



LIFE OF THE MARQUESS OF RIPON, K.G.





Engraving by Walter P. H.

Reynolds

from a mezzotint of the portrait by Sir Hubert Herkome, R.A.

# LIFE OF THE FIRST MARQUESS OF RIPON

K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., D.C.L., Etc.

BY LUCIEN WOLF

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. I



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## PREFACE

THERE has been some delay in the preparation of this book, due partly to the failure of my eyesight, which has, for all practical purposes, incapacitated me from reading and writing, and partly to the War, which fastened men's minds on other things and necessarily modified the plan I had formed for the treatment of my theme. The book, however, has not suffered on that account. I was fortunate in finding other eyes and hands which toiled for me, not only with intelligence, but with unwearied devotion. I am, too, the less concerned to apologize for the delay because it has proved a positive advantage to the memory of Lord Ripon. Time, indeed, has but little relation to the right of a public man to a full record of his life in the literature of his country. Is the story intrinsically interesting? Does it add materially to our stock of knowledge? Is there any element of permanence in the ideas and achievements it records? Judged by these tests the Life of Lord Ripon, even in my inadequate rendering of it, will, I think, be found fully justified.

*It will be a triumph he richly deserved. He was not a showy statesman. He hated the "Palaver" and the limelight. He was not a great speaker or a good writer. But he was industrious, painstaking, honest, and shrewd. He had high purposes and far more than average ability, which, joined with a character of singular nobility and loveliness, once—in the Indian Viceroyalty—almost touched the high-water mark of genius. He served his country through nearly sixty years with such*

simplicity and so little self-assertion that, at the end, he seemed to fall quite easily into the ruck of political mediocrity. For at that time even his Indian work was only beginning to emerge from the distorting atmosphere of party controversy. The re-reading of his Life to-day in the light of an ample material, and more especially of the lessons of the Great War and of its political and social concomitants, must, I think, reverse this judgment and give to Lord Ripon a high place in the constructive statesmanship of the Victorian and Edwardian epochs.

It remains for me to express my gratitude to Sir Henry Primrose, K.C.B., for the high compliment he paid me in asking me, with the assent of his brother executors, to prepare this book, and for the valuable advice and great material help he has afforded me throughout. With him I should associate the name of the late Lady Primrose, who took a deep interest in the work, and who also contributed not a little to lighten my labours. It is a great regret to me that she has not been spared to see this measure of justice done to the memory of one to whom she was devotedly attached. Another friend to whom I am under a great obligation is Mr. C. E. Baines, of the India Office. He drafted for me an admirable digest of the great mass of papers relating to Lord Ripon's Indian Viceroyalty, and otherwise gave me the benefit of his skilled advice in dealing with Indian questions. My thanks are also due to Lord Buxton, who placed at my disposal his private correspondence with Lord Ripon during their administration of the Colonial Office, and to Lord Sydenham and Mr. John Leyland for kindly reading, and advising me upon, the War Office and Naval documents with which I have had to deal. Finally, I am greatly indebted to Mr. John Murray for his helpful interest in the book and for many wise hints and suggestions.

I should add that for the treatment of my subject and for the opinions expressed I alone am responsible.

PREFACE

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This, of course, does not apply to the special chapter on the spiritual and theologic aspects of Lord Ripon's Conversion, which has been contributed by the late Father Sebastian Bowden. Owing to my own religious affiliation the division of labour in this respect was inevitable, but I trust that in my treatment of the external aspects of this important event in Lord Ripon's Life I have shown no want of sympathy. I could not well do so the while I remembered the great maxim of the Hebrew sage : "The pious of all creeds have an equal place in Paradise."

W.

GRAY'S INN,  
LONDON, W.C.

*September 1921.*

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BOOK I

*THE NOBLE DEMOCRAT*

## CHAPTER I

### HEREDITY AND THE FAIRY GODMOTHER

(1827)

"THE lady of Lord Goderich was safely delivered of a son, at the house of the Premier, in Downing Street, on Wednesday night. This is his Lordship's only child : he and Lady Goderich had been deeply afflicted, about a year ago, by the death of their only child, an accomplished daughter."—*Times*, October 27, 1827 (Saturday).

The Fairy Godmother was accurate enough, if not entirely happy, in the portents with which she invested the entrance into the world of George Frederick Samuel Robinson, afterwards first Marquess of Ripon. Nothing, indeed, could have marked out more clearly the active and, for a time, turbulent part he was destined to play in the politics of his country. In the first place there was the portent of the Ministerial Purple. He was born during the short Premiership of his father, Lord Goderich, and in the historic house in Downing Street in which so many British Prime Ministers have had their official abode. Secondly, there were the anxieties which crowded over his cradle, and which counted for a good deal in the collapse of the Cabinet of which his father was the uneasy head. To have helped, however remotely, to unmake a Ministry before he was six weeks old, was a biographical presage of unmistakable significance.

As a matter of fact, his part in the concatenation of worries and distractions which wrecked the Goderich administration was by no means distant or indecisive.

Lord Goderich, a man of amiable but weak character, ambitious and not without shrewdness, but easily unnerved and wholly lacking in qualities of leadership and statesmanship, had been called upon by the King to head the Coalition Ministry after Canning's death in August 1827. At that time he was already a prey to domestic cares. He had had two live children—one, a boy, Hobart Frederick, who lived only two days, and the other, a daughter, Eleanor Henrietta Victoria, who had survived to a promising girlhood, but had been cut off in the previous autumn.<sup>1</sup> Lady Goderich, to whom he was devotedly attached, had suffered in health by her maternal trials,<sup>2</sup> and she was now within a few weeks of another confinement, which deeply stirred the hopes and fears of both. To these anxieties the Premiership, which at first seemed of the happiest augury, brought a veritable tempest of fresh troubles.

In the eyes of the average man the choice of Lord Goderich for that exalted position seemed in a measure justified by his undoubted gifts as a parliamentary debater, by the cordial relations he had managed to maintain with his colleagues of both political camps, and, more particularly, by the pliancy of his political opinions—with a judiciously advertised bias in a moderately Liberal direction—which seemed to constitute him the necessary solvent for the warring elements then only half dormant in the Cabinet. The King, no doubt, shared this view, but it was not on that account only that he made him Premier. What he had chiefly in mind was his own freedom of action. He

<sup>1</sup> The parents were inconsolable. When the Hall at Nocton, where they lived, was burnt down in 1834, a chest was found in the library ticketed: "To be saved first in case of fire." It was duly rescued, and proved to contain the playthings and other relics of little Eleanor.

<sup>2</sup> Of these trials Lord Malmesbury tells the following story: "Lady Goderich's little daughter, seeing her mother was very uncomfortable before the birth of her children, said she was determined to have all her children before she married, and enjoy herself afterwards."—Malmesbury: *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister*, vol. i, p. 253.

had never been enamoured of the Canning coalition, which had been forced upon him by public opinion, and, moreover, he hated the Whigs. On the other hand, he was not less averse from the domination of the Tories. Lord Liverpool, as Lord Carnarvon once told Tom Moore,<sup>1</sup> and as the incident of Sumner's appointment to a Canonry of Windsor in 1821 amply showed, could, and did, bully him on occasion, and of Canning he was afraid. It is no doubt true that he desired the supremacy of certain political principles, but only as embodied in himself and not necessarily as represented by any political party. In a word, he felt himself emancipated by the death of Canning, and he calculated on the unmasculine spirit and devotion to himself of the new Premier, assisted perhaps by the equilibrium of Whig and Tory influences in the Cabinet, to consolidate and enlarge the personal liberty he had gained. This was the complicated and perilous situation to which Lord Goderich ingenuously lent himself when, on August 8, a few hours after Canning's death, he was commanded to Windsor, and offered the First Lordship of the Treasury.

The difficulties of his position speedily revealed themselves. The King was not alone in his uncomplimentary estimate of Lord Goderich's character, and within three days a struggle for predominance between the Whigs and Tories in the Cabinet was set on foot. The first move was symptomatic rather than menacing. On August 11 Lord Lansdowne, accompanied by Mr. Tierney—the stormy petrel of the Whig faction—called on the Premier and urged the admission of Lord Holland into the Cabinet. Lord Goderich mildly objected and suggested delay, and the proposal was not pressed. But the following day a far more formidable attack was made on him. He received a letter from the King informing him that he proposed making Mr. Herries

<sup>1</sup> Russell: *Memoirs of Thomas Moore*, vol. v, p. 236.

Chancellor of the Exchequer.<sup>1</sup> What the King's motive was is not easy to say, but Greville was, perhaps, not far wrong when he suggested that it had less to do with Tory sympathies than with a desire to strengthen his own personal authority in the direction of the Exchequer.<sup>2</sup> Be that as it may, the effect was exasperating. A violent storm, which lasted until the first week in September, shook the unstable Cabinet and brought it to the verge of dissolution. The King eventually had his way, much to the chagrin of the Whigs, who were further embittered when, as the result of his victory and the consequent Cabinet discords, he virtually took the whole disposal of patronage into his own hands and otherwise acted without consulting the Cabinet.

This was the situation when, on October 24, Lady Goderich gave birth to her son.

The otherwise happy event brought no surcease to Lord Goderich's worries. On the one hand, Lady Goderich made a bad confinement, and both she and her husband became at once filled with anxiety for the new-born; on the other, the distractions of the Cabinet became every day worse confounded. The news of the battle of Navarino started a difference on foreign policy between Huskisson and Herries, which spread rapidly and angrily to other political questions. Then towards the end of November, the Whigs revived the thorny question of admitting Lord Holland into the Cabinet. Once more all was confusion. Goderich, without consulting the Tories, was persuaded to press the proposal upon the King, and met with a curt refusal, and on December 21, urged by Lord Lansdowne and

<sup>1</sup> See Lord Goderich's Memorandum in Appendix I. It has always been in doubt whether Mr. Herries was nominated on the initiative of the King or on the advice of Lord Goderich. The Whigs and Greville rightly suspected the King (Torrens, *Memoirs of Lord Melbourne*, vol. i, pp. 233-5; *Greville Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 109), but Mr. Edward Herries, in his life of his father, takes the opposite view (*Memoir of the Right Hon. J. C. Herries*, vol. i, p. 221). This question is now settled by Lord Goderich's own Memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> *The Greville Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 109.

Huskisson, he screwed up his courage to threaten resignation if his advice was not adopted.

Buffeted between the Whigs and the King, and with the prospect before him of a revolt of the betrayed Tories, the unhappy Premier became panic-stricken by a renewal of his domestic anxieties. What precisely happened is not clear, but Lansdowne and Huskisson had scarcely left him, after agreeing on the text of his threat to the King, than he resolved to resign outright on account of his private cares. "He added to his letter," writes Lord Palmerston, "a postscript which nobody saw, and in which he stated that he felt himself—from domestic circumstances, affecting the health of one most dear to him—totally incapable of continuing to perform the duties of his station."<sup>1</sup> The "domestic circumstances" were of course the baby, who thus unconsciously wrecked the Cabinet and set the whole country by the ears. It is true that a few days later Goderich momentarily recovered his self-possession and withdrew his resignation, but his embarrassments both political and domestic continued, and he finally succumbed to them three weeks later.

We have a glimpse of the intensity of the parental feeling which weighed on Goderich and his wife during this crisis in one of the names they gave their son. Besides the purely family names of George and Frederick, they christened him "Samuel"—"for this child I prayed, and the Lord hath given me my petition which I asked of Him."<sup>2</sup>

In the matter of ancestors George Frederick Samuel Robinson started life with an eminently respectable equipment, which, like the circumstances of his birth, was not without a certain prophetic significance. A

<sup>1</sup> Bulwer: *Life of Lord Palmerston*, vol. i, p. 208.

<sup>2</sup> The west window in Nocton Church, placed there by Lord Ripon in memory of his mother, contains intimate allusions to the stories of Sarah and Hannah and to the birth of their sons after hope of issue was extinct. Lady Goderich's first name was Sarah.

sturdy and canny race—typical Yorkshire—were the Robinsons of Newby from the beginning. In politics their party allegiance varied with the times, but whether Cavaliers or Roundheads, Tories or Canningites, Conservatives or Radicals, their history is clearly synthesized by their essentially Whig temperament. The late Lady Ripon once said of her husband: “When I married Goderich<sup>1</sup> he was one of the most violent Radicals in the country.” As will be seen presently this was literally true. Lord Ripon himself hugged the delusion to his last days that this Radicalism, which he prized in part as a legacy from his Cromwellian ancestry, had always remained with him unmodified. Coming across a copy of one of his earliest Socialist pamphlets one day in his eightieth year, he said naïvely to his private Secretary, Mr. St. Quentin: “If I had to write this over again I should not alter a word.” And yet side by side with this Radicalism the Whig instinct of his race persisted. It was written in his broad and carefully administered acres, in the dignities which crowded upon him and which he did not resist, in his earnest Ultramontanism, and, most curiously of all, in the public appreciation of his character which regarded him as a pledge of moderation in the most Radical Ministry of our times.

The founder of the Robinson family in the proprieted sense of the term was William Robinson of York, a merchant and shipowner, who amassed a large fortune in the Hamburg trade. He was the son of one Peter Robinson, of whom nothing is known except his name and the record of his death in 1542. The family appears to have migrated from Stafford, for contemporary with William Robinson of York was John Robinson of London, an Alderman of the City, and one of the most eminent merchants of the Staple of his time, who was a native of Darlston, and apparently a relative of

<sup>1</sup> He acquired the courtesy title of Viscount Goderich when his father became Earl of Ripon.

William.<sup>1</sup> Both were active in the illicit trade with the Hanse Towns, and John played an important part in the commercial politics of the English Factory in Hamburg, and for a time represented the interests of the Merchant Adventurers in Denmark.<sup>2</sup>

William Robinson was born in 1522. The times were favourable to commercial enterprise, and he was quick to respond to the golden opportunities they afforded. They came to him through the rise of the Merchant Adventurers, the decline of German trade supremacy, the economic genius of Gresham and the courageous commercial policy of Cecil, all of which culminated in the abolition of the monopoly of the Steelyard and in the free export of wool. Into the struggle with the already half-routed Germans William Robinson threw himself early in life. For some years he resided, as an "interloper," at Hamburg and Lubeck, importing and distributing Yorkshire kerseys. His success is attested by the fact that in 1581, having returned to York, he became Lord Mayor of that city and its representative in Parliament. In 1588 he was re-elected Member for York, and in 1594 served a second term as Lord Mayor. He died in 1616, leaving, besides a considerable sum of money, lands in Staxby and Baldersby, co. York, and Wotton, co. Lincoln.<sup>3</sup>

Of his two sons, William and Thomas, neither made any stir in the world, except that the elder followed in his father's municipal footsteps, and served for a time as Lord Mayor of York. He in turn also had two sons, William and John. The elder was M.P. for York in 1628, and was knighted by Charles I at Edinburgh in

<sup>1</sup> The late Lord Ripon seems to have been of this opinion. He caused inquiries to be made concerning John Robinson, and preserved the account of his family among his papers. There is, however, nothing in this account to show how John and William were connected.

<sup>2</sup> Ehrenberg: *Hamburg und England im Zeitalter der Königin Elizabeth*, pp. 174-5, 261.

<sup>3</sup> *The Genealogist*, N.S., vol. xxi, p. 176; *Cal. State Papers, Domestic*, 1595-7.

1633; not, however, for his public services, but in compensation for waiving his rights as a successful plaintiff in a Star Chamber action in which the friends of the King were interested in shielding one of the defendants.<sup>1</sup> In the Civil War the sympathies of Sir William appear to have been with the King, and he was even denounced as plotting against the Protector,<sup>2</sup> but he managed to emerge from the troubled times safely and with his estates intact.

By his second wife, a daughter of Sir Thomas Metcalfe of Nappa, he again had two sons, Metcalfe and Thomas, besides several daughters. The elder son received the reward of his father's loyalty in the shape of a baronetcy conferred upon him at the Restoration. He was, however, a Whig and had been an overt supporter of Fairfax in drafting and promulgating the Declaration in favour of a free Parliament in 1659. In 1660, 1661, and 1664 he was M.P. for York, and took an active part in the politics of the North Riding, more particularly in organizing the local militia for the support of the King. He died without issue in February 1689, at the climax of the Revolution, and was succeeded in his estates by his nephew, William, the elder of the two sons of his brother, Thomas.

The baronetcy had expired with Sir Metcalfe, but his heir had fortunately identified himself with the Protestant cause, and the dignity was at once renewed to him by the new King. During the reign of Charles II he had represented Northallerton in Parliament. He now became a member of the Convention Parliament, and from 1697 to 1722 he sat in the House of Commons as Member for York. Of his five sons, only one, Thomas, afterwards Lord Grantham, achieved any distinction. The interest of the others is chiefly genealogical and provincial. The eldest, Metcalfe, succeeded to the baronetcy, but died four days later, unmarried. He

<sup>1</sup> Hist. MSS. Com. Reports, Rep. 12, vol. ii, pp. 163-4.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. State Papers, Domestic*, 1655, p. 207.

was succeeded by his brother, Sir Tancred, sometime Rear-Admiral of the White and Lord Mayor of York. Sir Tancred had three sons, all of whom died without issue. The two elder, William and Norton, succeeded in turn to the baronetcy, but on their death the senior line became extinct, and the succession passed to Earl de Grey, the grandson of their uncle, Lord Grantham.

It was by this peer, the first Lord Grantham, that the bias of the political fortunes of the Squires of Newby was transferred from the essentially provincial arena of the North Riding to the larger theatre of the national life in Whitehall and Westminster. As a younger son, he had to carve out a career for himself, and he performed his task with eminent success. He was the "Excellency Robinson" with whom Carlyle has made us familiar in his *Frederic the Great*—"l'infatigable Robinson," as the Prussian King once described him, and, as Carlyle adds, "ancestor of certain valuable Earls that now are; author of innumerable quantities of the Diplomatic cobwebs that there were."<sup>1</sup> For many years British Ambassador in Vienna, he was the zealous though somewhat prosy instrument of the personal policy of George II in the War of the Austrian Succession, and it was he who acted as chief British negotiator of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, by which the war was brought to an unedifying end. On his retirement from diplomacy the King continued to avail himself of his devotion and experience in the home administration, but here, though his counsel and industry justified in part the confidence of his royal master, he was not altogether successful. As Secretary of State for the Southern Department—one of the twin Foreign Secretaryships of those days—he made no mark, and as leader of the House of Commons, for which the King designated him in 1754, he failed, very much in the same way, and largely owing to the same defects of character, as his grandson, Lord Goderich, in the short-lived Premiership of 1827. Nevertheless, like all

<sup>1</sup> Carlyle: *Frederic the Great*, bk. xiii, pp. 283, 306

the Robinsons, he was an excellent man of business, stolid and respectable to the verge of Philistinism, and with a shrewd appreciation of the "jumping cat" and its relation to his own interests. He was and remained an indispensable figure in the political drama of his day, and his services were not too extravagantly rewarded by a pension of £3,000 for two lives and the Grantham peerage conferred on him by George III in 1761.

By his marriage with his step-niece, Frances Worsley, a great-great-granddaughter of Oliver Cromwell, Lord Grantham all unconsciously founded a new family tradition which, as will be seen later, powerfully influenced the career of his great-grandson, the subject of this memoir. By her, too, he had two sons, the elder of whom, Thomas, succeeded to the peerage. The second Lord Grantham was a mellowed replica of his father, and with him the Robinsons may be said to have taken their place definitely among the governing families of the Kingdom. He was a Whig of the reactionary type of Lord Shelburne, in whose short-lived Cabinet of 1782-3 he held the then recently consolidated Foreign Secretaryship. Born in the British Embassy in Vienna, he spent the larger part of his early life in his father's profession, and ultimately became Ambassador in Madrid. He also walked in his father's parliamentary footsteps, but in neither sphere achieved anything of consequence. He remained, however, a political "personage" to the end, added a pension of £2,000 a year to the £3,000 inherited from his father, and by his marriage with Lady Mary Jemima Grey Yorke, one of the daughters and coheiresses of the Earl of Hardwicke, secured for his heir the reversion of the Earldom of De Grey, in addition to his own Barony of Grantham, and the original Robinson baronetcy which, as we have seen, devolved on his branch of the family by the extinction of the senior line.

Of his two sons, the elder, Earl de Grey, had no male issue, and the dignities he inherited from his father

passed to his nephew, the subject of this memoir, who was the only son of his younger brother, Frederick Robinson. Both Earl de Grey and his brother added very largely to the patrimony of their heir in landed estates, in dignities, and in political repute. The Earl did not figure very obtrusively in public life, though he filled the office of First Lord of the Admiralty in Sir Robert Peel's first Cabinet in 1834-5, and served a popular Viceroyalty of Ireland under the same chief in 1841-4. He was, however, a man of considerable culture, who dabbled in the arts, affected the sittings of learned societies, and wrote books of more than mediocre merit; notably a Life of the famous Cavalier General, Sir Charles Lucas, and a monograph on the Duke of Wellington.

Perhaps his most substantial service to his heir was his addition of the historic estates of Studley Royal and Fountains Abbey to the family acres. They were bequeathed to him, with contingent remainder to his brother and nephew, by Miss Elizabeth Sophia Lawrence of Studley, a distant relative of the Robinsons, through her great-grandfather, John Aislabie, the notorious Chancellor of the Exchequer in Sunderland's Cabinet of 1718, whose sister Mary was the wife of Sir William Robinson, the second baronet. It was not on this account, however, that the bequest was made. The story goes that in their young days Miss Lawrence and Lord de Grey were deeply attached to one another, and that the disposal of Studley and Fountains was a token of the affection of the lady, which had survived the faithlessness of her lover. She is even said to have accompanied the bequest by a tin box containing all the proposals of marriage she had rejected for his sake, but of this there is no confirmation in her will. Fountains is alleged—inaccurately, as it happens—to have been purchased by John Aislabie out of the tremendous bribes he received from the South Sea Company, and the late Lord Ripon was very fond of saying to his

guests, when showing them over the picturesque ruins of the old Abbey : " This is all that remains of the South Sea Bubble."

Earl de Grey's younger brother Frederick—the father of our Lord Ripon, and himself the first Earl of that peerage—was more essentially a politician. In him all the shrewd opportunism of the canny Squires of Newby, rendered more flexible and alert—as in the case of the first Lord Grantham—by the necessity in which he found himself, as a younger son, of carving out his own fortune, reached its highest point of development. But, beyond this opportunism, a good parliamentary manner, and a scrupulous devotion to business and the traditional proprieties, he had little to commend him. Of mediocre talents, shallow and almost smug, and singularly deficient in strength of character, he was the most derided and nicknamed of the politicians of his time—the " Goody " of Lady Granville, the " Snip Robinson " of Creevy, the " Lady Goderich " of Princess Lieven, the " Prosperity Robinson " of Cobbett, and " the transient and embarrassed phantom " of Disraeli. On the other hand, he had a remarkable capacity for winning the friendship, and even confidence, of those nearest to him, and this, allied to his inexhaustible opportunism, made of his career an astonishing success. He readily adapted himself to all the evolutions of the old Tory party into Peelite Liberalism, beginning his official life as a subaltern of Eldon and assistant to Castlereagh (1809), and ending it (1846) with the fall of Peel, in whose administration he had Gladstone as his immediate colleague. On the way, he managed to fill many of the highest offices of State.

Castlereagh, who formed a warm affection for him, made him Under-Secretary for the Colonies in 1809, and took him with him to the Conference of Chatillon in 1813-14.<sup>1</sup> He was a Lord of the Admiralty in 1810,

<sup>1</sup> The late Lord Ripon, writing to Sir Cornewall Lewis on behalf of his father on November 9, 1858, says : " My father, as I think you are aware, went abroad with Lord Castlereagh in 1813, and was with him at the

a Privy Councillor in 1812, when he was scarcely thirty, and a Lord of the Treasury and Vice-President of the Board of Trade in the same year. In 1818 he succeeded to the Presidency of the Board, to which he added the Treasurership of the Navy in 1819. His success at the Board of Trade—then far more closely associated with fiscal policy than it is now—justified his appointment to succeed Vansittart as Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1822; though, as a matter of fact, he owed it far more to the posthumous patronage of Castlereagh than to his own abilities. Lord Liverpool gave no other reason for it, and the King, in accepting it, wrote to the Premier that he hoped "Mr. Robinson will feel the tribute of affection and regard that has been paid to the memory of his and our friend, poor Lord Londonderry, by your selection."<sup>2</sup> The King, however, soon learnt to value Robinson for his own sake, not so much on account of his political acumen as for his pliant devotion to the Royal interest. There was, indeed, an idea of making him First Lord of the Treasury when Lord Liverpool died,<sup>3</sup> and it was entirely the King's favour which gave him the Premiership in succession to Canning. His inglorious tenure of that high office has already been traced.

Most public men would have sunk for ever under the storm of ridicule which, after this fiasco, followed him into a brief retirement. Not so Robinson. He had obtained a peerage, the Viscounty of Goderich, under Canning's short administration, and his appetite for

headquarters of the Allied armies. He was sent back to England in February 1814 to see Lord Liverpool, and having received his instructions returned to Chatillon with full powers to take part in the negotiations, had they not been broken off before he arrived."

<sup>1</sup> See an interesting note on this subject in Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. i, p. 240.

<sup>2</sup> Yonge: *Life of the Second Earl of Liverpool*, vol. iii, pp. 209, 211.

<sup>3</sup> Stapleton: *Life of Canning*, vol. iii, pp. 365, 379; Parker: *Sir Robert Peel*, vol. i, p. 451. It is, however, clear from a letter written by his son to Sir Cornwall Lewis (November 17, 1858) that the idea was never made known to Robinson.

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honours and office was not to be so easily discouraged. The secession of the Canningites from the Duke of Wellington's Government, and the formation of the new Liberal party, gave him his opportunity. He threw himself with energy into the organization of the seceders, and even angled for their leadership. In this he was disappointed, but his timely services to Liberalism were rewarded in 1830 by the Colonial and War Secretaryships—the offices he had held under Canning—in Lord Grey's Reform Administration. In his new environment Goderich could no longer invoke the memory of Castlereagh's patronage, and he was not a conspicuous success either as a Colonial or a War Minister but he found in Lord Grey's talent for rash promises, and his nervous dread of Cabinet complications, ample opportunity for self-advancement.

In the spring of 1833 there was a shuffle of Ministerial portfolios, from which, to the astonishment of the gossips, Goderich emerged with the Privy Seal, an Earldom, and a promise of the next Garter. The memoirists have many stories to tell of this curious transaction, but the truth is that it was entirely due to the astute way in which Goderich played on the Premier's weaknesses. The resignation of the Privy Seal by Lord Durham, and the claim of Mr. Stanley to a Secretaryship of State, made it necessary to transfer Goderich to Durham's place. Goderich, however, refused to budge, and even declined an Earldom which was offered him as a make-weight. After frightening everybody, including the King, with the prospect of a Cabinet crisis, he consented to the change, but asked for the Garter by way of compensation for his "sacrifice," together with the reversion of the next vacant Secretaryship of State, and a suitable office for his private secretary. The King, however, objected to the Garter, on the grounds that Goderich was not of sufficiently high rank, and that there was no Garter vacant. Ultimately, the matter was compromised by Goderich's acceptance of the

Earldom of Ripon, as a qualification for the first available Garter, his other two conditions being also conceded.<sup>1</sup>

This was the high-water mark of his career. Lord Grey's promises in regard to the Garter and a Secretaryship of State were not fulfilled, for in the following year Ripon resigned, together with Stanley, Graham, and the Duke of Richmond, on the Irish Church question. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe says in his *Memoirs*<sup>2</sup> that this was the "ostensible" reason, and in a sense he is probably right, for, although Ripon was a strong Churchman, he was too sensible of his personal interests not to be influenced by the fact that the Grey administration was undoubtedly moribund, and that public opinion was tending more and more towards Sir Robert Peel, who, by a lucky accident, was one of the oldest of his personal friends. Peel's chance, however, did not come for another seven years, but Ripon meanwhile became a convinced Conservative, and indeed, so rapidly, that already in 1839 he was prepared to take office under Peel.<sup>3</sup> Two years later, when the Melbourne administration came to an end, and Peel succeeded to the Premiership, Ripon was appointed President of the Board of Trade, with Gladstone as Vice-President. He failed to agree with his brilliant assistant, who has placed on record that "in a very short time I came to form a low estimate of the knowledge and information of Lord Ripon."<sup>4</sup> In 1843 he was transferred to the Board of Control, but his official life was now practically at an end. His political influence was gone, his parliamentary usefulness had long been exhausted, and it was intended

<sup>1</sup> Greville's account (*Journal*, vol. ii, pp. 365-7) is substantially accurate, but he is wrong in stating, apparently on Goderich's authority, that the offer of the Garter or of any other compensation came from the King. A draft of a letter from Goderich to Lord Grey, in his own handwriting, dated March 27, 1833, explicitly states that he proposed the transaction to the King that morning.

<sup>2</sup> Lane-Poole: *Stratford Canning*, vol. ii, p. 35.

<sup>3</sup> Parker: *Sir Robert Peel*, vol. ii, p. 394.

<sup>4</sup> Morley: *Gladstone*, vol. i, p. 250

to retire him at the first opportunity.<sup>1</sup> The Peel Cabinet, however, suddenly collapsed in June 1846, and Ripon was thus spared this final indignity. The rest of his life, which ended in January 1859, was uneventful.

In all his private relations Ripon was impeccable, and not without engaging qualities ; but he had no real statesmanship, and, although an industrious and useful administrator, he was too self-seeking to be a good politician. Gladstone once, in an angry mood, classed him with Sidmouth, whom he certainly resembled in many ways ; but, while he had all Sidmouth's mediocrity and appetite for place, he had none of his courage and consistency. In one respect, however, he showed a measure of both. He was one of the earliest of the Free Traders, and although, by a curious lapse, attributable more to the superficiality of his knowledge than to inconsistency, he was also the author of the Corn Laws, he remained a Free Trader to the end of his life. His best work was performed at the Exchequer, under Liverpool, and at the Board of Trade, under Peel, but it is to be remembered that in the one he had Huskisson behind him and in the other Gladstone. Although he knew his Ricardo fairly well,<sup>2</sup> he was not an expert economist, but he had a shrewd faculty for using the better brains of his associates and subordinates.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ashley ; *Palmerston*, vol. iii, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> A copy of Ricardo's Works in the library at Studley Royal has the following inscription :

"October 24, 1852.—The merits of Mr. Ricardo's opinions and works upon the complex subject of political economy have long been acknowledged by all those who have made that science their study ; and in the hope that my dear son may find this publication useful at the opening of his career as a Member of Parliament, I give it to him on this his twenty-fifth birthday, as a mark of my affection and confidence.—RIPON."

<sup>3</sup> Ripon's posthumous fame has benefited apparently from the personal popularity of his son and daughter-in-law. Bruce, afterwards Lord Aberdare, writing to the son (then Viscount Goderich) on January 22, 1856, says : "When I last saw Sir William Napier, he told me that he had been going over his MS. *Life of Sir Charles*, and that the thought of you and Lady Goderich had made him soften his diatribes against your

Ripon married, in 1814, Sarah Albinia Louise, only daughter of Robert, fourth Earl of Buckinghamshire, then President of the Board of Control in the Liverpool Cabinet, and a cousin by marriage of Castlereagh. Lady Ripon was a woman of sincere piety, in a Low Church sense, and much force of character, and her negative influence upon her son's upbringing was considerable. The circumstance, however, that seems to have affected her son's career most was her descent from John Hampden. This, together with her husband's descent from Oliver Cromwell, created a political tradition for him which had much to do with his public activities throughout his life.

Father as far as his sense of truth would permit him. You see by what influences the stern truth of history is perverted. A lovely Viscountess fascinates the heart of a septuagenarian warrior, and lo! the horrible crimes of a perfidious statesman are softened down into peccadilloes." Bruce was afterwards literary executor to Sir W. Napier.

## CHAPTER II

### " THE DUTY OF THE AGE "

(1852)

" You and I," said Lord Ripon to his private secretary, Sir Bruce Seton, after a hard day's work in the Privy Council Office in the early seventies, " have done very well in the world, although neither of us had the advantages of a public-school education." The complacency of the remark was even better justified than it seemed, for the education Ripon received at home was by no means the best of its kind. It began late, and seems to have been carried on without much method or discipline. His parents were fearful of injuring his health by premature study, and he used to relate that he taught himself writing by copying such of his father's discarded letters and envelopes as fell into his hands. Thanks to the wholesomeness of his environment and the amazing appetite for reading he developed almost as soon as he mastered his alphabet, the results were extremely happy. At Nocton,<sup>1</sup> his mother's property

<sup>1</sup> The Countess of Ripon was deeply attached to Nocton, where her father and grandfather (Earls of Buckinghamshire), her elder son, and only daughter were buried, and where she and her husband were also buried. The beautiful parish church, one of Sir Gilbert Scott's real successes, was built by her, and completed by her son. The estate came to the Hobarts from their relations, the Ellis's, in 1742, and passed successively to the third and fourth Earls of Buckinghamshire. Nocton Hall was burnt down in 1834, and the Ripon family went to live at Putney Heath, but spent much of their time at the Steward's House at Nocton. In 1841 the rebuilding of the Hall was begun, and the foundation-stone was laid by Goderich, then a boy of 14.

in Lincolnshire where he spent his childhood and where the most intimate friends of the family were Squire-Parsons of the type of Peregrine Curtis of the Longhills and Thirkill White, the atmosphere, though decidedly Whig, was also strong with a foretaste of what afterwards became known as Muscular Christianity. He grew up to be a manly youth, good-hearted and merry, passionately devoted to shooting, fishing, and entomology, and miscellaneous reading on a vast scale. In the latter respect his parents left him much to himself, and he thus acquired the strange, secretive habit which lasted him through life, of reading himself into opinions of his own and saying little or nothing about them until they had become convictions almost beyond recall. Bunsen, who met him in 1850, described him in a letter to Schnorr von Karolsfeld as "a young man of German cultivation, eager for improvement."<sup>1</sup> If by "German cultivation" he meant thoroughness he was abundantly right.

• Soon after his coming of age in the stormy year of 1848, his father obtained for him an appointment as attaché to Sir Henry Ellis's<sup>2</sup> special mission to Brussels on the affairs of Italy. The mission was of no great importance and was, moreover, abortive,<sup>3</sup> but it was a great delight to Ripon—or, rather, Lord Goderich as he then was—because in the first place it enabled him to look more closely into the political upheaval on the Continent, which had already won his strong sympathy; and in the second place, he was to make the jaunt in the company of his great chum and cousin, Robert

• <sup>1</sup> *Memoirs of Baron Bunsen*, vol. ii, p. 246.

• <sup>2</sup> Sir Henry Ellis was a natural son of the fourth Earl of Buckinghamshire, and brother to the Countess of Ripon (Letter to T. Hughes, October 4, 1855). Both the Earl and Countess of Ripon were much attached to him, and their son was executor of his will. He began life in the service of the East India Company, and was afterwards active in diplomacy, chiefly as Minister Plenipotentiary in Persia. He died at Brighton in 1855.

• <sup>3</sup> *Parliamentary Papers*, 1849, No. lviii, part iv.

Ellis,<sup>1</sup> then on leave from the Madras Civil Service, and together they hoped to be able to pay a flying visit to another chum, John Forbes Clark of Tillypronie—afterwards Sir John and Vice-Lieutenant of Aberdeenshire—who held a minor diplomatic post in the Paris Embassy. The breakdown of the Brussels mission in 1849 was thus a godsend to Goderich. Together with Ellis he was enabled to roam for some months over France, Italy, and Switzerland, studying closely the political unrest in those countries, and storing up impressions which did more than anything else to give definite shape and direction to his subsequent career.<sup>2</sup> The most immediately fruitful of his experiences was his visit to Paris in April 1849, where Clark introduced him to Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, who, like himself, was a humanist as well as a political idealist, and who at that time was playing a prominent part in the politics of the Revolution as an active supporter of Odillon Barrot. The Co-operative panacea for Labour troubles known as the *Associations Ouvrières* was then being applied, apparently with magnificent success, by the French Republicans, and Goderich, after a careful investigation of it, became convinced of its efficacy. He returned home full of schemes for the establishment of similar Associations in England.

For some time he had been casting about for a medium through which he could give expression and effect to the strong political views which had now taken definite shape in his mind. He had drifted far from the paternal moorings, and in spite of the Whig atmosphere in which he lived, had passed successively from his father's tepid

<sup>1</sup> Robert Staunton Ellis (1825-77), I.C.S.; went out to Madras in 1844; was Deputy Commissioner of Nagpur and Superintendent of Police in the Mutiny; C.B.; Chief Secretary to the Madras Government, 1870; Member of Council at Madras, 1872-7; retired; Member of the Council of India in 1877; died October 9, 1877. (*Dictionary of Indian Biography*, by C. E. Buckland.) Robert Ellis was a son of Sir Henry Ellis.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Ellis kept a diary of the tour, but unfortunately it has not been found.

Manchesterism to Radicalism, Chartism, Socialism, and even Republicanism. The first stimulus on this unfashionable road he probably found in his Cromwellian ancestry, of which he was always exceedingly proud, but it was accelerated by the stirring events of 1848, by the appalling disclosures of sweating and poverty published by the *Morning Chronicle* in the following year,<sup>1</sup> and by the failure of Chartism, which especially excited his pity for the unsolved problem of the working classes. It is true that parties and coteries with alleged solutions of the problem were not wanting, but none of them quite met Goderich's case. He was quick to detect the cruel social incidence of Manchester Individualism, though he was already a staunch Free Trader. In spite of certain tendencies of his own towards mediævalism, especially in religion and art, he was equally unattracted by the romanticist solicitude of Disraeli and the Young England party for the working man. The old Radicals had approximated too closely to the Whigs to please him, and the new Radicals and Socialists—the *disjecta membra* of Chartism—grated on him by their lack of an elevating, and more particularly a religious, inspiration. The nearest approach to an expression of what was vexing his soul he found in a small but turbulent weekly publication entitled *Politics for the People*, which under the auspices of Charles Kingsley ran for some three months in 1848. It was the organ of the little party known afterwards as the Christian Socialists, which had been formed by Maurice, Kingsley, Tom Hughes, and J. M. Ludlow to regenerate the social system by a revival and practical application of the communistic principles of the early Christian Church. Its mixture of Christianity and Chartism, its outspoken hostility to the Manchester School, its manliness and earnestness, substantially met Goderich's difficulties.

<sup>1</sup> *London Labour and the London Poor*, by Henry Mayhew. This was the first form of the well-known work under the same title published in four volumes in 1862.

He not only read *Politics for the People* regularly and attentively, but there is reason to believe that he even contributed to it.

It happened that within a few weeks of his return to England in the summer of 1849, Ludlow also paid a visit to Paris, and came back with precisely the same sanguine impressions of co-operation as Goderich had formed. He confided them to Hughes, and together they set about trying to embody the then somewhat inchoate and as yet even unnamed doctrines of the Christian Socialists in an English reproduction of the French Communist *ateliers*. The scheme was delayed chiefly by Maurice's aversion from practical politics, and when in March 1850 its organization took definite shape Goderich was on the eve of another Continental tour—this time in Germany.<sup>2</sup> When, however, he returned in the autumn, he seems to have made it his business to get in touch with the Christian Socialists, and towards the end of the year formally joined them in their co-operative activities. All this and much more are set forth in the following two letters to Hughes :

To Thomas Hughes

NOCTON HALL, 7th December, 1850.

MY DEAR MR. HUGHES,—To the official part of your letter I can only reply by saying how really I regret that I cannot attend your first lecture on Wednesday, as I have promised to be at Lord Hardinge's at that time. Had I known it a week sooner, I should have tried hard to be there.

I am delighted to hear of the progress our principles

<sup>1</sup> Lord Ripon's collection of *Politics for the People* contains (p. 157) some verses entitled "After me the Deluge," with corrections in his own handwriting, which strongly suggest that he was the author. The verses are a satire on Lord John Russell's speech against household suffrage (June 20, 1848).

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii, pp. 13, 35, 40, 46; Bunsen, loc. cit.

are making, and when I return to London I hope often to be able to attend the Board, scandal or no scandal, and it will probably then be easier for me to do so.

I hope you have been good enough to tell the Secretary to put down my 2s. a week, as I was not able to get to Ch. St. before I left London—and if so small a sum as £5 would be of use I should be very happy to send it you.

However I may on some points differ from your views, on that which I take to be the great object of the Society—namely, the substitution of a Free Co-operative Organisation of Labour, for the present tyrannical *Disorganisation*, you know that I am entirely with you—and if you are willing to have my help in spite of any differences, I shall be only too happy to do anything I can to assist an object I have so much at heart.

I cannot agree with the "Christian Socialist" on education, but I should very much like to have more conversation with you on the subject. I did not give you the Lancashire "Plan" as agreeing entirely therewith, though I am a member of the National Public School Association, which sprang from the Lancashire one. I have read *Alton Locke* since I came down here, and many parts of it have delighted me more than anything I have read for a long time, and it has greatly increased my desire to know Mr. Kingsley, which I hope you will help to effect when I come to London.

With many thanks for writing to me,

I remain, most sincerely yours, GODERICH.

To Thomas Hughes

NOTTON HALL, 21st December, 1850.

MY DEAR MR. HUGHES,—As I have not heard from you since I wrote to you in answer to your letter of the 5th, I fear that you may not have understood what I then meant to say.

You said in that letter that though the Society's finances were more settled, yet you were still glad to receive even small subscriptions, and therefore as I am most anxious to contribute to and share in your efforts, I offered to send £5 in addition to my weekly 2s. I know that this must appear a very small sum, but it is all that at the present moment I could send, however desirous I am to make it larger, and so I hope you will accept it, as it is offered.

Forgive me for thus troubling you, but as you did not write I feared I might not have made my letter clear.

I have some thoughts, though not yet at all settled, of going for a few weeks to Paris at the end of next month. If I do so, perhaps I might be of use in getting information about the Associations or in some other way, and therefore if I determine to go I will, if you like, see you before I do so.

Believe me, very sincerely yours, GODERICH.

A curious silence, extending over a whole year, follows these letters. Goderich, as we have seen, was a subscribing member of the Society for Promoting Working Men's Associations, and had even joined its Central Board, but there is no trace of his activities in the records of the Society until the following December, and then only in the form of an acknowledgment of a small subscription to the Maintenance Fund of the

organ of the movement, *The Christian Socialist*.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, among Goderich's carefully sifted papers, there is an entire blank in his correspondence between December 21, 1850, and April 5, 1852. The explanation, however, is not difficult to guess. Goderich's extreme opinions and more especially his new associates, who had been solemnly banned by all the great organs of opinion as firebrands of the worst kind, had caused no little scandal in the family circle at Nocton, and, besides, he had himself begun to suspect that Christian Socialism was not so perfect a reflex of his own ideas and emotions as he once thought. The differences, indeed, went deeper than those indicated by him in his first letter to Hughes. Superficially, some of the Christian Socialists, and notably Kingsley, were as ardent for political reform on the Chartist plan as he was, but at heart they were almost all Tories as far as practical politics was concerned, and their socialism had much more to do with the individual spirit than with the structure of society. Goderich, on the other hand, was a Revolutionary Radical as well as a Christian Socialist, and although for a time the two might be kept distinct, he could not but be ill at ease when now and again he obtained glimpses of the reactionary attitude of his colleagues on constitutional questions. Nevertheless, it is certain that he kept in touch with his much-maligned friends in Charlotte Street,<sup>2</sup> for in his letters to Hughes in 1852 he more than once refers to the Council meetings he attended and the tracts he was concerned in writing and publishing. Among the latter was an English translation of Feugueray's *L'Association Ouvrière Industrielle et Agricole*, which does not seem to have been published.<sup>3</sup>

There was, however, one long interval in this work,

<sup>1</sup> *Christian Socialist*, vol. ii, p. 409 (December 27, 1853).

<sup>2</sup> 76 Charlotte Street, Fitzroy Square, the central office of the London Working Men's Associations.

<sup>3</sup> "Feugueray also advances, and will be a splendid performance when finished, I doubt not." (Letter to Hughes, April 5, 1852.)

but it had nothing to do with differences of opinion either with his father or with the Socialists. It was due to his marriage, which took place on April 8, 1851, with its attendant courtship and honeymoon. His bride was his cousin, Henrietta Vyner, a daughter of Captain Henry Vyner of Gautby Hall, Lincoln, and granddaughter of his uncle Earl de Grey. Much was expected of this marriage in the way of Goderich's political reformation, and old Whig cronies of his father like Lord Hardinge and Mr. Goulburn, in offering him their congratulations, prophesied that the bride would soon bring the prodigal back to "the family politics." The prophecy was not fulfilled, for although Lady Goderich never made any overt confession of Christian Socialism she most devotedly abetted her husband in all his political heresies and even won the adoration of his Socialist friends.

Early in 1852 his interest in Christian Socialism was stimulated by the great strike of the Amalgamated Engineers, and by the controversy which at once arose among the faithful in Charlotte Street as to the attitude that should be adopted towards it.<sup>1</sup> This brought to a passing crisis the growing differences between Goderich and the more orthodox of Maurice's followers. Maurice and Kingsley were all for teaching moral lessons and against practical intervention. On the other hand, Hughes and Ludlow, together with Goderich, were aflame for battle. The advanced party won, and immediately proceeded to champion the cause of the men with the utmost energy and enthusiasm in the press and on the platform. Goderich, besides attending the strikers' demonstrations at St. Martin's Hall, emphasized his sympathy by sending from his then slender income a cheque for £500, to enable the strike pay to be kept up when the men were at their last

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii, pp. 103-11. *Charles Kingsley: Letters and Memories*, vol. i, pp. 311-13. *Weekly Dispatch*, February 1, 8, and 29, 1852.

gasp.<sup>1</sup> In this action, Maurice had reluctantly concurred, but it was not long before the crisis was renewed in a more formidable shape.

The Engineers' strike and the question of the active intervention of the Christian Socialists in it grated on the idealism of Maurice and his more orthodox followers, but it did not touch the Tory fundamentals of their conception of the social scheme. Early in 1852 Goderich all unconsciously stumbled against this Holy of Holies. The accession of Lord Derby to power with a minority in the Lower House rendered a General Election inevitable, and Goderich began to cast about for a constituency to represent in the Radical interest. The centre of gravity of his political opinions thus became shifted from Christian Socialism to political Radicalism, and the result was soon seen in a pamphlet he prepared for the series of tracts for working men then being published by the Christian Socialists. It was a vivid and rapid survey of the democratic movement from the earliest ages to the present day, and a strong assertion of "the duty of the age" to abolish aristocracies of all kinds and to realize popular self-government, universal suffrage, and all the other enfranchising aspirations of democracy. The argument was set in what Goderich apparently imagined to be an orthodox Christian Socialist framework. He dealt with democracy precisely as Maurice had dealt with Socialism, declaring it to be a God-given principle vouched for by the Old Testament, and owing its first great stimulus to the example and teaching of Jesus. It sought, in short, to expand Christian Socialism into Christian Democracy, thus rendering to the state the same re-Christianizing service that Maurice and Kingsley had tried to render to society. At the same time, it was an outspoken exposition of radicalism in its most extreme form.

As Goderich's first public confession of political faith, the *Duty of the Age* is a biographical document of much

<sup>1</sup> Webb: *History of Trade Unionism*, p. 197.

interest, upon which it is necessary to linger a little. The first few pages are devoted to establishing the proposition already referred to, that true democracy is essentially Christian, and comes from the Gospels, and that it is fundamentally different from the Greek and Roman ideas of freedom, inasmuch as it knows none of the Greek and Roman limitations, as, for example, in regard to slavery. On this point he has a footnote on the American Republic which should be quoted, because, as we shall see presently, it aroused especial resentment :

"I have said that the Greek idea of freedom, the selfish idea of freedom for oneself and one's own class or nation, fell for ever 1,800 years ago ; but I am wrong ; there is even now a State in this one respect (would that it were so in others !) the counterpart of the old heathen commonwealths ; there is a Republic which it is much the fashion to hold up to Englishmen as the model of all governments, whose citizens dare to call themselves democrats, dare to talk of freedom, equality, and brotherhood, with the whip of the slave-driver in their hands, and the blood of the negro crying out for vengeance against them. But whatever these men are, they are *not* democrats, and some Western Spartacus will one day teach them that they are the veriest tyrants on earth, and that the fate of all tyrants is in store for them."

Goderich then proceeds to give his definition of democracy :

"That which in these times seems really amid many confusions and contradictions to be meant by this word, is the assertion, first, that every man, so far forth as he is a man, has a claim to a share in the government of his country ; in all its duties, responsi-

bilities, and charges ; and secondly, that *self-government* is the highest and noblest principle of politics, the safest foundation on which the State can rest."

In contrast with this definition of what is wanted, we have then a description of the existing aristocratic system :

"In every country in Europe the people are divided into two classes, the rulers and the ruled ; not into two bodies, one of which is charged with the government, as must ever be the case ; but into two distinct classes, one of which has taken upon itself to govern the other ; and everywhere the one class is the minority composed of the rich—the other is the vast majority, consisting of the poor. Those, then, who are the fortunate, as the world counts fortune, are the governors, those who are the unfortunate, the governed ; and it is not strange that with such premises before their eyes every day, both classes should have come to the conclusion, that the possession of power is the road to all happiness and prosperity ; and so, that the one should desire to gain it, the other to retain it for themselves. . . . Below all this there lies deep in the hearts of the disenfranchised millions, the feeling that they are men, as much as those who rule them ; that they have ' a stake in their country ' of far different and far higher value than any ' property qualification ' can confer ; they feel that the highest earthly honour they aspire to, is to become citizens of a free commonwealth, to share in their country's government somewhat more nobly than as mere payers of taxes ; and with such feelings we can sympathize, to such we ought to give our love. These men, these Democrats, these Chartists, claim only that which it is God's purpose should be theirs."

The privileges and honours of the aristocracy, "already marked for destruction," are described by the author—himself, be it remarked, a courtesy viscount and the heir of two earldoms, a barony and a baronetcy—as "separating man from man, instead of uniting them, and breeding hatred and revolution, instead of peace and love."

A plea for self-government and universal suffrage follows :

"The real principle of politics, that which in all time has been productive of all good and wise rule, lies in what is called self-government. . . . Wherever this principle has been most fully admitted, there has reigned most universally that reverence for law which is the greatest, if not the only, safeguard of freedom ; which has been the glory and the preservation of England, and the want of which has lately enabled a bad man to establish his power in France, on the ruins of that liberty which he had sworn to defend. In proportion to the share which any nation has been called to take in its own government, has been its growth in courage, in nobleness, in wisdom, in all the highest qualities of a nation's life."

But it is not only the governing aristocracies that Goderich objects to. He indicts all tendencies to exclusive privileges, and he is especially hard on what "is often nowadays spoken of as the only *good* aristocracy and called that of talent" :

"Aristocracy of talent, despotism of the intellect ! It may sound fine, it may captivate 'Bobus of Houndsditch,' and 'talented' young gentlemen ; it may be preached very eloquently by men who know or believe that it would place power in their hand ; but it means for all that, just what all aristocracies mean—exclusion,

division, selfishness. . . . It means, in plain truth, that those who have sharp understandings, and can chop logic skilfully, are to say to their plainer, less brilliant brothers, These laws which we give you are the only ones which are in accordance with the 'inexorable laws of Political Economy,' which we understand and you don't; or, This creed, or no creed, is the only one which is in accordance with the 'great laws of criticism,' which we understand, and you can't, and so must take them for granted on our word: but this will not do; this is not the freedom, equality, and brotherhood for which the great heart of Europe sighs so deeply; this is as sheer despotism as Nicholas's of Russia; as sheer popery as Leo's the Tenth."

The whole concludes with a battle-cry, and a significant reminiscence of the author's Cromwellian tradition:

"We have heard the first cannon-shots of one of the greatest battles in that world-old war; and if the peril of such fights be great, the honour is far greater, if we are found on the right side. We can no longer blink the questions which are being asked us on every hand; we *must* take some part in the coming struggle. Let each man then strive in all earnestness and all sincerity to determine on which side the right lies, and having done so, let him forsake all and follow that. We democrats have little doubt which way the decision of most good men will ultimately be; we have none which cause will triumph in the end. But let us beware lest any folly or any sin of ours retard that triumph, and let us remember that the old Puritan spirit is the only one in which we can hope to conquer; that spirit which told our ancestors that they *must* fail if they should ever separate 'God and the cause.'"

This, in brief outline, was the manifesto to which Goderich sought—quite innocently, of course—to commit Maurice and his inharmonious friends.

On April 5 Goderich wrote to Hughes: "My prophecy is finished—value small—ultimate fate uncertain. It might do for the Monthly if ever it comes into existence—but you shall see it when we meet." Hughes saw and read it in due course, and was delighted with it. He determined that it should be one of the Tracts, and sent it for their approval to Ludlow and Kingsley, who, together with himself and under the supreme authority of Maurice, formed the publishing committee. Both were equally enthusiastic with himself. Kingsley wrote at once to Goderich:

*From Charles Kingsley*

EVERSLEY, May 25, 1852

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH,—I have read through your pamphlet with extreme delight, and thank God that there is a chance of a man getting into Parliament who holds such doctrines. I sincerely wish you success at Hull, and in all other undertakings of yours. I have been impertinent enough to alter a few words here and there, where I thought the sentence might gain in clearness or piquancy. And there is one expression about which I wish to say a few words: You speak of "rich, idle, and capitalists." I think just now, putting the latter worthies into the same category with the two former may give needless offence, and be misunderstood—might it not be as well to omit the one word? I find this from the way in which they have misunderstood what I said about the distinction between ~~capital~~ and capitalists in my last pamphlet, which one would have thought was plain enough; but the truth is, that without knowing it, they have got so thoroughly to

consider themselves as standing to their workmen in the relation of arbitrary governors to governed, that it will take years to open their eyes,—and take perhaps longest to open those of the best masters, like Greg, or my brother-in-law, Grenfell. . . .

Yours ever faithfully, C. KINGSLEY.

P.S.—I have been reading the pamphlet to Mrs. Kingsley, and she bids me tell you (which I confess myself) that I have not said half enough, either in its praise, or in proof of my own pleasure in it—and that “though she has not the pleasure of knowing Lady Goderich, she begs to send her her warm congratulations on the birth of this *second* child.”

May I ask—you are surely going to put your name to it? Even if the so doing made it expedient to emasculate it somewhat here and there (which I do not see to be necessary, except perhaps the expression “*we* democrats” towards the end). Still, the mere fact of a man in your station getting up and saying such things will do incalculable good, not only to your class, but to others below. As you have paid me the compliment of consulting me about a title, would not *The Duty of the Age* express your purpose? About “capitalist”—I have appended a note advising you to leave out “idle” as well, and also “industrious” and “labourer” in the antithetic sentence, letting “rich” and “poor,” which after all embrace the whole question, stand to fight it out together.

The next step was to send the manuscript to Maurice, and then the storm burst. What happened is told in some letters which Maurice wrote to Ludlow in the following September, owing to a mistaken impression

Ludlow seems to have formed that Goderich resented the wiggling Maurice had administered to him.<sup>1</sup> It seems that Maurice was deeply angered by the pamphlet. He sent for Goderich and upbraided him in a style which he himself describes as "vehement." Finding that Goderich was not without sympathizers in his own ranks, he then committed his views to writing and sent them in the form of a long memorandum to Kingsley, who passed them on to Goderich.<sup>2</sup>

This memorandum is not less curious than the tract itself. It opens with an acid reference to the spirit of mutiny rife among those "with whom I am in the habit of acting," and then, after a passing defence of the Greeks, boldly attacks the proposition that democracy in the modern sense is the outcome of Christianity :

"I cannot assume, as the essay does, that Christianity at once broke down the barrier which separated man from man, by its proclamation of a universal brotherhood. It did that in principle by the habits and maxims of the Church in Jerusalem ; it has done so in a measure by the fraternities which have come into existence in the early and middle ages, and by the power which it exerted over the minds of individual masters in favour of the emancipation of their serfs. But if we speak of the world at large, this was to be the latest, not the earliest exhibition of its dominion. There were others quite as obvious which we cannot overlook without setting aside the facts of history. The Gospel begins with the proclamation of an invisible and righteous *King*, a King taking the nature of His subjects, sympathizing with them, dying for them." It was this

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii, pp. 125-30.

<sup>2</sup> This memorandum is the original referred to in the letters to Ludlow published in Maurice's *Life*, but no portion of its text has hitherto been published.

proclamation, not a democratical one at all, which broke in pieces the absolutism of the Roman Empire ; the God-Man overthrowing the Man-God, the King whose delight was to do the will of His Father, the emperor whose delight was to do his own will. On this foundation the monarchies of Western Europe were established. Kings who had believed themselves descended from Odin acknowledged Jesus Christ as the true Odin : they were anointed in His name, they reigned by His grace. Wherever the civilization of modern Europe was to terminate, this was the beginning of it. Hereby the old Jewish idea of the king was raised and transfigured ; hereby the Greek idea of the king or tyrant, the mere clever sagacious man, was grafted upon that ; righteousness being acknowledged as the basis of royalty, the spirit of wisdom, and counsel, and courage were its promised and appropriate gifts, which the monarch could only refuse at the hazard of being deposed by Him who set him up. This is the principle upon which the monarchy of every European nation has stood, contradicted of course every year and day in practice, but vindicating itself by the crimes and falls of kings as much as by the brave acts which they did, and the dynasties which they established. For dynasties were to be established ; the family principle was to be asserted ; there was to be a witness through it of the perpetuity of God's government. If you will have exact facts, the fact of hereditary succession is one of the most memorable that you can take notice of."

Carrying the war still further into the enemy's citadel, Maurice then contends that Christianity even taught the Divine right of aristocracies of talent as well as of blood :

"But again; the Gospel affirms a great radical, eternal distinction between the spirit and the flesh, between men walking after the spirit and walking after the flesh, that is between men following their own inclinations and yielding to them, and men walking erect according to the law of their being, looking for divine guidance. Here lies the justification of the old Greek idea of aristocracy. The Greeks said that men were to rule animals, that the great majority of those bearing the form of men were mere animals; that they, the Greeks, being men, were appointed to rule these. This was the Athenian faith even more than it was the Lacedæmonian. Instead of admitting that Athens was weak because it held this faith, I believe that herein lay a great part of her strength, and the counteraction of much weakness which came to her from other causes. At the same time I admit that there was an element of weakness in this belief. Men were divided into two classes, the spiritual and the animal; it was not understood that every man who is serving his animal nature has still the capacity of a spirit in him; it was not admitted that the most devoted man had in him at the same time all tendencies to degradation. Hence the animal man was of necessity a mere serf who could never rise; the higher man was a mere soul or intellect, glorying in his own strength, aspiring to be a god, but not seeking help from God, always liable to become a beast. Relationship to God being proclaimed by the Gospel as the true law of humanity, obedience to mere inclination, however general, is the anomalous and apostate state; the best men are necessarily those in whom there is most of humanity; they furnish the rules and standards, not the exceptions. European aristocracy is grounded upon this principle. There are men

who are intended to rule. Mere intellectual gifts do not ascertain who they are, though they need all such. Chivalry, humanity, condescension, are to be their special attributes. They are acknowledged as divinity sent into the world and preserved in the world, yet not as beings of another race from those whom they rule; on the contrary, beings of the same race, sharing their infirmities and temptations, governing them through sympathy with what is best in them, and a consciousness of sharing what is worst; so fitted to be their guides and champions. These best men may be so in virtue of personal prowess and well-doing, they may keep up the idea of family and succession, and the sanctity of blood, one of the most precious to a nation. They may be priests asserting the dignity of the divine humanity; they may be professional men asserting the dignity and sacredness of all callings. In every case a divine vocation lies at the root of their existence; apart from that they are nothing. In every case they are witnesses against mere plutocracy, or the government of wealth and possession which is the counterfeit and antagonist of aristocracy, as despotism is the counterfeit of monarchy."

A little later Maurice, with rising scorn, deals with Goderich's plea for self-government:

"Again and again in this tract, the word universal citizenship is substituted for universal democracy. Universal citizenship, to be sure! That I desire as much as any one can desire it; that I believe to be most distinctly and directly the result of the Gospel, that which in this day *we* are to bring out of it. But I believe that universal citizenship is incompatible with universal democracy; I believe so long as the Americans

continue democrats, it is utterly unfair, historically and philosophically unfair, to complain of their having slaves. All experience seems to show that the two conditions, instead of being contradictory, as we are sometimes taught, are essential to each other. We talk of self-government and allow a strange equivocation to steal into our mind. Sometimes we mean by self-government the government *over* self, sometimes the government *by* self. Again and again this fatal confusion appears in the essay. Most of the moral exhortations, exceedingly valuable and excellent in themselves, presume it and turn upon it. Let self-government have the one meaning which is the true one, and you inevitably introduce the idea of the flesh and the spirit, of that in man which rules and that which obeys, and out of this will come the idea of an aristocracy; it is the proper political counterpart of that moral principle. Give self-government the other sense, the one which, as the writer of the tract most truly says, it has borne in the minds of nearly all the advocates of democracy, and it is soon felt to be such a dream, such a fiction, that it can only be realized in some government over *others*. But since all the *citizens* are self-governors, what must the others be? *Slaves*, of course."

Finally we have this wrothful allusion to Goderich's personal relationship to the controversy :

"Instead of approving the sentiments which the writer of the tract expresses respecting aristocrats, and the duty which is laid upon them to contemn, or relinquish their peculiar position, I say boldly, it is treason to the cause of Socialism, to the cause of the people, to the cause of God, for any aristocrat to do that. . . . The mistake of Lord John Manners's youthful couplet was

that he supposed the old nobility could not be saved, unless they did what in them lay to save arts and commerce by giving them nobleness. That is their business now. A much harder business, but a much grander one, than that of giving up their birth or rank, or pretending to give them up, that they may become plain citizens or clodhoppers."

No denunciation of error could have been more outspoken and pontifical. Nevertheless, it was not successful in crushing Goderich or even in suppressing the pamphlet altogether. Goderich, who, as he wrote good-humouredly to Hughes on May 18, was anxious to retain "the good opinion of the Prophet," endeavoured to meet his objections by interpolating a few more "moral exhortations," and emphasizing others to the effect that working-men should fit themselves for self-government by training themselves to be "citizens inwardly as well as outwardly," and by devoting all their energies meanwhile to the most extensive realization of the co-operative idea; but in regard to self-government itself and the abolition of all class distinctions he was inexorable. Writing to Hughes later in the year he says: "I believe that all good tendencies are *towards* Democracy, and *from* Aristocracy and Monarchy, in any sense except a pedantic one, and I am not going to fight, as I believe, against God and my conscience by trying to bolster up any such dead dogs."<sup>1</sup>

Thus the pamphlet remained virtually unexpurgated. In this form and under the title suggested by Kingsley it was printed, but as an independent anonymous publication and not as a Christian Socialist tract.<sup>2</sup> At

<sup>1</sup> In another letter to Hughes, he repeats his "unchangeable belief in Democracy and Socialism," though Maurice had declared the terms to be irreconcilable. In the same letter he has this dig at Maurice: "Working-men are not angels; . . . but they are a great deal nearer angels than aristocrats are, in spite of the latter being the representatives of 'spirit!'"

<sup>2</sup> *The Duty of the Age*. London: published by John James Bezer, 183 Fleet Street. 1852. (Price 4d.)

the last moment Goderich hesitated for some unexplained reason<sup>1</sup> to give it to the world, and the whole edition, in a dozen huge, square, brown-paper packages, was stored in Hughes's chambers in Old Square, whence many years later it was despatched to Studley Royal.<sup>2</sup> What ultimately became of it nobody knows. Very few copies are now extant.

