REALISM-PHENOMENALISM CONTROVERSY IN INDIAN THOUGHT

(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA AND BUDDHIST SCHOOL)

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C O N T E N T S

PREFACE : INTRODUCING THE SUBJECT

The present work is an attempt to delineate critically the realism-phenomenalism controversy in Indian philosophical literature. Phenomenalism is a theory which tries to explain both the external world and the internal mind in terms of experienced qualities or given sense-data without postulating any underlying substance which lies beyond the scope of sense-experience. Realism, on the other hand, upholds the view that not only the external objects or given sense-data are real, but also the substance and universals are equally real in the sense of existing independently of the human mind. In India the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers are largely representative of realism and the Buddhists are mainly the proponent of phenomenalism. Consequently the scope of our discussion is mainly limited to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Buddhism.

In Indian philosophy, the controversy between the realism and the phenomenalism is centered round the following main issues :-

i) The reality of substance(dravya) as a separate category.

ii) The existence of whole (avayavin) apart from the parts (avayavas).

iii) The reality of universal (sāmānya) apart from the individuals or particulars (vyakti).

The Buddhists split the reality into discrete, disconnected bits called moments or point-instants(kṣaṇas or svalakṣaṇas) comming in continuous succession of one another. According to them the so-called unifying principles like dravya(substance), avayavi (whole) and sāmānya (universal) are not any reality at all. These are our mental concepts (kalpanās) which synthesise the given manifold of sense-data (svalakṣaṇas) into a unity and cause the appearances of unified empirical objects.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have also stated that the world of external objects is made up of the

smallest bits called atoms (paramānus), the ultimate reals. But the fundamental difference between these two schools - the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism - is that while the Buddhists discard any real principle of synthesis in the external world, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that there are two main systhetic principles which are objectively real, namely, substance (dravya) and universal (sāmānya). They assert that beside the smallest bits of ultimate material reals called atoms(paramānus) there is also some thing in the form of unifying whole (avayavin) and this unifying whole (avayavin) is an existent entity which is also a substance (dravya). The avayavin dravya (substance in the form of 'whole') is distinct and different in essence from the parts which it unifies or holds together. It is also a basic doctorine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers that the 'whole' (avayavin) and the parts (avayavas) are two different substances. The parts, in their turn are also wholes (avayavins) in respect of their own parts, and so on, till we reach the atoms which are only parts, and themselves have no parts. It may however be noted that although a substance in the form of avayavin (whole) is

the unifying principle of its avayavas (parts), the concept of whole (avayavin) and that of substance (dravya) are not identical. Substance has wider scope and includes atoms and eternal entities like space (dik), time (kāla), soul (ātman) etc., which are not avayavin (whole), since they have no parts. For this reason we have discussed the problem of substance (dravya) and the problem of whole and parts (avayavin and avayavas) in two separate chapters.

Apart from the concept of substance (dravya) and 'whole' substance (avayavi dravya), another synthetic principle admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists is universal (sāmānya). Gautam, the author of Nyāya-Sūtra defines universal in the following way: "The universal (sāmānya or jāti) is that entity which produces the notion of identity" in our mind (samāna prasavātmika jāti. Nyāya-Sūtra, 2.2.69). When a particular animal is present before me, I immediately recognise it as cow, i.e., I immediately classify it as belonging to a class named as cow. Now, this immediate classification is impossible unless I have

experienced a common character (gotva) in the cow in question, a common character which is shared by other cows of the world as well. If it were not the case, I could not have classified it with other cows. This experience of an identical common character (gotva) present in all cows does not come to be contradicted, and, since according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, uncontradicted experience is the only criterian of reality, there must be some objective correlative corresponding to my experience of identity and this is what is known as universal (sāmānya). This universal belongs to each and every individuals (vyakti), but at the same time it (sāmānya) is ontologically different from its corresponding individuals.

This concept of universal is, however, vehemently opposed by the Buddhist phenomenalists. They (Buddhists) are of opinion that the everchanging unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas) are the only realities. Every vestige of generality is absent in them. Generality, similarity, relation or universal is always something imagined or

constructed by the spontenous creativity of our understanding which in the Buddhist terminology is known as Productive Imagination (kalpanā). In this way the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists Join issue with one another on the problems of ontological status of substance (dravya), whole and parts(avayavin and avayavas) and the concept of universal (sāmānya).

But all the above problems have a well-marked epistemological hinterland which shapes and determines the nature of the problems and solutions thereto. This epistemological controversy between realism and phenomenalism is vivid on the problem of perception.

We have already mentioned that the Buddhist phenomenalists have analysed the external reality into discrete and detached bits of ultimate realities called svalakṣaṇas or unique particulars. These svalakṣaṇas, according to them, can be apprehended by a kind of indeterminate non-erroneous perception which is absolutely free from the concepts of understanding(kalpanāpoḍam abhrāntam jñānam pratyakṣam). This inderterminate

perception, according to the Buddhists, is the only valid perception. In this indeterminate stage of perception, the svalakṣaṇas remain free from all qualifications - name (nāma), class (jāti), substance (dravya) etc. But on the back of this indeterminate perception our understanding, which is otherwise known as Imagination (kalpanā) in Buddhism, becomes operative (pratyakṣa pṛṣta bhāvi kalpanā) and all its concepts - dravya, guna, karma, jāti and nāma - are aroused and become identified with svalakṣaṇas as their qualifications. The result is the construction of empirical objects which are known by us in the so-called determinate perception. This prompts the Buddhists to say that the determinate or judgemental perception is not perception at all. It is the constructions of the understanding and is inference in the broad sense of term. Since the objects of judgemental determinate perception (qualified svalakṣaṇas) are constructed by understanding, the knowledge of them is not termed as perception (pratyakṣa), but intellection or inference by the Buddhists. So, the judgemental perception of determinate objects is mere inference. Hence, as the idea of substance(dravya) and the concept of

universal (sāmānya) are conceived or constructed by understanding, they can not be, the Buddhists opine, the object of genuine indeterminate perception at all. Thus, on the ground of the non-perceptibility, the Buddhists deny the objective existence of substance and the reality of universal as separate categories.

In reply to the above charge of the Buddhists that substance and universal are unreal because they can not be perceived, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists argue that the determinate perception is as real as the indeterminate perception, because the sense function, i.e., sense-object contact (indriyārtha sannikarṣa), is equally present in the determinate perception as well. The difference between these two kinds of perception is, according to them, one of quantity. In indeterminate stage we get non-qualified cognition of the perceived objects. In the latter stage the perceived objects are cognised being associated with substance(dravya), universals (jāti) etc. So the determinate perception,accordnig to the Naiyāyikas,is also valid perception, and

hence the object of determinate perception. Moreover, in support of the Nyāya position we may cite the definition of perception, as uphold by Vācaspatimiśra, which asserts both the determinate and indeterminate perception as vaild. To define perception Vācaspatimiśra asserts that "whatever comes within the range of the knowledge produced by the sense is the object of perception, and not merely that which comes incontact with the sense(Yad eva indriya Jasya gocaras tat pratyakṣam, na tv indriya-sambaddham. Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, p-118, line-17). It means that there may be an object of perception which is not in contact with the sense, and yet it may have been comprehended by a perception produced by the sense. So, it may be said from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point of view that the substance (dravya) and the universal (sāmānya) are realities inspite of the fact that they are objects of determinate knowledge. Consequently, the objection of the Buddhists, according to the Naiyāyikas, does not stand to reason.

Again, the realism - phenomenalism controversy may be viewed from the point of view of the problem of

whole and part (avayavin and avayavas). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists the whole(avayavin) is something over and above its parts and this 'whole' can be perceived by our senses. For example a tree is a whole apart from its branches, leaves etc. and in perceiveing any one of its parts, we perceive the 'whole' tree. But here the Buddhists join issue with the Naiyāyaikas. They (Buddhists) deny the reality of the 'whole' and raise the following problem in the case of the perception of a so-called whole tree. When we say we perceive a whole tree what do we actually perceive ? As a matter of fact we perceive only the front part of the tree with which our visual senses are in contact. But what about the back part of the tree, which we can not see directly ? Since our eyes do not have direct contact with it, we can not say that the knowledge of the back part of the tree is perceptual also. In this case what happens is this: On perceiving directly the front part, our intellect indirectly interprets or imagines that there exists a back part of the tree with which our visual senses are not in direct contact. But this intellectual

interpretation follows the direct perception of the front part of the tree with such inconceivable rapidity and instinctive spontanaety that uncritical common sense fails to take any notice of it and believes the knowledge of the whole tree to be perceptual. The Buddhists thus conclude that the perception of the 'whole' is not possible over and above the perception of its parts.

But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists do not agree with the above contention of the Buddhists. They hold that in perceiving a part (avayava) of an object we perceive the whole (avayavi) of it, since the whole(avayavi) inheres in each of its parts (avayavas). So we can directly perceive the whole object. Moreover, they argue that even if the inference of the unperceived parts were possible, that would at best provide us with the knowledge of another part side by side with the perceived one, and not with the knowledge of anything 'whole' to which these parts might be refered and in respect of which the notion of 'whole' tree might arise. Again, the Naiyāyikas argue that if it be said that the knowledge of a whole tree is obtained by effecting a synthesis of the

the two parts - its perceived front part and the inferred back part - the question would at once crop up : how could such a synthesis be possible where there is no common ground and point of reference ? Synthesis implies the connecting of several experiences by reference to one unitive principle. But no such unitive principle is admitted by the Buddhists. So the two parts of a tree, hold the Buddhists, are not really the parts of a unitive whole, but only discrete units constit ing no more than an aggregate. It is natural therefore, that when two parts come to be cognized, they can not be felt as complementary to each other. They appear simply as unrelated items, indifferent slices of matter which are incapable of being synthesised or integrated in such a manner as to give rise to the idea of a tree as a single composite entity.

The Naiyāyikas further argue that even if we admit that the idea of the tree arises when two parts (the perceived front and infered back part) are cognised together, there is nothing to indicate that the tree is cognised inferentially. We may reconstruct or imagine

a thing by ideally joining its parts. But the knowledge of the thing which has been achived thus is by no means inferential in character. For, by any act of inference we neither relate the facts of experience nor experience facts as related, but know one thing through the medium of another because of an invariable relation (vyāpti) between the two. Moreover, the tree can not be an object of inference because the psychological condition which is necessary for such inference are found to be absent. If the tree as an aggregate of it parts is to be validly inferred from the perception of one of these parts, it is necessary that the aggregate should be known to have an invariable relation with the parts in question, which it does not have so the Buddhists claim that the 'whole' can not be cognised through perception, rather it is an object of inference, does not hold water.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter entitled 'In Defence of Substance' has four sections. In the first section I have tried to argue why the Buddhists position that the substance has no separate existence apart from its qualities does not hold

water and the Nyāya position - the substance is a separate real entity over and above its qualities - seems to be more convincing than that of the Buddhists. The second section of this chapter deals with the logical necessity of postulating substance (dravya) as a distinct category apart from the qualities (gunas), and the whole (avayavin) apart from its parts(avayavas) along with the objection of the Buddhists. The third section is an attempt to formulate a definition of substance. In the last section I have discussed the atomic theory (paramānuvāda) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers and the objections raised by the Buddhists against this theory.

The second chapter of the thesis deals with the problem of whole and parts (avayavin and avayavas). It contains three main sections. The first section is devoted to the study of the epistemological problem arising out of the problem of perception of the 'whole' (avayavin). The second section deals with the metaphysical problem of whole and parts. This problem starts with the question: Is an object merely aggregate of its parts or something over and above them ? And how is the whole

constituted and how is it related to its different parts ? The Buddhist phenomenalists hold that the 'whole' is nothing but the aggregate or assemblage of the parts. And the parts are the only existent realities, the so-called 'whole' is nothing but our mental construction(kalpanā). The Nyāya realists, on the other hand, are of opinion that the 'whole' is ontologically different from its parts and is something over and above its parts. The production of sensible material objects from infrasensible atoms, according to them, is explainable only on the basis of the assumption that the whole (avayavin) is different from its parts (avayavas). This 'whole', according to them, is related to its parts by the relation of inherence (samavāya). But the Buddhists do not admit any such relation. Both these opponent groups have advanced several arguments in support of their respective stands which I have tried to discuss in the second section of this chapter. Apart from the arguments to refute the 'whole' as an independent entity and its perceptible character, the Buddhists have also advanced various arguments on the basis of which they deny the reality of citra-rûpa or variegated colour as a whole(avayavin)

as advocated by the Nyāya realists. Moreover, the Buddhists have raised objections against the Nyāya theory of whole (avayavin) on the ground of weight and space. I have discussed all these along with the Nyāya answers in the third section of this chapter. In the last part of this section I have tried to examine from the Nyāya view point the five antinomies put forwarded by the Buddhists to refute the reality of whole apart from the parts.

The third chapter is an attempt to analyse the problem of universal and particular (sāmānya and vyakti) in its various aspects. One of the accrimonious battles in Indian philosophy was fought between the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers on the question of the ontological status of universal(sāmānya) - whether the universals are realities existent by themselves or they are mainly empty names or concepts with no reality affixed to them. The Nyāya thinkers are uncompromising realists and advocate the ontological reality of the universals. But the Buddhists are staunch phenomenalists and deny the reality of the universals. In this chapter I have tried to highlight the controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists and the Buddhist phenomenalists on the ontological

reality of the universals. The first section of this chapter deals with the realistic arguments to prove the reality of universals. In this section I have also tried to make a case for the Buddhist phenomenalism whithout a clear understanding of which the stand point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism can not be properly appreciated. In the second section of this chapter I have discussed the Buddhists arguments in favour of the imperceptibility of the so-called universals and the Nyāya counter arguments to establish the perception of universals (sāmānya). The third section is an attempt to explain the Buddhists arguments to disprove the ontological reality of universals and their relation with particulars. In the last section of this chapter I have tried to expose the fundamental weekness of the Buddhist arguments to champion the cause of the Nyāya realists.

In the fourth chapter, which is a concluding chapter of my thesis, I have given a resumé of what have been discussed in the previous chapters and on the basis of that I have tried to state my positive conclusions.

I feel it a solemn duty to express my thanks and gratitude to my teacher and mentor of my thesis, Dr. Sushanta Sen, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy & Religion, Visva-Bharati, under whose patient guidence and loving supervision this research work was taken up, conducted and completed. I am also grateful to him for his affection bestowed upon me in every sphere of my life including my academic persuits. My thank also goes to Dr. Aparajita Choudhury, a scholar and Principal, R.S. Girls' College Karimganj, for her help and co-operation in pursuing my research project. My thanks are due to all of my learned colleagues and comrades, specially to Dr. Sujit Choudhury and Mr. Subodh Adhya for their constant encouragement. Last but not least my gratitude is due to my parents and maternal uncles for their inspiration and financial support but for which I would not be able to complete this work.

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C H A P T E R - I

IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE (DRAVYA)

In our experience we distinctly see that there is a substratum, that is, a jar in which the qualities like colour, touch, size,etc.,reside. Our experience presents us with two separate realities, the properties and their substratum, and they are different in their essence. This differentiation between the properties and their substratum is the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. A substance (dravya) is conceived as the substratum(āśraya) of its properties. Of course a substance itself may be a property(dharma). A whole (avayavin) is a property(dharma) of its parts (avayavas) in which it resides. Thus while a substance may be a property, a substratum of properties is necessarily a substance. An exception may however be pointed out that properties, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers include universals(sāmānya), and the actions also. For instance, the universal 'colourness' (rupatva) resides in 'colour'(rupa) which is a quality. Here we find a substratum (āśraya) of properties other than a substance(dravya). But properties such as substance (in the form of avayavin), qualities and action in which the universal sattā(existence)

resides, are, for that reason, real objective properties. These properties reside only in a substance. The difference between the properties and their substratum, i.e., the substance, is that the properties are dependent for their existence on the substance. So long as the properties exist, they can exist only as the residing in their substance. But a substratum (substance) does not depend for its existence on anything else. Śrīdhara says that "apprehension on substanceness is just an apprehension of having independent existence".[1] Substance is defined by Kanāda as "possessing qualities and actions, and as an inherent cause".[2] Substance has obviously been conceived in this definition as the substratum (āśraya) or the repository, as the abiding ground of qualities and actions. We see that our thought instinctively serized on two different aspects of reality, that which is presented to our senses, the sensible qualities, and that which sustains these qualities in their existence, the substance. The colour, the form, the sound and the other qualities that we perceive cannot be imagined by us to float as homeless 'attributes of nothing;' we are obliged to refer them to something which

1. Sva-prādhānyapratītir eva dravyatvapratītir. Śrīdhra, Nyāyakandali, with Praśastapādabhāṣya, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1895), P.13.

2. Kriyāgunavat samavāyīkāranam iti dravya lakṣanam. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), i.e., 15, 1.2.15.

holds them and is their abiding ground. This notion of abiding ground gives us the concept of substance. On the question of the separate existence of substance, the Buddhists join issue with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The arguments of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers to prove the existence of substance over and above its qualities and the counter argument of the Buddhists to refute the reality of permanent abiding substance would constitute the subject matter of this chapter.

The Buddhist philophers, like the phenomenalists of Europe, have denied the existence of substance and have employed almost identical arguments in their refutation of this category.[3] According to the Buddhists, our understanding is limited to qualities. We get through senses a particular touch associated with a particular colour and external form, but we are never aware of anything which possess these qualities. The notion of an abiding, unifying substance as a single entity (for example, a rose) comprising these qualities, is only a figment of imagination. In fact

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3. Vide Tattvasaṁgraha of Śāntarkṣita, (Gaekwad Oriental Series, No.XXX, Baroda, 1926), Verse No.564-572, and Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā (Boroda, 1926).

there is no justification for supposition of a socalled 'unitive principle' or 'substance'. When we perceive a rose we perceive some qualities like colour, touch and smell, but we never perceive a rose as a substance. Substance, therefore, is only an unnecessary and superfluous assumption. The idea of self-identical and unitive principle which exists in and through the different parts and which appropriates the diverse sensible attributes is logically unjustifiable. The socalled 'substance' as opted by the Naiyāyikas, urge the Buddhists, is nothing but the conglomeration or aggregate (samudāya) of different evanescent attributes without any permanent underlying principle called a substance(dravya).

But the Naiyāyikas, in defence of substance(dravya), argue against the Buddhists by saying that, as a matter of fact, our experience manifests itself in the shape of a synthetic judgement consisting of two items delivered by two separate sense organs in one whole. We say, 'The jar that I have touched is the same as what I see'. How can these two acts of touching and seeing refer to one and the same thing, unless the two sensible qualities are supposed to co-exist in the same substratum'? The Buddhist, however,

might argue that the so-called perception of the same substance as the underlying substratum of two different qualities obtained through different senses is illusory. But the Naiyāyikas atonce retort that this illusory perception of an object is possible only if there is veridical perception of the same object at its back. For instance, even an ordinary illusion as the mistaking of a rope for a snake is possible only for a person who has previous experience of snake. And if this account of illusion be admitted, the reality of substance cannot be denied.

Moreover, there is absolutely no reason to deny the validity of this synthetic judgement, as it is not contradicted by its subsiquent experience.

Again, the Naiyāyikas argue that if the perception of the so-called substance is nothing more than the sensible qualities alone, then the knowledge of identity inspite of the change of qualities would be unaccountable. To strengthen their thesis the Naiyāyikas have given the following example: The unbaked jar is black, but it becomes red when it is baked in a furnace. The cessation of blackness does

not entail cessation of old jar. Nor does the emergence of redness involve the creation of a new jar, as we have directly perceived the jar as an identity persisting in and through the persisting qualities. Thus, an abiding substance over and above the qualities exists.

The Buddhists argue that since substance and qualities are always felt together, they must be supposed to be identical. According to the Buddhists, simultaneous perception of two entities is the proof of their identity. If, for example, 'a' and 'b' are always perceived together, that is, if 'a' is never perceived without 'b' and 'b' is never perceived without 'a', then 'a' and 'b' are to be taken as identical. This is known as sahoupalambha niyama in the Yogācāra (Idealist) school of Buddhism. By applying this test of identity, the Buddhist idealists try to prove that the object (viṣaya) and the consciousness of object (vijñāna) are one and the same. Now the same argument can be used by the Buddhists in general to demonstrate the identity of substance and its quality. The Buddhists might argue that since the perception of substance and its qualities always take place at the same time, i.e., substance can never be perceived without the qualities and vice-versa,

therefore, these two are to be taken as identical. Against this position the Naiyāyikas urge that it is possible to perceive a substance without its qualities. For example, an ill person perceives a conch-shell as yellow: its original qualitiy, white, is not seen. Here the conch is perceived but not its quality 'whiteness'. This shows that perception of the substance is independent of that of its qualities.[4]

Here the Buddhists may again argue against the Naiyāyikas that, the perception of which the Naiyāyikas have mentioned is the case of an illusory perception. This, therefore, does not prove that conch shell is perceived but not its quality 'whiteness'. Moreover, we can verify the conch by means of touch and also by the pragmatic test. The sound that is normally associated with conchs is found to be produced by this particular one also. So, its presentation with an altered colour is no proof of its illusoriness. It should be maintained in conformity with the data of experience that, there is no mistake so far as the substantive element, viz, the conch is concerned, though the perception of yellowness is wrong.

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4. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka, (Bibliotheca, Indica, Calcutta), P.722.

In reply the Naiyāyikas point out that they agree with the Buddhist's opinion of concomitant relation between the quality and the substance. But there is no necessary relation between their perceptions. Because the non-perception of the condition (vyāpaka) does not entail the absence either of the concomitant (vyāpya) or of its perception.[5] For example, the non-perception of fire does not argue the absence of smoke, or of its perception. So, though whitness be regarded as the necessary condition of the conch, that is, thought there can not be conch which is without whiteness, the non-perception of whiteness would not necessarily imply the absence of conch, or even its non-perception. So, substance is something which is over and above its qualities.

The Buddhists may again raise the question that it may be true that the perception of the substance is not dependent upon its qualities, but the perception of the qualities is possible only when the substance is perceived. This simultanous perception proves that the qualities and its substance are not different.

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5. Na ca vyāpakanupalabdhimātrena vyāpyatādupalabdhi nivartate. Ibid, P.724.

But the Naiyāyikas answer that the concomitance of two perceptions as cited by the Buddhists is only one-sided (sama) and not reciprocal (asama), and therefore can not be a proof of identity of existence. For instance, an object is seen only when there is perception of light. But though the perception of light and the object are found to be identical, yet light is the condition only for which the object is seen. So, light and object are not identical by any means. For this same reason the co-existence (deśavaccheda) of substance and quality can not be pressed forward as a proof of their identity. Substance and quality may be cognized at the same time on account of the necessary concomitance of their conditions of perception and their coexistence may be similarly due to the concomitance of their condition of production. Thus, there is no incompitability if substance and qualities are numerically different and at the same time they are co-existence, or objects of synchronous cognitions.[6]

According to the Buddhists, the indeterminate perception(nirvikalpaka) is the only valid perception, because it contains no conceptual or imaginary element in

6. Ibid, PP.725 - 726.

it (kalpanāpoḍha). Such perception immediately follows the sense-object contact and apprehends the objects in its unique, individual character (svalakṣaṇa) as free from association with name, class-character etc, (nāmjātyādya-mukta).[7] The idea of substance enter into determinate savikalpaka) perceptual knowledge only after a recollection of the class concept by means of a name has taken place. In other words, when perceptual context is determined and distinguished by linguistic symbol, and is thus subsumed under a class notion, which is purely an intellectual act (kalpanā) that the idea of substance emerges in our thought. So, the Buddhists would say that what the Naiyāyikas call sense perception of substance is nothing but a subjective construction of creative imagination of human mind (kalpanā). If the sense organs are competant to cognize the substance, urge the Buddhists, then why is it that the substance is not cognized at the very first moment, i.e., at the time when the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) takes place ? So, the notion of substance can not be derived directly from sense-perception and is only a conceptual construction (vikalpa), having nothing

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7. Ibid, PP.725 - 726

corresponding to it in the objective world. Hence, the Buddhists differ from the Grammarians (Vaiyākaranas). Because, according to the Grammarians, knowledge is always word-associated (śabdānubiddha), and the knowledge which is word-associated is determinate perception. And this knowledge is only real knowledge. Hence the Buddhists differ from the Grammarians.

In answer the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers point out that they admit the Buddhist analysis of perceptual operation, but it does not prove that the indeterminate perception is the only reality. It is true that in the first instance the knowledge is indeterminate and it is expressed in the from of determinate judgement only after the verbal associations has taken place. But this does not take aways from its sensuous character, for the contents of the determinate perception are solely determined by those of indeterminate perception.[8] The Buddhists may again raise question that if the perceptual determinate knowledge is considered a proof of reality of its object, then why it

8. Tasmād Ya eva Vastvātma savikalpasya gocārātīta eva nirvikalpasya Śabdollekha vivarjitaḥ II Jayanta Bhatta, Nyāyamañjarī, (Kāshi Sanskrit Series, 1936).

is not placed in the same category with imaginary construction ? The Naiyāyika's answer is that the difference between perceptual judgement and judgement of imagination is distinct and clear to all. One is asserted to be true and the other is not asserted so. This difference of character can be accounted for only if we suppose the former judgement to be directly conversant with reality, and this can be possible only if the sense organ continues to function.[9] The recollection of a name is only one of the requisite conditions which together with the operation of the sense organ is responsible for the materialization of the perceptual judgement.[10] For example, we can not get a determinate visual judgement by simply recalling the name, if we shut up our eyes immediately after the sense object contact.[11] The sense function is a necessary condition of even determinate perceptual knowledge. So, there is no reason for disbelieving the objective validity of determinate knowledge, and consequently for impunging the objectivity of substance, for the knowledge of it is directly derived from the objective datum.

