully developed and carefully set forth in Vāmana, who may thus be fittingly regarded as the best representative of the *Rīti*-system. The credit of being the first writer on Poetics goes to Vāmana who, before Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, gave us a well thought out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics, no longer naive or tentative, which in spite of its theoretic defects, is in some respects unique and valuable.

Vāmana for the first time systematically worked out as to what is the 'soul' or essence of poetry. Vāmana's predecessors, who considered the body of poetry more important, never troubled themselves with what Vāmana lays down in clear terms - "*Rītirātmā kāvyasya*"¹³ i.e., the *Rīti* is the soul of poetry. Working out this figurative description, he points out that the word (*Śabda*) and its

sense (*Artha*) constitute the 'body' of which the soul is the *Rīti*. He defines the *Rīti* as *Viśiṣṭapada-racanā* or particular arrangement of words. This particularity (*Vaiśiṣṭya*) of arrangement again rests upon certain definite combination of the different *Guṇas* or fixed excellences of composition. For instance, of the three kinds of *Rīti* proposed by Vāmana, the *Vaidarbha* unites all the ten *Guṇas*, the *Gaudī* abounds in *Ojas* and *Kānti*, and the *Pāñcālī* is endowed with *Mādhurya* and *Saukumārya*. This is how Vāmana would distinguish the different *Rītis* from one another. On these three *Rītis*, poetry takes its stand just as painting has its substratum in the lines drawn on the canvas. The *Vaidarbhī* is of course recommended, for it contains all the excellences; and as the genius of each diction is peculiar to itself, Vāmana rejects the view that the other two inferior dictions ought to be practised as steps leading up to the *Vaidarbhī*. He argues that one who begins with the improper cannot attain the proper diction. If the weaver practises weaving with jute, he cannot attain proficiency in the weaving of silk. It will be seen from this analysis of the three kinds of diction that the *Vaidarbhī* is the complete or ideal one that unifies all the poetic excellences whereas

the other two encourage extremes. The one lays stress on the grand, the glorious or the imposing, whereas the other on softness and sweetness, whereby the former looses itself often in bombast, the latter in proximity. It will be noticed also that the names of different *Rītis* are derived from those of particular countries and Vāmana expressly says in this connection that the names are due to the fact of particular excellences of diction being prevalent in the writings of particular countries.

It should be observed that the term *Rīti* is hardly equivalent to the English word 'style' by which it is often rendered but in which there is always a distinct subjective valuation. Although *Artha* (i.e., sense or idea) is admitted as an element by Sanskrit writers, the *Rīti* consists essentially of the objective beauty of representation (of the intended idea) arising from a proper unification of certain clearly defined excellences or from an adjustment of sound and sense. It is, no doubt, recognised that appropriate ideas should find appropriate expression; or in other words, the outward expression should be suitable to the inward sense. *Rīti* is not like the style, the expression of poetic individuality, as Western Criticism generally understands it.

It is merely the outward presentation of its beauty called forth by a harmonious combination of more or less fixed literary 'excellences'. Of course, the excellences are supposed to be discernible in the sense or import, as much as in the verbal arrangement, but this subjective content is not equivalent to the indefinable element of individuality, which constitutes the charm of a good style. If we accept the nomenclature of a modern analyst of style, we may say that the Sanskrit authors admit what he would call the 'mind'-in-style, as a subject of technical formulation, but not the 'soul'-in-style, which is elusive and which they leave to individual writers to evolve their own way.

Vāmana therefore teaches that the *Guṇas* are essential in poetry, as they go to make up the *Rīti*, which is the 'soul' of poetry. Like Daṇḍin, Vāmana enumerates the *Guṇas* as ten, which appears to have been the standard number from Bharata's time, but he really doubles the number by clearly differentiating between the *Śabda-guṇas* and *Artha-guṇas* and regarding each *Guṇa* as belonging respectively to *Śabda* and *Artha*. In other words, each *Guṇa* is looked at from two different points of view and the distinction thus

proposed between verbal and ideal excellences comes in, as technically put, according as the word or the idea is the denoter (*Vācaka*) or the denoted (*Vācya*). We find in Vāmana for the first time the definite classification of *Guṇas* of *Śabda* and *Artha* respectively. This sharp distinction clears away some of the vagueness surrounding definitions of Bharata's and Daṇḍin's individual *Guṇas* and Vāmana, though widely differing from his predecessors in the peculiar connotation by way of attaching to some of them, is careful in distinguishing the allied *Guṇas* from one another.