It may have had something to do with his parliamentary candidature at Hull, where, as will be seen presently, he was a little chary of advertising his extreme opinions.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Hughes in *Life of Maurice*, vol. ii, p. 127. Hughes's statement that Maurice did not see the tract until it was in print is an error.

## CHAPTER III

### THE FALLEN PROPHET

(1852—1853)

APART from the conflict with Maurice, the year 1851-2 was strenuous and even troubled for Goderich. Fortunately, it was lightened by a good deal of congenial and wholesome ruralizing and much domestic happiness. It was his honeymoon year, and towards the end of January 1852, to the great joy of the young couple, it brought them their boy, to whom the father, in his rebel enthusiasm, gave the name of Oliver, in due course to be shortened to the traditional "Noll." There was great jubilation later in the year, when the namesake of the regicide Protector began to cut his teeth. "Oliver flourishes greatly," wrote Goderich to Hughes, "and has cut two teeth, the young tiger."

We have a few more—unfortunately very few—glimpses of his home life, and also of his rural recreations at this period in his letters to Hughes. Here is one :

*To Thomas Hughes*

WREST, 5th April, 1852.

MY DEAR HUGHES,—Many more thanks for your last letter, which was a stunner, especially the Tennyson-Turner-Ruskin-like description of the coast sunrise, which has nearly driven my wife wild. We shall be here till Easter Wednesday, and delighted if your brother will come over and see us, and also see how aristocrats build themselves houses to live in *not* like Tit-bit Alley.

Really, the house is well worth seeing. . . . On Thursday we shall have been married a year, and certainly shall not cry over our condition during it. . . . I have nothing to report of our doings here ; there being no fish but tame carp, no beetles to be found in this cold weather, and a parson who preaches very dull low sermons. Still, we are by no means to be pitied, being very jolly, and there is plenty of good beer of my Lord's brew to be had for asking, and so I will stop. Our love to everybody. *Vale.*

Ever yours affectly., GODERICH.

Fish and beetles and congenial society were soon found elsewhere, as the following letter shows :

*To Thomas Hughes*

OLLERTON, NOTTS, 18th May, 1852.

MY DEAR HUGHES,—I have been wishing and intending to write to you every day since I came into these parts ; but trout and beetles and hospitable old aristocrats have kept me so well employed that I have not had time to do so. Now, however, I will pour out my soul to you on all topics, and begin with telling you that as yet I have only had one day's fishing, and then caught but four brace of small trouts, which, however, rejoiced me not a little. The forest is magnificent—much more beautiful than I expected ; in fact, as beautiful as anything without mountains, the sea, or a southern sky, can well be. Though one misses the oaks, which are not in leaf yet, the beautiful contrast of the tender green of the young birch and lime and the stern, dark pines, those emblems among trees of *permanence*, is most delightful ; and as every open space is now covered with the yellow blossoms of the gorse,

the whole effect is—what shall I say?—very pleasant to my eyes and my wife's.

In said forest dwelleth a man also most pleasing in his way to my democratic soul, a *shoemaker* (just tell this with my compliments to those Tottenham Court Road fellows), who has a most excellent collection of insects beautifully preserved and properly named with Latin names, some of them being most rare and curious, a nice set of books on Natural History and many other matters, and who is, withal, as far as I can see, a fine, unaffected fellow. I am going to wander with him to-morrow over the forest a beetle-hunting, and hope to get some of these rarities. I will tell you more of him afterwards. . . .

Ever yours affectionately, GODERICH.

The only other letter of this kind is peculiarly interesting, for the queer picture it gives of the ingenuous comprehensiveness, amounting almost to an obsession, of Goderich's democratic outlook on life. It extended apparently to trees and pictures :

*To Thomas Hughes*

OLLERTON, NOTTS, 22nd May, 1852.

MY DEAR HUGHES,—. . . And now for rurals. Wind N.E. Fish won't bite, like wise animals. Insects stunning—scarlet beetles with black heads and fine Latin names abounding. Cobbler a very good fellow, and pleasant companion to wander with in this beautiful forest for a day. The remarks of the democrat on scenery are true; but still the heroes of the earth, the mountains of God, deserve their due share of hero-worship, and if God was in the small still voice He was also on Sinai's top. But to admire either the great or the little to the exclusion of the other is not to be a Democrat,

but an Aristocrat, who likes one class or one set of people more than another because they are *his* class or set. Tell that to Bezer.<sup>1</sup> So we won't preach at each other thereupon, except that ye will make note that I do and can admire and appreciate the smallest stream and humblest bit o' grass, aye and, unlike Ruskin, the curl of railway smoke, or the beautiful working of ~~the~~ steam-engine. . . .

. . . Go and look again at the "Huguenot," which I can't get out of my head. There's true democratic painting in them flowers and bricks now. I hear swells don't like it just for that reason, that it does look after the little things as much as the great, though the humans are, just as they ought to be, clear away the first thing in the picture, especially that dear woman's face. This is not so much the case in Ophelia,<sup>2</sup> and there perhaps lies the cause of its less perfection. See how I murmur to you, like a babbling stream on every sort of thing. . . .

. . . Fare thee well. God bless you and yours.

Ever yours affectionately, GODERICH.

Meanwhile, his parliamentary candidature had taken definite shape, although the difficulty of finding a constituency in sympathy with his peculiar political opinions was formidable. At first he seems to have taken for granted that one of the pocket boroughs of the Robinson family—probably Ripon—would be his for the asking, for he writes to Hughes early in April: "I think, if I can, I ought to try what can be done in Parliament, as I seem to be the only man among the

<sup>1</sup> John James Bezer, the publisher of the *Christian Socialist* and of the other publications of the Society for Promoting Working Men's Associations. Hughes describes him as "The one-eyed Charlist costermonger whom we—heaven save the mark!—had set up as our publisher!" —*Life of Maurice*, vol. ii, p. 126.

<sup>2</sup> "The Huguenot" and "Ophelia" by Millais, exhibited in the Academy of 1852.

faithful who can come in." If that was his idea, he was soon disillusioned, for his uncle, Earl de Grey, strongly disapproved of his Radicalism, and would give no countenance to his candidature in his electoral preserves. Ultimately, though with much dubiety, he fixed upon Hull. The moral reputation of this seafaring borough and the political sincerity of its "free and independent burgesses" left a great deal to be desired, while the difficulty of framing a political programme acceptable to any normal constituency sorely perplexed him. This perplexity was reflected in the brevity and vague Liberal banalities of his election address, which was issued on May 7. In a letter to Hughes, written ten days later, he discusses his difficulties :

"I feel every day more how widely I differ from all existing parliamentary parties, and on what utterly different grounds my faith rests. So pray send me a good lot of true principles from the wilds of Old Square to cheer my heart before I fight with these very great beasts at Hull. As to my prospects there, I do not know what to think. You see, I am not the man to represent the Middle Classes, although on all commercial and financial questions I ought to please them; always excepting Cobden's rot about the Expenditure of '35, which, however, no one now believes; and although I believe, being a conceited dog, that I know more about their *real* interests than they do themselves."

Another reason for his hesitation was that he was compelled to ally himself with the sitting Member, Mr. James Clay,<sup>1</sup> whose Liberalism was of the tepid orthodox type.

<sup>1</sup> The great authority on whist. He was a friend of young Disraeli in 1830, and was with him at Malta. "To govern men," writes Dizzy to his father, "you must either excel them in their accomplishments or despise them. Clay does one, I do the other."

The Tory press was, of course, quick to perceive Goderich's embarrassment, and made all the capital of it they could. The *Hull Packet* feigned a histrionic surprise at the moderation of his Address. All accounts had represented him—

“as a Chartist in politics—nay, something worse—a Republican. ‘A nice little boy enough,’ said one of our informants, ‘but an O’Connor in politics, without O’Connor’s ability.’ His address was expected to be astounding, but it was merely of the orthodox whig-radical style. . . . In what does Lord Goderich deserve the support of the electors of Hull? He is twenty-four years of age; has not yet cut his political wisdom teeth; has as much practical knowledge of mercantile and maritime affairs as a ship’s ‘figure-head’; and yet, forsooth, because he is a lord, the electors are told to give the gods thanks for having sent them such a candidate, and to take him in to nurse forthwith. . . .”<sup>1</sup>

Goderich, however, soon warmed to the fray. His small stature and treble voice handicapped him a good deal on the platform, but he knew what he wanted, his oratory was fluent, his manner ingenuous and engaging, and he had considerable resources of combativeness. “The fact is,” he wrote to Hughes, “when I get a little angry with their pothering down in that damp seaport, and get my Ebenezer up, as a Yankee’d say, I do much better than when I’m in a mild humour trying to please them all round.” Although he avoided talking of Christian Socialism, or even of Co-operation, he was emphatic enough on the Suffrage and on other Radical questions, somewhat to the consternation of Clay, who found himself dragged helplessly into shockingly advanced opinions. His canvass was also very astutely—too astutely as it proved—adapted to the varying

<sup>1</sup> *Hull Packet*, May 7, 1852.

interests of the borough. Lady Goderich, "the accomplished and fascinating Viscountess," as the local Liberal organ called her, was indefatigable among the shopkeepers and shipowners; Newman Hall, handsome and persuasive, was a power at open-air meetings; and a contingent of workers from Charlotte Street, under the leadership of Bezer, the converted Chartist costermonger whom Maurice had appointed publisher of the *Christian Socialist*, looked after the few local Chartists and a much larger number of engineers and ships' carpenters who, in accordance with a long-standing Hull tradition, held their opinions in reserve for the highest bidder.

The fight went merrily and sturdily, and the victory was comparatively easy. At the nomination on July 7, the hands held up for Clay and Goderich were in the proportion of 50 to 1. The polling was held on the following day, and although this proportion was not maintained, the majority in favour of the Liberal candidates was substantial enough, being 431 on a poll of 4,060.

In the course of the election, Goderich had more than once been rendered a little uneasy by the mysterious methods of his agents with the engineers and ships' carpenters, and by the extraordinary demands for secret-service money made upon him by Bezer and others. His confidence in the converted costermonger was, however, unbounded, and in the blaze of his victory the last vestige of his misgivings disappeared. He set himself complacently to think of how he should comport himself in the new Parliament. He writes to Hughes on July 10:

"We did win a good fight, I take it, the chief praise whereof is due to Burges and Bezer. I earnestly hope I may be able to do some good in this Parliament; but it don't look as if it were going to differ much from the last. I shall be alone in my glory, I take it. However,

if we only get a Reform Bill, I have great hopes. I have got a stronger crochét than ever on that point, and will, when once more peaceful at Nocton, pour out a long epistolary prophecy thereon."

Again, on July 14 :

"It is curious that of all the Socialist or even really Democratic candidates, I should be the only successful one, and so being all alone among every description of Bulls of Bashan, it behoves me to be very careful what I am about, and to consider well what I go for to do. Send us the *Spectator* ; my wife wants to see it. I am described in one paper with real accuracy as Radical and Christian Socialist. If I am up to my place, my position may be a very good one ; for I start with weight in the House from the place I represent, a reputation for honesty, and the distinction, the highest almost a man can have, of being pre-eminently the working-class Member."

Four days later, this belief in his "reputation for honesty" was rudely disturbed by a letter he received from Julian Harney,<sup>1</sup> the editor of the republican *Star of Freedom*, which had been active on his behalf during the election. Harney stated that Bezer had disappeared and asked Goderich what he had done with him. Much disturbed, Goderich wrote to Hughes asking him to make inquiries, but two days later the murder was out.

To Thomas Hughes

NOCTON HALL, 20th July.

MY DEAR HUGHES,—The world is worse than I took it for. Please, are you honest? I wonder whether I am. I am thinking of turning misanthrope, only I don't know whether that would do much good either.

<sup>1</sup> George Julian Harney was one of the Chartist leaders and a disciple of Louis Blanc (Holyoake: *Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life*, vol. i, p. 106).

Bezer has bolted ! and Newton <sup>1</sup> has advertised me in the *Star of Freedom* as going to preside at his dinner, when I have declined three times !!! the second don't much signify beyond being a wrong thing to have done. But the first ! Bezer bolted. My dear fellow, if this is true, I shall retire into a tub and turn cynic. Mrs. Bezer has written to me to-day, begging to know what has become of him. It is a wonderful story. He would not take anything for himself even for his expenses beyond £2, which he must have spent three times over ; but he did ask for a cheque to help the *Star*, which as being the only way he would let me pay him, I gave him, and therewith he seems to have bolted ! I cannot believe it. As far as I am concerned it don't signify, for the good he did me, if it were to be measured at the Tyndale Atkinson rate, was worth a small California. But that Bezer should be a scoundrel ! I won't believe it. Pray do see Mrs. Bezer. Harney, as I told you, has written to me, to ask what has become of him. It is important that none of this should be made public, or the Hull Tories will triumph and petition and get up no end of row, so pray look to that. My dear friend, I really am utterly disgusted. Do tell me if anyone is honest. Is Shorter ?<sup>2</sup> Is Lloyd Jones ?<sup>3</sup> I'm in a very distraught state, so forgive these ravings. . . .

God bless you and keep us all honest, and preserve us from scoundrels. My wife miserable about Bezer, and very poorly. Farewell.

Ever yours affectionately, GODERICH.

The fallen prophet.

<sup>1</sup> William Newton, publican and Trades Unionist. In 1852 he was a candidate for the Tower Hamlets, but was unsuccessful.

<sup>2</sup> One of the Secretaries of the Society for Promoting Working Men's Associations.

<sup>3</sup> One of the most active colleagues of Hughes and Ludlow in the Co-operative movement. Jones was not a Christian, but an Owenite, Socialist.

For a time the scandal was hushed up, and the Hull Tories were balked of their petition. Lulled into security, Goderich resumed his day-dreaming, and in September wrote to Hughes full of righteous enthusiasm for the work he had planned out for himself in the approaching Parliament.

“ I think greatly of what I may be able to do for the Good Cause in the National Palaver, and I hope that much Radical and some purely Socialist work may be possible, and that perhaps on all questions it may be possible to force or to lead people to look honestly at them, basing themselves on Fact and working only for Truth. But perhaps that is *too* sanguine, for the present time. Anyhow, we must be very steady and cautious in what we do.”

It was indeed “ too sanguine.” The Hull Tories were already on the track of Bezer, and on the way had stumbled on quite a number of fishy transactions with the engineers and ships’ carpenters. They soon had enough evidence to justify a petition, and on November 19 the House of Commons was in due form seized of their grievances, which were referred to a Select Committee for inquiry and report. The Committee met early in the following March. The case for the petitioners was grossly exaggerated, and not a little of it was proved to be corrupt ; but enough remained to unseat Goderich and his colleague, and at the third sitting, on March 7, their leading counsel, Mr. Edwin James, announced the withdrawal of the defence. Happily, the report of the Committee acquitted the sitting Members of any culpable knowledge of the wholesale bribery that had been practised.<sup>1</sup> The truth is that Goderich was really and entirely ignorant of the

<sup>1</sup> *House of Commons Journal*, November 19, 1852 ; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1852-3, vol. xiv ; and *Hull News*, March 5 and 12, 1853.

acts of his agents, which formed the staple of the case for the petitioners. Had that case rested exclusively on the minor malpractices which he suspected, and to which in a measure he had thoughtlessly lent himself, he would not so fully have deserved the personal exoneration he received at the hands of the Committee.

During the four months that the petition was hanging over his head Goderich had proved himself a useful and hard-working Member of the House. He spoke three times, once on an outrage perpetrated at Berlin on a British subject named Stead, when he asked that an apology should be exacted from the Prussian authorities (November 30); once in a debate on Partnerships of Limited Liability (December 7); and once on the Ordnance Estimates, when he strongly pleaded for an improvement in the barrack accommodation of the troops (February 28, 1853). Of the incendiary opinions with which he had been commonly identified he made no sign. His votes, however, were in full accord with his Radical promises. He was in the minority in support of the motion of his relative, Charles Villiers, for the final repeal of the Corn Laws; he voted against Mr. Disraeli's Budget in the division which sealed the fate of the Derby Administration; he voted for the admission of Jews into Parliament, for allowing the Colonies to govern themselves, for the extension of the probate and legacy duties to land, and against Church rates. He thus played a part—though not perhaps very substantial—in the swift change which towards the end of 1852 placed the first Liberal Cabinet in office, and consolidated the party with which to the end of his life his political fortunes were bound up.

It was, however, some little time before he definitely recognized this allegiance. He was still a Radical and a Christian Socialist, with very pronounced, though not very outspoken hankerings for republicanism, when, on March 30, 1853, he received and accepted a proposal

to contest a vacancy which had arisen in the parliamentary representation of Huddersfield, through the unseating of Mr. Stansfeld. Only a week before, in writing to Hughes about Association business, he had referred to himself as "I, the Republican." Nevertheless, once again, he found it necessary to veil his extreme opinions, although Huddersfield was certainly more Radical than Hull. He was relieved of some measure of restraint by the fact that he was opposed by a Coalition Liberal candidate, and that he had not the susceptibilities of a moderate colleague to consider. Nevertheless, he contented himself with standing as "the friend of the working-man," without party ties, and with an ideal of levelling up democracy to a happy and contented national brotherhood, which was strongly reminiscent of the doctrines of Christian Socialism, though without any admission of the fact. There was, indeed, a good deal of danger in such an admission, and this Goderich recognized. Hughes proposed to come to Huddersfield to speak for him, but the offer was declined, on the ground that it was not desirable to ventilate "these questions." The other side, however, held different views, and with the assistance of a "renegade Chartist" named Joshua Hobson, who apparently still had friends in Charlotte Street, placarded the town with a lurid picture of Goderich as a Communist, a Socialist, a Chartist, a Cosmopolitan, and the ally of foreign firebrands—such as Kossuth, Mazzini, Louis Blanc, and Ledru-Rollin. Goderich made a dexterous defence, and the attacks failed, but the bitterness of his opponents was not appeased. They reviled him as a traitor to his order, they declared that he had been disowned by his family, and they offered big monetary rewards for the detection of himself and his agents in a repetition of the malpractices at Hull. Here Goderich's task was an easy one, and the frankness and manliness with which he replied to the unworthy campaign vastly increased his popularity in the borough. The population

was large, though the register was small, and at the nomination on April 20 he carried all before him, at a meeting of over ten thousand people. At the election, which was held on the following day, he was returned by a majority of 82, on a poll of 1,268.

Goderich does not seem to have been very elated by his triumph, although this time it was clean and solid enough. The note of youthful enthusiasm and rosy expectancy which ran through his letters to Hughes after the Hull election is strangely absent from those he now addressed to his friend. The truth is that his squalid experiences at Hull and four months' contact with the uninspiring realities of parliamentary life had very much sobered him. He had begun to realize that the Golden Age was still far off, and that the road to it was as drab and dreary as it was long. This disillusionment had been accentuated by what he had seen of the real character of Bezer and certain other stalwarts of the "Brotherhood of Workers" in Charlotte Street, and by the rapidly accumulating evidence of the crumbling of the whole structure of co-operative production founded by the Christian Socialists.

The economists have tried to show that this failure was due to a misapprehension of industrial conditions,<sup>1</sup> but in truth the cause lay much deeper. Kingsley was right when he said, some years later, that "associations are a failure because the working-men are not fit for them."<sup>2</sup> Ethical brotherhoods could not well be made with men of the stamp of Bezer, or even of the unregenerate workmen who looked upon co-operative production, not as a new moral life, but as a more remunerative substitute for Capitalism. This lesson Goderich had learnt, and it depressed him not a little. He writes to Hughes on October 11, 1853:

<sup>1</sup> Potter: *The Co-operative Movement*, pp. 123-4, 155, 167. Webb: *History of Trade Unionism*, pp. 207-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Letters and Memories of Kingsley*, vol. ii, p. 35.

“I am not surprised to hear what Cooper reports as to the Co-operative feeling in ‘the Provinces.’ I have many thoughts anent the matter, and among them it seems to me that if the working-men only care for co-operation when they are in distress, they don’t much, in truth, care for it at all, with here and there exceptions of course. Our Utopia will need to be built on foundations which can only be laid deep in men’s hearts, and we are little likely to see the completion, if we see even any extensive beginning of the foundations. The jubilant ‘laying of the first stone’ of the new heaven and the new earth will be for another generation; I hope for Noll and Maurice.”<sup>1</sup>

Again, on October 30 :

“I’d rather believe that the world was going to be regenerated in about ten years, as I once practically did, than that that period won’t arrive by express train from heaven, as I now see. However, as long as one can keep working *towards* it, that is quite enough.”

Although his illusions were so largely dispelled, he was not downhearted, and he continued to “work towards” his ideal with dogged pertinacity. He wrote regularly for the *Journal of Association* until its last number; he lectured indefatigably to Mechanics’ Institutes all over the country,<sup>2</sup> and he was unremitting in his attendance at the various Councils and Committees which vainly propped up the decaying fabric of Christian Socialism. Now and then he had a return of his old

<sup>1</sup> Hughes’s infant son.

<sup>2</sup> The MSS. of some of these admirable lectures are preserved among his papers. One is on “Tennyson’s Poetry,” another “History and its Study,” a third on “Our Indian Empire,” and still another on his favourite subject, Entomology.



*T. and E. Cox, Ripon.*

THE MARCHIONESS OF RIPON (circa 1855)

*(From a miniature at Studley.)*

day-dreaming. Writing to Hughes from Newby Hall on September 22, 1853, he says :

“I am very glad to get into this country again, for I am fonder of it than any other place in the world. I have for it quite a Swiss *Heimweh* sometimes. If only I could get half a million of tin and turn that Fountains Abbey, restored and beautified, into a Working-man's University—don't that make your mouth water !”

It was, however, a sigh rather than a dream. Six years later he could have transformed the old Abbey had he wished, but he did not. He had, in short, sown his political wild oats, and henceforth we find him—at least in domestic politics—making the best of things as they are, with all his rebel spirit gone, or rather transmuted into a high sense of public duty, within the limits of the old social system, despite its coronets and other irrepressible imperfections.

BOOK II

SIX YEARS IN *THE COMMONS*

## CHAPTER IV

### MUMPS AND DUMPS

(1853)

GODERICH sat in the House of Commons for only six years, but he achieved for himself in that short period a very considerable reputation both as a politician and a parliamentarian. This is the more remarkable because of his comparative youth—he was only 26 in 1853—and of his intense dislike of the whole atmosphere of the House, its manners and methods. It was, indeed, a real triumph of hard work and of a high and self-sacrificing sense of duty. Often enough he felt tempted to fly the “perpetual jaw,” and, as his Socialistic enthusiasm cooled, it even reconciled him to the prospect of the House of Lords. There is a curious passage in one of his letters to Hughes at this period, which shows how his political disillusionment, acted upon by the tedium and uncongenial histrionics of the Commons, was already leading him to a sort of Whig Paternalism, which ever after remained the essential basis of his politics.

“ . . . My path hereafter, when it gets into the peaceful solitudes of the House of Lords, is likely to be pretty much what it was before I entered this Palaver, with, of course, the addition of the work (and grand work it is, if you set about it rightly) of a landowner; and I therefore look forward to a time, probably not very far distant, when I may to a great extent return to

pursuits more naturally congenial to me than this perpetual jaw to which I am listening day and night.”<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes his Socialist hankerings flickered up again, but his aversion from the Commons remained.

“I wish I could get you for some hours after 12 *at night*, with a warm fire and a good pipe and some of Peacock’s Ale, and talk over many things. I see the need of so much work, and see so little the way of doing it, as far as my appointed palavering department is concerned, that I sometimes get into very low spirits and want the sight of you to set me a-going again. . . . I have no faith in the House of Commons, and that is the plain truth and a very sad one.”<sup>2</sup>

Even as late as the autumn of 1855, when his position in the House was quite assured, he continued to rail in his private letters against its “soul-destroying atmosphere.” His sense of duty, however, remained unshaken. Writing to Hughes, at the beginning of the recess in that year, he says :

“I need not say that I rejoiced to get clear of all the wretched humbug of the Palaver, whose weary, useless, unceasing talk had fairly sickened me. I suppose that by the time it meets again, one shall be ready to begin the treadmill once more, but it is very difficult to see what good can be done in such an element. It is difficult to imagine anything more unsatisfactory than the looking back upon the doings of Parliament this year ; and *if it were not that I become every day more and more convinced that the work one is in is the work one ought to do*, I should be inclined to make my bow to the people

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Thomas Hughes, dated H. of C., July 4th (1853).”

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., dated “H. of C., December 6th, 1853.”

of Huddersfield and the British Public and retire into some retirement, whence I might discharge Latter-day pamphlets at a faithless and untoward generation; but it ain't no good a-thinking of that sort of thing, and so for a short time of holidays I try to forget the House of Commons and all its accompaniments."<sup>1</sup>

It is true that, plod as he might, he was not accomplishing much in the way of actual legislation, but his reputation was growing all the same. He was industrious, conscientious, and singularly well-read, and otherwise accurately informed on all current political questions. Moreover, he had made himself pleasantly conspicuous and interesting as the leader of a tiny group of his own—a sort of prehistoric Fourth Party—which added not a little to the gravities, as well as the gaieties, of the parliamentary game. This party consisted of Austen Henry Layard<sup>2</sup> and Henry Bruce<sup>3</sup> in the House, and of W. E. Forster<sup>4</sup> and Tom Hughes outside. Like their young leader—he was the junior of all of them by from five to twelve years—they were all men who found it difficult to accommodate themselves exactly to any of the existing party limitations. They were, of course, Radical and anti-Whig, and as much convinced as Disraeli that Protection was damned as well as dead, but the ideals of Christian Socialism still lingered with them, and set them bitterly against all

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Thomas Hughes, dated "H. of C., August 20th, 1855."

<sup>2</sup> Archæologist, politician, and diplomatist. Radical M.P. for Aylesbury 1852-7. Appointed Ambassador to Constantinople by Lord Beaconsfield, 1877-80.

<sup>3</sup> Afterwards Lord Aberdare. Liberal M.P. for Merthyr Tydvil 1852-69 and for Renfrew 1869-73. Home Secretary in Gladstone Administration 1869-73; Lord President of the Council 1873-4. Reformed the Licensing Laws, 1872.

<sup>4</sup> Bradford manufacturer, and afterwards conspicuous as a Gladstonian statesman; active in the politics of the West Riding during the fifties. Entered Parliament in 1861 as Radical Member for Bradford. Vice-President of the Council 1868; part author (with Ripon) of Elementary Education Act and Ballot Act. A leading Imperial Federationist.

the individualist and *laissez-faire* aspects of Cobdenism. They were, in a sense, doctrinaire and as intellectual as Mill, but they were also manly and sport-loving, Imperialist without fustian, hating John Bright and the Peace Society, and full of a serious and sympathetic interest in the common soldier and the cultivation of military science which would have rejoiced the heart of Mr. Kipling. In short, they were romanticists, very much after the style of the Young England Party, though their main inspiration was ethical and Biblical rather than feudal.

The party, of course, made no pretence to any formal organization, but it acted together with tacit discipline and duly recognized its common interests. We have more than one humorous glimpse of its particularity and of Goderich's place in it in Bruce's racy letters to his chief :

"I intend coming to town on the 30th—sooner I cannot. Could you, without inconvenience, give me a bed on that and the following night? We should then be able to indulge in a long talk—plan the ruin of Palmerston, the interruption of the Peace Conferences, the overthrow of the British Constitution, or whatever else may be necessary to clear the way to that blessed consummation when 'Goderich shall rule and laws be all repealed.'" <sup>1</sup>

Again, four months later :

"Adieu! Pam is a humbug; Ben Hall<sup>2</sup> ditto. Luckily there is a virtuous Goderich, a strenuous Layard, a patriotic Bruce, or where would England be!" <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Bruce, January 22, 1856.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Benjamin Hall, then First Commissioner of the Board of Works. His management of the Parks caused much public discontent (Dalling: *Life of Palmerston*, vol. iii, pp. 413-15).

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Bruce, May 25, 1856.

The references here to Palmerston were more serious than they seem. There were slight gradations of difference in all the positive and negative creeds of the Goderichites, but in their holy detestation of the swagger of Palmerston and what they firmly believed to be the dishonesty of Disraeli they were completely at one. Layard, we know, was at the time a fanatical enemy of the then Home Secretary and had already incurred much odium by his indecent attacks upon him. If Goderich was less outspoken, he felt none the less deeply. Towards the end of 1853, he learnt to his horror that Kingsley was beginning to entertain a kindlier feeling for Palmerston, whereupon he thus poured out his wrath to Hughes :

“ Your news of Kingsley’s admiration of Lord Palmerston grieves me greatly. I cannot doubt that Viscount to be the most unprincipled man in the House of Commons next to Disraeli. . . . I shall read the article in *Fraser* eagerly ; but to set up Lord Palmerston as the man to be Prime Minister is just about the most wretched error and miserable falling down before cleverness (genius he has not) I can conceive. I can’t help writing strongly because few things make me so indignant as the way in which men speak of and admire Disraeli and Palmerston and Graham. Bad is best perhaps nowadays among ‘ statesmen,’ but when you have got an honest man like Gladstone, to go and take up with a self-seeking political adventurer like Lord Palmerston is really grievous.”<sup>1</sup>

The spirit of “ prophecy ” was not very strong on Goderich when he wrote this letter, for within fourteen months the “ self-seeking political adventurer ” justified Kingsley’s “ wretched error,” and actually became

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Hughes, December 23, 1853.

Prime Minister. Worse still, some four years later, Goderich himself was contentedly serving under him in his second Administration. Not a little of this strange reconciliation—at any rate in its earlier stages—may have been due to the superior repulsion he felt for the “self-seeking adventurer” on the other side, for we find him in the following year excusing an act of indulgence on his part towards the Government, on the ground, not of any unsuspected merit he had discovered in them, but because “they are the only Ministry which stands between us and the degradation of having Dizzy again in office.”<sup>1</sup>

But blacker evils were stalking abroad in these early days of Goderich's parliamentary career than the flourishing wickedness of Pam and Dizzy, and the unrighteous atmosphere of the legislative arena, in which they disported themselves with so much jauntiness and cynicism. To Goderich's ingenuous soul, the whole social and political history of 1853-4 was full of gloom. In spite of the great economic prosperity, he was profoundly depressed by the moral rottenness of things, as illustrated by such events as the unpunished *coup d'état* of Napoleon III, the invasion panics, and later on the angry mutterings of the coming European War. Even the prosperity of the country troubled him—perhaps, indeed, most of all—for he recognized in it a triumph for Manchester materialism and individualism, and he shrewdly feared that it could only lead to further moral and social disaster.

His dismal forebodings on this head were speedily realized. In a manuscript he prepared towards the end of the year, and which will be more particularly referred to presently,<sup>2</sup> he tells in his characteristic way what happened. The prophecy of the economists that wages would rise as trade improved was not fulfilled, and a sputtering of small strikes began to

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Bruce, August 25, 1854.

<sup>2</sup> *Fragmentary Wild Oats, infra*, pp. 74-5.

“ lay bare the unsound foundation on which was built the mighty superstructure of our ‘ unexampled prosperity.’ ” For a time a dangerous struggle was averted by local hand-to-mouth agreements, “ showing in how rough a manner the vital question of what a man is to receive for his labour is settled among us.” But soon the trouble broke out afresh and in a more disquieting form. Goderich thus describes it :

“ Strikes became more and more frequent throughout Lancashire, and spread from Preston to Wigan and Manchester and elsewhere ; and at last, in the month of September, the Master Manufacturers of Preston met and formed a League, binding themselves to close all their mills on a certain day if the men on strike did not return to work. The men held out, the day came, the mills were closed, and 20,000 men, women, and children were thrown out of work at once. Still the men refused to yield, and gradually the Masters’ Association spread from Preston to the neighbouring towns, and in order to cut off the supplies of money, which the men in work furnished to those on strike or locked out, the mills were closed in district after district and the evil spread wider and wider. The Colliers’ strike at Wigan was altogether separate ; but it led to some results yet more serious, for soldiers were called out to quell a riot, and blood was shed. So that at last, in November and December, this was the picture which the great manufacturers’ districts of England presented. This was the condition of that industry which we are so fond of calling ‘ the glory of England and the envy of the world ’—a most serious dispute raging for months between the masters and the men, spreading from town to town throughout the county of Lancaster, 50,000 men out of work, every mill stopped,

the work of production totally at an end, bloody riots occurring, both sides banded together in hostile combinations, the bitterest feelings, the strongest class hatreds existing, the men counting on ruining the masters, the masters on starving the men, the Associated Masters refusing work to any unless all came in, some of the best and some of the worst feelings of man's nature urging both sides to hold out, demagogues and aristogogues (let the word be pardoned for the truth of its meaning) keeping up the mutual hatred and helping to render settlement impossible, and all this, in some instances, for a money amount hardly worth speaking of, and showing therefore by this very fact how deep and wide is the separation between the two classes, how terrible their alienation."

Goderich was profoundly distressed. Not that the crisis was essentially different from that of the previous year, when, in the strike of the Amalgamated Engineers, he had helped to lead the men in their fight against the masters; but his own views had changed. He now realized—no doubt as a result of his disheartening experiences in Hull and Charlotte Street—that the Labour Question, with its bitter "class alienations," was not a mere affair of battle between Right and Wrong, but that at its root lay a problem of infinite complexity, requiring for its solution, not only many large and difficult political reforms, but also a slow and still more difficult process of moral regeneration on both sides.

The allotted work and unexpected war preoccupations of the Parliamentary Session left little scope for remedial legislation. Goderich, accordingly, cast about for solutions elsewhere, chiefly in private study and an industrious correspondence with his political friends. Lord John Russell had promised a new Reform Bill

for the following year, and to the study of the Franchise question and of the practicability of a large scheme of national Education Goderich, devoted himself as soon as Parliament rose. His first letter on the subject affords a further glimpse of the gradual modification of his ultra-democratic opinions, which had set in after the Hull Election Petition.

*To Thomas Hughes*

I CARLTON GARDENS, 15th August, 1853.

MY DEAR HUGHES,—I am very glad at last to be free from the Palaver for some time, and to be able to get a little quiet reading which may somewhat prepare me for next year. It will be necessary to endeavour to bring people to the scratch upon the Suffrage Question, not by wild motions, but by laying down principles, which, if one could once get them accepted, must lead to the desired end very soon. Whether a Palaver is much use, is one thing, and may be fairly questioned; but if you have a "Representative System," the only sound base on which it can now rest is universal suffrage, restricted by exclusions on account of insufficient education or moral wrong; to be applied, of course, in each individual case, and not to classes. I don't mean that you can get there at once, for I don't think, from what I have seen of electors, that you could, especially in the counties; but you must get there soon, by one road or another, and you had better start without delay by the road of Law. I want to see a *large* extension of the Franchise, larger in towns than in counties, the improvement of the present distribution of Members, and a beginning of a recognition of the moral and educational principle, which might easily be done. I don't know why I've written you this lecture on Reform; but I've been thinking a good deal about it lately.

This, of course, was, for its time, quite good Radicalism of the philosophic kind, seeing that Mill himself, in his seclusion at Avignon, was then thinking out a similar plan, though without actual exclusions, which he afterwards set forth in his *Considerations on Representative Government*.<sup>1</sup> It was none the less a complete recantation of the opinions Goderich had expressed, with so much democratic zeal, only sixteen months earlier in his still-born pamphlet *The Duty of the Age*. Then he was almost rabid against electoral exclusions of all kinds, more especially those entailed by the recognition of an "aristocracy of talent—despotism of the intellect."<sup>2</sup> Now, these very exclusions had become for him "the only sound base" of Franchise reform. It was not the only sign of a relapse into the ancestral Whiggism he manifested about this time.

But the strikes were now spreading every day faster and more furiously, and it became clear that if any remedies were to be found they must be of a more immediate efficacy than Franchise reform and improved systems of education. Moreover, the coming war had rendered it very doubtful whether Lord John Russell's Reform Bill would see the light. Goderich turned his attention to other schemes, characteristic of his chastened political mood. He was now for industrial peace, on a basis of Arbitration, guaranteed by a sort of benevolent despotism on the part of the masters. It takes one's breath away to find the fiery demagogue of the Engineers' Strike now proposing to organize the better kind of masters and to work with them on a paternalistic plan. He thus hesitatingly sketches his idea to Hughes :

"I am inclined to think that, while keeping on hard at work at the Associations which exist, or which can be made to exist, we should do good by trying to get

<sup>1</sup> Chapter viii.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, pp. 32-3.

at the manufacturers themselves and getting them to do their duty by their workmen. I should like greatly to get up a muster roll of the Wilsons and Forsters and J. G. Marshalls, etc., of England, to get to know their ways of dealing with those who work for them. We see from time to time good landlords, working perhaps with much prejudice and not altogether in the best way, and spoilt here and there and warped with aristocracy; why, then, should we not find also good captains of manufacturing industry, who ought to be for many reasons truer men than your unworking landlords. I incline to think that while Association is of the future, this other is of the present, and has been too much overlooked and neglected by us. How say you?"<sup>1</sup>

Hughes was not altogether unresponsive, especially on the subject of the failure of Associations. "If the faith was all that we held it to be," he writes in reply, "not even our clumsy proclaiming of it and our astonishing differences in general beliefs could have made such a hash, as we did, of a good deal of our work." Thus encouraged, Goderich for four months carried on a voluminous correspondence with Hughes, Ludlow, Maurice, Forster, and Bruce, gradually evolving a scheme of Arbitration to deal with industrial disputes as they ~~arose~~, and another of industrial co-partnership to render their arising less likely, the whole to be settled by a Parliamentary Committee.

*To Henry Bruce*

NOCTON HALL, NR. LINCOLN, 3rd December, 1853.

MY DEAR BRUCE,— . . . The most feasible scheme I can imagine would be something of this sort. Let there be established in each trade a Board composed of masters and men, elected probably after the manner

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Hughes, dated Malvern, September 6, 1853.

of the French *Conseils des Prud'hommes*;<sup>1</sup> and let their first business be to collect and publish regularly the condition from time to time of all those matters which may be said to form together the elements of the bargain between the master and workman, the number of men employed in the particular trade, the number of mills running, or mines worked, the price of the raw material, the price of the manufacture, and the supply of the raw material present and to be expected, etc. By this alone, we should, if well done, clear away much error from the minds of the men. Then let them decide all those questions of individual disputes between master and workman which the *Conseils des Prud'hommes* deal with in France, and by this we may hope to get rid of strikes arising, as they often do, from such individual disputes. And, lastly, let them be authorized to arbitrate in any matter whatever which may be referred to them by both parties. . . . But the preliminary step would clearly be to get the matter considered by a Committee of the House of Commons.

I do not know whether you have turned your attention to another question, which such a Committee would be sure to have brought before it, and which I think contains in it wider and more important bearing on this question in the future than even the idea of arbitration. That is the alteration of our Partnership Laws. At present we permit neither partnership with limited liability nor the kind called in France *en commandite*. Now it seems to me that, while the strict regulations of limited liability might afford a means to the working-men of investing their savings in many more advantageous

<sup>1</sup> Goderich seems to have been unaware that a scheme modelled on the *Conseils des Prud'hommes* had been tried in the Macclesfield silk trade, in 1849, and had failed.

ways than are now open to them, and might divert them from thus wasting their money in ruinous contests, the permission of the *commandite* system would enable the manufacturer to give any of his workmen a more direct interest in his business than he now can, without, at the same time, giving them authority as to its management, and would thus remove one obstacle to that real union and association of all concerned in the work of production, on the existence of which we can alone wisely depend for safety.<sup>1</sup>

In both these schemes Goderich was a pioneer so far as this country was concerned,<sup>2</sup> but it fell to others to carry them out. Two years later he got his Select Committee of the House of Commons, but it achieved no constructive work, and it was not until 1869 that the gradual change of sentiment among employers rendered Boards of Conciliation possible. Even thus, however, Goderich was, in a measure, justified in having sought his solution in the moral regeneration of the captains of industry. His influence on the eventual acceptance of co-partnership was more direct. He worked hard in the House of Commons to remove the legal obstacle referred to in his letter to Bruce, seconding a motion for Reform of the Partnership Laws in 1854, debating strenuously the abortive Limited Liability Bills of 1855 and 1856, and himself introducing a Registration of Partnerships Bill in 1858. These efforts bore their fruit, after he had left the Commons, in the

• <sup>1</sup> This new form of Association was a further symptom of Goderich's deviation from his earlier Socialist ideals. To the orthodox Co-operator and Socialist, co-partnership is anathema, only another and insidious form of capitalist exploitation. (See Holyoake: *History of Co-operation*, pp. 308-9; Potter: *The Co-operative Movement*, pp. 160-3.)

<sup>2</sup> He probably borrowed his idea from France, where co-partnership had been successfully established in 1845 (see Mill: *Principles of Political Economy*, pp. 462-4), just as he borrowed his arbitration scheme and, at an earlier date, his system of Associated Workshops from the same country.

Limited Liability Act of 1862, which was followed by a large number of eminently successful experiments in co-partnership on the lines originally contemplated by him.

Unfortunately, in the winter of 1853, all these suggestions of an amicable understanding between masters and men still fell on deaf ears. Neither the captains nor the soldiers of industry had any other thought than the relentless prosecution of their internecine war, and although some of the wiser leaders of the men were not indisposed to consider arbitration the masters would have nothing of it. The struggle ended in a collapse of the strikes and a consequent embitterment of the "class alienations" which had so deeply stirred Goderich's fears.

The end of the year accordingly found him more despondent than ever. Both at home and abroad—the war was now approaching with rapid strides—the outlook was certainly of the dimmest. But this was not the only cause of his low spirits. He was still further depressed by an attack of mumps, which, besides being a mortification in itself, brought with it the vexation of isolating him from his friends.<sup>1</sup> He took refuge, as he often did when he was troubled, in composing what he called "a prophecy."<sup>2</sup> In this case it was not inappropriately named, for it was a veritable jeremiad on the whole political situation.

The MS., closely written on eighty-six large quarto sheets, has been preserved among a number of other still-born efforts of Goderich's indefatigable pen, but it has no political and very little biographic value. Its picture of the strikes, already quoted, lacks perspective, and its account of the state of foreign affairs is vitiated by its extravagant abuse of Palmerston. One suspects,

<sup>1</sup> He wrote to Hughes, on December 23, that he was suffering from "mumps and dumps." His wife and "Noll" both took the malady badly.

<sup>2</sup> Same letter: "I'm engaged in uttering a prophecy; but whether it is to be consigned at once to the flames when finished or read in the ears of a select few, or entrusted to some son of Neriah, in the shape of a printer, to get read in those of princes and people, I as yet know not."

indeed, that not a little of its author's gloom was due to the mixed circumstances in which the war presented itself to him. He was chagrined by it, not because he thought it wrong—on the contrary he was strongly in favour of it—but because he hated Russia and Palmerston with equal bitterness, while Austria and Turkey, who were on the anti-Russian side, also figured in minor degrees among his pet antipathies. Generally, the pamphlet was homiletic rather than political. It denounced Jeshurun-waxed-fat together with all the political economists, but proposed no practical remedies. It called for the reform of men's hearts, the revival of religion, and a return to national consciousness under pain of the early downfall of civilization.<sup>1</sup> Had these views persisted, we should probably have seen Goderich retracing his Whig-bound steps and re-embracing Christian Socialism on the Maurice model, but they passed with the debilitating effects of the mumps. What he afterwards thought of the "prophecy" is shown by the fact that when he ultimately classed it among his papers he endorsed it *Fragmentary Wild Oats*. }

But while these particular views passed, the desire to write a book of some kind on the political and social problems of the day lingered with him for over a year. His next project was a treatise on Wages, and to that end he plunged deeply into a re-study of the economists; but the fit wore off without any actual writing.<sup>2</sup> Towards the end of 1854, he planned a more ambitious

<sup>1</sup> Goderich was always much nearer his opponents than he imagined. There was much in his pamphlet with which Cobden, Palmerston, and even Disraeli would have agreed on general principles. Cobden fully realized the demoralizing effects of the prosperity he had done so much to compass (Morley: *Life of Cobden*, vol. ii, cap. v). Disraeli thought a nation without a creed was lost (Buckle: *Benjamin Disraeli*, vol. iv, p. 372). With regard to Palmerston, see *infra*, cap. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Hughes, January 6, 1854. Even in making the announcement he had a premonition that the project would share the fate of his other literary efforts: "This, however, like Coleridge's *Book on the Logos*, is likely to turn out a dream, though I seriously think of doing it unless Parliament takes up too much time."

work under the title of *A Political Memorandum*. It was intended to be a survey of the whole field of English politics, divided into three parts, dealing respectively with Foreign Politics, the State of Parties, and Home Politics. The plan was duly completed, and a rough draft of the first and third sections was written, but no more. The bulky fragment was only added to the now very considerable store of manuscript tokens of Goderich's unfulfilled literary ambitions.

The *Political Memorandum*, however, possesses a certain biographic interest, especially in the section dealing with Foreign Politics. To this we shall have occasion to refer more fully in the next chapter. So far as the domestic problems touched upon in the *Fragmentary Wild Oats* are concerned, it marks a reassuring return to sober standards of practical politics, together with the beginning of a constructive stage in his relative Conservatism. Fundamentally, his outlook on politics is very much what it was in the *Duty of the Age* and in the *Wild Oats*, but his remedies are now full of Whig reservations. He still wants his ideal statesman to recognize the "inevitableness of Democracy," but not in order to destroy root and branch. His idea now is to transform gradually with a reverent use of existing materials. His remedies are five in number : Franchise Reform, Education, the Conciliation of Classes, Religious Freedom, and Revival of National Life. The new spirit comes out most clearly in the first and second of these remedies. The chief feature of his Franchise scheme is the substitution of educational and moral tests for the Ten-Pound Householder ; and that of his educational scheme, the full utilization of all existing voluntary and religious efforts within a national and compulsory framework. These ideas are characteristic of the whole of this section of the *Memorandum*. They are particularly interesting, because they illustrate a crystallization of political opinion which knew no essential modification in Goderich's later life.

## CHAPTER • V

### A MAN OF WAR

(1853—1856)

THROUGHOUT the autumn and winter of 1853, the coming of war with Russia was heralded by military and naval movements on the Danube and in the Bosphorus, and by the desperate peace futilities of the diplomatists at Vienna. The crash came at last, with the Anglo-French declaration of war, in March 1854. It found Goderich wholeheartedly on the side of the fire-eaters. This may seem strange, in view of the fact that, in the war of classes at home, he had definitely abandoned his early truculent Jacobinism, and had settled down as a staid apostle of Peace, Arbitration, and Co-operation with the Benevolent Despot. The truth is, as Lord Kimberley wrote to him many years later, he was "a man of war from his youth,"<sup>1</sup> while in foreign politics he was still a vehement Jacobin, after the idealist manner of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey in 1789, and he would have nothing to do in the way of kindness with despots, benevolent or otherwise.

His attitude towards war in general is perhaps best described by himself in a passage in his *Fragmentary Wild Oats*, dealing with the efforts of the Peace Society to prevent the war.

"The Peace Society, of course, took alarm and poured forth lamentations over the evils of war, and trite

<sup>1</sup> August 26, 1870.

truisms on the blessings of peace, and injured what was true and noble in the cause they defended by an injustice towards the past which was equalled only by its ignorance. They might have preached truth effectively even to the text of the Russian invasion [of the Principalities], and have told men that what war was in the former ages of the world it is not now, and that our true fighting is with stubborn cotton in Australian and Canadian wastes rather than with our brother men; they might have dwelt on the thousand evils of modern armies, their uselessness and mischievousness in times of peace, and the direct encouragement which their perpetual existence affords to war and to tyranny, and they might have declaimed against such standing armies with at least the advantage of a long English tradition to teach them. But they did not; they preferred to denounce all war, to abuse and calumniate all soldiers, to deny all history, and to lay themselves open to the imputation of every low motive, and of showing forth but another phase of that Mammon-worship and that denial of National life which form the great evil and sin of our time, and they thus cut off from association with them the best and wisest men of our time. . . . If there be need for us to fight, we must not shrink from any contest, or let any prospect of material ruin make us an instant fail of our duty."<sup>1</sup>

Thus to him war was always a possible necessity, evil, no doubt, but still a necessity. The acceptance of this principle had already enabled him to gratify what was, perhaps, an inherited taste for military studies. His father, who was twice War Secretary, had developed early in life a pronounced interest in the same direction, and had, in consequence, been

<sup>1</sup> *Fragmentary Wild Oats*, MS., pp. 23-5.

nicknamed "the General" by his intimates.<sup>1</sup> Goderich, in his turn, had formed a sort of military coterie among his friends, chiefly muscular Christians like Tom Hughes and thoughtful professional soldiers like Colonel Shadwell, Sir William Sterling, and General Mansfield, who, besides studying together problems of military science and history, had formed very definite and advanced views in regard to a Citizen Army, the abolition of Purchase, the education of the common soldier, and army reorganization generally.

The Crimean War, as it was afterwards called, appealed to Goderich both as a just and necessary war, and—less consciously, no doubt—as an opportunity for the practical prosecution of his military studies and Army reforms. It was, in his view, necessary for two reasons. In the first place, Russia was the typical Despotism and he hated her with quite an apocalyptic hatred. In the next place, the "crime of 1815," by which the Holy Alliance had resettled Europe on a shamelessly reactionary plan, had to be finally undone, and this could best be accomplished by the overthrow of Russia. His only regrets were that Austria, the chief accomplice of Russia in 1815, could not be dragged in on the doomed Muscovite side, and that the opportunity of the Hungarian rebellion in 1848 had not been seized upon by Great Britain to annihilate both in the name of European Freedom.

These views are set forth very fully and clearly in his *Political Memorandum*, and, incidentally, in his earlier *Wild Oats*. In themselves they have perhaps little importance, but they are at any rate interesting as showing how constant and uniform is the morbid mental condition in which even intelligent and matter-of-fact members of belligerent communities almost

<sup>1</sup> Croker alludes to this hobby of his in a letter to Peel (August 10, 1813). He sighs for "those happier days when once a week we found a solace and diversion in coffee and Quintilian, buttered toast and General Robinson" (Parker: *Sir Robert Peel*, vol. i, p. 56).

invariably find themselves. Extreme exaggeration is the dominant symptom, and it takes precisely the same forms whoever the enemy may be and whatever the causes and objects of the war. The enemy is pictured as something infra-human, the detected foe of the whole human race ; the cause of the war, however limited in itself, is magnified into an issue vital to morality and civilization ; the end to be attained is invariably a durable peace, and often an international millennium to be reached through the complete crushing of the enemy. This was the national psychology in England in 1854, precisely as it was in 1804 and 1914, though all the belligerents had meanwhile changed sides and the scale and methods and real issues were in each case widely different.

Here, for example, is Goderich's characterization of the enemy in 1854 :

“That great, grim, shadowy power, which sits brooding over Europe and Asia, and of which no man knows really whether it be strong or weak, whether its people be a young race yet to play a great part in the world's history, or men, as Diderot describes them, rotten before they are ripe ; that dark, silent Russian Czar, the hater of freedom, the foe of every people struggling to cast off oppression, the prop of Austrian rottenness, whose image recalls the visions which old Hebrew prophets saw of the Babylonian power as it advanced stride by stride to swallow up Jerusalem.”<sup>1</sup>

Not even the corruption and misgovernment of Turkey, whom Russia had attacked, suggested a doubt of the justice of this indictment. On the contrary.

“The more strongly we are drawn to sympathize with a Christian Western Nation in its contests with a dying

<sup>1</sup> *Fragmentary Wild Oats*, pp. 21-2.

Oriental one, the more ought we to feel the shame of the contrast between the conduct of the Czar and that of the Sultan ; the more are we bound to denounce and repudiate the lawless ambition, the low hypocrisy, which degrades the Faith which it pretends to serve, and the insolence of power in his enemy which enlists every good feeling of men's hearts in favour of the Turk. No, there can be no doubt on which side in this contest is right and justice."<sup>1</sup>

As for the cause of the war, it was all very well for Lord John Russell and his Ministerial colleagues to prate about the " integrity and independence of Turkey," but in reality the mischief lay deeper and was infinitely more far-reaching.

" The real and very sufficient reason why the English people, taken in the largest sense of the word as the aggregate of all the powers and influences of the Nation, has gone to war with Russia, is because they have suddenly awakened to a universal conviction of that which many men have long seen and known, that the steadily increasing power of Russia was becoming daily more and more threatening to Western Europe, and that the possession of Constantinople, to which he was visibly stretching forth his arms, would, by rendering the Czar master of one of the most important political positions in the world, enable him to exercise an almost irresistible influence and domination over the prostrate Governments of Europe, and to stamp out with ' Slavonia's frozen heel ' the dying embers of that brighter future which now forms the hope and the consolation of the struggling and uneasy multitudes from the Thames to the Danube. It seems, then, to me,

<sup>1</sup> *Fragmentary Wild Oats*, pp. 34-5.

not to be so very difficult to answer Mr. Bright's taunting question, Why did you go to war? We went to war to check the advance and to restrain the power of Russia, which we at last perceived, late indeed, but still we trust in time, to threaten not alone the integrity of Turkey and the existence of its Mahometan rulers, but the freedom and the progress of all Europe." <sup>1</sup>

It followed that a peace which merely safeguarded Turkey from Russian aggression would be ludicrously inadequate. What was wanted, and what had to be fought for at every cost, was a peace which would "confer a lasting blessing on our children's children, and might really place at length the peace of Europe upon a sound basis." For this two things were necessary.

"The future of Europe depends on the diminution of Russian power and influence, and the erection of such barriers against her advance towards the West or the South as shall effectually relieve all other Powers, small and great, from the necessity of considering in their internal affairs or their external relations the inclination and wishes of the Czar; and on such a 'reconstruction of the Map' as shall remove those endless seeds of discontent, conspiracy, and war which were sown broadcast over the Continent by the antiquated doctrines, the selfish policy, and the careless injustice of the diplomacy of 1815." <sup>2</sup>

In a word, Goderich's view—and in substance it was then the view of all England—was that Russia should be hemmed in and rendered permanently innocuous by restoring the independence, or effecting the reunion with their parent states, of her Finnish, Polish, Bessarabian, Crimean, and Georgian provinces, and, further-

<sup>1</sup> *Political Memorandum*, MS., pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

more, that the Peace of Europe should be consolidated by repainting the map in accordance with "a just union of the claims of nationality, of history, and of geography."

In other respects Goderich's early views on the war are also interesting. Thus, he had much to say on the question of alliances, more particularly in criticism of the Government's apparently friendly relations with Austria, which gave him an opportunity of once more expressing his profound distrust of Palmerston.<sup>1</sup> Here his attitude was quite logical, in view of his attachment to the "Principle of Nationalities" and his hatred of Metternichian Reaction, and it was also substantially right. Unfortunately, it led him at the other extreme to advocate an alliance with Germany, or rather Prussia, which only shows—as the late Lord Salisbury pointed out some years later<sup>2</sup>—how utterly illusory is all politics founded on, and limited by, abstract principles. The passage is, however, worth quoting, if only as a curiosity :

"Prussia is one of the most natural and safest of Continental Allies for England, and we were bound in the interest of the very war on which we were entering, as well as on general grounds, to use every effort to bring her over to our policy. . . . Once engaged in the contest she must have gone into it heart and soul ; the feelings of the people and the interests of the State would alike have forced her to do so. In the negotiations for peace the interests of Prussia and those of Europe would be identical, and she might even have been indemnified without difficulty for the loss of the Province of Posen, should that have resulted from the new arrangements of Europe. The Prussian nation is the flower of Germany, educated, thoughtful, and

<sup>1</sup> Goderich was, as usual, unjust to Palmerston, whose eyes were really very wide open in regard to Austria. (Ashley : *Life of Palmerston*, vol. ii, pp. 51, 67, 87.)

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Quarterly Review*, January 1904, pp. 318-19.

united, and it could have weathered without fear any storm which might follow the breaking up of the system of 1815, and the establishment of a juster and more enduring system."<sup>1</sup>

This naïve idea of Prussia sympathizing with any national aspirations not her own, shows how easily Goderich was misled by his nationalist enthusiasm. Apart from his total misunderstanding of the Prussian character, he does not seem to have realized that reunited nationalities, just as much as emancipated democracies, may be quite as dangerous to the general peace as the most ambitious and unscrupulous of despotisms. National character does not change with widening frontiers or even expanding forms of government.

During the Session of 1854 Goderich gave no public indication of his deep interest in the war and in Army questions, except by one short intervention in the debate on the Army Estimates, when he suggested an improvement in the method of schooling private soldiers.<sup>2</sup> The questions which mainly engaged his parliamentary activity were survivals from the previous Session, like the Friendly Societies Bill and the Law of Partnership. He also took part in the debates on the Simony Law Amendment Bill and on Conventual and Monastic Institutions, and was, as usual, a hard worker on Committees. The delicate health of Lady Goderich, however, preoccupied him a good deal, and as soon as Parliament rose he resolved to take her abroad and winter with her in the Pyrenees.

He wrote to Bruce that he intended "to read immensely,"<sup>3</sup> and his letters show that he kept his word, but at the same time he followed the war very closely and keenly.

<sup>1</sup> *Pol. Mem.*, pp. 6-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cxxx, p. 1301.

<sup>3</sup> Letter, August 25, 1854.

To Thomas Hughes

HÔTEL DE FRANCE, PAU, 15th October, 1854.

. . . This battle of the Alma seems really to have been a glorious affair, as to hard fighting and cool courage, and dear old Sir Colin (what a fine fellow he is!) appears to have behaved like a regular trump. As yet I have heard nothing from Shadwell, and I am very anxious to do so and to learn how he and Sterling got on. I am so glad Evans has done well; I always liked him and the swells didn't, which are excellent reasons for rejoicing in his pluck and distinction. I, however, entertain some doubts, which I hardly dare mention—they seem so presumptuous—as to whether the *strategic* part of the business has been as good as it might, for it strikes me that we have done wrong in our march to Balaclava and our consequent abandonment of the great road to Simferopol and Perikop, by the occupation of which, after the battle of the Alma, we had cut off Menchicoff's retreat, and placed him really very much in the position of Mack at Ulm in 1805. Of course all this criticism may be wrong, for our information is still very imperfect; but looking at the map the other day these thoughts came into my head. . . .

MAISON FOREST, 18th November, 1854.

. . . What glorious fellows our soldiers are, and how terribly interesting the siege is! In some ways it is not all understandable by me; for I don't believe such a siege with such an enormous garrison receiving reinforcements *ad libitum* and able to move about as it pleases, was ever carried on before. It may go down in history with Troy and Syracuse—only I hope Lord Raglan is not a second Nicias or Nikias, as Grote spells

him. I enclose a note for your wife, and with many loves remain,

Always yours affec<sup>ly</sup>, GODERICH.

Towards the end of the year the country began to realize, as Disraeli said, that the Government, while "anticipating a great war, had only provided for a small one," and it became necessary to reassemble Parliament to take measures for the more vigorous prosecution of hostilities. But something more than vigour was needed. The condition of the Army in the Crimea was deplorable from every point of view except gallantry. Goderich was impatient to take his share of the work of finding remedies, more especially as he felt that the time had come for giving some of his ideas on Army Reform to Parliament. Unfortunately, the continued ill-health of his wife tied him to Pau, and he could do no more than pour out his feelings to Hughes.

*To Thomas Hughes*

MAISON FOREST, 3<sup>rd</sup> December, 1854.

. . . A man don't like to shirk work in such times as these. For my wife's sake I don't want to go, for she would be very lonely here, and I should be especially sorry to leave her when she is uneasy about Noll and, consequently, nervous and seedy. It is a bore to be away at such a moment, but that can't be helped. . . . I certainly used to underrate our modern soldiers. Still, the foundations of my thoughts on these matters remain unchanged. I think the citizen soldiers of antiquity and of the Middle Ages (for with all the differences between the two, they had that very noble characteristic in common) a better institution than the modern Standing Army (though I was wrong in imagining

that the new style of soldiers could not individually feel like citizens). I must still dislike and disapprove very strongly the life of such Standing Armies in time of peace, and, in spite of all the gallant deeds of many aristocrats at the Alma and at Inkermann, it seems to me unwise and unjust that at this time of day they should enjoy a monopoly of all promotion. Of course it would be impossible to get rid of Standing Armies until the Good Time is quite come all over Europe, when you and I, and probably Maurice and Noll too, shall be in our graves ; but a great deal might be done to remedy the evils to the soldiers themselves of their peace-life, and the aristocratic promotion might be got rid of, while I cannot help thinking that something also might be done to mitigate the *professional* character of our Army and render it more national than it is—though it is so in essentials, it now turns out, to a much greater extent than I used to believe. No man can resist, certainly not I, the heart-stirring story of Inkermann, and most truly do I feel the great worth and nobleness of the men who there fought.

These views seemed to be justified a few weeks later by the admitted failure of the system of recruiting, and the curious remedy in the shape of a Foreign Legion adopted by the Government. The country was then far from any ideas of compulsory service, but in the following letter there are echoes of anxieties which have a curiously familiar ring for the present generation :

*To Thomas Hughes*

MAISON FOREST, 26th December, 1854.

I see the *Times* puts me down as having paired in favour of the Foreignering Bill—the which is a lie. I

paired with "a noble Markiss" for the whole time before Xmas; but Heaven knows when I did so I had no idea that according to the Government we were, at least for the time, done up, and that we were to be asked to call in foreign aid. I therefore never paired with the least reference to the F. Enlistment Bill; and though I don't agree the least either with the "constitutional" nonsense, or still less with the claptrap injustice and falsehood with which the Germans or Swiss have been abused as "cowards" and "assassins," etc., yet I certainly never could have consented to employ thus early in the war any but our own people. If you can't get old enough men to enlist at present, alter your system, throw open promotion to the private soldier, promise ample care for the wives and families of married recruits, and make use of the proper methods of a free govt., by employing your useless Lord Lieutenants and Deputy Dosses to stir up by speeches, by proclamations, by every possible means, the enthusiasm and zeal of the citizens. I cannot believe that it would have been impossible to have got any number or kind of men required, if we had adopted proper means. Shall it be said that when Nicias wrote to the Athenians that dispatch quoted, in spite of Lord John, with such terrible justice by Dizzy, that people sent out a second armament as great as the first, and that we Englishmen cannot do as much? Surely not.

The political crisis which had been growing out of the military mismanagement ever since the opening of the emergency Session reached its climax on January 23, when Roebuck gave notice of his famous motion for an inquiry into the condition of the army before Sebastopol. Goderich, full of his schemes of Army Reform, tore

himself away from Pau and travelled post haste to London. In the debate on January 28-29, which brought about the fall of the Aberdeen Cabinet, he took no part, wisely reserving himself for a moment when his proposals could receive a more concentrated attention. While he was waiting, an unexpected compliment was paid to him, which, had he been less of a stalwart Radical than he was, might well have closed his mouth for a good decade. Palmerston, who, whatever his defects, never bore malice, offered him office in the Government he was unexpectedly called upon to form. What the office was and the circumstances of its offer have not been recorded.<sup>1</sup> Many years later, when he was chaffed by Mr. Asquith for having served under Palmerston in 1859-66, he defended himself by saying that he did under that Government what he had done ever since—"I took what I could get and waited to get more."<sup>2</sup> In 1855 he was not quite so advanced on his Opportunist career, and he declined Palmerston's offer.