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9. Monorajyarikalpanām kāmam asty apramānata yathāvastu pravṛttanam na tv asāv akṣajanmanām. Ibid, Part-1, P.90.

10. Ibid, P.89.

11. Na hi vacakasmarianānantaram akṣiṇi nimilya vikalpayati patoyam iti. Ibid.

II

In the previous section, we have tried to argue why the Buddhist position that the substance is identical with its qualities does not hold water and the Nyāya position that substance is a separate real entity over and above its quality seems to be more convincing than the Buddhists position. But in this section we are going to discuss the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of whole (avayavin) and part (avayavas), which is stated to be one of the main planks for the defence of substance. We shall deal with this theory in details in a separate chapter, but here we shall try to preview the problem.

The fundamental difference between the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas lies in that, while the Buddhists discard any real principle of synthesis in the external world, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers admit two such synthetic principles which are objectively real, viz, a substance (dravya) and a whole (avayavi). These two of course are not separate categories, because a 'whole' is also a 'substance'. The substance in the form of the whole (avayavidravya) is distinct and different in essence from the parts which it holds together. It is the basic doctorine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers that the parts (avayavas) and their 'whole' (avayavin) are two different substances. The parts,

in their turn, are also avayavins in respect of their own parts and so an, till we reach the atoms which are only parts and themselves have no parts, and therefore, they are not avayavins. It may, however, be noted that although a substance in the form of avayavin(whole) is the unifying principle of the avayavas (parts), the conception of avayavas and that of 'substance'(dravya) are not identical. The concept of substance has a wider scope and includes atoms and eternal entities like ether, etc., which are not avayavins. So far as the material objects of ordinary experience are concerned they are all effect substance (kārya-dravya), and as such, they are avayavins, i.e., the unifying principles of their parts. A 'substance'(dravya) in the form of avayavin(whole) is thus a unifying principles.

Dharmakīrti, a celebrated Buddhist logician of the seventh century A.D.(638 A.D.), initiated a new phage in the discussion of the theory of the whole by introducing in his Pramāna-Vārtika three difficulties, which along with one or two more added later, provided basis of controversy between the Buddhists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, and this controversy reached a climax in Udayana's treatment in his Ātmatattvaviveka.

Dharmakīrti's three difficulties are the following: (1) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a person's body is a whole of which his hand is a part. Now it is possible for a hand to move without the whole body moving, as we can easily see; yet, on the Nyāya theory, since the whole is a unity, it must move if a part of it does. Therefore, we are led to a contradiction: the body both moves and does not move. (2) An extended object may be partly covered up by another one; Yet, since the whole is unity, it follows that it is both covered up and not covered up. (3) One whole, say a cloth, may be partly red and partly some other colour. Yet, since the cloth is one thing, it is both red and not red at the same time.

Udayana discusses these three arguments and adds two more: (4) A unitary thing can occupy only one place, for otherwise it will have several parts corresponding to the several places it occupies. Yet, patently the wholes such as a pot and a cloths, which the Nayāyikas call unitary do occupy several places. Therefore, one thing both does and does not occupy several places, which is contradictory. (5) The fifth antinomy which is raised by the Buddhists is as following: The whole as an extendend thing, it is

contended, may be both perceived and not perceived by the same person at the same time and in the same place; for, when it is perceived in connection with one part, it is not perceived in connection with another part which lies outside the visual field.

Some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers namely, Vācaspati-miśra, Śrīdhara and Udayana have attempted to give answer to the above alleged Buddhist difficulties in the following way: (1) So far as the first difficulty is concerned, the Naiyāyikas opine that there is no centradiction involved here, for the opposite properties movement and absence of movement - do not characterize one and the same entity. The movement is found in the hand, and the absence of movement in the body as a whole. Udayana, a eminent Nyāya philosopher, asserts in this context that it is not the fact that, the movement of the part necessarily entailes the movement of the whole, for the whole and the part are different entities which owe their movements to different causes;and these causes do not always synchronize.[12] The movement of the hands, for instance, is due to a particular

12. Udayana, Āttmatattvaviveka,(Bibliotheca Indica,Calcutta), P.586.

kind of violitional impulse, and that of the body to another. One may will to move the hand but not the whole body. The Buddhist may object again that if the whole does not move when a part moves, it means that the whole is composed of two parts, one of which is in motion and the other is not. But such a whole can not exist, because, the moving part would inevitably be disjoined from the motionless one, and this would result in the snapping of conjunction between the two parts and in the disruption of the whole composed of them. But the Naiyāyikas would reply that this objection is not valid. Because, according to them, a moving part necessarily gets disjoined from another part in the whole. There are, according to the Naiyayikas, two types of disjunction which may be caused by movement - one which is destructive of such conjunction of parts as contributes to the formation of a whole, and the other which is not destructive of such conjunction and which means only the disjunction of a part from the space previously occupied by itself. These two types of disjunction are mutually exclusive and cannot simultaneously brought about by a single movement in a part. Thus when there is a movement in the hand, it results only in its change of position, and not in the severance of its connection with the body.(2) The Naiyāyikas have easily answered the second

objection of Dharmakīrti, i.e., a thing is covered and uncovered at the same time. According to the Naiyāyikas what is covered is one part and what is not covered is another part, so that the contradictory predicates are really related to two distinct entities, and not to the whole which is different from either or both of them. Vācaspati Miśra opines that the whole may be perceived even when a part is covered, for the other part being not covered is exposed to the view.[13] But a question may be raised here by the Buddhist: Why does not the whole look as much extended when a part is covered as when no part is covered, if it is the same whole that is perceived in both the cases ? The Naiyāyika's answer is that even the whole is perceived, the perception of its specific magnitude depends on the perception of a part that is sufficiently large. It cannot be definitely said how large the perceived part is required to be, the only thing that can be said is that it should be large enough to make the perception of the specific magnitude of the whole possible. So, when an appreciably large part of the whole is covered, the true magnitude of the whole is not perceived owing to

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13. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāya Vārtikatātparyatīkā (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares), P.265.

the lack of the requisite conditions.[14] (3) In answer to the third objection of Dharmakīrti, i.e., the same whole being coloured and not coloured at the same time, Vācaspati Miśra said that there is no contradiction involved here because there is really no redness in the whole or in any part of it. If the whole or a part appears as red, that is because of its conjunction with a colouring substance (rāgidravya saṁyoga), by which its true colour (not-red) is eclipsed; the perception of redness in it, therefore, is as illusory as the perception of redness in a crystal associated with a red flower.[15] (4) The fourth argument, i.e., or one thing occupying and not occupying several places, has ramification beyond the context of a discussion of wholes, since it relates to the attitudes of Buddhists and Naiyāyikas on the problem of universals as well. The Buddhists find it contradictory that one thing can occupy more than one place as in the cases of universals as well as wholes. The answer of the Naiyāyika is that things do come into contact with more than one thing atonce. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers answer this objection in their atomic theory, according to which, atoms can do just that, that is, they come into

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14. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka, (Bibliothecea Indica, Calcutta), P.588.

15. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benaras), Page.267.

contact with several other atoms at once. (5) As an answer to the fifth objection of the Buddhists, the Naiyāyikas give the following reply. The Naiyāyikas point out that, if one part is perceived and another is not, this does not imply that the whole is both perceived and not perceived. It is not necessary for the perception of the whole that all its parts should be simultaneously perceived. Hence, when one of the parts is perceived, the whole is also perceived, although the other part may remain unperceived. There is thus no antinomy of the nature indicated by the Buddhists, for the contradictory characteristics are predicated of two distinct parts, and not of the whole composed of them.[16]

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the whole (avayavin) is an effect substance(kārya-dravya) of which the parts (avayavas) are cause. Now, an objection has been raised by the Buddhists against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position: How can cause and effect as 'parts' and 'whole' exist simultaneously ? It does violence against the principle,

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16. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka, (Bibliotheca, Indica, Calcutta), P.587.

i.e., two gross material substances (mûrta dravyas) can not occupy, the same space(deśa).[17] The Buddhists point out that impenetrability (sapratighatva) is a necessary attribute of matter, which means that the space occupied by one matter can not be occupied by another. To reply the above objection the later Naiyāyikas differ from the early Naiyāikas. According to the early Naiyāikas, the effect-substance (avayavin) is different from its parts and emergs from them as a new substance,[18] but the simultaneous existence of the cause with the effects is not postulated. Vātsāyana has clearly stated that new effect-substance(kāryadravya) is produced only when the cause-substance (kārana) undergoes a different arrangement (Vyûhāntara), it is inferred that the cause is destroyed when its effect is produced.[19] The cause (kārana), in the theory of the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is conceived in the form of 'arrangement of parts preceding the effect(kārya). For example, in the case of cloth, the previous arrangements of threads is its cause which is destroyed when the cloth is produced. The Buddhists

17. Mûrtanām-samāna-deśatā-virodhāt. Jayanta Bhatt, Nyāyamañjarī, (Kashi Sanskrit Series,1936),Part-II,p.66. This dictum is also referred to in other works of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. i) Śrīdhara,Nyāyakandali,(Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benaras),p.148,(ii) Viśvanāth,Nyāyasiddhāntamuktābalī (Nirnaya Sagar Press,Bombay),On verse No.113.

18. Dravyāntarotpatti-pakṣa. Vātsāyana,Commentary On Nyāyasûtra (Calcutta, Sanskrit Series,Calcutta)Part-II,ii.16.

19. Vyûhāntarād-dravyotpatti,draśanam purva-dravya nivṛtter anumānam.Gautama,Nyāyasûtra,(Bibliotheca Indica,Calcutta) Part-II,ii.16.

may contend again that if the cause is destroyed before the effect comes into existence, it will mean that the effect is produced from the destruction of the cause, i.e., from the void(sunya). Vātsāyana answers the above Buddhists contention by stating that, when the old arrangement of parts is distributed and, consequently, the cause substance which was born of that arrangement disappears, the effect is produced from the new arrangement of parts which comes into being and not from the void.[20] Thus, the early Naiyāyikas have established that although the cause-substance is destroyed, its parts arranged in a different way produce the effect. It may be noted here that, the effect, according to early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is not merely a new arrangement of parts but is a new substance produced by that new arrangement. Thus, the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers refuted the Buddhists objection by asserting that, the effect produces after the destruction of the cause but the causes(avayavas) leave its parts behind; it is not any case of destruction without any kind of continuity (niranvaya-vināśa avayavins). So, the problem of existence

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20. Vyāhatā-vyūhānām avayavānām purva-vyuha-nivṛttam vyūhāntarād dravya-niṣpattir nabhāvāt. Vātsāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya(Viziamagram Sanskrit Series,Benares), Part-IV,i.18,p.939.

of two gross substance in the same space does not arise. But the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers do not accept these early Nyāya theory. They refute the Buddhists objection - simultaneous existence of two substances (avayavas and avayavin) in the same space(deśa) - by saying that, it is the fact that two gross material substances (mûrtadravyas) can not occupy the same space (deśa). But the term 'deśa' in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dictum does not mean space, but substratum (āśrya). And substratum of an object, according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, is in the form of its parts(cause) in which it resides. For instance, threads are the substratam of the cloth, and substratum of the threads is their cause, i.e., fine fibres of the cotton(aṁsus). Thus the cause and the effect have not the same substratum. It would appear that the objection has been met by the peculiar Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that an effect resides in its cause or a 'whole'(avayavin) resides in its parts(avayavas). The real problem of the same space being occupied by two gross material substance is, however, not solved. The answer from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint would be that the dictum that two gross substances cannot occupy the same space is not applicable in respect of two gross substances of which one resides in the other by inherent relation(samavāya).

III

In the foregoing sections, we have discussed the logical necessity of postulating substance as a distinct category apart from the qualities and whole apart from the parts along with the objections of the Buddhist philosophers. In this section we shall be concerned with the possibility of formulation of a defination of substance. In other words we shall disscuss here with such question as: is a definite conception of substance possible ? Or what is the common feature of the things called substance(dravya) by the Vaiśeṣika philosophers ? An ordinary unthinking man can not be expected to have a conception of substance wide enough to comprehend all the known and unknown substances coming under it. Nor again, can the enlightened convention of philosophers be proof of the possibility of such a concept, because the convention of one school is found to be irreconciliably at varience with that of another. For example, the Mimāṁsaka is convinced that darkness(tamas) is a substance, and the Vaiśeṣika is equally convinced that it is only the negation of light, and not a substance at all. So, neither the popular, commonsense view of things nor the philosophical interpretation of them can be relied upon to throw light on the essential nature of substance which is universally present in all the substances known to us.[21]

21. Na hi laukika parikṣā kasasādhārani dravya kāraṇagatcent matiḥ .... paravipratipattyāvā sandehas tatra. Śankara Miśra Kanthābharana, a commentary on Nyāyalīlābatī(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares),p.89.

Here we propose to deal with the various definations suggested by different thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and to critically evaluate them in the light of the criticism advanced by the Buddhists and other critics.

We have seen previously that substance is a kind of entity in which the attributes inhere but which itself is distinct from its attributes. But this defination of substances advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas was severely attacked by the Buddhist phenomenalists. The problem of the defenition of substance has, however, been approached from a different angle by Śrīdhara, the author of Nyāya-kandali. According to Śrīdhara, substance, apparently, means more than merely something which has qualities. It means something that is felt as self-subsisting, something that exists in its own right. For a definite idea of substance, it is necessary that there should be posited a synthetic concept of substancehood (dravyatvajāti) to which all specific substances can be affiliated on account of their possession of some fundamental common character. But no community of nature, apparently, subsists between a lump of clay and a lump of gold both of which are supposed to be substances. Now, the question is what is the common

character of these sepcific substances through which substancehood reveals itself and makes itself intelligible to us ? Śrīdhara answers that the notion of substancehood is arrived at through a notion of self-subsistence.[22] A particular substance may have qualities and action widely divergent from those of another substance, and may, for that reasons, look unlike the latter very much. But this does not affect their essential similarity of character based on the fact that every substance is felt as self-subsisting, as compared with its qualities and actions which can not be supposed to exist without being supported by something that exists in its own right; that is, by substance.

This view of substance has been severely criticised by Citsukhāchārya. He asks: what is this self-subsistence that is supposed to be the criterion of substancehood ? Is self-subsistence (svātantrya) equivalent to existence without a substratum or the capability of a thing to be perceived independently of the perception of its substratum[23]?

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22. Svaprādhānya pratītir eva dravyatvapratītiḥ. Śrīdhara, Nyāyakandali,(Vizianagham Sanskrit Series, Beneras),p.13.

23. Citsukhācārya, Citsukhī (Tattvapradīpikā),(Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay), P.178.

In the first alternative, all composite wholes, i.e., material substances will cease to be substance, since everyone of them is dependent for its existence upon the parts that constitute it.[24] In the second alternative, sound and touch of air, which are admitted as qualities by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, will transpire to be substances, since they are perceived even when their substrate, i.e., ākāśa and the air in which they respectively inhere, remain unperceived.[25] Self-subsistence, therefore, in any sense can not be held to be true criterion of a substance.

The Vaiśeṣika philosophers say in reply that substance are of two kinds, namely, eternal and non-eternal. Atoms, ākāśa, time, space, mind, and soul are eternal substances, whereas the composite material bodies are non-eternal substances. Eternal substance are, by their very nature, self-subsistent, in an absolute sense. They exist in their own right, i.e., independently of any other thing. Non-eternal substances, however, can not claim such absolute self-subsistence because they are constituted of parts in

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24. Nayanaprasādini of Pratygrūpabhagavat, a commentary on Citsukhī, (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), P.77.

25. Ibid, P.178.

which they inhere.[26] But even a composite material body, though sustained in its existence by its constitutive parts, is felt as self-subsisting in relation to its own qualities and action which inhere in it. Substancehood thus implies the character of self-subsistence (either absolute or relative) that we perceive in things marked by the possession of qualities and actions. The instance cited by Citsukha in connection with the second alternative interpretation of self-subsistence are beside the point, and the undesireable consequences alleged by him arise not so much from any defect in the definition as from the Sceptic's eagerness to do away with the concept of substance altogether. As a matter of fact the denial of substance on the ground of its imperceptibility will, in some case, inevitably lead to the substantializing of its perceptible qualities, and this is what we find in the cases of sound and touch of air.

Again, Kanāda, the author of Vaiśeṣikasūtra, defines substance as that which possesses action and qualities, and is the inherent cause.[27] Here we get three distinct characteristics (lakṣaṇa) of substance. These three characteristics

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26. The Bhāṣya of Praśastapāda, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares), PP.16 - 21.

27. Kriyāgunavat samavāyī kāranaṁ iti dravya lakṣaṇam. Kanāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), P.1.i.15.

are first, substance is that which possess action or motion (kriyā), secondly, substance as possessed of qualities (gunattva) thirdly, the substanceisis that which is inherent cause or material cause (samavāyikārana). Now, we shall discuss these three characteristics and their defects separately. First, substance is that which possess action or motion (kriyā). This definition of substance is too narrow, as it fails to include within its scope certain recognised substances which are immobile by their very nature, e.g., space, time etc. Motion of course need not be actual in all cases; even the mere possibility of motion in a thing entities it to be classed as substance. But motion, whether actual or potential, is only an incident of limited magnitude (mûrtatva), and can not belong to ubiquitous substances like ākāśa, time etc. which are not capable of changing their position. So, the definition of substance by means of property of motion is not applicable.

Secondly, some philosophers of the Vaiśeṣika school define substance as 'that which is the substratum of qualities'.[28] And this definition has been formulated on the

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28. Gunāśraya dravyam. Vallabha, Nyāyalīlābati (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares), P.752.

basis of Kanāda's reference to the possession of qualities (gunavattva) as one of the distinctive characteristics of substance. This definition, according to Citsukha, is not acceptable, because it excludes a substance at the first moment after the production, when it remains destitute of qualities.[29] According to the Vaiśeṣika theory, substance is the inherent cause (samavāyikārana) of its qualities, and when cause is the antecedent of the effect, then substance will be its antecedent to its qualities and remains qualityless at the moment of its origination. So, this definiation of substance, i.e., substance is the substratum of the qualities, suffers inconsistency. To avoid this difficulty Vallbha, the author of Nyayalilāvati, has given a new definition. According to him, "the substance is that which is never the substratum of the absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva) of quality as such".[30] In other words, the actual existence of quality is not intended as the definition, but even the potential existence of quality will do. This definition of Vallabha does not apply to substance at the

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29. Utpannamātram dravyam kṣanam agunam tisthti'ty agnikārād avyāpheḥ. Citsukhāchārya, Citsukhi (Nirnaya Sagar Press Bombay), P.178.

30. Gunāśrayo dravyam. Tatra yadyapi sambandha na sanatānaḥ tatta'pi hā tyantayogavyavaccheda lakṣanārthaḥ. Vallabha, Nyāyalīlāvati,(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares),P.753.

moment of its origination. But this definition has also been criticised. This definition will extend to absolute non-existent itself. As a thing can not function as its own substratum, the non-existence in question cannot be the substratum of the same non-existence.[31] So, the definition of substance as that which is not the substratum of the absolute non-existence of quality is found to be too wide, be contended that absolute non-existence is, like knowability or namability, a fact, of which regation is not predicable in any context (kevalānvayin) and which therefore is necessarily present in every thing including itself; for such a contention implies its presence in substance as well, so that even substance comes to be the substratum of the absolute non-existence of quality.[32] Again, it may be said that the whole objection is based upon a right adherence to the assumption that absolute non-existence is a unitary principle, although, as a matter of fact, there is no conceivable logical bar to the possibility of a plurality of non-existences. So one non-existence can be the substratum of another non-existence, whereas a substance is never the

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31. So'pi hi gunavattvātyan tabhavs tasyā' nadhikaranam, Svasya svasminnavrtteḥ. Citsukhāchārya, Citsukhī (Tattvapradīpikā), (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), P.176.

32. Na ca prameyatvādivat Kevalānvayitvam yen.... svavrtlita syat, Kertanvayitva ca bhagnaṃ dravyalakṣanam. Pratyagrūpabhagava, Nayanaprasādini, (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), P.176.

substratum of the non-existence (atyantābhāva) of qualities. But his defence too is not satisfactory. It is observed that though one non-existence can be conceded to be the substratum of another non-existence, the expression 'non-existence of quality' as an element in the definition of substance, suffers from ambiguity, which must be cleared to make it intelligible. The question may crop up that, does the non-existence refer to any one of the qualities definitely, or all the qualities collectively ? If the absence of one or the other specific quality is intended, then the definition will be too narrow. As the qualities are numerous, the presence of one particular quality in a substance is consistent with the absence of another, and the terms of the definition will exclude the substance in question from its purview.[33] Thus, if substance be defined as 'that which is never the substratum of the non-existence of one definite quality, say, colour (rûpa), air (vāyu), which is marked by the possession of the quality of touch (sparśaguna) will be excluded from the class of substance on the ground that the quality of colour in never predicable it. If however, it is mentained that the expression 'non-existence of quality' means the non-existence of each and every one of the qualities, then

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33. Ibid, P.176.

the definition will be impossible, as we can not conceive of an entity which is never the substratum of the non-existence of all the qualities, that is, in which all the qualities are always present. The affirmation of all the qualities in a substratum would be intelligible if each individual substance could be supposed to be always possessed of all the qualities.[34] The definition may of course change its implication if by the 'non-existence of quality' we should understand not the absence of all conceivable qualities, but the absence of any one of them. But this too will not improve upon the former position because the meaning of 'anyone' is absolutely indefinite. Every member in a class of existents may be disignated by the term 'anyone' and so the inclusion of this term in a definition is extremely misleading. It makes the definition indefinite and thus defeats its very purpose.

From these above two definitions we get no clue to the existence of the substance universal (dravyatvajāti) which must be posited to make possible our conception and linguistic usage of substance as a category. Our experience also is more or less non-commitant in this matter, for, in

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34. Ibid.

the bewildering variety of specific substances we fail to discover any community of nature which may indicate the presence of substance universal in all of them. So, a positive, independent proof of the substance-universal has to be pointed out, and this is sought to be given in a new definition, viz. that substance is that which is the inherent or material cause (samavāyikārana). This we get in the third aspect of the definition of substance proposed by Kanāda.

We have seen already that a quality or an action can never be an inherent cause of anything because, by its very definition an inherent cause is that in which the effect directly inheres. An effect, be it substance, quality or action, must have a substratum to inhere in, and this substratum is invariably a substance. Now, one question may arise here: what is the effect that can be universally referred to substance as its inherent cause ? The effect can not be a specific quality (viśeṣaguna) like colour or sound, because, substance like space and time have no specific quality, and so the definition would not extend to them. This is why, conjunction (saṁyoga) or disjunction (vibhāga) has been suggested to be the effect which can be

affiliated to all substances irrespectively.[35] Even eternal and ubiquitous substances must come into the relation of conjunction with, or disjunction from, another substance. Conjunction and disjunction being qualities must have a substratum in which they can inhere as their cause, and this inherent cause is substance. So, the definition of substance as the inherent cause of conjunction or disjunction is complete, and does not exclude any substance out of its scope. Now, the relation of causality is conceivable between the things only if each of them is found to be possessed of a definite character. A cause is always a definite entity, and so also the effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher does not believe in the existence of the uncharacterized simples. If an entity without definite character is supposed to function as a cause, there will be no possibility of restricting the affirmation of causal relation to only legitimate cases of such relation.[36] When, for instance, we say that timber is cause of the table, what is it that we should understand by affirming timber as the cause ? Certainly timber is understood not merely a substance, that

35. This point has been introduced first by Vallabha and developed later on by Viśvanāth. Vide Nyayalīlābatī of Vallabha, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares), pp.94 and 97, and Siddhāntamuktāvalī of Viśvanāth, (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), pp.64-65.

36. Avaśyam by avaccedakena bhavihavyam, anyathā ksmikatapatteḥ. Śaṁkara Miśra, Upaṣkār, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), I.ii.5.

is, something, which is different from all that is not substance, but, as a definite substance with a distinctive character (timberness). If it were not so, the cause of the table might as well be affirmed to be any other substance just on the ground of its being a substance. This also applies to the effect. So causality is intelligible only with regard to a fact having a definitive character. This definitive character in a thing not only makes it what it is not, but also determines the exact function that it should be capable of exercising; in other words, its specific function (including the causal function) is entirely dependent upon what constitutes its specific qualitative content (dharma). This being the case, the definition of substance, as the inherent cause of conjunction or disjunction, necessarily pre-supposes that this inherent causality must have a definitive characteristic of the causal entity as its determinant (avaćchedaka), and that the characteristic is nothing but what is called the substance-universal. This universal should be a logical necessary, be supposed to be present in all things which are found to be the inherent cause of conjunction or disjunction.[37] The postulation of

37. Kāryasamavāyikāranatavaćchedakataya saṃyogasya vibhāgasya na samavāyikāranatvāvaćchedakatayā dravyatvajātisiddheḥ. Viśvanātha, Siddhāntamuktāvali (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), pp.64-65.

the substance universal as a determinant of inherent causality is thus an inescapable logical necessity, otherwise every individual instance of inherent causality would be an isolated, self-determined fact, and there would be no criterion to determine why this causal function should be exercised by some reals and not by others. It, therefore, follows that such reals alone are in a position to function as inherent cause participating in the substance-universal and are determined and characterized by it.[38]

An objection has been raised by the Buddhist Phenomenalist against this definition of substance by reference of causality. Causality, it is urged, is only an accidental character; as it can come into operation only with reference to an effect. An entity can be characterized as a cause only when an effect is produced, and an event being an occasional event, the causality is an occasional characteristic. It can not be supposed that there might be eternally existing effects, because the very supposition is bound to lead to absurd consequences. An eternally existent fact can not call

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38. Kāryāśrayatvam api sāmāmyāniyatamo navasu eva na syāt. Kāranatvam hi sāmānyena niyamyate. Udayana, Kirnābali, (Benares, Sanskrit Series), p.33.

for a cause of its own, because a cause is necessary only to bring into existence something not existing before. So, the Buddhists opine that, the definition of substance by reference to causality does not seem to be wholly satisfactory.