After the *Guṇas*, Vāmana deals with the poetic figures or *Alamkāras* as elements of subsidiary importance. We meet this definite differentiation of *Guṇa* from *Alamkāra* for the first time in Vāmana; for Vāmana was indifferent to it, Daṇḍin does not accept it and Udbhaṭa appears to have denied any difference. At the outset, Vāmana states that poetry is acceptable from embellishment (*Alamkāra*); but he is careful to explain embellishment, not in the narrow sense of poetic figure but in the broad and primary sense of beauty or charm (*Kāvyaṃ grāhyaṃ alamkārat, saundaryam*

alamkārah).¹⁴ He also points out that it is only in the secondary instrumental sense that the term *Alamkāra* or embellishment is applied to simile and other poetic figures (*Alamkṛtir alamkārah karaṇa-vyutpattyāpunar alamkāraśabdo'yam upamādiṣu vartate*). In this view, Vāmana apparently develops Daṇḍin's teaching logically; but Vāmana does not make the presence of poetic figures a necessary condition. What makes poetry acceptable, in his opinion, is the presence of charm or beauty (i.e., *Alamkāra* in the broad sense of *Saundarya*) which he does not define and which is in some respects undefinable. Vāmana simply says that this beauty is to be attained by avoiding *Doṣas* and employing *Guṇas* and *Alamkāras*. The *Rīti* and its constituent *Guṇas* are indispensable in the production of this beauty and the poetic figures only contribute to its heightening. Vāmana, for the first time, fully developed this distinction between the *Guṇa* and the *Alamkāra* as to their respective position in a formal scheme of Poetics, which is vaguely hinted by Daṇḍin. The *Guṇas* being essential to *Rīti* are defined as those characteristics which create the charm of poetry (*Kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmāḥ*)¹⁵ – a function which is assigned to both *Guṇas* and

Alamkāras by Daṇḍin – but *Alamkāras* are such ornaments as serve to enhance the charm already so produced. The *Guṇas* are said to be *Nitya* (permanent) implying that the *Alamkāras* are *Anitya* (transitory) for there can be charm of poetry without the *Alamkāras* but no charm without the *Guṇas*. In other words, *Guṇa* stands to the poetry in the *Samavāya* (inherence) relation while the *Alamkāra* in *Samyoga* (contact) relation, *Samyoga* being explained as mere conjunction capable of being separated and *Samavāya* implying inseparable connection (*Ayutasiddha*) or inherence (*Nitya-sambandha*). To put it in the usual figurative language, the *Guṇa* is related to the ‘soul’ of poetry (viz., *Rīti*) while the *Alamkāra* rests merely on the ‘body’ (viz., *Śabda* and *Artha*). The *Alamkāra* without the *Guṇa* cannot by itself produce the beauty of a poem, but latter can do so without the former. But Vāmana justifies at the same time the existence as such of the *Alamkāra* as an element of poetry and supports a phrase of poetry, which is indeed admitted by Ānandavardhana but not properly dealt with by him and which is elaborated only by his follower Ruyyaka who however takes his inspiration on this point from the *Vakroktijīvitakāra*.

While the orthodox schools of Poetics were elaborating systems of *Alamkāra* and *Rīti*, there flourished several writers who discussed the question of the dramatic *Rasa* after Bharata and formulated explanations of the latter's much discussed *Sūtras* on the subject. Their exposition, however, concerned the dramatic art and their theories did not yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics, which was entirely dominated by the *Alamkāra* and *Rīti* systems. The aesthetic importance of the *Rasa*, therefore, was never realised until it was taken up and worked into Poetics by the Dhvanikāra and his followers.

This will be obvious from a reference to the views of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin on this subject. To Bhāmaha, the most important element in poetry is *Alamkāra* or *Vakrokti*. He does not seem to possess any clear notion of the function of *Rasa* in poetry, the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure *Rasavat*, which, in his opinion, must manifest the *Rasas* clearly. The *Rasa* is thus included in the scope of a particular figure only and given a very subordinate place in his system.

The same remarks with regard to the recognition of *Rasa* apply more or less to Daṇḍin; but Daṇḍin seems to have been more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin allows the *Rasas* to be included in figures like *Rasavat*, which appear to have been the only means by which they could permit the *Rasa* to play any role in their systems. It may be contended that Daṇḍin gives prominence to *Rasa* by including it in one of the essential excellences (*Guṇas*) of the diction (*Rīti*) viz., in *Mādhurya*, which is defined as the establishment of *Rasa* in the word and in the object. From this it appears that by the term *Rasa* in the *Mādhurya-guṇa* Daṇḍin means absence of vulgarity and he does not contemplate the inclusion of *Rasa* in the technical sense.

Although Vāmana improves upon Daṇḍin's system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further in the treatment of *Rasa*. His idea of making all poetic figures an aspect of metaphorical expression precludes him from defining the figure *Rasavat*, but he attempts to include *Rasa* in one of the essential (*Nitya*) characteristics of poetry viz., in the *Artha-guṇa-kānti* which he

defines as an 'excellences of sense' in which *Rasas* should be conspicuously present.

The older writers on Poetics before the advent of *Dhvani*-theorists content themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression, the 'body' of poetry and hardly trouble themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle, the 'soul' of poetry; nor do they identify, as some later writers do, this 'soul' with the psychological factor known as *Rasa*. Vāmana, no doubt, starts the question and offers to solve it by declaring that the diction or *Rīti* is this soul; but we have seen that in Vāmana's view *Rīti* is not the expression of poetic individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by a definite adjustment of certain fixed literary excellences. The older writers, therefore, put the greatest emphasis on the *Ālaṅkāra* (poetic figure) or on the *Rīti* (diction in the objective sense) the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry. It is partly for this reason that the Dhvanikāra condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for explaining the nature of poetry. He expounds his own system in which the suggestion of *Rasa* (*Rasa-dhvani*) plays such an important

part. The *Dhvani* school, in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. One is expressed and includes what is given in so many words; the other is unexpressed but must be added to it by the imagination of the reader or listener. The unexpressed or suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed, is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (*Vyañjanā*).