As soon as the new Cabinet had shaken itself down, through a stormy reconstruction, into something approaching normal life, Goderich took his Reform scheme in hand and gave notice of an address to the Crown. His motion was limited to the system of promotion in the Army, which it declared to be "injurious to the public service and unjust to the private soldier," but his speech in introducing it ranged over the whole field of Army mismanagement and was especially severe on the purchase system. Owing to the discontent out of

<sup>1</sup> The only reference to it is in a letter Goderich wrote to Hughes after his return to Pau (March 8, 1855): "Looking back at the strange six weeks I passed in England, I feel this satisfaction, at least, that I did honestly and rightly in the important personal question I had to decide about taking office, and I think that the near approach of that position, which has many attractions for me, especially in the change from talk to work, and its deliberate rejection, will dissipate any remnants of a petty and false ambition for mere office which I confess has sometimes haunted and troubled me."

<sup>2</sup> Speech at Eighty Club.—*Times*, November 25, 1908.

doors, the debate assumed quite imposing proportions, and engaged the participation of the Prime Minister and of other leading Members on both sides of the House. Among the supporters of the motion, the most interesting and effective was that fine old soldier of fortune, General De Lacy Evans, still faint from his efforts on the battle-fields of the Alma and Inkermann. Goderich, however, was not happy in his tactics, and not only was his motion thrown out by a majority of 158 to 114, but he had on the following day a "bad Press," even in quarters like the *Times*, where criticisms of the Army administration had been fiercest. The truth is that he was suffering from a temporary relapse into democratic sentimentality. In the following letter to Hughes he diagnosed the cause of his failure with creditable accuracy :

*To Thomas Hughes*

MAISON FOREST, 8th March, 1855.

. . . Thinking over the whole matter, I feel that I was right in presenting my motion as I did and urging the point I did, because it was the one on which I felt really strongly, and I had long done so ; but for my own interest in the H. of C. I was wrong altogether. If I had been less democratic and less pressing, and merely moved for a Committee, I should have had a large majority and much praise in the morning papers ; but I should not then have done what I felt *called* to do, but merely what would have been good for me, and I thought it right to stick to my original motion and object. I am afraid that you have judged me somewhat wrongly, being led astray by never having yourself tried to talk democracy to the House of Commons—a task enough to frighten many a man—for the House knew, with its accurate instinct,

well enough what I was at, and that is why they rejected the motion and the *Times* abused me. It put them to this test: Are you ready, not merely to let your middle classes into the ranks of your officers, but the people; and are you ready to do so *at once* when you have a good clear opportunity? That was the question I meant to ask them, and they were afraid to give an honest answer, so they tried their utmost to get rid of the motion without a division, and failing that they rejected it on false pretences and abused me afterwards, as they were quite right to do. My motion was clearly a parliamentary mistake, and I found that out before I made it, but I believe that, barring some improvements which might have been made in the phraseology, it was the right thing to have done in the matter; and that I should have forced (for it was sheer force in many cases) 114 respectable M.P.'s to vote for me is good service done. If there are not twice as many sergeants promoted in the next year as there was in the last, it will not have been my fault. . . .

These were not the only reasons why the motion was a failure. As Mansfield afterwards wrote to him from Constantinople, the application of democratic principles to the Army was difficult owing to the illiteracy of the average recruit, and it had been rendered ten times more difficult by the wastage of the war, which had carried off the best elements in the ranks.<sup>1</sup>

It was not long, however, before the wider aspects of the war drove all thought of Army Reform out of Goderich's mind. He carried back with him to the Pyrenees a trunk full of diplomatic documents on the Eastern Question, together with many recondite works on the geography and ethnography of the lands bordering the Black Sea. At these he worked with characteristic

<sup>1</sup> Letter: Constantinople, December 31, 1855.

thoroughness, and when he returned to England in the early summer, he felt himself fully qualified to deal with all the intrigues for an inconclusive peace which he knew were in progress in Vienna. Early in September the fall of Sebastopol was announced. While other people were for the most part rejoicing, he was deeply perturbed by fear lest this success should favour the Peace intrigues. The danger was not confined to Vienna. As far back as the previous December he had confided to Bruce his apprehension that the Government might be tempted to make "a bad Peace," which would leave the detestable settlement of 1815 unrevised,<sup>1</sup> and his doubts had not been allayed by the substitution of Palmerston for Aberdeen. Moreover, in the interval the Peace Party at home had been rendered disquietingly articulate, if not visibly strengthened, by the open support given by Gladstone to the efforts of Bright and Cobden to stop the war on the basis of Russia's acceptance of three of the so-called "Four Points" of the Vienna Note. This limitation of "the essential objects of the war" to the safeguarding of the "integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire" was anathema to the Jingos of the time, with whom for once the extreme Radicals, and Goderich with them, were in full agreement.

So far as Palmerston was concerned, Goderich was once again misled by his personal antipathies.<sup>2</sup> The minds of the two men, quite unknown to one another, were indeed moving on lines not only very similar in scope but curiously alike in detail. Both had foreseen the Peace Movement which followed the fall of Sebastopol,<sup>3</sup> and when that movement matured they evolved independently almost exactly the same scheme

<sup>1</sup> Letter, December 17, 1854.

<sup>2</sup> Writing to Hughes about this time, he says: "Of course, one can't expect Palmerston, being a mere mountebank, to do what a hero alone can do." (Letter, October 4, 1855.)

<sup>3</sup> See Palmerston's letter on this subject to his brother on August 25, 1855. (Ashley: *Life of Palmerston*, vol. ii, p. 100.)

of settlement. The coincidence is very striking, all the more because Goderich was probably first in the field in placing his views on record, and in a form which could not have been made known to Palmerston. While at Brighton towards the end of November, he met Forster and discussed the whole question with him. Forster agreed with him that if the hopes of the Radicals were to be fulfilled, or if only an adequate compensation for the sacrifices of the Allies was to be obtained, another campaign was necessary, and that its triumphant prosecution was quite feasible. At the same time he asked Goderich to consider the problem of Peace in the then circumstances of the war, and to let him have his views in writing. Goderich consented, and on November 30 sent him a long and reasoned letter, in which he anticipated almost all the points secured by British diplomacy in the Treaty of Paris exactly four months later.

The letter is worth placing on record,<sup>1</sup> not only as a contribution to the literature of the Treaty of Paris, but also as illustrating Goderich's painstaking methods in studying even questions with which his parliamentary activities were not mainly concerned. Broadly speaking, the problem he had to consider was how many and how much of his original war ideals could be saved if the then military situation in Armenia and on the Danube remained unmodified. He recognized at once that a revision of the settlement of 1815 in the sense of a general liberation of oppressed nationalities was impossible, and also that the hemming-in of Russia on her Western European frontier was only partially practicable. Still, something might be done in both these directions, and with that view he made the following six proposals :

(1) " All existing treaties between Russia and the Porte to be swept away.

<sup>1</sup> Appendix II.

(2) The Danubian provinces [Moldavia and Wallachia, now Roumania] to be united into one, under the suzerainty of the Porte, without any foreign protectorate and with a constitution suited to the wants and wishes of the people of the country, the Règlement Organique being altogether abolished.

(3) The navigation of the Danube to be free and the country south of the Kilia Mouth, together with the Tête de pont of Reni, to be ceded to Turkey.

(4) Sebastopol to be destroyed and not rebuilt, or the harbour used for military purposes ; and the Bosphorus fortified.

(5) The countries south of the Caucasus now in the possession of Russia to be given up and to be formed into two States under Turkish suzerainty, with complete internal independence ; Turkish Armenia being for this purpose united with the Armenian provinces ceded by Russia.

(6) The Isles of Aaland to be ceded to Sweden, or, at any rate, to be deprived of their fortifications and to be perpetually demilitarized."

In discussing these points, Goderich further suggested that if possible Bessarabia should be ceded to the United Principalities, though he doubted whether Russia could be forced to agree to this. He also insisted that, as an alternative to the new buffer States on the Caucasus frontier, the whole of the Black Sea should be neutralized and "commercialized." If these points are compared with the Treaty of Paris, it will be seen that Goderich anticipated all the essential provisions of that compact. It is true that as they stand they seem to be intended primarily as a protection to Turkey, but this was by no means Goderich's aim. His sole idea was to erect barriers against Russia, and if he retained a nominal suzerainty of the Porte in his proposed buffer States,

it was only with the view of strengthening those barriers by bringing them within the collective guarantee of Europe. If he did not propose, as he formerly did, to complete the chain of buffer States with a liberated Poland and the annexation of Finland to Sweden, it was because the stage then reached by the war did not justify such large demands.

Unfortunately, even while he was writing, the military situation in Asia was undergoing a change which relegated his territorial projects in that region to the same limbo as his idea of a liberated Poland. Early in December, the surrender of Kars to the Russians was announced. Had this misfortune stood alone Goderich would not have been very much disconcerted, as he still had his Black Sea, alternative to fall back upon; but when some three weeks later it was discovered that the Austrian proposals in regard to the Black Sea stipulated that they should not form part of the general Treaty of Peace, but that they should be dealt with in a separate Treaty between Russia and Turkey alone, he saw the whole of his projected settlement toppling to pieces. He now became more than ever convinced that another and much enlarged campaign was indispensable.<sup>1</sup> Downing Street, however, thought otherwise, and agreed to discuss preliminaries of peace on the basis of the Austrian proposals. Goderich resigned himself to the inevitable in a characteristic letter to Hughes:

*To Thomas Hughes*

WREST PARK, 19th January, 1856.

MY DEAR TOM,—So we are to have peace! I still *doubt*. I scarcely even wish it, for I cannot persuade myself that if we have peace now, even a tolerably good one, old England will not have *lost*, whoever else may have gained—have *lost* at least in position and

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Bruce, December 24, 1855.

prestige, and I would not for worlds have one pleat of the old Lady's cap injured, or one breath to dim the brightness of her fame. I know such views are very old-fashioned and unchristian, according to the Xianity of people with whom religion appears to be nearly synonymous with cowardice; but whether it is old or new, Jew, Turk, Infidel, or Heretic, it is right, and that's all I care about.

The only thing is that we may under such guidance as we have, or are likely to have, do no better next campaign than we have done hitherto, and if so, perhaps it is better that we should stop now if we have a good chance.

With loves to and from all, I rest,  
Always yours affec., GODERICH.

The final Treaty of Peace turned out better than Goderich had expected, for Palmerston not only secured the neutralization of the Black Sea but also the cession of Bessarabia to the Principalities. The Protocols of the Paris Congress showed, too, that Palmerston was not quite so bad as Goderich's fancy had painted him;<sup>1</sup> and so except for one angry fling at the Tripartite Treaty, of which he disapproved as making a new link with Austria, he ceased from grumbling.<sup>2</sup> His Radical friends were not so easily placated. Layard was furious. "We have done nothing for liberty," he wrote from Constantinople in a letter full of maledictions on Stratford Canning, Palmerston, and Williams of Kars.<sup>3</sup>

To this outburst Goderich seems to have made no response. His silence is not difficult to understand.

<sup>1</sup> It afterwards became known that even on the Polish Question the British Cabinet was not dumb, though unfortunately it only succeeded in extracting from Russia certain informal assurances which were not fulfilled. (See Filipowicz: *Confidential Correspondence of the British Government respecting Poland*, Paris, 1914.)

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Bruce, May 22, 1856.

<sup>3</sup> June 9, 1856.

The Crimean War with its "inconclusive" termination represents a further stage in his political disillusionment. Not that his generous impulses staled or, indeed, ever staled; but, as in the field of domestic reform, so now in the domain of international reconstruction, he realized that it was not possible to bring about a millennium "by express train." He returned to the slower but surer processes of administrative reform, more particularly on the military side where the prospects were hopeful, owing to the popular interest in Army efficiency kindled by the anxious experiences of the war. He joined General De Lacy Evans in a vigorous campaign for the abolition of the sale and purchase of commissions, and, during 1856-8, created for himself a well-deserved reputation as one of the soundest authorities on military questions in the House.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Harvard*, vol. cxi, pp. 1795 et seq.; vol. cxlii, p. 1019; vol. cxlix, p. 436.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE INDIAN APPRENTICESHIP

(1857—1858)

THE distracting influence of the Crimean War on the relations of certain politicians and factions in the House of Commons was aggravated rather than relieved by the Peace. The Peelites and Whigs, who had more or less held aloof from the concentration of middle-class Liberalism under Palmerston, together with the whole body of Manchester Radicals, found themselves more than ever estranged from the Government. Palmerston's Jingoism, his suspected lukewarmness to Reform, and, above all, his personal ascendancy, were hateful to all of them.

In the spring of 1857 it was noted by the public journals that the whole Opposition were agitated by strange whisperings and a mysterious expectancy. What precisely was in the wind was only fully made known many years later.<sup>1</sup> The "fortuitous concourse of atoms," as Palmerston afterwards called it, with a juster sarcasm than he knew,<sup>2</sup> was, in fact, in very unfortuitous process of coalescence. Tories and Peelites, Whigs and Radicals, were sidling up to each other with the single purpose of upsetting the debonair Dictator. Gladstone was in furtive parley with Derby and Disraeli, on the one hand, and with Cobden on the other, while Lord John was becoming openly critical of his

<sup>1</sup> Most fully in Morley's *Life of Gladstone*, vol. i, pp. 558 et seq. See also the previous chapter.

<sup>2</sup> Ashley: *Palmerston*, vol. ii, p. 136.

late colleagues, whom he had only forsaken eighteen months before, for their own good.<sup>1</sup> Forced into the open by the China War, the Cabal managed after a heated debate of four nights to place the Government in a minority of 16 (March 3). This success would probably have consolidated the only half-crystallized "concourse of atoms," but for the pluck of Palmerston. He at once appealed to the country, which responded by smiting his enemies hip and thigh, and sending him back to St. Stephen's with an apparently solid majority of 85.

The election was disastrous for the Radicals, especially those of the Manchester School. Cobden, Bright, Milner Gibson, Miall, and Goderich's own close ally, Layard, were all thrown out. Goderich himself managed to survive, although he had been one of the "atoms," and had both spoken and voted against the Government in the China debate. His case, however, was not quite the same as that of Palmerston's other enemies. He was known to be hostile to the Manchester School; he had been essentially Palmerstonian on the Crimean War, and if he had disliked the Premier as bitterly as Gladstone and Cobden, he had, at any rate, been careful to dissemble his antipathy. Moreover, he appealed to a new constituency, the West Riding, where his family influence was considerable, and where for some time Forster had been working hard on his behalf. The Riding had until then been represented by Cobden, but his views on education, and more particularly on the war, had alienated from him almost all sections of the electorate. Goderich, with his Radical Imperialism, proved a welcome alternative. Curiously enough, Cobden migrated to Goderich's old constituency at Huddersfield, where the Radicals were thought to be of a less flamboyant type, but this proved to be a delusion, and the Free Trade chief suffered a crushing defeat.


<sup>1</sup> Spencer Walpole: *Life of Lord John Russell*, vol. ii, pp. 273-4.

Scarcely was the election over, when the news of the Indian Mutiny and the appalling horrors which attended its outbreak, stirred the nation to its depths and threw all other political questions into the shade. To Goderich it did not come altogether as a surprise. In the previous November his cousin, Robert Ellis, writing from Nagpore, had warned him that "the state of India is most precarious."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, he had long been deeply interested in the affairs of the great Dependency and had followed all their recent developments very closely. In view of the large part he was destined to play in Indian history, the origin and growth of this interest are well worth tracing.

Its first impulse was hereditary. To his father it probably owed nothing, for though the elder Ripon was President of the Board of Control from 1843 to 1846, his tenure of that office was quite pathetically incompetent.<sup>2</sup> It was from his maternal grandfather that Goderich derived the foundations of all his views on Indian politics. The fourth Earl of Buckinghamshire was an Indian statesman to whom sufficient justice has not been done. Unlike the first Lord Ripon, he was a man of strong character, of great courage, and, though a staunch Tory, capable of very definite liberal opinions. He first distinguished himself as a singularly upright and public-spirited Governor of Madras, where he won for himself the confidence and affection of the whole Presidency. But it was during his short tenure of the Board of Control in Lord Liverpool's Administration that he gave evidence of the larger statesmanship which entitles him to rank among the pioneers of Liberal reform in India. It was he who, on the occasion of the renewal of the Charter in 1813, abolished the trade

<sup>1</sup> Letter, November 28, 1856.

<sup>2</sup> It was his last office, and owing to the quarrel between the Company and Lord Ellenborough it was from the beginning a hornets' nest. Ripon took refuge in illness and left Peel to do the work. Parker: *Sir Robert Peel*, vol. iv, cap. i, and p. 265.)



THE FOURTH EARL OF BUCKINGHAMSHIRE

• (From a portrait at Studley.)



monopoly of the Company and threw open the commerce of India to the world. His speeches on that occasion anticipated in broad outline much of the modern Liberal doctrine of Indian administration. He startled the Nabobs and ex-Viceroy by avowing his readiness to abolish the Charter altogether in the event of any recalcitrancy on the part of the Company. He strongly emphasized the direct responsibility of the Crown for the welfare of the country, and he declared, with a blunt earnestness which had obviously nothing of cant about it, that the United Kingdom could not divest itself of its duty to promote "the moral improvement and social happiness of the people," and even to assure "the security of their property and personal freedom."<sup>1</sup> These were bold and unfamiliar words a century ago. Buckinghamshire, in short, was a precursor of Bentinck, of whom Goderich said many years afterwards that he had always "endeavoured to follow in his footsteps."<sup>2</sup>

Though Buckinghamshire died eleven years before Goderich was born, he exercised a very real influence over his grandson. It was in the Earl's home at Nocton, full of fascinating relics of his Madras Governorship, that Goderich spent the first seven years of his life. Moreover, the relatives with whom he was in closest touch at this period, and for many years after, were his maternal uncle, Sir Henry Ellis—Buckinghamshire's only son<sup>3</sup>—who had also served the Company in India, and his cousin, Robert Ellis, who afterwards became a distinguished member of the Madras Civil Service. Goderich may therefore be said in a measure to have been brought up in an Indian atmosphere. As soon as he began to think of public affairs he plunged into a course of reading on Indian history and politics, and when his cousin went to Madras in 1844 he kept up with him a regular correspondence in which the two young

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. xxv, pp. 699-752; vol. xxvi, pp. 786-8.

<sup>2</sup> *Speeches of the Marquis of Ripon in India*, vol. ii, p. 291.

<sup>3</sup> See *supra*, p. 21.

men discussed all current problems of Indian administration. Both were Radicals, but, while Ellis inclined to the school of Cobden and Bright,<sup>1</sup> Goderich remained faithful to the Liberal Imperialist tradition of their common grandfather. One of his earliest lectures to working-men, delivered while the republican fit was still strong upon him, was on "Our Indian Empire." It was a careful and judicious survey of British rule in India, designed to show that our record in that country was, on the whole, a matter for patriotic pride and not for shame. Later on, after the siege of Lucknow, he enlarged the lecture, and was very active in delivering it before Radical Clubs and Mechanics' Institutes, in which the "cut-the-painter" school had made many converts through the Mutiny.<sup>2</sup>

Notwithstanding this fund of knowledge Goderich, with characteristic modesty and caution, made no serious attempt to intervene in the Indian debates until the spring of 1858. He was none the less busy in the background, storing up facts, maturing his judgments, serving on committees, and occasionally helping in the solution of minor questions on which his help was solicited by friends in India. Even before the Mutiny, his interest in such questions was well known to thoughtful men in the Peninsula. Bartle Frere, then at the outset of his career, frequently consulted him. In November 1856 we find Ellis writing to him: "I got a very nice letter, full of your praises, from Hyder Jung, the Mussulman gentleman I introduced to you, and who went home to advocate the interests of the Carnatic Stipendiaries." A couple of months later, he was specially asked to bring to the notice of the House of Commons certain grievances of the Bengal Army officers in connexion with the management of the Bengal Military Fund.<sup>3</sup> Hence, when the Mutiny

<sup>1</sup> Letter, February 2, 1858.

<sup>2</sup> The MSS. of both these lectures are among the Ripon papers.

<sup>3</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cxlvi, p. 1046.

broke out, he had many valuable sources of information at his disposal, and later on these were supplemented by Layard, who, towards the end of 1857, made a journey to India to examine the facts for himself.

It was, however, from Ellis that the larger part of his information and advice was derived. Ellis was then Deputy Commissioner in the disaffected state of Nagpore, and he had excellent opportunities of forming a sound opinion of the situation. As early as July 4, he found time to communicate his impressions at considerable length to Goderich. Here is what he said of the origin of the Mutiny, and it is worth quoting because it is now substantially the view of all the accepted historians of the outbreak :<sup>1</sup>

*From Robert Ellis*

. . . I believe it to have been that the policy of annexation pursued lately has so alarmed all the native princes of India, that they have combined to send agents throughout India to sow disaffection among the native soldiery. They have skilfully availed themselves of every circumstance to attain their object, and they have been terribly successful. The organization of the Bengal army has been, and is, very imperfect—the discipline lax, and the sepoys were much disappointed at the annexation of Oude, from which country a large portion of the Bengal army is supplied. Say what we will, the natives have a great liking for a native Raj; and the sepoys' families in Oude suffered very little from misgovernment, as they were protected by the Resident. The annexation of Nagpore created great alarm among the native princes, for this reason: they knew how perfectly submissive the late Rajah had always been to the British Govt., and they felt that if Nagpore has been annexed we who have

<sup>1</sup> Letter: Nagpore, July 4 [1857].

given frequent causes of complaint cannot hope to escape. The fact that cartridges, made up in a manner which made their use a degradation both to Mussulman and Hindu, were sent out to India and were nearly being distributed, was seized on by the agents of revolt to inspire the sepoys with the idea that their religion was to be interfered with. They said: "See how steadily the British Govt. is interfering. First there was the interference regarding the Suttee sacrifice; then an army of missionaries has been sent during the last few years to make Kaffirs of our children. Then the British Govt. has been passing enactments to encourage the remarriage of widows, contrary to the Sartons and time-honoured custom, and then, as if this was not sufficient, they have resolved to take away the caste and defile the Hindu and Mussulman sepoys by making them eat cartridges smeared with the fat of pigs and bulls. Their agents also spread a report that flour mixed with bone-dust was being imported from England, and that the Govt. intended to buy up all the grain and force the polluted flour into the market." All this will appear childish to you in England, but you cannot understand the extraordinary credulity of the natives, and the rapidity with which these rumours travel and gain strength. . . .

The same letter contains a graphic account of events in Nagpore itself, which helps us to understand what kind of man Ellis was :<sup>1</sup>

*From Robert Ellis*

. . . I had for nearly three weeks previous to the outbreak received secret information wh. led me to

<sup>1</sup> "In this crisis [the Mutiny] the judgment and resolution of Mr. Ellis and his coadjutor, Mr. Ross, averted a great calamity."—Article "Nagpur" in Hunter's *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. x, p. 169.

believe that a storm was near, but nothing authentic was reported; so that all that could be done was to watch the troops here—the Nagpore Irregular Force and the Madras troops at Kamptee, ten miles off. The Irregular Force consists of 1 Regt. Infantry, 1 Regt. of Irr. Cavalry, and a horse battery. News came at the beginning of June that the Bengal Regt. at Intbatpore, about 180 miles from here, were ready to rise. It was resolved to send a portion of the Madras troops from Kamptee and about 300 men of the Irr. Cavalry from Nagpore. The men of the Irr. Cavalry came forward to volunteer their services, and although I had heard that they intended to go over to the Bengal troops, whenever they got near them, their own officers were firmly convinced of their fidelity. On the evening of June 13, at ten at night, I received intelligence that the Irregular Cavalry had determined to rise that night at twelve (they were to have marched on the morning of the 14th), to murder every European, and to seize the treasury and hill fort, proclaim the fall of the British Govt., and place on the throne Erhwunt Rao Goojar, a grandnephew of the late Rajah of Nagpore. I instantly woke Emily [Mrs. Ellis] and sent her off with another lady and some children to Kamptee, rushed off to warn the officer who was to have commanded the detail of Irr. Cavalry ordered to march. I then got on a horse and galloped to the Commissioner, informed him of what had happened, sent off the rest of the ladies to Kamptee, to wh. place the Com<sup>r</sup> also went to get Madras troops. A few of us then warned the handful of Madras troops in charge of the Arsenal and Hill Fort of what was happening, and in an incredible short space of time we had the Irregular Infantry and the Horse

Battery out on parade. To our great delight they proved staunch, and we marched up to the Irr. Cavalry lines. They were completely disorganized by finding that their plot was discovered.

I then marched a company to the city of Nagpore, where they had conspired to join the mutinous cavalry. However, the news had preceded me of the plot being discovered and they all fled and concealed themselves. In the morning at daybreak a force of European Horse Artillery and Madras Cavalry were brought in by the Commissioner from Kamptee, and we were then complete masters of the situation. We have disarmed the Irr. Cavalry, who are strictly confined to their lines, and have hung three of their officers. The Madras troops and the remainder of the Irregular Force bore the execution without a sign of discontent. I gave the signal with the fullest confidence in the justice of the sentence and the wisdom of severity—although this point was much canvassed here—but any other course would have encouraged the disaffected and been attributed to fear. As Deputy C<sup>r</sup> of Nagpore I've had the most ceaseless and disagreeable labour of finding and arresting the leaders of the conspiracy in the City of Nagpore—and I have reason to be thankful that I've not yet been shot. Their relations, of course, secretly determine to be revenged, and I've had all kinds of warnings not to go into the City, but in these times *il faut payer de sa personne*, and unless we give an example of fearlessness we shall never get our subordinates to do their duty. . . . . •

Ellis concludes his letter with an appeal to Goderich :

“ . . . However, I hope things will settle down, but raise your voice to ensure a large number of European

troops being sent at once to India. These events have done incalculable harm to our prestige, and we must hold India for some years with a strong British army. Once secure we must direct our attention to strict measures of reform in our system of administration. . . ."

Both Layard and Frere wrote to Goderich much to the same effect on the causes of the Mutiny. Though Frere's letters arrived too late to be of any use in the Indian debates of 1858,<sup>1</sup> his views, especially those on the reform of the Indian Government, made a lasting impression on Goderich.

Ellis's appeal to Goderich to raise his voice for troops and Reform proved unnecessary. Once more Palmerston disappointed the lingering distrust of his Radical critic, for not only did he take prompt and vigorous measures to dispatch an army to India, but he speedily resolved to grapple with the problem of Reform on drastic lines. Shortly after the rising of Parliament in August, he gave notice to the East India Company of the proposed transfer of their political powers to the Crown. This time Goderich was ungrudging in his praises. He wrote to Hughes from Brighton on November 27, 1857:

" . . . So E.I.C. is to be abolished ! Well done, Pam, say I. If you go on like that I shall get quite inclined to support you heartily. We must not, however, in our satisfaction at the abolition of the double Govt, forget that the task of devising a new Govt for India will be a most difficult one. Great will be the responsibility resting on the H. of C. this Session, and

<sup>1</sup> Layard's letters cover the same ground as those he wrote to Mrs. Austen at the same time (Bruce: *Sir Henry Layard's Autobiography and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 212-19). In substance they confirmed the views of Ellis, but their main standpoint was more uncompromisingly pro-Indian. The best of Frere's letters to Goderich has already been published (Martineau: *Life of Sir Barille Frere*, vol. i, pp. 265-70).

I tremble to think how its duty is likely to be discharged. . . ."

What Hughes thought of Palmerston's *coup* we are not told, but both Ellis and Layard looked to his task of reconstruction with grave apprehension, and Goderich seems to have given full, though not indiscriminating, weight to their views. Layard wrote from Indore on January 31, 1858, with a strong and characteristic plea for the unassimilable Oriental civilization of the Indian races.

*From A. H. Layard*

. . . In transferring the Government of this country to the Crown enormous good may be done and we may begin anew in India. But I confess that I feel alarmed when I contemplate the enormous difficulty of the task and the manner of man to execute it. . . .

. . . There is equal danger in making India a mere rig-up for destitute peers and their relatives, and in placing it under the immediate control of Parliament. I shall look with anxiety to the measure which Palmerston may propose to Parliament. . . .

. . . That which strikes a traveller—even one who has had some experience in the East—in India, is the distinct character of the country and people, the peculiar development of their civilization, which, in some respects, has attained a very high degree of perfection. It is something to be amongst a civilized people who have never heard of Moses or Abraham,<sup>1</sup> whose traditions are utterly different from those of the rest of mankind. When we remember these facts, we may easily conceive the difficulty of converting to our religion or to our habits and sentiments some two hundred millions of such a people. . . .

<sup>1</sup> Layard seems to have forgotten the Mussulmans.

Ellis was more concerned with the machinery of the new Government and its final purpose :

*From Robert Ellis*

. . . The abolition of a double government will be doubtless an advantage to India, but the constitution of an Indian Council w<sup>b</sup> shall be effective, and not liable to the corruption of party influence, is a difficult matter, although not an impossibility. I consider the *principles* upon w<sup>b</sup> you will resolve to govern India—namely, *for itself* and with a view to leaving it hereafter—the really important part of the work. . . .<sup>1</sup>

With the view that India must be governed for itself Goderich was, of course, in perfect sympathy, but he had no idea of so shaping the new Government as to make it a mere prelude to a policy of scuttle. He saw, however, with Ellis, that the crux of the matter lay in the constitution of the proposed India Council, and to this aspect of the question he gave much thought.

Meanwhile, Palmerston's Government, despite its imposing majority, had suffered a sensational defeat on the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, and had found itself constrained to retire (February 19). The solution of the Indian question thus passed to Lord Derby, who had succeeded in forming an administration with Disraeli as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the hostile Commons. The day before his defeat, Palmerston had obtained leave to introduce his Bill for transferring the Indian Government to the Crown. With his resignation this Bill disappeared, and another was drafted by the new President of the Board of Control, Lord Ellenborough, who, as an ex-Governor-General, had his own, albeit rather eccentric, views on the subject. It was Ellenborough who was Governor-General when Goderich's father went to the Board of Control in 1843, and the relations of the two men had

<sup>1</sup> Letter, February 2, 1858.

given rise to much unpleasantness.<sup>1</sup> This, however, did not appreciably affect Goderich's judgment of the Bill. He wanted to see a good Government in India, free to do its work with the least possible interference from home, and he especially distrusted parliamentary control in so delicate and distant a problem. Palmerston's Bill provided for a Council of eight nominated by the Crown ; Ellenborough's proposed one of eighteen, partly nominated and partly elected by fancy constituencies recruited from the chief commercial centres in the United Kingdom and from retired Anglo-Indians. Neither pleased Goderich. The nominated Council might easily mean too much interference from Downing Street ; the mixed Council would probably be less efficient and even more meddlesome. What was necessary was a body which would leave to Calcutta the things that were Calcutta's, and which in Whitehall would confine itself strictly to advising the Minister. How to form such a Council perplexed Goderich. It happened that, to the March number of *Fraser*, Arthur Helps had contributed a short article in which he argued the case against any kind of Council, and to him Goderich turned for guidance :

*To Arthur Helps*

6 EASTERN TERRACE, BRIGHTON, 30th March, 1858.

MY DEAR MR. HELPS,—Your short article in the last number of *Fraser* has interested me very much.

I entirely agree with the general principles which you there lay down in regard to Councils connected with executive departments of Gov<sup>t</sup>, and the more I think upon the subject the more force do I see in your arguments. There is, however, one consideration which you appear to have passed over, and which perhaps somewhat lessens their applicability to the

<sup>1</sup> Parker : *Sir Robert Peel*, vol. iii, p. 265.

particular case of the Home Gov<sup>t</sup> of India. It is this. The Gov<sup>t</sup> in India ought, as it seems to me, to be made as much as possible the real Executive of that country, and the functions of the Home Gov<sup>t</sup> should be restricted in practice within narrow limits. This appears to be the opinion of most of those best qualified to speak upon Indian affairs, and if it be a right one the objections to the dilatory and checking efforts of a Council become less strong, and may be (I do not say that they are) outweighed by the advantages which such a body would afford by being at hand to enlighten a Minister chosen after our English fashion, not for his knowledge of the questions with which he will have to deal, but for his influence and position in Parliament, and by acting as a "buffer" between the Gov<sup>t</sup> of India and the hasty ignorance of a momentary majority of the House of Commons. Now, you have left out of view in your article this peculiarity of the Home Gov<sup>t</sup> of India, and have argued as if it were in reality the Executive of that country; and I should therefore like very much to know whether this circumstance, when it is brought directly under your notice, removes any of your objections to the establishment of a permanent Indian Council. I do not much expect that it will. You will probably say that whatever may be the functions of the Home Minister for India, the Council will shackle and worry him injuriously and unnecessarily in their exercise. I am very much inclined to believe that, if this be your answer to my questions, you will be right; but, nevertheless, I am so strongly impressed with the importance of making the Gov<sup>t</sup> of India the really strong power, that I am sometimes tempted to dilute the influence of the Home Administration, and through it

of Parliament, by the intervention of a Council, though by no means of such an one as that proposed by Mr. Disraeli, which, apart from its other defects, would have an exactly opposite tendency, and would be so strong that it would endeavour, and probably be able to keep, the whole administration of India in its own hands.

I should be very grateful to you if you would tell me whether you think that these considerations are entitled to any weight. There is so strong a feeling in Parliament and "out of doors" in favour of a Council of some kind, that we are almost sure to see one established. . . .

. . . Pray forgive me for asking you your opinion upon this point. My only excuse for thus troubling you is to be found in the heavy responsibility which rests upon me and every M.P. for the course which we may pursue at this time in regard to Indian affairs. . . .

Believe me, my dear Mr. Helps,

Yours faithfully, GODERICH.

Helps was quickly converted.

*From Arthur Helps*

VERNON HILL, BISHOP'S WALTHAM, April 2/58.

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH,—. . . Your question is a very important one and goes to the root of the matter. I am inclined to agree with you, that the greatest part of the government of India had better be initiated and perfected in India—certainly initiated.

On that account let us have a Council of very able men here, who will discern the just limits of their power of action; but do not let us have a Council the main idea of which is that it should be a restraint and a hindrance. If we do, the restraining power breaks out

into open quarrel : Parliament must take cognizance ; and must interfere more and more in the details of Indian affairs, not being able as yet to master the details of government in this compact little island, so that year after year there are more continuation bills passed and fewer measures of any kind brought to perfection—I mean even parliamentary perfection.

A first-rate Minister, with a subordinate Council (not altogether consisting of old Indians), is more likely, in my judgment, to give fair room and scope to the government of India in India, than will be attained by either of the projects of law which have been brought before the House this Session.

Yours very truly, ARTHUR HELPS:

This seems to have convinced Goderich, and he began to intervene in the Indian debates with the air of a man who had made up his mind. His first important Indian speech, however, was not made on this aspect of the question, but on a side-issue of Ellenborough's main task at the expiring Board of Control, which nearly brought about a fresh Ministerial crisis. Canning, the Governor-General, had issued a Proclamation to the rebels in Oudh declaring the lands of the province forfeit to the Crown. The apparent harshness of this step gave rise to much excitement and controversy, although, as a matter of fact, it was only intended as a prelude to a further stage in Canning's eminently just and conciliatory policy. Ellenborough, always itching for the limelight, and knowing that he might depend at once upon the high Tories, who hated Canning for his freedom from vindictiveness, and on the extreme Radicals, who would be sure to be up in arms against any threats of confiscation, reproved the Governor-General in a rhetorical and offensive dispatch. In its original form the dispatch was " secret," but Ellen-

borough, without consulting his colleagues, gave it out for publication. The controversy aroused by the Proclamation was now drowned in an outburst of indignation at the tactless arrogance of Ellenborough; and, on behalf of the Opposition, Cardwell gave notice of a resolution of censure on the Government. Fortunately for Ministers, Ellenborough bowed to the storm and resigned, and the Opposition, not sure of its Radical wing, felt itself appeased and withdrew the resolution. In the course of the debate, however, Goderich made a notable speech in defence of Canning.<sup>1</sup> One cannot help suspecting that, in this case at least, he was to some extent influenced by Ellenborough's provocative treatment of his father in 1844. Goderich was not in the habit of sacrificing principle to personal admiration, but he did so in this case, and it is not easy to resist the explanation we have suggested.

The line he took was certainly in the nature of special pleading, as was afterwards pointed out by Bright, who followed him in the debate with a blunt protest that, if the question lay between hurting Canning's feelings and sanctioning his Proclamation, he, for one, could not hesitate. Goderich was partly for not "hurting Canning's feelings" and partly against Ellenborough's dispatch, which, he held, condemned the Governor-General unheard. He argued ingeniously that neither the House nor the Government knew anything of Canning's motives, and hence the interpretation sought to be placed on the Proclamation was not justified. As for the suggestion that the Opposition sympathized with harsh measures, he repudiated it warmly.

" . . . We are not here to advocate a policy of revenge; we are not here to defend the acts of a vindictive and cruel ruler. We are here to claim that due consideration should be shown to one who, at a time of imminent

<sup>1</sup> May 20, 1858. *Hansard*, vol. cl, p. 932.

peril, when the minds of men were excited by fear and anger—when their passions were roused by tales of horror, unsurpassed by any in history—boldly and courageously stood up, almost alone among his countrymen in India, against the cry for blood, and used all the influence of his high position and the weight of his authority against the demands for indiscriminate vengeance. We are here, Sir, to defend ‘Clemency Canning,’ and we accept the name that was given in derision as his highest title to honour.”

His personal references to Ellenborough in the same speech were not without a hidden reminiscence of his father’s grievances. He reminded him how Sir Robert Peel had defended him when, as Governor-General of India, he had issued a Proclamation open to the same reproaches as that issued by Canning, and he expressed his regret that he and the Government had not followed “this wise and generous example in the present case.” This was an allusion to Ellenborough’s punitive Proclamation against the Scinde Amirs in 1842, which gave great displeasure at home, both to the Government and the East India Company. It was not, however, Peel alone who had screened Ellenborough, and he knew it. Goderich’s father, then President of the Board of Control, had in the measure of his abilities taken the same course, and Ellenborough had repaid him with the reverse of gratitude.<sup>1</sup>

Before this question was finally disposed of, the Government found themselves involved in fresh difficulties over their India Bill. The more the measure was studied, the less acceptable it became. Bright denounced its fantastic Council scheme as “claptrap,” but public condemnation was not confined to this aspect of the Bill. There was grave danger of a defeat on the

<sup>1</sup> Parker: *Peel*, vol. iii, pp. 13, 17, 265.

Second Reading. Fortunately, the Opposition were reluctant to make the future of India a party question, and Disraeli deftly availed himself of this feeling to adopt an idea suggested by Russell, by which Resolutions of the House, affirming the broad principles of the new administration, were substituted for the unpopular Bill. When, however, the Resolutions were announced, it was found that the Bill had only been suspended instead of withdrawn. Goderich led a vehement protest from the Opposition benches, and gave notice that he would oppose the motion to go into Committee on the Resolutions unless the Bill were definitely abandoned. Russell supported him in a strong speech, and the Government capitulated.<sup>1</sup>

The question of the constitution of the Council in which Goderich was mainly interested came before the House on June 14, under the fifth Resolution. To this debate he contributed a thoughtful and well-reasoned speech. Ellenborough's original plan had been considerably modified, and the Resolution proposed only to pledge the House to a Council, partly nominated and partly elected. Even in this form it gave rise to misgiving and criticism, which no one voiced more clearly and decisively than Goderich. Radical though he was, he had convinced himself that, so far as the India Council was concerned, the elective principle was inadmissible. He would, he said, have supported the suggestion that there should be no Council at all, but for the consideration that with our forms of Parliamentary Government India would often be placed under the control of a Minister who had not a special or intimate knowledge of Indian affairs. He was consequently in favour of assisting him with a Council, so that if he were afterwards called to account in Parliament for anything that went wrong he might not be able to plead ignorance. But that Council, he insisted, should be exclusively nominated and advisory. An elected,

<sup>1</sup> April 23 and 25. *Hansard*, vol. cxlix, pp. 1584, 1585, 1709.

or partially elected, Council would be an independent body, and its temptation to intermeddle with all the details of Indian government would be irresistible. This he held to be extremely undesirable. The only sound principle was to leave a free hand to the Indian Government in all questions of detail. On high constitutional grounds, too, he opposed the elective principle. The Council, he said, was an executive body, and election had nothing to do with executive functions.<sup>1</sup>

The speech was much commented upon in the subsequent debate, and Gladstone devoted himself at length to a confutation of the constitutional point raised by Goderich. The sound sense of his reasoning, however, prevailed. Although the Resolution was carried by a substantial majority, the Government abandoned the elective provision in their final Bill, and divided the nominations between the Secretary of State and the Directors of the Company. This arrangement was still further modified by a later Act, with the result that Goderich's plea for a Council entirely nominated by the Minister was acted upon.

These were the only public appearances of Goderich in the important India debates of 1858, and they give but a faint idea of the hard and intelligent work on the Indian problem which lay behind them. He had, indeed, gradually evolved in his own mind a complete scheme for the reform of the Indian administration, of which his Parliamentary activities in regard to the constitution of the Secretary of State's Council were only the keynote. What this scheme was is briefly outlined in some letters which passed between him and Frere later in the year. Having limited the powers of the Home Government, he was for giving a very large measure of decentralized autonomy to the Indian Government.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cl, p. 2053.

<sup>2</sup> Letter, November 17, 1858.

*To Bartle Frere*

. . . Greatly increase the powers of all your officers, civil or military, hold them strictly responsible for the exercise of those powers; abolish the Regulations, divide the country into manageable districts, cease to attempt to check your officers by the inflexible machinery of stereotyped rules and orders, and substitute for them rigorous and constant personal inspection by their superiors; select carefully and promote by merit, and then you will have placed your Indian Administration on a sound and healthy footing. I am all for decentralization in India, so far as it means subdivision of presidencies, etc., and increase of the authority of local officers; but I am entirely opposed to Bright's plan of having no central Govt. at all. There are matters strictly Indian, *i.e.* not involving questions that must always be reserved for the Home Govt, which, nevertheless, can only be dealt with by a central authority, and wd. consequently, if you had no G.G., have to be referred to the India House here. There are many other objections to this scheme; but I think this is a very strong one, because I entirely agree with you in wishing to diminish as much as possible the interference of the H[ome] G[ovt.] . . .

. . . Our great object ought to be to strengthen the Govt. in India, and to make the position of G.G. such as will enable him to hold his own against unreasonable pressure from home.

With Frere's idea of an enlarged council for the Governor-General, he was not inclined to agree, on the ground that there would not be enough work for it, and that consequently "it would become a nuisance by trying to make work artificially." He suggested an ingenious alternative: 1

“ . . . It has sometimes struck me that the best organization for the G.G.'s Council wd. be one somewhat similar to that of the French *Conseil d'État* ; a body consisting of a considerable number of members, divided into sections, to whom all important questions should be referred for their report, and meeting from time to time as a whole whenever the G.G. might wish to consult them more solemnly. By some plan of this kind the G.G. might surround himself with able men drawn from many parts of India, and every branch of the Service, and also from the non-official classes. He cd. consult them how and when he liked, not being at all bound to follow their advice ; and I would also allow him to employ them as inspectors or on any special mission he might think fit. . . .”

On another point he differed from Frere, the method of selecting members of the Indian Civil Service, which had been settled on the basis of Open Competition in 1853.<sup>1</sup> They were agreed that the selections should originate in England, and all promotions should be reserved to the Indian authorities, but Frere was not in favour of selection by competitive examination, for the reason that a merely intellectual test of merit would be a source of danger rather than efficiency in India. Goderich argued very strongly for competitive examination, as a security against jobbery, which would be sure to infect the discretion of the Indian authorities in their work of promotion if it were allowed free play in the original selections at home.

*To Bartle Frere*

. . . I am convinced that if you leave the first app<sup>ts</sup> to be made by the Sec<sup>y</sup> of State on his own nomin<sup>a</sup>,

<sup>1</sup> 24-25 Vic., c. 54. Frere's letter will be found in Martineau, op. cit., vol. i, p. 265.

the same influences wh. will secure that nomination to his own friends or partizans will also follow the future course of his nominees in India, and lead to a pressure on the Local Govt. for their advancement very difficult to meet and very injurious to the public interests. I am sure that you will think me right when I say that we ought to send out to India the very best Englishmen we can get to go there, and if that be our object it does seem to me that an open system of ex<sup>n</sup> is the best wh. can be devised for ascertaining, *in the first instance*, the qualities of young men hitherto necessarily ascertained by the only efficient test, that of actual practice. We are as yet only in the infancy of the system. Our ex<sup>ns</sup> are probably now too purely literary; I hope to see them greatly improved; but I cannot but think that *for first appt.* they will ultimately give us the best test of merit.

But it was not only on the civil Government of India that Goderich had formed definite opinions at this stage of his public career. His normal interest in military questions had also led him to examine very carefully the Indian military problem, and we find him in the same year dissenting with great self-confidence from the views of so high an authority as General Jacob. Frere had sent him Jacob's views for his opinion,<sup>1</sup> and Goderich, who was always something of a "militarist" in Indian affairs, had expressed himself "startled" at Jacob's contention that with a proper organization and management of the Native Army, India could be held with 40,000 British troops. He was not disposed to rely so implicitly on the loyalty of the Native Army,

<sup>1</sup> The letter from Frere is dated "Kurachee, May 5, 1858." It enclosed a copy of a letter addressed to Sir Charles Trevelyan by Jacob, on March 24, 1858.

however well and sympathetically it might be managed, and he insisted that "we must surely retain, as the foundation of our power, a sufficient body of English troops to enable us to meet at once the possible defection of our Native Army."<sup>1</sup> In the same letter he outlines his "own idea of the proper reorganization of the Native Indian Army":

" . . . Abolish all native artillery. Form your regts. of cavalry and infantry on the Irregular Model. Give them *few* European officers, but select *those* most carefully. Make the command of a native corps a prize in the Service.

Let your native officers be real officers, and not, as I take it has been hitherto the case, a kind of bastard sergeant.

Let every European officer be first posted to an European regt., and do not let him be appointed to a native regt. until he has shown that he possesses qualifications for command.

Keep up the zeal of your officers by a system of promotion by merit and by strict inspection, but give them very large discretion, and allow few, if any, appeals from their authority. . . ."

Thus were the foundations securely and wisely laid for the great task of Indian statesmanship which Goderich was destined to perform twenty years later.

<sup>1</sup> Letter, July 13, 1858.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE SURRENDER TO PALMERSTON

(1855—1859)

BOTH in and out of Parliament Goderich's reputation made very considerable and solid progress during these eventful years. Echoes of it even reached Ellis in far-away Nagpore. "Goderich's reputation is growing in England," he writes in the autumn of 1856, "and I watch it with the greatest interest and with unalloyed pleasure, for its progress is steady and without any drawback of any kind."<sup>1</sup> More convincing is the testimony contained in the following letter :

*From Thomas Hughes*

12 PARK LANE, *Friday night.*<sup>2</sup>

DEAR GODERICH,—I write from the lodgings of the American I spoke to you about. I am here to spend a last evening with him. He is a famous fellow, and is just going back to throw himself into the cauldron<sup>3</sup> like a man and with all manner of right beliefs and intention. He was himself recounting to me what he had seen and done here, and what he had not done which he wanted to do ; and volunteered that there was one man whom he knew from reading speeches, etc., whom he particularly wanted to see but who was out of England, and named you. He had no idea that I knew anything

<sup>1</sup> Letter, September 27, 1856.

<sup>2</sup> The letter is dated in an endorsement by Goderich, October 3, 1856.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is to the Civil War which was then already threatening. In 1856 hostilities had actually broken out in Kansas.

particular about you, so that it is a captive of your own spear. I offered to give him an introduction, telling him you had returned, at which he jumped, saying he would go anywhere to see you before he started, which will be next Friday. He proposes to run down and see you next Tuesday, so be ready for him; he is a fine fellow going on a noble path.

Yours ever affect<sup>ly</sup>, THOS. HUGHES.

The American here referred to was Stephen Hurlbut, afterwards a distinguished General under Sherman in the Civil War. He duly made his pilgrimage to Tunbridge Wells, where Goderich was then staying, and the two men seem to have been very well satisfied with each other.

This growing reputation of Goderich was not due to any sensational parliamentary or other public successes. It was the fruit of his unostentatious industry and thoroughness over a wide field of work, of his high ideals and transparent honesty of purpose. It was all the more remarkable because he disliked with ever-growing intensity the histrionics of parliamentary debate, and his tastes were becoming more and more administrative. Even on the great questions in which he played a part, such as the Army and India, his main activity was behind the scenes and, as we have seen, is represented more by his letters than his speeches. But his best work was done in connexion with less showy measures, the Cinderellas of legislation, which made little noise in the newspapers, but were none the less essential to social progress. Thus, in 1857-8 we find him chiefly prominent in the debates relating to Savings Banks, Industrial Schools, Probates and Letters of Administration, Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, Civil Service Reform, the Marriage Law Amendment Bill, the Registration of Partnerships Bill, of which he was the author, the Administration of Justice, Beer Houses, and similar questions. To all of them he brought

a completeness of technical knowledge and a soundness of judgment which ranked him among the most useful Members of the House. It was to the cumulative effect of these unambitious but necessary labours that his growing political reputation was really due.

One of the most valuable services he rendered at this period was in connexion with Civil Service Reform. Together with Layard, he was one of the pioneers of the Competitive Examination system, and it was on his motion that the principle was first adopted by Parliament on April 24, 1856, and July 14, 1857. This was the culmination of labours which extended back to 1855, when he supported Layard's agitation for administrative reform at a series of great public meetings, and gallantly seconded his abortive efforts for "Fitness, not Favour" in the House.<sup>1</sup> When Layard lost his seat in March 1857 Goderich continued the struggle practically alone.

An interesting by-product of this campaign was that it first brought him into close relations with Gladstone, who had himself fought a hard but unsuccessful fight for Competitive Examinations in the Aberdeen Cabinet in 1853.<sup>2</sup> The deferential terms of the letter recording this approximation—the first letter from Gladstone in the Ripon papers—afford a further testimony to the consideration Goderich had won for himself in the House. The circumstances in which it was written were as follows: After the adoption of Goderich's resolution in April 1856, the question had been held in abeyance on a pledge from the Chancellor of the Exchequer<sup>3</sup> that existing abuses should be remedied and a wider scope given to the Competitive System. This pledge was not fulfilled, and when, on May 29, 1857, Mr. M. T. Bass put a question to the Chancellor in

<sup>1</sup> For an account of the agitation see Layard, *Autobiography and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 250-4.

<sup>2</sup> Morley: *Gladstone*, vol. i, pp. 509-12.

<sup>3</sup> Sir George Cornewall Lewis,

regard to certain patronage abuses, in which Members of Parliament were said to be concerned, he received a curt and unsatisfactory reply. Thereupon, Goderich gave notice that he would raise the question again on the Civil Service Estimates.<sup>1</sup>

*From W. E. Gladstone*

OXFORD, May 31, 1857.

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH,—I was surprised both at the tone and at the substance of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's answer to Mr. Bass yesterday, and I was not surprised at your notice which followed.

I should be little, I may perhaps say not at all, disposed any forward movement except with your approval. I confess, however, my first leaning is to the opinion that, after the motion you carried and the pledge you exacted last year, you cannot, if that pledge remains unredeemed by further advance, remain content either with a mere discussion or with a prospect of inquiry.

If the promise was (and so I understood) unequivocal, why should not its fulfilment be required, and can it be waived without some disparagement to yourself and to the late Parliament? On the other hand, though the House is new, this novelty will make the Gov<sup>t</sup> shy of provoking a dangerous division.

I do not know if you have ever consulted Sir James Graham upon this subject, but I think his judgment on it would be of great value.

I have been arguing from conviction against inclination, for I should much prefer not being brought into conflict with the Gov<sup>t</sup> if I can avoid it.

It may be from a fortnight to three weeks before I am in town again, but you will hardly answer sooner.

Yours sincerely, W. E. GLADSTONE.

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cxli, pp. 1401-8, 1430, 1443; vol. cxliii, p. 525.

The encouragement of Gladstone, for whom, in spite of the Crimean War, he had always retained a great admiration, seems to have spurred Goderich to a special effort, for when he again moved his Resolution on July 14 he made an exceptionally good speech which carried the whole House with him. The Chancellor renewed his pledges in a speech full of amiabilities for his "noble friend," and Palmerston himself wound up the debate with the announcement that the Government accepted the motion.<sup>1</sup>

Goderich was now becoming distinctly *ministrable*. In the following year, when the tottering career of the second Derby Cabinet kept the public in a fever of impending Ministerial changes, the newspaper prophets, as well as his own friends, constantly singled him out for Cabinet rank in the next Liberal Administration. This was especially the case during the crisis caused by the publication of Ellenborough's obnoxious dispatch to Canning.<sup>2</sup>

*From Sir Charles Douglas*

HÔTEL WINDSOR, RUE DE LA RÉGENCE, BRUXELLES, May 19/58.

MY DEAR GODERICH,—I fear much that a letter I wrote to you a fortnight or three weeks ago has never reached you, or else that one from you has miscarried. I therefore write again, for I very much wish to hear from you, and should be very sorry if you thought I had forgotten to write as I promised. When I wrote, the Govt. on Sufferance had not made itself unbearable, and tho' I ventured to assume that you would have an offer from *one* of the two proximate Ministers, I did not then anticipate it would be so soon, or that those noble Lords would so soon be *d'accord*. I know nothing but what I see in the *Times* and *Herald*, but I *assume* that Palmerston will be Premier, go to the H. of Incurables and leave Johnny to

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cxlv, p. 1324; vol. cxlvi, pp. 1463 et seq.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, p. 114.

lead the H. of C. I can hardly think that Derby will dissolve, therefore I suppose on Friday he will be out; *except in case of dissolution*, I cannot feel any *personal* interest, but I really am very anxious on *your* account. Palmerston Govt. pure and simple is impossible, but the Johnny and some *new* men may do well—and I look to you as one of the latter; but I more than ever think that if you accept *any* thing less than a seat in the Cabinet, you will lose the chance of personal *power* in the House and County which yr. position as Member for the W.R. enables you to attain—and out of the Cabinet you would have no *official* power to make up for what you would lose. If you are not fit to take the place of Labouchere, V. Smith, Baines, Stanley of Alderley, Harrowby, in the opinion of Palmerston and Johnny, I think you are far *better* with your position in the House, where you are, and much more powerful. The London correspondents of the French papers give you a subordinate place, and put *me* in a rage. I am, of course, very anxious to know if there is to be a dissolution? . . .

. . . We hope Olly and baby are both well. Jane unites with me in kind love and regards to Lady Gh., and I am ever, my dear Gh.,

Yrs. affectionately, CHARLES DOUGLAS.<sup>1</sup>

P.S.—I *hope* to see you Secy. of State for *Colonies*.

As we shall see presently, the newspaper prophets were not very far wrong. It was not, however, Goderich's growing reputation alone which had thus brought him to the threshold of Downing Street. Two other very important circumstances were operating in

<sup>1</sup> Sir Charles Eurwicke Douglas, K.C.M.G., an old friend of the family. Goderich's father appointed him Colonial Secretary of the Ionian Islands. He was M.P. for Warwick 1837-52 and Banbury 1859-65.

his favour. On the one hand, he had for some time been gradually overcoming or, at any rate, restraining his aversion from Palmerston; and, on the other, the good-natured Premier had long had an appreciative eye on the promising young politician, despite his undisguised dislike of him. These circumstances were important because, without Palmerston's favour, any official career in the Liberal party had become impossible. Goderich's more tolerant feelings for the Liberal Leader probably dated back to the unexpected offer of office he received from him in March 1855.<sup>1</sup> He could not be altogether insensible to so high and generous a compliment. Nevertheless, the approximation, so far as he was concerned, remained reluctant and negative, and was subject to curious relapses. Even after the Crimean War, he did not make much advance upon the grudging admission that, while "Pam was probably a mountebank, Dizzy was certainly a rogue, and there was no other alternative." As late as February 4, 1857—on the eve of the election in which he figured, for the first time, definitely as a Palmerstonian—his private feelings remained mixed. Thus he writes to Hughes :

*To Thomas Hughes*

To take one's way wisely and righteously through the mess of our foreign politics, as they present themselves in the H. of C., is a very hard task to an honest man. As it seems to me, one can't help preferring the pluck of Pam to the peace humbug of Milner Gibson and Gladstone,<sup>2</sup> or the friendship with decayed despotisms which Dizzy advocates; and yet the Palmerston policy is a miserable meddling affair after all, most unsatisfactory, and very unworthy of England. It is a terrible case of Hobson's choice, but

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> This is curious in view of the correspondence with Gladstone only four months later (*supra*, pp. 124-5).

it must be made, and so I suppose it will end in a grumbling vote for Pam as against his rivals.

The "grumbling vote" was given in his Election Address to the West Riding on March 13, in the following words :

"Since the formation of Lord Palmerston's Government I have given to it a general support; and, if you return me to Parliament, I shall be prepared to continue to do so for the future, as far as may be consistent with those Liberal principles which will always direct my political course. I think that Lord Palmerston deserves the thanks of the country for his conduct during the late war with Russia, for the manner in which he directed our diplomatic affairs during that difficult period, and especially for the course which he pursued at the time of the Vienna Conferences, and in respect to the disputes about the Isle of Serpents and the Bessarabian frontier, and I am of opinion that the present Government is more entitled to our confidence than any other which would be likely to be substituted for it."

In substance, this is an amusingly close paraphrase of the uncomplimentary analysis of Palmerstonism contained in his letter to Hughes. Whether, however, his real attitude was quite as Hobsonic as he made out seems a little doubtful.

Two letters from Lady Palmerston, both dated March 19, show that at this time he was on very friendly terms with that exceedingly clever lady, who was apparently relying upon him to assist her in promoting her husband's interest in the election.<sup>1</sup> The letters

<sup>1</sup> Lady Palmerston was grandaunt of Lady Goderich, through the marriage of the sixth Earl Cowper, her son by her first husband, with one of the daughters of Earl de Grey. In 1857 Goderich's acquaintance with her seems to have been quite recent. It probably only dated back to the previous year, when they met at Wrest Park, on the occasion of Lord Cowper's death. Lady Goderich was much attached to her "uncle Cowper."

relate to the candidature of Lady Palmerston's grandson, Lord Ashley, for Hull, and in the circumstances they have a decidedly piquant interest.

*From Lady Palmerston*

*Thursday.*

DEAR LORD GODERICH,—*Don't send the Lawyer.*<sup>1</sup> I find the Shaftesburys *determined* to let Ashley take his chance—only they beg you will be kind enough to write directly to your friends at Hull to recommend Ashley as a Palmerstonian and of liberal Politicks, and they hope this will carry him through. He is not gone to any Tory House or to any Tories, but to the inn, and he stands independent. Pray write directly to Hull.

Y<sup>rs</sup> sin<sup>ly</sup>, G. PALMERSTON.

*PICCADILLY, Thursday night, 2 o'clock.*

DEAR LORD GODERICH,—I am very well satisfied that you sent the gentleman<sup>1</sup> off, and it was very kind of you to be so active.

It will be a comfort to have an impartial opinion; but I really believe that in any case he, Ashley, had better stand and take his chance, as his prospects really seem to be good, and I hope L. P.'s name may make a new point in the party politics of Hull. It seems to have had so much effect in many places.

Therefore pray, in any case, write to your friends there under the notion that he is *sure* of standing, and no time should be lost as they are now all canvassing.

I think you might write by the early post to recom-

<sup>1</sup> There is no clue to these mysterious personages or their business.

mend him as a good liberal and *Palmerstonian*. What we want is to get the liberal party, or at least a part of them, and perhaps in this way he may cut into both parties. You must recollect that this is really a new state of things. This unprincipled Coalition, as addresses call it, make also a mixed party on our side, so I fancy blue and orange may fuse with some other colour or sink into white.

Pray call here when you can do so. I shall stay at home all morning and till I dress for the L<sup>d</sup> Mayor's dinner, and the sooner you can call on me the better, as I think we must have accounts from Ashley to-morrow morning.

By all these requests and proposals you see that I am depending very much on your good nature and friendly feeling, and pray excuse me if you think I am encroaching too much.

You might mention to your friends that Ashley is Palmerston's private secretary. This will lead them to feel that he is a real Palmerstonian and not a Tory in disguise.

I find from Shaf<sup>y</sup> that Ashley has many very good promises of support and even, I hope, some chance of Mr. Clay's favour.

Y<sup>rs</sup> very sin<sup>ly</sup>, G. PALMERSTON.

The second letter is endorsed in Goderich's handwriting "19 March, '57—no answer—saw her 20." What happened at the interview is not recorded, but Goderich does not seem to have written the letter recommending Ashley to the Hull voters.<sup>1</sup> Ashley was nevertheless returned.

<sup>1</sup> There is no trace of such a letter in the Hull newspapers of the time.

Lady Palmerston's description of her husband's Liberalism as of a type that might be relied upon to "cut into both parties," and thus dish the "unprincipled Coalition" <sup>1</sup> on the other side, is delightfully candid, but it is not easy to imagine Goderich listening to it with sympathy or even patience. If he did, the synthesis is probably found in Lady Palmerston's caressing reference to his "good nature." However that may be, it is certain that after the election Goderich ceased to figure as a permanent critic of the Government, and resigned himself to party discipline. For some time we hear no more, even in his letters, of the "mountebank" and his "muddling," and when the India Bill was announced in November he actually contemplated becoming a "hearty" supporter of his leader.<sup>2</sup> It was not a very energetic impulse. The Radical leaven in him still kept him on the alert against Palmerston's "swagger," although the general bias of his politics, and probably his growing desire for an administrative career, tended to make him more and more of a Palmerstonian in principle and action. This psychological conflict comes out very clearly in his attitude towards the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, which unexpectedly broke up Palmerston's big majority and wrecked his Administration, in February 1858.

Five weeks earlier—on January 14—Orsini had made his mad and wicked attempt to assassinate the French Emperor while he was driving with the Empress to the Opera. Napoleon and his consort had a miraculous escape, but many humbler folk were killed or maimed for life. Condemnation of the crime was universal, but in France it soon turned to an indignant outburst against England. Orsini and his gang had been political refugees in England, and it was under the shelter of British laws that they had hatched their conspiracy

<sup>1</sup> This was the "fortuitous concourse of atoms" referred to in the previous chapter, pp. 98-9.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, p. 107.

and had manufactured their infernal machines. The French Press were furious in their complaints; Army officers sent addresses of congratulation to the Emperor full of insulting references to England as "an infamous haunt of assassins," and some of them were published in the official *Moniteur*; the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an official dispatch, practically called upon us to modify our laws, and the Ambassador, Count Persigny, made a speech to a deputation from the City Corporation which, if not actually provocative, was at any rate injudicious.<sup>1</sup> Palmerston, realizing the importance of the French Alliance and the essential reasonableness of the French grievance, acted with unusual restraint and good sense. He made no formal reply to Count Walewski's dispatch, but, as of his own initiative, introduced a Bill into the House of Commons to strengthen the law relating to Conspiracy to Murder.