This difficulty, however, cannot make the knowledge of the substance-universal, as the universal character of all substances, impossible of realization. Causality is only the medium through which we come to the knowledge of the substance-universal, and even if the latter be a wider concept, there will be no difficulty in seizing hold of it as the constitutive ground of substance as a class. The concept of inherent causality, we know, is not intelligible without a determinant and as this determinate, again, cannot be anything else than the substance-universal, the definition of substance by inherent causality has got its utility. In fact, apart from the evidence of perception, the possibility of substancehood as the universal character of all substances can be inferred only from causality. Although, causality is not a necessary concomitant of substancehood, being a temporal determination, still it is the unfailing means of our knowledge of the latter as the universal that functions

as a determinant of causality. That substancehood does not necessarily co-exist with causality and is therefore, independent of this functional characteristic, is not denied. The Buddhist objection that, causality is only an accidental determination, therefore, does not stand in the way of our knowledge of it. The inherent causality, which is found in all substances, is thus an independent proof that established the existence of the substance-universal as its determinant.

From this discussion we can conclude that the definition of substance by means of inherent causality is possible and useful. More widely, the definition of substance which has been given by Kanāda, is more justifiable and logically acceptable definition than that of the Buddhists.

IV

In the previous section we were concerned with finding a satisfactory definition of substance as given by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. In the present section we shall try to discuss various types of substances as admitted by them. Finally we shall also discuss the theory of atomic substances (paramānuvāda) as advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers and the Buddhist critique of it.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have admitted nine different substances, each exclusive of the rest, but all ultimately conformable to the notion of substance as such. They are following :- earth(pṛthivī), Water(ap), fire or light(tejas), air(vāyu), ākāśa, time (kāla), soul (ātman) and mind (manas).[39] Among these nine substances (dravyas) recognised by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers five of them, namely, earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa are material elements (bhûtāni); and the rest four, i.e., space (deśa), time(kāla), mind(manas) and soul(ātman) are non-material,(though not necessarily

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39. Kṣhityaptejomarud byomkāla dig-dehinau manah / Dravyānyth gunā rûpaṁ rasa gandhatataḥ param. II, Viśvanāth, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay), Verse No. 3.

spiritual, in the sense consciousness not being to essential quality of them).

The physical order has been explained in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system in terms of the five physical substances - earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa. Every physical substance (bhûta-dravya) has some specific qualities perceptible to an external sense.[40] The specific qualities of earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound respectively. The soul, no doubt, has a number of specific qualities, viz, consciousness, pleasure, pain, etc.[41], still it can not be classified as bhûta, as these qualities can be apprehended only through the operation of the mind which is the internal sense-organ (antaḥkarana). A physical substance or bhûta, therefore, can also be defined as a substance possessing some specific qualities which is absent in the soul(ātman).

Among the five physical substances, ākāśa differs from others in many important respects. Ākāśa is a non-corporal(amûrta) substance and therefore possesses unlimited

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40. Praśastapāda, Bhāṣya,(Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares,1895), p.22.

41. Ibid, p.24.

magnitude, it is also devoid of tactility(sparśa). The other four material substances, on the other hand, are limited in magnitude and characterized by tactility with all its implications. These substances, again have the capacity of producing composite substance out of themselves, i.e., of being their formative causes(samavāyikārana). Earth, for example, is such a cause of a substance like jar.[42] But ākāśa is incapable of being the constitutive stuff of any substance. Again, the specific quality of ākāśa, i.e., sound, is non pervading(avyāpyavṛtti); that is, its incidence at any particular moment is confined within the limits of a part of ākāśa, and its existence in that part is not incompatible with its absence in any other part of the same. The specific qualities of the other four material substances are, in contrast, pervasive of them. And these substances necessarily possess some of the important characterististics by means of which matter is ordinarily sought to be defined. Such characteristics are size, shape, impenetrability and mobility. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Philosophers treat these substances as material principles which are neither transmutable into one another nor reducible to a common ground. Each of them,

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42. Ibid.

according to them, is a fundamental and homogeneous kind of matter, characterized by its own specific quality or quality-group.

All the material bodies, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, are composed of extremely minute, in visible and infrasensible particles, i.e., atoms(parāmanu) of the four material substances such as earth, water, fire and air. It is the common knowledge that finer and finer constituents or parts. In other words, every material thing is divisible into parts, which are necessarily finer than itself. If we push the process of division further and further, we shall, of course, come by finer into finer-parts. This finest part is called atom(paramānu) by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the basic material of this visible universe are, therefore, the four different kinds of atoms which can never be destroyed. An atom or parāmanu is eternal because it is a substance which is partless like other.[43] Udayana in his Ātmatattvaviveka argues that partlessness and producedness are contradictory to each

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43. "Paramānuḥ nitya dravyatva satyam avayavatvāt ākāśa vat". Śrīdhara: Nyāyakandali,(Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Varanasi,1963),p.329.

other. Atoms are indivisible and partless. Therefore they are not produced. So they are eternal. There is a qualitative difference among these ultimate particles of matter or atoms, so that atoms of any particular element can give rise to the product of that element only. They are intrinsically inactive colourless and partless.

Now, the question arises; why should we admit the existence of atom or paramānu at all ? Vātsāyana in his Nyāya-Sūtra-Bhāṣya and Śaṇkara Miśra in his "Upaskāra" and Śrīdhara in his Nyāya-Kandalī holds that the existence of atom is deduced from the divisibility of a perceivable material objects into finer and finer parts. In this progressing decreasing scale of matter, its magnitude of minuteness (anuttva) must find its calmination in some substratum just as the magnitude of largeness(mahattva) which is found to occur on the progressively increasing scale attains its highest point in such all pervading substances as time, space, etc. This terminal point in the process of division of matter which refuses to be further divided is known as atoms(paramānus). The atoms thus mark the limit of divisibility of matter. Udayana argues in his 'Kiranāvali' that, the above argument

involves the blemish (doṣa) of mutual dependence. The existence of minutest magnitude proves the existence of an atom. Again the existence of an atom proves of the minutest magnitudes.[44] Some may say that matter is essentially a continuous structure and therefore every bits of matter, however small it may be is infinitely divisible. But Sridhara in his 'Nyāyakandali' and Jayanta Bhatta in his 'Nyāyamañjari' argues that if all objects be alike divisible indefinitely, it would be difficult to account for the observed variation of magnitudes in gross matter. Thus, for instance, if a mustardseed and a mountain were supposed to be constituted of an equally infinite divisibility of matter necessarily implies, it would lead us to the absurd positions to think that the size of both the seed and the mountain is the same.[45]

The Buddhists phenomenalists may question again that, inspite of equality in the number of parts two bodies are found to vary in size, and it is because of the fact that the parts of the larger body are themselves larger than those of smaller body or because the parts

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44. Paramānu siddhau anuparimāna siddhoi paramānu siddhi. Udayanāchāryya,'Kiranāvali (Benars Sanskrit Series, Beneras),

45. "Sarvesām anuvasstita avayavatva merusarṣapay tulya parimānatva pratītiḥ". Śrīdhara,Nyāyakandali,(Vizianagram, Sanskrit Series,Varanashi,1963),Page.330.

are packed together more loosely in the former than in the latter. But Udayana in '<u>Kiranāvalī</u>' holds that, this objection is an unteanable one. Difference in size between two things is possible only when at least one of them is of finite extension. But how can a thing be finally extended whose constituent parts are supposed to be infinite in number ? In short, in this case there will be no final unit of a determinate size in respect of which the difference in size between two things can be logically explained.

Again, the Mādhyamika Buddhists attack this atomic theory by saying that in the process of division of matter. We come to a terminal stage no doubt. But it is not because we have discovered certain atoms which can not be further divided but because nothing is left to be divided. The ultimate nature of all things, according to them, is void (<u>śûnya</u>). But Uddyotkara in his <u>Nyāya-Vārtika</u> shows this objection in the following way: Division is possible only if there is a thing to be divided. That thing really constitutes the base (<u>ādhāra</u>) on which division is to rest. However for the process of division may be carried on it can at no times annual its base or end invaeuity because

division minus the divisible is inconceivable and absurd as digging a cave in empty space.

Again, the question is raised; Does ākāśa which is simple and all pervading principle exist in the inside of an atom or not ? The admission of the former alternative will make an atom further divisible and that of the second will reduce ākāśa to a thing of limited magnitudes. Uddyotkara answers that this objection springs from a misconception of the nature of relation of ākāśa to the atoms. Ubiquity has been defined as conjunction or with all substances of limited magnitudes[46] and the conjunction of ākāśa with the atoms is not denied. Hence, ākāśa is certainly ubiquitous. But the question of the existence of ākāśa with the atoms does not arise at all, as an atom has neither inside nor outside. Ubiquity does not mean conjunction with even what is non-existent. The inside of atom does not effect the ubiquity of ākāśa at all. Now the existence of atom is admitted.

From these combination of these atoms gross material objects are originated. The process of origination is as

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46. Yan mūrtimat tena sarvena sambandha iti sarvagatetvārthaḥ. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārtika, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), iv, ii, 20, p. 517.

follows. The atoms confoined together give rise to a binary compound which is technically called dvyanuka. The dvyanuka is infinitely small and therefore imperceptible. Three such binaries suitably adjusted produce a triad or trasarenu which is the minimum visible entity. Its magnitude is finite and all other finite objects are made out of it. To the question how the finiteness of the trasarenu arises from the infinitely small size of the atoms, the answer given is that, it is due to the number and arrangement of constituent atoms. The qualities of all producers are to the qualities of atoms of which they are compared.

We already describes that atom is not visible and they are not capable of directly producing gross material objects. There is an intermediate entity called dvyanuka which is the result of the combination of couple of atoms. But what is the logical necessity of assuming the existence of dyād ? To answer this question Śrīdhara argues in his Nyāya-kandali that if the single eternal substance like atom is supposed to be directly productive there would be perpetual condition for production and production would never cease, which contradicts the notion of pralaya (cosmic dissolution) admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

philosophy. Therefore, the gorss matters are directly produced out of something which themselves are non-eternal (dvyanuka).

It should be noted here that the gorss material object which is brought into existence by the conjunction of atoms in an entierely new product which did not pre-exist in its parts (asatkārya-vāda). The relation which holds between the new products and the atoms or between the whole and its parts is one of the inherence(samavāya).

Śaṁkara is his commentary on Brahmasûtra and Vasubandhu in his Vriṇsatitīkā have raised objection against the conjunction between two things. They argue that the conjunction between two things is possible only in respect of their parts and since the atoms have no parts they would coalise at one point and the result would be a failure of accretion of gross magnitudes. To answer this difficulty the Saûtrāntika Buddhists advocates the paramānupuñjavāda according to which, the atoms informing the gross material objects, do not actually come into contact which one another, but merely assembly together very closely. Raghunātha Śiromoni, the famous Neo-Naiyāyika

of Bengal, suggests another solution. He advocates trutivāda according to which, the gross visible, truti or trasareṇu, is the ultimate unit of matter. But the classical Nyāya answers that the above solutions are untenable. In the famous case the gross material object would become imperceptible since the atoms are. In the latter case, the truti can not be the ultimate unit of matter since, it is visible entity and all visible entities and further divisible into parts.[47] Hence, Śrīdhara is of opinion that the conjunction among the partless atoms must be admitted. He says that for conjunction it is not necessary that substances should have parts, for even an impartile substances like ākāśa is found to be in conjunction with other partless substance like the soul. Again, both the soul and the mind are partless entities; yet they are found in conjunction with each other. Hence each case of conjunction it is to be explained as determined by the special nature of substance conjoined. The principle which makes the conjunction possible in the case of atom is not the compositeness of the factors, but the possession of a definite magnitude (mūrtatva) and touchability (sparśatva). These two characters are the principle of exclusion and

47. Trasareṇuh sāvayavaḥ cākṣuṣa dravyatva ghatavat. Raghunāth Śiromani, Padārthatattvanirupana, (Benares Sanskrit Series, 1916), p. 13.

resistance. An atom having characteristics thus excludes another atom and prevents mutual absorption Uddyotkara in his Nyāyavārtika points out that the fact that conjunction and resistance are observed in composite bodies is made the basis of a general conclusion that for conjunction and resistance atom must be composite. But this is nothing but an argument by analogy.

The combination or conjunction of atom in performing gross material objects requires activity or motion. But the atoms are supposed to be passive or devoid to activity in nature. So from which source their motion or activity is derived ? To answer Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers say that all atoms are combined into the multifarious things of the world by an omnicient and omnipotent conscious agent who is God. The creative will of God sets the atoms in motion and the world is created by their combination. But God's will in this respect is not arbitrary. It is determined by the prospective experience (bhoga) of the individual souls. The experience of the individual soul in its term is determined by the moral disposition (adṛṣta) it has acquired in his previous life. This means that God has created the world according to dharma and adharma in the individual soul.

Dharma means such disposition acquired in the previous life as it is to yeild unpleasant experience in the present life. Hence, we find that God guides the process of creation according to the adṛṣta of the individual soul. Hence, when Śaṁkara attacked the Vaiśeṣika atomism by saying that, an intelligent principle like adṛṣta cannot account for the notion of atom in the process of creation he had in mind the ancient, view of Vaiśeṣika which did not admit the existence of God. But Śaṁkara's charges holds no longer when the latter Vaiśeṣika thinkers introduced the notion of God in their philosophy.

CHAPTER - 2

WHOLE AND PARTS (avayavi and avayavas)

I

We have had occasions to mention in the previous chapters that the realists differ radically from the phenomenalists on the question of the ontological status of whole and its part (avayavin and avayavas) and their corresponding relation with each other. According to the phenomenalists the whole is nothing but mere aggregate of its parts. But the realists hold that the whole is ontologically different from its parts and is something over and above them. In Indian philosophy the phenomenalistic position is represented by the Buddhists. According to the Buddhists the whole as such is nonest, it is nothing but parts existing together. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, advocate the realistic position in this regard as against the Buddhists. According to them, the production of sensible material order from infrasensible atoms is explainable only on the basis of the assumption that the whole is different from its parts. We shall discuss the ontological status of the whole and part (avayavi and avayavas) in detail in the next section of this chapter. In this section let us deal with the epistemological problems relating to the concept of avayavi and avayavas (whole and parts): how is the whole

(avayavin) known by us ? Is it perceived or inferred ? Or is there any other modes of knowledge by which it can be cognised ?

The common linguistic usage in which the visual perception of a thing, say, a tree, is expressed is : we see or perceive a tree. But when we say that, what do we actually perceive ? As a matter of fact we perceive only the front part of the tree with which our visual senses (eyes) are in contact. But what about the back part of the tree, which we can not see directly ? Since our eyes do not have any direct contact with it, we can not say that the knowledge of the back part of the tree is perceptual. In this case what happens is this: on perceiving directly the front part, our intellect indirectly infers or interprets that there exists a back part of the tree with which our visual senses are not in direct contact. But this intellectual interpretation or inference follows that direct perception of the front part of the tree with such inconceivable repidity and instinctive spontaneity that uncritical common sense fails to take any notice of it and belives the knowledge of the whole tree (including its unperceived but infered back part) to be wholly perceptual.

The main objective of our discussion now is to examine whether there is any interpretative or inferential components in our so called perceptual knowledge of an object. The philosophical school known as realism asserts that there is no place of inference in direct perception of an object, whereas the school of phenomenalism upholds the opinion that no perception of worldly object is possible without inference. In Indian philosophy the Nyāya philosophers largely represent realistic position, but the phenomenalistic position is mainly represented by the Buddhists Logician (nyāya-vādino Bauddhāḥ).

According to Nyāya realists, in perceiving a part (avayava) of an object we perceive the whole (avayavi) of it, since the whole (avayavi) inheres in each of its part (avayavas). So we can directly perceive the whole object . But the Buddhist phenomenalists do not agree with the above contention of the Naiyāyikas. They hold that only the unique particulars called 'svalakṣaṇas' are objects of direct indeterminate perception. Perception, according to the Buddhist phenomenalists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of senses, the pure sensation of an efficient 'point instant' (svalakṣaṇa) of external reality and is absolutely devoid of the forms of the understanding

(kalpanāpoḍam).[1] Moreover the Buddhists are of opinion that the so called perception of the empirical objects like an apple or a tree which the Naiyāikas call the determinate perception (savikalaka pratyakṣa) is really the construction (kalpanā) of human mind on the basis of the indeterminate perception of the unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas). These 'particulars' are empirically conceived by the Nyāya realists but these are transcendentally understood by the Buddhists. The Buddhists' particular is the point instant, the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa), and is radically different from all constructions (kalpanās) of the human mind. But the realists' particular is the concrete physical individual objects of our every day experience like an apple or a tree, which for the Buddhists is a construction of our mind on the basis of transcendental particulars. The Buddhists agree with the Mimāṁsakas in holding that in all percetion there must be an element of novelty, i.e., a felt addition to our experience. Cognition in the true sense must be a new cognition, cognition of the object not yet cognised anadhigata-artha-adhigantṛ). If this be the case, argues the Buddhist, then such feeling to novelty belongs only to the first moment of sensation in the knowledge of an

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1. Dharmakrīti, Nyāyabindu,(Bibliotheca Indica; Calcutta, 1929), Chap.-1.

object. In the following moments when the attention of perceiver is aroused, it is no more that pure sensation which it was in the first moment; it becomes the repeated cognition of the first flash of awareness. True perception, therefore, according to the Buddhists, is always momentary sensation; enduring perception is not perception at all; it is not cognition proper, it is re-cognition. The cognitive element of our mind is limited to that moment only when we get the first awareness of the object's presence, i.e., the unique particulars. All the worldly object, according to Buddhists, are mental construction or imagination, and this mental construction is based on the unique particulars of the object. For example let us take the proposition 'This is a tree'. In this proposition the 'This' represents a qunique particulars (svalakṣaṇa), but the element 'tree' is the quality of 'This'. The Buddhist phenomenalists opine that is seeing an object we always go beyond the given, and this going beyond can be construed as inference. The Buddhists use the term inference to refer to any type of active mental construction. In this way the Buddhist phenomenalists establish that there must be some inferential elements in perception of an worldly object.

But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers do not agree with the above contention of the Buddhists. They hold that even if the inference of the unperceived part were possible, that would at best provide us with the knowledge of another part side by side with the perceived one, and not with the knowledge of anything 'whole' to which these parts might be refered and in respect of which the notion of a 'whole' tree might arise. Again, the Naiyāyikas argue that if it be said that the knowledge of a whole tree is obtained by effecting a synthesis of the two parts- its perceived front part and the inferred back part - the question would at once crop up: how could such a synthesis be possible where there is no common ground and point of reference ? Synthesis implies the connecting of several experiences by reference to one unitive principle. But no such unitive principle is admitted by the Buddhists. So the two parts of a tree, hold the Buddhists, are not really the parts of a unitive whole, but only discrete units constituting no more than an aggregate. It is natural, therefore, that when two parts come to be cognized, they can not be felt as complementary to each other. They appear simply as unrelated items, indifferent slices of matter which are incapable of being synthesised or integrated in such a manner as to give rise to the idea of a tree as a single composite entity.

The Naiyāyikas further argue that even if we admit that the idea of the tree arises when two parts (the perceived front and infered back part) are cognised together, there is nothing to indicate that the tree is cognised inferentially. We may reconstruct or imagine a thing by ideally joining its parts. But the knowledge of the thing which has been achived thus is by no means inferential in character. For, by any act of inference we neither relate the facts of experience nor experience facts as related, but know one thing through the medium of another because of an invariable relation (vyāpti) between the two. Moreover, the tree can not be an object of inference because the psychological condition which is necessary for such inference are found to be absent. If the tree as an aggregate of its parts is to be validly inferred from the perception of one of these parts, it is necessary that the aggregate should be known to have an invariable relation with the part in question, which it does not have. Again, the whole contention proceeds on the supposition that there can be an inference of the unperceived part from the perceived one. There is, however, no warrant for this supposition. We can not, for instance, accept the proposition. 'The front necessarily possesses a back' as a valid major premiss.

For, how can one part possess another ? It is only a whole (avayavin) which can possess parts, but the whole is denied by the Buddhist phenomenalists. Moreover, the Buddhists make an assumption: the back part exists invariably as an associate of the front. But, the Naiyāyikas argue that it can not be explained why the two parts should at all come together. These two parts are discrete units having ordinarily no capacity for aggregating. However, these are found to be invariably related only when they come under the operation of the causal principle in one of the following ways: either when they are related as cause and effect, or when they co-operate to produce a common effect and are thus members of a single causal collection (sāmagrī), or when they are the co-effects of a common causal factor. But, none of the above ways of the causal operation is found here, on the basis of which the invariable relation of these two discrete units, i.e., the front and the back part of the tree, can be ascertained.

The Nyāya realists are of opinion that though there is an element of truth in the common sense view that the constituent parts of a whole are present in the whole, but

it is also possible to say that the whole in some sense resides or is present in the parts of it.[2] As we ordinarily say that the branches, trunk etc, of a tree are in the tree, it can equally be said that the tree is present also in the branches or trunk of it. If it be so, the 'whole' tree is simultaneously present in each of its parts. The 'whole' tree is contained in its parts by the relation of inherence (samavāya), while the parts are contained in the whole tree by the reverse relation of inherence. That is why we see the tree in the branches as much as we see branches in the tree. There is no reason, therefore, to suppose that only the part is perceived, not the tree as whole.[3]

But the Buddhist phenomenalists in their own defence reiterate that the so called 'whole' of the Naiyāyikas is nothing but the aggregate of parts. The parts are existent whereas the whole is a mere figment of imagination (kalpanā). It has no distinct existence apart from the parts. But the Naiyāyikas reject this contention of the Buddhists with the help of a reduction ad absurdum form of

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2. Gautama, Nyāyasūtra, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), Sūtra No.2.1.32.

3. Nahindriyena ekadeśe tatsahacārito' vayavi na sannikrṣtaḥ tena yathi kadeśah sannikarṣād upalabhyate evam avayavy api sannikarṣād upalabhyate. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārtika, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), 11.1.32, p.215.

arguments, i.e., nothing can be apprehended unless the whole is established first as a distinct percept.[4] They claim that sensory awareness of a part or a piece or a surface would be impossible unless the whole is accepted immediately as a surfaces. To substantiate this position the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers put forward what is usually known as atomism (paramānuvāda).

According to this atomic theory we can not apprehend a part or parts unless we apprehend the whole. For, parts are parts only in relation to the whole, and each part must have further parts or pieces. We can regress in this way until we reach in the 'partless' atoms. Atoms are only parts, never wholes, and they have no further parts of their own. But atoms are by definition imperceptible. So, there what happens is this: atoms, the constituent parts of a whole, are not perceptible until the minimum gross visible 'whole' object is produced by the constituent parts; i.e. the atoms. In this way it is shown that if perception has to grasp anything, it must grasp whole first before it can perceive its parts.

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4. Nyāyasûtra, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta) Sûtra No. 2.1.35.

Again, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers argue that all things that have different makers (kartṛ) and different potencies (śakti)[5] must be regarded as different; threads and cloths have different makers and different potencies; hence they are different. Kamalśīla clarifies the term 'ādi' occuring in 'bibhinnakartṛśaktyādeḥ' as meaning 'kārya-kāla-parimāna', so that the whole expression means' different markers (kartṛ), different effects (kārya), different periods (kāla), and different sizes (ākāra).[6] Difference in these respects is antagonistic to identity. Wherever we find these features, we have to conclude that the things are different.[7]

In reply to the above objection of Kamalśīla, that is, the differences of makers and potencies are irreconcilable with identity and unity, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers assert that these lead to possession of contradictory qualities and contradictories assuredly can not have the same locus.[8] The makers of threads are prior to cloth

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5. ".... bibhinna kartṛśaktyādeḥ" Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgrah (Buddha Bharati Series), P.264.

6. Ibid(Kamalśīla's cementary); as refered by Biswanath Sen in his book The concept of part and whole(avayava and avayavi).(Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta), p.32.

7. "Ye bhinna kartṛ-kārya-kāla parimānaste bibhinnaḥ", ibid.