Now the unexpressed, through the suggestive power of sound or sense may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*Vastu*) or an unexpressed figure of speech (*Alamkāra*), but in most cases, it is a mood or feeling (*Rasa*), which is directly inexpressible. The *Dhvani* school, therefore, took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of *Rasa* with the theory of *Dhvani*. Ānandavardhana himself says that his object is not merely to establish *Dhvani* but also to harmonise it with *Rasa*.

The origin of the *Dhvani* school like that of other schools of Poetics is lost in obscurity. Nevertheless, the first clear formulation of its theory of *Dhvani* as a whole is to be found in the memorial

verses of the Dhvanikāra whose date is unknown but who could not have been very far removed from the time of his commentator Ānandavardhana. The very first line of the first verse of the *Dhvanyāloka* itself states that the theory that *Dhvani* is the essence of poetry was traditionally maintained by earlier thinkers (*Kāvyaśāstrī dhvanirīti budhairyaḥ samānātāpūrvā*).¹⁶ Accepting this statement of the Dhvanikāra, it is difficult, however, to explain why the *Dhvani*-theory did not in the least as the *Rasa*-theory did to a certain extent, influence such early writers on Poetics as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin or Vāmana. It is easy to maintain, on the other hand, that the *Vyañjanā* as a function must have been evolved by the school that set up a theory of *Vyañgārtha* or *Dhvani* as this function is not traceable in rhetoricians before the time of Ānandavardhana.

After Vāmana, the most important critic and aesthete was Ānandavardhana, the author of *Dhvanyāloka*. He shifted the emphasis from the external elements of poetry to a much more intimate factor – from *Guṇas* and *Alamkāras* – to *Dhvani*. This learned critic, like Daṇḍin, realises the difficulties involved in formulation of a definition of poetry and avoids this question

carefully. In reply to the question as to what constitutes the soul of Poetic creation, Ānandavardhana points to the unexpressed content and has the opinion that manifestation of this content alone is sufficient enough to extend recognition as good poetry to a combination of sound and sense, although it is bereft of figure of speech and charming expressions. In explaining his doctrine, his commentator Abhinavagupta says that words and expressed meanings being comprehended by all constitute the body of poetry. The very fact that an ordinary expression, though consisting in an association of words and expressed meaning is not regarded as a specimen of *Kāvya* shows that there is a factor other than these two that constitute the true essence of poetry. This factor, he says, is nothing other than an implicit idea. According to Ānandavardhana, a suggested sense manifests itself in any of these three aspects: (a) fact (*Vastu*), (b) an imaginative mood (*Alamkāra*) and (c) an emotional mood (*Rasa*). Although from the point of view of the theory he considers each of these three aspects of suggested meaning as imparting life to poetry, his real leaning is towards *Rasadhvani*. It is not incorrect to draw such a conclusion from his

observation that practically he regards a suggested emotional mood as the correct secret of Poetic Art. The creative artist recovers from the *Vācya* (denoted) through his significative power the experience in its entirety and the joy that follows. Suggestion or *Dhvani* is, therefore, the link between the words on the page on the one hand, the vision or experience on the other. It is called *Vyañjanā*, more appropriately rendered as the significative power of words. This *Vyañjanāvṛtti* creates *Rasa* in the heart of *Sahr̥daya* (connoisseur) and poetry becomes charming. The relation between the expressed and the suggested sense is that of the *Dīpa-sikhā* (flame of a lamp) and *Prakāśa* (its illumination). In poetry, more than denotation, it is connotation, suggestion and rhythm that help us to get at the experience. The word that can be articulated (*Vācya*) can express only a fraction of the experience. It is their capacity for 'suggestion' that takes us to the experience in its entirety. *Dhvani* functions through denotative and connotative meaning of words even as *Ātman* functions through the *Śarīra* or the body. *Dhvani* is the soul of *Kāvya* ("*Kāvyaśyātmā dhvaniḥ*").

According to Ānandavardhana, *Rasadhvani* is the best and real *Kāvyaātmā*. The epic *Rāmāyaṇa* is the expression of pathetic sentiment (*Karuṇa rasa*) aroused in the mind of the poet on hearing the lamentations of *Krauñca*, separated from its consort – “*Karuṇādāvapi rase jāyate yat param sukham sacetasāmanubhavaḥ pramāṇam tatra kevalam.*”¹⁷ It is true that there is an experience of pleasure even in the case of pathos. Only proof for its existence lies in the experience of a connoisseur. Had there no such experience, none would have been inclined to read literature. It may be compared to – “Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thoughts.”¹⁸ According to him, *Guṇas* and *Alamkāras* are related not to sound and sense but to emotional mood alone. In sharp contrast to the view held by writers belonging to pre-*Dhvani* school that, *Guṇas* are *Dharmas* of *Śabda* and *Artha*, Ānandavardhana holds that really they are qualities inhering *Rasa* – the soul of the poetry and when one describes them as qualities belonging to sound and sense, he only says so figuratively. In Ānandavardhana, we find an attempt to hold a psychological analysis of an appreciator; as he says, the three qualities – *Mādhurya*, *Ojas* and *Prasāda* postulated by him lies at the

root of production of three types of mental states produced from perception of poetry, delineating different sentiments. Similarly, he holds that the poetic figures, though belonging to *Śabda* and *Artha*, go really to augment the beauty of the emotional mood that creates them in its urge to manifest itself. Although Ānandavardhana betrays his partiality for *Rasadhvani*, he takes care to maintain his original position that *Dhvani* in general constitutes the soul of poetry and accordingly quotes copious illustrations of *Vastudhvani* and *Alamkārādhvani* alike.