For once he misunderstood the temper of his countrymen. In his unwonted sobriety he also forgot what we should call to-day the "khaki" auspices under which his majority in the House had been recruited. His enemies—the old "fortuitous concourse of atoms"—were not so heedless. Their scent was sharpened by the soreness of the *débâcle* they had suffered eleven months before and by their longing for revenge. All were up in arms against the erstwhile swashbuckler, and the applause they received in the country was prodigious. It was strange to see avowed Pacifists like Gladstone, Bright, and Milner Gibson virtually brandishing in Palmerston's face his own discarded Jingo weapons. They were followed by a large body of Palmerstonian Radicals, headed by Tear'em Roebuck and a number of dissatisfied Whigs led by Russell. On the first reading of the Bill the Government were saved by the Tories, who hesitated to risk the imputation of acting as apologists of regicide. On the second reading, however, the issue was changed by an ingenious

<sup>1</sup> *Times*, January 24, 1858.

amendment moved by Milner Gibson, in which, while expressing readiness to strengthen the law against conspirators and assassins, the Government were censured for not vindicating the national dignity by replying to the French dispatch.<sup>1</sup> This gave Disraeli the opportunity he wanted, though Derby still hesitated,<sup>2</sup> and in the division the Government majority of 85 melted away into a minority of 19. It was a great day for the small knot of bitter anti-Palmerstonians—much greater for them than for the patriots who were honestly outraged by the insults of the French colonels—and this fact was exultingly underlined by the appearance of Bright and Milner Gibson, two of the most prominent victims of the election of the previous year, as tellers for the majority.<sup>3</sup>

In this orgy of political vindictiveness and factious intrigue, Goderich was one of the few men in the House who resolutely kept their heads. He did not like Palmerston, he hated Louis Napoleon, he had been the friend of Mazzini and many other political refugees in London, he was as good and almost as flamboyant a patriot as Roebuck, and in the previous year he had voted with the "atoms" on the question of the Chinese War, and had privately resented with them Palmerston's jingo appeal to the country. And yet on this occasion we find him voting steadily with the Government. It would be easy to suggest personal and interested motives; but, as a matter of fact, his action was scrupulously consistent and was, moreover, inspired by an admirable subordination of private impulses to the public interest. In both these respects his attitude was in clear contrast to that of Gladstone and his friends, for the moral considerations which actuated

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cxlviii, p. 1758. As a matter of fact, a perfectly adequate verbal reply was made. (See dispatch from Lord Cowley, *Parl. Papers*, 1857-8, vol. ix, p. 133.)

<sup>2</sup> Buckle: *Life of Disraeli*, vol. iv, p. 113.

<sup>3</sup> Both had meanwhile been returned at by-elections for Birmingham and Ashton-under-Lyne respectively.

him on the Chinese Question, when he voted with the "atoms," were essentially the same as those which inspired him on the Conspiracy to Murder Bill, and this was assuredly not the case with his former allies. The grounds on which he voted with Palmerston and the spirit in which he envisaged the whole question are set forth very lucidly in a long letter he wrote to Forster immediately after the first division.

*To W. E. Forster*

1 CARLTON GARDENS, S.W., Feb. 10th, 1858.

MY DEAR FORSTER,—My thoughts have been chiefly occupied of late by the Conspiracy Bill, and I do not know that I have ever felt greater difficulty in making up my mind what course to take in regard to any public question.

I ultimately decided to vote for the introduction of the Bill.

There were, I think, four matters to be considered in respect to it. First, was the Bill itself, in the abstract, a proper one for the House of Commons to take into consideration? for that was all which we decided to do by the vote last night. I thought it was. It seemed to me that in many cases of conspiracy to murder fine and imprisonment for two years would be a wholly inadequate punishment, and that the change proposed to be made by the Bill in the existing law upon this subject was one reasonable enough upon the face of it. That being so, I had to ask myself, in the second place, whether there was anything in the circumstances of the introduction of the Bill at the present time which ought to make us reject it. I cannot think that the mere fact of the French Government, of whose friendship and alliance we have been so perpetually boasting,

asking us to afford their Sovereign greater protection against assassination, ought of itself to induce us to cast from us with indignation any proposition of this kind, which we should otherwise have entertained; but then we were reminded of the language of the French Colonels, and of its insertion in the *Moniteur*. No doubt these gentlemen, in search of promotion, displayed much insolence and yet more ignorance upon the subject of England in their addresses, and the appearance of those addresses in the *Moniteur* gave them more importance than they would otherwise have possessed. The Emperor's apology, for such it certainly is, must be set against these objectionable proceedings, and weighing the one against the other I came to the conclusion that the really dignified course for England was to treat language of this kind with the indifference which it surely deserves, and to do, without regard to it, whatever she might think right. I need not tell you that I felt a strong disinclination to do anything which the French Government might wish for after the use of such language, but it seemed to me that it was the part of a nation conscious of its own strength and dignity to take its course steadily, undisturbed by such foolish impertinence, and moved by it neither to the right hand nor to the left. I could see little real dignity in Roebuck's language, much exaggeration in Lord John's, which would have been admirable if we had been asked to agree to an Alien Bill, but which seemed to me to shoot quite over the matter really in hand. I thought, therefore, there was a good *prima facie* case for the proposed change in the law. . . . But, in the third place, I felt that it was my duty to consider well whether the passing of the proposed Bill would in truth interfere in the least degree

with the "right of asylum," as it is called. I could not see that it would. I have no wish to give protection and to afford facilities to persons plotting to commit such crimes as that which was lately attempted in Paris. In the interests of Liberty I would do everything to prevent such attempts; in the interests of the Political Refugees I would take every step consistent with our English ideas of justice to punish those who plan them, and the great body of the refugees in this country, whom I believe to be entirely innocent of any complicity with such offences, have, I think, nothing to fear from the decisions of English juries. . . .

But, lastly, I had a yet graver responsibility resting upon me in regard to this vote. The information which reached me is sufficient to show that by refusing point-blank to entertain this Bill, the House of Commons would have run the risk of war. The state of anger and excitement in France is very great. We know that the French people have never been as cordially friendly to us as we have lately been to them. . . . I do not mean to say positively that war would have resulted from a rejection, at the first stage, of this Bill, but it was impossible to vote without feeling that one might have to answer for a war between England and France. Could I have taken upon myself that responsibility with a clear conscience? I think not. I would to-morrow reject a demand for an Alien Bill, for an Extradition Bill for political offenders, or for any such measure, without hesitation, though I knew that the result would be war in twenty-four hours. But should I have been justified in incurring the risk of bringing about so tremendous a calamity because impertinent sentences had been inserted in the *Moniteur*, for which the Emperor had been forced to express his

regret ; that is, to beg our pardon ? I do not think that I should ; and I could not overlook in reference to this part of the question the present position of this country, without troops and without generals. It is all very well to bluster. It may be true that no attack upon England would be ultimately successful, but surely no wise man would omit from his consideration at such a moment the actual position of his country. I do not think the state of feeling between France and England at this moment at all satisfactory. I never had that overweening confidence in the French alliance which some people entertained, and I feel that there is still no small possibility of danger from across the Channel. Now it seems to me that, instead of having worsened our position by complying with the request of the French Government, as far as we can without abandoning our own principles, we have improved it ; we can now say to the French people : “ A great crime against the life of your ruler was plotted in England, and the means of executing it prepared there ; you appealed to us to endeavour to prevent such a thing being done again under the shelter of our hospitality ; we did what we could do, consistently with our English customs and our English ideas of justice ; we showed thereby our abhorrence of the crime, and our readiness to punish those legally convicted of it ; but we can do no more ; more we would not do for the security of our own citizens, nor even for that of our own sovereign ; and if you think that you can force us into exchanging our English freedom and our English justice for the system which you have chosen to prefer, we are ready to show you that while we are anxious to give you every satisfaction which a faithful ally can justly ask at our hands, we are prepared to shed our blood, if

need be, for the maintenance of those principles of jurisprudence, and those habits of hospitality, which have been handed down to us as a precious heritage from our forefathers." I do not say that it will ever come to this; I trust that it may not, but if it does I cannot but think that if we are able to make the answer I have given above, we shall be in a better and in a really more honourable position than if we had said now in the language of Roebuck, "Your Emperor has no right to complain of conspirators or to object to any proceedings they may carry on in England. He has done the same himself, and we have no answer to give you but a flat and a contemptuous refusal." . . .

I have no doubt that I shall be well abused for my vote. I gave it as I thought best for the interests and the honour of England. I may have judged rightly or wrongly, but at all events I did not consult in respect to it either my private feelings or my private interests. . . .

With so good a case it is at first difficult to understand why he had found himself so much embarrassed in deciding on which side his vote should be cast. The truth, of course, is that once again his prejudices and his reason were in conflict in regard to Palmerston. He was piqued by the discovery that his pet aversion was again in the right, and that he was in duty bound to register a vote which was not only a public mark of approval of Palmerston, but at the same time a sort of self-imposed censure on his own "private feelings." We have a naïve expression of this mental struggle in his next letter to Forster—written after the second division—in which, while bewailing the gravity of the crisis caused by Palmerston's defeat, he frankly rejoices in his downfall as a providential punishment for his normal sinfulness.

*To W. E. Forster*

I CARLTON GARDENS, LONDON, S.W., 20th February, 1858.

MY DEAR FORSTER,— . . . The Gov<sup>t</sup> of Palmerston has fallen: the Parl<sup>t</sup> which raved in his favour not twelve months ago, and was ready to endorse every act he might do, has turned against him, and the very same combination of individuals which defeated him on the China question has now upset him again. I think it is a righteous judgment both upon him and upon the Parliament, though I voted in the minority, and though I believe the decision of last night to be fraught with much danger. As far as Palmerston is concerned, it is right that he, who unscrupulously pandered last year to the worst parts of our English character, should find himself unable to control that swaggering spirit which he did every thing to excite. It is right that the instrument of his overthrow should be that very Parliament which got itself elected upon no other principle than the name of the man they have now deserted. It is right that the injustice with which he treated others should recoil now upon himself. But all personal or individual considerations at this moment are utterly unimportant. We are in the midst of a great crisis, not a "ministerial crisis" only—that is a comparatively unimportant affair—but of a crisis in our relations with France which required the utmost caution, wisdom, and forbearance, and which has certainly not found these qualities in the House of Commons. For my own part, I voted on this occasion as I did on the former stage of the Bill, because I could not but see through the flimsy pretence that the amendment was not directed against the Bill. . . .

Serious misunderstanding with France, if no more, I

think inevitable, with all its consequences of mutual preparations for war, increasing irritation, and the throwing of Louis Napoleon entirely into the arms of Russia. And by whom has this state of things been hastened on? By Milner Gibson, Bright, and Gilpin. I confess that I have no patience with the peace men. It is true that they have great excuses for hating Palmerston, but Bright, at least, ought not to have run the risk he has, to gratify any feeling of that kind, however natural. . . .

Despite its unctuous joy in the punishment of Palmerston, this letter really marks the final stage in Goderich's approximation to the fallen Minister. The process was hastened by the wholly unexpected result of the Cabinet crisis. With an audacity truly Disraelite, the Tories determined to brave the overwhelming Liberal majority in the Commons and take office. This was the last straw to Goderich. It was not only supremely evil in itself, but it was an evil brought about by the unpardonable factiousness of all the anti-Palmerstonians, with whom he might otherwise have sympathized and acted. Thus, by a process of exhaustion, Palmerston became his only possible refuge. Happily, it was a chastened and more malleable Palmerston than the reactionary bogy he had so long figured to himself.

During the short-lived Derby-Disraeli Administration of 1858-9 Goderich held aloof from the main currents of party warfare, devoting himself to the less ambitious measures already reviewed. He was, however, preparing to take a larger part in debate in connexion with the Reform Bill promised by the Government, and in December he confided the conclusions at which he had arrived to George Glyn, the Member for Shaftesbury, in a long and interesting letter.<sup>1</sup> It must suffice

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix III.

here to say that his views on both Redistribution and the Extension of the Franchise had matured in a conservative sense since he expounded them in the *Wild Oats* and the *Political Memorandum*.<sup>1</sup> They had become cautious or, as he explained to Hughes,<sup>2</sup> "practical," to a degree which would have warmed the hearts of the unbending Tories, who were then struggling against the "Niagara-shooting" schemes of Disraeli and Stanley in the Cabinet. But they proved of no material importance at the time, for on January 28, 1859, the death of his father called him to the House of Lords as second Earl of Ripon, and his direct interest in the composition of the Commons came to an end. It is curious to note that his last speech in the Lower House was on an Indian subject.<sup>3</sup>

Five weeks later the rickety Derby Cabinet fell, after a defeat on their Reform Bill and a desperate appeal to the country, which only resulted in the return of a Liberal majority of 43. Palmerston was entrusted with the making of a new Government, and the hopes of Ripon's friends beat high. All expected to see him in the Cabinet, and the least the newspapers predicted for him was the Privy Seal.<sup>4</sup> They were doomed to disappointment. Palmerston's offer duly arrived, but it was something much less than the Privy Seal.

*From Lord Palmerston*

94 PICCADILLY, 15th June, 1859.

MY DEAR RIPON,—The Secretary of State for War will be in the House of Commons, and I am very anxious to be able to persuade you to be, as Under-Secretary of State, the organ of that department in the House of

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 76. See also pp. 69-70.

<sup>2</sup> Letter, March 19, 1859.

<sup>3</sup> Transport of Troops to India. *Hansard*, vol. cli, p. 1867. (July 21, 1858.)

<sup>4</sup> Quotation from *Daily News* in letter from Forster, June 19, 1859.

Lords. Lord Wodehouse has been so good as to consent to represent in the same way the Foreign Department, the head of which will also be in the House of Commons. Would you have the kindness to come to me here this evening to give me your answer, and to enable me to answer any questions you may wish to ask.

Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON.

On this mortifying document is a laconic endorsement in Ripon's handwriting: "Saw him—offered me the Under-Secretaryship for War—*accepted the offer.*" It is not difficult to understand both the offer and the acceptance. Palmerston was constructing his Cabinet on a singularly bold plan of Liberal concentration, which not only took in the wavering Peelites under Gladstone and the malcontent Whigs under Russell, but even aimed at the inclusion of Cobden and the Radical irreconcilables. It was a great stroke in the Parliamentary game, for it aimed a deadly blow at the Government monopoly by the aristocratic families. Guizot showed an acute, though perhaps not very exact, perception of its significance when he said that it was the end of "la grande politique" in England. But in this combination Ripon, who was still young, and who besides was a peer and already helplessly bound to Palmerston, could not reasonably claim a place in the front rank. Forster put the case regretfully, but convincingly, in reply to an explanation from Ripon which, unfortunately, has not been preserved.

*From W. E. Forster*

BURLEY, NEAR OTLEY, June 19, 1859.

MY DEAR RIPON,—Very many thanks for your letter. I certainly *am* disappointed, there is no use denying that, but the more I think about it the more clearly I see you could do nothing but accept. Now you are

out of the H. of C. and therefore have no constituency to back your claims, you must rest on [your] general position in the country. In order to gain that you must earn an administrative reputation. I am sure you will do this as soon as you get the chance, but I agree with you that it will not do to let the chance slip any longer. With four distinct parties squabbling for office, I dare say holding off would have ended in no place at all rather than in a better place, so that I think you have done the best thing for yourself in pocketing this, poor though it be, and as regards the public question, it is plain enough that the duty is to rally round the Gov<sup>t</sup>. . . .

Considering the part you, and Herbert too, have taken in the War Reform, I think the public will expect a good deal from you. . . .

Yours ever aff., W. E. FORSTER.

There can be no question that Ripon acted wisely. It was perhaps a little galling to have to surrender to the "mountebank" on his own terms, but the new Government proved to be the beginning of a long and decisive epoch in the reconstruction of English Liberalism, with which the whole of Ripon's subsequent career was identified, and it would probably have been much less easy for his political advancement had he not participated in its splendid evolution from the start.

## CHAPTER VIII

OFF THE STAGE

(1852—1859)

BEFORE the year was out another peerage fell to Ripon by the death of his uncle, Earl de Grey. As the De Grey Earldom was senior to that of Ripon, this involved another change in his style and title, and he now became known as Earl de Grey and Ripon, or de Grey for short.

Politically these changes did not sensibly influence his life, except perhaps that they supplied him with an atmosphere more congenial to his administrative tastes than he had found in the House of Commons. They entailed no wrench or sense of incongruity in his party affiliations, for he had long been disillusioned of his early *sans-culottism*, while, as for office, he could not have had less than his Under-Secretaryship had he remained in the Lower House, and, in the circumstances, he was not likely to have had more. It was in his private life that he was chiefly affected.

While his father lived he had no stable domestic life, and he seems to have been restricted even in the matter of income. He was not provided with an establishment of his own, and he wandered from one or the other of his father's town and country houses—Carlton Gardens, Putney Heath, and Nocton—or was allowed to build a more or less temporary nest on the delightful Wrest and Studley Royal properties of his uncle, or with the Vyners at Newby, or with the Ellis's at Brighton. At fixed intervals he paid dutiful visits to the parental headquarters, wherever they happened to be, but these

excursions were far from happy. His mother's dour temperament and his father's senile irritability and close-fistedness made of them something of a trial, especially for his frail young wife, whose girlhood had been passed in the sunniest surroundings. Many painful allusions to the "domestic rows" which marked these visits, and to the disturbing influences of certain "Putney toadies," and of the "many liars who live on my deceived parents," occur in his intimate correspondence with Hughes.<sup>1</sup> He was, nevertheless, an excellent son, and the patience and punctiliousness with which he discharged his filial duties rested on a foundation of genuine affection, which the most disconcerting experiences could not shake.

He found, moreover, a rich compensation in the gaiety and tenderness of his own little circle of wife, children, and friends. Lady de Grey, despite her delicate health, was the most helpful of helpmates. Her sweet and buoyant temper completely matched that of her husband, and from the day of their marriage their life was one long honeymoon. During the first four years they were never parted for a single day.<sup>2</sup> Every variation of his opinions was unquestionable gospel to her, and her fine taste in books and other things was law to him. His friends were her friends, and, in addition, their wives and babies were her special delight. They all adored her, even the Christian Socialists and the strange creatures who often came in their wake. Furnivall<sup>3</sup> fell head over ears in love with her, much to the merriment of her spouse. "My Missus is better to-day," he writes to Hughes. "She writes to Furnivall about twice a week, and receives the most enamoured answers from that bearded gent." To which the said Missus postscribes playfully: "I

<sup>1</sup> Letters, August 21 and November 18, 1854, etc.

<sup>2</sup> Letter, March 8, 1855.

<sup>3</sup> Frederick James Furnivall, afterwards the distinguished philologist and editor of Chaucer. He was at this period a devoted disciple of Maurice and an active worker at Charlotte Street.

beg leave to state that the writer hereof is guilty of a gross libel." <sup>1</sup> Their son was another source of joy to him. He was growing up a sturdy boy, though with little promise of emulating the unctuousness of his regicide namesake. In his second year his father noted that "Noll says 'How do?' in the slangiest of ways." <sup>2</sup> Two years later we learn that "the Protector is flourishing mightily," <sup>3</sup> but still apparently not very Protectorially, for towards the end of 1857 he "rolled from top to bottom of a flight of stairs and was not the least hurt," whereat his father genially opines, "I suppose he is reserved to be hanged." <sup>4</sup>

Sorrows were, however, not wanting in this happy circle. Not only de Grey, but also his closest friends, Hughes and Bruce, were stricken in turn. De Grey and Hughes each lost a daughter, and Bruce a sister to whom he was deeply attached. De Grey's daughter was born in the summer of 1857, and was so weak at birth that she had to be baptized immediately. She quickly gained strength, however, and was duly christened in the names of her grandmothers, Mary Sarah, with Hughes for her godfather. <sup>5</sup> A year later she died, after a painful illness. "All is over here," wrote the bereaved father to Bruce. "Our dear little girl's sufferings are at an end. She died on Saturday morning about nine o'clock, peacefully and I hope without pain, and she looks now as calm and beautiful as if she had never suffered at all." <sup>6</sup>

De Grey had learnt from Hughes the religious consolations which are most effective in afflictions of this kind. Nothing illustrates more definitely the influence of Hughes on his friend than the letters on this subject, though it was exerted more or less perceptibly in many

<sup>1</sup> Letter, July 18, 1852.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Hughes, October 11, 1853.

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Bruce, December 11, 1855.

<sup>4</sup> Letter to Hughes, November 27, 1857.

<sup>5</sup> Letters to Hughes (July 21, 1857) and Bruce (July 9, 1858).

<sup>6</sup> Letter, July 5, 1858.

other ways. In December 1856 Hughes lost his little daughter Eve in tragical circumstances, and he thus poured out his soul to his friend :

“ . . . She had wonderfully softened and deepened since you saw her, and in fact the corn was ripe, and then ‘*immediately* he putteth in the sickle,’ not waiting our time, but the moment it is ripe ; she cd. never have been so fit for God’s Kingdom again, or He wd. have left her to go gleaning about the house with her little golden head rejoicing our hearts. After the first wrench, from which I recovered before night, you cannot think how little I have suffered ; I am quite astonished at it myself ; but for years now I have so thoroughly believed and tried to live into the reality of invisible and the unreality of visible things, that it does not seem the least strange to me, but inexpressibly real and joyful and soothing, to have a little golden-headed angel daughter whom I cannot see, but who is far more one with us all than she ever was on earth, and whom I shall never have to look sternly at for not learning her lessons. Dear Fan<sup>1</sup> feels it all just as I do, but her weakness of body at present keeps her spirit down, but only at longer and longer intervals, thank God ! We are quite prepared for the worst that can happen, so rejoice for us. . . .

“ In some sort I do humbly think and believe that we are already ‘triumphant over death and thee, oh time !’ God bless you. I mayn’t write again or I may, as business goes. . . .”

De Grey replied :

<sup>1</sup> Hughes’s wife. She was a niece of Richard Ford, author of the famous Spanish *Handbook*. They were married in 1848.

<sup>2</sup> December 8, 1856.

“ . . . What a time of trial it has been ! But God has supported you in it wonderfully, and given you that faith which alone, as it seems to me, can render such sorrows bearable. I was sure that you would feel just as you do about it. I cannot tell you all the thoughts your letter raised in me, and I would not say to yourself all I felt about it, but I must thank you very heartily for it, for it was a letter to do one good ; and if ever it should be my fate to suffer as you have, your words will be to me a source of comfort and support. My dear friend, I have learnt more of what real faith and real Christianity is from you, now and before, than from anything else.”<sup>1</sup>

The reflection about his own fate was, as we have seen, prophetic. How deeply Hughes's words had sunk into him is shown by the following extract from a letter he wrote to Bruce three years later, when Bruce was mourning the death of his sister, Isabel Tyler :

“ I have never known a sister's love, but I can nevertheless understand the magnitude of the loss of such an one as you describe. It is very hard to part from those who have become bound up with our existence, and whose departure from among us leaves a vacant spot in our life, which we go on expecting every moment to see filled once more, and then start with the recollection that it is empty for ever. But I have always felt very strongly that we shall meet again with one another. I know not how or when or where ; but I believe that their spirits are even now hovering round us, and that they have not lost their love for us or their interest in our doings. I often think of

<sup>1</sup> December 11, 1856.

my lost little one as near me, free from all her earthly sufferings, and knowing what she never learnt here. I *believe* this whenever I can turn from the hard and hardening realities of life ; but I have seldom spoken of it to anyone but to you now. Your letter tempts me to do so ; for it has touched me very deeply, and filled my heart with affectionate sympathy.”<sup>1</sup>

De Grey's long and intimate friendship with Tom Hughes was one of the decisive moral factors of his early life. The two men were in the most perfect sympathy in all things, more especially in the fundamental earnestness of their characters, but Hughes had the advantage in worldly wisdom and in the breezy expansiveness and irrepressible optimism which came very largely of his public-school training. He was thus a perpetual stimulus as well as a sound guide and philosopher to de Grey, whose natural tendencies, arising from the isolating circumstances of his upbringing, were to shrink into himself and to despair in face of the powers of evil. To Hughes he opened his heart more freely than to anyone else, and he learnt to rely upon his judgment and encouragement in all his difficulties. “ It sets me thinking,” he writes to him, on the eve of his twenty-fifth birthday, “ how we have fraternised more and more, till, for my part, I cannot find that I have a friend to whom I turn more often and with more affection than to you. Forgive me writing thus, but you are so great a brick as to make me thus to speak.”<sup>2</sup>

The correspondence between the two men, chiefly on public affairs, has already been largely drawn upon. A few glimpses of their gayer intercourse may here be given.

In 1855 they spent the recess on their respective native heaths, de Grey at Newby and Fountains, the

<sup>1</sup> February 14, 1859.

<sup>2</sup> October 21, 1852.

country of which he once wrote to Hughes that he was "fonder of it than of any other place in the world,"<sup>1</sup> and Hughes in the Berkshire Downs.

*From Thomas Hughes*

LONGCOTT RECTORY, BERKS, *Augt. 25/55.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,—We are making a famous beginning of our vacation, interrupted only by a miserable client of mine, for whom I am preparing the elaborate will of a rich gent whose brain is softening; I wish you would bring in a Bill to make it unlawful for parties to let their brains soften in the long vacation. Fanny is wonderfully better, as you may guess from our day's work; three miles and half from this is the famous White Horse, on which Alfred fought the battle of Ashdown, whereby Wessex was delivered from the Danes, and close to it is another hill, a spur thrown out from the great chalk range, called the Dragon's Hill, upon which (so I have been told, and have to a great extent from my earliest childhood believed) St. George killed a dragon: is not the place where the dragon's blood ran down the hillside to be seen to this day, and will any grass grow upon it? Fanny and the children had never seen these lions except from the distant vale, so the rectorial Bucephalus being otherwise engaged, we proceeded along cross roads, which have never improved (or, rather, have grown much worse) since Alfred's time; the cart had nothing but a cross-board for seat with no back; however, as Fanny declared that she was much less jolted than she has been in your wife's brougham in Pall Mall, there was nothing much to complain of. We arrived at the foot of the hill, up which nothing four-legged short of a dragon could drag

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 57.

anything, and then he wd have his tail to help him, and then Fanny and the children got out and we scrambled up, the wind, which is always fresh there, having taken Evie clean off her legs once ; it is delicious to see how children take in good dragon stories when they have been well brought up, and if we had had a spade and pick I shd. have been quite ready myself to have dug for the dragon's bones, as Maurice proposed. We left Fanny on the plaid there, and John and I, with a child apiece, scrambled up to the White Horse, another 150 feet, and down again ; the children tried the expedient of sliding down, but soon came on their legs again by reason of what Evie called " these beastly flowers," meaning the thistles.

We then shambled home through Uffington, where at the east end of a magnificent Early English church the bones of many generations of my illustrious progenitors rest, and we went about the village visiting old servants, one who was maid to my great-grandmother, and partaking of all sorts of refreshments from the strongest ale to hard-bake and barley sugar, of which last the children have store enough to kill a second dragon. Altogether, I think Fanny must have scrambled and walked three miles and is only healthily tired, so I look towards great improvements in the health line. We leave this middle-age neighbourhood on Monday, with great regret, for the sophistications of Torquay.

What you say about the Palaver<sup>1</sup> I am the cove as can understand, seeing that the vocation of barrister is difficult to be swallowed as an *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν* ; I don't think I am quite so sure as you that one oughtn't to change, and often feel strongly tempted to turn parson (if any Right Rev. wd. do the needful for

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 59.

me). I think that Fanny wd. be a wonderful parsoness, and after all if a man is ever prompted to it can he ever safely turn from the work which was Christ's special work on earth? I have long intended to lay a case before the Prophet on this subject, but I hate trying to shift responsibility from my own shoulders. Meantime you and I will most likely grind on to our graves making and administering feeble and flabby laws, having at any rate the comfort that our lives, as they ought to be, are battles, tho' it be but with mud dragons and desolate parchment wastes, wherein it don't much matter if we get licked, seeing as how

So thou but strive thou soon shalt see  
Defeat itself is victory.

Good-night.

T. H.

A more riotous note was struck in the correspondence of the following year, when de Grey went to Italy, and Hughes, in the company of Tom Taylor<sup>1</sup> and Kingsley, explored North Wales.

*From Thomas Hughes, etc.*

PEN-Y-GWRYD, N.W., Aug<sup>t</sup> 20/56.

*Scene.*—Pot-house parlour, looking on wild bogs and mountainous mountains.

*Dramatis Personæ.*—*Tom Taylor*, in a great beard and barnacles and a flannel shirt, a *feu d'enfer*, his English breeches, patched across behind with a piece of Welsh red-and-blue flannel (cut, I believe, from our hostess's old petticoat), the patch having been necessitated by reason of the series of muckers gone by him

<sup>1</sup> The most popular English dramatist of his time. He was then a regular contributor to *Punch*, the editorship of which fell to him on the death of Shirley Brooks in 1874.

in yesterday's scramble over precipitous precipices. *Parson Lot*<sup>1</sup> stealing everybody's paper to dry plants in, and jogging of the table in an unchristian manner so that parties can't write a bit ; his neck half-broken by a rock in the stream where we bathed this morning, and otherwise much knocked about by wind and weather, but struggling still into respectability by reason of the common domestic linen collar and a clean shave. *I*, with battered hands and knees, in the poor mangled remains of my wardrobe, to wit, a flannel shirt, *D*'s trousers very dirty and in considerable rags, and an old boating coat.

Well, we have certainly enjoyed ourselves famously, altho' it has been given unto us to catch no salmon, and only small trout and par, all of which we shd. have thrown in again in civilized streams. If you want your friends perpetually to pray for your soul you can't do better than buy fishing tackle and lend it to them ; we have used your flies without mercy, but inasmuch as no salmon have come to our lure none of them are lost, and you will get the whole again as good as new, barring the weather stains on the book and a little of the gloss taken off some of the salmon flies.

*(In Tom Taylor's handwriting)*

N.B.—And all the better for them. A bloated aristocrat, thanks to these weather stains, may enjoy the credit of having *used* these implements of destruction as well as of having bought them.—T. T. •

This place is a small public kept by the best of Welshmen and his wife, at the top of a pass, from which run

<sup>1</sup> Kingley's *nom de plume* in *Politics for the People* and the *Christian Socialist*.

three vallies, one to Bedgellert, 2nd to Capel Curig, and 3rd to Llanberris ; Snowdon is right above us, which we have ascended, and on the summit of which the Parson has deposited his boy's knife, lent him for the tour ; when he thinks upon the loss whereof he teareth his hair and prophecyeth fearful things. We are, as you may guess, high up, the highest watershed in fact in these parts, and as often as not cloud-covered, for the weather is very bad and dirty. Yesterday we had a noble scramble over a mountain of enormous size, nearly as high as Snowdon, called the Glydder Vawr. It is a huge mass of syenite and trap and other volcanic rock, the wildest hill I ever was on, I think ; the particulars you will hereafter read in *Punch* and in the Parson's new novel. Tom will tell you how useful your landing-net staff proved as an alpenstock. We turn out for a mountain tramp every day, taking our luncheons with us, and get back to a late dinner at 7.30 or 8. This is the wonderfulest place for dreams that ever was—we have all been knocking about the Pyramids and doing many stranger things in our sleep.

We leave here on Friday 22nd and get home next day ; I have very good accounts of Fanny and the children. Next week we go to Folkestone or Walmer or some sea place near London, where we shall be when you cross, D.V., and shall get a glimpse of you in passing.

(*In Tom Taylor's handwriting*)

I am glad to be able to confirm the above, barring faults of orthography—some of which I have corrected—and punctuation, which is on a radically erroneous principle and past emendation. I beg also to state that the repairs on my posterior clothes are concealed

by the tails of my coat, and that viewed in front I am perfect in my nether man ! Where we are going to-day mussy only knows. I am abandoned to two wild men — mountain-climbers, salmon-seekers, plant-pickers, rock-renders—and if I come back with whole bones it will be a crowning mercy. I write cheerful letters home, not to alarm my wife, but, in truth, I go in fear of my life between this Socialist lawyer and this Socialist parson—two unnatural varieties of the genus professional man, each caring more for his neighbours than himself or his cloth, and thus departing from the wholesome rules of his craft.

But you are equally untrue to your noble order, so my complaints will fall on an idle ear—I ∴ forbear. But if I am left a demd unpleasant body on these mountains, don't say I didn't expect it, and inform my relatives and have Thos. Hughes and Chas. Kingsley tried as murderers before the fact.

Yours in fear and trembling, with love to my lady,  
TOM TAYLOR.

N.B.—My poor wife is in Yorkshire, where I join her at the week-end, if I live so long.

*(Written across front page)*

These frantic parties have got hold of my yarn and finished it, which is all the better as it will amuse you more. The Parson has all the prophecy knocked out of him and can only talk slang, which is very refreshing.

With love to your wife (we are off for Snowdon),  
Ever yours affectly., THOS. HUGHES.

P.S.—Whether you will ever get this is doubtful. We can't pay postage here, as no one knows what it is.

MY DEAR LORD GODERICH,—I must put in my share of this epistle. Especially thanks for the loan of the salmon tackle, w. deserves a better fate, and still more for the landing-net handle, whêreof the spike and hook has preserved Tom Taylor from coming home like Miss Biffin without legs or arms, and, like her, wielding the pen for life with his mouth. *Vide* sketch.

(*Sketch, under which is written :*)

• This posture chronic for 4 hours.

Result, triumph, but dearly bought as far as habiliments were concerned. Pray remember me to Lady Goderich. I trust you are enjoying a somewhat more genial climate than we.

Yours truly ever, C. KINGSLEY.

*To Thomas Hughes*

VENICE, 11th Sept., 1856.

MY DEAR TOM,—Your two most pleasant letters have both duly reached me, and I beg you to put more faith in my directions another time and not to think that I would let a letter from you be lost in an Austrian Post Office—and I know few letters over the loss of which I should have more grieved than the triplicate one from the place with an unpronounceable name. Said letter gave us much delight, barring that it did not chronicle any notable victories over the genus *Salmo*. You seem to have had a very jolly time in Wales, and if I had not been where I was I should have liked to have been there very much.

I wish the Parson wouldn't go for to stick the "Lord" before my unfortunate name; but ever since Ludlow cut up so rough upon that subject I've been afraid to suggest such a thing to anyone.

And now before I proceed farther I must exhort you to visit your respected Uncle in the city of Paris about the 27th, on which day also we hope to reach that place. It would be so pleasant to be together there. Pray come if you can—we would walk all over the place, see all past, present, and future associations, and deliver many prophecies, while our wives should look at every bonnet and discuss every hideous development of French fashion to their hearts' content. Since I wrote you we have had very pleasant voyaging—up the Paletug:ra to the foot of Monte Rosa, a most beautiful excursion, the pleasure of which was heightened by living in queer pot-houses with little or no food—then to Lugano and Como—on the latter lake we stayed four days in a delightful spot with a terrace overhanging the lake, from which my wife fished for unhappy dace to her great delight. While there we were honoured with a visit from Hayward,<sup>1</sup> who detailed to us the last news from Pall Mall, which, however, was not particularly interesting. We went thence by Bergamo, the Lago d'Iseo, Brescia, and Verona to this place. These Lombard cities, especially Verona, are very interesting—full of beautiful bits of Gothic architecture, bright here and there with frescos on the street and house-walls (now almost decayed), and each possessing an history, and in many parts a noble history of its own—but everywhere, and here in Venice especially, you have the painful feeling that there is no present—all now is stagnant, dead—there is no state, no nationality, little industry, and less faith. You walk everywhere among ashes. One hopes and believes that there is a future

<sup>1</sup> Abraham Hayward, famous as a social oracle and essayist. He wrote much and well on politics and letters, but it was in society that he wielded the greatest power.

for Italy, and gazes with intense interest on the sun rising (in contradiction to nature) *in the west*, and yet the aspect of the people here is not encouraging. The children of the Dandolos and Gradenigos loiter about cafés and have dwindled into Frenchmen—while the most insolent aristocrats the world has ever seen, without one ground for even reasonable pride, swagger over them in the conscious strength of their vast army. However, I must not go on in this strain. I am not happy at the part we English are playing in this Italian business ; but of that more at another time—and now to leave the melancholy present and look, for a few minutes at the glorious past. We made acquaintances at Brescia with a good little fellow, by name Palgrave,<sup>1</sup> who was coming here and had with him the *Stones of Venice*, the want of which we were deeply lamenting. He let us have the use of it occasionally, and we have found it of infinite assistance. We quite agree with all Ruskin says about Porcello, the Doge's Palace, and St. Mark's. The Palace is certainly one of the most perfect buildings I have ever seen, and St. Mark's, in its way, most beautiful. I have heard it compared unfavourably by English tourists with the Duomo at Milan, to which it seems to me quite infinitely superior. This is, to my mind, the best place in the world to disgust one with Renaissance architecture—the churches built by Palladio are simply and perfectly *hideous*. I cannot understand anyone in their senses admiring them in any way.

We intend to leave here on Monday next, and return home by way of the Splugen and Thusis to Paris. If

<sup>1</sup> Probably Francis Turner Palgrave of *Golden Treasury* fame. He was then in the Education Department and eventually became Professor of Poetry at Oxford.

you would write a line, *as soon as* you get this, to Poste Restante, Zurich, to say whether there is any hope of our meeting in Paris, and, if so, where you will be, it will just catch us, I think. I have, alas! lost the stick you gave me—I was so fond of it. Give me another like it, large and strong, there's a good fellow, for I am really unhappy about losing the old one. My wife joins with me in loves to you and yours, and therewith I remain,

Always yours affectly., GODERICH.

*From Thomas Hughes*

[? FOLKESTONE, undated.]

DEAR OLD BOY,—Thanks for your jolly letter. I don't wonder at your grunting and grumbling over the "Lord" dodge, but one must take folk as one finds them. I often wonder whether the prophets and swells in all times have been so far before the rank and file in knowledge and behind them in practice (except *the* Prophet; thank goodness, he hasn't a grain of pride or self-consciousness, or what the blazes it is, in his whole body, soul, and spirit), who'd have thought 6 or 7 years ago, when *Yeast*<sup>1</sup> came out and the "*οἱ περὶ Μαυρισε*" began moving, that *the* Parson, Parson Lot the Chartist, and the "Black Man,"<sup>2</sup> wd. be *the* two who never really believed in equality and brotherhood, for if they did they wd. practise it, I suppose, as much towards folk who are conventionally above them as below, seeing that the former<sup>3</sup> is out and out the hardest of the two. However, you was born a Lord and bred a Lord, and I suppose must take the

<sup>1</sup> Kingsley's novel, written in the interest of Christian Socialism and with much sympathy for Chartism.

<sup>2</sup> Ludlow's nickname.

consequences of being found in that dreary and disgusting situation.

This letter will be sent through Clare Ford,<sup>1</sup> which will save postage and be the chance of its reaching you. I am sorry to say there is no chance now, that I see, of our coming to Paris ; we can't afford it, as the Firs<sup>2</sup> are being finished and will cost much tin. Fanny has told your wife, however, that we are up to a trip to meet you on the coast, which I hope you will arrange somehow, and I look forward with huge joy to our being neighbours through the winter. I will occupy myself in searching for a mighty stick meet for the breaking down of high places and the demolishment of scoundrelism, with which I hope (when you take to perorating in the Palaver with arms in your hands) you may knock an under-secretary's teeth down his throat and pound the table into small pieces.

We are in the most ridiculously small house here you ever saw ; our sitting-room, the only room in the house (for the boy sleeps in the kitchen, and there is no w.c.) in which there ain't beds, is exactly  $\begin{matrix} \text{f. i.} & & \text{f. i.} \\ & \text{by} & \\ & 11.6 & 10.6 \end{matrix}$  papered with a series of heads of the old Duke and pictures of his battles. There is no room for me and Maurice to wash, so we turn out on to the beach every morning at 7 to bathe, a source of danger just now as it is very rough with a great under-tow, delicious swimming, but as you come ashore the waves cut you over and mingle you with the pebbles in a surprising manner, and as I am obliged to spend most of my time among them (i.e. the breakers), holding on to Maurice,

<sup>1</sup> A cousin of Fanny Hughes, afterwards Sir Francis Clare Ford. He entered the Diplomatic Service, and eventually became ambassador at Constantinople and Rome.

<sup>2</sup> Hughes's house at Copse Hill, Wimbledon.

who can't swim, I am having rare practice in picking myself up ; I am delighted to find how plucky he is, and if not carried out to sea in the next few mornings he will make a rare young water dog. . . .

. . . If your wife will be kind enough to buy for me a pair of slippers like those she has seen (and worn, I daresay) of Fanny's, bronze leather with bars across, and a pair of boots (not black), I shall be much obliged and will duly pay for same ; they are, of course, for Fanny, who won't order them for herself ; I think she knows the size. We have had a real good Yankee, a friend of Lowell's, with us ; if you wd. know his political beliefs read the next *Edinbro'*, in which he has done an article on Uncle Sam ; he has instructed me in the science of preparing cobblers, whereby you will benefit next summer. I have nought more to say but love to you and yours.

Ever yours affectly., THOS. HUGHES.

De Grey had many other close friends at this period, notably Layard, Bruce, and Forster, but none of them entered so intimately into his life as Hughes, though, curiously enough, his friendship with Bruce and Forster proved more permanent. The explanation is that, from the time he took office and entered the House of Lords, he became more and more engrossed by politics, and this, added to the ceremonious circumstances of his social life, seems to have imperceptibly brought about a subsidence of his intimate relations with Hughes. They gradually saw less of one another, while the friendship with Bruce and Forster, being primarily political, endured. No one, however, took Hughes's place in his affections. The main result of the alienation was that in his most private concerns de Grey relapsed into his old reserve, and thus was probably led to work out silently the solution of his spiritual problem, which

caused so much public sensation a few years later, and which, in view of all his earlier associations, has always been difficult to understand.<sup>1</sup>

Three other friends of his at this period should not be forgotten. The first was Maurice, for whom he always preserved an unbounded admiration and reverence. The second was Carlyle, in whose thought and even dialect he was for a time steeped, and of whom he saw a great deal in 1854 and 1855.<sup>2</sup> The third was Robert Cecil, afterwards the third Marquess of Salisbury. In spite of his unbending Toryism, Cecil's fine character and splendid abilities, and perhaps too his bitter hostility to Disraeli, appealed strongly to de Grey. The sympathy, curiously enough, was mutual and lasted their lives, though in politics they remained irreconcilable. It was even shared by so stalwart a Radical as Forster. "What a pleasant evening we had last night!" he writes to de Grey in 1858. "I have rarely seen a man I more draw to than Lord Robert Cecil."<sup>3</sup>

Besides travel and the society of his friends, de Grey spent much of his time off the parliamentary stage in shooting, fishing, beetle-hunting, and reading on a vast and varied scale. Social reform, however, always had a first charge even on his leisure. Though he had drifted away from the more controversial aspects of Christian Socialism, he retained his interest in Co-operation and other practical manifestations of Maurice's and Hughes's zeal for the uplifting of the masses. The Working-Men's College made an especial appeal to him,

<sup>1</sup> His conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1874. (See *infra*, Cap. XIII, and Supplementary Cap., pp. 323 et seq.)

<sup>2</sup> Sir C. Gavan Duffy, in a letter dated June 11, 1892, writes to Ripon: "I knew that you were well acquainted with Carlyle, for he has spoken to me of you more than once; first, as what you were rather than as what you are—a young nobleman who had got a generous but quite erroneous theory of human affairs derived from the French Revolution, and so forth; in fact, opinions which he had once held himself, but had become afraid and somewhat intolerant of in later times."

<sup>3</sup> The letter is undated, but from internal evidence it is clear that it was written on December 19, 1858.

partly through his strong interest in Mechanics' Institutes and popular education generally, and partly because of the peculiar circumstances which called the College into being.

These circumstances were Maurice's dismissal from his Professorships at King's College, on account of the alleged heterodoxy of his *Theological Essays*.<sup>1</sup> De Grey warmly espoused Maurice's cause. He writes to Hughes at the height of the conflict :

“ . . . I am so grieved about the Prophet ; pray tell me what you hear about him and it, and how it has ended, and whether you think he would like me to write to him, etc. . . .

“ My wife is really better for Malvern air and quiet, and delighted in being there. She met a parson there, apparently not a bad fellow, but much shackled with orthodoxies and white neckcloths, which make him more or less into a man of buckram. He heard of the objections to ye Prophet's Lectures, and having read the one on the Atonement pronounced it ‘ inconsistent with the Church's teaching,’ whereat persons of an impious turn of mind felt inclined to make answer ‘ the Church be blowed.’ But, insomuch as he was, I believe, anxious to find the measure of the Prophet's thoughts to be that of the small creed which it is proper to hold, I fear that it may go hard with him (i.e. ye Prophet) before the Pharisees of King's College. . . .”

Again, when the decision of the College Council was pronounced :

<sup>1</sup> The first suggestion of a Working-Men's College came from a meeting of working-men held on December 27, 1853, when one of the speakers expressed a hope that Maurice “ might not find it a fall to cease to be a Professor at King's College and to become the Principal of a Working-Men's College.” (*Life of Maurice*, vol. ii, p. 221.)

<sup>2</sup> September 22, 1853.

“ . . . I've written to the Prophet and endeavoured to convey to him how much I feel that I owe him for that book. I have, indeed, little doubt, from the way in which it grows upon me, that I shall at last owe yet more to it—and I am clear of one thing, that if Christianity, to say nothing of old Mother Panther, is to become once again a real religion to men, and to bring to us the true solution of our present doubts and difficulties and fightings, it must be preached as Maurice preaches it—so that we have in this King's College business probably entered on a great struggle for the living faith against chimeras, and shams, and formulas, high and low, black and white, the end of which may be far off. . . .”<sup>1</sup>

When the college was established de Grey was holiday-making in the Pyrenees. He had, however, already promised Hughes all the support he could give it,<sup>2</sup> and as soon as he learnt that it was duly launched he sent a cheque for £25 to the Treasurer, “with the humble request that I may be admitted an original member.”<sup>3</sup> Later on he became a member of the Council, and a very frequent visitor to the College and speaker at its meetings and social functions. In the Council he advocated very strongly a scheme suggested to him by Lord Stanley for extending the work of the College to the smaller provincial towns, by affiliating to it the local Mechanics' Institutes.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> November 7, 1853.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Pau, October 15, 1854.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Jurançon, November 5, 1854.

<sup>4</sup> Letter to Hughes (October 29, 1855) and Hughes's reply (November 5). See also Lord Derby's *Speeches and Addresses*, vol. i, pp. 10, 12 et seq.

BOOK III  
*IN AND OUT OF OFFICE*

## CHAPTER IX

### REFORMING THE WAR OFFICE

(1859—1863)

THE Army administration of the Palmerston-Russell Cabinet during the seven years from 1859 to 1866 is notable as marking the beginning of the great work of War Office reconstruction and Army Reform, which first took definite shape under Cardwell in 1870, and received its finishing touches some thirty-five years later at the hands of the Esher Commission and Lord Haldane. Under two such men as the new Secretary of State, Sidney Herbert, and his ardent Under-Secretary, de Grey, changes were inevitable. Both had been for years in the front rank of the parliamentary advocates of Reform, and Forster was probably right in opining that the public would "expect a good deal" from their association in Pall Mall.<sup>1</sup> This, at any rate, was the view of one instructed onlooker, who knew both the needs of the Army and de Grey's competency to deal with them better than anybody. Mansfield, now Chief of the Staff under Lord Clyde in India, lost no time in expressing his gratification at his old friend's appointment. "I rejoice both on public and private grounds," he wrote to him from Simla, "that you have consented to take office, and more especially that you are installed in the War Department."<sup>2</sup> It cannot be said with truth that the high expectations thus indicated were fully realized, but, as will be seen, that was not the fault of either Herbert or de Grey. In spite of un-

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 144.

<sup>2</sup> July 22, 1859.

toward circumstances they grappled very capably with the problem before them, and they succeeded in making some very useful contributions to their eventual solution, mainly in the domain of War Office reorganization.

For this work the moment had clearly come. As a separate Department of State the War Office in 1859 was only five years old. Hastily given an independent life four months after the outbreak of the Crimean War,<sup>1</sup> it was not likely in such circumstances to find itself equal to the great military emergency which confronted it. Unfortunately, it had always formed part of a highly complicated system of divided responsibility and multiple control, the faults of which only became aggravated by the ill-considered way in which it was now reconstituted. The idea was to centralize all the scattered organs of the Army Administration in the new Ministry, and in pursuance of it, as Sir Robert Biddulph has said, "part of the old Colonial Office, part of the old Ordnance Office, all of the Secretary-at-War's Office,<sup>2</sup> part of the Treasury, and a little bit of the Home Office were suddenly thrown together."<sup>3</sup> No effort, however, was made to combine these fragments in an organic whole, while the main vice of the original jumble—the dual control of the Secretary of State and the Commander-in-Chief—remained untouched. The result was an administrative breakdown which seriously hampered the military effort in the Crimea and provoked a storm of popular indignation at home. In deference to this outburst and the further sensation caused by the revelations of the Roebuck Committee, a few changes

<sup>1</sup> War and Colonies had previously been under one Secretary of State. The separation was decided upon in July 1854, and was carried out by an Order in Council dated August 11, 1854.

<sup>2</sup> The Secretary-at-War was a Minister distinct from and independent of the Secretary of State for War. He controlled the finances of the Army, but not other functions. He was closely associated with the Horse Guards, but had scarcely any organic relations with the War Office. The office was merged in the War Secretaryship in 1865.

<sup>3</sup> Biddulph: *Cardwell at the War Office*, p. vi.

were made in 1855, but they produced no essential improvement. The patchwork machine continued to move as slowly and ineffectively as ever. There seemed to be a tacit combination of Court, Tory, and bureaucratic influences, before which the reformers and even Parliament itself were helpless. In 1856 the House of Lords, at the instance of Palmerston and Derby, assented un murmuringly to the doctrine of the inviolability of the privileges of the Horse Guards.<sup>1</sup> Two years later the House of Commons actually resolved that the ~~Commander-in-Chief~~ should be placed in definite subordination to the Minister, but the Queen, moved by the Duke of Cambridge, intervened, and the Government promised that no action would be taken on the Resolution.<sup>2</sup> In the War Office itself the obstructives were led by the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Benjamin Hawes, who set himself grimly, patiently, and successfully to thwart the Reformers and maintain the *status quo*.<sup>3</sup> At length, in March 1859, the Commons resolved to attack the problem in earnest, and appointed a Select Committee to ascertain what had been done to improve "the administration of Military Affairs" since 1855. Of this Committee Sidney Herbert was appointed Chairman, but he retired in July on becoming Secretary of State for War, and was succeeded by Sir James Graham. The Committee reported in July 1860. The result of the inquiry was trenchantly summed up by Graham in a remark he made at the time to Cardwell: "There is only one word that can describe it, and that word is Chaos."<sup>4</sup>

Previously to taking office in 1859 neither Herbert nor de Grey had given much attention to the specific question of War Office organization. They had been

<sup>1</sup> Martin: *Life of Prince Consort*, vol. iii, pp. 453-4.

<sup>2</sup> Wheeler: *The War Office*, p. 170.

<sup>3</sup> Cook: *Life of Florence Nightingale*, vol. i, pp. 390, 403, 405; vol. ii, pp. 60, 61.

<sup>4</sup> Biddulph: *op. cit.*, p. vi.

chiefly concerned with improvements of the Army itself, and with the comfort, education, and efficiency of the officers and men as such. Twelve months' experience of work in Pall Mall had, however, convinced them of the importance of overhauling the central administration, and it had accordingly been determined to take the task in hand as soon as the Committee presented its report. This devolved entirely on de Grey, for Herbert, as he afterwards confessed to Florence Nightingale, had not "the bump of system" in him,<sup>1</sup> whereas de Grey, with the help of J. K. Godley, then Assistant Under-Secretary and a strong advocate of Reform, had completely mastered the question and had made up his mind as to the lines on which the new organization should be built.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile, de Grey had had his hands full of organizing work in other directions. The arrangements for bringing into being the new Volunteer force—to be referred to presently—were entirely confided to him, and when, in September 1859, war with China was renewed, the administrative work in connexion with it was largely left to him. Here his close friendship with Mansfield proved of great value. The correspondence between them at this period shows that the rapid mobilization, equipment, and transport of the army sent from India to the Peiho owed much to the freedom and fulness with which the Chief of the Staff at Simla and the War Under-Secretary in London communicated with one another and the confidence they reposed in each other.<sup>3</sup> Nor did this work suffer in any way from any qualms of conscience de Grey might have felt as to its consistency with the vote he had given against

<sup>1</sup> Cook: *Life of F. Nightingale*, vol. i, p. 404.

<sup>2</sup> Godley's evidence before the Committee comprises a scheme closely resembling that afterwards drawn up by de Grey. The close intimacy between the two men is attested by a letter from Godley to Ripon, dated April 4, 1860.

<sup>3</sup> Letters to and from Mansfield, September 19, 26; October 30, 31; November 10; December 17, 25, 1859.

the war when it was originally embarked upon two years before.<sup>1</sup> It was characteristic of him that he took pains to set his mind at rest on this point, though the effort produced a curious medley of Radical suspicions and Palmerstonian attachment to Imperial prestige. He thus explained himself to Mansfield :

“ . . . This repulse<sup>2</sup> is very bad in every way. The failure is unmistakable ; we have no chance of explaining it away or, I fear, of wiping it out for several months to come ; and I look with considerable anxiety for information as to the effect which the news of it will produce in India. There are various points as regards both the diplomatic and naval proceedings which require clearing up and about which I am at present by no means satisfied ; but whatever may ultimately turn out to have been the errors committed, if errors there were, there can be no hesitation about the necessity of now striking a blow which will re-establish our reputation in China and the East generally on its former footing. . . . ”<sup>3</sup>

By the time the blow was struck de Grey had apparently convinced himself of the unredeemable turpitude of the Chinese, for he meditated a highly original settlement of our relations with them which, if not a good diplomatic expedient, did not err on the side of tenderness for the enemy. This also he confided to Mansfield :

“ . . . To tell you the truth privately in your ear alone, I do not believe in Chinese treaties and never have. A treaty with China means a war with China every few

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 99.

<sup>2</sup> The British and French Ministers having been refused access to the Peiho River, the British Naval force endeavoured to force a passage, and were repulsed with a loss of three gunboats and 400 killed and wounded.

<sup>3</sup> September 19, 1859.

years, and I should prefer to see us say to the Chinese, You are so ignorant of the Law of Nations and of the rules of international intercourse that you are not fit to have treaties made with you. We shall therefore take possession of one or two ports in your country, and look solely to our trade. If you impede that, we shall punish you locally, and shall take your customs into our own hands until we have indemnified ourselves for all losses ; but if you let us trade quietly we want no more, and do not care whether we travel about the interior or have access to Peking or not. . . .”<sup>1</sup>

The obvious difficulty about this idea is that other Powers would probably have been quick to follow our example, or would have availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by our aloofness to secure privileges by treaty. In either case our interests would have suffered.

The preoccupation of the China War lasted until the end of the parliamentary Session of 1860. As soon as Ministers reassembled in London for the winter Cabinets, de Grey set to work on the plan of War Office reorganization. At the outset he found the scope of his reforming activities disappointingly limited. It was not his fault that the scheme to which he now set his hand did not deal drastically with the fundamental evil of Army maladministration. “ The Report of the House of Commons Committee,” he writes to Mansfield, “ makes any close amalgamation of the War Office and Horse Guards impracticable at present, and we must therefore content ourselves with making our portion of the military administration as good as we can, and certainly there is plenty of room for improvement.”<sup>2</sup> The old obstructive influences had, in fact, once more triumphed. The Committee Report discountenanced any interference with the Dual Control in unmistakable terms, though the grounds on which it urged this—

<sup>1</sup> December 12, 1860.

<sup>2</sup> September 1, 1860.

that the Secretary of State was to all practical purposes supreme, and that it would be unwise to shake the reliance of the Army on the Commander-in-Chief's freedom from political influence in matters of appointments, promotions, and discipline—appear to be mutually destructive. Nevertheless, within the narrow limits thus prescribed to him de Grey produced a very good scheme.

The Minute embodying it is a model of lucidity and common sense.<sup>1</sup> De Grey's task consisted in bringing order out of the "chaos" revealed by the Select Committee Report. This chaos arose mainly from the random distribution of the office work among the old imperfectly co-ordinated departments, which were managed, for the most part, by civilians whose knowledge and responsibilities were equally indefinite, and who generally reported with an unnecessary exuberance of Minuting through the Permanent Under-Secretary of State. The result was that not only was the departmental work very unsatisfactorily performed, but the Secretary of State was overwhelmed with business much of which had to be scamped, and even then he was not always competently advised. The remedies proposed by de Grey dealt effectively with these defects. In the first place he advised a new and more logically assorted distribution of the office work between four great departments, with clearly differentiated functions and with chiefs possessing the best technical competency and a distinct and definite responsibility. These heads of departments were all to be soldiers of high rank—a Military Officer dealing with promotions, rewards, pensions, and discipline, in correspondence with the Horse Guards; an Artillery Officer acting as Director of Ordnance and materials, and concentrating in his hands the management of arsenals and the provision of warlike material for the Army; an Engineer Officer holding the old designation of Inspector-General of

<sup>1</sup> For text of the scheme see Appendix IV.

Fortifications, charged with the management of all Army works and buildings; and, finally, a Military Officer to whom would be transferred the functions of the old commissariat and store departments relating to the clothing and feeding of the Army, the supply of camp equipage, the management of transport, and the charge and issue of stores. The co-ordination of the work of these departments was to be the main duty of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, who would also manage the whole internal administration of the office and take custody of the archives, the Registry, the library, and other similar branches. He would be a civilian. In order to bring the work of the Secretary of State within manageable compass, and at the same time to secure to him the best expert advice, the plan gave considerable discretion in minor matters to the four military heads of departments, who were at the same time to be the advisers of the Minister on the questions of Army administration with which they had respectively to deal. It also provided for a large devolution of Ministerial authority on the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, who was to be relieved of most of his departmental functions and become the recognized coadjutor of the Minister. In a separate section the Minute dealt with the way in which the reorganized machine should transact its business, and proposed a number of shrewdly conceived reforms. It especially emphasized the necessity for curbing the mania for minute-writing which possessed the whole office, and formulated new rules for this purpose.

De Grey was fortunate enough to bring nearly all the main features of this scheme into operation during his tenure of office in Pall Mall.<sup>1</sup> If he did not settle

<sup>1</sup> All the writers on War Office organization ignore de Grey's services in this respect. Some references are made to his scheme in Sir Edward Cook's *Life of Florence Nightingale*, but no details are given, and Sir Edward hazards the conjecture—entirely unjustified as will be seen—that de Grey not only did not succeed in reforming the War Office, but that he never “seriously attempted” to do so (vol. ii, p. 63).

finally the structure of the Ministry,<sup>1</sup> he, at any rate, achieved his purposes of giving it an orderly and symmetrical organization and a largely increased effectiveness. In this sense the scheme was a substantial contribution to the larger plan of Army Reform initiated in 1870. The achievement is all the more creditable to de Grey, because from the beginning his efforts encountered unexpected obstacles, or were hampered by more urgent preoccupations.

He had, indeed, not yet completed his Minute when Sidney Herbert, under the pressure of ill-health, accepted a Peerage while retaining the Secretaryship for War. This entailed the removal of de Grey to another post, as it was necessary to have a House of Commons man in the Under-Secretaryship. He found a congenial refuge in the India Office as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to Sir Charles Wood, who was a brother Yorkshireman and one of his most attached friends. He completed his Minute, however, before leaving Pall Mall, and it was in due course submitted to the Cabinet and unanimously approved.<sup>2</sup>

In Pall Mall its début was not auspicious. "Our scheme of reorganization," wrote Florence Nightingale to Sir John McNeill (January 17, 1861), "is at last launched at the War Office; but I feel that Hawes may make it fail; there is no strong hand over him."<sup>3</sup> It was shrewdly thought. Herbert was desperately ill, and de Grey being away, the permanent obstructives had the field to themselves. Still, Herbert, as he said on his deathbed, did his best. When in May Godley died, he seized the opportunity to make a change in the spirit of de Grey's scheme, but it was not quite

<sup>1</sup> The changes made by de Grey's two successors, General Peel and Sir John Pockington, were in the nature of variations of the details of his scheme and did not affect its principle. For these changes see Biddulph, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

<sup>2</sup> Stanmore: *Life of Herbert*, vol. ii, p. 404. See also letter from Florence Nightingale to de Grey, May 16, 1862, *infra*, p. 181.

<sup>3</sup> *Life of Florence Nightingale*, vol. i, p. 404.

what de Grey had intended. He abolished the vacant Assistant Under-Secretaryship and so far acted on the scheme, but at the same time he appointed the Secretary for Military Correspondence to a new post, that of Military Under-Secretary of State, which had not been contemplated by de Grey. In itself the change was a good one,<sup>1</sup> but it seems to have exhausted the energy of the dying Minister. A month later he threw up the sponge. He wrote to Florence Nightingale :

“ . . . As to the organization I am at my wits' end. The real truth is that I do not understand it. I have not the bump of system in me. I believe more in good men than in good systems. De Grey understands it much better. . . . ”<sup>2</sup>

It was the end of War Office reform so far as Herbert was concerned. Seven weeks later he died, having resigned a few days previously.

For the vacant Secretaryship of State de Grey was clearly marked out, and, with all his modesty and public spirit, he was not unconscious of it. Disappointed at his original subordinate office he had chafed at its protracted continuance. Over a year before he appears to have confided his impatience to his cousin Ellis, for we find the latter writing to him from Madras on July 10, 1860 :

“ . . . I consider that you are quite right in feeling impatient at your subordinate position, for the fact of being subordinate so often prevents a man carrying out to their full extent what he knows to be essential measures. I so far, however, rejoice for your sake in the position you have been in, for the work you have

<sup>1</sup> Its effect was to create a dual Permanent Under-Secretaryship, half civilian and half military. De Grey, in his scheme, had proposed to keep the Permanent Under-Secretaryship in civilian hands.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Florence Nightingale*. Extract from letter dated June 7, 1861.

done, and so successfully, points you out for our future War Minister. . . ."

This high estimate of de Grey's claims was not confined to Ellis. When he retired from the War Office at the end of 1860 it was amid a chorus of eulogy of the admirable work he had performed. "He is a man," wrote Herbert to Palmerston, "who ought, whenever there is an opportunity, to be again employed. He is an excellent man of business, full of tact and good sense, a thorough gentleman, and fond of work, which he executes thoroughly." The Premier fully agreed. "What you say of de Grey entirely confirms the opinion which I had formed of him, though from far less means of forming one than you have had." Like tributes came from the Prince Consort and the Duke of Cambridge. The Prince wrote to Herbert: "We shall regret the loss of Lord de Grey very much, who had won golden opinions in the discharge of his duties of Under-Secretary, and will be much regretted by the Army." The Duke was equally laudatory. "The removal of Lord de Grey," he wrote, "from the position of Under-Secretary I most sincerely deplore. He has done his work with great tact and great judgment, and his place will not be easily filled up."<sup>1</sup> His absence from the War Office had only accentuated this sense of his loss, and Florence Nightingale recalls that within a fortnight of his death Herbert had said to her more than once that he hoped de Grey might be his successor.<sup>2</sup>

There were, however, formidable difficulties in the way of his appointment. Gladstone held very strongly that the Ministers at the head of the great spending departments should be in the House of Commons, where they could be restrained by some measure of Manchesterian criticism, and, although he had concurred in Herbert's retention of the War Secretaryship after

<sup>1</sup> Stanmore: *Life of Herbert*, vol. ii, pp. 405, 408, 409.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Florence Nightingale*, vol. ii, p. 30.

his transfer to the Lords, he was resolved that the experiment should not be repeated. Unfortunately, beyond his technical qualifications, de Grey had little in the way of political influence to oppose to this formidable objection, and accordingly it was arranged between the Premier and the Chancellor that Sir George Cornwall Lewis should be transferred from the Home Office to the War Office, and that de Grey should be invited to resume his old position there. The offer was duly made to de Grey by Palmerston, who wrote: "You would be of great use to Lewis in the Office and of great service to the Government in the House of Lords."<sup>1</sup> De Grey was too public-spirited to resist this appeal, but he could not wholly conceal his mortification.