8. "Viruddha dharmādhyāsamātra-nibandhano hi bhāvanām parasparato bheadḥ", Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgrah, (Buddha Bharati Series)p.264.

in time since they are seen before the cloth is manufactured; the length and breadth of cloth are different from those of each of the yarns (patasyāyāma vistarābhyāṁ yāvat pramānaṁ na tāvat pratyekam tantunāmasti). On these grounds which, the Naiyāyikas assert, are not inconclusive(nanaikāntika hetunām), they hold that the avayavin is distinct from the avayavas.*

The Buddhists do not admit the above contention of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Śāntarakṣita, a renowned Buddhist logician, raised several objections against the Nyāya theory. The first objection is from the view-point of the Saûtrāntika who is an avowed kṣanabhaṅgavādin. For him things are all momentary, pataparākkālina - tantu and patasmāna-kālinatantu, threads just before the manufacture of cloth and those co-existing with cloth are different. If the Naiyāyikas mean to say that the avayavin is different from the avayavas just preceeding its emergence, his argument is futile (sādhana vaiphalyam)[9], for it seeks to prove the proven or to establish what is already established(siddha-sādhana-doṣa).[10] Such difference is openly admitted and

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* This argument is stated in the book of Biswanath Sen, The Concepts of Part and Whole(Avavaya and Avayavi),(Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta,pp.32-33.

9. Ibid, p.241, Verse-578.

10. Yadi prathamāvasthābhābibhyo' samādhigata patākhyānebhyastantubhyah patasya bheda sādhyate,tadā siddhani sādhyate. Kamalśīla,Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā(Buddha Bharati Series)on Verse-578.

unreservedly accepted by the Buddhists, that is, the kṣanabhaṅgavādin Buddhists. Secondly, if the Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, is out to prove difference of avayavin from the avayavas constituting it and co-existing with it their argument, Śāntarakṣita asserts, is fallacious, the grounds adduced being asiddha (or unestablished).[11] Kamalśīla states the Buddhists objection thus; "If the cloth were a recognised entity (prasiddhas) as something different from the yarns existing along side, then it might be proved to have different makers, potencies etc. in relation to and in contrast to the yarns. As it stands, the cloth, however, is not recognised as such and the opponents i.e., the Naiyāyikas, have till to prove its difference from the yarns.[12] Kamalśīla here tried to say that; for the Naiyāyikas the probandum is 'tantubheda', the hetu is in turn 'bibhinnakartṛ kārya' etc., and the pakṣa is 'the cloth (the form of the pratijñā being 'patah tantubhinnah bibhinna kartṛtyadeh, i.e., the cloth is different from threads because of difference of makers etc.) But the pakṣa is here asiddha - it is not yet proved, and in such an unestablished locus or dharmi, the hetu dharma can not

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11. "Atha patasmānakālabhāvino ye tantavastebhyaḥ patasyānyatvam prasādhyate, tadā hetunām asiddhate". Ibid.

12. Yādi tadānim tantu vatiriktastatsamānakālabhāvi patah prasiddho bhavet tadā tasya tantuvyapekṣayā vibhinnakartṛ tvadayodharmāḥ siddhayuḥ, ... sa etvāyam tantuvyatireki pato no siddhaḥ tadbhedasyaiya prasadhyitum prastutatīyāt". Ibid,p.242.

reside. Hence, there is the fallacy of asiddhahetu, this particular type being known as āśrayāsiddha doṣa. So, from the Śāntarakṣitas contention it can be said that the avayavin can not be proved by means of any valid argument, that it is not inferable at all. This is, we should note, not a criticism of any inference in particular where by the avayavin is shought to be proved but a general and broad criticism of the very inferability of the avayavin. The Naiyāikas reject the above argument of the Buddhists they point out that if the sādhya or the probandum were to be an admitted entity recognised by both the disputants, then what was the necessity of proving it at all ? It is already established and any attempt to prove it would involve the fallacy of siddha-sādhana. What is needed is that it should be recognised by one of the parties. In fact, the Buddhist's plea is self-contradictory. For when does the Buddhist recognise an entity ? Before proving it or after ? Obviously it can not be the former, for certainly the Buddhists do not recognise unproved padārthas. But the latter course is also not open to the Buddhists, since they can not prove an unrecognised padārthas.

As regards the point that the avayavin can not be the subject of inference (i.e. pakṣa), the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

philosophers stand in the same. An alīka padārtha, an entity recognised by none (at least by neither party), can not certainly be the pakṣa, for them there would be the fallacy of āśrayāsiddhi, e.g., sky-lotus is fragrant.[13] Here the pakṣa is some thing universally regarded as non existent. But an entity admitted by one of the combatants can well serve the purpose of 'pakṣa'. Indeed this is an established practice amongst philosophers and even a cursory glance at the arguments advanced by them against their opponents will bear this out.

Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers establish that, the Buddhists plea of non-inferability of the avayavin is untenable and that the avayvin can be inferred, where and if necessary. This must not be taken to mean that the avayavin can not be perceived. That would be wrong, for, we see, according to the Naiyāyikas that, the avayavin is capable of being perceived, given the condition of perception. What the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers really mean is that the avayavin can be known both by the perception and inference. Effectiveness of one pramāna does not signify ineffectiveness of another. This is because the

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13. Annambhatta, Tarkasaṁgraha, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p.60.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers believe in both pramāṇa-saṁplava and pramana vyavasthā and not, like the Buddhists the pramāṇa-vyavasthā, only.[14] Again, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists urge that apart from inference, perception also points out to the existence of the avayavin. Most of the objects with which we are familiar such as tables, chairs, trees, we know by perception. If they were all just the aggregates of atoms (paramānu-sañcaya) they would have remained invisible. An atom being atīndriya, a bundle of them would have remained invisible. Hence, nothing would be left over for perception if the avayavin were not admited.[15]

The Buddhists also raise the objection against this agrument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. According to them if the avayavin were an object of perception, there would have been no controversy about it, for, we would have only to see it, to recognise it. The very fact that there is more than one opinion about it which irretrievably indicates its non-perceptual character.

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14. Kim punaḥ pramānam prameyamabhisamplavantetha pratti prameyaṁ vyavatishanta iti, ubhayathadarśanam. Phanibhuṣana Tarkavāgiśa, Nyāyabhāṣya, (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1963), p.1.1.3.

15. Yādi hyāvayavi na syāt, sarvāgrahaṇaprasangaḥ; pramānunāmtindriyatvat. Kamalśīla', Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā. (Buddha Bharati Series), On Verse-561.

Not that we do not perceive any thing but that we do not perceive anything as an avayavin distinct from avayavas.[16] In fact we have only the multitude of atoms left over and it is this we perceive. Though atoms are individually invisible, collectively they are not so. It is therefore, an unwarranted proposition that atoms are ever imperceptible. This may be true for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers who hold the eternity of atoms, but for the Buddhist atoms are ever changing and when they attain a specific condition, they can well be objects of perception.[17]

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have also given the answer of the above objections of Buddhist phenomenalists. According to the Naiyāyikas we have knowledge of the from 'this is a table','this is a chair' etc. which can not be doubted. It is attested by introspective deliverence as also by linguistic usage. When there is a table before us we know by anuvyavasāya that 'we are seeing a table', we are seeing a chair' etc. That we are seeing one things a

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16. Avayava-vyātirekenavayavino' anupalambhāt. Jayanta Bhatta, Nyāyamañjarī,(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), P.114.

17. A siddhamānūnāmatīndriyatyam; viśeṣtavasthaprāptanāmindriya grahavat. Yasya hi nitayah paramānavaḥ iti pakṣaḥ tam pratyānunām viśeṣubhāvāt sarvadatendriyatvam syāt, nāsmānprati! Kamaśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā (Buddha Bharati Series) On Verse-586.

single object, is the clear verdict of 'introspection' and nobody contradicts it, since it belongs to the common stock of knowledge. Language also bears this out use of singular number of the 'table', chair, etc. and of indefinite articles 'a', 'an' before the corresponding nouns show beyond doubt that the content of perception in such case is a single object (ekabuddhi). It is one, not many. The Naiyāyikas ask: how would the Buddhists account for this perceived unity?[18] For the Naiyāyikas the reason is obvious. This unity indicates that the object is a unitary entity, i.e., an avayavin. The Buddhists differ and hold that this sense of unity(ekabuddhi) is really nānārtha-viṣayaka, not abhinnārtha viṣayaka.[19] It relates to many and not to a single substance. The object in all such cases is a group of atoms and not any avayavīdravya. Therefore, the knowledge of unity in respect of this plurality is false. It is illusory.[20] We are

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18. Ekamidaṁ dravyam ityekabuddhervisayam paryanujojyoh kimekaonddhirabhinnārtha viṣay ? Aho nānārtha viṣayeti. Phanibhuṣan Tarkavāgiśa, Nyāyabhāṣya(Calcutta Sanskrit Series), On Verse, 2.1.55.

19. "Evamanusu saṅcitesva grahyamānapṛthaktvesva kamidamityu paoadyate buddhiriti" Vātsāyana,Nyāyabhāṣya(Vizianagram, Sanskrit Series,Beneras) On verse 2.1.35.

20. "eka vibhramāt. Śāntarakṣita,Tattvasaṁgrah,(Buddha Bharati series) On, Kārikā-588, and Yathā dipādau satyāpi bhedah ekatva vibhrāmo bhavati tathā nairāntaryananeka sasmātara padārtha samavedānato yamekotra vibhrama. Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā of Kamalśīla,(Buddha Bharati Series) on the Kārikā - 588.

mistaking a number of avayavas closely situated for an avayavi. The Buddhists further observe that this is nothing unusual and is not the only instance of its kind. We have many other such instances where many is mistakenly treated as one. A forest is but a collection of trees, each existing separately from others and not very far from them. Yet, when refering to those trees together, we say 'one forest', or 'there is a forest' An army, for example, is nothing but the aggregates of four senāṅgas elephant, horse, chariot, and foot,[21] all are distinct and separate. Though they are many, we refer to them all by the omnibus expression 'an army' or 'there goes an army'. In both these cases of sense of unity is non-veridical and the use of singular number in language is misleading. Similarily, a pot or a cloth is in reality an aggregate of parts (avayavas), a cluster of components and not a whole (avayavi) and our perception of it as a thing (avayavin) is ayathārtha.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists have formulated a number of agruments to refute the above contentions of the Buddhists. Firstly, they raise the question: how is it

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21. Phanibhuṣan Tarkavāgiśh, Nyāyadarśana (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1963), On page-173.

possible for a group of atoms to be perceived when atoms are each of them imperceptible ? Since, the atoms are imperceptible by nature, and a thing which is imperceptible by nature can never be perceptible. So, as an atom is not perceptible, a group of atoms is not perceptible also.

Secondly, the Naiyāyikas point out that the illustrations of army and forest are far from happy infact the Buddhists are incorrect. A forest or an army is not at all an aggregate or avayavasamūha, each of them is an avayavin. Therefore, the use of singular number in these cases is perfectly in order and our perception of unity is fully justified by the objective facts.

Thirdly, even if the army or the forest were regarded as aggregates, that would not help the Buddhists, for on their analogy he would not be able to explain how a number of atoms can be perceived as one. The components of these things, viz., senāṅgas,(i.e., elephant, horse, etc.) and vanāṅgas, i.e. trees etc.) are by nature perceptible. Under appropriate conditions they can be perceived and distinguished from one another (gṛhyamāna pṛthaktvamat). It

is only certain frustrating factors like distance, dim light etc. which make it impossible for us to discern their separateness.[22] Now, false perception or bhākta pratyaya is possible when something is presented to the senses and apprehended in its general character; the specific features being unnoticed. The Character perceived bears a strong resemblance(bhakti)[23] to a feature of the illusory content. In case of forest the trees are apprehended not in their specific character of 'manyness' (nānātva) or 'separateness'(pṛthaktva) but as a single non-distinguished something which has the 'look' of a forest. Hence, we falsely perceive the trees as a forest.[24] In case of a jar or any other single entity, the atoms which appear together as a jar must first of all be presented to the senses with their separateness obscured. But the atoms being supersensible, can not be apprehended; and if the dharmin is not apprehended there can be no question of failure to take note of their distinctive character. Therefore, atoms can not be held to account for our false perception of unity. The fourth objection is that, every

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22. Senāṅgesu vanāṅgasu ca dûrādagṛahyamānapṛthaktvesu ekamidami tyupadadyate buddhiḥ. Vātsāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), 2.1.36.

23. Bhaktirnāmātathābhûtasya tathābhāviviḥ sāmānyam; ubhayena bhajyate iti bhāktiḥ. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārttika, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benaras), pp.243-244.

24. Gṛhyamānagrahanasya canya nimittatvāt na tu paramānavo gṛhyante teṣāmatīndriyatvāt" ibid, p.243.

illusion presuposes a veridical experience of the illusory object. A man having rope-snake illusion must have had earlier experience of snake in a valid cognition, otherwise he can not even know that there is such a thing as a snake in the world for less save illusion of it.[25] Similarly, mithyā ekabuddhi presupposes Yathārtha ekabuddhi-fasle perception of unity presuppose of genunine perception of it in the past. But no such perception is possible on the Buddhists theory of the cosmos. There is no unity anywhere, either in the physical or psychical realm. All things are only agglomerations or saṁghāta, hence there can be no veridical experience of unity. In that case, ask the Naiyāyikas, how can there be false perception of many atoms as a unity ? This is also borne out by the fact that if the Buddhists still try to prove the possibility of such false perception, they will find no instance(dṛṣṭānta) in their support. The illustrations of army and forest, as we have just now seen, will not do so. The Buddhists can not cite any instance where a real unity of many atoms has actually prceived. Hence, one of the five essential elements (pañcavayaya) of demonstrative argument(parāthanumān) is lacking viz. udāhārana or illustration. Therefore, the

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25. "Mithyāpratyaya apyete nabhavanti pradhānābhāvāt", ibid,p.244.

Buddhist view about illusion of many atoms as one is untenable one.

The Buddhist phenomenalists try to answer the above argument of the Naiyāyikas in the following way. According to them, (the Buddhists) though such sapakṣas are not forthcoming in the field of visual perception. Yet these can be shown in other fields viz. in auditory, tactile, olfactory and gustatory perception (indriyāntara viṣayesva pratyayah). The Buddhists make no difference between substance and quality, and so the objects of the auditory, olfactory and gustatory perceptions are, for them, nothing but the aggregates of atoms(paramānusamûha).[26] A sound, for example is composed of sound paramānu. Now, when we here a sound, they are each a single content, i.e., one sound as distinguished from numerous other sounds we are sensing at other times. This is same in the case of taste, touch also. These are all numerically different and we can perceive their differences. Here, therefore, we get the required basis ofi illusory experience (pradhāna) a veridical perception of unity. The Buddhists may claim on this basis that the perception of many atoms as one is false.

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26. ...teṣām mate sabdadayo'pi sañcita eva. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā. (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), p.276.

The Naiyāyikas have raised some questions in the context of above Buddhist argument of sapakṣatva. They ask: why do the Buddhists regard the perception of one sound, one taste etc. as veridical ? Is there any distinction between experience of a sound and that of jar, in so far as they are experiences of unity ? In both cases we perceive a unity; yet the Buddhists invest one with authenticity and denies the same to the other. Therefore, perceptions of unity in these fields cannot be cited as instances because of lack of any special, distinguishing feature in them.[27] Hence, the Buddhists view can not eventually be sustained and our experience of unity must be reckoned as valid.

Moreover, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers argue that as it is true that the constituent parts of a tree are present in the whole, it is also possible that the whole in some sense resides or present in its parts.[28] In other words it can be said that the tree is present also in the branches or trunk of it. Because, the tree

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27. Viśeṣahetvabhāvād dṛṣṭānta avyavasthā. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārttika, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneras) 1915, p.244.

28. Ibid, p.244 and Gautama, Nyāyasûtra (Bibliotheca Indica) on Sûtra No.2.1.32.

is contained in its parts, and must be present in each part simultaneously; as much as the parts, the branches etc. are contained in the tree. The tree is contained in its parts by the relation of inherence(samavāya). Hence we may see the tree in the branches as much as we see branches in the tree. There is no reason, therefore, to suppose that only the part is perceived, not the tree as whole.[29]

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29. Na hindriyena ekadeśe tat sahacārito' vayavi na sannikrṣtah,tena yathāi,kadeśabsannikarṣād upalabhyate evam avayavyapi sannikarṣād upalabhyate. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārttika,(Bibliotheca Indica,Calcutta),II,i.32, p.215.

II

In the foregoing section, we have discussed various epistemological problems concerning whole and part (avayavin) and avayavas): how is the whole known by us ? Is it perceived or inferred, or is there any other mode of knowledge by which it (the whole) can be cognised? In this section we shall mainly deal with the ontological status of whole and its parts. Accordingly we shall be concerned with the questions like: Is the whole something over and above its parts ? Or is it a mere aggregate or assemblage of parts ? How is the whole constituted and how is it related to its parts ?

We have already mentioned in the previous section that, according to the Buddhist phenomenalists, the whole is nothing but mere aggregate of its parts. The whole as such is nonest, it is nothing but parts existing together. On the other hand, the Nyāya realists opine that the whole is ontologically different from its parts and is something over and above them. The production of sensible material order from infrasensible atoms, according to them, is explainable only on the basis of the assumption that the whole (avayavas) is different from its parts (avayavas).

Both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists and the Buddhist phenomenalists admit that, the external material object which is commonly experienced as a 'whole' (avayavin) can be dessolved into discreate, detached, and disconnected ultimate realisties. The Nyāya realists explain these realities as paramānu and the Buddhists call these as svalakṣaṇas or kṣaṇas, or unique particulars or point-instants. By the combination of these atoms or svalakṣaṇas (unique particulars) the external world emerges. Though there are some apparent similarities between atoms (paramānu) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists and point-instants (kṣaṇas) or unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas) of the Buddhists, yet these two are fundamentally different.

The atom of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is a substance which possesses not only qualities like smell, taste, colour etc. but many universals like satta (existence), dravyatva (substanceness) prithivitva (earth-ness), etc. and also the differentiating entity called viśeṣa. All these properties, universals, and viśeṣa are objective entities having their essence separate from that of their substratum (atom). The atom of the Vaiśeṣika, therefore, being a substance and containing these separate entities

(properties) within it, would appear to be complex. Kṣaṇas of the Buddhists, on the other hand, are conceived as dharmas (properties). In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology they are described in terms of qualities (guṇas), colour, touch etc. and for that reason, they are sometimes felt to be qualities. Kṣaṇas, however, like a material substance, posses the property of sapatighatva, i.e. obstructability, which is defined as "the fact that the space occupied by one of them cannot, at the same time be occupied by another". But they are not to be equated with the substances of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the very idea of substance being foreign to the Buddhist thought. But atom, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, occupies the same space which is occupied by its effect dvy-anuka, which is also a separate substance. Apart from this Kṣaṇa is like a property. It is thus obvious that the conception of the Buddhist Kṣaṇas is different from that of the atom. But owing to their obvious similarty in being the smallest fragments of reality, the Buddhist Kṣaṇa is often spoken of as an atom (paramānuh). The term Kṣaṇa, however, can never be used for the atom(paramānuh) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika for the reason that the latter being felt to be eternal and can not be equated with the kṣaṇas

which is merely a momentary point instant. Now we shall return in our main discussion that both the kṣanas and atom are discrete and detached bits of reality. The external material world presented to us is, however, a unified reality or a synthesis of these realities, and the question arises as to what the unifying agency or the principle of synthesis is ? The Buddhists say that the synthetic principle is subjective only, i.e., it exists in our though and nowhere in the external world. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers declare that the basic principle is that whatever is experienced exists in the external world and therefore, the unifying or synthetic principal has an objective basis. As a result of the connection of two atoms, there arises a unified reality in the form of 'whole' avayavin, i.e., a dvyanuka which is different from atoms. Similarly, further avayavins emerge from dvyanukas. The avayavin, which is a seperate substance, has been conceived in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy as unification of parts, a synthetic principle. Thus, a dvyanuka is a synthetic principle of two atoms. This unifying principle, as already explained, emerges as an effect substance from the parts. There is another synthetic principle called the universal (sāmānya) which brings about

a synthesis of a different kind, i.e., in the form of a notion of commonness in similar objects. These two synthetic principles, i.e., the dvyanuka and sāmānya, ofcourse different in their nature and function. But they both have one common feature. In both the cases, there is one entity associated with many. The one avayavin associated with many parts in one case, and the one universal with many individuals in the other. To hold that there is an objective reality which is one yet associated with many both in point of time and of space, is fundamentally opposed to each other. According to the Buddhist, the external reality exists only in the form of discrete and disconnected moments. The 'no soul theory' (anātma-vāda) of the Buddhists implies that there is no unifying principle in the detached moments of reality. The 'no soul theory' (anātma-vāda) is crux of the teaching of the Buddha. The term ātman is used by the Buddhist in a wider sense. According to them, there is not only no permanent entity called soul in human beings or in other living creatures(pudgal-nairātmya) but there is no soul even in other inanimate external objects (dharma-nairātmya), which means that there is no substance in the form of a 'whole'(avayavin) residing in its parts.

Thus the 'no-substance theory' (adravya-vāda) is implied in the no soul theory, (sarvaṁ anātman). Thus the two principles, viz. the avayavin and sāmānya are the most disputed topics on which the Buddhist joins issue with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. We shall discuss about the universal (sāmānya) is a separate chapter. Now we shall be concerned with the controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists and the Buddhists phenomenalists on the problem of whole and part (avayavins and avayavas).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have advanced a number of arguments to prove avayavin (whole) to be different from its parts. The main argument of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas is this: This material world perceived by our senses is made up of atoms which on account of being minute are imperceptible, and therefore, there must exist objects made up of atoms which possess gross maguitude and are perceptible. These gross objects must be in the form of avayavins of their parts (avayavas), i.e., the atoms from which they must be different. The Buddhists raise objection that one single hair is not perceptible from distance but a mass of hair is perceptible. In the same way, one single atom is imperceptible, but a gross

number of them will be perceptible. In answer the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers say that a hair is not perceptible from a long distance but is perceptible by nature, because it can be seen from a close range. There is also a qualitative difference between the atom and a hair, because atoms are imperceptible by nature and consequently there is no question of their perceptibility: even a mass of atoms are not perceptible. Uddyotkara argues in this context that "those who believe that atoms themselves are the cause of comprehension of 'gross' objects like a jar should be asked whether the difference in the comprehension of atoms (which become perceptible) is due to some speciality being produced in them or without any such speciality ? If it is produced in them, we call it avayavin and if not, it would be a contradiction to say that the same atoms are both perceptible and imperceptible. The opponent may say that the congunction (saṁyog) of atoms is their speciality; and the atoms, in a mutual proximity, become perceptible on account of their conjunction. But the realists rejoin that it is not possible because atoms being imperceptible their conjunction also can not be perceived".[30]

30. Yasya paramānobo ghatādibuddhihetabo bhavanti sa ca idam prastbya kim,paramānab upagat viśeṣa iti. Kim cataḥ ? Yadyupgat viśeṣah,yot sau viśeṣan sotvavavḥ iti prāptam arthanupgativiśeṣa ta ebāta indriya aindriya kah ca iti mahān virodh. Viśeṣa saṁyogaḥ paramānumāṃ,te paraspara pratyastau satyam saṁyoga upakaranā upalapsyanta iti na, atindriya tvadnunāṁ,nātindriyanāṁ saṁyoga pratyakṣḥ bhavitumh iti",Uddyotkara,Nyāyavārtika(Biloliothera Indica),p.502.

Commenting on the above passage of Uddyotkara, Vācaspatimiśra quotes a verse from Dharmakīrti's Pramānavārttika which argues the Buddhist point of view thus: "what the contradiction is there, if many atoms, having acquired some excellence (atiśaya) which was absent in a single atom, cause comprehension of one gross object like the sense and others.[31] It means that the sense, manas, and an external object produce a knowledge when all of them work in concert, but each one of them separately does not do so. In answer to the above Buddhist question Vācaspati Miśra points out that Uddyotkara has already answered this question when he says that excellence or speciality in atoms can not be any thing other than the origination of an avayavin. To this the Buddhist rejoins; even for the origination of an avayavin, you (the Naiyāyika) will have to admit the emergence of a new quality (speciality) which will be its cause. Why not hold, then, the same quality as the cause of the knowledge of one gross object instead of introducing an immediary, avayavin.[32] In answer to this Vācaspati Miśra replies; "whatever is

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31. The verse in question is: "Ko vā virodho bahavaḥ samjātātiśayaḥ pṛthak/Bhaveyuḥ kāranam buddher yadi nāmendriyadivat" Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), p. 502.

32. "Na ca vam āgantukam āsādya paramānavo' vayavinām janayanti teniva sthūla-buddhiṁ, kṛtam avayavinā" Vācāspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras), p. 502.

comprehended in a cognition is regarded as the object cause (ālambana pratyaya) of that cognition.[33] Moreover he says that "our cognition can not have for its object mutually exclusive and most subtle atoms. Therefore, we have to assume the emergence of a gross object in form of an (avayavin). Otherwise, there cannot arise the knowledge of one gross objects because atoms are different from a gross object".[34] The Buddhists, however, point out that grossness or extension of the external object is not the attribute of an external object but the comprehension of the object (pratibhāṣa-dharma). The realists may rejoin: in that case, the knowledge which presents an external object as gross or extended will have to be regarded as an illusion'. Moreover, the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas assert that if it is true, then it is also true that there must have some cases in which there was the right perception of a real gross object. Because, illusion is always preceded by right knowledge. So, from the above discussion we can conclude that the atoms(parts) are the constituent elements of external objects (whole). Our next attempt will be to discuss how the whole (avayavin) is related to its component parts ? On this question of relation, to its

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33. Yad-abhāsa hi buddhis tad asyā ālambanapratyayaḥ, Ibid,p.502; line-19.