Abhinavagupta, a commentator of *Dhvanyāloka*, declares that *Rasadhvani* alone forms the soul of poetry and maintains that *Vastu* and *Alamkāra* ultimately terminate in *Rasa*.¹⁹ He describes this *Rasadhvani* as *Viśrantisthāna* (i.e., place affording the readers aesthetic repose). He has discussed in his *Locana* and *Abhinavabhāratī* the nature of *Rasa*, the barriers to the realisation of *Rasa*, how the *Sahṛdaya* gets over the obstacles and realises the experience. This realisation is considered *Alaukika* or transcendental. It is ineffable and cannot be expressed. It is a peculiar kind of cognition similar to but not identical with yogic

knowledge or realisation which is universal, disinterested and impersonal. Due to peculiar character of such experience, Viśvanātha has described it as *Brahmasvādasahodara* (i.e., dwarf sample of the taste of the realisation of Brahman),²⁰ which is also supported by Abhinavagupta. The experience is disinterested, universal and impersonal like the taste of Brahman who is also disinterested, universal and impersonal. But both are not identical due to having quantitative difference between them. *Brahmānanda* is permanent while bliss arising from aesthetic enjoyment is temporary. It continues till the absorption breaks up. Hence, the latter, though qualitatively same, is quantitatively different. Following the footsteps of this great commentator, all later writers show a decided partiality for *Rasadhvani*.

It is curious to note that though Abhinavagupta declares the essentiality of *Rasa* in poetry, without which there could be no *Kāvya*, he criticises Bhaṭṭanāyaka, when the latter attempts to explain away the *Prākṛta* stanza - '*Bhama Dhammia*' etc. as an example of manifestation of *Rasa*. Bhaṭṭanāyaka is of opinion that in the stanza under consideration, it is the realisation of Frightful

sentiment that leads to cognition of the much talked of negation, because the religious-minded person who is afraid of the lion naturally keeps away from the groves infested with lions. In reply to this, Abhinavagupta points out that the Frightful sentiment is not realised by the religious-minded person who become a victim to its basic feeling 'fear' only. A man of poetic sensibility alone experiences this Frightful sentiment, if it is realised at all. He further points out that a semblance of erotic emotion is experienced in this stanza. He maintains that by affording recognition of *Rasa*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka practically accepts the position of the *Dhvanivādin*. The difference between the stands of the two is that while a *Dhvanivādin* recognises that the centre of gravity in a poetic creation may lie in its material and imagination as much as in its emotional element, Bhaṭṭanāyaka holds that it is an emotional element that is of prime importance in poetry. Bhaṭṭanāyaka is of opinion that though *Śabda* predominates in *Śāstra* and *Artha* in the *Ākhyāna*, yet in the *Kāvya* both these elements are subordinated to the *Vyāpāra*. This he says, is of three fold in nature: *Abhidhā*, *Bhāvakatva*, *Vyāpāra* and *Bhojakatva*: *Abhidhā* presents the

Vibhāvas, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicarībhāvas* – *Bhāvakatva* accomplishes generalisation of three factors as also of others, – *Bhojakatva* brings *Sattvaguna* into prominence and ultimately leads to manifestation of one's pure consciousness.

Kṣemendra takes the essentiality of *Rasa* for granted and assumes propriety as constituting the very life of a poetic creation. The literary excellences and poetic figures beautify only the external form of poetry. The principle that enlivens all these elements is that of appropriateness or *Aucitya*. In elaborating this doctrine, he further states that a poetic figure augments the beauty of a poetic expression only when it is inserted properly in an appropriate place. In this respect, it is similar to an ordinary instrument of decoration that gives a body a beautiful look only when worn in proper place. Thus, a girdle placed on neck or a necklace worn in waist makes a body look ludicrous; but if worn in proper places they would enhance the beauty of the human body. Kṣemendra remarks that the same thing happens in case of *Guṇas* and *Alamkāras* belonging to poetry. Without *Aucitya*, they fail to become instrument of embellishment. The proper placing of things in

such a manner as to suit *Rasa* and the avoiding of things not suitable to it form the essence of artistic expression. This is propriety, *Aucitya*.