*To Lord Palmerston*

I CARLTON GARDENS, S.W., 19 July 1861.

MY DEAR LORD PALMERSTON,—I shall be happy to accede to the proposal contained in your letter of yesterday.

Although I have much interest in the business of the War Office, I should not myself have sought for a change of Under-Secretaryships; but as you think that by returning to the War Department I can be of use to Sir G. Lewis and to the Government, I have much pleasure in consenting at once to do so.

Believe me, yours sincerely, DE GREY.<sup>2</sup>

Once back in Pall Mall he lost no time in pressing forward the reorganization scheme. One important feature of it realized itself from the beginning through his personal relations with the new Minister. This was the provision that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary should be less of a departmental Chief than the deputy

<sup>1</sup> Letter, July 18, 1861.

<sup>2</sup> Letter, July 19, 1861.

and coadjutor of the Secretary of State. Lewis readily fell in with this arrangement, not so much because he recognized its wisdom as because he had little interest in his own work in the Office and was quite content to be something of a figurehead.<sup>1</sup> Within a month de Grey succeeded in carrying out another of the four main provisions of his scheme. A Director of Ordnance was appointed in place of the President of the Ordnance Select Committee as Artillery Adviser to the Secretary of State, and was given charge of the whole of the manufacturing departments.<sup>2</sup> Then came a long pause, and it was not until the following May, when Hawes died, that the road was clear to resume the reforms. Florence Nightingale was quick to urge de Grey forward, though there is no reason to believe he required the stimulus.

[PRIVATE.]

*From Florence Nightingale*

9 CHESTERFIELD STREET, W., May 16/62.

DEAR LORD DE GREY,—Had the death of Sir B. Hawes happened one twelvemonth ago, it would have secured the reorganization of the War Office.

Would it be possible to do it now?

If so, there is but one man who can do it. And that is yourself.

You are probably aware that Sidney Herbert presented the substance of your paper on the reorganization dated Jan. 1, 1861, to the Cabinet in the November or December before, and that it was accepted by the Cabinet—indeed, he said he was quite “provoked at the facility” with which they accepted it, when he

<sup>1</sup> See Herbert's prophecy on this point in *Life of Florence Nightingale*, vol. i, p. 406, and how it was realized, in vol. ii, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup> Biddulph; *Cardwell*, p. 12.

was "primed with arguments" against their expected opposition.

You probably know that your letter to the Treasury which accompanied the paper of Jan. 1 was sent in by Lord Herbert to the Treasury.

Is the time ripe now when you could do something, the principal obstacle being removed?

Let me add that when Sidney Herbert instituted the double Permanent Secretaryship, he did it against his own better judgment. It was not the fruit of his conviction. He admitted that it was organizing the office for the men, not the men for the office.

I am certain that the feeling of having done this broke his heart and hastened his death, and that his best friends will be those who now follow up the plans of his better days.

My only excuse for writing to you is my intense interest in the subject.

Perhaps you know that he intended to put Capt. Galton in one of the Headships of Departments (had he reorganized the War Office), and to have put Major Gordon, of Constantinople, in Capt. Galton's present place.

Yours sincerely, F. NIGHTINGALE.

This letter seems to have influenced de Grey, for he at once corrected, as far as he could, Herbert's deviation from his scheme, by giving the new Military Under-Secretary the whole of the Permanent Under-Secretaryship, and by adding to it Douglas Galton in the revived office of Assistant Under-Secretary of State.<sup>1</sup> This, of course, was not exactly what he had originally intended, but the result was the same, inasmuch as the new Permanent Under-Secretary and Assistant

<sup>1</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

Under-Secretary divided between them the management of the whole office and the co-ordination of its various departments on the one hand, and the carrying on of the work of the Secretary of Military Correspondence on the other. Thus, two of the great departments suggested in his scheme were duly organized. A third followed very shortly. This was constituted by the appointment of an Inspector-General of Engineers in place of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, to act as Director of Works and as Engineering Adviser to the Secretary of State.<sup>1</sup> The creation of the fourth great department, dealing with clothing and feeding the Army, camp equipage, transport, and stores, proved a more difficult enterprise, and it was not until four years later that de Grey succeeded in appointing a commission which carried out his proposal in its entirety. Meanwhile, however, in 1863 he realized an important instalment of this part of his plan by removing the clothing business from the old Stores Department and making it a separate branch under a Director of Clothing.<sup>2</sup>

It has been necessary to enter into all these arid details in order to show, what has not hitherto been realized, how substantial was de Grey's achievement in War Office reorganization. A comparison of the facts just cited with the proposals contained in his Minute shows that he carried out all the main lines of his scheme. The filling in of the details is more difficult to trace, but this also was in a large measure accomplished by him. At any rate, when he left office in 1866 he might well have boasted that the "chaos" revealed by the Select Committee of 1860 had been cleared away, and that in its place a well-organized structure had been created, on which later reformers could build with ease and safety.

Besides reorganizing the War Office it fell to de Grey,

<sup>1</sup> Wheeler, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-8; Biddulph, *Cardwell*, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Biddulph, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

during his tenure of the Under-Secretaryship, to give a remarkable stimulus to the Volunteer movement. The movement in its revived form—it had almost disappeared after the Peace of 1815—was due to the Invasion Panic of 1859, which followed on the strained relations of Great Britain and France in the previous year.<sup>1</sup> De Grey was not—at least not overtly—among the scaremongers, but, as we have seen, he profoundly distrusted Napoleon III, and he readily assimilated in his Palmerstonian environment a haunting belief in the reality of the French menace. His letters to Mansfield at this period are full of his uneasiness on this score. “War stands close to us,” he writes on June 11, 1860, “and must, I think, come before long if the present reign in France continues.”<sup>2</sup> More astonishing is the readiness with which he accepted the Palmerstonian theory, of which Herbert was a convinced exponent, “that steam had bridged the Channel, and for the purpose of aggression had almost made this country cease to be an island.”<sup>3</sup> He threw himself energetically into all the defensive measures which were the necessary corollaries of this theory—not only the raising of Volunteer corps, which happily survived for more useful ends, but also the wasteful fortifications policy which, at a cost of £7,500,000, dotted the southern shores of England with all sorts of queer citadels.<sup>4</sup>

The Volunteers, however, had not a superabundance of friends in high places. Professional soldiers, with the Duke of Cambridge at their head, scoffed at them;<sup>5</sup> Palmerston treated them with gentle irony; Herbert, though he welcomed them as a manifestation of ‘a

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, Cap. VII.

<sup>2</sup> See also letters to and from Mansfield, September 19 and October 26, 1859, and November 9, 1860.

<sup>3</sup> *Hansard*, vol. clx, p. 18. For Herbert's views see Stanmore, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 211-12, 274-5, 277.

<sup>4</sup> Letter to Mansfield, October 18, 1859. See also Speeches in the House of Lords, *Hansard*, vol. clxv, pp. 836-44; vol. clxvii, pp. 1080-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Panmure Papers*, vol. ii, pp. 435, 437, 439, 444.

military spirit in the middle class,"<sup>1</sup> preferred the development of the Militia; while Gladstone only saw in them a further swashbuckling excuse for indefensible raids on the Exchequer. Hence, de Grey had the field pretty much to himself, and as, fortunately, by the War Office regulations, it was entirely in his own department, he had ample opportunities for tilling it effectively. For some years he had been in the Yorkshire Yeomanry, and soon after taking office he accepted the Honorary Colonelcy of the first Volunteer battalion of the West Yorkshire Regiment. His own personal friends rallied round him with enthusiasm. Tom Hughes roused the Working-Men's College, and within a month formed three strong companies from the students, with Furnivall and John Martineau as captains, and Maurice as chaplain.<sup>2</sup> The idea of a Working-Men's Corps officered by Christian Socialists fluttered the Conservative doves, but de Grey firmly exercised his prerogative and sanctioned it, together with the appointment of Hughes himself as Major Commandant.<sup>3</sup> Later on the corps wanted de Grey to be its honorary Colonel, but the proposal was not pressed.<sup>4</sup> Forster, in spite of his Quaker convictions, followed Hughes's example and carried the Fiery Cross among the Yorkshire mill hands. "Let us be ready for war," he wrote to de Grey, and forthwith raised the Burley Rifle Corps from among his own factory workers.<sup>5</sup> Tom Taylor, who was then in the Government Act Office, was equally busy in Whitehall, where he helped to form the Civil Service Rifle Regiment, of which he was one of the captains. Henry Phillips did likewise with the Artists'

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. civ, p. 699.

<sup>2</sup> The regiment of which this was the nucleus was afterwards the 19th Middlesex. See Davies: *The Working-Men's College, 1854-1894*, pp. 77 et seq.

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Hughes, Dec. 6, 1859.

<sup>4</sup> Letter from Hughes to Lady de Grey, October 29, 1860.

<sup>5</sup> Letter from Forster, January 17, 1860. See also Reid: *Life of Forster*, vol. i, pp. 320-1.

Corps.<sup>1</sup> These friends of de Grey supported him even more effectively with their pens. Hughes, who was then busy in the Press, managed to harness the *Spectator* and the *Volunteer Service Gazette* in praise or defence of all the Under-Secretary's plans, while Taylor did miscellaneous work of the same kind in the *Morning Chronicle* and *Punch*, and wrote stirring patriotic verse which Kate Terry, in the garb of Britannia, declaimed amid frenzied applause at Volunteer banquets.<sup>2</sup>

Small wonder, then, that the movement hummed, and that within the first six months of de Grey's administration nearly 150,000 citizen soldiers were enrolled. De Grey put every facility in their way. He carried through the plan for supplying them with adjutants and drill sergeants;<sup>3</sup> he introduced and pressed through the Rifle Volunteer Corps Bill, which gave them adequate practising grounds;<sup>4</sup> and in the teeth of the Horse Guards he brought to a successful issue the great Easter Monday Volunteer Field Day at Brighton in 1862.

This was the happy climax of three years' excellent work by all concerned. Tom Hughes, who figured in the review with his sturdy companies of working-men from Great Ormond Street, sent de Grey a characteristic account of its success :

*From Thomas Hughes*

7 BELGRAVE PLACE, BRIGHTON, *Easter Tuesday.*

DEAR GODERICH,—Fanny's letter to your wife and the papers will have told you all about the doings here yesterday before you get this, but I must write to thank

<sup>1</sup> Letters from Taylor, January 26 and September 19, 1860.

<sup>2</sup> e.g. "Address written by Captain Tom Taylor for the Hon. Artillery Company's Dinner in aid of the Funds of the National Rifle Association" (June 27, 1860, 4 pp.).

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Herbert, January 31, 1860; *Hansard*, vol. clvi, pp. 553-6; vol. clx, p. 185.

<sup>4</sup> *Hansard*, vol. clx, p. 819.

you for the kind loan of the mare, who looked beautiful (which is much more than her rider did) and behaved admirably. . . . I really think the troops did about as well as any troops I have ever seen. The movements could not have covered a less space, I should say, than from 4 to 5 square miles, and the manœuvres were necessarily rather complicated, as 4 lines had successively to be brought into action (to satisfy the war thirst of the Volunteers) and all within sight of the grand stand (to please the lady-spectators, which the old chief insisted on doing, as he said that part of the success was quite as important as the military business). The marching past was not over till 3.15, and we in the second division had pretty well made up our minds that we should not burn our blank cartridges. On the contrary, our regiment for one managed to burn every round before the enemy were disposed of. We were thrown out to skirmish, it is true, but every regiment, I am sure, must have had a full dose of soldiering. I certainly never saw troops change front or deploy quicker or to all appearances more steadily than the greater part of those here yesterday did, but of course my experience is small.

Now for the other side : One of the divisional generals, Cranford, instead of bringing a proper staff, had two young boys for aides (Guardsmen) who couldn't carry messages—e.g. one of them rode up to Ranelagh and ordered him to advance his brigade in echelon of *companies* instead of *echelon of battalions* ! If such blunders had only been made to *the party of order* it wouldn't matter, but when made to Garibaldi & Co. it gives opportunity to the enemy to blaspheme. One regular brigadier, Grey, broke down *completely*—luckily his brigade major, Colville (a Shorncliffe man), was thor-

oughly competent, and when his brigadier had *thoroughly* put his foot in it took the command and pulled the troops through without further muddle. With these exceptions the regular staff was very good, and worked admirably with our officers. If you hear of faults and grumblings so far as movements are concerned, depend upon it they are all traceable to these two sources if they have any foundation at all. Elcho and Radstock handled their brigades admirably: Ranelagh, I hear, would not obey orders. I was in Radstock's brigade, so can speak myself for that. He only gave one order which could not be understood, and then explained himself at once, so that he had a clear idea of what he meant, which is the great thing.

One other point of serious import has been raised. McMurdo (who worked like a dragon) employed a lot of Volunteers on the Quartermaster-General's staff, and they did their work well. Phillips, the chief of them, mounted a cocked hat, which gained him great respect from railway officials, etc., and on the whole, though provocative of mirth, was probably useful, *but* the moment he appeared in our brigade Radstock was delighted—"The first step to a Volunteer Staff," said R., and no doubt P.'s cocked hat is so, and we must expect to hear more of this staff question. I am inclined to think that the best thing to do (if practicable, of which of course I am no judge) would be to take the bull by the horns and have a Volunteer staff *for certain purposes*, carefully selecting the men and specifying their duties. Phillips might safely have his tab, with cocked hat and feathers, and would do a great deal of useful work well; and there is a man in Bury's corps (one Warralin, a clerk in the P. Office) who has the greatest talent for organization, without exception,

I have ever come across. He came down here for the Civil Service and Artists' Corps, and has provided *everything* for them (including pews at church), conveyed them everywhere, and in fact done for them better, and cheaper by at least 50 per cent, than any other corps. Now a staff of a dozen or half a dozen such men as these, for commissariat and transit purposes, would, I should think, be useful and popular, and would show all right-minded people that there is no feeling against giving us all the chances we are fit for. The question, of course a far graver one, of a staff for purely military purposes ought not, I think, to be mooted yet if we can help it. With another year or two's experience such men as Colville, Shaw, Gooch, etc., will be thoroughly appreciated by our officers and men and will appreciate us, and then either the desire for a staff will die out or the creation thereof will do no harm and raise no antagonistic feeling.

All this I hope will not bore you; or, rather, I am sure it won't. One gets so few chances of feeling the collective Volunteer pulse that it is worth while to tabulate results and look ahead. I forgot to say that McMurdo's staff, Erskine, the gallantest and handsomest of men, Harman, etc., were beyond praise everywhere, but they are scarcely pure regulars by this time, and have a sort of sympathy for us which partially blinds and disqualifies them.

I have a deal to do and nothing more particular to say, except our united loves to your wife, and hopes that you are having a good time (as the Sovereign Prince used to say). . . . When we meet I shall have much more to say concerning the review, and the future of the V.S. Meantime bye bye.

Ever yours affectionately, THOS. HUGHES.

Hughes's suggestions were not forgotten when later on de Grey, as Secretary of State for War, gave the Volunteers the Act on which their whole organization finally rested.<sup>1</sup>

His service to the Volunteers, unlike his work for War Office reform, did not lack appreciation in his own time. Earl Fortescue told the House of Lords, in July 1860, that de Grey "had won golden opinions by the courtesy, ability, and zeal with which he had accomplished the official labour of regulating and organizing the Volunteer Force."<sup>2</sup> That this was also the opinion of the Volunteers themselves was shown by the address presented to him by their Commanding Officers in February 1861, thanking him for the great services he had rendered to the Force during his first tenure of the Under-Secretaryship.

<sup>1</sup> The Volunteer Act, 26 and 27 Vict.

<sup>2</sup> *Hansard*, vol. clx, p. 184.

## CHAPTER X

### IN THE CABINET

(1863—1866)

ON April 13, 1863, George Cornwall Lewis died suddenly, and the Secretaryship of State for War again became vacant. Lewis's brother-in-law, Lord Clarendon, wrote to de Grey: "I am sure it will be a melancholy satisfaction to you to know how great an affection and esteem he had for you, and how much he considered that his labours were lightened by the able assistance that you so willingly gave him. It was a constant subject of his conversation with us all."<sup>1</sup>

Although de Grey was quite conscious that this tribute to him really understated the value of his work in the Office, he had less hope of succeeding to the Secretaryship of State than he had when Herbert died. The old difficulties still remained; they were, indeed, a little aggravated. Gladstone continued fretful and sore over what he deemed the extravagance of the Militarists, and he was not unaware that de Grey had been against him in his struggles on this question.<sup>2</sup> He was, consequently, more than ever anxious to have the head of the War Office in the Commons. Other people had other views, and among them was that very energetic lady Florence Nightingale: She had great hopes of de Grey for the furtherance of her own pet schemes. One of them—War Office Reform—he

<sup>1</sup> April 16, 1863.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, de Grey's letter to Lord Frederick Paulet, February 8, 1862.

had already served well. Another, which she was particularly anxious to promote at this moment, was Sanitary Reform in the Indian Army, and she dreaded having to deal with it through a Minister whom she did not know and who might prove refractory to her enthusiasm. Cardwell, who was believed to be Gladstone's candidate, she did not know, while Panmure, to whom Palmerston leaned, had long been anathema to her. On the other hand, de Grey was a friend and a proved sympathizer with the cause.

She at once set to work to secure his appointment, and began by enlisting the support of Harriet Martineau, then a leader-writer on the *Daily News*. "Agitate, agitate, for Lord de Grey to succeed Sir George Lewis," she telegraphed to Harriet on April 16. The next day the world was solemnly informed through the columns of the *Daily News* that public opinion expected the appointment of de Grey. But this was not all. While Harriet was thus bombarding Fleet Street, Florence was executing a frontal attack on Downing Street. She wrote to Gladstone, and she sent her brother-in-law, Sir Harry Verney, armed with written instructions, to interview the Prime Minister. Gladstone frankly confessed that he preferred a House of Commons man, but Palmerston was more sympathetic, and Verney derived a very hopeful impression from his talk with him.<sup>1</sup> This impression was swiftly justified.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

To H. A. Bruce

HOUSE OF LORDS, 20 April, 1863.

MY DEAR BRUCE,—Lord Palmerston sent for me this morning and offered me the Secretary of Stateship.

I had so completely given up all idea of getting it that I was really surprized when the offer actually came.

<sup>1</sup> Cook: *Life of Florence Nightingale*, vol. ii, pp. 29-31.

I am delighted that I did not act first.

Lord Palmerston does not wish the arrangement to be mentioned until it appears in the newspapers.

I know you will rejoice at my success heartily. I can hardly believe it myself.

Yours ever, DE GREY.

The public announcement was made on the 22nd, and, together with Hartington's appointment to the Parliamentary Under-Secretaryship, was extremely well received.

De Grey never seems to have been made acquainted with the great service rendered to him by Florence Nightingale. It was, however, not the only one. Together with Tom Hughès, she frequently whipped up her friends in the press to help her friend in Pall Mall, and in this way did much to smooth his path. One of these efforts deserves to be recorded for the characteristic and amusing letters to which it gave rise, although in itself it was neither important nor successful.

Shortly after taking office de Grey was worried by a military scandal which was alleged by the press to have happened at Mhow, the headquarters of a division of the Bombay Army in the Indore State. Colonel Crawley, commanding the Dragoons in that place, was charged with abuses of authority which had caused the death of Sergeant-Major Lilley and "grievous hardship and suffering" to his wife, and also with having made unfounded statements, to the prejudice of a brother officer, at a court-martial held at Mhow for the trial on a trumped-up charge of Paymaster Smales. The affair excited great interest in Parliament and the press owing to a suspicion that Mansfield, then Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, and the War Office at home were endeavouring to shield Crawley. The Duke of Cambridge consulted de Grey, and it was determined to bring Crawley to England and submit him to a court-

martial. While preparations for the trial were being made it came to de Grey's knowledge that Matthew Higgins, better known by his pen-name of "Jacob Omnium,"<sup>1</sup> was about to publish an *ex parte* account of the case, and he asked the good offices of Hughes and Florence Nightingale to get the article suppressed. The rest of the story is told in the following letters :

*From Thomas Hughes*

3 OLD SQUARE, Oct. 19/63.

MY DEAR GODERICH [*sic*],—About Higgins going to write his Crawley case in *Cornhill*.

The row about Smales will break out strongly in the press at the end of this month—"cause why." A hansom stopped in the street on Saturday, and out jumped Higgins to catch me by the button-hole. He told me he had prepared a careful statement of all the facts, which was to appear in the next *Cornhill*. Did I take an interest in the Court Martial, etc.?—Yes.—Then would I comment on his paper in the *Spectator*?—Yes.—So I went off straight to the office and left a note for the editor, who was out. I enclose his answer, which you will see books the *Spec.* for me. Of course Higgins is doing the same with *Saturday Review*, *London Examiner*, and with the daily press, so you may look out for a grand shindy in about 10 days' time.

Will you kindly send me the best list you can of *every* official document which has been published, and if there is likely to be any difficulty about getting any of them please tell me how to reach such. Also if there is anything you know of besides official documents which a party ought to peruse who is going to write on the

<sup>1</sup> Higgins's connexion with the Mhow affair is explained in the introduction to *Essays on Social Subjects* (1875), pp. lvi-lx.

subject. Of course I know the case pretty well as one of the public who is interested in Army matters generally, but not enough to write fairly on it. The *Cornhill* will be out about the end of this week, probably not in time for the weeklys, who will go in the week after, but there is no time to lose. You see, Hutton's<sup>1</sup> statement as to official acquittal was founded on a letter of Smales's, so will not go for much, but I have some impression myself of having seen something almost equivalent to a white-washing so far as the Iniskilling a/cs were concerned. . . .

Kingsley is writing a history of England for boys, the first sheets which I have read very good. Love to your wife and Olly.

Ever yours affectly., THOS. HUGHES.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

*From Florence Nightingale*

HAMPSTEAD, N.W., Oct. 23/63.

DEAR LORD DE GREY,—Capt. Galton wrote to me about the Higgins' Article. And I did again all I could to prevent it. But it will not have the least effect. What is the use of appealing to the fair play of a man who has no fair play in him? i.e. Higgins. I am furiously anti-Crawley, and therefore manifestly to Mr. Higgins my object is only fair play.

Of course I did not use your name in any way. And the blame, if any, of "trying to tamper with the free action of the British press," &c., &c., &c.!!! will be mine.

Have the goodness to burn this note out of the world and out of your memory. And I will tell you what I know.

<sup>1</sup> Richard Holt Hutton, editor of the *Spectator* from 1861 to 1897.

The article in question was written for the *Edinburgh Review*. But its refusal was managed there on the ground that it would be "highly unbecoming" to publish anything when the enquiry is in progress and the Court Martial coming on.

Mr. Higgins said even then that he could easily publish it elsewhere.<sup>1</sup>

He was told that all *ex parte* discussion before the trial should be deprecated.

I understand that the article itself is not pro anybody, and that it hits out pretty evenly at everybody concerned.

Mr. Higgins was also told that Crawley's friends might, by way of transferring the trial to a Civil Court, take proceedings against any journal commenting so freely on his character.

I understand that Mr. Higgins, tho' animated by his strong natural and national love of a "row," has a very sincere feeling towards yourself and Sir Wm. Mansfield, and has no intention of saying or doing what is likely to be inconvenient (but, alas! the love of writing something "smart," what Irish ink-bottle can resist it?); that with regard to Smales, no one is for him, but that the W.O. *seems* to be in a false position, viz. by treating him as if guilty of misconduct in his office of Paymaster, and yet not taking direct proceedings against him or his sureties.

But this is only an "emergent" from the great Crawley case, and has no direct bearing upon it. But it is merely on this point that there is an *apparent* case for Smales.

However, I would not trust that there is not more

<sup>1</sup> As one of Thackeray's most intimate friends Higgins had great influence with the *Cornhill*.

mischief than this in Mr. Higgins. (He is now in Paris.) Some men are unfair from their stupidity; others have unfairness thrust upon them: but I do not know Mr. Higgins' equal for being unfair *con amore*.

I have written this to you instead of to the W.O., because I am not sure that the W.O. thinks that discretion is the best part of valour.\*

Please remember that, however unimportant this information is, it is for yourself alone.

Yours most faithfully, FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

\* The above does not include Capt. Galton, who is very discreet.

[PRIVATE.]

*From Florence Nightingale*

HAMPSTEAD, N.W., Oct. 24/63.

DEAR LORD DE GREY,—I am sorry to say it is quite impossible to prevent the appearance of the Higgins article now. It is already advertised. Smith and Elder have sent Mr. Higgins 50 guineas for it. And he himself is gone to Naples.

It is a flagrant injustice, this article, and one which none but an Irishman could commit. I trust it will be visited upon him in public opinion.

But I am told that there is nothing in the article of the smallest consequence to the W.O. I do not vouch for it, however.

(I believe that Mr. Higgins did not know that the reason the W.O. have not taken notice of Smales' defalcation is that you were waiting for evidence from India. But he might have known it.)

In fact, the essence of unfairness is—to give an opinion without knowing what might be known.

Yours most faithfully, FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE.

At the trial of Crawley, which was held at Aldershot on November 17, 1863, all the charges against him broke down, and he was acquitted and restored to the command of his regiment. The procedure at the trial was afterwards criticized, but it was vigorously defended by de Grey, who told the House of Lords that the Government "approve of and rejoice in the acquittal of Colonel Crawley."<sup>1</sup>

This, however, was a very trifling interlude of a tenure of office which was preoccupied by much graver anxieties. Relations with the United States, which had been at breaking point in the winter of 1861, remained strained throughout the Civil War, while on the Continent the beginnings of the colossal maelstrom which was to engulf Europe half a century later were already angrily discernible in Bismarck's dealings with the Schleswig-Holstein Question. This state of things led very naturally to great reluctance on the part of the Horse Guards to consent to reductions in the Army Estimates, with the result that de Grey's cares became complicated by frequent conflicts with the Treasury and its tempestuous master. He did his best to mollify Gladstone by taking in hand the question of the reduction of Colonial Garrisons, which had been decided upon by a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861, in pursuance of an arrangement arrived at between Herbert and Gladstone two years previously.<sup>2</sup> Here he was fortunate in finding an ally in Cardwell, who became Secretary of State for the Colonies early in 1864, and who was not only ready to facilitate the reductions but equally willing to help de Grey in resisting them when Imperial needs rendered them inadvisable. The two men worked together in the closest harmony, but, unfortunately, they were hampered by unexpected difficulties. It was not only impossible

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. clxxiii, pp. 1175-9.

<sup>2</sup> Stanmore: *Life of Herbert*, vol. ii, pp. 217, 221-2, 236. Biddulph: *Cardwell*, p. 29.

to reduce the considerable force sent to Canada during the "Trent" crisis in 1861-2, but the continued ill-temper of the United States rendered a large outlay on frontier fortifications indispensable. Moreover, New Zealand became plunged in a renewal of the Maori War—the so-called Waikato War—in April 1863, and instead of reducing the garrison in that Colony it became necessary to increase it. Nevertheless, de Grey and Cardwell between them managed to effect some notable economies. Towards the end of 1864 they brought back five battalions from New Zealand, and they managed at the same time to diminish the number of troops on the West Coast of Africa, in the West Indies, and at Hong Kong, and to obtain increased monetary contributions from Mauritius and other Crown Colonies.<sup>1</sup>

All this, however, was more than counterbalanced by the increasing military needs of Canada. The American danger had preoccupied de Grey at an early stage of his work in the War Office. In 1859 he wrote anxiously to Mansfield about it,<sup>2</sup> and in the same year he made proposals to Herbert for improving the defences of British Columbia.<sup>3</sup> When towards the end of 1861 the Confederate envoys, Mason and Slidell, were seized by the Commander of a Federal cruiser on board the British Packet *Trent*, he had no illusions as to the provocative character of the outrage. The Cabinet left the military preparations almost entirely in his hands. "I quite share your feeling that you must prepare for war," wrote Cardwell to him, "and I trust you will conduct it in North America as well as you conducted it in China."<sup>4</sup> Happily, war was averted, but if this was chiefly due to the wise control exercised by the Queen over Russell's bellicose diplomacy some of

<sup>1</sup> There is a very full private correspondence between de Grey and Cardwell on this subject, ranging from April 1864 to December 1865.

<sup>2</sup> Letter, September 19, 1859.

<sup>3</sup> Minute, October 21, 1859.

<sup>4</sup> Letter, December 3, 1861.

the merit unquestionably belongs to the promptitude, smoothness, and tact with which de Grey dispatched troops and munitions to Canada.

The problem of providing against a renewal of the danger remained, and de Grey set himself to its study. In August 1863 he proposed to the Cabinet that a vote should be taken in Parliament for putting Quebec into a better state of defence.<sup>1</sup> Owing probably to the objections of Gladstone nothing was done, but de Grey was not to be denied, and he sent Colonel Jervis to Canada to inquire into the whole question on the spot. In the following spring Jervis brought back a scheme which was approved by both de Grey and Cardwell. It provided for certain works at Quebec and Halifax at the cost of the Imperial Government, leaving the defences of Montreal to the charge of the Colonial Government. This time the approval of the Cabinet was secured, and it was agreed to ask Parliament for a vote of £200,000.<sup>2</sup> Later on, when the Canadian Delegation came to London to discuss Confederation with the Imperial Government, the question of Defence was reopened, and it appears that an extension of the Jervis scheme was suggested. This provoked a vehement protest from Gladstone, in the form of a Minute which he addressed to Cardwell.

• *From W. E. Gladstone*

I do not know what precise degree of significance attaches to Col. (?) Macdougall's communications with the ministers from Canada; and I presume the material part of this paper lies in such indications of opinion as he may have obtained from them.

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Palmerston, September 7, 1863.

<sup>2</sup> Letters to and from Cardwell, April 14 and 19, and June 28, 1864. *Hansard*, vol. clxxvii, pp. 422-4.

<sup>3</sup> The reference is probably to the Hon. William McDougall, who had been a delegate to the Quebec Convention in 1864 and was very active in all the Confederation negotiations.

It does not appear to me that the paper exhibits any plan on which a judgment can be passed.

But I am strongly of opinion that to commit the honour of England and of the British Navy to the defence of any one of the American Lakes against the United States is one of the gravest questions ever submitted to a Cabinet; and that we should not be justified in entertaining such a question at all, except upon receiving unequivocal proof that it is the desire and intention of the Canadian people, the case arising, to fight for their separate existence, and for the connection with England, in the same spirit in which the South has fought. Or such a desire and intention I have not, for one, as yet seen the evidence: but it may be forthcoming.

W. E. G. *May 10. 65.*

In transmitting this strange outburst to de Grey, Cardwell wrote:

[PRIVATE.]

*17 May, 1865.*

MY DEAR DE GREY,—The enclosed is not so bad. But is not the honour of England committed already? and was it not from a deep sense of this that you and I moved in the Cabinet last year?

Yours truly, EDWARD CARDWELL.

The wisdom of de Grey's policy in regard to Canada was speedily demonstrated. As the American Civil War neared its end and the triumph of the North became assured, the tone of the Washington Government towards Great Britain increased in acerbity. They prepared more especially to take up their grievances

in regard to the *Alabama* and the other Confederate commerce destroyers which had been fitted out in England. Encouraged by the prospect of a rupture between the two countries and relying on the support of the large number of Irishmen who had had military training in the Civil War, the Fenians planned a rising in Ireland. Happily, it proved abortive, owing to the prompt precautions taken by the British Government, but, as Palmerston shrewdly saw, the danger was only shifted to the Canadian Frontier.

*From Lord Palmerston*

BRISTOL, 27 Sept. 1865.

MY DEAR DE GREY,—The American assault on Ireland under the name of Fenianism may now be held to have failed, but the snake is only scotched and not killed. It is far from impossible that the American conspirators may try to obtain in our North-American Provinces compensation for their defeat in Ireland. If that should be, we might have an inroad this autumn or early next spring. We ought, therefore, to consider what our means of defence in Canada are. The works at Quebec are, I conclude, going on as fast as can be accomplished. The Canadian Government has probably the command of a large number of militiamen and volunteers. But what weapons are there in Canada to arm them with? The American Fenians would come armed with excellent rifles, and if I am not mistaken our store-houses in North America are full of smooth-bore Brown Besses quite unfit to be opposed to rifles. I wish you would consider whether it might not be expedient to send over to Quebec before the navigation is closed a sufficient quantity of good Enfields, with ammunition and a proper proportion of

Armstrong Field pieces. It would be well also that the works at Quebec, such as they are, should be supplied with some heavy guns.

Show this letter to Cardwell and thus save me the trouble of writing separately to him.

Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON.

The Earl de Grey, &c. &c. &c.

De Grey was able to assure the watchful Premier that all his wishes had been anticipated and that if the Fenians crossed the border they would get a sufficiently warm reception.<sup>1</sup> He prophesied truly enough. When the Fenian incursions took place in the following April and June they were easily dealt with by the military forces—Imperial and Colonial—which had been thoughtfully armed by de Grey, and that without testing the unfinished fortifications of Quebec.

The Schleswig-Holstein Question, which ran its course parallel with the American Civil War, appeared at the time to be a much smaller affair, but in reality it was fraught with consequences not a whit less tremendous. It was the overture of the colossal Bismarckian drama and of that still bloodier world-tragedy which came more or less consciously in its wake. British statesmanship on both questions was strangely blundering and perverse. Looking back at it now, in the lurid light of the greatest of all wars, one cannot but reflect, in the spirit of Oxenstiern, how little is the foresight with which the world is governed.

• In both cases the issue was one of national unity—America striving to preserve her unity, Germany seeking to compass hers—but with this difference, that while in the one case the unity was an end in itself, in the other it was, if not intended, at any rate destined

<sup>1</sup> De Grey's letter has not been preserved, but it is referred to in a letter from Palmerston dated October 4, 1865. Cf. letters from Cardwell and de Grey, October 5 and 11.

to become an instrument of international tension. England, however, was impartially hostile to both and was within an ace of war with both. That war with America would have been the most fatal blunder in British history we have now the best reason for knowing ; but it is not so certain that the restraining influences which prevented Palmerston from embarking on war with Germany in 1864 were equally wise.

What part did de Grey play in this momentous crisis ? Although he was the most recent recruit in the Cabinet and his personal weight was consequently not great, he was able to exert a certain influence by the fact that he was the War Minister upon whom the main executive responsibility would fall in case of war. So far as the ultimate consequences of the crisis were concerned, he was apparently no wiser than any of his colleagues.<sup>1</sup> His sympathies, however, were with Denmark, and though he ranged himself with the anti-war party, he did so on intelligible and consistent grounds wholly limited to the responsibilities of his Department. Hence he had no part in the diplomatic miscalculations and tergiversations which rendered the final *dénouement* so humiliating for this country. His direct official concern with the question appears to have begun in the winter of 1863, when the Duke of Cambridge warned him, first in a private letter and later in an official Memorandum, that "with the world in a state of *great insecurity*"<sup>2</sup> any reduction in the Army estimates

<sup>1</sup> All appear to have been dominated by considerations of the moment whether they were for or against war. Only one man seems to have had a glimmering of the real danger ahead. Robert Cecil, in a vigorous article in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1864, wrote with prophetic insight : "If by timid language and a false love of peace Germany is encouraged to believe that she can set treaties at defiance with impunity, a Continental war will result, in which it is almost impossible that England should not be forced to take a part." Unfortunately, Cecil's prophetic genius did not serve him as well on the American question, on which he was just as bellicose against the North.

<sup>2</sup> The italics are the Duke's. See letter dated November 22, 1863, and "Memorandum for Lord de Grey—Estimates, 1864-5," Horse Guards, December 5, 1863.

would be extremely unsafe. De Grey sent the documents to the Prime Minister, but it was not until February 2 that he received Palmerston's reply.

*From Lord Palmerston*

94 PICCADILLY, 2 Feb'y. 1864.

MY DEAR DE GREY,—I return you the Duke of Cambridge's letter. In a purely military point of view his Proposal is perfectly right and ought to be adopted. But financial and political considerations are at the present moment so strongly against it that I am clearly of opinion that we could not propose it to the Cabinet.

What turn events may take in the North of Europe, it is impossible at present to foresee, but whatever line the course of events may lead the British Government to adopt, I am convinced that we shall not be found deficient in the means necessary to give effect to the policy which we may think the best.

Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON.

The Earl de Grey.

This letter could not but cause serious anxiety to so prudent a man as de Grey. Only six months before, Palmerston had openly threatened Germany in a speech in the House of Commons.<sup>1</sup> On December 26 he had written to Russell that if German troops invaded Schleswig it "would, in my clear opinion, entitle Denmark to our active military and naval support,"<sup>2</sup> and on February 1, 1864—that is, the day before the above letter was written—Marshal Wrangel had crossed the frontier into Schleswig. And yet Palmerston declined to sanction military precautions, even though he knew that in order to give effect to the policy he favoured he could not count on an immediate expedi-

<sup>1</sup> July 23, 1863.

<sup>2</sup> Walpole: *Life of Russell*, vol. ii, p. 401.

tionary force of more than 20,000 men. Small wonder, then, that de Grey declined to countenance a policy of war.

That this was not for want of sympathy with the Danes is shown by the following letters.

*From the Prince of Wales*<sup>1</sup>

MARLBOROUGH HOUSE, FALL MALL, S.W., May 10th [1864].

MY DEAR LORD DE GREY,—Many thanks for sending me the official telegram relating to the defeat of the Austrian ships by the Danes, which I only received late yesterday evening.

Everybody seems delighted at the news, and it will be some encouragement to the poor Danes.

I also rejoice to hear that at the Conference<sup>2</sup> yesterday it was decided to have a suspension of arms from the 12th for a month. I only hope that during these next two days the Prussians will not make an attack on Alsen.

Ever, very sincerely yours, ALBERT EDWARD.

*To the Prince of Wales*

HORSE GUARDS, 10/5/64.

SIR,—I beg to thank Y.R.H. for your letter, which I have just had the honor to receive.

I do indeed rejoice that a suspension of arms has been agreed upon, and I cannot conceive it possible that the Prussians should avail themselves of the two days before its formal commencement to make an attack upon Alsen.

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards King Edward VII.

<sup>2</sup> At the instance of Russell a Conference of the Powers had met in London on April 25 to endeavour to settle the question. It proved abortive and was dissolved on June 22.

Such a proceeding would deserve universal reprobation and might be followed by very serious consequences.

DE GREY.

Nevertheless, de Grey remained prominently identified with the anti-war party, and this is shown by the fact that when, owing to the failure of the London Conference, the situation became extremely menacing, the Queen, who was also strongly opposed to war, chose him as her medium for communicating a vigorous expression of her views to the Cabinet.<sup>1</sup> On July 19 General Grey handed him the following copy of a Memorandum from Her Majesty, the original of which he had shown him the day before.

*From the Queen*

QUERIES ?

1. If Arbitration be refused by one or both parties, will not the Emperor of the French's proposal of testing the feelings of Sleswig be accepted ?

2. If *all* but Denmark agree to this last proposal, what is to be done ?<sup>2</sup>

3. In case the question of giving material aid to Denmark should really have to be considered, ought not the Government seriously to consider what this can effect ? If only by *sea*, and *singlehanded*, ought we to run the fearful risk without 1st letting Parliament and the Country know what fearful consequences might result from such a proceeding, and how little we could effect ?

<sup>1</sup> The Queen was at the time very freely accused of endeavouring to shield Germany without regard to British interests ; but it is clear from the correspondence printed in Fitzmaurice's *Life of Granville* (vol. i, pp. 464-70) that she was not more pro-German than de Grey himself.

<sup>2</sup> The Danes *did* decline the French proposal.

How long also can we go on? In September or October our ships must leave the Baltic. Can we singly prevent the Prussians from forcing Denmark to give up Sleswig? the more so if Sleswig refused to go to Denmark?

And shall we not be more humiliated by giving partial assistance, and yet not preventing this result, than by withdrawing from all participation in the contest and negotiations?

Besides, don't we know that France's wish is to get us actively engaged in this quarrel, *alone*; that it is the object of Denmark to draw us into it?

This document was at once communicated to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, with the following results.

*From Lord Palmerston*

94 PICCADILLY, 20 June 64.

MY DEAR DE GREY,—I return you the Queen's memorandum.

As to the *fearful* consequences of a war with Germany, they exist only in the Queen's imagination. They might be bad for Germany, especially for Austria, but want of ultimate success in accomplishing our purpose would be the worst danger we should incur. That, however, would be an evil, to be weighed against those attending an opposite course.

Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON.

The Earl de Grey.

*From Earl Russell*

37 CHESHAM PLACE, BELGRAVE SQUARE, S.W.

June 21 [1864].

The Queen is, I think, mistaken as to these fearful consequences.

The King of Denmark will not give up all Sleswig, because the Danish inhabitants of Sleswig intreat him not to do so.

France is not anxious to see us embark singlehanded in a contest with Germany,<sup>1</sup> but to have our help in getting Venetia from Austria and the Rhine frontier from Prussia—so our danger is small.

Our trade would suffer, but would be protected by our Navy.

R.

Russell's argument was not more convincing to de Grey than Palmerston's jauntiness. Nor was it even convincing to Russell himself, for when he learnt three days later from Cowley, our Ambassador in Paris—it is significant that Cowley's dispatch was not written until June 24,<sup>2</sup> while Russell's note is dated the 21st—that he had accurately interpreted the aims of France, he himself shrunk from throwing the whole Continent into the melting-pot for the sake of Schleswig.<sup>3</sup>

Meanwhile, de Grey had not limited his peace campaigning to the Cabinet.

*From Thomas Hughes*

113 PARK STREET, *Tuesday evening.*

DEAR GODERICH,—I must write a line just to say that I am not going to write in the *Spectator* this week. You may say "What the devil do I care?" My reason, however, is that in our walk on Sunday you so far shook my *warlike* REASON (my instincts remain as

<sup>1</sup> It is, however, a fact that Cowley, our Ambassador in Paris, had already warned Russell that this was probably the desire of Napoleon (Walpole: *Russell*, vol. ii, p. 408).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 408-9.

strong as ever) that, though I own I feel the humiliation deeply, I cannot say the Government are wrong. Accordingly, I went round by the office this morning and *discoursed* with Hutton and Townsend, who I found are much too far gone not to pitch into everybody and everything.

Besides their strong feeling on the subject, I find that through the Editor of the *Economist*, who is a great friend, they had it almost direct from Gladstone that we were in any case to go for a localized war. At any rate the paper will probably, or I may say certainly, speak very strongly against the peace policy this week, and, though it is of very little consequence, yet as you are aware that I often write for the paper, I shouldn't like you to think that after seeming to be convinced *viva voce* I went in anonymously t'other way.

I daresay you will understand my feeling. In any case, no harm is done by this note, which please burn and think no more about it. It is only one more specimen of the hobbles which anonymous writing gets coves into; but what is to be done? The good papers won't let you put your name.

Yours ever, THOS. HUGHES.

Eventually the peace policy prevailed, and the decision of the Cabinet was confirmed by the House of Commons, though there was bitter criticism—not confined to the fire-eaters—of the “desertion” of Denmark, after she had been encouraged to look to Great Britain for support. No one, however, seems to have noticed the other and more culpable dissonance of Palmerston's policy, which while threatening war deprived the country of the means of making the threat good.

One useful innovation came of the Schleswig crisis. It showed both the Duke of Cambridge and de Grey

that the Prime Minister and his friends required to be better informed as to the real state of Continental armaments, and with that view they proposed that British Military *attachés* should be permanently appointed to the chief European Embassies. After some difficulty with the Treasury the proposal was adopted.<sup>1</sup>

Palmerston easily weathered the storm of taunts and reproaches to which his unfortunate treatment of the Danish Duchies gave rise. When in the autumn of the following year he died, it was just after a General Election, which was much less of a vote of confidence in his political principles than a demonstration of the nation's affection for his genial personality. He was, indeed, the most typical Englishman of his century, shrewd as he was daring, and industrious, good-natured, bluff, downright, superbly insular, and, on the whole, amazingly lucky. He died without an enemy. Men like de Grey, Layard, and Bruce, who had spent their youthful Radical ardour in denouncing his delightful "swagger," had ended by loving him and serving under him. "Poor old Palmerston!" wrote Tom Hughes. "Though I knew him so slightly I can't help feeling as if I have lost a personal friend."<sup>2</sup> And Bruce<sup>3</sup>:

"How little we thought when discussing the possible future, how near the change had approached. To my mind the noble Pam has been no less fortunate in his death than in his life. He closed his career, like the sun in the tropics, without a twilight. He has left an anxious task to his surviving colleagues."

To de Grey the loss was more serious than he at first realized. Charles Wood, turning away from the grave

<sup>1</sup> See letter from the Duke, March 8, 1864, Memorandum from de Grey, March 10, and Notes from Palmerston and Russell, March 11.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to de Grey, October 19, 1865.

<sup>3</sup> Letter to de Grey, October 22, 1865.

of his old Chief, said paradoxically to Algernon West: "Our quiet days are over; no more peace for us."<sup>1</sup> So it proved. Cabinet and other changes at once became inevitable, and in the making of them de Grey's position was severely shaken. Russell was the new Premier, and his first task was to assure to himself the powerful support of Gladstone as leader in the Commons. But Gladstone was, as he himself wrote, still "sore with conflicts about the public expenditure,"<sup>2</sup> and his fretfulness was now increased by what he called "the lopsided condition of the Government, with the strain and stress of administration in the House of Commons and nearly all the offices about which the House of Commons cares represented by heads in the House of Lords."<sup>3</sup> This state of things had become aggravated by the transfer of the Premiership, in the person of Russell, to the Upper House, and Gladstone accordingly hesitated to retain office until a remedy could be found. In these circumstances Russell hastily resolved to sacrifice de Grey.

*From Earl Russell*

PEMBROKE LODGE, RICHMOND PARK, S.W., Oct. 24, 65.

DEAR DE GREY,—I am disposed, however reluctantly, to accept the handsome offer you made yesterday.

I think the Secretary of State for War should be considered the successor of the Secretary at War—always a member of the House of Commons.

It seems to me that Lord Hartington might be Secretary of State in your place.

I should be glad if you could remain in the Cabinet, but I know not how it could be.

Yours truly, RUSSELL.

The Earl de Grey.

<sup>1</sup> West: *Reminiscences*, vol. i, p. 306.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Russell: Walpole, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 422.

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Russell; Morley: *Gladstone*, vol. ii, p. 154.

*To Earl Russell*

1 CARLTON GARDENS, S.W., 24 Oct. 1865.

MY DEAR LORD RUSSELL,—I have just received your note.

I told you yesterday that though it would be with great regret that I should leave my colleagues, with whom I have for some time acted so cordially, I felt it to be due to you to place my office at your disposal, if you should think it for the advantage of your Government that I should not continue at the head of the War Department.

I have now only to say that I shall be quite content to make this sacrifice, if you should finally determine that you will thereby be enabled to add strength to your Government.

Yours truly, DE GREY.<sup>1</sup>

Russell did not so "finally determine." When the news reached Charles Wood he posted down to Pembroke Lodge in a state of great annoyance and strongly remonstrated with the Premier.<sup>2</sup> Spencer Walpole says that "objections were raised in higher quarters."<sup>3</sup> At the last moment, too, difficulties were experienced with other Ministers who were unable or unwilling to take the new offices assigned to them. The upshot was that the whole plan had to be abandoned.

<sup>1</sup> De Grey was apparently very agitated when he wrote this letter, for there are no fewer than three drafts of it, almost illegible with corrections, among his papers. In the second draft he had inserted the words "in all sincerity" after "I told you yesterday," but he omitted them from the final draft.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from Wood to de Grey, October 24, 1865. See also memo. of de Grey of the same date, with an appended note by Wood.

<sup>3</sup> *Life of Russell*, vol. ii, p. 423.

*From Earl Russell*

PEMBROKE LODGE, RICHMOND PARK, S.W., Oct. 25. 65.

DEAR DE GREY,—Your very handsome conduct will always be remembered gratefully by me.

Finally, I think it will not be necessary to make a change, and at all events I do not propose to do so at present.

I remain, yours faithfully, RUSSELL.

It was not, however, until five weeks later that a "final" decision was taken, and even then it was not final.

*From Earl Russell*

PEMBROKE LODGE, RICHMOND PARK, S.W., Dec. 2. 65.

DEAR DE GREY,—You may consider that all notion of a change in your office, which you administer so well, is given up. Cardwell is too busy with colonies to desire a change, Charles Wood is not in a state to be transferred with impunity to a new office.

Pray tell Lord Hartington. You must inform me when any question arises upon which the Horse Guards press unfairly upon you, and I will do my best to assist you.

I remain, yours truly, RUSSELL.

The concluding sentence of this letter is significant of the continued precariousness of de Grey's tenure. While Palmerston lived he had a Chief who was, in a large measure, in the same boat with himself as far as relations with the Horse Guards and the Treasury were concerned, but now the Prime Minister was solid with the Chancellor and, consequently, the War Secretary was helpless. As it happened, it was not of much

consequence, for the days of the Cabinet itself were numbered. Six months later it fell, partly through inherent weakness and partly through the unwise attempt of the Premier and Gladstone to impose a new Reform Bill on the Liberal Party while it was still much more Palmerstonian than Liberal. De Grey left the War Office before the final catastrophe. On February 2, just two months after Russell had assured him that all notion of a change had been given up, Charles Wood, enfeebled by a hunting accident, resigned and went to the Upper House as Lord Halifax, whereupon Russell seized the opportunity of giving satisfaction to Gladstone by transferring de Grey to the vacant Indian Secretaryship. Hartington succeeded him in Pall Mall.

The interval had been employed by the tottering Minister in a valiant attempt to complete his reorganization of the War Office, and even to lay the foundations of a large scheme of Army Reform. In the War Office two things were still necessary to give final shape to the reconstruction he had planned in his Minute of December 1860.<sup>1</sup> One was the concentration of all business relating to supplies and stores, as well as transport and clothing, in one Government Department, under a Military Chief directly responsible to the Secretary of State. The other was the readjustment of the whole staff and its conditions of service to the new departmental system. The first of these changes was a matter of some complexity, and de Grey appointed a Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Strathnairn to study the transport aspect of it.<sup>2</sup> The Committee was still sitting when he retired from Pall Mall and even when the Cabinet fell. The new Minister, General Peel, duly extended the scope of its inquiries,

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, Cap. IX, p. 175.

<sup>2</sup> Some interesting details of the early work of the Committee are contained in a letter from Strathnairn to de Grey, October 12, 1866. The original scope of the Committee was defined in a Minute drawn up by de Grey in 1865 (*Hansard*, vol. clxxxviii, pp. 586-92).

and in 1867 it reported. In the following year the Department projected by de Grey—the last of his four new subdivisions of the War Office—was established in accordance with its recommendations, though with somewhat larger functions than he had contemplated.<sup>1</sup> The reorganization of the staff was the work partly of a departmental Committee under Lord Hartington, appointed by de Grey in 1865, and partly of Tom Hughes, who was specially imported into the War Office to codify and co-ordinate the old warrants and regulations with a view to the establishment of a Regulations Branch.<sup>2</sup> As for the scheme of Army Reform, it only survived de Grey's retirement to be decently smothered by the Commission to which it was referred. This was Lord Dalhousie's Recruiting Commission of 1866.<sup>3</sup> Under the terms of its appointment de Grey contemplated "reforming the whole system of the Army by combining the depot companies with the militia," and other reforms by which an adequate reserve might be created.<sup>4</sup> The Report of the Commission, however, left matters very much as they were,<sup>5</sup> and thus Army Reform was shelved for another four years.

De Grey's career as Secretary of State for India lasted only five months, owing to the fall of the Government towards the end of June. He had, however, a good deal to do with the India Office during the whole period of the Palmerston Administration. From the

<sup>1</sup> Biddulph: *Cardwell*, pp. 13-14, 23, 101.

<sup>2</sup> It is not quite clear what became of the work thus done. Hughes presented two official reports to de Grey in November 1865, but no trace of them can be found in the War Office. See letters from Hughes to de Grey, "Easter Eve," April 18, August 7 and 29, September 8, and November 7, 1865.

<sup>3</sup> Holland, in his life of the Duke of Devonshire, attributes the appointment of the Commission to the Duke, then Lord Hartington (vol. i, p. 63), but this is an error.

<sup>4</sup> Letters from and to Russell, January 4 and 5, 1866, and from Gladstone, January 15, 1866. See also de Grey's statement in the House of Lords on March 14, 1867 (*Hansard*, vol. clxxxv, pp. 1781-6).

<sup>5</sup> Command Paper No. 15, 849/1867.

time he joined it in 1859 he was in correspondence with Mansfield, Frere, and Ellis on all sorts of Indian problems, and this led him to pay frequent visits to the India Office to discuss with Sir Charles Wood the information and opinions thus confided to him.<sup>1</sup> In this way he kept in very close touch with Indian affairs. One of the Indian questions in which he played a considerable part in co-operation with Wood was the reorganization of the Indian Army rendered necessary by the Mutiny. Here his friendship with Mansfield proved very useful.<sup>2</sup> It fell to him to introduce the European Forces (India) Bill into the House of Lords in 1860, and he performed the task with marked skill.<sup>3</sup>

In the following year he served for six months as Parliamentary Under-Secretary under Wood. Although the time was brief the experience he gained was of the utmost value. Much of his later success as Viceroy is, indeed, explained by this experience. Two other Governors-General, Dalhousie and Canning, had been Presidents of the Board of Control, and four others, Northbrook, Dufferin, Lansdowne, and Curzon, were Under-Secretaries; but he was the only Viceroy who held both the Under-Secretaryship and the Secretaryship of State. Nor was it only by this close contact with the central machinery of Indian administration that he benefited. Of even greater value to him was his personal intercourse with his Chief, Charles Wood, and with a still more remarkable man, John Lawrence, then a member of the Secretary of State's Council, and afterwards Viceroy during de Grey's tenure of the office of Secretary of State. Both these men stood for liberal principles in Indian administration. Twenty

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, letters to and from Mansfield, September 19 and December 25, 1859, April 21 and June 11, 1860; from Frere, September 5, 1859, and February 25, 1860; and from Ellis, July 10, 1860.

<sup>2</sup> The correspondence with Mansfield on this subject is very voluminous. See letters from and to him, July 22, August 9, September 19, 26, and 27, October 31, and December 16, 1859, and September 1, 1860.

<sup>3</sup> *Hansard*, vol. clx, pp. 1067-73.

years later de Grey related with pride to a large audience in the Senate House of the Calcutta University how, as Wood's lieutenant in the Lords, he had piloted through that House the Indian Councils Act of 1861, which first enabled Indians to be appointed to the Legislative Council.<sup>1</sup> He was never tired of speaking of Wood as one of his chief mentors in Indian statesmanship. As for Lawrence, de Grey has left on record, in a letter addressed to Lawrence's biographer, an acknowledgment of the instruction he received at his hands at this period :

"He [Lawrence] was then at the height of his fame, just after his great services during the Mutiny, and he was always ready to give me, though only an Under-Secretary, every assistance and information in his power. He would come and sit in my room at the office sometimes for an hour or more together, and place all the stores of his Indian knowledge and experience at my disposal, with a kindness and simplicity and a modesty of which I have the kindest recollection."<sup>2</sup>

When later the two men had to work together for a few months as Secretary of State and Viceroy, the most perfect accord existed between them.<sup>3</sup> Curiously enough, two of the most important questions with which they had then to deal were questions which later on bulked largely in de Grey's own Viceroyalty. These were the questions of Afghanistan and of Tenant Right in Bengal and elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> On Afghanistan Lawrence was the foremost champion of the policy of "Masterly Inactivity," and although de Grey, unlike Lawrence, afterwards saw the advantage of compromising with the Forward School in territorial details, yet on all the essential aspects of the question he remained absolutely

<sup>1</sup> *Speeches in India*, vol. ii, p. 128.

<sup>2</sup> Bosworth Smith: *Life of Lawrence*, vol. ii, p. 383.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 478.

<sup>4</sup> *Infra*, Vol. II, pp. 83 et seq.

at one with Lawrence. As for the question of Tenant Right, de Grey entirely agreed with Lawrence in his championship of the tenants of Bengal and Oude, and vigorously applied the same policy during his own Viceroyalty.<sup>1</sup>

One other event which occurred during his tenure of the Secretaryship of State made a deep impression on his mind, as indeed it did on all England. That was the Orissa Famine of 1866. On that occasion the Government of India did not display the forethought and energy which it has never since failed to exhibit in the face of famine, and the results were terrible. The lesson was not lost on de Grey when he himself had to govern in Calcutta, for it was almost in a spirit of fanaticism that he insisted, in and out of season, on the necessity for building and hurrying on famine protection railways, in defiance of the financial purists and even of the Home Government.<sup>2</sup> Famine policy, he wrote to Hartington, is "a test question for the English Government in India."<sup>3</sup> How nobly he worked to satisfy this test and to prevent any repetition of the horrors of 1866 when the responsibility became his, will be narrated in a later chapter.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to note that in Bengal, Lawrence found himself in opposition to the Indian planters, who were employing means of doubtful legality to force their tenants to cultivate indigo for them to manufacture. Lawrence's comments sound like a prophecy of the Ilbert Bill controversy. (Bosworth Smith: *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 550.)

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*, Vol. II, pp. 82-9.

<sup>3</sup> Dispatch, November 12, 1881.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. II, Cap. XVIII, pp. 81 et seq.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE LORD PRESIDENT

(1868—1873)

FEW episodes of English Parliamentary history have left a deeper mark on the Party System than the career of the Derby-Disraeli Cabinet, which took office on the fall of Russell in June 1866. Its tactics upset for the moment the fundamental traditions of Parliamentary life, and its strategy changed permanently the common ground of the Party conflict. For two years and a half the Ministry maintained itself against a majority in the House of Commons, and it did this by a series of ingeniously contrived "extra dances" with the extreme left of the official Opposition, which paralysed all the normal relations of parties. The permanent effect of the work which resulted from these tactics—chiefly Disraeli's Radical Reform Bill—was described with perfect accuracy by Lowe in a bitter passage of one of his speeches on the Bill.

"We have inaugurated a new era in English politics this session, and, depend upon it, the new fashion will henceforth be the rule and not the exception. This session we have not had what we before possessed—a party of attack and a party of resistance. We have, instead, two parties of competition who, like Cleon and the sausage-seller in Aristophanes, are both bidding for the support of Demos."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard* (May 20, 1867).

Probably not even Lowe himself realized the literal and pregnant truth of this taunt. It was the fashion at the time, and for some years afterwards, to regard Disraeli's Reform Bill and its dexterous management as a monument of unscrupulous opportunism and shameless legerdemain, designed only, as Salisbury wrote in a famous article, "for the attainment and preservation of place."<sup>1</sup> No one believes this to-day, and Salisbury himself, who in 1886 and 1895 reaped the rich harvest of the Tory Democratic revolution, did not fail to make public recantation of his error.<sup>2</sup>

To many moderate men on the Liberal side the Franchise revolution in itself was far too serious for mere recrimination on the score of parliamentary tactics, and not inconspicuous among them was de Grey. It is, indeed, curious to note in his letters and utterances at this period a total absence of the personal imputations on Disraeli which Carlyle gathered up into one thunderous tornado of invective,<sup>3</sup> and which in former years he would have gleefully echoed. As we have seen, his views on Reform had become much modified since his early Republican days,<sup>4</sup> and the Palmerstonian atmosphere in which he had so far spent his official life seems to have emphasized their Whig tendency. He now stood with the Centre Liberals, who doubted the wisdom of Household Suffrage and feared a lowering of the County Franchise; but he was even nearer in this respect to the Adullamites than to Gladstone, as they stood respectively at the beginning of the controversy. Accordingly, the *dénouement* which found all parties, except the dwindling Adullamites and the few dissident Tories who followed Lord Cranborne (Robert Cecil), tumbling over each other in a wild scramble to widen

<sup>1</sup> *Quarterly Review* ("The Conservative Surrender"), October 1867.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, October 1902, p. 651.

<sup>3</sup> *Shooting Niagara—and After?*

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*, pp. 69-70. See also Appendix III.

the democratic scope of the Reform Bill, disturbed him deeply. He did not conceal his alarm, though party loyalty and a shrewd feeling that the Moderates should keep in touch with the Extremists if the Unbound Demos was to be safely guided; imposed upon him a tactful reticence.<sup>1</sup> His position, however, was well understood and appreciated, and during the next six years he wielded no small influence as a centre of more or less mild reaction in the Liberal camp.

The new party competition in the field of Democracy could obviously not continue indefinitely, and its limit was reached when Gladstone made his famous bid for the Disestablishment of the Irish Church. The Cabinet resisted and were defeated, whereupon they appealed to the new electorate, which responded with a majority of 100 for Gladstone. In due course the Liberal leader was busy constructing his Government. This proved a task of some delicacy, owing to past pledges and the necessity of giving adequate representation to the "new men," and de Grey's place in the combination was consequently not easy to decide.

*From W. E. Gladstone*

II C. H. TERRACE, *December 6th, 68.*

MY DEAR DE GREY,—I have now been three days at work, and it has been painful to me to remain for so long a time silent within a few hundred yards of so kind a friend and an old colleague so much trusted. I am now able to ask you whether you will allow me to name you to H.M. as President of the Council, and I hope to have your assent, which I shall highly prize.

<sup>1</sup> He only spoke once on the Reform Bill, but the aim of his speech was to persuade the Government to settle the question of Redistribution on lines which would save it from the "rashness" of the Parliament to be elected under the Bill (*Hansard*, vol. clxxxix, p. 289). For further glimpses of de Grey's attitude see letter from Kimberley, November 25, 1867, and letter to the Duke of Cambridge, April 10, 1868.

You will see for the first time more authentic information in the papers of to-morrow, and if you like to come as far as my house all information which is in my power to give will be placed at your command.

Believe me, sincerely yours, W. E. GLADSTONE.

The Earl de Grey, etc. •

The question was not decided until two days later, when de Grey received the following enigmatic note from the Premier :

MY DEAR DE GREY,—It is all right—once for all.

Ever yours, W. E. GLADSTONE.

Tues. Dec. 8th. 68. 9 a.m.

Of what was said at the intervening conferences and what was "all right" there is no record, but it is perhaps not difficult to guess. As de Grey afterwards explained to Mansfield, he would have preferred to return to the War Office, but he found "that *in these days*"—it was not so clear before the Reform Bill, e.g. in 1863 and 1865—"the interest of the Government requires that the head of that Department should be in the House of Commons."<sup>1</sup> He was also not without some hankering for the India Office. It transpired, however, that, apart from the question of principle, Gladstone had long been pledged in the disposal of both these offices. In the Cabinet crisis which followed the death of Palmerston, Cardwell had been his candidate for the War Secretaryship and Argyll had been definitely promised India.<sup>2</sup> De Grey was, however, far from dissatisfied with the post allotted to him. "After the War Office," he writes to Mansfield, "there is no Department in the work of which I feel a greater interest than I do in that of this Office." And he adds: "I have long given much attention to Educational questions,

<sup>1</sup> Letter, December 21, 1868.

<sup>2</sup> Memo. by Halifax sent to de Grey, October 24, 1865.

and at the present moment they are of peculiar importance and urgency." <sup>1</sup> When his Cabinet was completed Gladstone made a classification of the new Ministers under the three heads of "Peelites," "Whigs," and "New Men," and he placed de Grey among the Whigs.<sup>2</sup> All this indicates pretty clearly what was said and what was agreed upon at the conferences of December 6-7. The upshot, apparently, was that de Grey was to deal with Educational Reform in the full knowledge that he would approach it in the temper of a Whig.