34. "Na ceyaṁ paraspara-vyavṛtta-pramā sukṣma-paramānu-ālambana,tathā sati sthūla bhedāt tad ekam iti na syāt". Ibid,p.502, Line-20.

the phenomenalists, i.e., the Buddhists, are sharply divided in opinion from their philosophical opponent, the Nyāya realists.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the whole (avayavin) is related to parts (avayavas) by the relation of inherence (samavāya) but not vice-versa.[35] The avayavas are samvāyin or the container(ādhāra) of the content avayavins. For example, in the case of a jar, the whole jar is related to its parts by the relation of samavāya, and the soil is the container (ādhāra) of the content whole jar. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers consider the samavāya as vyāpyavṛitti. They explain the constitution of the whole as follows: The parts come in contact with one another and then they make the whole (avayavin). And the new born whole (avayavins) is related to the parts (avayavas) by the relation of inherence (samavāya). And the whole, (avayavin),according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists is supposed to pervade its parts through and through.

But the Buddhists are vehemently opposed to the concept of samavāya and ādhara-ādhārya-bhāva and the concept

35. The inherence relation is not the both way relation. It is asymmetrical relation. IfXstands in one relation to Y, Y can not stand to X in the same relation. Here avayavin is related to avayavas in the relation of samavāya,but from the side of avayavas it is not samavāyi but "samavetatva".

of one subsisting in many, Hence forward we shall highlight the Buddhists' arguments on the basis of which they refute the realistic theory of (i) samavāya, (ii) concept of whole subsisting in its parts (iii) the idea of one substing in many.

According to the Naiyāyikas the substance,i.e., the avayavin subsist in every constituent parts of it. But the Buddhists, specifically Śāntarakṣita says that things like yarns, hands, and other limbs cannot be pervaded by a single composite whole, because they are many(anekavat).[36] Moreover, the substance, i.e., the avayavin cannot subsist in many because it is one like atom.[37] Kamalśīla elaborately restates this argument of Śāntarakṣita. According to Kamalśīla that which is diverse can not be permeated by a single substance, that is, for example, straw, hut and jar.[38] These objects (straw, hut and jar) are many and diverse in character and admittedly not imbued with any single substance. The

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36. Ekāvayavyanugata naiva tantukārādayaḥ. Śāntarakṣita, Tattva Saṁgraha; (Baroda Oriental Institute,1926), Verse-604.

37. "Nānekāvayavāśrītam ekatvādanuvat" Śāntarakṣita, Tattva saṁgraha,(Baroda Oriental Institute,1926), Verse-605.

38. "Yadanekaṁ na tadekadravyānugatam; Kata Kuttya Kutādayah" Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā,(Boroda,Oriental Institute) Verse-605.

The components in question viz. Yarns, hands etc. are also many and diverse. Experience nowhere provides us with an instance of plurality being steeped in unity, of many being shot through with one. Experience rather tells us of unredeemed pluralism of 'many-free' from the least vestige of community. Hence, there is vyāpaka viruddhopalabdhi, i.e., knowledge of the contrary of the vyāpaka of the opponent. So, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thesis is untenable. Again, the Buddhists say that, what is one must subsist in a single atom.[39] The 'avayavin' is one; therefore it can not subsist in many. So, there is again vyapaka viruddhopalabdhi. Śāntarakṣita now conteds that inspite of the above arguments if the opponents stick, to their position, then they can be challenged on the ground that such subsistence of one in many is not warranted by any pramāna. It is impossible because it militates against the nature (svabhāva), form and character (rūpa) of an avayavin to subsist simultaneously in many parts. The Buddhists raise the question in this connection : Does the avayavin subsists in one part in the same form in which it subsists in another ? Or does it do in some other form ? The former alternative is not acceptable.

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39. "Yadekaṁ tadekadravyāśrītam ya thaikah paramānuḥ" Kamalśīla Tattvasaṁgrahpañjikā,(Orintal Institute, Baroda,1926), Verse-604.

Because, if the whole subsists in one part with its from and distinctive nature intact, it could not be subsisting in others at the same time in the same way. If the whole pertaining to one component subsistedi in some other component which occupied a different space, in the form and manner, it would mean that the two components were not distinguishable from each other. The second alternative is not also acceptable equally. If the avayavin subsisted in the other part in another from and feature, it would no more be one, for difference of form and distinctive character nullifies unity of the object. Indeed, on this view, we should have to postulate as many avayavins as there are parts, for the avayavin has to subsist in each of them in a different form and character.[40] But this is absolutely absurd. Hence, neither of the alternatives is tenable.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers answer the above Buddhists arguments in a very simple way. According to them experience determines the truth and content of propositions and it is to experience that we have to turn to see whether one resides in many or not. Experience shows

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40. "Tadekaṁ dravyamekāvayava kodikṛitam yattasya rûpam tenaivavyavantaresu vartate, Yadyā anyena-iti pakṣa dvayam". Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgraha,(Orintal Series, Baroda,)p.250.

that in some cases one resides in one, as in the case of a man lying on the coach and that is in some others it resides in many, that is, the whole is in the parts. This is not however a solitary case where we find the relation of container and contained (āśraya-āśrayī) between many and one. Uddyotkara has given other examples, that is, number (sankhyā), separateness (pṛthakatva), conjunction (saṁyoga), disjunction (vibhāga) and universal (sāmānya). In all these cases, according to Uddyotkara, how can Buddhist deny that one can dwell in many?[41] Moreover, as Raghunāth Śiromani points out, if these were really self-contradictory, how could this be found at all in experience ? Contradictions under no system are admitted to be objects of experience, for if they are experienced they can not be deemed to clash with each other.[42] Since we get instance galore where a manifold is the substrate (āśraya) and a unit is the content (āśrayī), we have to conclude that there is nothing monstrous in holding that one can and does reside in many.

Now we shall discuss the Buddhists arguments against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas second theory that the whole can

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41. "Evam sarvesvaneka dravya vṛttisu saṁkhyā pṛthaktva saṁyoga bibhāga sāmānya disvanuyogādhi kārana vyāvṛtn doṣo vaktavyaḥ. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārtika (Bibliotheca Indica) p.215.

42. Yadṛśasya virodho na tasyādhyāso yadṛśasya cādhyāso na, tasya virodh, Raghunāth Śiromoni's Commentary on Ātmattvaviveka (Bibliotheca Indica), p.586.

subsists in its parts either wholly or partly. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists a thing can subsist in another only in two ways either partly or wholly. The avayavin therefore can subsist in each of its parts wholly without any remainder, e.g., vocal excellence of the cuckoo (kālavinka kantha gura); or it can subsist only in part, e.g., a single thread running in and through the followers.[43] Now, if the avayavin subsisted wholly in one part and were exhausted in it there would remain nothing over, to be in other parts; so they would be useless and superfluous.[44] If it is still maintained that the whole some how subsists entirely in each and all of the components, then it follows that there would be as many avayavins as there are parts, each avayavin having a different locus of its own., like water lilies blooming in different tanks.[45] But this is repugnant to the Naiyāyikas. For this means that the avayavin would cease to be one and be reduced to the status of avayavas. A unitary reality embracing the parts such

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43. "Yathā Sraksūtram Kusumeṣu", Vācaspatimiśra, Nyāyavārtika tātparyatikā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Benaras), p.381.

44. Śeṣāvayava variyarthyam, Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārtika (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneres,) p.213.

45. Tataśca savārtmāna vṛtterjugapadaneka kundādivya vasthota kubālādivat anekatvamavayavinaḥ prapnoti. Kamalśīla, Tattva-saṁgrahapañjikā, (Buddha Bharati Series,) Verse-612.

as the avayavin is supposed to do in blown sky-high.

The matter does not end here, there are other difficulties also. If a avayavin existed wholly in a part and was constituted of it, it would be 'ekadravya' and it will be not perceivable. Because the conditions of perceptibility recognised in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika are, among other things, gross dimension and composition by many substances. Since the avayavin in the present case consists only of one part, it obviously can not be perceived. And this goes against the Nyāya-contention that the whole is perceptibile. In fact, such an avayavin would be atomic in magnitude, for an atom alone is ekadravya. Moreover, on such a view the avayavin would be indestructable. A thing that is composed of many may be destroyed, because destruction is only decomposition, a resolution into smaller components. So, there is no meaning in saying that it can be destroyed.

We can not also maintain the other alternative viz. the avayavin exists part by part in its components. For this would mean that the whole existed in its component through the medium of a set of intrinsic, non-constituent

parts. There would be thus two sets of parts - constituent and non-constituent parts. But this goes against the experience and also to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention. Because, experience does not give us any such two fold parts of a thing. Now, the question may be raised that how is the whole related to its non-constituent parts ? As stated before it can not exist entirely in any of its parts; if however it is to exist partially, there would be a third set of parts and so on ad-infinitum.[46] Again, if the whole was to exist piecemeal, we would have any instance of many being in many and not of one being in many.[47] The whole would lose its self-identify and unity and would just be a conglomeration of parts.[48] But this is preceisely the Buddhist view and the Naiyāyikas would certainly not accept it.

Śāntarakṣita, the Buddhist philosopher, does not accept the very Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of vṛtti of subsistence of the whole in the parts. According to him if each

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46. "Atha ekadeśena iti pakṣaḥ tadā anāvastha syādekadeśanām" Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā", (Buddha Bharati Series) On verse-613.

47. "Tathā ca sati nikamānekats aikadeśena vartate kim tu anekamānekatva iti" Vācāspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Beneras), P.382.

48. "Evam hi sati eko ' vavi na syāt avayavapracayamātrarupatvāttasya·Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā (Buddha Bharati Series) Loc, cit.

of the composites present in each of the components together occupied the same space, then and only then they could be said to subsist in a component,[49] since,however, that is not possible, i.e., the many composites subsisting in the many components can not all occupy the same locus, we can not speak of subsistance of the whole in the parts.[50] Vācaspati also states this Buddhists argument as purvapakṣa with considerable greater trenchancy. According to Vācastati Miśra, if the whole exists, part for part, in the avayavas, then ultimately we have to come to atoms and instead of saying ' a garland running through flowers', should say 'an atom of the garland is in a atom of a flower.[51] But subsistence of one atom on (or in) the other is absured. Hence, it is not meaningful talk to say that the avayavin subsists in the avayavas (avayavesu avayavi vṛtteḥ).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers next give arguments to refute the Buddhist objection and to establish their position, i.e., the whole or avayavin is over and above its parts. They give two arguments to reject the Buddhists

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49. Yadyekadeśaḥ pratyekāvayavinah syuh,tadā avayavehyavayaviv ṛttaḥ syāt, Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā,(Buddha Bharati Series)Loc,Cit.

50. Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā (Buddha Bharati Series), loc, cit.

51. "Kusumaparamānabekasmin sūtra pramānureko vartate", Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavarttikatātparyatīkā(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series),p.382.

position. According to the Buddhists the only ground of rejecting an avayavin is the impossibility of its subsistance either part by part or in its entirety. Now the question may arise, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers point out : Is this ground or probans some thing perceived by the Buddhists ? Or is it some thing uperceived ? In the latter case it is open to the charge of being 'asiddha' (unproven). As a matter of fact, the Buddhists have nowhere perceived such subsistance, hence the ground asiddha; consequently, the Buddhists conclusion, that is, the avayavin is non-existent is untenable. If, on the otherhand, such vṛtti or subsistence as such is not admitted by him it would be the same in everywhere including the case of the avayava and avayavin. In that case it is not open to the Buddhist to deny 'avayavin'. Again if vṛtti or subsistence as such is not admitted by him, then the question whether subsistence is partial or complete does not arise at all and should not be entertained at all. Instead of hair spilliting as to the mode on subsistence the Buddhist in the very begining should denounce it. So the Naiyāyikas may finally wind up by saying that in any event the opponent can not deny avayavin,because it is vouched for by our perception which takes the form'. 'It subsists herein',

'the cloth subsists in the yarns' etc.[52] Vācaspati says in this context that if, as the Buddhists argue, there is no subsistence, then all talk of whether subsistence is by part or as a whole is no much empty verbiage.[53]

The Buddhists say in reply that so far as subsistence or '<u>vṛtti</u>' as such is concerned it has been shown to be a myth. The second question relates to the mode of subsistence and to the validity of such expressions as 'partial or complete subsistence'. These are used and intended to be taken only analogically. By the term 'in', entirety' what is meant to be clarified is whether the '<u>avayavi</u> substance' subsists as an impartible whole-in the way in which the <u>śrīphala</u>, that is, the bilva fruit, lies in a dish ? Or does it subsist in some other way as a certain person, Chaitra does when lying down on several seats ?[54] This latter sense is shought to be brought out by then term 'subsistence in part'. Hence, there is nothing wrong in using expressions to which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has exception. Lastly, as regards to the perceptual character

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52. Śāntarakṣita, <u>Tattvasaṁgrah</u>, On verses Nos.-613 - 617.

53. "Vṛitterabhāvāt ekadeśena va kartsnyena va vartate iti riktam vacah", Vācaspati Miśra, <u>Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā</u>, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series,) Loc, cit, Verse No. 620.

54. Śāntarakṣita, <u>Tattvasaṁgraha</u>, (Buddha Bharati Series) Verse No. 620.

of subsistence of the whole in parts, it is flatly denied by the Buddhists. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers restated this Buddhist contention to negate the relation between whole and part. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers controvert the Buddhist thesis that since the whole can not exist in the parts either wholly or in part, it can not be admitted. Like Vātsyāyana Uddyotkara challenges the very basis of the Buddhist contention and says that the concepts of 'existing wholly or in part' (kārtsnyena ekadeśenava) do not apply to the whole.[55] When there are many things in a group and we include all of them without remainder we use the term 'kṛtsna' or 'all'(or complete or exhaustive).[56] More clearly, it may be said that the underlying idea is that it implies a totality, a manifold, each member of which has been included in our calculation and none left out. Naturally, it can not be applied to the avayavin which is unitary substance and not a manifold. Similarly, concept of 'part' does not go with it, again for

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55. "Kim pratyayayavām kṛtsnovayavi varbateathaikadeśenen nopapadyate prasnaḥ. Phanibhuṣan Tarkabāgiśh, Nyāyabhāṣya, (Calcutta Sanskrit Series), S.No.4-2,11 and "Kimavayaya ekadeśena vartate atha ursnenaiva vartate iti na yuktah prasanah navayavi kytsno naikadeśaḥ' Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārttika, (Chawkhamba Sanskrit Series), p.214.

56. Kṛtsnamiti khalvanekasya śeṣāsyabhidhānam, Ibid.

the reason that it has no parts except the avayavas of the components which are its inherent cause and therefore different from it. In fact, the word 'ekadeśa' as distinguished from the word 'kṛtsna' is used when some members of a given total are left out.[57] The avayavin, being a unitary and not a multiple substance, obviously does not admit of being conceived as existing in part.

It may be asked,"if the whole does not subsist in the parts, either wholly or partly, how else does it do so ? These are the only modes of subsistance and there is no third one".[58] Vācaspati in answer to this question says that it is not correct to hold that subsistence must always be either in entirety or in part,i.e., subsistence is vyāpya and either of these modes (prakāradvayānyatra) is vyāpaka.[59] There is also another mode viz, subsistence by nature(svarupataḥ). The thread running though the flowers of a garland is such that, by nature, it has to exist in the flowers. It does not exist there wholly or in part but by reason of its being what it is. Similarly guna subsists in its locus by reason of its nature, i.e., because of its

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57. Na ca kṛtṣnaikadeśābhyāṁ prakārāntamasti. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series),p.381.

58. Na kiṃcitkvacit kārtṣnyenaika deśena va vartamānam dṛṣtam iti tayorvṛttimprati vyāpakatvamasiddham, ibid,p.382.

59. Tatra sūtrasya kṛttih kusumeṣu naikadeśena vā nāpi kartsne yena kimtu svarupatḥ; evamavayavesvayavinaḥ svarupataḥ eva. ibid,p.382.

being a guna, even so in the relation of avayavas and avayavin. The avayavin is such that it can not but be in its avayavas - that is its nature, its svarûpa. Therefore, the above said bimodality can not be said to cover all cases of subsistence of the avayavin in the avayava can not be nullified. In fact the problem of how many ways are there of a thing being subsistent in another is to be empirically determined and we can not start with any preconceived notion in the matter.

Thus, we see that subsistence of the avayavin in the avayavas is natural, not circumstantial.[60] This relation is called samavāya. It is āśraya-āśrayi bhāva - the avayavas are āśrayi or, the content. In this relation one is in many at one and the same time. But the Buddhists do not admit any such relation and this brings us to the next point of discussion, that is Buddhists criticism of samavāya.

We have already mentioned that one of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention is that the whole is apprehended by us as subsisting in parts. We have congnitions of the form 'the cloth is in the yarn' or 'the pot is in the potsherds': and

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60. "Svābhāvika na tu āgantuka" Udayana, Kiranābalī, ed by Gourināth Śāstrī, p.251.

this clearly shows that there is subsistence of the whole in the parts. Since experience and knowledge attest such subsistence, it has to be admitted as a brute datum, as an indisputable objective fact. Possible difficulties regarding mode of subsistence can not be allowed to supersede or negate this fact, rather they are to be explained or sorted out on the basis of and in the light of such subsistance. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers designate such subsistence by the term samavāya or inherence.

Although samavāya or inherence later came to be supposed to obtain in various cases, e.g., as between a substance and its qualities and motion, an eternal substance and its ultimate differential etc., still, in the begining, it seems to have been introduced into the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature only to explain the peculiar relation between the kārana and kārya-dravya. Kanada does not indicate of qualities, movements, universals to be residing in their substance by relation of samavāya. He defines samavāya as "that which produces in respect of the material cause and the effect, the notion this

subsisting in that".[61] The relation of samavāya, therefore, makes it possible for the material cause and the effect to be container and contained (ādhāra and ādheya) respectively. It seems that originially samavāya was meant to explain only this relation of subsistence; subsequently, it was extended so as to cover other cases. The Buddhists, however, reject the relation of samavāya. They deny the relation samavāya which is vouchsated by relevant cognitions such as 'the cloth is in the treads' or 'the pot is in the potsherds'. Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician, asserts in this context that, apart from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, we nowhere come across such linguistic expressions. They are not also found in language of the ordinary people. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas deliberately coin such expressions which a view of defending their theory of samavāya; these expressions are not dictated by the nature of things.[62] Śāntarakṣita also argues in this context that the notion of subsisting in this'(etadiha vijñānam) exists for the opponents only (paresāmeva vartate)

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61. "Ihedam iti yatah kārya kāranāya sa samavāya",Kanāda, Vaiśeṣikasūtra,(Bibliotheca Indica) vii, 2.26.

62. Yadirasti samavāyah, tadā'tha tantusu pataḥ' ityādiyaḥ buddhyaḥ na syaḥ ? ... iha tantusu pataḥ ityādisabadaḥ ime svayam mamāyanu locanaiḥ kṛtaḥ na vs as ta pur adhināḥ, ibd, Verse-149.

it is due entirely to their infactuation with their own doctorins (svasiddhāntanuraguna); and is never met within common experience (na dṛṣtai laûkikam tu tat).[63]

The Naiyāyikas answer by saying that expression of the form 'A' is in 'B' (iha khalu vartate, atra khalu vartate) with some words in the locative case and same in the nominative indicating presence of one thing in another, are not peculiar to him or to his philosophy. They are used by common people as well and even by the Buddhists themselves. Do they not claim, for example,[64] The horn belongs to the cow 'sṛngam gāvitishatilit' the horn is in the cow ? And do they not claim validity for the same ? Here certainly some sort of subsistence obtain and is so accepted by the Buddhist. Dharmakrīti points out that regarding the above expressions of the Nyāya as indicating samavāya of the whole in theparts, e.g., the cloth is in the thread is unknown to the common man; it sounds outrageous to him.[65] Not only does he never have such knowledge but he had rather knowledge of the reverse, e.g., the

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63. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgrah,(Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series) Karika-826.

64. Dharmakṛtti, Pramānavārttika,(Buddha Bharati Series), Verse-150.

65. Ibid.

thread belong to the cloths.[66] As Dharmakrīti points out, the latter is certified by pratyakaṣa and is universally accepted, as is borne out by the language of all unsophisticated people; the former however is maintained only by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. It is 'upakalpita', i.e., imagined by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers and 'alaûkika', i.e., not found in the world, because it falls beyond the realm of what is established by pramāna (pramāna siddhir bahir bhāvāt."[67] Śāntarakṣita drives home this point by saying that the notion that appears in our ordinary experience is 'the branches are in the tree' and not 'the tree is in the branches'[68],'the stones are in the hill', and not 'not hill is in the stone'. Thus we should say following universals down the ages that parts make up the whole and being to it, and not vice-versa, as the Naiyāyikas believe, to wit, the whole belongs to and is in the parts.

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66. Na kevalam 'tha tantusupatak' ityādika dhiya loke na siddhaḥ kintu tadviparitad eva prariddhān. Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahpañjikā,(Buddha Bharati Series)On verse-830.

67. Dharmakṛtti,Pramānavārtika(Buddha Bharati Series) On verse-150.

68. Vrikṣe śākhāyaḥ sibaśeāga ityesa laûkikimatih. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgrah, on verse-830 and na tu sākhāyām, vṛkṣaḥ, silāsu pravata iti, Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahpañjikā, On verse-830.

The Naiyāyikas now seek to give counter arguments to the Buddhists above stated argument.* They argue that even the expression approved of by the Buddhists, that is, 'the horn belongs to the cow' suggests that what is called 'the cow' is different from its parts and thus goes to prove the avayavi as distinct from avayavas. If the whole were not distinct from parts, the cow from its avayavas. We could not even speak of horns being in the cow.[69]

The Buddhists say in reply to the above argument that it simply means that the horns are never found apart from the remaining parts which together with them, i.e., the horns are known as the cow,[70] It does not signify the existence of an additional avayavin called 'cow'.

Śāntarakṣita explains in this connection that according to the Buddhist sentences containing a word in the nominative and another in the locative signify two things,

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* Biswanath Sen, The Concepts of Part and Whole (Avayava and Avayavi) (Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, 1985), pp. 45-46.

69. Yadyayayavebhyo na gaurbhinnah tadā gāvī sṛigam ityāpina syāt ? Monorathanandin's commentary on Pramānavārttika, (Buddha Bharati Series) on Kārikā-150.

70. "Gavākhya-Pariśiṣṭāṅga-vicchedānupalambhāvāt", Pramānavārttika on Kārikā-150.

close proximity (nairātmya) or identity (tādātmya).[71] It signifies close proximity when the two words stand for two protions of an aggregate (avayasañcaya) as in the above example or for portions of two different aggregates, i.e., the bilva fruit is in the bowl (kundādau śrīphalam). 'The branches are in the tree', or 'stones belong to the hill', mean that branches and stones are found to be in close contact with portions other than themselves, viz, trunk of the tree and base of the hill respectively.[72]

But in case where we speak of colour, sound, taste, smell, action etc. and residing in a substance identity is meant, identity between the substance and colour, taste etc. as the case may be 'colour is in the jar' means 'colour is of the nature of the jar, and not that 'colour' and jar are two different things and one inheres in the other. Kamalśīla here points out that the word 'tādātmya', used by Śāntarakṣita, is not to be taken as 'sameness' or equation', other wise colour and jar would be identical; wherever any patch of colour is found, it would be termed 'jar' and vice-versa. What is however intended here is that

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71. Na tu avayavatiriktagosadbhāvāt" Monorathanandin's commentary on Pramānavārttika,(Buddha Bharati Series) On Kārikā-150.

72. "Vivakṣita śākhārita vyatirekatanyadhovyavasthi tāni skandhādinyanyani" Kamalśīla, Tattvasaṁgrahapañjikā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series) On Kārikā-831.

though colour is found in many places, colour associated with certain other sense data which together forms a jar, is different from character, components found elsewhere. This distinction from other things, i.e., sense data (atadvyāvṛtti) is sought to be pointed out by the expression 'colour in the jar'. Hence it means not that the 'colour is the same as jar but that it is of the nature of the jar' (ghate rûpam = ghatasva bhām rûpam, no ghatadyāt mākamityārtha).[73] Śāntarakṣita, therefore, concludes that only when two things are known to be different from each other and one is contained in the other, do we have the notion that 'this subsists in that'?[74] Cloth and yarns however are never perceived as distinct from each other, so there cannot arise in our mind the notion that one subsists in the other.

Dharmakīrti also says in this context that cloth and threads can not subsist one in the other by inherence, for inherence would pre-suppose that the two things are different and exist simultaneously. But this is obviousely absured. For threads are the cause and cloth is the effect

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73. Ibid.

74. "Nānātvalakṣane hi syādādha rā dheya bhûtāyoḥ idamatreti vijñānam kundadau śrīphalādivat. Śāntrakṣita, Tattvasaṁgrah (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series) On verse-831.

cause. Cause and effect are related as antecedent and consequent and not as synchronous entities (naika kālam kathañcan). A cloth is but the subsequent state of yarns brought into existence through the instrumentality of loom, weaver and other machinery (tantusaṁskārasambhūtam kāryam) threads are the antecedent condition of the cloth.