Aucitya is harmony and in one aspect, it is proportion between the whole and the parts, between the chief and the subsidiary. This perfection is all the morals and beauty in art. This *Aucitya*, proportion and harmony on one side and appropriateness and adaptation on the other, cannot be understood by itself. It presupposes *Rasa*, the soul of poetry, to which all other things are harmonious and appropriate. Although Kṣemendra mentions sentiment or *Rasa* as one of the numerous elements pervaded by propriety, a careful analysis of his work reveals his firm conviction that the test of *Aucitya* lies in suggestion of *Rasa*. Thus the principle of propriety, based as it is on the contention of Ānandavardhana that there is no other circumstance that leads to the violation of *Rasa* other than impropriety. The supreme secret of *Rasa* consists in observing the established rules of propriety. To depict *Rasa* it is necessary to observe the rules of propriety and the subject, which is anticipated by Bharata, may take various forms according as it

relates to the subject matter, the speaker and the nature of sentiment evoked or the means employed in evoking it. Kṣemendra develops and pushes the idea to its extreme and speaks of *Aucitya* as the essence of *Rasa* (*Rasa-jīvitabhūta*) and as having its foundation in the charm or aesthetic pleasure (*Camatkāra*) underlying the relish of *Rasa*.

In his *Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa* Kṣemendra expresses his opinion that *Camatkāra* constitutes the very life of poet and poetry. According to him, a composition bereft of this element is like gold without any priceless gem to illuminate it and is as unattractive as the youth of a woman devoid of grace. He speaks of ten kinds of *Camatkāra*. The concept of *Camatkāra* is not a novel one, because the learned Dhvanikāra and Abhinavagupta used this expression several times in their composition. Thus it refers to delight that arises in the mind of an appreciator on reading a poem and as such comprehends all the poetical elements – *Guṇa*, *Alamkāra*, *Rīti*, *Vṛtti*, *Dhvani* and *Rasa*. He recognises the essentiality of *Camatkāra* or literary delight and makes a new approach to the problem of Poetry. He thinks that in order to constitute poetic expression, a

composition has got to be relished or enjoyed, whether this enjoyment is due to sound-effect or depth of meaning or insertion of poetic figures or depiction of moods. He is of opinion that it is this ability to generate artistic delight that differentiates a poetic expression from an ordinary linguistic one.

Kuntaka must have been a contemporary of Abhinavagupta.

Coming to Kuntaka, we find the emphasis shifted from external appendages and even from the unexpressed content to the imaginative faculty of the poet. This gives a new turn to an expression and enables it to bloom into the flower of poetry. In the whole range of Sanskrit *Alamkāras* Kuntaka is the only critic to give the creative faculty of the poet its due share. He includes it in the definition of *Kāvya*. Others only mention it as one of the casual factors of poetic creation. He makes Bhāmaha's conception of Poetry his starting point. He defines it as a combination of sound and sense arranged in a composition, shining with strikingness (*Vaicitra*) of expression and effected by the skill of the poet – a composition that causes delight to the connoisseurs of poetic art. In explaining this definition he, first, sets at rest all controversies concerning the

problem whether word alone constitutes poetry or meaning alone does it. He maintains that the ability to cause delight is present in both language and idea and that both are of equal importance in poetry. He points out to *Vakrokti* to explain as to what lies behind the harmonious blending of language and meaning, as is found in poetry. *Vakrokti* is explained as a mode of expression, to which charm is infused by the skill of the poet. Thus, in the doctrine of Kuntaka, ultimate emphasis is laid on imaginative faculty of the poet that gives a new turn to expression and arranges language and meaning in unison. Taking this broad connotation of *Vakrokti*, Kuntaka maintains that this *Vakrokti* constitutes the only possible embellishment or *Alamkāra* of poetry –

“*Ubhāvetāvalamkāryau tayoh punaralamkṛtiḥ /*

*Vakroktireva vaidagdhyaḅhaᅅgibhaᅅnitirucyate //”*²¹

For the sake of convenience of treatment, one speaks conventionally of *Alamkārya* (that which is to be embellished, viz., *Śabda* and *Artha*) and its *Alamkāra* (embellishment viz., poetic figure) but this distinction, in his opinion, is not essential. The embellished speech itself in its entirety is poetry and the addition of poetic figures is not

adventitious. He maintains that embellished word and sense constitute poetry. It is not proper to say that *Alamkāras* belong to *Kāvya*, for this statement would suggest that *Kāvya* may exist without them. Indeed, *Vakrokti* as a mode of expression being essential in poetry, underlies and forms the substance of all poetic figures so called. As such, the *Vakrokti* is, as Kuntaka holds, the only *Alamkṛti* (embellishment) possible to *Śabda* and *Artha* and all so-called poetic figures are but different aspects of *Vakrokti*. In fact, Kuntaka includes the *Alamkāras* in the province of *Vākya-vakratā*.

The *Vakrokti* being the only *Alamkāra* admissible, all other *Alamkāras* or poetic figures so analysed by other rhetoricians can be properly included in its comprehensive scope. Kuntaka is conscious of the fact that the *Kavi-vyāpāra*, which is the source of *Vakrokti*, is undefinable in nature. Yet, one can distinguish and classify its function into six different spheres. The *Vakratva* created by *Kavi-vyāpāra*, may occur in the following cases: (i) in the arrangement of letters, which is termed *Varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*; (ii) & (iii) in the substantive (*Prātipadika*) or the terminal (*Pratyaya*) part of a word, it