Whether "Whig" was precisely the appropriate label to attach to him may be doubted. With rough accuracy, however, it represented the tendency of mind he had gradually formed, and which, in spite of his frequent Radical professions in after years, he never wholly shook off. It is important to note this tendency here, not only because it affected all his activities in the historic Cabinet which he now entered, but because it probably struck deeply into his spiritual consciousness and thus contributed to the dramatic change in his confessional affiliation which came later, and which otherwise would be difficult to explain. In pure politics he was really more of a Conservative in the Disraelian sense than a Whig, though he would have hotly repudiated and resented the designation. Still, if we look closely into his attitude on the crucial question of Reform, we shall see that he was very much nearer the "fancy franchises" of Disraeli's first draft of his Bill—and that for very good Conservative reasons—than any other solution of the problem.<sup>3</sup> But the chief practical characteristic of his Conservatism was a veritable passion for compromise, which now began to grow upon him and which soon dominated his whole political outlook.

In the heated political circumstances of the time this

<sup>1</sup> Letter, December 21, 1868.

<sup>2</sup> Maxwell: *Life of Clarendon*, vol. ii, p. 354.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. letter to Glyn, Appendix III.

was a distinctly useful asset. It brought about a closer cultivation of his old friendship with Robert Cecil—who had become third Marquess of Salisbury in 1868—and enabled him through that friendship to negotiate several important compromises with the Tories in the Lords, which sensibly lightened the strain of the 'Constitutional machine' under the burden placed upon it by the Reforming zeal of the new Parliament. His activities in this direction seem to have begun early, for we find traces of them in connexion with the conflict over the Irish Church Bill in 1869. Although he was strongly in favour of the Bill he was not less strongly averse from a campaign against the House of Lords. He writes to Bruce at the beginning of the crisis :

“ I am all the better for a short escape from the hot atmosphere of the House of Lords, where it is, I assure you, by no means easy to hold out just now. I cannot help being somewhat anxious as to what may be done in that assembly about the Irish Church Bill ; anxious, not for the sake of the Government, but for that of the House, for I am not at all desirous to see the House of Lords swept away, or even exposed to the serious danger which would result from the failure of the Bill this session.”<sup>1</sup>

Exactly what action he took does not appear, but it is significant that on July 20 Gladstone writes to him expressing the willingness of the Cabinet to consider any reasonable offer, and that two days later (July 22) Cairns wrote to Granville proposing the Conference which resulted in a settlement.<sup>2</sup>

The inference suggested by this coincidence is strengthened by the fact that on three other important

<sup>1</sup> May 24, 1869.

<sup>2</sup> Fitzmaurice : *Granville*, vol. ii, p. 14.

measures which met with disfavour in the Lords, he was certainly active in negotiating compromises, and on two of them quite successful. These were the Endowed Schools Act, the University Tests Act, and the Elementary Education Act.

The Endowed Schools Act was the first legislative fruit of his Lord Presidency, but, although he piloted it with admirable tact and resource through the House of Lords, it was far more exclusively Forster's measure than his own. It was a notable instalment of educational reform, and the service it rendered the middle classes in this respect forms a worthy parallel to the great work achieved in the following year by the same hands in the fields of universal elementary education. The Bill, however, dealt not too tenderly with the law of trusts, and was inclined to treat ancient endowments with scant respect. On this account it was regarded with a good deal of suspicion by the Lords. Forster, however, made concessions, and de Grey supplemented them with conciliatory assurances on doubtful points, and after some grumbling the Bill passed. But trouble soon arose over the Radical interpretation placed upon their powers by the Commissioners appointed under the Act, and an amending Act became necessary, especially as certain powers created under the original Act were to expire in 1873. De Grey opened negotiations with Salisbury in the summer of 1872 and various concessions were agreed upon. Eventually, Salisbury consented to waive all opposition to the amending Bill, on condition that the powers of the Commissioners should be re-considered by Parliament at the end of another year.<sup>1</sup> Even then, as he afterwards confessed, it was only out of personal regard for de Grey that he let the Bill pass.<sup>2</sup>

On the University Tests Bill the conflict between the two Houses was more serious. When it first came before

<sup>1</sup> Letters to and from Salisbury, August 9 (2) and 17, 1872; July 26 (2) and 27, 1873.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*, p. 284.

the Lords in the summer of 1869 it was not technically a Government measure, and the House unceremoniously threw it out. In the following year Gladstone reluctantly adopted it, and de Grey took charge of it on behalf of the Government. This time the Lords shelved it by appointing a Select Committee of inquiry. The anger of the Nonconformists and Radicals in the Commons, where the Bill had passed without a division, was intense, and de Grey approached Salisbury with a proposal that he should abandon his Select Committee in return for certain minor concessions. The proposal was not successful.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

*From the Marquess of Salisbury*

40 DOVER STREET, W., Aug. 1./70.

MY DEAR DE GREY,—If I was to consult my own peace of mind I should get rid of this University Tests Bill and its Committee at any sacrifice. It's a perfect nightmare. But the difficulty of which on reflection I cannot get rid is this : I have promised to do my utmost to get a thorough inquiry—both publicly and to those whose views I represent. I could not huddle the affair up and assent to the passing of the Bill unless I got for them a substantial concession. I should not think the Headships enough without the concession either of some punitive power against anti-Christian teaching or of some control over the election either of Fellows or at least of Tutors. It is very difficult to say in what form I should be content to take this control, for I want to hear more evidence ; but I do not think it would be difficult to contrive.

But you have not given me even the Headships, for you propose it in a form which would not bind the Government, and which even if it were successful this

year would be no sort of security for next year. In fact, you candidly reserved to the Govt. perfect freedom of action in respect to the question next year.

I fully admit that I should require a great deal to tempt me (speaking *quâ* politician, not *quâ* any tired individual) to abandon the inquiry which I have asked for and obtained. Such a proceeding has, I cannot help feeling, an unpleasant appearance of playing fast and loose—in short, a flavour of Dizzyism. • •

Believe me, ever yours truly, SALISBURY.

This was clearly not a fighting mood, and de Grey did not think it worth while to pursue the bargaining. His prescience was justified, for when the Bill reappeared in the Lords in the following July, Salisbury offered only a languid opposition to it, and it was easily carried against him.

The compromise on the Education Act related, not to the Act itself, but to the co-operation of the Church Schools subsequent to the passing of the Act, and it helped very materially in the success of the measure. Its details will be dealt with presently.

In all these transactions the high personal regard in which de Grey was held by the Chiefs on both sides counted, of course, for much, and we have pleasant evidence of this regard in the following letters :

*From W. E. Gladstone*

HAWARDEN CASTLE, CHESTER, Nov. 21. 69.

MY DEAR DE GREY,—I write to place at your disposal the Garter, recently rendered available by the death of Lord Westminster.

On every ground of public confidence warranted by my experience as a colleague, and of private friendship and regard, if I may presume to cite them in the case,

I am heartily glad to make this offer, and I am sure that your acceptance of it, should your judgment so incline you, will be in every way agreeable to the Queen.

With our united kind remembrances to Lady de Grey,

• I remain always, sincerely yours,

• W. E. GLADSTONE.

*To W. E. Gladstone*

• STUDLEY ROYAL, RIPON, 23<sup>rd</sup> Nov. 1869.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—I am greatly obliged to you for your kind letter and for the offer contained in it, which I have no hesitation in accepting.

I am not one of those who profess to despise a distinction such as the Garter, but I can truly say that I value far more than the honour itself the terms in which you have made the offer, and which lead me to hope that I may regard it as a proof of your approval of my conduct as a colleague and as a mark of personal friendship, on which I set the highest estimation.

Lady de Grey joins with me in kind regards to Mrs. Gladstone, and I remain,

• Always yours most sincerely, DE GREY.

*From the Marquess of Salisbury*

• 40 DOVER STREET, W., May 31, 1870.

MY DEAR DE GREY,—The University of Oxford desire to confer on you an Honorary degree at the approaching Commemoration. We owe you honour on many grounds, personal and official; and we owe you cordial thanks for your kindness in the matter of Keble College.<sup>1</sup> I trust you will accept this expression of our respect and gratitude—especially as I hope that, through your

<sup>1</sup> It was chiefly owing to de Grey's exertions that the Charter for Keble was pushed through the Privy Council.

means, the opening of Keble College may take place at this Commemoration. . . .

Ever yours truly, SALISBURY.<sup>1</sup>

*To the Marquess of Salisbury*

BALMORAL CASTLE, N.B., 1 June 1870.

MY DEAR SALISBURY,—It is no ordinary expression of commonplace civility when I tell you that I am very greatly flattered by the honour which, as I hear from your kind letter, the University of Oxford proposes to confer upon me.

I can truly say that I know no distinction which I should appreciate more highly than one which will connect me with your illustrious University.

It was not my good fortune to have a University education myself, but the best proof which I can give of my appreciation of its value is to be found in the fact that my son is going up next week for his matriculation at Christ Church.

I know that I owe my selection for this honour very much to your kindness, and I beg you to accept my most sincere thanks. . . .

I really hope that we have at last got over all the difficulties about the Charter for Keble College, and are safe in smooth water. I am only too glad to have had it in my power to facilitate the establishment of an institution intended to do honour to the memory of the author of the *Christian Year*.

Yours sincerely, DE GREY.<sup>2</sup>

The Elementary Education Act was the greatest of all the great reforms carried by the Liberal Adminis-

<sup>1</sup> Salisbury was then Chancellor of the University.

<sup>2</sup> De Grey received his D.C.L. at Oxford on June 22, 1870.

tration of 1868-74. It was, at the same time, a striking manifestation of the spirit of compromise which de Grey brought to the labours of the Government. National education was one of the earliest of his political enthusiasms. In his twenty-third year he joined the National Public Schools Association, founded in Manchester—as its programme set forth—“ to promote the establishment by law, in England and Wales, of a system of free schools, which, supported by local rates, and managed by local Committees, specially selected for that purpose by the ratepayers, shall impart secular instruction only ” ;<sup>1</sup> and in the following year he subscribed to the so-called “ Lancashire plan ” adopted and published by the Society. It was, as we have seen, the one subject on which he differed from the Christian Socialists when he joined them in 1852.<sup>2</sup> Later on his zeal for pure secularism in national education cooled, together with many other of his youthful democratic infatuations, and in the *Political Memorandum* which he wrote in 1853 he sketched out a more conservative scheme<sup>3</sup> which, as will appear presently, became the foundation of the great Act of 1870. Despite the distractions of other political work in the intervening years, his interest in education never flagged. He found a fruitful outlet for it in the Working-Men’s College and the Mechanics’ Institutes ; and it was one of the main links of his long and close friendship with Forster. During the three years immediately preceding his accession to the Presidency of the Council this interest had been quickened by two political events which, precisely on the ground of our educational defects, seemed to threaten the internal stability of the nation, and even its rank and influence among the Great Powers. The triumph of Prussia in the Six Weeks’

<sup>1</sup> “ The Scheme of Secular Education proposed by the National Public Schools Association,” Manchester, 1851.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, letter to Hughes, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, p. 76.

War, which cast before it the sinister shadow of Imperial Germany, was founded as much on compulsory education as on the needle gun; and Disraeli's Reform Act of 1868 had shifted the axis of political power in England to something very nearly akin to the unlettered mob.<sup>1</sup> These events were pressing on de Grey's mind when he wrote to Mansfield in December 1868 that educational reform had come to be "of peculiar importance and urgency."

It was not, however, until the late autumn of 1869 that the first steps were taken for the preparation of a Bill. Gladstone was tepid, and was besides preoccupied by his Irish measures.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, on October 2, he agreed that the question should be brought before the Cabinet on "some early occasion,"<sup>3</sup> and Forster, who had joined the Government as Vice-President of the Council, was at once set to work on the preparation of a Memorandum sketching the provisions of the proposed Bill. Forster's authorship of this Memorandum and the conspicuous part he played in defending the Bill during its stormy progress through the House of Commons, have given rise to the belief that the Act, as it took final shape on the Statute Book, was his exclusive handiwork. This is not the case, and Forster himself would have been the first to deny it. He was always de Grey's devoted lieutenant. Even in regard to the Endowed Schools Bill he wrote to him, "I am working *under* as well as *with* you";<sup>4</sup> and when in the following year he entered the Cabinet without changing his office, he again wrote to his Chief, this time in regard to the Education Bill itself, "I am very glad we may

<sup>1</sup> Bismarck said in the Reichstag on November 29, 1881: "The Prussian schoolmaster won the battle of Sadowa." Lowe said in the House of Commons after the passing of the 1868 Reform Act: "I believe it will be absolutely necessary to compel our future masters to learn their letters." (Martin: *Life of Viscount Sherbrooke*, vol. ii, p. 323.)

<sup>2</sup> Morley: *Gladstone*, vol. ii, pp. 298-9.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Gladstone, October 2, 1869.

<sup>4</sup> May 21, 1869.

hope to finish the job together.”<sup>1</sup> The truth is, that while the two old friends divided all the work between them with the utmost loyalty and mutual helpfulness, the governing principle of the Bill was de Grey’s alone, though Forster had become a willing convert to it.<sup>2</sup> This principle was, as de Grey wrote to the Queen in sending her a copy of Forster’s Memorandum, “to provide efficient elementary education throughout England and Wales with the smallest possible interference with existing schools.”<sup>3</sup> To this principle, with all its denominational implications, de Grey had been long attached—indeed, ever since he wrote his still-born *Political Memorandum* fifteen years before. Here is what he said in that essay of the Education Bill of his ideal Minister :

“While it lays down as its first principle that it is the duty of the State to see that the People have afforded to them the utmost possible means of obtaining an Education worthy the name, suited to their varying capacities, limited by those capacities alone and stretching through the length and breadth of the land, it will not cast aside, but carefully cherish, all the vast efforts of voluntary endeavour which have hitherto been made, and will not forget that instruction is not education, and that the religion of the people is still, even in its least attractive forms, a possession infinitely too valuable to be dealt roughly with by the rude hand of impatient power.”

He repeated this formula in more sober and cautious language in the Education debate raised in the House

<sup>1</sup> July 3, 1870.

<sup>2</sup> Forster had previously been a strong opponent of Voluntaryism and the Church Schools (Reid : *Life of Forster*, vol. i, pp. 308 et seq.), and on this account was regarded with hopefulness by the Secularist Radicals and the Disestablishment party.

<sup>3</sup> February 7, 1870.

of Lords by Russell on March 8, 1869, seven months before Forster began the preparation of his Memorandum. Russell had spoken disparagingly of the voluntary schools, and de Grey protested that it was a mistake to imagine that they were not doing good work and that they could be easily dispensed with. He added :

“ It is one of the difficulties of this question that we have at work in this country at the present time so many and such various educational appliances. My own feeling is that so far as they require to be supplemented in order to meet the wants of the country, supplemented they ought to be ; but it would be unwise on the part of the Government or Parliament to throw aside or to waste any of these means of education which are now at the disposal of the country.”<sup>1</sup>

This principle of maintaining and supplementing the voluntary schools was the foundation of Forster's Memorandum and of the Bill which was subsequently modelled upon it. Nor was de Grey's work limited to this fundamental idea. The drafting of the Bill was largely done by the Government draughtsman, Jenkins, at early morning conferences with de Grey and Forster at de Grey's house in Carlton Gardens.<sup>2</sup> To de Grey also fell the task—one of delicacy and vigilance—of working the Bill through the Cabinet, and afterwards of piloting it through the House of Lords. Forster's main achievement, apart from his collaboration with de Grey, was the gallant and successful fight he made for the denominational aspects of the Bill against his old Nonconformist and Radical friends and fellow-workers in the Commons.

The Bill passed both Houses, with relatively few

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. cxciv, cols. 811-15.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Forster, November 9, 1869.

amendments—relatively, that is, to the fierceness of the opposition organized by the Birmingham League—and no essential modification of de Grey's principle of retaining the Voluntary Schools as part of the new National system. It is true that concessions were made by the Government, both in regard to religious instruction in Board schools and the support of denominational schools by the ratepayers, but on the balance neither the Secularists nor the Nonconformists gained any appreciable ground. Nevertheless, the National Society, which controlled the larger number of Church schools, was at first dissatisfied with the Act, and for a moment there was grave risk that it would refuse to allow its schools to take the place allotted to them in the new scheme. The result would probably have been disastrous, not only to the Church schools themselves, but to the whole cause of religious education in the country. This disaster was skilfully averted by a concordat concluded privately between de Grey and Salisbury, almost immediately after the Bill had passed.

The main trouble with the National Society related to the machinery provided by the Act for working the Conscience Clause. The Society had always refused to identify itself with, and make grants to, schools which admitted a Conscience Clause under the old Privy Council regulations, and, though it was now ready to modify its attitude on this point, it was not prepared to hand over its schools to the Education Department unless it were afforded an opportunity of withdrawing them should experience show that the arrangement affected adversely the essentially religious character of the schools. Both Salisbury and de Grey were, from the beginning, at one as to the reasonableness of this objection and the scope of a compromise. Both were anxious for the sake of the Church that the schools should come in under the Act, and Salisbury was as little disposed as de Grey to share the fears of the extreme Church party. Accordingly, de Grey, with

the assent of Forster, offered a concession which, as he wrote to Salisbury, "goes to the very edge of our powers, if, between you and me, it does not overstep them."<sup>1</sup> In this spirit Salisbury set to work to persuade the National Society, and eventually obtained its adhesion to a formula drafted by himself which, with a trifling verbal amendment, was accepted by the Education Department. The details of the agreement and of the negotiations by which it was reached will be found in the correspondence between de Grey and Salisbury printed in an appendix.<sup>2</sup> Briefly, it pledged the National Society schools to accept the Conscience Clause machinery of the Act, with the reservation that if the arrangement proved unsatisfactory to the Society, its schools could withdraw from it on repaying the building grants received by them from the Privy Council. The bargain was eminently fair and it proved extremely successful. Indeed, so numerous were the applications for building grants for Church schools which poured into Whitehall that Forster was tempted to withdraw from it, and for the first time in their lives there was danger of a serious disagreement between himself and de Grey.<sup>3</sup> Happily it passed, and the agreement stood as one further vindication of the practical usefulness of de Grey's accommodating temper in the reforming work of the Government.

Even then the troubles of the Act were by no means ended. The Birmingham League, which embodied all the hostilities of the Nonconformists and Secularists, became daily more irate as it marked the success of the Act, and a fresh campaign was set on foot to procure its modification. Before it reached a head, however, de Grey's activities were transferred, provisionally, to another field.

The new task assigned to him by the Government

<sup>1</sup> October 14, 1870.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix V.

<sup>3</sup> Letters to and from Forster, November 20 (2) and 22, 1870.

was the most momentous of his career. Towards the end of 1870 the international situation of Great Britain became gravely imperilled—how gravely we are only now in a position to judge. The levity and short-sightedness of British statesmanship during the American Civil War and the War of the Danish Duchies had borne startling fruit. Prussia, unloosed in Schleswig, had marched triumphantly to Empire through the bloody fields of Sadowa and Sedan, and, by a prescient understanding with Russia, still smarting under her discomfiture in the Crimea, had the hegemony of Europe almost within her grasp. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the American people sat brooding over the wrongs they had suffered at our hands during the Civil War. It is idle to pretend now that those wrongs were wholly imaginary. Our technical defence was, perhaps, good enough, but the vital interests of nations are not measured by legal pedantries, and the Americans only knew, and knew truly, that in the hour of their supreme peril we were the reverse of friendly or even indulgent to them. Nor did they think that our defence was even technically good—especially in the matters of the premature recognition of the belligerency of the South and the fitting out of the *Alabama* and other Confederate cruisers in British ports. They held that they were entitled to both moral and material reparation, and as soon as their hands were free of the rebellion they told us so. Our response failed altogether to realize the depth of American feeling. We were perhaps misled by the extravagant truculence of men like Charles Sumner into thinking that it was artificial. There was, however, plenty of better evidence of the real intensity of the national sense of injury, especially in the grimly sad expostulations of such friends of England as James Russell Lowell :

“ Shall it be love, or hate, John ?  
It's you that's to decide ;  
Ain't *your* bonds held by Fate, John,  
Like all the world's beside ?

Old Uncle S., sez he, ' I guess  
 Wise men forgive,' sez he,  
 ' But not forget ; an' some time yet  
 The truth may strike J. B.  
 Ez wal ez you an' me ! ' " <sup>1</sup>

So matters stood when Sedan was fought and the European equilibrium, on which we had so long counted, was shattered. War with America had become almost a mere question of opportunity, and the opportunity was ominously nigh.<sup>2</sup>

The perils of the new situation were not slow to disclose themselves. On October 31, less than two months after Sedan, Russia tore up the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris and virtually flung them in our face. We had no alternative but to threaten war, though it was certain that we should have to wage it alone, and hence it became imperative for us to scrutinize closely the whole tangled field of our international relations. Then, for the first time, the reality of the American danger dawned upon us. On November 19—two days before Odo Russell told Bismarck at Versailles that unless Russia withdrew from the position she had taken up we should be compelled to go to war—the Cabinet had before it a grave Memorandum, drawn up by Lord Tenterden,<sup>3</sup> in which the ugly truth was uncompromisingly set forth, and the necessity of obtaining a friendly adjustment of the American claims was insisted upon "as a matter of national exigency." It was almost too late. On December 5 President Grant in a message to Congress used language respecting the relations of the two countries which, while not overtly menacing, seemed to leave no doubt of the intention of the American Government to "retaliate" on England in *her* hour of need.

<sup>1</sup> "Jonathan to John," in the *Biglow Papers*.

<sup>2</sup> See on this point letters from C. F. Adams and C. Sumner to Forster, June 4 and 8, 1869 (Reid: *Forster*, vol. ii, pp. 14-15, 18).

<sup>3</sup> Then a senior clerk in the Foreign Office. He became Assistant Under-Secretary of State in 1871, and in 1873 succeeded Lord Hammond as Permanent Under-Secretary.

Negotiations were now urgent, but the difficulties of approaching the United States were considerable. Overtures in the common diplomatic forms were undesirable, as they would have had the appearance of trying to buy off the United States in face of the Russian emergency, and to secure from her a neutrality which Great Britain herself had not too scrupulously observed during the Civil War. Moreover, on the only group of questions which mattered, those known as the *Alabama* claims, Great Britain could not with any shred of dignity initiate an official conversation, seeing that only a few months before a Treaty of Arbitration proposed by the American Government itself and signed by Lord Clarendon had been ignominiously thrown out by the American Senate without debate. Fortunately, Tenterden was equal to these perplexities. In his Memorandum to the Cabinet he made an ingenious suggestion which was well calculated to overcome them. In the place of ordinary diplomatic negotiations on the *Alabama* claims, he proposed that High Commissioners should be appointed by the two Governments to consider together other but less envenomed disputes which had arisen chiefly between the United States and Canada, and to agree upon recommendations for their settlement. This scheme was to be submitted to the Washington Cabinet in such a form as to lead them to accept it on the condition that the *Alabama* claims were included, to which Great Britain would at once agree. This suggestion was approved by the Cabinet, and Sir John Rose<sup>1</sup> was dispatched to Washington on a secret mission to sound the American Government. So far as the opening of official negotiations was concerned the mission proved quite successful. Hamilton Fish, the American Secretary of State, was genuinely anxious for reconciliation, and he readily acquiesced in the procedure

<sup>1</sup> Canadian lawyer and statesman who had made his home in England, devoting himself to American finance. He became a K.C.M.G. in 1878 and a Privy Councillor in 1882.

suggested by Tenterden. On the substantial question, however, he was unyielding. He frankly told Rose that unless Great Britain were prepared to express regret for what had happened and pay compensation, American opinion would not be satisfied and the High Commissioners would only waste their time. Still, he did not insist on any engagement in this sense, though he tried hard to get it, and having stated his views he left it to Her Majesty's Government to give such instructions as they might think proper to their High Commissioners, "hoping that the right feeling and efforts of the two Governments may lead to a successful result." On this basis the tragi-comedy of initiating official negotiations was solemnly proceeded with. On January 26 a Note was addressed to the American Government proposing a Joint High Commission on the Canadian Fisheries and similar questions. On the 30th Fish replied asking that the *Alabama* claims should be included. On February 1 an affirmative answer was returned, and two days later the American acceptance of the British proposal was officially notified.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout these delicate transactions de Grey had been deep in the confidence of Lord Granville, upon whom, as Foreign Secretary, the main responsibility rested, and as soon as the prospect of the meeting of the Joint High Commission was clear enough, he was asked by the Prime Minister to undertake the captaincy of the British team. He assented, although he was much preoccupied by his work at the Privy Council Office—mainly, the struggle with the Birmingham League over the Education Act—and by private perplexities the nature of which we are left to conjecture. He had, however, so thoroughly convinced himself of the imperative necessity of a full and frank understanding with the United States, that he felt he could not hesitate. Moreover, the men available for the mission who were

<sup>1</sup> This narrative of the inception of the *Alabama* negotiations is based on confidential documents which are now used for the first time.

prepared by sympathy, understanding, and courage to entertain the necessary sacrifices and to make them with the requisite dignity and authority, were still surprisingly few. His opinions with regard to America and Germany had undergone a complete change since, in his Christian Socialist days, he had denounced the United States as a sham democracy<sup>1</sup> and, during the Crimean War, had advocated an alliance with Prussia.<sup>2</sup> In the one case he had been profoundly influenced by the ideals of the North in the Civil War and by the Pan-Anglo-Saxonism of Forster and Tom Hughes, and in the other by Bismarck's harsh treatment of the French during the war which was then in progress.<sup>3</sup>

His colleagues on the Commission were Sir Stafford Northcote, who, as representing the Opposition leaders, emphasized its national character; Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister in Washington; Sir John Macdonald, Prime Minister of Canada; and Professor Montague Bernard, the distinguished Jurist and Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford; with Lord Tenterden as Secretary. On February 9 de Grey set sail for New York amid a shower of encouraging letters of God-speed. "If it goes well," wrote William Harcourt, "you will be a great benefactor of our race."<sup>4</sup> Tom Hughes was more confident and less stilted: "It is the biggest bit of work going for England."<sup>5</sup>

Owing to the peculiar circumstances in which the negotiation was initiated the task of the Commissioners was of a magnitude and difficulty out of all proportion to its essential purpose. In addition to the *Alabama* grievances they were instructed to deal with the complicated questions of the North American Fisheries, the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, the transit of goods through Maine and the lumber trade, the Manitoba boundary, the much vexed difficulties which had arisen

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> Letter to Gladstone, March 21, 1871.

<sup>4</sup> February 7, 1871.

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, pp. 83-4.

<sup>5</sup> February 8, 1871.

in connexion with the Island of San Juan, the claims of British subjects who had suffered during the Civil War and those of Canada in connexion with the Fenian raids, and finally a revision of the rules of Maritime Neutrality. To this prodigious programme the American Commissioners gaily proposed a few additions. All these subjects were painstakingly and, on the whole, successfully treated, but they were so essentially subordinate to the *Alabama* issue that they need not be considered in detail here. Unfortunately, they added very greatly to the difficulties of de Grey, not only through their intrinsic complexity, but more particularly because they brought him in frequent conflict with Sir John Macdonald, who found it difficult to recognize their subordinate character and to realize the imperial issue at stake. "Shindies and scrimmages" of a very unedifying character were frequent in the private conferences between the Canadian and his British colleagues,<sup>1</sup> and throughout his work on all the purely North American questions de Grey had to fight a triangular duel with Macdonald and Fish.<sup>2</sup> There was a good deal of misunderstanding behind these disputes, and they were temporarily envenomed by external mischief-making, but in the end they were quite satisfactorily settled, and neither the personal relations of the delegates nor the main purposes of the Commission were materially affected by them.<sup>3</sup>

The critical stage of the negotiation was reached at the third sitting of the Commission, when the question of the *Alabama* claims was opened by the Americans. So far no material approximation of the views of the two Governments had been reached or even attempted. The British Commissioners were instructed to propose

<sup>1</sup> Pope: *Life of Macdonald*, vol. ii, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> Letters to Granville, March 6, 7, 21, 22, 24 (3), 27 (2), 31; April 15, 17, 18, 21, and 25.

<sup>3</sup> De Grey was certainly inclined to judge Macdonald unfairly, but the latter's own letters to Tupper completely vindicate him. (See Pope: *Macdonald*, vol. ii, pp. 92, 99-100, 105-6, 131, and 136.)

unrestricted arbitration in the same form as it had been proposed by Rose and rejected by Fish in January.<sup>1</sup> Downing Street, indeed, was the more disposed to adhere to this proposal, since the danger of a collision with Russia over the Treaty of Paris was now in a fair way of being exorcised.<sup>2</sup> One concession, however, the British Commissioners were authorized to make. This was to express in a friendly spirit "the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government for the escape of the *Alabama* and other vessels from British ports and for the depredations committed by those vessels." In due course this *amende* was announced by de Grey (April 8), and accepted by Fish with very evident satisfaction "as a token of kindness."<sup>3</sup> The first conciliatory move, however, came from the Americans, and took the form of a choice of modes of settlement, one of which was arbitration within certain limits. As reported by de Grey on the same day (March 8),<sup>4</sup> this important proposal ran as follows :

"The readiest and best way to meet these [the *Alabama*] claims would be for Great Britain to pay a gross sum, to be agreed upon, in discharge of them. Should the Commissioners be unable to arrive at an understanding for such a payment, the American Commissioners would be willing to refer the liability of Great Britain to some competent tribunal which should be empowered to assess damages.

They would at the same time expect that the following

<sup>1</sup> Earl Granville to Her Majesty's High Commissioners, February 9, 1871.

<sup>2</sup> A Conference of the Powers was then sitting in London to compose the difference. On March 13 the Treaty of London was signed by which Russia virtually admitted the illegality of her repudiation of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, whereupon the signatory Powers consented to abrogate those clauses.

<sup>3</sup> Dispatches from the High Commissioners, April 8 and 10, 1871.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, March 8, 1871.

principles of international law should be laid down, to be applied to the decision of the claims of the United States, whether those claims were considered by this Commission or by such a tribunal as had been mentioned.

1. Any great maritime Power with a strong Government, possessed of the material resources requisite to enable it to perform its duties, is bound to use active diligence in order to prevent the construction or fitting out, arming, equipping, or augmenting the force, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel whereby war is intended to be carried on upon the ocean against a Power with which it is at peace, during hostilities between that Power and its insurgent citizens who have been recognized as belligerents by such great maritime Power.

2. When such a vessel shall have escaped, such Power is bound to use like diligence to arrest and detain her when she comes again within its jurisdiction.

3. Such Power is further bound to instruct its naval forces in all parts of the globe to arrest and detain vessels so escaping, wherever found upon the high seas.

4. Any Power failing to observe either of the rules of international law above described, is justly to be held responsible for the injuries and depredations committed and damages occasioned by such vessel."

While in form the scheme of arbitration here outlined was a concession to the British view, in reality it was only a circuitous way of reaching the alternative settlement originally contemplated by Fish, under which the liability of Great Britain should be admitted or assumed and only the amount of damages discussed and agreed upon. This will be clear when it is remembered that the dispute on the technical side largely hinged upon the question of what were the recognized principles of International Law governing the case. In the scheme

now proposed the principles on which the arbitration was to be based were precisely those which were upheld by the United States and denied by Great Britain. In other words, the Americans virtually stipulated that the arbitrators should be bound in advance to accept the American case. This was obviously unreasonable. Still, concessions of some kind had to be made on the part of Great Britain—especially in view of her expression of regret—and it was possible that by negotiation the American plan might be so modified as to approximate to such concessions. Accordingly, de Grey agreed to discuss the new principles on their merits as principles of International Law which might be adopted for the future, reserving the question of their application to the arbitration under discussion. On this basis the negotiation continued, with the result that the Americans consented to very substantial modifications. This done, however, they reverted to their proposal that the new principles—of course as amended—should be adopted as instructions to the arbitrators. The British Commissioners, finding them immovable on this point and realizing that all chance of a Treaty depended upon it, took the responsibility of recommending the Cabinet at home to accept it.<sup>1</sup> In making this bold recommendation de Grey was clearly the moving spirit.<sup>2</sup>

The telegram of the Commissioners, which reached London on March 15, came as a thunderbolt to the Cabinet. Only two days before the Treaty of London had been signed by which the Black Sea question was settled, and, with the exception of Granville and Forster, Ministers seem, for the most part, to have settled down to the complacent illusion that they had the Americans in the hollow of their hands. Granville and Forster give amusing accounts of their awakening :

<sup>1</sup> Dispatches from the High Commissioners, March 14, 1871.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to Gladstone, March 21, 1871.

[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

*From Earl Granville*

F.O. *March 18/71.*

MY DEAR DE GREY,—We had a tremendous row in the Cabinet about your and our proposal—Gladstone agreeing, but reluctantly—Forster a tower of strength, most active and judicious—Stansfeld of no use at all—the Chancellor firm and mild—Bruce, Ch. Fortescue, Kimberley supporting—Halifax ditto running about copying and recopying with occasional declarations in an opposite sense to us. Harty Tarty very doubtful—Argyll criticizing, but for conciliation—Lowe, Lowe all over, objected to the Commission, to concession, and to obtaining any settlement for the future. Cardwell violent against—much better pay a sum at once—Goschen letting go the *gros mot* “dishonor” and talking great nonsense, in my opinion.

We should never have succeeded if Roundell Palmer had not entirely supported us.<sup>1</sup>

Forster and I are convinced that the Cabinet are quite unaware of the national desire to see the matter settled, and the reproach we shall endure if by adhering to cast-iron instructions we lose this great opportunity of settling the matter.

It is a great thing having Northcote committed, and I am glad to see you approve of his nomination. His ideas are certainly a little wild.<sup>2</sup>

Yours, G.

<sup>1</sup> Palmer, afterwards Lord Selborne, became Lord Chancellor in 1872. He was not an optimist in Anglo-American relations, but he strongly supported de Grey's recommendation on practical grounds (Selborne: *Memorials*, Part ii, vol. i, p. 218).

<sup>2</sup> He had taken up his duties with great enthusiasm. He wanted to propose a general tribunal of international arbitration, “which had a

[PRIVATE.]

From *W. E. Forster*

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, *March 18, 1871.*

MY DEAR DE GREY,—All I can say is that though I have not written, I have watched over your affairs like a lynx. At one time I much feared the Cabinet would refuse to depart from unrestricted arbitration, but Granville stood firm, and he and I at last pushed through the consent we have given you. . . .

. . . Lowe was most violent in his opposition, according to his wont, and Goschen went a long way with him. Cardwell professed to prefer paying money down. The Chancellor [Lord Hatherley] was very useful and helpful. Bruce backed us. Kimberley assented reluctantly, and so did Halifax, though mollified by being allowed to cook the compromise. I think Gladstone himself did it because he did not see how to help himself. The Duke [of Argyll] began to understand the position at the end of the second Cabinet, and I do not think Fortescue got into it at all. Hartington was silent, but I think rather with Lowe, and Stansfeld, whose first Cabinet was on Thursday, was also very silent, but inclined to be with us. . . .

The consent of the Cabinet was not unconditional. On the advice of Roundell Palmer they proposed to insert in the Treaty a stipulation that the new rules should be binding on the High Contracting parties in the future, together with the following explanation of

somehow wild appearance such as I should not have expected to find in the proposal of so sober a man " (de Grey to Granville, March 3, 1871). He also wished to raise the question of the immunity of private property at sea. De Grey comments: " I suspect N. gets his views on this point from his brother-in-law, Farrer of the Board of Trade " (ibid., March 7, 1871).

the motives of the British Government in accepting them :

“ Her Britannic Majesty has commanded Her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty’s Government cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of International Law which were in force at the time when the claims mentioned in Article I arose ; but that Her Majesty’s Government, in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries and of making satisfactory provision for the future, agrees that in deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty’s Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules.”

This proposal was accepted by the Americans, and the Joint Commission then set themselves to hammer the new rules into final shape. On April 5 de Grey was able to announce that the text had been agreed upon. It ran as follows :<sup>1</sup>

“ A neutral government is bound—

First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace ; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval

<sup>1</sup> Dispatch from High Commissioners, April 5, 1871.

operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties."

A comparison of this text with the rules as originally proposed by the Americans and with the provisions of English municipal law at the time will show how considerable was de Grey's diplomatic achievement. The Americans had, practically, abandoned three-quarters of their original demands, and the residuum, as de Grey justly contended, amounted to very little more than what Great Britain had already admitted in her own neutrality legislation.<sup>1</sup> Besides this, the new rules placed very salutary and necessary restrictions in the future on the American conception of neutral rights, and their acceptance, as was supposed at the time, carried with it the abandonment of the American indirect claims. These practical gains were independent of the cardinal achievement that the Americans were enabled to profess themselves, and were in fact, satisfied, and that the Treaty with all its epoch-making possibilities was thus saved.

The Treaty was signed on May 8, and was approved by the United States Senate a fortnight later. In England its reception was not enthusiastic, but on the whole it was admitted to be a fair bargain. Russell, who had stoutly withstood the American claims in the first instance and had no faith in the permanency of an Anglo-American reconciliation, was deeply chagrined at what he regarded as a British surrender. With him went a good many fire-eaters both in Parliament and the Press, and as the full truth of the negotiations, as

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Tenterden, June 6, 1871.

set forth above, could not be told,<sup>1</sup> their case appeared to possess a certain cogency. Nevertheless, when Russell brought forward a hostile motion in the House of Lords on June 12, it met with a frigid reception and had to be withdrawn.

De Grey's services were rewarded with a Marquisate. How well he had deserved this recognition was little known outside the immediate circle of those who had shared the heat and burden of the day with him. His own estimate was modest enough. Writing to Granville some ten days before the Treaty was signed he said :

“Many thanks for your letter of the 15th and for the encouragement you give us in it. I hope that it is not merely parental fondness, which makes us think that the Treaty will be a reasonable one, fair to both countries and calculated to settle our differences on a basis which gives a good opportunity for the establishment of permanent friendly relations. There will be things in it which I should have wished to be different, and some that will, I daresay, be thought to have a somewhat ridiculous aspect ; but I am convinced that the importance of the objects to be attained made it wise to consider the crotchets of the Americans on minor points ; while the powers of the Senate as to Treaties, the want of control of the present Government over its own Party, and the exigencies of Canada have complicated the negotiations so much, as to oblige us to attempt at every turn to reconcile by some compromise more ingenious than elegant the conflicting desires of the Senators, President, and Canadians without letting go the substantial objects which we had in view.

<sup>1</sup> At the request of the American Commissioners no detailed protocols were kept, and the agreed summaries drawn up at the end of the negotiations threw very little light on the diplomatic struggle.

I hope you will be able to approve of our work as a whole. I can truly say that we have spared no pains to make it as good as was possible ; though it is more than likely that, if you had made a better choice of a first Commissioner, you might have had a more artistic work.”<sup>1</sup>

Granville’s opinion was recorded at an earlier stage :

“We are all much struck with the great ability and tact which you seem to have shewn in all matters connected with the work. Our only regret is that no record will remain of your obvious victories over your American colleagues. Indeed, I was obliged to telegraph to you the necessity of having something more to produce (in case of failure, or even of any arrangement which may incite criticism here) than the protocols you have sent home.”

But perhaps the most convincing tributes are those of his own colleagues as voiced by Stafford Northcote. “The history of our exploits,” he writes to Granville, “will never be written as it deserves to be, and de Grey will never get all the credit he deserves for his strategy, though I hope he will get some for the result of it.” Again, on the eve of the signing of the Treaty: “Latterly I think we have had the whip hand, and de Grey has managed Fish most skilfully. I have told you already how much de Grey has impressed us all by his judgment, tact, and temper, and by the high tone he has maintained all through the affair.”<sup>2</sup>

The title de Grey chose for his new step in the Peerage was that of Ripon.<sup>4</sup> It is curious to note, in view of

<sup>1</sup> April 28, 1871.

<sup>2</sup> Letter to de Grey, March 25, 1871.

<sup>3</sup> Fitzmaurice: *Granville*, vol. ii, pp. 87, 89. (Letters dated April 14 and May 5, 1871.)

<sup>4</sup> Letter to Gladstone, June 12, 1871.

what happened to him three years later, that when Gladstone offered him the Marquisate he proposed to take the title of Mowbray, which was then in abeyance and which was the oldest of the pre-Reformation Baronies and the parent Barony of the Dukedom of Norfolk. He only relinquished the idea when he learnt that the Duke of Norfolk and Lord Petre still claimed the title.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Letters from and to Sir Albert Woods, Garter, June 11 and 13, 1871.

## CHAPTER XII

### SOME DISCORDS AND A RUPTURE

(1871—1873)

THE Education Act had been placed on the Statute Book and the Treaty of Washington had been duly signed and ratified ; but the fight for both was not yet over. Trouble over the Act was threatening before Ripon's departure for America, and he returned home ready to take his share of its defence. The reopening of the *Alabama* dispute, however, came to him—as, indeed, to most people on this side of the Atlantic—as a great and disagreeable surprise.

One of the main practical considerations which reconciled the British Government and people to the Treaty of Washington was the understanding that the so-called “ indirect claims ” had been excluded from the Treaty, and that the Tribunal of Arbitration which was to meet at Geneva later in the year would not be called upon to adjudicate upon them. These claims had much embittered the Anglo-American feud. They were invented by Charles Sumner during the angry debates on the Reverdy-Johnson Convention in 1869, and were founded on the contention that Great Britain was responsible for the prolongation of the Civil War, the decline of the American shipping trade, all increases in the rates of insurance, and many other remote consequences of the depredations of the Confederate cruisers.<sup>1</sup> Gladstone afterwards calculated that damages assessed on this extravagant basis might easily amount to more than the whole of the National Debt.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Selborne: *Memorials*, vol. i, p. 210.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231.

claims had proved very popular in the United States, and there was grave doubt as to whether any Administration would be strong enough to disavow them. It was consequently with great relief that all friends of peace on both sides of the Atlantic had learnt that these claims had been abandoned by the United States. The assurances on this head were, however, vague and negative, and it is not quite clear how public opinion became so certain of their definite character. It is true that the Treaty said nothing about them and that its context appeared to exclude them, but, on the other hand, it did not definitely renounce them.<sup>1</sup> As a matter of fact there was a renunciation, but the circumstances in which it was recorded rendered it impossible for an official appeal to be made to it.

The story is rather curious, and it is symptomatic of the extreme delicacy with which the friends of peace had to tread throughout these negotiations. At the opening of the High Commission in Washington Hamilton Fish proposed informally that the Protocols should be of the baldest kind, giving no detailed information in regard to the debates.<sup>2</sup> The object was to keep Congress in the dark—as Congress had the right to call for every scrap of written documents—and thus to assure a freedom of negotiation which otherwise would have been impossible. There can be no question that in making this proposal Fish, who kept his own counsel wonderfully to the end, was actuated by an honest desire to arrive at a fair and lasting agreement. The result, however, was that no official record was kept of many important exchanges of views, and the only note of them was contained in secret dispatches sent home by the British Commissioners after each

<sup>1</sup> In the debate on the Treaty in the Lords on June 12, 1871, Granville said that the indirect claims "disappeared" under the "limited reference" of the Treaty (Russell: *Recollections and Suggestions*, p. 397). On the other hand, Cairns held that the Treaty justified the American demands (Buckle: *Disraeli*, vol. v, p. 178).

<sup>2</sup> Dispatches from the High Commissioners, March 4, 1871.

meeting. At the penultimate sitting, however, it was resolved to draw up a general statement of the course of the negotiations supplementary to the dated Protocols, and this was done.<sup>1</sup> The pledge in regard to the indirect claims alleged to have been given by Fish was reported by the British Commissioners in their secret dispatch of March 8, 1871, relative to the sitting of that date. It was in the following terms :

“It was believed by the United States Government that they had also a good equitable claim for indirect or constructive losses. These latter, however, they did not prefer, and their not doing so must, they considered, be regarded as a great concession.”

Fish was then reported as proceeding to outline the two alternative modes of settlement proposed by his Government, which have already been quoted.<sup>2</sup>

It will be seen that the pledge as here given was absolute and unconditional. In the agreed general Protocol, however, drawn up at the close of the negotiations, it took a less definite form and was given in these words :

“In the hope of an amicable settlement no estimate was made of the indirect losses, without prejudice, however, to the right to indemnification on their account in the event of no such settlement being made.”<sup>3</sup>

At first sight it seems strange that the British Commissioners should have accepted this statement as an accurate account of what actually took place on March 8, but they judged quite reasonably that no good purpose would be served by objecting to it. In their view—and indeed, in the view of every candid student of the

<sup>1</sup> Dispatches from the High Commissioners, May 3 and 4, 1871 (with enclosure).

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, pp. 243-4.

<sup>3</sup> Dispatches from the High Commissioners : Enclosure in May 4, 1871.

case<sup>1</sup>—"the amicable settlement" by which the abandonment of the indirect claims was now conditioned had already been reached in the Treaty,<sup>2</sup> and thus the abandonment was in as little doubt as if the more absolute pledge had been quoted. Moreover, the quotation of this pledge in a public document would have only compromised Fish with the Senate, and might, at the last moment, have jeopardized the whole Treaty.

Great, then, was the indignation of the British Government and of the whole nation when, on the exchange of the British and American "Cases" at the first meeting of the Arbitration Tribunal on December 15, it was found that indirect claims in the full sense of Sumner's speech had been put forward by the American Government. For a time it seemed as if the Treaty of Washington was doomed. Russell, Lowe, Cardwell, Goschen, and all the jingoes within and without the Cabinet clamoured for immediate withdrawal from the Arbitration, and they were speedily joined by their more moderate colleagues.<sup>3</sup> Even Gladstone, as Granville wrote to Ripon,<sup>4</sup> became "very violent," while Granville himself, though resolved to make every effort to save the Treaty, was frankly sceptical of the good faith of the "Americoquins des États plus ou moins Unis," as he mockingly called them.<sup>5</sup> Stafford Northcote was completely crushed, and wrote almost daily letters to Ripon and Granville crying that "all is up."<sup>6</sup> Ripon, Granville, and Forster were, indeed, the only

<sup>1</sup> Gladstone afterwards drew up for the confidential use of the Cabinet (February 17, 1872) an elaborate Memorandum "On the force of the words 'Amicable Settlement,'" showing that the contrary view "utterly violates logic and grammar."

<sup>2</sup> In justification of this view it is to be noted that the Treaty describes itself in its preamble as providing "for an amicable settlement."

<sup>3</sup> Letters to and from Granville, April 6, 1872.

<sup>4</sup> February 4, 1872. See also Ripon's sharp reply of the same date.

<sup>5</sup> The joke was invented by Count Pahlen and was much *gouâté* by Granville. (See his letters to Ripon, March 18 and April 15, 1871.)

<sup>6</sup> Letters from Northcote, February 15 and May 8, 1872.

men who remained calm and hopeful, and eventually even Granville and Forster went over to the intransigents. Happily, Fish, who was supposed to be the villain of the play, kept a vigilant hold on the passions he had unloosed, and he was seconded with admirable watchfulness and skill by the American Minister in London, General Schenck.

Officially, the American view of the dispute was that the Treaty provided for the submission of all claims to the Arbitral Tribunal, and that the "amicable settlement" referred to in the general Protocol of the High Commission related only to the first of the two alternative modes of settlement proposed by Fish.<sup>1</sup> In other words, had the British Commissioners agreed at the outset to confess the culpability of Great Britain and to pay a lump sum by way of damages, that would have been held to be an "amicable settlement" in the sense of the protocol; but as they did not accept this proposal, but chose the alternative of an arbitration which was designed to reach the same result in a circuitous way, that was not "amicable." It is not necessary to discuss the reasonableness of this argument, if for no other reason than that it is very doubtful whether Fish himself was sincere in advancing it. Fish's tactics were, indeed, very shrewdly gauged at the time by Lord Blachford in a letter to Granville :

"I infer that the American Government are just as much alive to the enormity of the indirect claims as we are—that they do not dare to give them up themselves, but wish to ride off upon an adverse decision of the arbitrators, and that they in their own interests so settled the Treaty, or so intended to settle it, that they should have an answer to anyone who charged them with abandoning what the popular sentiment required them to maintain; while our Commissioners

<sup>1</sup> Parliamentary Paper C.-545. North America, No. 7 (1872), p. 3.

in our interests so settled the Treaty that, taken as a whole, it should carry an indirect renunciation of their claims. I suppose that the United States Government, in prosecution of their desire to bamboozle their own people, have availed themselves of the loophole that they have reserved (or think they have reserved); but that as this brings them into collision with the sense in which our Commissioners have settled the Treaty, the whole thing is blown up and the attempt to circumvent popular opinion fails.”<sup>1</sup>

How true this was is shown by the more private diplomacy pursued by Fish, as soon as the indignant rejection of the indirect claims by British public opinion made it manifest that the whole Treaty was imperilled, and that with its collapse the relations of the two countries would become infinitely worse than they had ever been before. Fish had two strings to his bow. One was to revert to his original proposal that the whole question should be settled out of court by the payment of an agreed lump sum by Great Britain. Failing this he was apparently prepared, if Great Britain would let the arbitration proceed, to give secret instructions to the American arbitrator to use his influence with the tribunal to dismiss the indirect claims. Thus, in the last resort, he would be able, as Blachford said, “to ride off upon an adverse decision of the arbitrators.”

Schenck opened the case for the first of these proposals in a private conversation with Stafford Northcote, and promptly learnt from him that it was quite inadmissible :

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

*From Sir Stafford Northcote*

86 HARLEY STREET, February 4, 1872.

MY DEAR RIPON,—I have had a long, but not an encouraging, conversation with Schenck. . . . He

<sup>1</sup> Fitzmaurice : *Granville*, vol. ii, p. 64.

“ claimed ” that the negotiations had been conducted as set forth in the protocol, and the waiver of the indirect claims was only made in prospective consideration of our agreeing on a gross sum. I told him that my recollection was that their original offer was alternative (either a gross sum, or arbitration subject to rules), and that we had accepted the second branch of the alternative. He disputed this, and said the first mention of arbitration came from us. I stated my distinct recollection of what passed, and told him some of the thoughts that occurred to my mind as the American proposal developed itself. He changed the subject ; and said the practical question was, how to get out of the “ tight place ” now. There were, he said, several courses open to us. If we demanded peremptorily, in language however civil, that the U.S. should squarely retreat from the position they had taken, they would refuse, and the treaty would be at an end. If the case were that of individuals, the individual against whom an award was made might appeal against it in error if it appeared to exceed the limits of the submission : nations could not so appeal, but a nation might refuse on that ground to be bound by the award, and might reject it, “ taking the consequences.” If we gave notice that we went to the arbitration with the foregone determination to do this we should at least not give the U.S. ground for saying they were taken by surprise, and we should stand the chance (which he presumed we thought a good one) of the arbitrators deciding in our favour. This, therefore, would be better than a square demand without alternative.

As he had repeated these words several times, I asked what alternative he meant. He said he thought the best course would probably be that, as there had been

a hitch, we should revert to our original position and come to an arrangement for a gross sum, "larger perhaps than Great Britain would think fair, and less than we should think fair." "There would perhaps be less difficulty," he said, with a twinkle of his eye, "in coming to this arrangement now than there was some months ago." I said, "I look on that as an impossible solution for the present Government; it would probably turn them out." He said, "I suppose you don't much care about that." I intimated my philosophical indifference so far as the Government were concerned, but said the question is not a party one, but a matter of national concern. He said, "I suppose you would rather they were turned out upon any other question than the breach of the treaty." I am not quite sure that he used the word "breach," but it was something to that effect.

These were the material points of his talk. He seemed by no means in bad spirits, and rather gave me the idea that he enjoyed the "fix" we were in, and he thought it would end in our paying to get out of it. I have no doubt that if we got out in that way the Americans would be enchanted at the smartness of their negotiators. Schenck did throw out a remark that he hoped we, the Commissioners, would not be looked on as a parcel of knaves and fools; "I am sure I don't look on you as a fool, and I hope you don't look on me as a knave." I thought it best to make no reply to this remark.

One other he hazarded (I thought) to try me. He said something to the effect that he presumed we did not question the honesty of the arbitrators. I took no notice to him.

I remain in haste, yours, S. N.

After this conversation nothing more was heard of the "gross sum" proposal. Nor was the alternative idea of securing an adverse decision from the Tribunal itself ever actually put forward on the part of Fish. It seems, however, to have been hinted at in the above conversation and in a later interview between Adams,<sup>1</sup> the American Arbitrator, and Forster,<sup>2</sup> when read in the light of what eventually happened at Geneva. Meanwhile, in spite of Schenck's warning against asking the United States to withdraw the claims, Granville initiated negotiations on this basis.<sup>3</sup> They dragged on slowly and fruitlessly. Towards the end of April the growing impatience of the public became reflected in a notice of motion by Russell in the Lords, calling upon the Government to retire from the Arbitration until the indirect claims had been withdrawn. The situation thus created was exceedingly serious, as the majority of the Cabinet were in favour of accepting Russell's resolution. Ripon and Forster, however, both threatened to resign if this course were followed,<sup>4</sup> and the crisis was tided over for a time.

It was none the less evident that if a complete rupture was to be avoided a new basis of negotiation would have to be sought. Meeting Schenck at Buckingham Palace on April 24, Forster told him "that he must find a peg for Ripon and me within the next few days, or we could not keep the Treaty alive."<sup>5</sup> Schenck promptly took the hint. On May 7 he suggested to Granville an Additional Article to the Treaty pledging both countries, in their future relations, to the renunciation of indirect claims growing out of breaches of neutrality, and binding

<sup>1</sup> Charles Francis Adams (1807-86), son of John Quincy Adams and grandson of John Adams, respectively the sixth and second Presidents of the United States. He was an eminent politician and diplomatist and was American Minister in England from 1861 to 1868.

<sup>2</sup> Reid: *Forster*, vol. ii, pp. 28-9.

<sup>3</sup> Parliamentary Paper C.-545.

<sup>4</sup> Reid: *Forster*, vol. ii, p. 27.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

the United States, in consideration of this new rule, to "make no claim" for indirect damages at Geneva. Although this was a long stride towards surrender on the part of the United States, it was by no means certain that the Cabinet would entertain it.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

*To Earl Granville*

8.5.72.

MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—Forster and I agree in thinking that Schenck's last proposal contains the basis of a settlement; but we thought it best to say nothing on the subject in the Circulation Box, as our approval might only set other members of the Cabinet against the arrangement.

RIPON.

The Cabinet reluctantly agreed to authorize Granville to propose the new Article, but stipulated that the indirect claims referred to in it should be strictly limited to the three categories of such claims recited in the American Case.<sup>1</sup> On this a new controversy arose. The United States Senate struck out the limitation and insisted that the new rule should apply to all "remote and indirect losses" (May 26), but the British Cabinet declined to accept this amendment, as being "too wide."<sup>2</sup> Both Forster and Granville agreed with this view, much to the chagrin of Ripon, who now stood alone in the Cabinet. With the strong support of the Queen, however, he urged that the material point had

<sup>1</sup> These categories were "the loss in the transfer of the American commercial marine to the British flag; the enhanced payments of insurance, and the prolongation of the war and the addition of a large sum to the cost of the war and the suppression of the rebellion." Granville's note was presented to Schenck on May 10.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the draft additional Article and of the various amendments of it proposed by both parties are given in a Confidential Minute prepared by the Foreign Office for the Cabinet.

been gained, and that it would be unpardonable to wreck the Treaty and the Arbitration on the difference which remained and which, he contended, was in itself of no real importance.

*To Earl Granville*

BALMORAL CASTLE, N.B.,<sup>1</sup> 29. 5. 72.

MY DEAR GRANVILLE,—I need not tell you that, since I received your cyphered telegrams yesterday my mind has been pretty constantly occupied with the intelligence which they contained.

The present position of affairs, if I understand it rightly, appears to me to be a very serious one. The amendments made by the Senate in the Supplementary Article are objected to by the Cabinet, and the alterations which we have proposed in those amendments are rejected by Mr. Fish, who says, and Thornton confirms his statement, that it would be hopeless to make a further appeal to the Senate. We seem, therefore, to have arrived at a deadlock, and to be brought face to face with the failure of the Negotiation and the break-down of the Treaty.

The question, therefore, which we have each of us to ask himself, is whether the point upon which we break off is of sufficient importance to justify so serious a step.

I must honestly say that I find it very difficult to bring myself to that opinion. If we decline to bind ourselves for the future not to make claims for remote or indirect losses, it must be because we think that cases may arise in which it would be right and for our interest to make such claims. Now I confess that I fail to see what those cases are likely to be. It must be borne in mind that claims for *direct* losses, in the

<sup>1</sup> Ripon was acting as Minister in attendance on the Queen.

sense of this correspondence, are admitted to include such claims as those for the "pursuit and capture" of the *Alabama*, etc., so that by parity of reasoning they would include claims for the cost of resisting a Fenian raid upon Canada and capturing the raiders. If the conduct of a neutral is so unfriendly as to induce you to declare war against him, you can, if victorious, levy any contribution you please on your conquered enemy, but short of being compelled to it by force of arms there is no nation, I am confident, who would submit to be rendered liable for claims of a wider and more remote description than those which fall within the category of "direct claims," according to the meaning of the term as used in the present controversy.

But I think some one quoted in the Cabinet on one occasion the case of a weak country which could not go to war with the peccant neutral, but whose claim for compensation as a matter of international right ought to be maintained. Now I am convinced that the real interest of weak countries is that claims of this kind should be limited as strictly as possible. Practically, they never could recover exorbitant sums from the strong, but a Napoleon or a Bismarck would find it easy to eat them up by due process of law under the cover of an indirect claim—and so Goschen has argued more than once in these discussions. I do not go his length as to our duty to bear witness to the abstract principles of International Law on behalf of weak States; but so far as that duty goes, it ought to make us hesitate before we rehabilitate "indirect claims" by rejecting the Senate's amendments.

And now let us look at the effect of our breaking off now in our relations with the United States. I fear it would be worse than if we had insisted on the with-

drawal of the indirect claims in so many words from the first. We have hitherto had a large number [of] persons in America, and many of them of great authority, on our side. Is it probable that they will be with us now? Will they not say, fairly or unfairly, that we cried out loudly enough against "indirect claims" when they were made upon ourselves, but that we evidently wish to retain the use of so powerful a weapon in our own hands for future occasions? This argument would not weigh much with me, I admit, if I felt that we were clearly right on general grounds in insisting on leaving the door open for bringing forward such claims on some possible future occasion; but doubting if we are right in this, the feeling that the point now in dispute is one on which public opinion in the United States will probably be unanimous against us presses upon me a good deal.

But, further, will the public opinion of Europe be with us? It seems to me doubtful. We have hitherto been supported as the opponents of indirect claims; we shall now be represented as in reality their champion. Your friend "the intelligent foreigner" is not always just to "perfidious Albion," and it will astonish me if he does not discover fresh traces of perfidy in our present proceeding. Seriously, if we have not shifted our ground we shall at all events have the appearance of having done so, to those who have not the time or the means of looking carefully into the matter.

The messenger is going and I cannot write more. I am much perplexed as to what I ought to do; but I will think the whole subject carefully over again this afternoon, and either write to you to-morrow or go straight up to London, as may seem best on reflection.

I feel to the full how improbable it is that I am right

and you all are wrong in a decision in which you seem to have been unanimous ; but with my present light it will be very difficult for me to acquiesce in that decision.

Yrs. sincerely.

RIPON.

At the same time the Queen conveyed her views in unambiguous terms to the Cabinet :

*The Queen to Earl Granville*

BALMORAL, May 27, 1872.

I am commanded by the Queen to inform you that Her Majesty trusts that the amendments proposed by the Senate will be considered with an anxious desire to bring about a settlement of the question, and that the Cabinet may find it possible to accept them.

PONSONBY.

BALMORAL CASTLE, May 29, 1872.

The intelligence contained in Lord Granville's telegram to Lord Ripon<sup>1</sup> has been received with much regret. There appears to be no probability that the alterations proposed by the Cabinet in the amendments of the Senate will be accepted by the U.S., so that an entire failure of the negotiation seems to be imminent. Will not such a failure now produce great irritation in the U.S. ? The responsibility of breaking off the negotiations now and destroying the Treaty of last year is very serious. If further time is required, would it be possible to obtain the consent of the U.S. Government to an adjournment of the meeting of the arbitrators ?<sup>2</sup>

The Tribunal of Arbitration had been appointed to

<sup>1</sup> Telegram dated May 28, stating that the Cabinet were still unable to accept the American amendment.

<sup>2</sup> Both these telegrams were drafted by Ripon at the Queen's request.

reassemble on June 15 for the presentation of Arguments. There was consequently very little time in which to negotiate a settlement which would render it possible for Great Britain to continue to be represented. Two amendments of the American amendment had been proposed by Granville, on May 27 and 30 respectively, but they made no real approximation to the American standpoint, and Fish had declared it to be hopeless to submit them to the Senate.<sup>1</sup> To this impasse were added other embarrassments. Russell's motion in the Lords, which had been postponed at the request of Granville, was now down for discussion on June 4, and although the Queen had written to him privately, urging him to withdraw or adjourn it, he had declined.<sup>2</sup> Besides this, Ripon threatened to resign if the British redaction of the Additional Article was obstinately adhered to.<sup>3</sup> In this dilemma it was fortunate that the composition of the Cabinet majority was such that there could be no question, at that stage, of reviving the idea of accepting Russell's motion. Hence Ripon's view acquired great weight. Gladstone pronounced in favour of continuing the negotiations,<sup>4</sup> and it was agreed to propose a fresh amendment accepting the American formula with an interpretative clause. It was still, however, doubtful whether this proposal would succeed in time to save the Government from defeat in the Lords.

As it happened anxiety on this score was superfluous. When the debate opened it was found that Russell no longer based his motion on the general scope of the dispute, but on the vagueness of the operative clause of the proposed Additional Article.<sup>5</sup> He argued that the words "to make no claim" did not imply a with-

<sup>1</sup> Telegram from Granville to Ripon, May 28, 1872.

<sup>2</sup> Letter from the Queen, June 7, and Ripon's reply, June 11, 1872.

<sup>3</sup> Ripon to Forster, May 30; Ripon to the Queen, June 4, and the Queen's reply, June 5.

<sup>4</sup> Forster to Ripon, May 28, 1872.

<sup>5</sup> *Hansard*, vol. ccxi, pp. 1095 et seqq.

drawal of the indirect claims, and that there was reason to believe that some such evasion was actually contemplated. This view found strong support, and the debate proved exceedingly damaging to the Government. With great difficulty Granville obtained a further adjournment for two days.<sup>1</sup> He made good use of the interval. When the House reassembled on the 6th he presented it with a document which, as Ripon afterwards told Blachford, "exploded like a shell among the hostile ranks."<sup>2</sup> It was a letter from the ever-helpful Schenck, the main paragraph of which ran as follows :

*June 6th, 1872.*

. . . I am now authorised in a telegraphic despatch received to-day from Mr. Fish to say that the Government of the United States regards the new rule contained in the proposed article as the consideration for, and to be accepted as, a settlement of the three classes of the indirect claims put forth in the case of the United States to which the Government of Great Britain have objected.<sup>3</sup>

The scene in the crowded House when this letter was read was one of intense excitement. Instead of upsetting the Government and smashing the Treaty the Opposition were apparently hoist with their own petard. What would Russell do? All eyes were strained for him, but he was nowhere to be found. There was a pause, during which Ripon laughingly suggested that Lady Russell, who was in the gallery, might take upon herself to withdraw the motion in her husband's name.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. ccxi, pp. 1188-92. A division was taken after midnight, when the Lord Chancellor's motion for adjournment was defeated, but the motion was subsequently agreed to without a division.

<sup>2</sup> Marindin : *Letters of Blachford*, p. 342.