We have seen in the above discussion that Buddhists do not admit samavāya. In fact the Buddhists do not admit any relation,[75] not to speak of samavāya only. According to them reality is but detached and discrete bits called moments(kṣanas) and all relations are only upakalpita or imaginary, being subjective projections on an infinitely pluralistic universe. This being so, it is not surprising that the Buddhists have severely denounced samavāya. We have discussed their arguments together with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas answers thereto. We, however, made it clear and wish to reiterate that our concern is with samavāya not in all of its aspects but only in so far as it bears on our problem in hand, i.e., as the relation of substrate and content, between the cause and the effect, between parts and whole. It has also been seen in the above discussion

75. Saṁyoga vibhāgayoh pratidhesh". Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgraha ed by Baroda, p.270, Saṁyoga vibhāganka lpitu tavanarthakṣu'

that the difference between two contestants is the simple issue. Is the effect something different from the cause or not ? If it is held to be different, then samavāya or inherence becomes necessary to bring them together and keep them connected. This is the view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. If, however, the effect is deemed to be but a form of the cause, they would turn out to be an identical substance. Naturally, there would be no necessity of samavāya. It is for this reason that the Buddhist has no place for samavāya in his consmological scheme.[76] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have tried to establish that the avayavin is distinct entity and can be proved to be so by various reasons. Therefore, samavāya must be admitted. Besides holding between avayavas and avayavin, samavāya holds also between substance and quality, substance and action etc. with which we are not concern here. The Navya-Nyāya has tried to prove it on another ground. The ground is : we have qualified knowledge(viśiṣṭa buddhi) of qualities, action etc., e.g., 'the jar is blue'(which is guna viśiṣṭabuddhi). 'Devdatta is in motion'(which is kriyā viśiṣṭa buddhi) etc.[77] Now such determinate knowledge has three contents viśeṣya or qualificand, viśeṣaṇa or

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76. "Na samavāyosti pramānabhāvāt". Iśvarakṛṣna, Sāṁkhyakārikā, (Nirnaya Sagara Press, Bombay), Saṁkhya-sūtra-5/99.

77. Gunakriyādiviśiṣṭabuddhirviśeṣana viśeṣya saṁbandha viṣaya viśiṣta buddhitvāt. Viswanath, Siddhāntamūktāvalī, (Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay) On Kārikā-11.

qualifier and a relation between these two. Now such relation can not be saṁyoga which holds only between substance and not between a substance and a quality or an action. It can not be tādātmya because the substance, and the quality or the action are perceived to be different. It can not also be svarupa sambanda because in that case absence of a pen from the table can not be explained. Therefore it must be other relation which Naiyāyikas designate as inherence. Whatever be the ground for which it is established, the Naiyāyika asserts that the reality of avayavin can not be disputed.

To sum up the conclusion, the whole can not be equivalent to a mere aggregate of its parts, because the perception of it as a single unified thing is an uncontradicted fact. The theory which equates the whole with the totality of parts serves only to show that the perception of the whole, which is a felt fact, is impossible. In other words, the theory defeats itself. It sets itself to explain the perception of the whole, but ends in a declaration that, though not exactly in so many words, that there is no such perception at all. An analysis of the nature and

constitution of the perceived whole reveals the fact that the whole subsists in all its perceived and unperceived parts; it is composed of its parts and derives its being from them, but at the same time it is something in excess of them. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the whole thus resembles that of Russell. The whole, according to Russell is "a new single term, distinct from each of its parts and from all of them. It is one, not many, and is related to the parts, but has a being distinct from their".[78]

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78. Russell, Principles of Mathematics. p.141.

III

In the previous sections, we have discussed in detail the epistemological and the metaphysical problems concerning the whole and part. Now, in this section we shall confine our attention to elaborating the Buddhists' argument on the basis of which they deny the reality of citra-rûpa or variegated colour as a whole(avayavi) as advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists. We shall also examine the Buddhists arguments on the ground of weight and space to refute the reality of the whole as a separate entity. We shall also try to give the Nyāya answers to the five fold Buddhist antinomies(pañchabibha-virodh) which have been put forward by the Buddhists against the Nyāya concept of a distinct whole (pṛthagbhuta avayavi).

The existence of a separate colour in whole is, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, conclusively proved by the emergence of what may be called a veriegated colour (citra-rûpa) in an object (say a cloth) produced from parts (i.e., yarns) possessing different types of colour. A variegated colour is not the same thing as a variety of colours; the one is a single unified colour, and the

other is a mainfold of mutually distinguishable colours.[79] When, therefore, we speak of a multi-coloured cloth, we distinctly understand one particular type of colour to be present in the whole fabric of the cloth. On the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, colour by its very nature is pervasive of its substratum (vyāpyavṛtti). If a particular colour is present in any part of a thing, it can not be absent in any other part of the same thing. When a piece of chalk is described as white, it is assumed to be white in every part of it. It thus follows that the apparent co-presence of a number of colours in a multicoloured thing should be explained as implying the absence of each of these colours and the emergence of a new colour, viz., variegated colour, through their combination.[80] And this variegated colour must have a cause; it is the colours of the parts which generate it. The colour of one part, however, is different from that of another, and so there is no variegated colour in any one part. We have, therefore, to admit that the variegated colour belongs to the whole, and not to be parts.

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79. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārttika, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p.511.

80. Na ca nīlāpitādaya eva bahavo' vyāpyavṛttayas citrapadāspadam, rūpādinām vyāpyavṛttitvāt. Vācāspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), iv-ii, 12, p.454.

The Buddhist objection to the doctrine of a distinct avayavin (prthaghbuta avayavin) relates to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hypothesis of variegated colour or citra-rūpa.

The Buddhists argue that if the avayavin is a distinct entity, it should have a colour of its own apart from that of the avayavas. But even the closest observation of a cloth does not disclose in it any colour other than of its parts. When the colour of the whole is thought to be perceived, we really perceive the colour of the parts. The whole, therefore, can not have any distinct status.

The Naiyāyikas say in reply that the avayavin must have some colour, for there can be no substance without colour. And the colour of the whole follows the colour of the parts - if the parts are red, so is the whole. This is in accordance with the maxim - kāranagunah kārya gunanāmānabhante, i.e., attributes of the cause produce in the effect attributes of the same kind (this is true when the attributes are of a specific nature, and

not general, i.e., viśeṣa gunah and not the sāmānya gunah).[81] We fail to distinguish the distinctive colour of the whole from that of the parts because of the sameness of kind (sajātiyatva). Both the colour being of same nature, the one overshadows the other and make it impossible for us to discriminate between these two, but is does not mean that the other is not there. So, the non-discrimination of the colour of the whole does not prove the non-existence of the whole.

The Buddhists reject this contention and says that while it may go well when the parts are of a uniform, unvaried colour, it breaks down when they are of different colours. What colour would be the whole if the parts were some red, some blue and some yellow ? Similarly, what will be the nature of a cloth if it is made of different kinds of fabries, viz. cotton, silk and wool ? The avayavin can not obviously possess one of the colours in preference to another, for in that event the whole would have a colour different from that of some of the parts, and this would go against the above Nyāya maxim. The avayavin

81. Phanibhuṣana Tarkavāgiśh, Nyāyaparicaya, (Calcutta Sanskrit Series), p.83.

can not also possess all these colours simultaneously, for they are mutually contradictory (paraspara viruddha svabhāva). So, avayavin has no colour of its own.

The Nyāya reply against the above contention is that, if the avayavin is admitted at all then chitra-rûpa has to be admitted. Recognition of avayavin is the ground of recognition of chitra-rûpa not the vice-versa, i.e., it is not that, chitra-rûpa is first of all proved and then the avayavin is said to follow from it in a consequence. This will go to dispose of the Buddhists criticism that if chitra-rûpa is proved to be inadmissible the avayavin will have to be scrapped as if chitra-rûpa is the basis of recognition of avayavin. But this is just putting the cart before the horse. The avayavin is proved, the Naiyāyikas assert, not on the ground of citra-rûpa only but on other grounds also, but once proved, it demands a colour of its own when the parts are all of different colours. The result is regcognition of citra-rûpa. A thing can not be perceived by the colour of another, as in that case the colour of the wall of a room might make the air associated with it visually perceptible.[82] Since,

82. Na tāvad avayava rûpādavayavino grahanam yuktam vāyonaphupalahdhi prasaṅgāt. Yadyanya rûpādanyasyoplabdhir bhavati vayorapyupalabdhih prāpnoti, na caita dasti; tasmāt svarūpadavayavyupalabhyate. Uddyotkara, Nyayāvārttika (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p.507.

the avayavin is perceived, it has to be assigned a colour of its own different from that of parts.

The Buddhists insist that their thesis is not adversely affected by the above facts. If there is no such colour as citra-rûpa, how can the avayavin have it ? And their point is that there is no one species of colour called citra-rûpa. It is just a mixture of colour and that's all. But the Naiyāyikas answer this Buddhists' objection in the following way: First, the Naiyāyikas assert that recognition of avayavin is the ground of recognising citra-rûpa does not mean that it is the only ground and there are no other grounds. All that is meant is that, it is the sufficient condition, though not the necessary condition, of recognition of citra-rûpa. Secondly, the further ground on which chitra-rûpa or variegated colour is admitted is that it is perceived.[83] We perceive variegated colour as we perceive yellow or blue. This is borne out by the fact that when different parts of a cloth have different colours, we speak of 'the colour of the cloth' and not' of colours'. There we have perception of a unity which is expressed by the singular number and

83. ... tathāpi citrātmāno rupasya nāyukta ... sarvaleka prasiddhena pratyaksenaivopapaditvāt. Śrīdhara, Nyāyakandali (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), p.30.

not by plural. There we feel that, we are in the presence of a unitary colour and not of a variety of colours.

Moreover, the Nyāya philosophers offer another reason. Colour, they say, is universally recognised as vyāpyavrtti, unlike conjunction (saṁyoga) which is always slectional (avyāpyavṛtti). A thing can not have many colours. It may be red or yellow, green or blue but it can not be all of them together. Hence, the very concept of mixture of colours or variety of colours is alien to the Buddhists.

The Buddhists again raise the objection what would happen if the border of a variegated cloth were not variegated? In as much as the cloth as an avayavin exists in the border, its variegated colour should also be there and should therefore be perceived. But as a matter of fact we do not perceive it. How would the Naiyāyikas account for it ? The Naiyāyikas answer this objections in the following way. According to them, variegated colour or citra-rûpa is produced and revealed by a variety of colours present in the parts.[84] Hence, we can not perceive the citra-rûpa unless we are perceiving at

84. Avayava vṛtti vijātiya rûpa samāhāra avhivyañgyatvāt. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p.274.

the same time many colours belonging to parts; it does not reveal itself through a part having one uniform colour.[85] This is the solution of Udayana. Śrīdhara also supports it. The condition of perception of variegated colour(citra-rūpolambha sāmagri) is perception of colour of various parts.[86]

The main objection of the Buddhists, therefore, that the whole does not exist as a separate entity because it cannot have a colour of its own, is, according to thee Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, based on misinterpretation of experience and shallow logic.

The Buddhists next take a different line to attack against the Nyāya concept of the 'whole' as a separate entity. They bring in the notion of weight and space as instruments against the concept of 'whole' as an entity which is over and above its constituent parts. First, the Buddhists argue that if it is the fact that, by the conjunction of parts an additional whole is produced, then there should be an increase of weight. When the yarns are

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85. "Ekarūpavayava sahitasyā 'vayavina upalambheplyupalabhyate", Ibid.

86. Navyastu tatrāpi avyapya vṛttya eva nānārūpam. Biswanath, Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali, (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1916), On Kārikā-100.

woven into a cloth, we have, on the Nyāya view, not merely the avayavas, the yarns, but also the emergent avayavi, the cloth. And since the avayavin subsists in its avayavas and is not found apart from them, weighing the cloth really means weighing the yarns and the cloth, the avayavas and the avayavin. Consequently, we should have double the weight of the yarns. But we never find that it is so. The weight of a body is never found to exceed that of its parts. Rather our experience is that the whole weights equally as its parts. This conclusively shows, say the Buddhists, that the additional avayavin is a myth and a thing is nothing but its parts taken together.[87]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, sees in this argument an assumption which goes against the principle of qualitative causation. According to this principle, a quality of the cause produces a corresponding quality in the effect, and the two qualities, though similar, are numerically different from each other. The whole, therefore, should be supposed to have its own weight which

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87. Gurutvādhigato syātaṁ yadyasya syāt tulāntih. Dharmakīrti, Pramānavārttika, (Buddha Bharati Series) On Verse-154, p. 411.

is derived from the causal efficiency of the weight of the parts. We can not, of course, distinguish between the two weights, but that is not because there is no difference between them, but because we lack the capacity to appreciate the difference, In fact, if a whole, i.e., a body, had no weight of its own, it would not fall down when left unsupported, for the fall of a substance can be caused only by its own weight. It can not be contended that the weight of the parts is responsible for the fall of the whole. For it is only when two substances are in conjunction (saṁyoga) with each other that the weight of one contributes to the fall of the other; but the whole, which inheres in its parts, can not be in conjunction with them.[88] So the whole must be credited with a specific weight of its own, and can not be identified with its parts on the ground of the sameness of weight.

The second Buddhists argument is on the ground of space. According to them if the avayavas and avayavins are completely two different things then they cannot occupy the same space, that is, a jar or a cloth.[89] They

88. Uddyotkara, Nyāyavārttika, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), P.238.

89. Yo hi yasmādvyatiriktah sa tadadhisthisthitadeśa vyatirikta deśādhisthāna upalabhyate ghatādivapato, na caivamavayava bhyah pṛthagdeśo dṛśyate. Jayanta Bhatta, Nyāyamañjarī, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p.114.

are always found to occupy different portions of space. So, if the avayavin and the avayavas were different entities, they should be found in experience to do the same, i.e., they occupy different portions of space. But the fact is otherwise. The avayavin and the avayavas, whole and parts, occupy one and the same space, (samānadeśavṛtti). Therefore, they should be adjudged to be one and the same (abhinna). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have also refuted this argument of the Buddhists. According to them, it is conceded that parts and whole, threads and the cloth do not occupy different portions of space, but this is because of the relation of samavāya or inherence. Samavāya is āśrayāśrayi samabandha, it is the relation of substrate and content between two inseparables(ayutha siddha). In it, the samaveta resides in the samavāyi, the cloth in the yarns. The content naturally occupies the space of the substrate, and the two, therefore, come to occupy the same space, cloth occupies no other space than that of yarns. Although difference of space signifies numerical difference of things, non-difference does not point to identity. This is due to the fact that the avayavin is āśrīta in the

avayava and not because there is no distinct avayavin.[90] So, the Buddhist argument, on the ground of space to refute the Nyāya theory of whole, does not hold water.

Again, the Buddhist phenomenalists have advanced fice antinomies to refute the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the 'whole' - the whole as a unitary principle is numerically different from the avayavas though related to them by the relation of inherence or samavāya. This five antinomies (pañchavidha virodh) are as follows:
a) Grahanāgrahana virodh or upabambhānupalambha virodh or the antinomy of being perceived and unperceived at the same time, (b) āvaranaṇāvarana virodh or the antinomy of being covered and not covered at the same time.(c)Kampākampa virodha or the antimony being in motion and yet not being so simultaneously. (d) Raktārakta virodh or the antinomy of being coloured and not coloured simultaneously,(e) Taddeśatvātaddeśatva virodh or the antinomy pertaining to presence of the self same thing in many places. Now, we shall elaborate these antinomonies of the Buddhists and the Nyāya reply to refute these antinomies.

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90. "Tatvavyavāśrītatvameva nimittam nastivam" Ibid.p.114, and "Dravyanāme katva samavāyena samāndeśatam vyasidhāmo", Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, Calcutta), p.1069.

a) Grahanāgrahana virodh or upalambhānupalambha virodh or the antinomy of being perceived and unperceived at the same time - According to the Naiyāyikas the whole subsists in each of its part and a part is known along with the whole that subsists in it.[91] But in the case of perception of an object, i.e., the whole, we perceive that part of the object which is in contact with our sense organs (eyes), but there is also a back part which is not perceived. Now if we admit the Nyāya theory, i.e., the whole subsists in each of its part and the condition of perception,[92] it is not possible that the avayavin should remain unperceived when its substratum, the parts, are being perceived. In other words the whole as subsisting in perceived parts is perceived and as subsisting in unperceived parts remains unperceived. But it is one and the same whole that subsists in both these parts, and not two wholes or even two parts of a whole, one subsisting in parts perceived and the other in remaining parts. Hence, we have to say, as the Buddhists advocate, that the self same avayavin can both be perceived and unperceived by the same person at the same time and

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91. Ekadesopalabdhistat sahacāritavayawuypolabdhiśca. Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), On Su-32.

92. "Tasyāvayavasthanasyopalabdhikārana prāptasyikadeśo-palabhhavānupalabdhiranupanneti". Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhaṣya, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series), Beneras) On Su-32.

in the same place. But the Buddhists point out that it is self-contradictory which goes against the distinctive existence of the avayavin as a separate unitity.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists are also agree with the Buddhists in the point that, any self-contradictory principle can not be acceptable principle. But in the case of above mentioned objection, i.e., apprehension and non-apprehension of the whole, there is no such contradiction. The whole or avayavin can not be both perceived and unperceived, for once the whole is perceived, whatever the conditions it is apprehended once and for all and can not be said to be unapprehended. Moreover, they assert that apprehension and non-apprehension as such are not opposed, but if a thing is apprehended at a given time and at a given place by a person and yet is not apprehended by him at the very same time and place only then the alleged antinomy would arise. But this case does not occur in the perception of whole. So, this antinomy of the Buddhists, i.e., grahana-agrahana virodh, does not stand as a valid.

b) The second antinomy which is raised by the Buddhists is the antinomy of being covered and not covered at the same time avaranāvarana virodha. The Buddhist phenomenalists point out that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists the whole belongs to each of its parts. Now when one part of the whole, for example, a jar, is covered then what would happen to the whole ? In this case we have to say, as the Naiyāyikas advocate, that the whole is covered. Then the problem may crop up that there is also exposed part and we should say that the whole is uncovered at the same time as the whole belongs in the uncovered part. So, a whole may be covered and uncovered at the same time, which leads to a contradiction.

The Naiyāyikas assert in reply that, there is no contradiction in the above case. Because, the covering of a part does not mean that the whole is covered, as the Buddhists assert, for, firstly, the avayavin is different from and other than the avayavas,[93] and the covering of one is not the ipso facto the covering of a different thing.[94]

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93. "Avayavasyāvaranaṁ nāvayavinaḥ tasyānyatvāt". Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), p.383.

94. Biswanath Sen, The Concepts of Part and Whole (Avayava and Avayavin) (Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta), 1985, p.101.

Secondly, if upon a part being covered the whole were also covered, it would not then be capable of being apprehended; but as a matter of fact the whole is apprehended in such a contingency, being capable of being perceived through the exposed parts.[95] Moreover, the Naiyāyikas argue that we never see a thing in its entirety. We always see only the front, the interior and the back portions ever remain hidden and obstructed by the front. If the Buddhists were correct and if covering of a part entailed covering of the whole then we should not be able to apprehended the whole even through the frontal part.[96] But this is surely absured, for in that case nothing in the world could be known and everything would have been in the dark. For these reasons, the Naiyāyikas hold that avayavāvarana is not avayavyavarna. To put it more precisely, covering a part is not the sufficient condition of covering of the whole.

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95. Avayavavarane'pi tasya katipayavayavavasthāns ya grahanādeva. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), p.384.

96. Kimcidavayavāvaranevayavī yadyāvṛta-stadā parabhāgāvacchedenevārvāgavacchedenapi sa nopalabhyeta. Bhagiratha Thakkura, Bhagirathtīkā on Ātmatattvaviveka, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p.588.

The Buddhists make another point. When there is no cover on any part of a thing, the thing is apprehended along with its magnitude. Similarly, if the thing remains uncovered even with some parts behind a cover, we should be able, as before, to cognise its magnitude (sthaulyopalambha).[97] But as a matter of fact we are not able to do so. Some parts remaining covered, we fail to take a correct measure of its magnitude. To this the Naiyāyikas' answer is that even when the whole is perceived, the perception of its specific magnitude depends on the perception of a part that is sufficiently large. It can not be definitely said how large the perceived part is required to be; the only thing that can be said is that is should be large enough to make the perception of the specific magnitude of the whole possible. So when an appreciably large part of the whole is covered, the true magnitude of the whole is not perceived owing to the lack of reuisite condition.[98] But a

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97. Anāvaranadaśāvat katipayavayavāvarne'pi tathāvidhasthaulyopalambhahkinna syāditi. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta) p.587.

98. Ibid, p.588.

question may be raised; "How can the whole be perceived at all minus its magnitude"? Vācaspati says that the magnitude being only an attribute, the whole which possesses it is different from it, and so the non perception of its specific determination does not stand in the way of the perception of the whole.[99]

c) The third antinomy which is raised by the Buddhists is the antinomy being in motion and yet not being so simultaneously (kampākampa virodha) - The Buddhists argue that it is a matter of our common experience that when one part is in motion, the other often remains unmoved. The whole, i.e., a body, does not move even when a part of it, say a hand, moves. The body, in this case, obviously moves in respect of a part of it and does not move in respect of the unmoved other part.[100] Now, the body as a whole, the avayavin, must, therefore, be said to be both moving and unmoving which leads to a contradiction.

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99. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Beneras), p.266.

100. Six Buddhist-Nyāya Tracts in Sanskrit, (Bibliotheca Indica Calcutta), p.81.

In reply to this objection the Naiyāyikas assert that there is no contradiction here, for the opposite properties - movement and absence of movement - do not characterize one and the same entity. The movement is found in the hand, and the absence of movement in the body as a whole. The Naiyāyikas do not think that the movement of the part necessarily entails the movement of the whole; for, according to them, the part and the whole are different entities which owe their movement to different causes, and these causes do not always sychronize. The movement of the hand, is due to particular kind of volitional impules, and that of the body to another. One may will to move the hand but not the whole body.[101] Thus the Naiyāyikas conform that sakampatva (motion) and niṣkampatva (absence of motion) pertain to the concerning parts (avayavas) and not to the whole(avayavin). Hence, it is not the case, as the Buddhist advocate, that the whole has and yet has no movement simultaneously.

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101. Udayana, Ātamatattvaviveka, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta,) p.588.

When all the constituent parts of a whole is in motion, then only the 'whole' moves.[102]

d) The fourth antinomy which is raised by the Buddhists is the antinomy of being coloured and not coloured simultanceously (raktārakta virodh) - This objection is akin to the first antinomy. If a part is red, for example, while the other is not, how is the whole to be characterised ? In keeping with its stand, the Buddhists argue that the whole as inhering in the other part which is not red, must be not red. But then the difficulty arises as before; how can the whole be red and not red at the same time ? As stated above, it is not also possible for the whole to be partly red and partly not-red. This dilemma cuts at the root of the avayavin and negates its existence.[103]

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102. Avayavikampasya sakalāvayava-kampaniyatatvāt kva cidavayava kampe pyavayavi niṣkampaḥ/Bhagirath Thakkura, Commentary on Ātmatattvaviveka, (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p. 590.

103. Biswanath Sen, The Concepts of Part and Whole (Avayava and Avayavi), (Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, 1985, pp. 56-57.

To prove the invalidity of the above contention to refute the avayavin, the Nyāya-realists have advocated a new theory. Instead of denying co-existence as in the other cases here they deny out right the contradictoriness of the proposed alternatives. They deny, apparently paradoxically, that being red and being not red at the same time are contradictory. Why is it ? Because they are found to go together (sahadarśanāt). To make this contention clear we should be aware of two preliminary conditions. Firstly, the Buddhists are not here refering to the natural colour 'red' but to artificial colouring of red. So, the red colour of the avayavin is due to contact with a colouring substance (maharañjano saṁyoga nimittatvāt).[104] Moreover, if the red colour spoken of here were natural and intrinsic, the Naiyāyika's straight reply would have been that colour is always vyāpyavṛtti and that a thing would be red all over and not partly red. Hence, the Buddhist contention would be declared senseless. Secondly, it may be contended that the parts

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104. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā, (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benaras), p.385.

being red and not red, the whole would be citra-rûpa. But this is wrong. 'Not red', it must be understood, is not a species of colour, not even a quality, being an abhāviya padārtha; as such, red and not-red together cannot be said to produce citra-rûpa. It must be emphasised, however, that though 'not-red' is not itself colour, the 'not-red' part' will not go altogether without colour; it will have some colour other than red. So, the above objection of the Buddhists on the ground of raktārakta virodha does not hold water.

e) The fifth antinomy pertaining to presence of the self-same thing in many places(taddeśatvātaddeśatva-virodh). This antinomy imply two things:[105] (i) A single, undivided entity can not occupy many parts of space; (ii) A single, undivided entity such as the avayavin can not be in many avayavas. The second condition obviously follows from the first. Pandit Aśoka, an eminent Buddhist logician, advocates that any two portions of the space are mutually exclusive-uniformly

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105. Biswanath Sen, The Concepts of Part and Whole (Avayava and Avayavin), (Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta, 1985), p.58.

and invariably and we find no exception to it.[106] This exclusion can not be denied, because, so far as a part of space is what it is, can not be any other part. It has a specificity, a definitaness of its own which distinguishes it from the rest. This being so, the different parts stand opposed, and to that extent, contradictorry to one another. As a result, the content of these different parts are also mutually exclusive.[107] A thing can not therefore be in more than one locus. Subsistence in one locus automatically negates its subsistence in another which is exclusive of and opposed to the former. Since the parts of a thing occupy different parts of space, the avayavin can not subsist either in the different avayavas or in the different parts of space. If a thing is in one locus, we can know by the law of contradiction that it can not be in another. Again, the Buddhists assert that there is no necessity of perceiving the locus. The mere presence of the thing in front of us proves that it is nowhere else. This knowledge is based on the notion

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106. Taddesayośca parasparābhāvyābhicāra nimitto virodhaḥ. Six Buddhist-Nyāya Tracts (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p. 90.