is called *Padapūrvārdha* and *Pada-parārdha* (or *Pratyaya*) *Vakratā* respectively; (iv) in a sentence it is called *Vākya-vakratā*. The *Vākya-vakratā* may be of infinite varieties for it depends on the fertile fancy of the poet. (v) In a particular topic (*Prakaraṇa*), it is called *Prakaraṇa-vakratā*. (vi) In the composition as a whole, it is called *Prabandha-vakratā*. But Kuntaka himself admits that *Vakratā* may be of infinite kinds depending on the creative genius of individual poets. The emphasis laid by him on *Vakratā* of which *Rasa* is only one aspect leads the scholars to believe that Kuntaka develops an altogether new system, opposed to the doctrine of *Dhvani*. In fact Ruyyaka categorically mentions that Kuntaka comprehends the concept of *Dhvani* under such varieties of *Vakratā* as *Upacāravakratā* and the like. He thereby throws open the suggestion that he belongs to that group of scholars opposed to the theory of *Dhvani*, who like to equate *Dhvani* with *Lakṣaṇā*. A careful analysis of Kuntaka's work, however, reveals him to be an out and out *Dhvānivadin*, who not only recognises the supreme importance of *Rasa* and *Svabhāva*, but also at the same time realises the truth of Ānandavardhana's doctrine that propriety constitutes the secret of

all composition. For this reason while defining *Varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*, he expresses his opinion that letters appropriate to the context only are to be inserted and certain sounds, though unsuited to certain situations, are capable of helping the idea and *Rasa* in other situations. Ānandavardhana mentions suggestiveness of a suffix and following him Kuntaka enumerates *Pratyaya-vakratā* as one of the varieties of *Vakratā*. This *Vakratā*, he says, consists in use of proper suffixes, as are competent to suggest the intended idea or emotion. Kuntaka thinks that of a number of synonymous words used in different genders, the one used in feminine is to be preferred, because the gender itself is charming and is able to bring *Rasa* into comprehension, even though other forms of strikingness are not there. He introduces in this connection the topic of *Līṅga-vakratā*, which consists in use of a gender that suits the occasion by means of its effectiveness in suggesting the intended emotion. It is interesting to note that a number of verses quoted by Ānandavardhana as examples of different types of *Dhvani* are cited by Kuntaka to illustrate different varieties of *Vakratā*. This leads to

the inevitable conclusion that Kuntaka proceeds to formulate the doctrine of *Vakrokti* after taking the existence of *Dhvani* for granted.

Again, Kuntaka recognises *Pratiyamānatā* generally in those cases of *Vākya-vakratā* where the *Svabhāva* of an object forms the theme and guardedly uses the term *Gocāratva* (being the object of expression) instead of *Vācyatva* (express denotation) to include the possibility of *Vyañgyatva* (suggestiveness). He thus clearly indicates that such descriptions are possible not only through express words but also through suggestive expression. In other words, he accepts in a general sense what is known as *Vastu-dhvani*. In this way, he appears to acknowledge *Alamkāra-dhvani*, as elsewhere he acknowledges *Rasa-dhvani* and *Vastu-dhvani*. In one passage, while discussing the figure *Parivṛtti*, which he would consider to be *Alamkārya* (and not an *Alamkāra*), he gives his opinion that the so-called figure is charming when it involves suggestion. He speaks categorically in this connection of the three forms of suggestion of *Vastu*, *Alamkāra* and *Rasa* recognised by the *Dhvani* school.

Indeed, Kuntaka belongs to the group of authors who, having flourished after Ānandavardhana's time, do not deny the concept of *Dhvani* but try to explain it in terms of already recognised idea.

The close relation existing between *Dhvani*, *Aucitya* and *Vakratā* is noticed by Mahimabhaṭṭa whose comments throw a new light on Kuntaka's doctrine. Mahimabhaṭṭa accepts the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*. He holds that *Rasa* constitutes the soul of a poetic creation and on this score he agrees fully with Ānandavardhana. He differs from the learned Dhvanikāra only in point of its process of comprehension. While the latter postulates a function of suggestion in order to explain its cognition, he thinks that *Anumāna* is competent enough to bring *Rasa* into comprehension. Mahimabhaṭṭa is of opinion that *Aucitya* of *Rasa* and *Prakṛti* is the greatest *Guṇa* – most essential for a *Kāvya*. Absence of *Aucitya*, on the other hand, constitutes the greatest defect and forms the basis of all flaws that flow from it. In criticising the theory of Kuntaka, he says that the peculiar turn given to an expression by the skill of the poet, to which so much publicity is given by Kuntaka, is capable of being resolved into *Aucitya* or into *Dhvani*. To state more clearly, Kuntaka's

doctrine might mean that *Aucitya*, which figures so largely in his treatment of *Vakrokti*, constitutes the soul of Poetry or it might mean that *Dhvani* forms the essence of Poetry. No third alternative is possible because a specimen of Poetic Art that conforms to the principles of literary criticism cannot do without these two elements.

Jagannātha's *Rasa-gaṅgādhara* is the last remarkable work on Poetics. We do not, however, find in it a complete presentation of the subject, as the available text forms about two-fifths of what the work was originally designed to be by its author and is thus extant only in an unfortunately incomplete shape. Jagannātha defines poetry as a word or linguistic composition, which brings a charming idea into expression (*Ramaṇīyārtha-pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam*)²², a definition that reminds us of Daṇḍin's well-known description of *Kāvyaśarīra* as *Iṣṭārthavyavacchinnā padāvalī*. The charmingness belongs to an idea that causes unworldly or disinterested pleasure. This quality of disinterestedness is an essential characteristic, which is a fact of internal experience and which is an attribute of pleasure being synonymous with *Camatkāra* or strikingness.