<sup>3</sup> *Hansard*, vol. ccxi, pp. 1263-4.

<sup>4</sup> Marindin : loc. cit.

Then the Lord Chancellor rose to continue the debate. At this moment Russell's small form was seen entering the Chamber. There was a whispered colloquy with the Opposition Chiefs, after which the veteran statesman rose and in a few words declared that he was satisfied, and asked permission to withdraw his motion.<sup>1</sup> Granville, wreathed in smiles, gathered up his papers and shook hands with Schenck on the steps of the Throne. The most dangerous point of the whole fateful controversy was happily passed.

This 'gratifying result was, curiously enough, not so much due to the terms of Schenck's letter as to the fact that the House, stampeded by Granville's *aplomb*, had accepted it as meaning more than it actually said. True, it answered, and answered satisfactorily, the precise point raised by Russell, but this did not really change anything in the diplomatic situation. The deadlock remained. Schenck had defined the operative clause and its relation to "the new rule contained in the proposed Article," but he had not said to which redaction of the "proposed Article"—the British or the American—he was referring, and it was just the difference on this point, and not any difference on the meaning of the operative clause, which was, at that moment, most obstinately contested by the two Governments. Nevertheless, it was felt that after escaping the perils involved in Russell's motion the crisis, so artificial in itself, could not be allowed to remain open. The discussions of the new rule ceased. There was the less reason for continuing them because the United States Senate had adjourned for the recess, and hence, even if an agreement were reached, the Treaty in which it would have to be embodied could not be ratified for at least seven months, during which the Arbitration would have to be suspended. In these circumstances Fish reverted to his idea of "riding off"

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. ccxi, p. 126.

on an adverse judgment of the Geneva Tribunal, and an intimation to this effect was conveyed to London.<sup>1</sup>

As soon as the Arbitrators assembled the details were discreetly arranged. Adams and Cockburn,<sup>2</sup> the British Arbitrator, put their heads together, and Roundell Palmer<sup>3</sup> was called in to draft a "spontaneous declaration" for the Judges.<sup>4</sup> The proprieties, however, were strictly observed. At the opening of the Tribunal on June 15, Tenterden, on behalf of Great Britain, solemnly applied for an adjournment for eight months to enable a Supplementary Convention to be negotiated in regard to the indirect claims. The American agent professed to be without instructions, and the consideration of the application was postponed for two days.<sup>5</sup> The same comedy was enacted on the 17th and 19th. Thereupon Count Sclopis,<sup>6</sup> the President, with a fine air of a sudden happy thought, said that while he did not wish to say anything which might prejudice the dispute between the parties, it would perhaps help them if he were to state at once that the Arbitrators had already considered the indirect claims, and had arrived "individually and collectively" at the con-

<sup>1</sup> How and when this happened is not clear. Fitzmaurice (*Granville*, vol. ii, p. 96) says that it was the subject of negotiation with Granville on June 6, and there is a letter from Granville to Bright, dated June 12 (p. 98), in which the plan is said to have been settled. It is certain, however, that Roundell Palmer knew nothing of it when he left for Geneva on the 13th.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Alexander Cockburn (1802-80). He was at that time Lord Chief Justice of England.

<sup>3</sup> Afterwards Earl of Selborne (1812-95). He was the leading British Counsel at the Geneva Arbitration and became Lord Chancellor in 1872, and again in 1880-5.

<sup>4</sup> Selborne: *Memorials*, vol. i, pp. 236-7.

<sup>5</sup> The anxiety of the Cabinet is vividly described by Forster in his *Diary* (Reid: *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 31-3). The scene on the Terrace in Downing Street on June 15, when Ministers waited the whole afternoon "for the verdict," was made the subject of a pen-and-ink sketch by Mr. E. Fairfield of the Colonial Office.

<sup>6</sup> Federigo Sclopis de Saleranna (1798-1878), a distinguished Italian jurist. He was selected to preside over the Arbitration under the provisions of the Treaty of Washington.



"WAITING FOR THE VERDICT" (ALABAMA CLAIM, 1872)

- |                           |                       |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Mr. Goschen            | 7. Viscount Halifax   |
| 2. Mr. Cardwell           | 8. Earl of Kimberley  |
| 3. Mr. H. A. Bruce        | 9. Mr. Gladstone      |
| 4. Duke of Argyll         | 10. Earl Granville    |
| 5. Marquess of Ripon      | 11. Mr. W. E. Forster |
| 6. Marquess of Hartington | 12. Lord Hatherley    |
| 13. Mr. Stansfeld         |                       |

clusion that they were quite inadmissible and should be wholly excluded from the consideration of the Tribunal in making its award. The two agents were properly surprised at this announcement, and a further adjournment was granted to enable them to consider "the new position." At the next sitting, on June 25, the American agent announced the definitive withdrawal of the "indirect claims."<sup>1</sup> From this moment all was relatively plain sailing. The final award of the Arbitrators, which gave damages of £3,000,000 against Great Britain,<sup>2</sup> caused much grumbling in that thrifty age and even a good deal of political bitterness; but, at any rate, Ripon's fight for Anglo-American amity had triumphed, and, as subsequent events have proved, it was well worth all the sacrifices it entailed.

The renewal of the struggle over the Education Act is chiefly interesting, so far as this record is concerned, for the evidence it affords of the growing friction between Ripon and his colleagues in the Cabinet, which led to his resignation in the autumn of 1873. This friction was no doubt in some measure due to the steady Whiggism of his political outlook, but it had another and a deeper cause. For some time Ripon, with a relapse into his old introspective habit, had been a prey to spiritual unrest, and this made him long to be free of the worldly distractions of office and even sometimes ruffled his wonderfully equable temper.<sup>3</sup> The creed in which he had been brought up had long ceased to satisfy him, and after his mother's death in 1867 he seems to have begun to think seriously of a definite change in his confessional allegiance. The stages by which his reflections eventually led him to join the Roman Catholic Church will be found traced by a competent hand in a special chapter appended to this

<sup>1</sup> Protocols of the Tribunal of Arbitration, in *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxii, pp. 189-97.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>3</sup> Letter from Helps, August 7, 1871: "You have not been so sweet-tempered as usual lately."

narrative.<sup>1</sup> The task of the present writer is confined to noting the part played by them in the more external—and particularly the political—aspects of his career. This part was plainly discernible in his attitude towards the Nonconformist and Secularist campaign against the Education Act in 1871-3.

The Birmingham League was now virtually directed by a young man who was destined to make history. Joseph Chamberlain, then on the threshold of his political career, was the soul of the smashing agitation against the Act, and the tactics pursued by it bore all the marks of his explosive energy and resourceful astuteness. Having failed to defeat or discredit the Act on general anti-Clerical grounds, the League now sought to organize evasions of its denominational clauses by a strained and un contemplated interpretation of the powers conferred on the new School Boards. In this *sabotage* it was favoured by the faulty draughtsmanship of the Act, and it achieved a temporary measure of success. Its bugbear was Clause xxv, which enacted, in harmony with the tolerant spirit of the measure, that School Boards might pay the fees of children whose parents through poverty were unable to pay them, and that without interfering with the right of the parent to select whatever duly qualified school he pleased for his child's education. This clause had in view only the non-compulsory scope of the Act. Unfortunately, under Clause lxxiv School Boards were permitted to frame by-laws not only making school attendance compulsory in their respective districts, but also enabling them in such cases to provide for the remission or payment of fees. This thoughtless choice between payment and remission afforded an opening by which, in some cases, Clause xxv might be evaded and the "pauper child" forced, whatever the religious opinion of its parents, to attend only a school provided by the Boards. Accordingly,

<sup>1</sup> *Infra*, pp. 321-55.

the League advised congenial Boards to adopt compulsion, and at the same time to provide only for the remission of fees, thus rendering it impossible for pauper children to attend denominational schools where fees were exacted.

The first School Board to act on this advice was that of Southampton. Towards the end of July 1871 it submitted, for the approval of the Board of Education, by-laws framed in accordance with the advice of the League. Ripon was stirred almost to anger when they came before him, especially as he found Forster doubtful as to whether they could be vetoed. On August 8, at a Conference at Whitehall, he expressed himself in strong terms to Forster :

"It seems to me unjust and tyrannical to compel a poor parent to send his children to school, and to afford him the means of doing so only in a particular class of schools and not in any P.E. school which he may select. To use the power of remission instead of that of payment in order to compel the parent to send his children to the Board Schools is an ingenious evasion perhaps of the letter [~~spirit~~] of the Act, but leaves the injustice standing. I do not believe that it can be maintained in argument that it is right to fine a poor man who says, 'I am unable from poverty to pay for my child's schooling. I am quite ready to send him to a P.E. school of which I approve and which is at my door, if you will help me, but I decline to send him to a Board School, to which I have a conscientious objection.'"<sup>1</sup>

Forster was unconvinced, and on August 12 Ripon appealed to the Cabinet. The result was a compromise of a familiarly specious type. While sharing Ripon's

<sup>1</sup> Draft letter to Forster endorsed : " This letter was never sent, but we discussed the matter together, and I spoke in the sense of this letter. —R."

indignation, the Cabinet agreed with Forster that by the letter of the Act they were helpless. They resolved, however, to point out to the Southampton Board the cruelty of compelling a parent, to send his children to a school of which he disapproved, and to state that "my Lords cannot doubt that the School Board will see the justice of making use of the power they possess under Section XXV in favour of such parent."<sup>1</sup> Ripon, of course, was not mollified by this barren homage to his principles, and he speedily determined that some more substantial concession was due to him if he was to retain office.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

To W. E. Forster

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, 12/8/71.

MY DEAR FORSTER,—The decision at which the Cabinet arrived to-day with respect to the course to be pursued in regard to the Bye Laws of the Southampton School Board and other similar cases, has placed me in a position of very great difficulty.

I do not wish to reopen the discussion of the question, but I feel bound to lose no time in stating, with complete distinctness, that the only ground upon which I can consent to accept the decision of to-day, if I can accept it at all, is that it is clearly understood that if I am called upon to defend the non-disapproval of such Bye Laws as those in question, I can only do so upon the theory that the duty of this Department is confined to seeing that the Bye Laws of School Boards are legal, and with perfect freedom to myself to express in strong terms my opinion of the great injustice which may be inflicted under such Bye Laws, if they are carried out in the spirit in which they are framed.

<sup>1</sup> From the Council to the Southampton School Board, August 26, 1871.

I must, therefore, press upon you the necessity of not cutting the ground from under me by going beyond the narrow interpretation of the duty of the Education Department which I have laid down above.

Unless I can take my stand upon that, my position, difficult henceforth anyhow, will become untenable; and you know me well enough to be aware that I am not in the least likely to continue to hold for an hour a position which I do not feel to be tenable.

I have not a word to say against the manner in which the question was discussed; but the decision arrived at adds another to the many reasons which make me long for the day when I may be able to free myself without impropriety from the shackles of office.

Always yours affectionately, RIPON.

To *W. E. Gladstone*

1 CARLTON GARDENS, S.W., 13/8/71.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—Though I regret extremely the decision to which the Cabinet came yesterday about School Board Bye Laws, I have no wish to trouble you by reopening the questions which were then discussed.

But there is one point connected with the subject which has struck me since, and which I think it right, with reference to possible future discussions, to bring under your notice.

Forster defended the view which he took of the course to be pursued by placing a narrower interpretation upon the duty imposed upon the Education Department in respect to these Bye Laws than I do now or did when the Bill was before Parliament, and by expressing a hope that the School Boards would avail themselves of the powers of the 25th Section of the Act to prevent the actual infliction of injustice upon any individual.

Now, with respect to the latter of these arguments, I am anxious to point out to you that it can only be used so long as no actual case of oppression has arisen under the operation of the Bye Laws to which I have taken objection ; if they are carried out in the spirit in which in reality we have every reason at present to fear that they will be carried out, and Churchmen or Roman Catholics are fined or imprisoned under them, we shall be called upon the moment Parliament meets again to bring in a Bill to put an end to such admitted injustice, and I cannot see how the demand is to be resisted. I must, therefore, reserve to myself full liberty to urge the Cabinet to legislate upon the subject, if cases of oppression should arise under any of these Bye Laws during the recess.

But it seems to me that the attempt to legislate in this way will involve us in greater embarrassment and difficulty than would follow from the disallowance of the Bye Laws now, and I feel bound therefore to submit this further point for your consideration.

It is clear to me that we cannot allow the injustice to be really perpetrated ; I have serious fears that in some places that will be the case ; we can now prevent it by a timely disallowance of the Bye Laws ; if we pass the Bye Laws, we can only put an end to it by a fresh Act of Parliament.

I am very sorry to trouble you thus amidst all your anxieties ; if what I have said makes no alteration in your opinion as to the course to be taken now, pray do not think of answering this letter.

Believe me always, yours sincerely, RYON.

I shall send Forster a copy of this letter, as I should not like him to be ignorant of any step which I had taken on the subject to which it relates.

Eventually it was agreed that an amending Bill giving effect to Ripon's views should be brought in as soon as other pressing matters had been disposed of. These pressing matters, however, only became more pressing with time, and over a year elapsed before the Cabinet was able to touch the question again. When at last, in July 1873, Ripon moved the second reading of the promised Bill in the House of Lords<sup>1</sup> he was standing in the shadow of his final resignation on a totally different question.

In the interval the Government had steadily declined in popularity. The internecine virulence of the Birmingham League had given heart of grace to the Tories. A succession of unhappy blunders like the Collier case<sup>2</sup> and the Ewelme case<sup>3</sup> had dimmed the personal prestige of the Prime Minister and damped the ardour of his Parliamentary majority. Early in 1873 Disraeli, with a fine practical sense of his opportunity, took the field, and in March of that year the Government were defeated on the Irish University Bill. They forthwith resigned. Disraeli, however, was unable to form a new Cabinet and Gladstone consented to resume office. Ripon was at Cannes at the time, anxiously watching at the bedside of his son, who had suffered a severe accident. For this and other reasons which have already been indicated, the prospect of at last quitting office caused him no little relief. His wishes were not yet destined to be gratified. Gladstone,

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. ccxvii, pp. 1162-5.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Robert Collier was appointed one of the paid members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and was qualified for the post by what was virtually a fictitious appointment to a Common Law Judgeship. The appointment was violently attacked, and the Government narrowly escaped censure in both Houses of Parliament.

<sup>3</sup> An ecclesiastical parallel to the Collier case. Mr. Harvey, a Cambridge man, was presented to the Rectory of Ewelme, which by Act of Parliament was reserved for members of Convocation of Oxford. In order to qualify him he was incorporated as a member of Oriel and after six weeks' residence was admitted to membership of Convocation. The appointment gave rise to what Gladstone called "a Parliamentary peppering."

prudently edging to the Right, pressed his Whig colleagues not to desert him, and Ripon found it impossible to turn a deaf ear to such an appeal. In agreeing to remain, however, he stipulated that he should not be asked to change his office, besides laying down two other characteristic conditions.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

To *W. E. Forster*

VILLA LEONIE, CANNES, 18th March, 1873.

MY DEAR FORSTER,— . . . I have seldom in my life done anything which I personally disliked more than I do in consenting to return to office under present circumstances. It is intensely distasteful to me, but I do not think that I should have been right to refuse, more especially as I have no doubt that Gladstone himself will make no small sacrifice if he ends by consenting to remain. . . . I only hope that if I remain I may not be asked to change my office. . . . There are two points on which, I think, I ought to speak clearly. First, as to English Education, I cannot be a party to any concessions to the League which go at all beyond your intended Bill. You know that in that Bill I have gone to the very verge of what I can conscientiously agree to—I can go no further either as regards the 25th Clause or School Boards. I leave it to you to mention to Gladstone or not, as the circumstances seem to you to require. Second, I can not consent to be committed to an Extension of the Suffrage in Counties. I have, of course, no right to interfere with Gladstone or any other members of the Government voting for Trevelyan's Bill, however much I may regret it; but it would be impossible for me to agree to the *Cabinet's* being committed to that or any similar measure. If any idea should be entertained of taking up that ground

on the notion (a most mistaken one, I believe) that it would be a good cry for the Elections, I can have nothing to do with it. If, therefore, anything of the kind is likely, it would be much better for everyone that I should be allowed quietly to resign now, when I can do so on the ground of absence and de Grey's health, etc., than that I should have to retire in a few weeks, when it might be inconvenient to the Government. I think it only fair to Gladstone that he should be told this. . . .

Ever your affectionate, RIPON.

Gladstone's response was enthusiastic but scarcely contractual. He wrote to Forster: "To say that Ripon's letter is most handsome is only saying in other words that it is *his*."<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Ripon seems to have been satisfied.

It was not for long. Within "a few weeks," as Ripon had feared, the continued pressure from the Left unsteadied the Prime Minister, and when Trevelyan's County Franchise Bill came before the House on July 23 he found it necessary to throw a sop to the sulking Radicals which went distinctly beyond the neutral attitude stipulated by Ripon. He authorized Forster to make a statement of his approval of the Bill in terms which rendered it difficult for any Liberal to look upon it as an open question within the party. Ripon at once pressed his resignation upon the Prime Minister.

• To W. E. Gladstone

• I.C.G., 24 July 1873.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—I have just read the report of what took place yesterday in the House of Commons on the discussion of the Household Franchise (Counties) Bill, and as I feel myself placed in a position of difficulty

<sup>1</sup> Gladstone to Forster, March 20, 1873.

on account of the decided opinion which I entertain upon the question of the extension of the Franchise in Counties, I do not think that I should be acting fairly either towards you or towards myself if I did not endeavour to place clearly before you the impression which a perusal of the Debate has left upon my mind.

I must begin by admitting at once that in the communication which Forster made to the House of Commons by your direction, and in his own and Bruce's speeches, care was taken to indicate that it was not intended to pledge the individual members of the Government to the policy of which you and they were advocates; but although the Government was not pledged as a whole to that policy, the emphatic announcement of your views, made in a manner much more marked and striking than might have been the case if you had been able to speak in the Debate with all the guards and explanations which you would doubtless then have employed, does, as it seems to me, distinctly pledge you, as Head of the Government and Leader of the Liberal Party, to the opinion that the extension of the Household Franchise to the Counties is a measure to which the Party is committed as a practical question of the day, and which you will feel yourself bound to deal with at an early period.

Now I am sorry to say that I entirely dissent from this opinion. I do not say that it may not be necessary to extend the Household Franchise to Counties at some future time, though disliking uniformity of Suffrage I do not desire to see it adopted even in the future; but I feel strongly, for reasons with which I will not now occupy your time, that this extension of Household Suffrage at the present time is not necessary and would be mischievous, and is a measure to the

introduction of which I could not conscientiously be a party.

As I have said, I do not desire now to argue the question, but I cannot help pointing out in passing that both Forster and Bruce appear to have admitted, what is to me perfectly obvious, that such an extension of the Suffrage would involve a large redistribution of Seats, that is a complete new Reform Bill, involving questions of great magnitude and difficulty and tending, needlessly as I believe, to divert the attention of Parliament from other and much more pressing matters. For this I am not prepared.

I know that you will do me the justice to recognize that in stating my opinion thus strongly I am only repeating views to which I have already given expression. Forster wrote to me, while I was in France this Spring at the time of the Crisis, to say that he had shown you a letter which I had written to him with reference to our resumption of office, and in which I distinctly expressed my feelings with respect to the extension of the County Franchise, and the fear which I entertained that they were in opposition to your views upon the subject. That letter was not written with any idea that you would see it, although I am, now especially, very glad that it was shown to you; but it is a clear proof that the decided objection which I feel to the policy inaugurated yesterday has not been taken up hastily or without full and careful consideration of the whole subject.

But this being so, in what position am I now placed? I find myself in opposition upon a question of first-rate magnitude to the emphatically expressed opinion of my Chief, and to what is evidently hereafter to be the policy of the Liberal Party.

In such a state of things I feel bound to ask you to consider whether it would not be for the interest of the Government that I should resign at the end of this Session without giving any reason beyond the claims of my own private affairs, which I can very truly allege, and thus avoid what seems to me to be now inevitable, my having to retire next November or December, when it would be almost impossible for me to do so without assigning a difference of opinion with my colleagues as my reason for resignation, and when my retirement might make it difficult for others, who share my views in principle though perhaps feeling them less strongly than I do, to remain.

I confess that if I stop in office for the next few months my position will, to my mind, be a very strange one. You seem to me to be pledged to the extension of the County Suffrage beyond escape, you are the Head of the Government and the Leader of the Liberal Party, and I feel, though it is very painful to me to say so, that I cannot follow your lead in this matter. Is it desirable for anyone that in such a state of things I should continue to hold office temporarily? It would be on personal grounds very distasteful to me to do so; but I owe you and my colleagues and the Party with which I have been so long connected much too much not to feel bound to be guided, as to any question of time, by your wishes. I should be ungrateful indeed for the invariable kindness and far too great confidence which you have always shown me if I did not desire as far as I possibly can to consult the interests of the Government and your own convenience; but it seems to me that the most complete way in which I can do this is to leave you perfectly free, as I do by this letter, to let me drop out of the Government without

any ostensible difference of opinion, instead of retiring at a later period when it will be more difficult to put forward other than public reasons for my resignation, and when it may therefore be a cause of some possible embarrassment.

Believe me, my dear Gladstone, ever yours sincerely,  
RIPON.

This time it was final. What followed the writing of the above letter is recorded in a Memorandum drawn up by Ripon at the time and deposited among his papers.<sup>1</sup> Suffice it here to say that in so far as his resignation facilitated a reconstruction of the Cabinet on a more Radical basis it was probably as little disagreeable to the Prime Minister as to Ripon himself. As soon as Parliament rose the resignation was announced. It caused but little public comment and Ripon slipped back, as he had wished, almost unperceived into private life.

Among the letters of sympathy and regret he received from old friends was one from Salisbury. It is interesting as fixing the essential character of the rôle played by Ripon in the "Cabinet of Great Reforms," apart from his important legislative and diplomatic achievements, and it is also interesting for the letters which followed.

*From the Marquess of Salisbury*

CHÂLET CECIL, PUY, PRÈS DIEPPE, SEINE INFRE.  
August 9th, 1873.

MY DEAR RIPON,—I am exceedingly sorry to see the news that is brought to us to-day. I only hope that it is not caused by any illness in your family. I have every reason to regret your resignation—for it will not be easy to find any one who will show so much equity in considering the claims or even the prejudices of

<sup>1</sup> Appendix VI.

opponents. If I had had any suspicion you were going, I think I should have made a push to throw out the Endowed Schools Bill.<sup>1</sup>

However, you will have the satisfaction now of looking down with equable mind upon the experiences of your colleagues in a storm which, to say the least of it, will be sufficient to make them very seasick.

Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

*To the Marquess of Salisbury*

FINCASTLE, ISLE OF HARRIS, N.B., 18. 8. 73.

MY DEAR SALISBURY,—Many thanks for your letter, which has given me much pleasure, for I set no small store by such testimony as you so kindly bear to my endeavours to act fairly and considerately towards those from whom I may differ on political matters.

I am very glad in many ways to be once more a free man, though I was sorry to leave my colleagues, involved in so many difficulties ; but the time of my going was of Gladstone's choosing, and it is a satisfaction to feel that my resignation now helped him to carry into effect the reconstruction of the Government which he thought necessary.<sup>2</sup>

I am thankful to say in answer to your enquiry that my retirement had nothing to do with illness in my family, for though Lady R. has not been well lately, she is better now. She joins with me in the hope that we may be able to induce you and Lady S. to come to us at Studley this autumn ; we shall be chiefly there after the middle of October, and delighted to see you at any time—at present we have no engagements

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> The most significant change was the return of Bright to the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy.

except for the first ten days or so of November, when we expect to be in Lincolnshire.

Yours sincerely, RIPON.

*From the Marquess of Salisbury*

CHÂLET CECIL, PUYS, PRÈS DIEPPE, SEINE INFRE.

August 31st, 1873.

MY DEAR RIPON,—We should like of all things to be able to avail ourselves of your kind invitation this year, but unluckily Sir William Jenner has condemned me to a winter at Sorrento on account of a tendency to bronchitis in our youngest child—which is an awful nuisance.

Poor Bob Lowe—they will not let him rest in any office—they will hunt him into the House of Lords before they have done.<sup>1</sup>

Yours very truly, SALISBURY.

One is tempted to speculate on what might have happened had Salisbury gone to Studley in that fateful autumn, when Ripon, turning from the struggle with Nonconformity and Secularism, was thinking more seriously than ever of a haven of refuge in the Mother Church of Christendom. He was very lonely at the time. His old monitors were gone. The death of his mother had been quickly followed by the death of Maurice<sup>2</sup> and from Tom Hughes he had drifted far.<sup>3</sup> Salisbury, with his Toryism and High-Churchism, probably embodied a fighting solution of his problem in the fields of both politics and religion. The opportunity of testing it was denied to Ripon. He retired to his library and buried himself in Newman.

<sup>1</sup> Lowe had been transferred from the Treasury to the Home Office. Salisbury's prophecy came true in 1880, when, on the formation of Gladstone's second administration, Lowe was created Viscount Sherbrooke.

<sup>2</sup> He died on April 1, 1872.

<sup>3</sup> As far back as November 20, 1868, we find Hughes writing to Ripon: "Your handwriting gives me a sort of pleasurable twinge, like the sudden opening of a window on an old familiar scene."

## CHAPTER XIII .

FROM KING SOLOMON'S THRONE TO THE POPE'S FOOTSTOOL  
(1874—1880)

THE year 1874 opened with the landslide which overwhelmed the Liberal party and placed Disraeli firmly in the saddle for six dramatic years. Later on it was marked by disturbing symptoms of a revival of "No Popery" alarms. It was the year not only of the "Conservative Working-man," but also of the Public Worship Regulation Act, of the opening of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, of Gladstone's pilgrimage to Döllinger at Munich, and of its sequel in his fierce indictment of the Vatican Decrees and the civil allegiance of Roman Catholics. The public perturbation was, it is true, much less acute than that occasioned by the Tractarians or by the "Papal Aggression" in 1850, but none the less it was manifest that the minds of Protestants throughout the country were deeply disturbed. The exultant hopes which Hot-Gospellers and Secularists had founded on the destruction of the Temporal Power had not been realized. On the contrary, a reaction of religious fervour and of vastly increased proselytizing activity was everywhere seeking compensation for the worldly losses of the Papal See. Add to this the sweeping claims in the domain of civil politics which were deduced from the Syllabus, the scandals of the Ritualist controversy, and a ceaseless sputter of more or less conspicuous conversions to Rome, and it will not be difficult to understand the prevailing anxiety. This was the atmosphere in which, early in September 1874,

announcement was made of Ripon's secession to the Roman Catholic Church.

That it should be received with a storm of Protestant anger was, in any case, inevitable. Ripon was a Peer and an ex-Cabinet Minister whose loyalty to the strictest form of Anglicanism had never been questioned or suspected outside a very narrow circle of his relatives and intimate friends. But this was not all. He was also Grand Master of the English Freemasons, and in this capacity was popularly regarded as embodying with peculiar definiteness not merely dissent from, but actual hostility to, the Roman Church. This aspect of his conversion extended the public wrath far beyond the field of conscious Protestantism. Freemasonry was regarded, more or less accurately, as a citadel of religious toleration and political democracy, and hence the fact that Ripon had to resign his Grand Mastership before he was received into the Catholic Church<sup>1</sup> was widely denounced as justifying all the darkest apprehensions of Papal interference on the side of reaction in civil politics.

Here, again, his loyalty had been held to be unimpeachable. He had never been a *fainéant* Mason. Indeed, so earnest and punctilious was he in all the offices he held in the Craft that his private secretary, Seton, found it necessary to become a Freemason in order to keep pace with his chief's engagements.<sup>2</sup> Ripon was initiated in the Lodge of Truth (No. 521) at the

<sup>1</sup> This was accidental. Ripon, on the advice of the Junior Grand Warden, whom he took into his confidence, had intended to postpone the resignation until after his reception into the Roman Church, but at the last moment it was found that the resignation could only be received in Open Lodge and the only date available in the circumstances was September 2, six days before the ceremony of his conversion took place. The decision was taken so hurriedly that even the Prince of Wales, who was heir presumptive to the Grand Mastership, was not informed. Ripon wrote to the Prince a letter of apology and explanation on September 15, 1874.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Bruce Maxwell Seton, Bart., a principal clerk in the War Office. He became Ripon's private secretary in 1859, and retained the post, with occasional short intervals, until 1873. His relations with his Chief were extremely confidential. The above statement was made by him to the present writer.

Rose and Crown Hotel, Huddersfield, on May 17, 1853, shortly after his election as M.P. for the Borough. He was then still a Christian Socialist and a Republican, and he found much to attract him in the broad catholicity and simple ethics of Masonic teaching. He became Senior Warden of the Lodge in 1854 and was installed Worshipful Master in the following year. In 1861 he was nominated for the Provincial Grand Mastership of West Yorkshire, and was duly installed at Leeds on May 22 of that year under the banner of his Mother Lodge. The appointment was very popular, and was fully justified by the active interest he took in the affairs of his Province. To this day many of the Yorkshire Lodges have extracts from his masonic speeches inscribed on their walls,<sup>1</sup> and the skill and impressiveness with which he gave the ritual are still recalled by the older brethren as an example to new Masters. His career in Grand Lodge began in 1856, when he served as Senior Grand Warden. A few years later, Lord Zetland, the then Grand Master, appointed him his deputy, and in this capacity he became Second Grand Principal of the Supreme Grand Chapter. On March 2, 1870, on the retirement of Zetland, he succeeded to the Grand Mastership, and was in due course installed on the "Throne of King Solomon."

His tenure of office, though lasting only four and a half years, was unprecedentedly brilliant and fruitful. From the outset he had the hearty support of the then Prince of Wales—afterwards King Edward VII—whom he introduced into his first London Lodge and who made it a point to be present at all his successive installations.

*From the Prince of Wales*

SANDRINGHAM, KING'S LYNN, April 22/70.

MY DEAR LORD DE GREY,—Many thanks for your letter and for giving me all the information

<sup>1</sup> *The Jubilee of the Lodge of Truth.* Huddersfield, 1896.

I asked you concerning the approaching Masonic Festival. . . .

I have the greatest pleasure in accepting your kind offer to make me a Member of the Alpha Lodge. I had long wished to belong to a London Lodge, and I am sure I could not belong to a better one than the Alpha Lodge.

I felt much for the anxiety Lady de Grey and yourself must feel for your Brother-in-law's safety. The demands of the Brigands are quite outrageous, but I trust that Vyner will shortly be liberated.<sup>1</sup> We have beautiful warm weather here, and I trust you have the same in Yorkshire.

I remain, yours very sincerely, ALBERT EDWARD.

Two other Royal Princes, the Duke of Connaught—now Grand Master—and his younger brother, the Duke of Albany, joined the Craft during Ripon's Grand Mastership. Besides these notable recruits, the main body of the Order flourished mightily. The number of new Lodges for which Ripon was privileged to grant warrants reached a higher proportion than in any other similar period in the history of English Freemasonry.<sup>2</sup> But, perhaps, the most conspicuous event in his reign was his mission to the United States to negotiate the Treaty of Washington. He was the first English Grand Master to visit America, and both he and the American Lodges took care that the interesting event should be suitably celebrated. On May 10, 1871, he was received with great splendour and enthusiasm by the Grand Lodge of Columbia in the presence of delegations from all the other American Grand Lodges. Ripon made skilful use of the occasion to dwell on the civil allegiance

<sup>1</sup> Lady Ripon's brother, Frederick Vyner, with three companions, had been waylaid by Greek brigands at Marathon and held to ransom for £32,000. On being pursued by Greek troops the brigands murdered the whole party.

<sup>2</sup> The number of Lodges warranted by Ripon was 216.

of Freemasons and the application of their guiding principle to the cause of Anglo-American friendship. Speaking in reply to an address of welcome he said :

“ We all know that fraternity is the first principle of Masonry, and therefore it is that all must rejoice at everything which tends to bind more closely together the Masons of different nations and countries. A union between American and English Masons, a union which, for my part, I have always believed, and now I believe more strongly than ever, cannot be too close and fraternal.”

Again, at the banquet :

“ The leading principle of our ancient Craft is that of fraternity . . . whatever may be their race or their nation. Masonry does not, however, cause men to forget their patriotism in a vague cosmopolitan feeling. Men are better citizens of the United States and better subjects of the Crown of England because they are brethren of our ancient fraternity . . . I believe that it is for the highest interest of the civilization of the world, I believe that it is for the highest interest of America and England, that there should be the closest and most intimate union between the two countries.”

A curious incident happened during the banquet. The Grand Master of Massachusetts, in illustration of the liberalism of Freemasonry, mentioned that the first warrant of his Lodge was signed by “ Anthony Browne, 6th Viscount Montague,” who was deprived of his hereditary seat in the House of Lords because he was a Roman Catholic, but who found a refuge in Freemasonry and acted as Grand Master of England in 1732.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> “ Memorial of the welcome extended to the Grand Master of Masons of England by his American brethren ” (1871). The reference to “ Viscount Montague ” is incorrect. It should have been Viscount Montacute.

Almost to the eve of his conversion Ripon was both active and ardent in Grand Lodge. He was re-elected to the Grand Mastership for the fifth time on March 4, 1874, six months before his formal entry into the Church of Rome, and he presided at Grand Lodge as late as June 3,<sup>1</sup> when, from a letter written to him by Lady Amabel Kerr, it appears that he had already resolved to accept, at any rate, the sacramental authority of the Pope. That his attachment to Freemasonry was then still unchanged is shown by the following extract from his speech expressing "deep gratitude" for his re-election to the Masonic Throne:<sup>3</sup>

"I am very happy to be able once more to congratulate you on the prosperous condition of the Craft at the present time. . . . I trust that we shall always bear in mind that the strength of the Order does not lie in the number of its Lodges or in the increasing roll of its members, but in the spirit by which those members are animated and which lives and breathes in our Lodges. It is because I hope and believe that these principles are deeply written in the hearts of all that I do esteem it a very great honour once more to be called to preside over you."

These perplexing circumstances added an element of bitterness and even of calumny to the cyclone of newspaper anger which swiftly spread throughout the country. It was whispered that Ripon had long been in secret a member of the Jesuit Brotherhood and that he had actually been received into the Church of Rome eighteen months before his conversion was publicly announced. The charge was roundly made by a corre-

<sup>1</sup> *Proceedings of Grand Lodge*, 1873-6, vol. ii, p. 164.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*, pp. 325-7. Letter dated June 8 [1874].

<sup>3</sup> *Proceedings of Grand Lodge*, 1873-6, vol. ii, pp. 36-7.

spondent of the *Freemason* (October 3, 1874), who accused him of conspiring with the bitterest enemies of Freemasonry "to strike a deadly blow at the Institution." The truth, of course, is that Ripon's good faith in this as in every other circumstance of his life was unimpeachable. There was at this time no change in his favourable view of Freemasonry, and although he was well acquainted with the technical relations of the Craft and the Papacy he was slow to believe that the Papal Bulls which had been levelled at the Craft were still valid.<sup>1</sup> The last of these Bulls was fifty years old, and in spite of some of them Roman Catholics had not only remained in the Order, but had actually, like himself, occupied the Grand Mastership without incurring penalties.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, he was convinced that, the Syllabus notwithstanding, there was no necessary incompatibility between Roman Catholicism on the one hand and religious toleration and political liberalism on the other. When, at the last moment, the attitude of the Vatican in regard to Freemasonry was made clear to him it was relatively much too small a matter to modify the grave decision at which he had arrived.

This, however, was not the main ground on which his conversion was denounced. Very few of the criticisms, indeed, dared to touch his high personal character, and it was on the general principles that Roman Catholicism is essentially alien to the English character and that the Vatican Decrees had rendered it impossible for any Roman Catholic to be a patriot that he was arraigned. *The Times* led the way in the exposition of this—as it must appear to-day—astonishing doctrine.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> There were four of these Bulls, which were issued respectively by Clement XII in 1738, Benedict XIV in 1751, Pius VII in 1821, and Leo XII in 1825. (See "The Old Charges and the Papal Bulls," by W. J. Chetwode Crawley, in *Trans. Quatuor Coronati Lodge*, vol. xxiv (1911), pp. 47-65.)

<sup>2</sup> Lord Petre was Grand Master in 1772.

<sup>3</sup> *Times*, September 5, 1874.

“His [Lord Ripon's] sympathies have, at least in action, been given to the party of progress and enlightenment, and he would have been regarded until yesterday as a valuable member of the Liberal Party. This is the man who, in the full strength of his powers, has renounced his mental and moral freedom, and has submitted himself to the guidance of the Roman Catholic Priesthood. . . . Lord Ripon, we dare say, will still adhere to the Party in whose service he has won his honours and his Marquisate, but a statesman who becomes a convert to Roman Catholicism forfeits at once the confidence of the English people. Such a step involves a complete abandonment of any claim to political or even social influence in the nation at large, and can only be regarded as betraying an irreparable weakness of character. . . . To become a Roman Catholic and remain a thorough Englishman are—it cannot be disguised—almost incompatible conditions. . . . We do not for a moment doubt that men who have been born and brought up in the Roman Catholic Faith may retain their creed as a harmless and colourless element in their opinions. But when a man in the prime of life abandons the faith of Protestantism for that of Rome his mind must necessarily have undergone what to Englishmen can only seem a fatal demoralization. We submit to many things if we are born to them which we would never endure if they were imposed on us for the first time. But that a statesman, a man who has had twenty years' experience of the world, who has held high official posts in England, and has been a prominent diplomatist, should submit himself to the yoke of the Roman Catholic Priesthood, can only be due to some fatal obliquity of temperament. The principles of English life and of the Roman Catholic religion are very difficult to reconcile,

and when a man deliberately becomes a Roman Catholic he must be held to accept distinctly the principles of his new Creed. . . . It is a melancholy spectacle, but it indicates a weakness which is not an English characteristic, and, though we may grudge to the Roman Catholic clergy Lord Ripon's wealth and such social influence as he may retain, we may be sure that the material advantages he may bring to them will be their only acquisition. . . ."

This was the note of almost all the newspaper comments. The only noticeable variations were due to party or sectarian bias. Thus the Conservative press, with the *Standard* (September 7) at its head, while equally convinced with *The Times* that no Roman Catholic convert could be a good Englishman, affected to see in the "fatal obliquity of temperament" which led to such conversions a monopoly of Liberal statesmen. The organs of Church and Chapel also pointed their own special morals. The *Church Times* (September 18) regarded the defection as all the fault of the Public Worship Bill, and the *Nonconformist* (September 16) declared it to be the inevitable consequence of the necessarily anarchic condition of an Established Church. On one point there was complete agreement. It was that "the pervert Marquis," as the *English Independent* (September 10) called him, had committed political suicide and that English public life would know him no more.

Ripon himself did not altogether share this latter view. He had at one time feared that he would have to make the sacrifice, and he had resolved to resign himself to it for conscience sake,<sup>1</sup> but he was soon persuaded to a more hopeful frame of mind. His new religious mentors insisted that upon no account should

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Lady Amabel Kerr, December 26, 1874. (See also extract from Diary, *infra*, p. 316.)

he dream of retiring from politics. Cardinal, then Archbishop Manning, when the public clamour was at its height, wrote to him: "Do not think that your public life is over. You have still much to do, and Englishmen are learning that Catholics can serve the English people. . . . A little while of silence and patience and you will not be alone."<sup>1</sup> Lady Amabel Kerr wrote to him in a like spirit.<sup>2</sup> But the most encouraging signs came from his political friends in both the great parties of the State. About a fortnight before he made his change he wrote privately to a large number of his friends and colleagues announcing his intention. Some thirty of the replies have been preserved. They came not only from personal friends like Tom Hughes and Arthur Helps, but also from leaders of political opinion like Granville, Kimberley, Aberdare, Halifax, Wolverton, Carnarvon, and others.<sup>3</sup> The temper of these letters was very different from that of the press. They were regretful, of course, but not one of the writers dreamt of suggesting that Ripon's title to the affection and respect of his friends and the confidence of the public had been in the least diminished by what had happened. This was calculated to correct—and that very decidedly—the depressing effect of the frothy and probably evanescent condemnation of Fleet Street. Unfortunately there was one conspicuous absentee from this circle of political friends who now rallied round Ripon. The packet of letters contains not a word from Gladstone. And yet it is impossible that he could have omitted to write to him. The late Lady Ripon once told the late Lady Primrose that she believed that there was a letter from Gladstone, but that it was so unkind, and so unlike all the other letters,

<sup>1</sup> September 10, 1874. Ripon, curiously enough, owed his acquaintance with Manning to Gladstone, who introduced them to one another by letter on October 27, 1869.

<sup>2</sup> December 26, 1874. *Infra*, p. 334.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of some of these letters see *infra*, pp. 348-50.

that her husband had put it into the fire. As the sequel shows, this is not improbable. But, even Gladstone's silence at this critical moment could not but have caused misgivings, for if he believed as *The Times* believed, Ripon's hope of continuing his public life in the highest councils of the Liberal Party could have but little chance of being realized.

But whether Gladstone wrote privately or not he, at any rate, did not leave Ripon long in doubt as to his opinion. While in Munich during that eventful September<sup>1</sup> he received from London the proofs of an article on "Ritualism and Ritual" which he had written for the *Contemporary Review* some weeks before. In this article he gave the following reasons for believing that the "effort" of the Ritualists "to Romanise the Church and people of England" was "utterly hopeless and visionary":

"1. Rome has substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change of faith.

2. She has refurbished and paraded anew every rusty tool she was fondly thought to have disused.

3. She has equally repudiated modern thought and ancient history."

On reading over these passages Gladstone inserted a fourth reason between numbers two and three in the following terms:<sup>2</sup>

"No one can become her [Rome's] convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another."

<sup>1</sup> The suggestion that Ripon had perhaps not written to Gladstone because he was in Munich would not explain the absence of a letter from Gladstone, as Ripon wrote all his letters on August 20 and 21, and Gladstone did not leave for Munich until September 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra*, p. 308.

The application of these words in the stir caused by Ripon's conversion was not easy to misunderstand, and it would have been still less difficult had the public known how and when they came to be inserted in the article. It is true that later on, Gladstone, when hard pressed by Ripon, explained, rather maladroitly, that the passage was written without any personal reference to Ripon, "and, indeed, with a prospective much more than a retrospective view,"<sup>1</sup> but the fact remains that the point was not thought of in the original text of the article and was only inserted when Ripon's conversion had given it a noisy actuality.

The Roman Catholic community had borne the Press campaign with calm dignity, but in face of Gladstone's onslaught—which duly appeared in the October *Contemporary*—they felt it impossible to maintain silence. Monsell, who, in spite of being a "convert," had been Gladstone's Postmaster-General in his last Government, and had been raised by him to the peerage as Lord Emly, wrote to Ripon proposing a concerted protest to their late Chief.<sup>2</sup> Ripon, however, preferred to act alone. He could not but recognize the allusion to himself in the passage in the article imputing disloyalty to "Rome's converts," and he saw clearly that a withdrawal of the charge within these narrow limits was indispensable to the continuance of his political career. The result was the following spirited correspondence.

To W. E. Gladstone

Oct. 2, 1874.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—It is with great reluctance that I trouble you with a few words with reference to a passage in your recent paper on Ritualism, as reported in the newspapers, which if it be correctly given appears

<sup>1</sup> *Infra*, p. 308.

<sup>2</sup> September 29, 1874.

to bring a very serious charge against those to whom it refers and of whom I am one.

You are made to say, in speaking of Catholic converts, "no one can become her [Rome's] convert without renouncing his moral and mental freedom and placing his loyalty and duty at the mercy of another."

I have, of course, no right to speak for any one but myself, and it would be unpardonable impertinence in so recent a convert as I am to think of doing so, neither do I desire to enter into controversy of any kind; I will not even complain of your saying that I have renounced my "moral and mental freedom," though it is a source of deep regret to me to learn that you think I have done so.

But when you tell the world with all the weight of your great authority that all converts to the Catholic Faith have placed "their loyalty and duty at the mercy of another," and thus seem to give your sanction to a charge of disloyalty which, when made in the columns of *The Times*, may well be passed by in silence, but which coming from you is grave indeed, I, who have so lately been one of the Queen's Ministers, have no alternative, painful as the task is to me, but to remonstrate as strongly as I can against such an accusation.

I utterly deny that by becoming a Catholic I have become less loyal or dutiful as a subject of the Queen, and I have served Her Majesty too long and am too grateful for her many acts of gracious consideration to allow you, who are my political chief and were so recently the head of a Cabinet of which I was a member, to say or to imply, without protest from me, that I have done or am ever likely to do anything inconsistent with perfect loyalty or duty.

I will add no more; I am sure that you would not

have written what you must have known would give such acute pain to many if you had not believed that you were correctly representing their position. I am not the proper person to argue with you on the general subject of your charge, even if I had the ability or the inclination to do so ; but I could not let such words fall from the pen of one to whom I owe so much, and for whom I shall ever entertain so warm an attachment, without saying frankly how unjust I feel them to be.

Ever yours sincerely, RIPON.

*From W. E. Gladstone*

HAWARDEN CASTLE, CHESTER, Oct. 4. 74.

MY DEAR RIPON,—When I saw this morning the name on your envelope, I felt at once that the letter within it was probably a letter of remonstrance ; yet I could not help feeling a pleasure at seeing it at all. And what you have written is just what I should have expected from your old self. Your protest is manly and outright ; but, while writing with a certain sense of wrong received, you still cherish the spirit of kindness, which I trust will in some sense fill up or bridge over under all circumstances the gap that is now between us.

Now I have two points to deal with—first, to tell you whether I hold to my words ; secondly, to convey to your mind why it is that they convey, as I think, no personal charge against you. In dealing with these points I will endeavour to be perfectly explicit. Yet I know these matters—with which I have been but too conversant for five and thirty years—cannot be handled without rubs and shocks, if they are to be handled to any good and honest purpose.

First, then, I hold by my words; and I believe them well chosen, on the whole, to express my meaning, though perhaps they might be improved. By "Rome," which is my nominative, I meant to mark out what Dante 550 years ago blamed in his immortal and priceless Poem, the Roman or Popish element in the Western Church; much more virulent now than in his time, since the convulsions of the 16th century unhappily brought into being the order of the Jesuits. I meant to mark, and think I have marked, a power now supreme in the Roman Communion, perfectly distinct from the general movement of its lay mind, not in possession even of its clerical mind universally, but fatally menacing the freedom and health of both.

Then I come to the "convert," of whom I speak:

1. Because the question is of the "conversion" of England.

2. Because the "convert" (unlike the born R.C.) must be supposed to have made some sort of review of Roman doctrine, and have gone through some process of acceptance of it; and cannot be supposed to have failed to observe and weigh the late decrees of the Vatican.

As a convert you are bound to those decrees. They bind you to *believe* whatever the Pope decrees *ex cathedrâ*: an expression of which any authoritative and certain exposition has, I believe, been carefully withheld—of which I understand that about twelve definitions are fought for and against among Roman authorities—and which I apprehend the Pope will himself define *when the occasion comes*.

Besides this, you are bound by the Council to obey whatever the Pope orders or requires to be obeyed, *ex cathedrâ* or not.

I am sorry that I have not the decrees by me, and cannot quote ; but I think I do not misrepresent.

It has been mercifully declared that this power either does not extend to or will only be exercised in " faith and morals." And if I were now writing to Archbishop Manning I should say to him : " Be good enough to supply me with an explicit statement showing me what are the *portions of human life and conduct* which are not and cannot be included in either faith or morals."

I affirm that the domain of loyalty is not severed by any impassable line from the domain of " morals " ; or exempted from the orders which the Pope may give.

Therefore you are bound to obey whatever the Pope enjoins upon you, under the name of moral duty, even if it be, according to your judgment and mine, in the domain of civil loyalty.

Therefore as a convert you hold your " civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another."

Nor are you even protected by his supposed infallibility ; for he may not be speaking *ex cathedrâ* : and yet you will be bound to obey him.

That you have or that any particular " convert " has seen all this (and how much more !) I have never asserted. I have not stated that the convert " consciously " renounces his freedom or his civil duty. Perhaps the word " renounce " was not happy, as it may be thought to imply consciousness, which I did not mean. But no such criticism will, I think, apply to the assertion that he " places his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another." For I speak there of what he *does* ; not of what he may think he is doing, since I believe that you in particular, rather than speak or write any such thing knowingly, would have much

rather that the tongue were torn from your mouth, or the hand cut from your body.

This is virtually my reply on the second point. I apprehend it is perfectly legitimate to charge true logical consequences on opinions and acts, though not upon persons. The inclosed letter, received last night from Sir G. Bowyer, will supply an example. According to it I take *my* religion from the majority of the House of Commons. A more absurd and empty proposition I have never read; but there is nothing in it which I am entitled to treat as a charge against me.

Believe me when I say that I do not make a declaration of [this] kind, which I know to be polemical, lightly or wantonly: for I love not the atmosphere into which it brings me. But I have long foreseen what must happen if ultramontaniam continued, as it has continued, to run its furious course. As long as England owed a debt of justice to Ireland, I said as little as possible on this subject, lest I should hinder the discharge of that debt. Now, we have either paid it, as in the Church and Land Acts, or tendered payment, as in the Irish University Bill, only to have it contumeliously rejected by the Bishops of the Pope's communion; under orders, as I am informed from Rome, but this is a secondary matter. There, again, I do not think it is for a Prime Minister without a great necessity to expatiate much in these matters. In a private and independent position, the great scales of Duty are differently weighted.

But I should not have said so much, were it not for two things: first, the two great changes wrought in the position of the Latin Church by the proceedings of 1870; secondly, the to me undeniable fact that the Roman authorities have distinctly broken faith with this

country, which passed the Emancipation Act under solemn assurances from the highest local authorities that Papal infallibility was no part of Roman Catholic belief.

One of my greatest consolations would be to learn that with the upright manliness of your natural character you intended to offer a strong resistance to the mischiefs at which I have slightly glanced.

Believe me, with unchanging regard,

Sincerely yours, W. E. GLADSTONE.

*To W. E. Gladstone*

FULCHAM LODGE, GLEN ISLA, ALYTH, N.B.

6th Oct. 1874.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—I received last night your letter of the 4th.

As I have already told you, I have no desire to enter into controversy of any kind or with any one; least of all with you at a time when I am smarting under a deep sense of your injustice, and when to say more upon the painful topic of this correspondence would only be to shatter whatever may remain, on your side, of a friendship which I have so highly valued, and of which I am reluctant to relinquish even the shreds.

But I must, in order to avoid misconception, renew in the most explicit terms my protest against the passage in your paper on Ritualism, to which I have felt bound to take exception, and I must also state my conviction that the Decrees of the Vatican Council, referred to in your letter, do not bear out the conclusions which you have drawn from them.

Ever yours sincerely, RIPON.

*From W. E. Gladstone*

HAWARDEN CASTLE, CHESTER, Oct. 8. 74.

MY DEAR RIPON,—I am truly concerned to find that my offence appears to have been aggravated by my letter, and that you decline the friendly discussion to which I conceived that you had invited me.

In pointing out the meaning and effect of certain propositions, and in urging you to disclaim the mischievous consequences I exhibit, I may be in error, but I do not see how I can be doing anything which warrants a deep sense of my injustice.

I do not believe that friendship is, on these sad occasions, best maintained by silence. If a friend of mine joins the Roman Church, I assume that he regards me as suffering a great privation, and I regard him as one who has been overtaken by a deplorable calamity; but the sentiments of friendship do not therefore drop: they should, indeed, in some respects be quickened.

Let me, however, point out that, if you think that discussion may be injurious, there is another course open. This I described yesterday in a letter to Emly, who holds that my language applies to members of the Roman Church generally as well as to "converts." I copy the passage: "Allow me to suggest that the proper, perhaps the only proper, way of answering my statement will be by an explicit argument and declaration from Roman Catholic sources. Let there be such an argument and declaration" . . . (I break the sentence to say that by argument I mean merely what is needed to make the Declaration clear) . . . "showing that, if the Pope shall at any time make, in the name of faith or of morals, any declaration of belief, or any order as to conduct, which shall interfere with civil

duty, be either of these *ex cathedrâ* or be it not, you and other Roman Catholics will repel and resist them.

"Most happy shall I be, when and in so far as this may be done, whatever I may think of their logical consistency, to retract all I have said on this very painful subject, so far as they are concerned."

I do not presume to lay down a *formula*, but, looking at the substance of this suggestion, I cannot but hope you will consider it a fair one and well calculated to dispose of the point immediately in contention between us.

With all best wishes, very sincerely yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

To W. E. Gladstone

STUDLEY ROYAL, RIPON, 14. 10. 74.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—I have been moving about lately and have been unable to reply sooner to your letter of the 8th.

I must now begin by asking your pardon for having expressed myself as strongly as I did in my last letter.

Your kind answer implies, I trust, I was hasty in supposing that your friendly feelings towards me were seriously impaired, and I assure you that the hope that this is the case has given me very great pleasure.

I think that if you refer to my first letter you will see that you are mistaken in saying that I have declined a friendly discussion to which I had invited you; for in that letter I distinctly said that I did not desire to enter into controversy of any kind, and that I was not the proper person to argue with you on the general subject of your charge, even if I had the ability or the inclination to do so.

If, therefore, by a discussion you mean, as I suppose, a discussion on the general subject, I can only say that

I have never invited it, and that I am still of opinion that I ought not to engage in it.

But if you mean a discussion on the justice or injustice of your charge as it affects me as an individual you are, I admit, so far right, that I shrink from continuing it in detail because, as I could not honestly accept the mode in which you sought to relieve me from your censure by suggesting that I did not know what I was doing when I became a Catholic, I could only support my assertion that your charge against me was unjust by statements, which I would fain avoid.

However, as you seem to think that I ought in fairness to point out to you some of the grounds upon which I rest that assertion, I will try to do so.

I think it unjust, in the teeth, as I venture to believe, of the testimony of my past life, to hold me up upon any theory whatever to my sovereign and to my fellow-countrymen as likely to be wanting in civil loyalty and duty, without my having had even the possibility of doing anything to indicate that my whole character is changed, and that I, who as you know well, have up to now entertained a strong personal attachment to the Queen and who owe her so much, am about to cast those feelings to the winds and to forget those obligations.

Again, you say in your letter of the 4th, "I apprehend it is perfectly legitimate to charge true logical consequences on opinions and acts, though not upon persons," but I complain that you have used language in your paper which I can only understand and which I am sure that nine-tenths at least of those who read it will understand also as charging upon me, as a person, what you have set down as in your opinion the "true

logical consequences" of my becoming a Catholic. This I think unjust.

Let me illustrate what I mean by your own case. It seems to me that the "true logical consequence" of the opinion which you have expressed about Catholic converts is that every one of them is unfit to hold the smallest office in the State, and indeed, as I believe your distinction between "converts" and other Catholics, though plausible in theory, to be practically erroneous, that as a matter of fact all Catholics are in the same position—yet I should feel that it was doing you a grievous injustice if I were to tell the world that you entertained this opinion and might be expected to act upon it.

And now, though it is hateful to me to do so, I will come to a more closely personal matter. I ought not perhaps to say that in this respect you have been *unjust* to me, but it has been more painful to me than I can express that, at a moment when I was the most recent and most notorious "convert," when I was sure to be made to "point the moral and adorn the tale," you, my old chief, whom I hope I served loyally, should point me out to the distrust and contempt of my countrymen in terms which I could have treated with indifference in the mouths of those from whom we have hitherto been accustomed to hear them, but which from your lips are, I confess, hard to bear.

But if I go on I may easily become unjust to you in my turn. I was anxious not to continue this discussion because I feared that in the warmth of my feelings at this moment I might say things which were wanting in that consideration and fairness which you have a right to expect from me, even in any entirely private correspondence like this. I will therefore stop; indeed,

I have no wish to say more ; I shall try to forget the pain which I have felt and to remember only your many acts of kindness to me so far beyond my deserts.

I hate abstract declarations and I will make none ; I ask to be judged by my acts ; and I venture to believe that, so judged, you will find me in the future, as I have been in the past, a loyal and dutiful Englishman, though a sincere convert to the Catholic Faith.

Ever yours sincerely, RIPON.

*From W. E. Gladstone*

HAWARDEN CASTLE, CHESTER, Oct. 17, 74.

MY DEAR RIPON,—Do not think of asking my pardon in this or any other matter. I am too sensible of my own need for indulgence in all I say and do, not to be aware that I should be the petitioner and not you. Yet let a man feel ever so much that he is always blundering in the way of his duty, still he must go on trying to do it.

I am sensible that I did not use the right word in my reference to those called "converts": for to "renounce" may most fairly be taken as implying a voluntary and conscious act. I think that "forfeit" is the word I ought to have employed. But I do not know whether you attach any value to this substitution.

Let me add on another point that I wrote the passage without any personal reference to you, and, indeed, with a prospective much more than a retrospective view. The words as to "converts" were not written when you were most in my mind ; and were inserted in the proof when I was in Germany shortly before the proof was sent to press.

I wish I could go beyond these two explanations ;

but it is difficult. I cannot deny that my letters have implied that you "did not know what you were doing" when you joined the Church of Rome. If it seem strangely bold to say this to you, who have made no doubt a special examination of the subject, yet it is said by one who has had to examine the subject too, with pain, sometimes almost with agony, in the cases of relations and of friends, sometimes the nearest, during 35 years; and to whom this very subject has been (through them) the occasion of the severest mental trials of his life.

I do *not* think you "likely to be wanting in civil loyalty and duty." I think the very reverse, and am most ready to say so in the most formal and public manner. But I think loyalty and civil duty might make just calls upon you, which would require you to break with the principles of the system you have been led to embrace. My opinion is that you will refuse consequences which you are logically bound to accept.

You may perhaps think the same of me with reference to your illustration. To this I object; but I cannot complain. I am perfectly ready to maintain the civil privileges of your co-religionists, for reasons which I think good and sufficient. But I must frankly avow that I cannot now do it on the ground on which I would have done it during the controversy on Emancipation, viz. that their religion as expounded by competent authority imported nothing disparaging to civil loyalty.

I do not yet see my way clearly as to any further steps it may be my duty to take: and I do not know whether the explanations I offer are worth your having. If they are, you are absolutely entitled to them: but I should have to state what I defended, as well as what I explained.

But in any case until I am forbidden I shall always assume the undiminished existence of our old relations, as *well* as cherish the recollection of them.

Ever very sincerely yours, W. E. GLADSTONE.

*To W. E. Gladstone*

STUDLEY ROYAL, RIPON, 19 Oct. 1874.

MY DEAR GLADSTONE,—I have just received your kind letter of the 17th, and am much obliged to you for it.

I do not think that the public will apply your statement with as much tenderness for individuals as you do yourself; but I had not the public in view when I wrote to you. I made up my mind, when I became a Catholic, not to enter into any public controversy with any one, whatever might be said of me; and the object of my correspondence with you is attained now that I have had the great satisfaction of learning that *you* do *not* think me likely to be wanting in civil loyalty and duty.

It is to me a source of the greatest pleasure to find that you desire the "undiminished existence of our old relations." I prize those relations most highly, and I earnestly trust that you will never find me doing anything which would justly forfeit their continuance.

Believe me, ever yours most sincerely, RIPON.

Ripon had achieved his purpose. Gladstone, though yielding nothing on the question of Ultramontane principle, was entirely satisfactory on the personal issue. Ripon apparently had no further need for anxiety as to his public career, and it was perhaps because he attached this limited significance to the correspondence that he declined to publish it, although Emly strongly urged

him to do so.<sup>1</sup> He adhered to this decision, although in the following month Gladstone virtually repeated his reflections on the loyalty of Roman Catholics in his famous pamphlet on the "Vatican Decrees" and challenged them, in the terms of his letter to Ripon of October 8, to make a public declaration that they would resist any order the Pope might make which would interfere with their civil duty. His reticence was well judged. Four years later Gladstone had to re-edit his *Contemporary* article for inclusion in vol. vi of his *Gleanings*, and a sense of its injustice, quickened, no doubt, by the conspicuous absence of any overt facts to excuse it, seems to have pressed itself upon him. To the passage relating to "Rome's converts" he appended a footnote expressing his belief that "some at least who have joined the Latin Church since the great change effected by the Vatican Council would, upon occasion given, whether with logical warrant or not, adhere under all circumstances to their civil loyalty and duty." It was, perhaps, a little grudging, but its meaning, so far as Ripon was concerned, was clear enough.

Nevertheless, "the little while of silence and patience" prescribed by Manning proved more protracted than he had, perhaps, anticipated. This was not due to the persistence of Protestant prejudice, for although Gladstone's pamphlets were widely read and found a certain response in "No Popery" articles in the newspapers, the agitation quickly died away. Ripon, however, remained in retirement, chiefly because he had other things to do, and later on because he found it difficult to choose between Hartington and Gladstone in the abnormal situation created in the Liberal Party by Gladstone's resignation of the Leadership.

<sup>1</sup> Emly to Ripon, Oct. 13 and 17, 1874.

<sup>2</sup> Of the *Vatican Decrees* alone, 145,000 copies were sold before the end of 1874 (Morley: *Gladstone*, vol. ii, p. 519). The other pamphlet, *Vaticanism, an Answer to Replies and Reproofs*, was published in February 1875.

For two years he was not seen in Parliament, and then he only returned to watch Roman Catholic interests in connexion with the Elementary Education Bill of 1876.<sup>1</sup> From that time until 1878, when he began to resume his place in the higher councils of his party, he scarcely touched any large political question, limiting himself to the more humdrum measures which affected the religious and rural interests amid which his life was then mainly spent, or with which his experience as Lord President specially qualified him to deal. Meanwhile, he read prodigiously Roman Catholic Divinity and Radical politics, besides keeping himself abreast of the Blue Books, Reviews, and newspapers of the day. He wrote occasionally for the *Catholic Month*.<sup>2</sup> He shot his converts at Studley and Nocton more mightily than ever. No convert was ever more scrupulous in observing the offices of the Church. In the local affairs of the West Riding and of Lincolnshire, he developed a tremendous activity and achieved a greater popularity than he had ever before known.<sup>3</sup> The winter of 1875 and the spring of 1876 he spent in Italy. On his return he gave himself up very largely to Roman Catholic Institutions, especially the Catholic Union of Great Britain, of which, for all practical purposes, he speedily became the most considerable member.

Apart from the services he was enabled to render the Union by bringing his ripe political experience to bear on the denominational, and more particularly, the Roman Catholic incidence of current legislation, he conferred an inestimable boon on his new co-religionists by the vigour and frankness with which he endeavoured to dissociate Roman Catholics as such from party

<sup>1</sup> *Hansard*, vol. ccxxxi, pp. 798-802, 938, 941-3; Ripon to Manning, June 14, 1876.

<sup>2</sup> "Some Thoughts on Political Morality" (February 1879); "Co-operation" (July 1879).