107. "... Tenādhārabhūtena deśena yadvyāptam rūpam tadāpi deśāntara saṁsargādvicchinnam bhavati", Ibid.

that different parts of space are contradictory and a thing can not be in more than one locus. Stcherbatsky asserts in this context that "one real thing can not exist in many places. If that were the case, it would run against the law of contradiction. If a thing is present in one place, it can not at the sametime be present in another place. Thus to reside in many places means to be and at the same time not to be present in a given place."[108]

The Naiyāyikas answer that there is no rule, indeed nothing, to warrant the assumption underlying the Buddhist position, that is, to be in one place means not to be in another.[109] Rather experience tells us quite the contrary. It shows with unmistakable evidence that a thing can exist in many places and in many parts. A table pervades all the parts of space covered by it, and all its own avayavas occupying those parts. In this context the Naiyāyikas raise the question that what 'ataddeśatva' means ? Does it mean

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108. "Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, Vol.1,p.86.

109. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta), p.271.

'tadanyadeśatva', i.e., existence in another avayava or 'taddeśatvabhāva', i.e., non-existence in the avayava concerned ? If the Buddhists refer to the second sense, then their objection comes to this; how does the self same-whole exist and yet not exist in a particular part ? 'But this does not arise, as the Naiyāyikas do not hold that this is ever the case. It is admitted by all that a thing can not both be and not be in a place. Then, the Buddhist above said objection turns out in a new direction, that is, how can a thing, i.e., the avayavin exist in many parts simultaneously ? The Naiyāyikas have started their reply stating this problem. So, from this observation, it may be said that the above objection of the Buddhists, i.e., the presence of the self-same thing in many places, is untenable.

Beside the defence of the Buddhists objections the Naiyāyikas have advocated certain independent arguments to prove the existence of avayavin. Goutama asserts that if the avayavin is not admitted, every thing in the world would remain unapprehended (sarvāgrahanam

avayavasiddheḥ).[110] By every thing he means not merely all other substances but all other categories of reality viz. attributes (guna), motion (kriyā), universal (sāmānya), particular (viśeṣa) and inherence (samvāya). The more Goutama opines that, if the gross substance (sthūla dravya) is not recognised, as the Buddhists think, it should not be, then we can not also recognise atoms, or a concourse of atoms (paramānupuñja), because they are imperceptible. Consequently, we should fail to perceive any substance whatsoever, whether gross or atomic. If the substance went by the board, how should we be able to apprehened guna and karma which are not self-subsient but always exist in the substance as their locus ? If the locus (āśrya) went unperceived, we could not obviously perceive the content. Similarly, the universal has its locus only in substance, attribute and action, and if the last three go, the universal can not remain as a perceptible object. On the same ground of the locus being non-perceivable inherence (samavāya) and viśeṣa or particular also fade into oblivion. Non-recognition of the avayavin thus entails non-apprehension of all things under the sun. But

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110. Gautama, Nyāyasūtra, 2.1.34

certainly this is not true. It contradicts our universal experience and can not be accepted.

Again, the another ground for recognising avayavin, according to Goutama, is holding(dhārana) and pulling (ākarṣana).[111] He advocates that a thing is said to be held when a part of it being held, it is restrained from moving to another place. When we hold for example, a part of a book in hand, the book itself isheld and does not go apart. To hold a part of thing is, therefore, to hold the thing itself. And this is possible, asserts the Naiyāyika, because, the thing is a unity. If it was a mass of atoms, detached and disjointed, these things would not happen. We should then have slice in our hand, the other remaining where it is. Similarly, if a part is pulled, the whole also gets pulled and drawn.[112] This also shows the unitary character of the whole.

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111. Dhāranākarṣanopapatteśca. Gautama, Nyāyasūtra, 2.1.35.

112. ekadeśagrahanāsāhacarye satyāvayavino deśāntaraprāpti pratiṣedho dhāranam. Ibid.

From the above observation it may be said that the Buddhists arguments to refute the contention of perceptibility of the whole as an entity over and above the conglomeration of parts have some logical basis. But the arguments of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists to refute the Buddhist position and to establish their own stand, i.e., whole is perceptible and is a separate entity, is more justified and hence it is more acceptable.

CHAPTER - 3

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULARS(Sāmānya and Vyakti)

I

We have already mentioned in the Introductory chapter that the problem of niversal and articulars (sāmānya and vyakti) is one of the many aspects of controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists and the Buddhist phenomenalists. The Naiyāyikas assert that the universal (sāmānya) is a separate category (padārtha) and is something over and above its corresponding particulars (vyakti) in which it resides. But the Buddhist phenomenalists, on the other hand, insist that the unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas or kṣaṇas) are the only realities, and the universals have no objective existence what so ever, these being illusory creation of our Productive Imagination (kalpanā). This problem of universals and particulars be viewed both metaphysically and epistemologically. We shall begin with the metaphysical or ontological aspect of the problem first.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, the universal is a synthetic principle which assimilates

the individual objects subsumed under it into an indentical mode of being. But the Buddhists are vehemently opposed to this view. According to them, the external world consists of discrete and detached bits of reality called "unique particulars" (svalakṣaṇas); their synthesis exists only in our thought and hence, it has no objective reality of its own. The so-called universals, maintain the Buddhists, are nothing but mental images or conceptual constructions of our Productive Imagination (kalpanā). In contrast with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Mīmāṁsakas who are un-compromising realists so far as the ontological status of universals is concerned, the Buddhists have been generally designated as nominalists; but their is a kind of nominalism which cannot be distinguished from conceptualism, since a name and a concept, according to them, cover the same ground. Conceptual thought has been defined by them as naming thought capable of coalescing with a name. "Names originate in concepts", says Dignāga and vice-versa,

"concepts can originate in names."[1] Hence, to determine the import of names is the same as to determine the fundamental character of concepts. For the Buddhists conceptualism is the same as nominalism, there being no difference between them whatsoever.*

Reality, according to the Buddhists, consists of a plurality of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇas). Every vestige of generality is absent in it. Generality, similarity, relation or universal is always something imagined or constructed by the spontaneous creativity of our understanding which in the Buddhists' terminology is known as Productive Imagination (kalpanā). Positively the real is the efficient (arthá-kriyà-kâri), negatively the real is the non-ideal (nirvikalpa), by which is meant 'not ideationally constructed'. This non constructed dynamic particular which is said to be grasped immediately by our first moment of sensation in the cognition of an empirical object is claimed to be the only 'pure'

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1. Vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ, vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ Quoted in Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā by Vācaspati Miśra. (Calcutta Sanskrit Series,1936,1944),p.681.

* As stated in the book of Sushanta Sen, A Study of Universals (Research Publication,Visva-Bharati),p.44

reality by the Buddhists. This reality is 'pure' in the sense that it is not mixed up with the slightest bit of imaginative construction (kalpanā) of our mind. Directly opposed to this pure reality, there is pure identity, pure imagination of our understanding. God, Soul, the Sāṁkhya concept of primordial Matter etc. are examples of this pure imagination (viśuddha kalpanā).[2] These are, to use a pharse used by Kant, "transcendental illusions" having no objective validity whatsoever. But between these pure realities of efficent particulars and pure idealities of the so-called metaphysical entities, there is a half-imagined world, a world which though consisting of constructed images, are yet established on a firm foundation of efficient particulars. It is the phenomenal world of our everyday experience. The images arise in functional dependence on the moments of unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa) reflected in sensation and by an act of imputation they are objectivised and identified with those bare particulars. The result is the phenomenal world. Hence, we find that there are two

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2. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, (Mouton and Co. S.Gravenhage, 1958, Vol.1), P.70.

kinds of imagination, one pure and the other mixed with reality; and two kinds of reality, one direct and pure, and the other indirect and mixed with imagination.[3] The pure reality consists of unique particulars which are directly reflected in pure sensation. These particulars are shorn of all sensible qualities; they have no duration in time, nor have they any extension in space. Each of them is differentiated and distinguished from everything else in the world(sarvato-vyāvṛtta). Hence they are discrete, disconnected and absolutely isolated. The Sanskrit word for the 'unique particular', svalakṣaṇa means 'of its own kind' which has no parallel to it in the whole universe. It exists only for one moment, because no sooner it is born than it is destroyed and replaced by another quique particular which, although similar to it, is quite different from it. Lasting only for a 'moment', it is called momentary (kṣanika). But as a matter of fact, there being no separate reality called time which is the temporal receptacle of objects as

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3. Ibid.

understood in the realistic systems, the unique particular itself is called the 'moment'(kṣaṇa). As it is shorn of other duration in time or extension in space, the best English term for the Buddhist particular would be 'Point-instant', a term used by Stcherbatsky. This svalakṣaṇa, kṣaṇa, or 'point-instant' alone is the pure reality, according to the Buddhists, because it is not yet mixed up with the imaginative construction (kalpanā) of our mind. But over and above this pure reality, there is another reality which is impure so to speak, because it consists of objectivised images on the basis of these unique particulars. This reality has been endowed by us with a position in time, a position in space and with all variety of sensible and abstract qualities. This is the phenomenal world of our everyday experience.

From the above discussion it is clear, that a man, a cow, a jar etc., will not be real particular, according to the Buddhists; the real particulars here will be the transcendental point-instants which underlie

these phenomenal individual objects. Any general image constructed by though with reference to and on the basis of these point-instants is a universal. In this sense every predicable concept, every relation and quality will be a universal. From the Buddhist point of view, whatever can be expressed in speech by a name is a universal. The particular point-instant is inexpressible, since it is a thing shorn of all relations and is the ultimate subject of all possible predication. Hence the particular and the universal "may be mutually defined as the negation of one another, they are correlated as the real and the unreal(vastu, avastu), as the efficient and the non-efficient(samartha, asamartha), as the non-constructed and the constructed (nirvikalpaka, kalpita), the non-artificial and the artificial (akṛtrima, kṛtrima), the non-imagined and the imagined (anāropita, āropita), the uncognizable and the cognizable (jñānena aprāpya, prāpya), the unutterable and the utterable (anabhilāpya, abhilāpya), the own essense and the general essense (svalakṣaṇa, sāmānyalakṣaṇa), the thing shorn of all its extension and the thing

containing albeit quite redimentary extension(sarvato vyāvṛtta, avyāvṛtta)., the unique and the non-unique (trailokya-vyāvṛtta, avyāvṛtta), the non-repeated and repeated in space-time(deśa-kāla-anugata,ananugata), the simple and the composite (anavayavin, avayavin), this indivisible and the divisible (abhinna,bhinna), the transcendental thing and the empirical thing (paramārtha-sat, samvṛti-sat), the essence unshared by others and the essence shared by others (asādhārana, sādhāranalakṣaṇa), the external and the internal (bāhya, abāhya), the true and the spurious(analīkam, alīkam), the non-dialectical and the dialectical (viruddha-dharma-adhyastam, anadhyastam), the significant and the insignificant (atuccha,tuccha), the unformed and the formed (nirākāra, sākāra), the Thing-in-Itself and the phenomenon(svalakṣaṇa=paramārtha-sat, samvṛti-sat=sāmānya-lakṣaṇa)."[4]

A question can be raised here: how can the utterly heterogenous point-instants having nothing identical in

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4. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic(Mouton and Co. S-Gravenhage,1958,Vol.1), pp.184-185.

common produce an illusory image of identity in our mind ? The mental origin of the idea of universal which is the same as the idea of identity (anuvṛtti pratyaya) is perfectly conceivable when, corresponding to it, there is an idential character called universal existing in external objective world. But the Buddhists deny the objective existence of universals altogether while retaining the notion of identity as a mental concept (vikalpa). The genesis of this notions, therefore, remains an unaccounted mystery. To say that the idea of identity is simply an illusion(alīka) without giving any rational explanation of the illusion in question is simply to evade the intricacy of the problem. To this the Buddhists answer that the postulation of an objective universal to justify the origin of the idea of identity is based or necessitated by an erroneous view of causation a view which holds that the effect must be similar to the cause. But our experience teaches us, argues a Buddhist, that the things or objects which are utterly dissimilar can yet produce a similar effect and they can do so by virtue

of their inherent power.[5] For example, the plant known as '*guduci*' is used in medicine for the purpose of curing fever. But there are other plants which are also used in medicine for the same purpose. But these different plants all of which produce the same febrifuge effect have not the slightest similarity with one another, other in shape, or in substance, or in stuff or in any other. Their similarity lies not in having an identical property in common but in producing a similar or a nearly similar effect. In the same way, the utterly dissimilar particulars of a certain class, though not having in common an objective identical property called universal, can yet stimulate our Productive Imagination(*kalpanā*) by virtue of their inherent power (*śakti*) in such a way as to produce a general image, the notion of an identical universal in our mind.[6]

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5. Evamatyantabhede'pi kecinniyataśaktitaḥ,Tulyapratyavamarśādehertutvaṁ yanti nāpre. Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṁgraha*(Gaekwads' Oriental Series,Baroda, 1926, Vol.1),p.239.

6. Yathā gudūcyādināmeva jvarādiśamane śaktirnānyeṣām, indriyaviṣayālokamanskārādīnām ca viśiṣṭajñānotpādane, tathaikāpratyavamarśo'pi keṣāṁcideva śaktiniyama iti. Kamalśīla, *Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā*(Gaekwad,1926), p.497.

II

The problem of universal, though mainly an ontological problem, has a well-marked epistemological hinterland which shapes and determines the nature of the former. In the present section, therefore, an attempt will be made to study this problem in its epistemological background without which the true significance of it cannot be fully appreciated.

The controversy between realism and phenomenalism in India is closely associated with two different theories of sense-perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists assume an imageless (nirākāra) consciousness and a direct perception by the senses of both the particular and of the universal residing in it. The Buddhist phenomenalists transfer these universals out of the external world of mere particulars directly reflected in sensation, faced by an internal world of mere images, that is to say, of mere universals. Sensation becomes related to images as particular to universals.

Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the passive receptivity of senses, the pure sensation of an efficient point-instant (svalakṣaṇa) of external reality and is absolutely devoid of the forms of the understanding (kalpanāpoḍam).[7] It is, therefore, the bare moment of pure sensation or sense-intuition and is thus unutterable in itself. The Buddhists agree with the Mīmāṁsakas in holding that in all perception there must be an element of novelty, i.e., a felt addition to our experience. Cognition in the true sense, must be a new cognition, cognition of the object not yet cognised (anadhigata-artha-adhigantṛ). If this be the case, argues a Buddhist, then such feeling of novelty belongs only to the first moment of sensation in the knowledge of an object. In the following moments, when the attention of the perceiver is aroused, it is no more that pure sensation which it was in the first moment; it becomes the repeated cognition of the first flash of awareness. True perception, therefore, according to the

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7. Dharmakirti, Nyāyabindu, Chapter-I.

Buddhists, is always momentary sensation, enduring perception is not perception at all; it is not cognition proper, it is re-cognition. The cognitive element of our mind is limited to that moment only when we get first awareness of the object's presence. It is followed by the synthetical operation of the intellect which constructs a general form of immage of the object. But the function of sense-perception consists only in signalising the presence of the object in the ken, its mere presence and nothing else. To construct an image of the object whose presence has thus been reported by sense-perception is the function of Productive Imagination (kalpanā). Therefore, the salient feature of sense-perception lies in the fact that though it is followed by the construction of a general image, in itself it is non-constructive in nature. What passes as perception ordinarily and is regarded as such by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and other realists under what they call savikalpaka-pratyakṣa or judgmental perception is not perception at all. It is the original sensational core-followed by the construction of a general image of

the object and by an act of identification of the image so constructed with the given in sensation. In the judgemental perception, 'this is a cow', the 'this' is the sensational core and is unspeakable in itself and the element 'cow' is a general concept constructed by the understanding and expressed in a mnemic image (a connotative name) and identified with the given sensation by an act of imputation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, on the other hand, consider both the pure sensation (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and the judgemental perception(savikalpaka pratyakṣa) to be sense-perception and caused by sense-object contact (indriyārtha sannikarṣa). The difference between these two kinds of perception is, for them, one of quantity to be explained as follows. All the elements of judgemental perception are directly presented to our pre-judgemental level of perception as self-contained units not qualifying one another and as realities outside. In the savikalpaka perception also, according to the

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is immediate presentation(which may also be called immediate discovery) of reals outside, and as such there is no difference in quality between these two kinds of perception. The only difference in the latter case is that the items of the nirvikalpaka perception are presented (immediately discovered) as standing in a qualifier-qualified relation; and according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, this qualifier-qualified relation is as much an independent reality outside as the items themselves.

According to the other Indian realists also like the Sāṁkhya and the Mīmāṁsā thinkers, the difference between savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perception is never one of quality but one of the degree of distinctness and clarity. The nirvikalpaka perception, they hold, is vague, indistinct and inexpressible in words. On the judgemental plane, all the items of the nirvikalpaka perception become clear and distinct by qualifying one another.[8]

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8. Satkari Mukherjee, The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism(Calcutta,1944),pp.258-60.

Hence the difference between these two cases of perception, according to the Indian realists, is not one of kind, as the Buddhists maintain, but either one of quantity or of degree. The difference consists in a qualified and non-qualified cognition of the objects perceived, not in the passive receptivity of sense and the spontaneous construction of understanding. Substance (dravya), quality (guna), universal(sāmānya) etc., according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, are not thought-constructs as the Buddhists say, but ultimate irreducible forms of reality as the objective material of both kinds of perception—determinate or judgemental and indeterminate or pre-judgemental. We have direct apprehension of these ultimate entities through different forms of sense-object-contact. In the case of perception of a universal qualifying an object, the corresponding contact is either saṁyukta-samavāya or saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya.[9] In the case of a universal like 'jarness (ghatatva) corresponding to the substance 'jar' (ghata), the sannikarṣa or contact is saṁyukta-

9. S.C. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, (Calcutta University 1939), pp.182-83.

samāvāya through which the universal in question is perceived. The individual jar (ghata) being a substance (dravya) is saṁyukta or in direct conjunction with the sense and the jarness (ghatatva) is related to the individual jar by the relation of inherence(samavāya) and thus through saṁyukta-samavāya or the relation of inherence in that which is in conjunction with the sense, in perceiving the jar we also perceive the 'jarness' inherent in the jar. In the case of the perception of universals corresponding to qualities and movements (guna and karma), the particular contact involved is saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya. Blue colour, e.g. is a quality and bluness inheres in the blue colour as its universal and blue colour again inheres in the blue substance. We perceive the substance through the relation of conjunction (saṁyoga) with our sense of sight, the colour blue of the blue substance through the relation of saṁyukta-samavāya or inherence in that which is in conjunction with the eyes and the blueness of the colour blue through the

relation of saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya, i.e., through inhering in an inherent quality of the substance which is in conjunction with the sense. The same type of sense-contact operates in the perception of universals corresponding to motion. Again, soundness (śabdatva) as the universal of different kinds of sound is perceived by the auditory sense through another kind of sense-contact known as samaveta-samavāya.[10] The universal 'soundness' is in contact with the ear through its inherence (samavāya) in sound which inheres as a quality (samaveta) in the auditory sense.

The Buddhists, however, deny the perceptibility of universals on the ground that they are not forms of reality at all and the aforesaid varieties of sense-contact are not possible. The universals, according to them, are the intelligible concepts, the workmanship of our understanding which the sense cannot know. The function of the sense consists merely in presenting the efficient particular (svalakṣaṇa) which is the

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10. Ibid., pp.183-84.

affirmative elements in perception. It is the understanding that elaborates the presented element into a known empitical object by means of a concept of a universal of its own creation. A judgemental perception thus involves both the receptivity of sense and the spontaneity of the understanding, and therefore is not pure perception. Pure perceptioni is, as we have indicated already, nothing but presentation as such without any imaginative or conceptual elaboration. It is the bare datum in its immediacy and is unutterable in itself. Perceptual judgment is a further elaboration, the interpretation of the datum through any one of the five kinds of thought-construction (pañcavidha-kalpanā), namely, the image of substance (dravya-kalpanā) a quality (guna-kalpanā) an action (karma-kalpanā), a universal (sāmānya-kalpanā), and a name (nāma-kalpanā).[11] It should be noted here that though the name 'universal' (sāmānya) is given to one of the five kinds of categories of the understanding,

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11. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic(Vol.I), p.217

yet all of them should be treated as universals from the Buddhist point of view, since all of them represent the general construction of our understanding as opposed to the particular point-instants of external reality.[12] This is how a perceptual judgement transforms the non-significant datum of sense into a significant knowable object. Perception or more properly sensation, according to the Buddhists, does not know though it apprehends, while judgment knows but only by distorting what it apprehends. The subject of the judgment is the datum in its immediacy and as such unutterable. The predicate is an intelligible concept or universal. Judgment is the act of predication, i.e., the interpretation or mediation of the unutterable immediacy by an intelligible universal and is so far a deviation or distortion of the given in its immediacy.

Both the Mimāṁsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, however, reject the Buddhist view that the <u>savikalpaka</u> perception is a construction of the understanding

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12. "..... all categories are universals" ibid,p.218.

and therefore void of truth. The savikalpaka, according to the non-Buddhist Indian realists, answers to the real relational character of objects and is not a superimposition of thought-constructs ab-extra on an intrinsically non-relational manifold. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the relational as well as the non-relational represent different stages of knowing rather than of being so that though in the order of being there may not be relations without relata or vice-versa, in the order of knowing relations and the relata are first apprehended in themselves before they are apprehended as qualifying one another. It is clear from the above that if reality is essentially non-relational - a non-relational dynamic manifold as the Buddhists say or a non-relational undifferentiated essence of pure presentative consciousness (Brahman) as the Advaitins say, — then the relational consciousness of the non-relational reality will be more or less a construction of the understanding and will so far be a distorted representation of its intrinsic nature. Thus the movement of experience from the nirvikalpaka or non-relational

plane to that of the savikalpaka or relational will be a falling away from truth and reality, according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and the Mīmāṁsakas, however, (and also for the Sāṁkhya-philosophers for whom relational forms are real evolutes of prakṛti as the original non-relational matrix of objective reality) nirvikalpaka, i.e., non-relational, and savikalpaka or relational experience are not negatively related as according to the Buddhists and the Advaitins. One the contrary, the relational forms being not the impoverishment but rather the fuller and more developed forms of the non-relational experience, the latter is only a less adequate and less articulate apprehension of what is apprehended more clearly and distinctly and more in accordance with its developed intrinsic nature in relational experience. Thus the advance from the nirvikalpaka to the savikalpaka is not a falling away from truth as the Buddhists and Advaitins say but a marked gain in content, clearness and distinctness of apprehension.

The above discussion is sufficient to show how the ontological problem of universal can be linked up and is practically based upon the logical problem of perception. The validity or invalidity of the savikalpaka perception determines the reality or unreality of the universals. But the problem of universal can be viewed from a more general epistemological point of view. It rests upon the question - are sensibility and understanding, sensation and conception, two different and distinct sources of human knowledge or, do they represent two different stages of the same process of knowing ? The Buddhists maintain a sharp, radical and transcendental distinction between these two separate faculties of human knowledge, while the Mīmāṁsakas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers deny this distinction altogether. According to the Buddhists, the sensibility is passive and receptive and is the source of direct knowledge, while the understanding is creative and spontaneous and is the source of indirect knowledge, the sensibility directly apprehends

only the non-relational dynamic particulars, while the understanding creates the general images of the particulars and knows them.

The sense-perception of an entity, according to the Buddhists, is possible only if it is causally efficient (artha-kriyā-kāri), that is, if it possesses the faculty of affecting our sensibility. But mere efficiency is not enough for the sense-perception of an object, because there is always a plurality of causes. Therefore, over and above its causal efficiency, that cause alone is the object of sensation which invariably calls forth in our cognition its own general image.[13] But a universal neither can effect our sensibility, nor can it call forth an image of the object, since it is ex-hypothesi devoid of any kind of causal efficiency.[14] We cannot, therefore, according to the Buddhists, have any sense-perception of the

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13. Arthasāmarthyasamutthaṁ hi pratyakṣagocaraṁ. Sa eva cārthaḥ pratyakṣagocaro yo jñānapratibhāṣamtmanonvayavyatirekā-vanukārayati. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p.17.