The beautiful (*Ramaṇīyatā*) in poetry, therefore, is that which gives us impersonal pleasure. This pleasure is specifically different from that which one finds in the actually pleasing, and depends upon taste formed by continued contemplation of beautiful objects. It will be noticed that this definition not only gives us a remarkable analysis of the beautiful but also includes in its generality and comprehensiveness all the elements of poetry recognised by previous theorists, without specifically naming them. We have already noted that the poetic sentiment or *Rasa*, excited in the reader's mind, is peculiar in its nature. It is, no doubt, a fact of one's own consciousness but it is essentially universal and impersonal in character, being common to all trained readers and possessing no significance to their personal relations or interests. A distinction is made between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment. The former is individual and immediately personal and, therefore, may be pleasurable or painful; but the latter is generic, disinterested, and marked by impersonal joy. The poetic sentiment in this sense is supernormal (*Alaukika*). The things that cause disgust, fear or sorrow in ordinary life and the normal emotions that are far from

pleasant in actual experience, when conveyed in poetry, become ideal and universal and bring about this supernormal pleasure, which is not to be compared to the very mixed pleasure experienced in ordinary life. This pleasure, dissociated from all personal interests, is the essence of the mental condition involved in the enjoyment of *Rasa*. It is also the essence of all poetry, as conceived by Jagannātha.

The aesthetic pleasure (*Camatkāra* or *Lokottaratva*) into which this *Ramaṇīyatā* resolves itself is an essential element in the poetic figure. Jagannātha thus harmonises his own conception of poetry with Ruyyaka's theory of *Alaṅkāra* (which he accepts and elaborates) as involving this *Camatkāra* (also called *Hṛdyatva*, *Cārutva*, *Saundarya* or denoted by the technical terms *Vaicitrya*, *Vicchitti-viśeṣa* or *Bhaṇiti-prakāra*) imparted by the conception of the poet (*Kavi-pratibhā*). Kuntaka, who appears to have derived his analysis from Ruyyaka, laid down that in every poetical production the activity of the poet, which consists in an act of the productive imagination (*Pratibhā*), is the principal point and it should result in poetic expression. Jagannātha asserts that the *Pratibhā* alone is the

source of poetry and therefore of poetic expression, and as such it fixes the nature of *Alamkāra*. The special charm (*Vicchitti-viśeṣa*), which is thus imparted to poetic figure by the imagination of the poet, is taken as the basis upon which the poetic figures distinguished themselves in their special peculiarities. It is explained as an act of imagination on the part of the poet in so far as it is produced in the poem or as that aesthetic pleasure which is thereby brought into being. As to how this *Vicchitti* is determined, Jagannātha settles the question by resting it not only upon established usage (*Sampradāya*) but also upon one's own internal experience (*Anubhava*). On this fundamental principle, the various figures are minutely defined, differentiated, illustrated and classified. This portion of Jagannātha's work, in spite of its subtlety and polemic attitude, is one of the most acute, though unfortunately incomplete treatment of the subject.

The prime outcome of *Kāvya* is the enjoyment of *Vigalita-vedyāntara alaukika ānanda*, non-mundane pleasure arising from the melting of cognition of oneself. It may be described as pleasure out of one's own cognition (*Svasamividānanda*). The pleasure, which we

enjoy in our mundane life, is not the same as the pleasure, which is enjoyable from *Kāvya*. The first one is *Laukika* (worldly) whereas the second is *Alaukika* (transcendental). Aesthetic emotion, thus, is not born of practical encounter. It is not to be identified with the emotion that is aroused by that type of involvement. The essence of aesthetic experience, its life, consists of the activity of relishing (*Carvyamāṇika-prāṇāḥ*). It is a relish in which the *Rasa* alone, apart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness. It is therefore described as the relish in which the contemplation of any other thing but the *Rasa* itself is eliminated (*Vigalita-vendyāntara*) or which is free from the contact of aught else (*Vydyānta-sparsā-sūnya*).

Beauty (*Camatkāra*) is generated by the poetic action (*Kavikarma*) or poetic imagination (*Kavi-pratibhā*) and comes to dwell in the poetic tissue (*Kāvya-sārīra*). Beauty means *Rasa* or aesthetic experience.

In literature, truth is expressed through metaphor. Poetic language or metaphorical language is used in literature with a view

to arousing the aesthetic experience or sentiment of the readers. Ordinary language has the power of denotation and it cannot properly arouse the aesthetic experience. Naturally, poetic language needs metaphors in order to arouse the aesthetic feeling of the readers or connoisseurs. As a result, metaphor is mostly looked upon as a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish as opposed to the ordinary everyday language.

Literature aims at evoking certain emotions, which are universally present in men and thereby leads them to catharsis. In order to accomplish this purpose the language in literature takes the assistance of metaphor. The poet makes use of the unique process of suggestion with the help of metaphor while he composes his work. Poets do not communicate emotions through ordinary language. They only suggest them through metaphorical language. In fact, poets make feel the truth through the use of metaphors, which act as stimulators.