<sup>3</sup> *Diary, passim*. This diary was only kept for a short time, from November 23, 1878, to April 25, 1880.

politics. The whole tendency of the Union, and of the Roman Catholic nobility and gentry generally, was strongly Tory, and the same atmosphere pervaded Ecclesiastical circles. This bias had become accentuated by Gladstone's anti-Catholic pamphlets, and it was strengthened later on by the fancied interest of the Church in the policy of resisting the Russian advance on Constantinople, with which Disraeli and Salisbury had associated themselves. Into this latter movement Lord Denbigh, at the instance of Manning, sought to draw Ripon "on Catholic grounds," in December 1876, but without success.<sup>1</sup> Ripon saw clearly the dangers of this movement, and the justification it would afford for the anti-Catholic views of Gladstone which he had been at such pains to refute. In March 1877 he seized an opportunity of addressing the Catholic Union at length on this subject, insisting on the separation of religion and politics, and also on the tactical consideration that, seeing that no one political party was really hostile to Roman Catholicism, the interests of the Church would be best served by a distribution of Roman Catholic influence among all parties, and that, in the contrary event, the inevitable result would be to drive the parties not favoured by them into direct hostility to the Church.<sup>2</sup> This campaign was not entirely successful, for the Tory tendency of the Roman Catholics continued even down to the General Election of 1880, and did not pass unnoticed by the Liberal press.<sup>3</sup> It is, however, unquestionable that very serious consequences were averted by the stand made by Ripon, and the strong reaction it produced in him in the direction of Gladstonian Liberalism. On the one hand, the Liberal anti-Papists were disarmed, and on the other

<sup>1</sup> Letters from and to Denbigh, December 29, 1876; January 1 and 2, 1877.

<sup>2</sup> Letters from and to Baron de Haulleville, March 16 and 17, 1877.

<sup>3</sup> Diary, April 11, 1880. Letters from and to Monsignor Fisher, March 18, 21, 22 (2), 23, 30; April 4, 9, 10, 1880.

the Vatican realized the prudence of avoiding interpretations of the Syllabus which might result in the loss of so valuable an asset as its latest convert.

The popularity of the Disraeli Administration reached its high-water mark at the Berlin Congress of 1878, but it began soon after to subside. Embarrassments gathered about the Government. The wary hand of the Premier showed signs of losing its cunning, and "prancing pro-Consuls" in India and South Africa gave applications to his maxim of "Imperium et Libertas" which seriously upset the peace of the Empire and irritated the public. The hopes of the Liberals revived, and an energetic campaign against the Government was set on foot. Ripon needed no persuasion to throw himself and his rehabilitated political character energetically into the new fight. His almost unreasoning hatred of Dizzy had only been sharpened by the history of the last four years. Moreover, his sound knowledge of Indian affairs and his experience at the India Office had convinced him of the unwisdom, and worse, of the policy which had led to the Afghan War. In all the party councils which met at Devonshire House at this period, he was an active and trusted participant, and he formed with Northbrook and Halifax a sort of sub-committee which framed and directed the whole Indian policy of the Opposition.<sup>1</sup> His path to office in the event of a change of Government was, however, no longer clear before him. On the one hand, he feared that Hartington's leadership was a failure, and that Liberals could gain little inspiration from it.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, he was still sore with Gladstone on Roman Catholic grounds, and had even persuaded himself that Gladstone's retirement from the leadership in 1875 was a desertion of his party.<sup>3</sup> So inextricable seemed these perplexities

<sup>1</sup> Letters, 1878-9, *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Diary, December 2 and 7, 1878.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, December 27, 1878.

that on December 7, 1878, we find him writing in his Diary: "I have taken pretty good care to put an end to my chance of a return to office." This seems, however, to have been only a momentary outburst, for both at Devonshire House and in the Lords his party activity remained undiminished, and it soon became clear that, whether under Hartington or Gladstone, he had set his heart on entering the next Liberal Cabinet. He does not even think of conditions, as, for example, with regard to the County Franchise. It is not difficult to understand his attitude. Exclusion from office would have confirmed all the imputations cast upon Roman Catholics at the time of his conversion; it would have ruined his hopes of attaching an influential section of his co-religionists to the Liberal party, and it would have given free rein to the more mischievous political activities of the Ultramontanes.

The result was that at the beginning of 1880, when a general election was thought to be in sight, he determined to attach himself definitely to Hartington. On January 15 Reginald Brett, Hartington's Private Secretary,<sup>1</sup> paid him a visit at Studley, and he seized the opportunity of explaining his views to him:

*Extract from Diary*

*Thursday, 15 January.* . . . Talked to Brett about my views as to office for myself, told him that I should be prepared to take it, if offered, that I had not given up the career of public life—but that my first wish was that whatever was best for the interests of the Party should be done, and that if my place was wanted for some one else likely to be more useful, or if my being a Catholic was considered likely to damage a Government of which I might be a member, I should not wish to be included in the next administration; that if left

<sup>1</sup> Now second Viscount Esher.

out I should support the Party as loyally as ever ; that when I first became a Catholic I fully thought that my conversion would be a bar to office ; but that various circumstances, and the way in which I was asked to take part in Liberal meetings and proceedings in Yorkshire and also in Lincolnshire, seemed to show that there was no prejudice of any importance against me. I said that I only said this that it might not be thought that I had given up all thought of official life, etc., etc. ; but that I did not wish for, or dream of, any sort of promise or communication of any kind being made to me now—I do not think he knew what were Hartington's views—the matter may now rest here—I have said enough to prevent misunderstandings, and I shall, I hope, be quite contented with the issue whatever it may be.

The message was duly conveyed to Hartington and Granville, and on April 19 Forster told Ripon that they had expressed themselves about his prospects "in a very friendly way." <sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, the General Election had been fought, and mainly owing to Gladstone's energy in his Midlothian campaign the Conservatives had been hopelessly defeated. There was much talk of Gladstone taking the Premiership, but Ripon still stuck to Hartington, and even expressed the opinion that in giving countenance to the prevalent rumours Gladstone was "behaving very ill." <sup>2</sup> The rest of the story is perhaps best told in Ripon's own words :

*Extracts from Diary*

*Wednesday, 21 April.* . . . Forster called. He has seen Gladstone to-day. He (G.) will take office, if

<sup>1</sup> Diary, April 19, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

asked to do so—spoke considerably of Granville ; less so of Hartington—Forster thinks the Irish Secretaryship will be his destination. G. spoke in a very friendly manner about me and F. thinks I am pretty sure to have office. . . . Wolverton called.<sup>1</sup> He says that Granville, Hartington, and Gladstone are all behaving very well ; but he admitted that if he were in Gladstone's place he would not do as he was doing. . . .

*Thursday, 22 April.* . . . Wolverton came again and saw Hat.<sup>2</sup> I joined them. She thinks that Gladstone would offer me the Duchy of Lancaster. . . . Went in evening to Lord Reay—all the Liberal world there. Mrs. Gladstone very cordial. . . . G. was, of course, surrounded and seized on by all the world, and I had no conversation of importance with him. . . .

*Saturday, 24 April.* . . . Wolverton came. Gladstone is Prime Minister and Chancellor of Exchequer ; Hartington India Secretary ; Granville Foreign Secretary ; Childers War. W. seems pretty sure that I shall have something, probably Privy Seal. He says it is contemplated to offer W. Harcourt the Home Office, which is just what he does *not* wish for. Halifax called. He has seen Gladstone to-day. My name was mentioned among others for India. I hope it will not be offered me, on Hat's account. I do not think that I could accept, though it would tempt me much. Benediction at Oratory. Dinner at home. Gladstones and Miss G. Halifax and Ly. A. Wood, Mary Hobart, Wolverton, Mr. M. McColl. Gladstone was looking very well and seemed in excellent spirits. He was very friendly, and intimated that he meant to offer me something. . . .

<sup>1</sup> The second Lord Wolverton was afterwards Paymaster-General and Postmaster-General. Advised Gladstone on party questions.

<sup>2</sup> Lady Ripon.

Wolverton told me that India would be offered me in all probability, and urged me to take it. I represented strongly the difficulties as regards Hat, and ascertained from him that he *thought* if I refused India something in the Cabinet would be offered me.

*Sunday, 25 April.* Talked to Hat about India. She is very good about it, but evidently dreads it so much that I shall get out of it if I possibly can. High Mass at the Oratory—went to A. K.<sup>1</sup> afterwards.

Here the diary ends. Neither in Ripon's other papers nor in Gladstone's muniments at St. Deiniol's are there any letters relating to the appointment. We know, however, from other sources what happened. On the following day the Viceroyalty of India was offered to Goschen and curtly refused by him, and as he was in disagreement with Gladstone on the County Franchise no place was found for him in the Cabinet.<sup>2</sup> From memoranda in Gladstone's diary it appears that he saw Ripon on the 25th, 26th, and 28th.<sup>3</sup> On the 29th, at a party at Lady Cork's, Hartington told Houghton that Ripon had accepted the Viceroyalty and that he (Hartington) "would like to change places with him."<sup>4</sup> It therefore seems probable that after three days' hesitation on his wife's account Ripon had accepted the office on the 28th.

The announcement of the appointment was received with a certain chilliness by the newspapers, but on the whole their attitude indicated a vast improvement in public opinion on the Roman Catholic question. *The Times*, uncomfortably reminiscent of all it had said five years before about the un-English character of

<sup>1</sup> Lady Amabel Kerr.

<sup>2</sup> Eliot: *Life of Goschen*, vol. i, p. 196.

<sup>3</sup> Kindly communicated by Lord Gladstone.

<sup>4</sup> Reid: *Lord Houghton*, vol. ii, p. 387. Holland: *Duke of Devonshire*, vol. i, p. 295.

converts to Rome, of their disqualification for public office, and of the irreparable weakness of their intellects, contented itself with the reflection that it was "the most remarkable of the appointments outside the Cabinet." It added, however, that Ripon's "previous experience qualifies him in some measure for this great post."<sup>1</sup> Most of the other newspapers took the same line, while the organs of the Church and Chapel remained grimly silent. Manifestations of Protestant disapproval were, however, not wanting. The agitators, finding the newspapers unresponsive, appealed to the platform. Public meetings of protest against the new Government's concessions to Romanists — besides Ripon's appointment, Kenmare, who was also a Roman Catholic, had been made Lord Chamberlain — were held at Glasgow, Dundee, Liverpool, Bristol, and other places, and some of them, especially those in Liverpool, were very crowded and excited.<sup>2</sup> The Free Church Presbytery of Dundee petitioned the Queen and Parliament against the appointments and urged the General Assembly to take vigorous action. The Scottish Reformation Society also memorialized the Queen, declared the British Constitution and the Protestant religion to be in danger, and appealed to Gladstone's opinion of 1874 in proof of their alarms.<sup>3</sup> The movement, however, did not spread, and within a couple of months it was forgotten.

By way of contrast two of the very few generous comments on Ripon's appointment should be quoted. The first came from the leading organ of native opinion in Calcutta, the *Hindoo Patriot*, edited by the Hon. Kristodas Pal:<sup>4</sup>

"Lord Ripon's varied experience and his training in a good school of Indian politics mark him out as a man

<sup>1</sup> *Times*, May 1, 1880.

<sup>2</sup> *Times*, May 13, 25, 26; June 8, 1880.

<sup>3</sup> *Times*, May 13, 1880.

<sup>4</sup> *Times*, May 27, 1880.

to be relied upon. That he is distinguished by high conscientiousness is evident from the fact of his change of faith. A nobleman and a public man in his position would not have changed his ancestral religion if he had not been moved by high conscientious scruples. And a conscientious man will not fail to do justice to the poor and dumb millions of India. He takes charge of the helm of Indian affairs at a critical time, and we earnestly hope he will prove equal to the occasion. India, happily, is not divided by political factions, and all parties will therefore give him a hearty welcome and fair play."

The other came in the shape of a farewell address from Ripon's tenants at Nocton, and was the more remarkable because these good people were very largely under the influence of the Low Chu, a tradition with which his mother, who lived all her life at Nocton, had been so prominently identified. In the course of this address appeared the following passage :

"We cannot but feel most thankful that, after the great event in your life which marked the Autumn of 1874, there is still sufficient appreciation of your character amongst those who direct the affairs of this nation to enable them, without hesitation, to avail themselves of your services. To us . . . each year has endeared you more and more." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by the *Guardian*, May 12, 1880.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER  
*LORD RIPON'S CONVERSION*

BY THE LATE FATHER SEBASTIAN BOWDEN, SUPERIOR OF THE  
LONDON ORATORY

1880 - 1892 AND 1903 - 1907

## LORD RIPON'S CONVERSION

(1874)

THE correspondence contained in this chapter begins with the eve of Lord Ripon's conversion, and we are indebted for the account of his earlier religious impressions to Father Donald Skrimshire, who lived in close intimacy with him during the last years of his life, and heard the following details from himself.

A delicate boy, brought up at home in strict Evangelical tenets, Lord Ripon was conscious of no definite religious convictions till at the age of 17 he found an 'old Breviary in a bookshop at Ripon, and with the daily recitation of the office felt his first attraction to the Catholic Church. His practice of saying office, however, meeting with objections, was discontinued, and he became again indifferent. From this negative state he was awakened by the assassination of his brother-in-law, Mr. Frederick Vyner, by brigands in Greece in April 1870. He came to London on the following Sunday, went to St. George's Catholic Cathedral, Southwark, heard Mass for the first time in England, and his desire returned of becoming a Catholic. During the next four years, however, he remained an Anglican, and commenced the building of a church in memory of his late brother-in-law. Meanwhile he studied Newman's writings, and learned more fully the ground of the Church's claims and the nature of her doctrines in detail, with the result that in April 1874 he felt he could no longer remain in the Anglican communion. Much had to be done, however, before his reception as a Catholic could be accomplished. Strong as the motives of credibility might appear at times, shortly they would lose their force and his convictions fade as fresh objections appeared. He still had many difficulties, and though his letters save two are wanting, their nature is shown by the answers of his correspondents which

follow. In this state of uncertainty he went to Brittany that in quiet communion with God he might obtain help in his difficulties. But the calm and peace which he sought were for a time withheld. His prayers seemed to him of no avail. He was in a state of dryness and desolation. Heaven was silent and his mind a blank. "Defecit in salutare tuum anima mea" was his condition, but prayer without any perceptible response is a great trial, if experimental feeling be taken as a sign of its efficiency. The letter in reply from Lady Amabel Kerr urges him not to depend on feelings or look for a miracle in the way of any sense manifestation, but to ask for light and guidance and be ready to receive it in the way God sees best.

Lady Amabel Kerr was Lord Ripon's relation, a lady of remarkable intellectual ability, as her biography shows, who had herself experienced similar trials in her own conversion and was also able to sympathize with him in his political difficulties, more especially as those difficulties arose from political principles which he held very dear, and which she herself shared. Lord Ripon had implicit confidence in her judgment and consulted her frequently during this crisis, as the subsequent letters show.

Again, the solemn and majestic ritual employed in the Church, with its music, vestments and incense, offer to many a powerful attraction as divining a supernatural worship. To Lord Ripon, however, with his early Evangelical training, Catholic ceremonial seemed new and strange. He did not feel at home in the Church. Lady Amabel tells him that he must not expect to see the full beauty of "the painted windows," the Church's worship, till he was really inside. He was now only looking through the keyhole.

Another deterrent was the fear of the world, the sacrifice that the step might involve, the possible exclusion from political life. His mistress tells him that we are all poor, cowardly wretches—God's grace can alone cure that—and that the consciousness of our weakness is the safest way out of it. The pronouncements of the Syllabus on certain political ecclesiastical questions raised further difficulties, and seemed to bring him to a dead stop, as they appeared directly counter to many of his first principles as an advanced Liberal.

In reply he was urged to remember the conviction he had formed that the Church as a supernatural body stood by herself, that she alone had valid Sacraments, that, having accepted so much, he should not be arrested by what was much less; that the Syllabus truly interpreted bore a different sense to that given to it by a hostile world, that men like Montalembert and Lacordaire, holding politically liberal views, were not condemned, and above all, that he must be very fearful of losing the grace received.

A fresh obstacle was raised by the *Dublin Review*. Dr. Ward, the editor, was held to have unduly extended the sphere of infallibility by claiming it for almost every ecclesiastical pronouncement, and in condemning those who disagreed with him as unorthodox. Lady Amabel upheld that the *Dublin* represented a party which owed its strength chiefly to the fact that Protestants openly avowed their sympathy with those of the less extreme school. There was no reason why he should regard the views of the *Dublin* as the thought of the Church on these matters. He might enter the Church and remain its loyal subject without abandoning any of his political principles. In the imaginary case of a conflict between the duty due to the Pope and that due to the State on a purely civil matter, e.g. the Armada, where the Pope was not infallible, she would pray for guidance to the Holy Ghost.

Lord Ripon was received on September 8, 1874, and on the question of re-entering public life Lady Amabel urges him to do so with the wish that every public word or action of his should be prompted by the desire to promote the interests of the Church, and not merely to maintain his old position in spite of being a Catholic.

*From Lady Amabel Kerr*

I. ON DRYNESS IN PRAYER

June 8 [1874].

I waited till to-day to write, hoping to hear from you this morning. I was so glad to get your letter. It has set me wondering about you. I wonder if you are happy. The whole tone of the letter has given me the impression that you are *disappointed* at not

feeling more sensible devotion and emotion in the Presence of our Lord. I wonder if I am right. How I wish I was near you to speak straight out and get your answer. I long to beg of you not to expect a miracle, and not to be disappointed if it is not granted to you just in the way you would expect it—like Naaman, who was put out of his reckoning because Elisha did not follow the programme he had made out for him.

It would be so easy to be converted by a miracle—and perhaps God chooses a drier path for you. One thing one certainly gathers from all stories about the B. Sacrament, and that is that our Lord only reveals Himself to people in that way, I mean sensibly and emotionally, as He will and when He will; and, as for conversion by means of His Presence *felt* in the B. Sacrament, it has always seemed to me that He only uses that means when it is the only way of reaching a soul. Perhaps He has already given you enough light by other ways to see His will, if you faithfully work out and follow up that light—and a miracle of grace like that which one could long for for you would only be a squandering of grace. Perhaps He is only seeking to make you “hungry.” Only one thing I will say, if I may, and I know you won't be angry—Please, don't *try* to feel, and to screw yourself up to the pitch of sensible devotion and faith, for if you succeed it will be yourself who has done it, and then beware of the “grappin”! Do give yourself over to God in His Presence, and *know* He is there whether you feel Him or not. Do pray for further light and guidance with the light of that Presence shining on you—but pray that the light and guidance may be given in God's way and not yours.

How awfully cool it is of me writing like this! but I know by experience how one searches into oneself and asks oneself, “Did I feel it? Yes, I'm sure I did just then,” etc., etc., etc. I suppose one cannot help it *then*, I mean before one is inside the Church—then, I mean after, certainly one can *believe* and *know* independent of one's own feelings on the subject. But when one is outside one must make one's own self the criterion of truth in a certain sense. How I long for you to be inside, and to taste and see how wonderful it all is!

I thought of you so much on Corpus Christi. I could not feel any fears about you. I felt as if you were going to be consigned to the care of the B. Sacrament, and that you could not fail to see and arrive at what is true.

Your account of the Church decorations disgusted me. I suppose it is Napoleonic—but all that, as you say, is very immaterial—so is the want of devotion in the people—*except for their own souls*. Oh, that “grappin,” that “grappin”! . . .

Do, please, forgive this letter—I have written straight on, baldly and scoldly as it came into my head, and I have qualms. I have been rude—or, anyhow, unceremonious. Do write again soon. I think we go to Dinan the end of next week. •

## 2. ON THE OUTSIDE VIEW OF THE CHURCH

June 13, 1874.

I cannot say how glad I was to get your second letter. It was much more cheery than your first—which first somehow depressed me—I suppose I get frightened about you and for you from the mere fact of your being still outside, and therefore conjure up and imagine all sorts of possibilities.

I am so glad you like Low Mass so much better than High. I think I should have felt really distressed—though it would have involved or meant nothing—had the contrary been the case. I can enter into your feelings of disappointment at not feeling at home when you expected to be. But I am jealous for the inside of the Church—and I will protest against any hopes you may have of expecting to see the full beauty of the “painted windows” till you are really inside. I will admit that you are not looking at them quite from the outside, but I will jealously refuse to do more than admit that you are looking through the keyhole! . . .

## 3. ON CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES ABOUT THE SYLLABUS

Aug. 3, 1874.

The letter I got from you the other day made me rather low in my mind—I mean what you say about your

two obstacles which must be removed before you can get further. At least I don't mind your second obstacle—we are all poor cowardly wretches. God's grace is the only thing that can get over that, and the consciousness that we are such is the best and surest way out of it.

It is all you say about the Syllabus that distressed me, and after all my bragging and saying I would speak my mind out, I find it very difficult to tell you exactly why it distressed me. Somehow, in what you say—or, rather, in its tone (for how can one help, how could one object, to your finding that or any other point a *difficulty*)—I smelt something like a resistance, a wasting of, a playing with grace. You must remember I *cannot* see two sides to this question of the Truth of the Church. Therefore, in every step that has led you towards her I distinctly see God's grace, and nothing but it. To me, therefore, it is *plain*, though very wonderful, that you should have been as clearly led thus far towards the Faith as you have been. You have been led so much more clearly than so many—God has given you a faith without difficulty in all the supernatural parts of the Church. Even where you are, outside, you look and see and feel that the Sacraments are there as they are nowhere else; and if that is the case you must be out in the cold anywhere else. And God has smoothed away so many other difficulties which are so hard to many to accept. He has done all this—so much more than He does for most—so can you wonder that (I believing as I do) my heart should sink when you draw out so clearly what more you must have before you give yourself up to God and say, "I am Thine." And what is it that is this stumbling-block? Is not it so much less than all you have accepted, than all that God has given you the grace to believe? If you believe the rest as you say you do, does not the greater contain the lesser? I would not speak so of your difficulties in that direction if they were now what they were before you spoke to F. Dalgairns about it; but they have diminished so much, so unexpectedly to yourself; everything you have heard about the Syllabus, and all the other parts of the question which can be classed with it, has tended to reassure you, and why?

Just because you have come across them interpreted by the mind of the Church—instead of by the mind of the hostile world outside. And yet you say, "This matter must be clearer to me before I proceed further."

Will you for this run even the risk of *outstaying grace* ?

If you can make head or tail of this letter you will be clever, for I have regularly rodomontaded, but I have said what I mean, though I have expressed it badly. By nothing I have said do I mean to quarrel with your old purpose of taking a month to think it over quietly after your archæological labours. All I mean is that grace is a precious thing—and that somehow God never gives a superfluous drop of it. He will not mind the delay, but I so dread grace being checked by conditions. And if this did happen, if, as I should express it, grace was removed because it was not sufficiently corresponded with, what would be the result? Why, that you would think that your month's reflection had brought superior light and wisdom. And after that—

I feel as if I had passed all bounds of the liberty of speech you allowed me, and yet I should not feel comfortable if I did not say all this, feeling it as I do. Write me a little line to say you forgive me.

#### 4. ON THE "DUBLIN REVIEW" AND DR. WARD

Aug. 6, '74.

I was deeply interested by your letter—I sympathize very deeply with all you say—and for some reason or other this last letter of yours gives me none of the *fear* that you first did. I dare say I was foolish—and I sincerely hope mistaken—but that letter put me into a *panic* for you. As I have said before, I think the entrance into the Church seems to be so narrow—from all accounts of those who have experience—and such a large percentage of people turn back when they are even nearer than you apparently are, that I feared when I saw you seemingly recurring, and with almost equal strength, to the first difficulty. As I told you I *can* not see two sides to this question, and the idea of your losing sight and light now made me very unhappy ;

it would have made me unhappy for any one—but, above all, for you—you deny it, but I cannot disconnect Christianity in *your* case with Catholicism.

I should like to poleaxe the *Dublin*—not for its effect on you, but for what, according to you, it has said. I still maintain that the *Dublin* is a party, but I own, and I regret to have to own it, it is a very large party. I believe it is the predominant party in the Church—though no doubt it is the extreme of the party, as much as the *Univers*. Dr. Ward (not D.D.), the editor, is a great oddity—quite fanatical for his own views; and I know as a fact that if he is talking to anyone whom he suspects of being a “liberal Catholic,” he does not hesitate to tell him that he must go to hell! But he and his followers do predominate in the Church. I wish they did not. And I suppose they are the *favourite* party of the Church, if I may accuse my Mother of favouritism. No doubt they find sanction and approval and encouragement easier than do men like Montalembert; but I point to men like him to prove that the other side is sanctioned, and that men can hold his views and yet be considered by the *Church* as loyal Catholics. Montalembert was never snubbed or looked coldly at by the Church, except when he was suspected of resistance in *spiritual* matters—that is quite another matter. There, indeed, we must be all of one mind.

As you say, I am not called on to have or anyhow to utter an opinion on these matters as a Catholic—but I have my opinions, and I do not fear to say to you that it is with your view I sympathize and not with the writer in the *Dublin*. My blood boils when I read the other—the nobler, the Montalembert, Lacordaire—view cried down as unorthodox; but I still always recur to the comforting thought that the Church never has snubbed men like them for their views. Now, in your case, what I should feel would be this. I should not seek for more than to ascertain that you may hold your present political views—and then don't mind any overwhelming party in the Church. Be yourself. You are what you are, and you cannot be anybody else. I do believe that Catholics of liberal opinions (I use the word entirely politically) have uphill work nowadays, and the great cause for the uphillness is the favour

they are looked on with by Protestants, who think (and there they agree with Dr. Ward and Co.) that they are not altogether loyal to the Church. But what does it matter what people think, provided your conscience is clear before God and His Church? I quite believe that many more Catholic arms would be open to you if you came into the Church "à la Veuillot," but it is not Catholic open arms you are seeking—it is Truth.

Now, if you find you *can* hold your views as a Catholic, you will want no more, will you? If you ask more, then I shall begin to tremble again. I believe if our eyes could be supernaturally opened, we should all be seized with regular trembling, shivering fits at the fineness of the pinnacle point on which you are standing. We must not forget that "grappin," whose whole heart is bent on upsetting you—and he will not lose his opportunity, we may be sure.

I do not want you to come till you are satisfied that you ought, but I have that confidence in the Church's Truth that I feel no doubt as to every honest difficulty being solved when you are inside. That is why I do so hope that you will not try to solve the Syllabus difficulty in *all* its ins and outs while you are still outside. If you come in as soon as your conscience and your truthfulness allow, I believe that every moment in the Church and practical experiences as to what you may or may not be will smooth the way more and more before you. Remember the Church is *living*. Now she is a sort of paper system to you. There is where you will feel the difference, and if I am not mistaken you will feel it more politically than any other way. If there is one thing that she is not it is *wooden*.

• There now, I have given you a dose of it! I have not said what I wanted to say a bit. This morning when I was half awake in bed I composed the most eloquent letter and exposition of my views, but it has vanished now!

##### 5. ON THE DECISION TO BE RECEIVED

- Aug., 19, 1874.

I could only say "Thank God" when I got your letter this morning, and I feel that so strongly still that I find it difficult to write anything else.

I feel so torn (in one part of my nature) between my great joy and my pain for what you are suffering. It is no use or comfort to say to you that once you are in the Church all will be less painful, for everyone who has crossed the gulf says that to those who are still on the other side, and yet are not believed. But it is true, for all that. I never believed in grace till I was a Catholic. It is a sort of balm which God deigns to apply to one's daily struggles and wrenches and isolations in a way which, did one not feel the effects to be so divine, one might be inclined to call too minute for God's Hand.

Another thing helps so much. Everything is so unlike what one has pictured beforehand that things one has most shrunk from disappear or change aspect, the things one liked best and was most attracted by lose their prominent position. Catholics one felt quite sure one would love and lean on look different. One loves them none the less, but one finds one needs them less; and Catholics whom one shrunk from, and felt determined to hold aloof from—why, one forgets their existence altogether.

All is new—a Kingdom of God and of grace, in which one may be, oh, so happy, if only one "becomes like a little child," the condition our Lord laid down for entering the Kingdom of Heaven. But still one must feel strange at first—at least that was what I suffered from.

I very much like the idea of your being received on the Nativity of Our Lady. Do not hurry your time in London then. You will be so much happier if you allow a margin of a few days round the actual day of your reception into the Church. I hope I shall be in London just about the time you come up. I do not think I ought to put off taking up my abode there later than then. Anyhow we *will* meet—by a little management on both our parts I am sure it can be managed. I *must* see you then, for if not I do not know when I may see you, so pray do not forget me in your plans.

I am glad that F. Dalgairns's letter was satisfactory on the whole. I knew he would not have *any* sympathy with the views evidently expressed in the *Dublin*, but still I knew he would not share your indignation; I do

not think one would find—nor would one wish it—any priest of his age, and as good as he, who could sympathize or the contrary with any party in the Church. As I say, at his age, and as a priest, he must look straight at the *soul* part of the question, and could not feel our indignation against a man who is a real and true Catholic.

I have just been examining the date of the postmark on your letter, and I think I ought to have got it yesterday. If so, you will wonder at my not writing at once.

Dear Goderich, I shall think and pray for you very much. You have had no lack of prayers. Besides every friend and friend's friend I have whom I have set to work, every penny of the £30 you consigned to me to be spent in Catholic charities was made to gain prayers for you as its condition.

Good-bye. May God bless you and help you. I do not tremble for you any more, but I know too well that the path is not smooth before you. Once you are in I do not fear. God may not grant you His grace so *comfortingly* as I hope, but you will have it substantially, and then all will be well.

## 6. ON OBEDIENCE TO THE HOLY SEE

Dec. 26, 1874.

How very much I wish we could have a good long talk—about everything, and about this nasty controversy<sup>1</sup> that has been going on! You ask me what particular points have pressed me most. All the attacks I have received have been directed on *one* point, and that, unluckily, the point where I have a least ready answer. So long as it is a question of Infallibility I have had no difficulty—I *believe* that the Pope is infallible, and I can say so without qualms and thus silence any questioning as to what dilemma may turn up, but once it comes to the obedience we Catholics owe to the Holy See I have been put to it for an answer. There we come to the *fallible* part of the Popes, and depend upon it (even were no instances brought forward)

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, pp. 296 et seq.

where they can err they have erred, for the devil is far too active a being to let opportunities slip. Still no Catholic doubts that obedience to the Holy See is an *essential* duty. So when people bring forward imaginary instances where the duty of obedience might clash with one's sense of what was right I own I have not an answer ready, nor can I in cold blood think of one which would do for an answer to anyone except myself—viz. that the guidance of the Holy Spirit would make it all clear once the case were real and not imaginary. A case that I have thought of before, and which has been brought forward lately, and with which I have been personally attacked, is that of the Spanish Armada, when Catholics considered it their duty to defend their country, but thereby anyhow indirectly acted in disobedience to the Pope. No Catholic now, whether priest or layman, but thinks they did right; but at the time it might have been a dilemma. I hope I am not wrong to say all this. It would be no difficulty to me were I not attacked on the point and challenged for an answer. As for Lord Acton's charges against individuals, even saints, I fully agree with what you say, i.e. that no man is perfect, and I simply *rejoiced* when I read the refutation of his accusation against Fénelon, because I was sorry that Fénelon could have done such a thing. You know, don't you, that Dr. Newman is writing an answer to Gladstone. He is begging everywhere for prayers for the guidance of the Holy Ghost. I thought you would like to know this.

I should *very much* like to have a talk with you about your political life, but writing *must* do, though it is a poor substitute. *I hope* you will not give up public life unless you ever see it clearly right to do so. Therefore *my* feeling is that when Parliament opens you should put in your claim to be heard, and *secure* your position. Beyond that I should say: Take your time. If you ask me for my reason for saying so, it is this. My love for the Church prompts me to wish that the *reason* of your public life should be that you are a Catholic—that every public word and action on never mind what subject should be prompted by the desire to forward the interests of the Church, and not, as might be the case with some men in your place, by the desire to

maintain as much as possible their old position in spite of being a Catholic. Therefore *I* say: Take your time. There will come the time, and probably every moment brings growing symptoms of it to you, when this love of the Church and of God's glory through His Church will become a sort of ruling passion to you. When one is first converted one is so stunned, and also so thankful, that the broad view of the Church's interests becomes hazy—curiously enough more hazy than when one looked at her from outside—and though this is less the case with some converts than with others, I don't believe anyone can quite take in their positions as Catholics and what it involves until they have recovered their breath, and in a certain sense have got over all the first *personal* burst of their thankfulness. Even in private life—and how much more in public life—*I* feel that converts ought to take no step until they feel their love of the Church (and of souls in the spirit of the Church) to be an imperative part of themselves.

I'm afraid you will think I have written nonsense—and if I have you must forgive me, and remember you drew it down on yourself by asking my opinion, which I would never have given had you not asked me.

• God bless you, dear Goderich, this Christmas time. I love Christmas and I'm sure it brings great blessing.

Yr. ever affect.

A. K.

Father Dalgairns, whose letters follow, was one of Cardinal Newman's first disciples and followers into the Church of Rome. His lives of St. Stephen Harding, St. Gilbert, etc., written for Newman's series of English Saints, displayed such a grasp of mediæval history and power of picturesque setting as to evoke the praise of such a staunch Protestant as Dean Milman. As a member of the Metaphysical Society he had to defend Catholicism against scientific and literary agnostics, Huxley and Tyndall, Morley and Leslie Stephen, Thomson, the Anglican Archbishop of York, the Unitarian James Martineau, and others of every or no creed. Speaking of these debates, Thomson says he was more struck by the metaphysical ability of Father Dalgairns and Mr. James Martineau than of any of

the other debaters (*The Catholic Encyclopædia*, art. "Dalgairns").

*From Father Dalgairns*

I. ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE SYLLABUS

[Undated.]

Ever since I last had the pleasure of seeing you, I have regretted letting pass an observation of yours which seemed to show that you took too strict a view of the Pope's pronouncement on the Syllabus. Till this moment I have not had time to write, and I now lose no time in putting my mistake right; it concerned your interpretation of the following propositions: "Optima est conditio societatis, in quo imperio, non agnoscitur officium coercendi sancitis poenis violatores catholicae religionis, non quatenus pax publica postulet."

Your Lordship was under the impression that the condemnation implied an affirmation that in the best state of general society some penalties should be applied to a violation of the Catholic religion. You seem to think that any one who believes the Syllabus would be bound to affirm that in the best state of society some penalties ought by law to be laid on the professors of false religions. I do not think so. The stress of the condemnation lies elsewhere. You must remember the drift of the whole document. The Pope is vehement throughout against what he calls indifferentism, that is, the notion that there is no one ascertainable true religion, and therefore that all religions have a right to be treated as equal before the law. The authors of the condemned propositions made one exception to this right: namely, they allowed the justice of punishing those who broke the public peace. In other words, they affirm that a religion which caused public troubles, tumults, and revolutions might be coerced by legal penalties. In other words, the condemned authors asserted that no account whatever was to be taken of the truth or falsehood of a religion, but simply of its tendencies to disturb the public peace. It is plain that if this were allowed to pass not only the Roman Emperors were right in persecuting Christianity, but

the Jews would have been justified in crucifying our Lord for "raising a tumult among the people."

What, therefore, the Pope intends to condemn is not the principle that no penalties are to be inflicted on false religions, but the principle that there is no reason for punishing them except on purely political reasons. The desirableness or wrongness of inflicting punishment is therefore not the point contemplated in the condemnation. The point is the reason alleged for the punishment. All that is affirmed is that the truth or falsity of an opinion is to be taken into account, not the perturbation of the public peace. It would still be perfectly competent to anyone to hold that it would be best to let opinions alone, and that more mischief than good would issue from their suppression. This I believe to be the key to the interpretation of the whole Syllabus; it is the broad, sweeping indifferentism of the opinions which is aimed at. Thus one opinion is condemned for affirming that we may have a good hope of the salvation of *all* persons, whatever religion they profess. What is aimed at here is the universality, or rather universalism, of the proposition. Again, it is forbidden to affirm that it is worthy of praise that any religion whatever should be permitted to immigrants into a Catholic state. There again the universality of the assertion is condemned; again, not the freedom of the Press, but the freedom of giving utterance to all thoughts and to all opinions whatever they may be is condemned.

In every case the condemnation falls on the assertion of universal abstract right. I cannot help thinking that all who believe in one definite ascertainable true revelation must heartily join with the Pope in this matter, nor do I think that the Syllabus proves that supposing Catholics got the upper hand they would impose penalties on other religions. Hereditary heretics are in a very different position from heresiarchs, and it would be manifestly unjust to treat them in the same way.

I must beg your Lordship's pardon for the length of this letter. I was anxious, however, to lose no time in giving you what I consider the key to the Syllabus. It is a protest in favour of truth against indifferentism;

it is a re-assertion of a principle which the Reformation and the French Revolution have well-nigh made to disappear from the earth. The real struggle which is now going on is in favour of the first principle of Christianity as a divine revelation. I am quite sure that you agree with us, and not with our opponents; you feel that there is but one revelation, and that its truth is ascertainable now.

I feel intensely for you in the pain that is involved in making up your mind, but I would not have that pain increased by the idea that you are giving up first principles which you have ever held dear. Your occupation will not be gone. You will be carrying on your struggle in favour of denominational education; only you will now have a definite religion to fight for. If I did not feel intensely and know by experience that you would be taking the side of Christ against irreligion, I would not call upon you as earnestly as I do to become a Catholic.

Your note has just arrived. I shall be glad to see you to-morrow evening. I take the liberty of sending you a paper which I am to read at the next Metaphysical debate.

*Lord Ripon to F. Dalgairns*

THE DECISION TO BE RECEIVED AND THE DISPOSITION  
REQUIRED

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 8th,<sup>1</sup> which did not reach me until the 12th. I was sorry to find from it that you did not approve of my last letter. I think that something might be said in my defence; but you will see as I go on that it is not necessary, and I will therefore only assure you now that I have been very far from expecting that all difficulties were to be removed from my path before I could submit myself to the Catholic Church, that there have been, and still are, many with which I have not thought it right to trouble you, and that they come upon me day by day and almost hour by hour with scarcely diminished force. Will you forgive me if I also say, though I fear that it will seem presumptuous, that I think that I could quote passages from Montalembert's writings

<sup>1</sup> Not preserved.

which shew that he did not believe in any absolute abstract right to "freedom of worship"?

It is, however, needless to pursue this subject any farther. Since your letter arrived I have prayed to God to guide me and have very earnestly considered my position, and I can come to no other conclusion than that the Catholic Church is the only true Church of Christ on earth, that it is to her that God has been leading me during these last four or five years, and that I have nothing now to do but humbly to ask to be received into her fold.

I beg you, therefore, to tell me whether you think that I am fit to be received now, and if not, to point out to me what further steps I should take to prepare myself.

In order that you may be better able to judge how far I am fit, I ought perhaps to tell you that though I think my intellectual conviction of the claims of the Catholic Church is complete, I feel as if my faith were very cold; though I have deliberately made up my mind to take a step fraught with serious worldly consequences to myself, I have not at this moment any feeling of enthusiasm, and the question often rises in my mind whether I really *believe* anything at all. My answer is that I cannot help believing that God has been leading me very wonderfully during the last few years, and that it is the same Hand which has been guiding me up to this time which is now beckoning me to enter the Catholic Church. The answer is to me sufficient and conclusive; but is this Faith? . . . In order that you may be under no mistake about me which I can avoid, I will say one sentence about a subject which was mentioned in our conversations in London. You will perhaps remember that I then told you that I felt no difficulty with respect to the Catholic doctrine about Our Lady. I said so in the belief that it was consistent with that doctrine to say that though she is the first of creatures she is only a creature still, and that however far she may be above all other creatures and however exalted may be her prerogatives, the distance between her and our Blessed Lord remains still simply infinite. I feel no doubt that you will not object to this statement, but, as above all things I desire to be perfectly honest,

I have thought it right to give this explanation of what I formerly said.

If you should think that I may be received into the Church without delay, I would venture to express a wish that it might be on the 8th of Sept., the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin; it would be a great pleasure to me to be able to connect the greatest event in my own life with one of her Feasts. You will, I suppose, be back in London by that time, and I should propose to go up to Town a day or two before, to have some final conversations with you. But of course I must leave all this to your better judgment.

I would still ask you, however, to keep the step which I am about to take secret a little longer, as I have a few relations and friends to whom I am most anxious to announce it myself, before it gets, as I suppose it will do, into the newspapers. It would be very painful to me that they should hear it first from that source. I am sure you will understand this. . . . I have now only to thank you for the patience with which you have borne with me, and for all your kindness, for which I shall ever be most grateful; and to beg you to pray for me that it may please God to support me in the trials that now lie before me, and from which I cannot deny that I greatly shrink.

*From Father Dalgairns*

## 2. ON THE MODE OF RECEPTION. THE VULGATE AND OTHER DOCTRINAL POINTS

*August 30 [1874].*

I arrived here on Friday evening and found your letter on my table the next morning. I need hardly say that the reason which you assign for putting off your reception till the 7th is quite sufficient. This is quite consistent with your making your first Communion on the 8th. Your Confession will not probably take more than a quarter of an hour, is commonly done by interrogations, and a Priest accustomed to the work will easily elicit it in that time. I should not consider a person's reception complete till he has received absolution and conditional baptism, so that you might make your confession previous to the 8th, and be absolved

and conditionally baptized on that day, so will be able to receive communion if you liked. I mention this to explain what is meant by reception; or, rather, what is the external process by which it is done. When we meet you will tell me just what you prefer. I shall expect your visit on Thursday or Friday, unless I hear anything to the contrary. I thank God for what you say about your state of mind; a calm and peaceful state of mind is the best preparation of our Lord in the Holy Communion. Intense peace is the mark of God's presence and His action on the soul rather than any tumultuous feeling.

I can now answer with greater security the questions contained in one of your late letters.

1. There is great difference of opinion as to the meaning of the Council's decree about the Vulgate, and consequently great theoretical liberty in interpreting it. Practically it was not meant in any way to prevent the use of the original. It is open to anyone to use, for instance, the Greek Testament. The laxer interpretation gives to the words of the Council the meaning that the Vulgate makes no mistake whatever in the translation of passages involving points of faith and morals. The stricter interpretation is that substantially and in all things of any moment the Vulgate does not depart in any essential thing from the true sense of the Scripture.

2. I do not know the precise origin of the division of the Ten Commandments, but it is certainly as old as Saint Augustine.

3. What Pope Zachary condemned was the view that there was another world and other men under the earth; in other words, men not descended from Adam, and not redeemed by Christ: in fact, he forbade the denial of the unity of the human race.

4. The Church has never pronounced about the purgatorial fire; indeed, I am not sure that the word "fire" has ever been used by her in connection with purgatory. At the same time there is a strong tradition among the faithful upon the subject. Again, so little is known about the connection between spirit and matter, that I feel no more difficulty about fire having an influence upon the disembodied spirit than about

the union of body and soul, or the mode in which pain is felt by the soul in any case.

I trust, my dear Lord, I have answered your questions satisfactorily. My head is still dizzy with the rapidity of the train from Holyhead.

*Lord Ripon to F. Dalgairns*

#### PREPARATION FOR RECEPTION AND FIRST COMMUNION

Your letter of the 20th has reached me this morning, and I hasten to thank you for it.

This has been rather a trying week to me, as I have had to write to my more intimate friends to announce to them the step which I am about to take. I can, of course, only expect to be blamed by most of them; but I have already received some very kind letters, which lead me to hope that at all events in many cases God will be pleased to spare me the pain of sudden separation from those to whom I am most attached.

As you approve so kindly and with such generous confidence of my early Reception, I would beg you to give me, if you think proper, some directions for my preparation in the meantime, and especially with reference to Confession. . . .

You will think I write coldly. I am very cold. You speak of my first Communion. I can hardly write of, scarcely even think of it, I feel so hard; so utterly unworthy of so awful a blessing. But I *know* that I am following God's guidance, and I leave all in His Hands.

You do not allude to what I said in my last letter about Our Blessed Lady's position. I hope you do not disapprove of it. Please let me know.

My address till the 31st will be here—on that day I propose to go to Nocton Hall, Lincoln, for a few days, and then to meet you in London towards the end of that week. If anything occurs to me in the meantime about which I wish to consult you, I shall not hesitate to write to you, and I know that I need not ask you for your prayers.

*From Father Dalgairns*

3. ON PRAYER AND DISTRACTIONS

[Undated.]

It was very kind of you to write news of your arrival at Ripon. I was relieved by your account of the state of feeling, for I should have grieved if your neighbours had behaved badly to you. I am pleased that Mr. Vavasour has had the sense to urge your going to Communion to-morrow. You must not distress yourself even should distractions arise; remember they do not offend God unless they are wantonly entertained, and as long as they are not sins they are only crosses. A habit of devotion is a thing to be learned and acquired like all other habits, and you will be acquiring the habit through distractions, for you can only learn true resistance through their recurrence; they are very humiliating, and if they contribute to humble you they will do you good. If they come, dismiss them at once and think no more of them; if you make too much of them you will only add a second distraction to the first. I am glad of your wish to spend an hour on spiritual things on Sunday; I enclose a paper which may be useful to you; I am ashamed of sending such a dirty bit of paper, but I have lent it so often that it has got soiled. I wrote it some years ago when I was Confessor to a Convent of Nuns, and it has been found useful to beginners in prayer. When you have quite done with it, please let me have it again; there is, however, no hurry about it. I have ordered my bookseller to send you a Book of mine on the devotion of the Heart of Jesus. I trust it may be useful to you in apprehending the Catholic view of devotions. I think you have De Ponte's meditations on the Passion, and I should advise you to use them. You will find them too long to use them entire, and you had better take only one point at a time.

I own I am anxious for you to have your daily Mass close at hand as soon as possible; please to pray for me, for I have much on my mind, and want many prayers.

## 4. ON FIRST COMMUNION

*Sept. 6 [1874].*

I am very anxious that you should make your first Communion as befits so great an action, but I feel intensely that no one can prescribe to another the mode of so doing. I can only advise you to pour out your heart spontaneously and lovingly to our Blessed Lord. Speak to Him quietly and tranquilly whatever comes into your soul, whether it be thanksgiving, adoration, or love. Do not be over-anxious; men often spoil their communion by undue activity of the soul and a certain tumultuous fear lest they should not receive it as well as possible. It is even recommended at the moment of reception to honour our Lord by an adoring silence, simply remembering that He is there and bidding Him work His own will in the soul, only afterwards have recourse to your book to help you to thank Him for His great love. The best preparation is a good confession, which will cleanse your soul and clothe it in a wedding garment to receive Him. Our Lord has a peculiar love for the soul which He has reconquered after it had wandered from Him, and which comes to Him with a strong desire to dedicate and sacrifice at its future to His service. In that great act, as in every other, it is God Himself who does the greatest part, and the soul has only to present itself to Him with an earnest desire of doing His Holy Will. I shall say Mass for you when you communicate, and I trust that our Lord will help you to receive Him as you should.

## 5. FREEMASONS' SCHOOLS. 6. MEMORIAL WINDOW

[Undated.]

1. I see no objection whatever to your exercising your vote in consequence of past subscription. You have so bravely and publicly disconnected yourself with freemasonry that no one will mistake your voting for adhesion to a forbidden society. My only difficulty is about the education given at these schools. The use of an Almshouse or Home presents no difficulty. You must yourself judge whether there be anything objectionable in the kind of education given at these schools.

2. I do not see any reason against your putting up the memorial window which you mention. . . .

I can quite understand your feeling of loneliness in your first Sunday's separation from your family. I trust that God's grace will touch their hearts and that one day you will be reunited. . . .

Much moral courage was needed by Lord Ripon to face the hostile comments, private and public, probably to be made on his conversion. After it was announced, *The Times* said, "His conversion by itself was a proof of his having renounced his mental and moral freedom," "that his mind must have necessarily undergone a fatal demoralisation," that by his conversion "he forfeits at once the confidence of the English people," "and abandons every claim to political and even social influence."

Such censures in the public press Lord Ripon would have passed over unnoticed, but they were brought home to him personally by a public speech<sup>1</sup> of Mr. Gladstone's on Ritualism, repeating *ipsissima verba* the first comment of *The Times*. Having made the Syllabus and the Vatican Decree a matter of close investigation before his reception, as will be seen from the preceding letters of Lady Amabel Kerr and Father Dalgairns, and being convinced that, truly interpreted, they in no way clashed with his duties as a loyal subject, he was naturally much hurt at the charge of disloyalty from the lips of Mr. Gladstone, and by being supposed to have acted in ignorance of the consequences of the step he was taking.

After some correspondence, in which Mr. Gladstone admitted Lord Ripon's personal civil loyalty, though it might be inconsistent with the religious principles he professed, both writers concluded on their former friendly terms, and Lord Ripon's subsequent employment in high offices of the State under Mr. Gladstone, in India and the Cabinet, was a proof that his confidence

<sup>1</sup> It was not a speech, but an article in the *Contemporary Review*. *Supra*, p. 297.

in Lord Ripon's loyalty was still unimpaired amid the storm of public criticism to which he was exposed.

It must have been no small consolation to find the still undiminished affection of those dearest to him in his family circle, and to receive the letters which follow from his colleagues and friends. Not only do they give him full credit for sincerity of purpose, and assure him of their continued friendship, but so far from censuring his act, however much opposed to their own belief, they would consider him to blame were he not to act on a conviction once conscientiously formed.

Besides the letters selected others in the same strain were written by Lords Aberdare, Halifax, and Wolverton.

*From Sir A. Helps*

August 21, 1874.

I am very much touched by your true friendliness in confiding this to me. I take a very strong view (some people would say an extravagant view) of the claims of friendship.

When I have once made up my mind to consider a man as a friend, hardly anything he could do would suffice to break up that friendship for me. And, therefore, it would appear almost ludicrous to me that my friendship for him could in the least degree be dwarfed, or diminished, by his taking a different view from mine of a question beset with the greatest difficulty, and upon which the greatest minds have come to different conclusions.

My inclination is rather to have increased respect for one who, at much self-sacrifice (and it always is self-sacrifice in some way or other), adopts and avows a change of opinion in these all-important matters. If he is a man of any force of mind, I know how much thought, and, indeed, how much mental suffering, he must have gone through.

As for yourself, I feel certain that you have thought very deeply upon the matter; and that your conclusions are the sincere outcome of your thought. Some day I hope to have some earnest talk with you—not of an irritating or controversial kind—but it would be exceedingly interesting to me to hear from one, of

whose sincerity and earnestness I am so thoroughly convinced, any account of the course of thought which has influenced and directed him.

*From Mr. Thomas Hughes*

*August 22, 1874.*

Many thanks for your letter, which has reached me here this afternoon. It would indeed have been a most painful shock to me to have learnt the news it contained from the newspapers, and I thank you very much for sparing me that by making what must have been a painful effort in any case. I don't pretend for a moment to say that I am not terribly grieved. I have never yet had an intimate friend who has gone over (though many acquaintance), and it has always seemed to me that in such cases a great gulf must open between friends, however near they may have been to each other before. The one fact that you and I can never receive the Communion of our Lord's body and blood together in this world is a very sad confirmation to me of this belief. However, thank God there will be room for us all one day side by side at the Lord's table when we have done what poor little spell of work for Him is in us, and got home. Since reading yours, and sitting looking at the sea with the harvest moon shining on it, those splendid lines of Clough's on the ships parting in the night have been singing through my head. Do you know them? They end,

"To veer, how vain! on, onward strain,  
 Brave barks—through light—thro' darkness too—  
 One purpose guides whate'er betides,  
 To that and your own selves be true.  
 But oh, blithe breeze! and oh, great seas!  
 Though, once their earthly parting past,  
 On your great plane they meet again  
 No more, yet *lead* them home at last;  
 One port, methought, alike they sought—  
 One purpose hold where'er they fare."

I honour the courage which has carried you past the poor halting places of our Ritualists, and feel for you in the struggle you must have had. You are quite right in thinking that my love for you is not likely to

be shaken, though, as I have said already, I can scarcely yet realize how far apart your step may have carried us. My wife sends her best love. All well here.

*From Dean Liddon*

August 20, 1874.

Before opening your letter, I had a sad foreboding as to the probable character of its contents.

Of course, I cannot but think you wrong, and in a matter which we both believe to be of the first importance. But I deplore my own unskilfulness, or other and graver shortcomings, which have prevented my helping you through your difficulties as, God knows, I could have wished. I have no doubt whatever of your Lordship's honesty of purpose; and you will, I trust, forgive me for entertaining and expressing the hope that it may some day lead you to reconsider your present resolution.

Thanking you from my heart for all the kindness and patience on your part which has marked our intercourse.

*From the Earl of Kimberley*

August 22, 1874.

I naturally feel pain at finding myself so widely separated from an old friend in views as to religion; but disapproval or blame does not enter into my feelings. I differ, as you know, entirely from those who hold Roman Catholic tenets, and it would not be too much to say that on this subject our opinions are further than the poles asunder; but blame implies an act morally wrong in the person blamed, and far from disapproving the conduct of a man who embraces on conviction any particular religious opinions, I disapprove the man who, being convinced, has the intellectual and moral cowardice not to act on his opinions: and rest assured that however inharmonious our opinions must, I fear, be in future on many subjects, I shall remain none the less

Most sincerely yours.

*From Earl Granville*

August 27, 1874.

I am much touched by the confidence you place in me, and by your appreciation of the interest I feel in anything that affects your welfare.

I have received the news with some surprise, as I did not know you were inclined towards Roman Catholicism, and because I have never for a moment felt able to believe in its doctrines, although I have had great inducement to consider the question, and great opportunities of viewing the virtues and happiness encouraged by its influence.

But as to blame, it appears to me impossible that any should be due if, as I suppose, you have given not only reflection but also time to the decision. In many ways it must be a wrench to you, and you make some personal, social, and political sacrifices. If on account of these you had refused to embrace a religion which on complete consideration you believed to be true, there truly would have been the occasion for blame.

*From the Earl of Carnarvon*

August 31, 1874.

I am grieved at your letter received this morning, and though I feel all your personal kindness in it, and also hope and believe that the change which you announce will make no difference to us in the regard and friendship which we have for each other, still I cannot but deeply lament the conclusion at which you have arrived. I cannot, of course, tell the reasons which have influenced you—for amongst those whom I have known in similar circumstances the reasons have often been widely different—and I cannot but suppose that you have laid your doubts before the ablest amongst our own Communion, to be satisfied that there is no answer which as a closely interested party you may have overlooked. Assuming all this, and trusting to your kindness to forgive me for seeming to urge that which I doubt not you have done, I can only, with many others to whom this change of views will be very painful, acquiesce and accept your decision.

As regards Free Masonry, the loss occasioned by your retirement will be very serious, and the inconvenience—it is needless to disguise—great. This is, of course, inevitable; but there is no help for it, and we must, whatever is finally settled, make the best of the matter.

But you may rest assured that you will not be blamed for being further responsible for the difficulties which may arise than is necessary under the circumstances of such a change; and so far as I can make it clear that no inconvenience has been inflicted on any one beyond what was absolutely necessary, you may count upon me. Our relations here as in every thing else have been so steady and agreeable that you might, independently of all other reasons, depend on me. You need not, I feel sure, give yourself any anxiety on this head.

Whatever else I can do, let me know, and I will gladly use my best endeavour. Believe me with very great and sincere regret.

*From Mr. Cowper's Temple*

*Sept. 14, '74.*

May I take the liberty of telling you how much I admire and respect you for the self-sacrificing spirit in which you are striving to follow the call of the Master and to do what appears to you to be His Will. Although I cannot sympathize with the particular way in which you are trying to serve Him, I heartily sympathize with your purpose and determination. But I have recently seen unmistakable evidence that at the present moment the gracious Lord is coming closer, and closer to the hearts and souls of those who surrender themselves to Him in entire consecration, without the intermediary agency of any Church or Priests; and I am sure that Priests are intended to be witnesses to lead us to Christ, and not exclusive channels through whom we are to receive grace indirectly. The Lord will Himself be to those who have boldness to go directly to Him all and far more than all that Priests can be to those who have not been taught that they have a High Priest to whom they are bound to go boldly (Hebrews iv. 15).

I pray that you may be led to Him by whatever way you may find open to you.

Amongst the numerous letters of congratulations which he received from his now fellow-Catholics we select the following. The first is that with which he was honoured from Pius IX, the then reigning Pontiff.

*Pius P.P. IX*

Dilecte Fili, salutem et Apostoliam Benedictionem. Come il cercare il vero e l'abbracciarlo prontamente, ponendo ogni altro riguardo, cifu prova della rettitudine dell'animo vostro, Diletto Figlio, cosi, il sentir voi vivamente l'affetto che vi portiamo ci attesta ora la bonta del vostro cuore. Del resto cesserete dal maravigliarvi del gaudio Nostro allo scorgervi entrato nell'ovile di Gesù Cristo, se tornerete colla mente alle parabole da lui proposte, ed in particolare a quelle della pecorella smarrita e del ritorno del figliuolo prodigo. Egli ci ha consegnato tutto il suo gregge; quindi per Noi il mirare una pecorella, che correva pericolo di perdersi, prendere la via della salute, ed il veder venire a Noi un figlio, che sembrava perito, è una delle piu care consolazioni che fra le Nostre angosce possiamo desiderare dalla divina bonta. Voi poi rendete coi vostri propositi anche piu lieta questa consolazione: poiche memore dell'avvertimento dell'Ecclesiastico, " Figliuolo, in entrando al servizio di Dio sta costante nella giustizia e nel timore, e prepara l'anima tua alla tentazione," generosamente vi esibite a sostenere le difficile prove che vi attendono. Non vi sgomentate, Diletto Figlio, giacche " come nella fornace si provano i vasi di terra, cosi si sperimentano nella tentazione della tribolazione gli uomini giusti," onde e che l'Apostolo S. Giacomo scriveva, " Abbiate, fratelli miei, come argomento di vero gaudio le varie tentazione nelle quali urterete, sapendo come lo sperimento della vostra fede produce la pazienza, e la pazienza poi fa opera perfetta." Oltre di che poi, il Signore potra ben liberarvi dal travagli, e se per vostro bene non vorra farlo, non permettera certo che siate tentato al di la del poter vostro, anzi liberamente vi accrescera la grazia per sostenere la prova, e convertire le sofferenze vostre in merito degno di piu nobile corona. Noi vi auguriamo dall'alto non solo tutti gli aiuti e

grazie necessarie ed opportune, ma altresì ogni bene non meno nell' ordine spirituale che nel temporale. Ed intanto ad arra del divino favore e apegno della paterna Nostra benevolenza compartiamo a voi, Diletto Figlio, alla consorte vostra ed ai vostri figliuoli l'Apostolica Benedizione.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die 12. Novembris Anno 1874.

Pontificatus Nostri Anno Vicesimonono.

PIUS P.P. IX.

*Translation*

BELOVED SON,—Health and Benediction in the Lord. As the search for the truth and its prompt embrace in preference to every other consideration is a proof to us of the rectitude of your soul, so your keen appreciation of the affection we bear you assures us of the goodness of your heart. For the rest, our joy at seeing you enter into the fold of Jesus will not surprise you if you recall the parables He spoke, especially those of the "lost sheep" and the return of the "Prodigal Son." He has confided to us His flock. For us, therefore, the sight of a sheep, in danger of losing itself, taking the way of salvation, and coming to us as a son who seemed lost, is one of the dearest consolations that amongst our trials we could desire from the Divine Goodness. Amongst the thoughts which you keep before you, hold in remembrance as a matter of consolation the warning of Ecclesiasticus: "My son, when thou comest to the service of God stand in justice and fear, and prepare thy soul for temptation." Show thyself generous to sustain the difficult trials that await you. Be not dismayed, beloved son: "as the furnace trieth the potter's vessels, so the trial of afflictions just men." Whence the Apostle St. James wrote: "My brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations, knowing that the trial of your faith worketh patience, and that patience hath a perfect work." Although our Lord can indeed well free you from trials, if for your good He does not care to do so, He will never permit you certainly to be tried above your strength; nay, He will freely give you grace to bear the test, and change your sufferings to merit, to make you

worthy of a more noble crown. We sincerely wish that God may grant you not only all the aids and graces necessary and opportune, but also every good, spiritual and temporal alike. And meanwhile, as an earnest of God's favour and a proof of our Fatherly Goodwill, we bestow on you, Beloved Son, on your wife and children, the Apostolic Benediction.

PIUS IX, POPE.

ROME, ST. PETER'S, 12 November 1874.

*From Cardinal Manning*

Sept. 10, 1874.

I cannot say with what thankfulness I have read your letter. God has shewn to you a great sign of His grace, for nothing else could have lifted you out of the close circle of opposing forces which surrounded you. And I must say that you have been very faithful to His grace, for without the free obedience of your own will His grace would have been in vain.

I can well understand how all alone you feel. But this will not be for long. A little while of silence and patience and you will not be alone. Moreover, you have the happiness of standing against the storm of public opinion; and, what is more painful, of bearing the upbraiding of old friends equal in age and public life. I feel sure that you know how to thank God for all this. It is a small thing to bear a little of the shame which our Lord bore so abundantly for us. We can do little for Him: and it is well if we may suffer some little for Him.

It is not likely that you can see how your act will bear witness for the only Truth among men. It will remind Englishmen that they have a conscience, and that they must render an account to a higher tribunal than public opinion or the English Monarchy.

I well remember my last conversations and letters with Mr. Gladstone five and twenty years ago, and when I felt a pain which no words can say I remember wishing that it were double that I might have more to lay down at the foot of the Cross.

Allow me to say one thing. Do not think that your public life is over. You have still much to do, and

Englishmen are learning that Catholics can serve the English people.

I could not help writing all this. Let me ask you to offer my kind remembrances to Lady Ripon. Be sure that I shall not fail to pray for every blessing on you both.

In his public life as a Catholic he was foremost in promoting every interest of the Church within his power. First as member, then in 1890 as President, of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, a position he held to the end of his life, he was present as far as possible at every general meeting, and personally assisted special cases of distress for ten to twenty years. His zeal for the conversion of the heathen was seen in his prominent support of St. Joseph's Missionary College, and his care for Catholic interests at home was evinced in his watch over them as Vice-President of the Catholic Union. Abroad, his sympathy for the expelled religious was seen in his purchase of the Convent of San Damian, where he re-established the Franciscan Friars. Education had always been a foremost subject with him, and in the Cabinet he strove to obtain fair treatment for the Catholic schools, and was himself Chairman of the Leeds and Middlesbrough Diocese School Association. His inner Catholic life was faithfully regulated and observed. An alarm clock woke him at 6 a.m. and gave him an hour's prayer, the New Testament, *Imitation of Christ*, and the Beads, before his valet appeared at 7 a.m. He heard Mass daily, though in London he was fifteen minutes distant from the church. He confessed every Saturday and frequently communicated. His special devotion was the Blessed Sacrament. He loved to carry the canopy in the Eucharistic procession, and when, owing to his failing health, leave was given for him to have a private chapel, he took all pains to have it handsomely furnished. He always attended High Mass, though owing to his deafness he could hear little of either music or sermon. He resigned his seat in the Cabinet owing to the opposition offered to the Eucharistic Procession, and of his enforced absence from that Procession at the Eucharistic Congress he said that he had missed one of the opportunities of his life.

At Studley, Father Levick, St. Wilfrid's, Ripon, informs us his daily religious life was equally observant. Mass, daily Communion, visits to the Blessed Sacrament, and on Friday the Stations of the Cross. He dedicated his beautiful chapel there to Our Lady of Fountains, desirous as he said "that Our Lady of Fountains should have something of her own again." St. Bernard, patron of the Cistercians and of Fountains, St. Philip Neri, by whose son, Father Dalgairns, he had been received, St. George, his patron, St. Raphael, on whose day he was born, St. Francis Assisi, St. Vincent de Paul, St. Clare were seen in the windows of his chapel as his favourite saints. At the evening service at St. Wilfrid's, Ripon, he would light a candle and kneel for ten minutes before the altar to Our Lady which he had erected after his conversion.

During the last few weeks of his life, when confined to bed, he continued his prayers and devotions as far as he was able, and after the last seizure made the confession of his life to Father Levick and received the last sacraments. He repeated during the anointing, "Jesus, have mercy on me; Mary, my protector, pray for me," and with the silver crucifix in his hand given him by Pius IX surrendered his soul to God. So closed the simple, loyal, Catholic life of George, Marquess of Ripon.



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