In Sanskrit, metaphor is called *Rūpaka*. *Rūpaka* or metaphor is based on an element of identity. Though this element of identity is

quite distinct from the element of similarity discernible in simile, yet it cannot be denied that the basic element of similarity underlies this identity. Indian rhetoricians hold that the function of *Rūpaka* is *Upaṇṇjakatva* (an imposed property). The pretty face of the heroine is generally identified by the poet with the moon, one of the conventional standards of comparison, with a view to impress upon the mind of the appreciative readers the exquisite beauty of the heroine's face. However, the quality of being pleasing in itself cannot be the sole criterion of metaphor. Even when metaphor is used in derogatory sense, it is highly effective, e.g., calling a person 'black sheep' etc. Here the element of pleasingness is absent. The metaphorical expressions have assumed such an important place in everyday speech that they have become indispensable.

Metaphor is primarily used for stimulating the imagination and enriching the language, - literary as well as everyday language. Its most basic use lies in enhancing everyday speech. It is intertwined in language. The poet alone is not gifted with the ability to discern similarity in dissimilarities; rather we all are gifted in this respect to some extent. Perhaps in all of us, a poet lives somewhere and we all

possess poetic insight in greater or lesser degree. However, metaphor does not remain confined in similarity itself; it moves beyond similarity and encompasses identity. Two objects then are no longer similar; they are the same. When we read a piece of literature or watch a play being performed, what actually takes place in us is the process of identification and not mere perception of similarities. In fact, one does not have the slightest similarity with Bankim Chandra's renowned characters like Indirā or Kapālakundalā or Tagore's Nandinī. Yet, one can hardly deny the sense of identity with the characters and the situations that come from these pieces of literature.

Metaphor is an essential part of speech. We can say after Aristotle that metaphor is essential to language since "it is metaphor above all that gives perspicuity and pleasure and a foreign air".²³ However, excessive and disproportionate use of metaphor would bring impropriety to the language. The best way to use metaphor is in juxtaposition with ordinary words. The metaphor saves the language from becoming mean and prosaic, while the ordinary words bring in the necessary clarity of expression.

The proper use of metaphor in language is a great thing for a poet in particular, as Aristotle sees it, "But for the most important thing to master", he says, "is the use of metaphor. This is the one thing that cannot be learned from anyone else, and it is the mark of great natural ability, for to use metaphor well implies a perception of resemblances".²⁴ However, metaphor is used not by the poet alone. It is an integral part of language and we all use metaphors when we speak.

In our above discussion regarding the role metaphor plays in poetry, we have also become aware of the indispensability of metaphor in our everyday speech. It would not be an exaggeration to say that we use metaphors from our childhood in our everyday speech. The truth about metaphor is that it is a part of language itself. According to P.B.Shelley, language is virtually metaphorical and one cannot deny his standpoint. In fact, metaphor is the most primitive figures and it is inextricably intertwined in language.

References:

1. Gopīnāth Kavirāj: *Aspects of Indian Thought* p2, University of Burdwan, 1984.
2. *Īsopaniṣad*, Mantra No.8.
3. *Agnipurāna*, 345/10
4. *Locana on Dhvanyāloka* (Ed. Kappusvāmī Śāstrī) Madras, 1964, pp. 77 – 78.
5. Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy: *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana, Motilal, Delhi, 1982, p.XXXI
6. “*Ripuste mṛtaḥ putraste jātaḥ ityādivākyaṛthe ...na lokottaratvamiti na tatra kāvyaprasaktiḥ*” - *Kāvyaḍarsā* Commentary on verse No. 10, Ch.1, Ed. by K.Roy, 3rd Edn., Calcutta, 1971.
7. “*Yesām kāvyanuśilanānabhyāsavaśād viśadibhūte manomukure varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā, te hṛdayasaṁvāda bhājah saḥḍayah*”
Locana on Dhvanyāloka, 1/1
8. *Kāvyaḍarsā Vṛtti*, 4/28.
9. *Dhvanyāloka*, 1/5. Henceforth DL.
10. *Kāvyaḍarsā*, 1, 16.
11. *Kāvyaḍarsā*, 1/41- 42
12. *Ibid*
13. *Kāvyaḍarsā* 1
14. *Ibid* 1-2
15. *Ibid*
16. DL 1, 1
17. *Sāhityadarpaṇa* 3/36-38, henceforth SD
18. P.B.Shelley: “To A Skylark”.

19. “*Tena rasa eva vastuta ātmā vastvalamkāradhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyeta*” – DL, 1/5 p.27
20. “*Sattvodrekād akhanda – svaparakāsānanda – cinmayah/ vedyāntara-sparśasūnyo brahma-svāda-sahodarah// Lokottara-comatkāra-prānaḥ kaiscit pramātr̥bhiḥ// Svākāravat abhinnatvenāyamāsvādyate rasah// Rajastamobhyāmaspr̥ṣṭam manah sattvamihocyate//*” SD 3/35
21. *Vakroktijīvita* 1, 10.
22. *Rasa-gaṅgādhara* – 1 p.4.
23. Aristotle: *The Art of Rhetoric*. Translated by J.H.Freese, Pub: W.Heinemann Ltd., London.
24. Aristotle, Horace and Longinus: *Classical Literary Criticism*. Translated with an introduction by T.S.Dorsch. Pub: Penguin Books, 1987.