14. Na ca sāmānyaṁ nirastasamastārthakriyāsāmarthyamevaṁ bhavitumarhati, Ibid.

universals. Nor can we have any sense-perception of the so-called empirical individual objects, because they are nothing but the meeting point of several universals on the basis of some efficient particulars. The transcendental particulars therefore, which underlie the so-called empirical individual objects and which are causally efficient are the proper objects of our sense-perception.[15] That a particular of this kind should also be cognised by the conceiving, synthetic faculty of our mind or by inference is impossible.[16] The sphere of absolute particulars is not the sphere of inference or intellection. Inference or intellection cognises relation[17] but in an absolute particular no relation can be found. Relation is possible only between two universals not between two svalakṣaṇa particulars.[18] Therefore it is only the universals that

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15. Tasmāt svalakṣaṇa viṣayam pratyakṣam. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīka, (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1925), p.17

16. Na ca svalakṣaṇamanumānasyāpi gocaraḥ, Ibid, p.18.

17. Sambandhagrahānapekṣamanumānam. Nyāyamañjarī (Vol.I, edited and translated into Bengali, by Pancanan Tarka-vāgīś, (Calcutta University), p.229.

18. Pratibandhaḥ sāmānyadharmāvāśrayate. Vācaspati Miśra, Op.cit., p.18. The relation holding between a universal and its corresponding particular is not real relation, according to the Buddhists, but an imputed one imposed by the understanding.

can be inferred not the absolute particulars. The distinction between sensibility and understanding, or, between perception and intellection, is therefore, viṣayagata, i.e., arises from a difference of their respective objects. In the case of perception, the object is svalakṣaṇa real. In intellection (indirect knowing), however, what we know is not the real in itself but certain universals constructed by thought on the basis of our perception of unique reals.

Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers join issue with the Buddhists. They point out that the Buddhists' view of perception as svalakṣṇa-viṣaya does not square with the facts of experience since the universals like the particulars, also admit of perception. In fact, most perceptions of particulars are also perception of universals inhering in particulars. The different kinds of sense-contact which are operative in the perception of universals have been discussed already.

Nor is the Buddhist view of intellection as sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣaya necessarily true in every case, since the particulars also can very well be inferred like the universals. The existence of a particular fire, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, can either be perceived directly by the visual and tactile sense, or it may be inferred indirectly from the presence of smoke.[19] To a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist, therefore, the distinction between perceiving and mediate knowing is not viṣayagata strictly speaking; it arises from the difference of their respective kāraṇas or instrumental causes and is thus kāraṇagata and not viṣayagata. Thus, perception is jñānākaraṇka

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19. Particulars are empirically conceived by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists, but these are transcendentally understood by the Buddhists. The Buddhists' particular is the point-instant, the thing-in-itself(svalakṣaṇa), and radically different from all constructions of the conceptive faculty of our mind. But the realists' particular is the concrete physical individual objects of our everyday experience. The concrete individual objects, being a meeting point of several universals, is nevertheless treated as a particular by the realists, but for the Buddhists it is a construction of our mind on the basis of transcendental particulars and therefore treated as a universal cognised by inference.

jñāna, i.e., karaṇa while parokṣa or mediate knowing or intellection is knowledge mediated by another knowledge as its instrumental cause. In the case of perception, the instrumental cause or kārana in the sense of phalāyoga-vyavacchinna kāraṇa (the last cause in the causal series immediately after which the effect arises) or in the sense of vyāpāravat-asādhārana kāraṇa (operative uncommon cause) is either the sense-object contact or the sense itself. But niether the sense-object contact not the sense is itself knowledge though it causes knowledge which we call perceptual cognition. In inference and other forms of indirect knowledge, however, the resulting knowledge is mediated by some other knowledge. Thus, in inference the knowledge of the conclusion is mediated by the knowledge of a universal proposition (vyāpti-jñāna) and pakṣadharmatā-jñāna, i.e., the knowledge of the mark as a dharma or property of the pakṣa or the subject of inference.

As we have already shown that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers sensibility and understanding, sensation

and intellection, are not two radically distinct and separate source of knowledge, because both the particulars and the universals can be apprehended either directly by different sense-faculties or indirectly by understanding, there cannot be, therefore, no strict viṣayagata limit for each source of knowledge; one can very well interfere into the realm of the other. This view of the realists is known as pramāṇa saṁplava, a view which admits that the very same thing, be it a universal or a particular, can be cognised in two different ways - either directly by sense-organs or indirectly by the understanding.[20]

As against the above theory of the realists, the Buddhists put forward the theory known as pramāṇa-vayavasthā, according to which there is a sharp and radical distinction between two sources of knowledge corresponding to two kinds of object. The objects are either particulars or universals and accordingly the source of knowledge are either sensation or conception. Each

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20. Ekasmin viṣaye' nekapramāṇapravṛttih saṁplavaḥ, Nyāyamañjarī (Vol.I, ed.,p.Tarkavagis,1939),p.227.

source has a marked jurisdiction of its own to which the other has no access. The particulars are apprehended by the senses but the universals are conceived by the understanding. The senses cannot know the universals nor can the particulars be known by the understanding. The reason for this conclusion has been discussed already.[21]

Dharmakīrti, the famous Buddhist philosopher, proposes an experiment by way of introspection to demonstrate the rigid dichotomy between sensibility and understanding. The experiment consists in pointing to the simple psychological phenomenon of absentmindness. He says that when we are absentminded,

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21. It should be noted here that from the empirical point of view it is just the Buddhist theory which would deserve to be called '<u>saṁplava</u>' theory, since the two sources of knowledge, sensation and conception, are not found in our everyday experience in their pure and unmixed condition. The empirical world is a world created by our understanding by a synthesis (<u>saṁplava</u>) of its concepts with the pure sensation. In order to separate them and to show their mutual exclusiveness, we must go beyond actual experience, beyond all observable conscious and sub-conscious operation of the intellect, and assume a transcendental difference, a difference which, although unobserved by us directly, is urged upon us necessarily by uncontradicted ultimate reality.

i.e., when our attention is otherwise engaged (anyatra-gatacitta), we cannot recognise an object presented in our senses even if the senses are operative fully. In this case, the observer will not 'understand' anything except the bare presence of the object.[22] The attention of the observer must be directed to the object; the disposition of the past experience must be remembered, the name and its connotation must be recalled; only then will be observer begin to 'understand' and recognition will follow.[23] The experiment of Dharmakīrti signifies the fact that the understanding is a separate faculty different from the senses. The understanding is the mind's spontaneous activity subsequent to the function of the sensuous passive apparatus. There is a minimum limit to every empirical cognition, the limit being the pure unutterable sensation absolutely free from the construction of the understanding and on the basis of which the understanding constructs its universals.

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22. Anyatra gatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam, Sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravarttate Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgraha (Gaekwad, 1926, Vol.I), p.241

23. Saṁketa manaskārāt sadādipratyayāime, Jāyamānstu lakṣyante nākṣavyāpṛtya anantaram., Ibid, p.240.

The experiment of Dharmakīrti offers a remarkable coincidence with one proposed by Bergson. "I am going", says the French philosopher, "to close my eyes, stop my ears, extenguish one by one the sensations ..... all my perceptions vanish, the material world sinks into silence.....I can even, it may be, blot out and forget my recollections upto my immediate past; but at least I keep the consciousness of my present, reduced to its extremest proverty, that is to say, of the actual state of my body".[24] This consciousness "reduced to extremest poverty" is evidently nothing but Dharmakīrti's moment of pure sensation, the present moment. Bergson adduces it as a proof that the idea of nought is a pseudo-idea. The Buddhists refer to it exactly for the same purpose. But it is at the same time a proof that sensation and understanding are two quite heterogeneous sources of knowledge, the sensations being the basic foundation upon which the understanding builds up its entire superstructure. The universal is an illusion, it is mere name or concept

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24. Creative Evolution, p.293,(Macmillan,London,1911)

of the understanding without any objective correlative correspondening to it. Thus we find that the Buddhists' rejection of the reality of universals is founded upon the epistemological doctorine that the senses and the understanding are two utterly heterogeneous mental faculties, although united by a special causal relation, in as much as the images of universals always arise in functional dependence on sensation.

III

The Buddhists offer various arguments to disprove the ontological reality of universals. Kamalasila., a well-known Buddhist philosopher, argues that, had the universal been a separate objective reality apart from the particulars, we could have apprehended it separately as a fruit in a basket. But to have an abstract idea of a universal apart from the ideas of the particulars is a psychological impossibility. The universal cowness (gotva) is supposed to be berefit of the characteristics, colour or shape, which an actual individual cow possesses. But try as we may, we can not imagine, or have an idea of this universal 'cowness' devoid of those peculiar features of an actual cow. Hence the ontological unreality of the universals[25] is proved.

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25. Etaduktaṁ bhavati-anugāmipratyayānāṁ piṇḍādivyatiriktaṁ nimittamalamvanabhutameva bhavadbhiḥ sisādhayiṣitam, taccāyuktam, tasyāpratibhāsanāt; tadvilakṣaṇavarṇākṛtyādipratibhāsanācca. Tathāhi-bhavaddhivarṇākṛtyakṣarākāraśunyameva varṇyate gotvādisāmānyam, vijñānam ca varnādipratibhāsānugatamanubhūyate, tat kathamasya varnādiśunyamālamvanaṁ bhavet, na hi anyākārasya vijñānasyānyadālamvanaṁ yuktamatiprasaṅgāt. Kamalaśīla, Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā (Gackwad, 1926, Vol.1), p.243.

It should be noted here that Berkeley, an English nominalist, adopts almost the same line of argument in his celebrated "introduction" to his "Principles of Human Knowledge" and also in the main body of the Principles to dispose of Locke's conceptualistic theory of universal.[26] As against Locke, Berkeley denies the mental existence of the universals in the form of general ideas by pointing out the psychological impossibility of imagining the general as opposed to the particular, the abstract as opposed to the concrete. Our capacity of forming ideas, argues. Berkeley, is always limited to the particulars. The so-called ideas of universals, therefore, are mere names or words without any corresponding mental concepts or objective correlative.

But though the type of argument advanced by both Berkeley and a Buddhist is almost the same, the enormous difference between these two philosophers should not be

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26. As stated in the book of Sushanta Sen, A Study of Universals, (Research publication, Visva-Bharati, 1978), p.59.

overlooked. So far as Berkeley repudiates the objective existence of the universals by pointing out the psychological incapacity of our mind of having general or abstract ideas as opposed to the ideas of the particulars, a Buddhist would readily agree with him. But he would point out to Berkeley that what he calls the idea of particular is also general, general in respect of the particulars coming under it. The non-general is only that thing which is strictly 'in itself' (sva-lakṣaṇa), i.e., a thing whose being or knowledge is not determined by anything other than itself. If, on the other hand, the being of knowledge of a thing is determined by, relative to, or dependent on things other than itself, then it is no longer 'in itself'(sva-lakṣaṇa) it is no longer a particular, it becomes general. In this sense, only the very first moment of unutterable sensation represents particulars. Moments which follow this first moment of pure sensation or the determinate images or concepts which subsequently arise in functional dependence

on this first moment, are all universal or general, since, according to the Buddhists, their being and knowledge are determined by a negation of their opposites, and hence dependent on them. The idea of a particular blue colour as opposed to the idea of blueness in general is a particular idea, according to Berkeley. But a Buddhist would say that if it is blue in colour, this means that it already not non-blue and then it is general, no more 'in itself' (sva-lakṣaṇa) but 'in the other' (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) relative, dependent, constructed and dialectical. The absolute particular blue is the unutterable point-instant of the first moment of sensation which is subsequently understood by the understanding by a general image of blue. The reality and meaning of this image of blue consist in the negation of things which are not blue in colour. In this way, the idea of the blue which is proposed by Berkeley to be a particular idea is also general or universal, according to the Buddhists. The particulars are empirically conceived by

Berkeley, transcendentally understood by the Buddhists.

We have seen how the psychological impossibility to have an abstract general idea over and above the ideas of particulars is made the ground for rejecting the ontological reality of the universals. But there are many other arguments advaced by the Buddhists which tend to disclose the absurdity of a realistic theory of universal. Most of these arguments try to show that even granting a separate ontological existence to the universals apart from the particulars, the realists fail to explain with success the relationship between them.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, the particular and its corresponding universal are realted to each other as the 'support' and the thing 'supported' (ādharādheya-sambandha). But a support, the Buddhist argues, is always a cause which modifies its content. An unsupported apple which naturally would fall down to the ground is transformed into non-falling down

object when it is supported by a basket. But the universal is supposed by the realist to be an eternal never changing entity which cannot be efficiently acted upon so as to be modified by a cause and hence it cannot be supported by a substratum.[27]

Again, one particular object is said to 'support' several universals at the same time, which according to the Buddhists, is an unintelligible jargon. Thus the fact of 'being a tree'(vṛkṣatva) and that of 'being a śiṁśapā tree'(śiṁśapātva) are two separate universals which are supported by the self-same particular tree named śiṁśapā. They are regarded as two separate universals, because each of them has its own separate name. They, therefore, cannot be possessed in common by the same supporting particular, just as cowness(gotva) and horseness (aśvatva) do not represent two characteristics possessed by one common substratum.[28]

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27. Api cāstu sāmānyaṁ vastusat tathā'pi nityatvādanupakāryatayā svalakṣaṇādhāratvānupapattiḥ. Ādhāratvamapi hi karaṇatvameva. Patanadharmāno hi vadarādayaḥ kundādivirpatanadharmānaḥ kriyānta. Na ca nityaṁ kriyata iti nādheyam, Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā (Chowkhamba, 1925), p. 484.

28. Tathā vṛkṣatvaśiṁśapātva svatantre eva sāmānye svaśabdābhyāmavagamito na gouraśva iti vatsāmānadhikaranyṁ bhajetām., ibid.

But even supposing for the sake of argument, urges a Buddhist, that a self-same particular can 'support' two or more universals at the same time, it will lead us to the absurd position to think that there can not be any existential and connotative difference between those different universals which are ontologically distinct from one another. If one of them be suggested by a name or by a conception, then all the remaining ones, since their existence depends on the same supporting cause, will be eo ipso suggested and their names will practically become synonyms. Thus the names of the universals like existence, substantiality, solidity, arboreity and śiṃśapāness, all of which are supposed to inhere in the self-same śiṃśapā tree, will have the same meaning, which is evidently absurd. Again if different universals be supported by the same particular, then, in perceiving one of these universals, we should be able to perceive the rest of them. But that this is not the case is proved by the fact that from a considerable distance in a dim moonlit night, a śiṃśapā tree is

perceived merely as something existent and nothing else. Had the hypothesis in question been true, i.e., if the self-same particular tree supported the different kinds of aforesaid universals, then in perceiving the universal 'existence' within it, we could have perceived the rest of them at the same time. But this is not the case.[29] These considerations, the Buddhists claim, conclusively dispose of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention that a single individual object is the support of several universals at the same time.

Again, when a universal is said to be present in a particular instance of it, the Buddhist asks the Naiyāyikas - is it present in it in its entirety, or, is only a part of it present in that particular instance ? If it is present in its entirely, then, in accordance with the law of contradiction, nothing of it will be left to be present in its other particular instances, so that if there be one individual cow by

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29. Ekopakārake grāhye nopakārāstato'pare, Dṛṣte tasminnadṛṣṭā ye tadgrahe sakalagraha, Ibid.

virtue of its possession of the universal 'cowness' (gotva), there will be no other individual cows in the world. And if it is present in its various particular instances part by part, then, the universal in question, instead of being a simple unanalysable entity as claimed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, will be a complex one composed of parts; and as no complex entity is enternal, the universal would cease to be eternal (nitya). But this conclusion directly goes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of universal. Moreover, if only a part of the universal 'cowness' be present in a particular cow, then we are landed in the absurdity that an individual cow is only partly a cow and partly some other animal such as a horse.

Next, the Buddhists ask the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers - are the so-called universal present everywhere (sarva-sarva-gata), or, are they confined only to their respective particular instances(vyakti-sarva-gata)?

If it is present everywhere, then all things will be confused together and form a chaos, because a cow would be then characterised not only by cowness(gotva) by also by horseness (aśvatva), dogness etc., which are everywhere by suppostion.[30] If the universal is, on the other hand, confined only to its respective particulars, e.g., if the universal 'cowness' be present only in all individual cows and not in any other animals, then it would be difficult to account for its sudden appearance in a newly born particular object which springs into existence at a spot where the universal in question was not found previously and whereto it couldn not have moved from another individual in which it was, being by hypothesis, incapable of movement. Only the substances are capable of movement, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, and if the universal in question moves from another individual, it would cease to be a universal and turn out to be a substance. Moreover, how can we explain the perception of the individual from which its corresponding universal is transmitted to the other

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30. Jayanta Bhatta., Nyāyamañjarī(Chowkhamba)1936,pp.272-73.

newly born individual ? It cannot be said that the universal in question is born a new along with the newly born individual, because the universals are eternal entities which do not admit of any temporal origination. As the sudden appearance of a universal in a newly born individual object cannot be explained with success, so also we cannot explain its sudden disappearance from an individual when it is broken or destroyed. The universal in question cannot be destroyed along with the destruction of the individual, since it is an eternal entity incapable of destruction. Nor can it be said that it moves forward in search of an another individual as its abode, because it is *ex hypothesi* devoid of any motion. Even if for the sake of argument we admit it can move forward to another individual for its locus, the individual to which it moves cannot accommodate it, because it is already possessed of its own universal and the new-comer universal would prove superfluous to it. Again, suppose the species we call cow becomes extinct in the course of evolution so that not a single individual cow is

anywhere left on the earth, where will the eternal 'cowness'(gotva) go ? Will it wander about like a floating adjective in empty space and epty time ? Even if it does so, its subsistence in space and time (which, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers are substances) would make them understood as cow, as the presence of a cow-universal (gotva-jāti) in an individual cow makes the latter understood as a cow. But this is obviously absurd. All these Buddhist objections in connection with the relation of a universal to its corresponding particular objects have been summed up in the following verse:

> Na yāti na ca tatrāsīn na cotpannaṁ na cāṁśavat,
> Jahāti pūrvaṁ nādhāram aho vyasana-saṁtatih
>
> Pramāṇavārtika, 1/153

The main point of the realists' answer to the objections summed up in the verse[31] is that all of them are based on a false spatial view of universal,

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31. In the next section we shall see how can all other objections adduced by the Buddhists against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of universal be answered successfully from the stand point of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism.

that the universals are spatial entities spatially located in particulars. But the particular is not the spatial seat of the universal, it is only a means of revealing it (vyañjaka). The universal 'cowness' is present not only in the particular cows but also in other animals such as horses, dogs etc. But it is not manifested in other animals except in the individual cows. That is why, the universal 'cowness', though present in a horse, cannot be perceived in it. It can be perceived only in a cow which along possesses the capacity to manifest it. Hence, despite its omnipresence, a universal cannot be perceived anywhere and everywhere in the world, it can be perceived only through the perception of the individual which is capable or revealing it.[32] Hence it is both correct to say that the universal is omnipresent(sarvasarva-gata) and also that it is present in its respective particulars (vyakti-sarva-gata).[33] When a new particular is born, it comes to be related to its corresponding universal

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32. Sarvasarvagatā jātiriti tāvadupeyate, Sarvatrāgrahaṇam tasyā vyañjakavyaktyasannidheḥ, Jayanta Bhatta., Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba), p.285.

33. Tatra yat tāvat pṛṣṭaṁ sāmānyaṁ sarvagataṁ vyaktigataṁ veti tatra pakṣadvayamapi vayāṁ kakṣīkurmaḥ, Nārāyan Bhatta, Mānameyodaya, p.231.

and is manifested through it. Though the universal is eternal and omnipresent, its relation to a particular individual and hence its manifestation come into existence only at the moment when the individual in question comes into being.

But the Buddhists might resort to the above argument of the realists that potential or unmanifested existence is equivalent to non-existence. Efficiency, activity or actuality(arthakriyākāritva) is the mark of the real. If an entity is devoid of this efficiency, if it is unable to affect our sensibility so that it fails to produce any kind of sensation within us, it should be pronounced as unreal or non-existent. The Buddhists could readily concede to Berkeley's dictum- Esse est percepi - to be is to be perceived - if perception is taken in the sense of pure sensation devoid of any kind of imaginative construction. Hence to say that the universal 'cowness', though present in a horse, is not perceived in it, because it is not manifested there, is a clear contradiction in terms. Moreover,

it is said by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers that only some particulars possess the capacity of revealing a specific universal. But it cannot explain — why the universal in question should be perceived in those particulars. The flame of a torch reveals the objects in a dark chamber, but it cannot be said that those objects are felt or perceived <u>within</u> the flame.

IV

In the foregoing sections of this chapter, we had engaged our attention in finding out the various grounds offered by the Buddhist phenomenalists on the basis of which they seek to deny the ontological reality of the universals. In our present discussion our main programme will be to expose the weakness of this phenomenalistic theory by showing that the so-called grounds put forward by the Buddhists in support of their theory can not stand the test of criticisms offered by the Nyāya realists. Consequently, our discussion will have the effect of reductio ad absurdum; it will indirectly substantiate the logical soundness of the realistic theory of universals, in accordance with which the universal is a separate ontological entity (padārtha) apart from the particulars, by reducing the Buddhists position to illogical absurdity.

The first thing we are to examine here is the theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā upon which the entire edifice of the Buddhistic phenomenalism seems to rest.

It is a theory which maintains that sensation and inference, the only sources of human knowledge, are radically opposed and mutually exclusive in the sense that each of them has a marked jurisdiction of its own to which the other has no access. Pure sensation apprehends only the non-constructive particulars whereas the universals, which are nothing but the constructions (kalpanās) of our understanding, are the special field of inference. Sensation cannot apprehend the universals, nor can the particulars be apprehended by inference. This theory is in flat contradiction with the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-saṁplava, according to which the self-same object can be cognised either directly by sense-perception or indirectly by inference. There is no hard and fast opposition between sensation and inference and each of them can change its function with the other with regard to the same object.

We have seen in our previous sections how the case of Buddhist phenomenalists stands or falls with

their theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā and hence., if this theory is proved to be false and the cause of the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-saṁplava be championed, the entire superstructure of the Buddhistic phenomenalism will collapse and crumble to the ground.

The Naiyāyikas point out that if the theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā on which the Buddhists have relied so much be accepted, it would rather go against their claim of inference as a valid source of knowledge. Universals, which according to the Buddhists, are nothing but the constructions of our understanding, are the exclusive objects of inference. But inference always depends upon a prior knowledge of the thing to be inferred (sādhya) as invariably related with some of its mark (linga, sādhana). This invariable concomitance between the sādhya and sādhana has been technically called the relation of vyāpti. But the knowledge of any kind of relation (sambandha) presupposes a previous knowledge of its different relata (sambandhi) as independent units. The sādhya constitutes a relatum

in the relation of vyāpti. Hence without a knowledge of the sādhya apart from the relational context, the relation of vyāpti which is regarded as the ground of inference cannot be ascertained. The sādhya, in the case of inference as interpreted by the Buddhists, is always a universal, i.e., a construction of the understanding, the knowledge of which must, therefore, be derived from inference. Hence we find that inference here depends upon the knowledge of relation(vyāpti) and the knowledge of relation,in its turn, depends upon inference (of the sādhya). This is clearly a case of petitio principii, a defective way of ratiocination technically known in Indian philosophy as anyo'nyāśraya-adoṣa.[34]

Moreover, if the knowledge of the sādhya, as one of the relata in the relation of vyāpti be itself the result of inference, then, for this inference of sādhya an another relation of vyāpti should be assumed, in which case the required knowledge of the sādhya would again be the result of another inference, for which

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34. "Na hyavijñātasambandhaṁ liṅgaṁ gamakamiṣyate,
Sambandhadhīśca sambandhidvayāvagatipūrvikā,
Sāmānyatmakasambandhigrahaṇañcānumānataḥ.
Tasmādeva yadīṣyeta vaktamanyo'nyāsaṁśrayam".
Jayanta Bhatt. Nyāyamañjarī, Vol.I, (Bengali translation by Pañcānan Tarkavāgiś, (Calcutta University 1939), p.254.

another relation of vyāpti should again be assumed and the knowledge of the sādhya required; and this process would be multiplied indefinitely. The fallacy of indefinite regress (anavasthā), thus, becomes inevitable.[35] Hence we find that the Buddhist theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā which emphasises the inferential character of the universals as opposed to their perceptual character, annuls the very claim of inference as a valid source of knowledge, since the relation of vyāpti which is considered to be the ground of inference cannot be ascertained on this theory.

But the Buddhists, in support of their theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā put forward an objection against the theory of pramāṇa-saṁplava as sponsored by the Naiyāyikas. Pramāṇa means the source of cognition and cognition, according to the Buddhists, must be the cognition of something new, cognition of something not yet cognised (agṛhītagrāhi). There must be an element of novelty in our cognition, argues a Buddhist, a felt addition to our experience not received before. But if the Nyāya theory

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35. Anumānāntarādhīna sambandhigrahapūrvikā,
Sambandhādhigatirna syānmanvantaraśatairapi, Ibid,p.254.

of pramāṇa-saṁplava be true i.e., if the self-same object be cognised both by perception and inference consecutively, then the source which comes latter must be dismissed as a source of cognition, since it gives us then not the cognition of something new, but re-cognition of something which has already been cognised. Instead of being agṛhītagrāhi, it would be a caseofof gṛhītagrāhi, and hence, should not be regarded as a pramāṇa.

But the Naiyāyikas answer the above objection of the Buddhists by saying that the character of being agṛhītagrāhi is not always a universal and necessary mark of pramāṇa since a gṛahītagrāhi source may equally given rise to a piece of valid knowledge (pramā). To this, the Buddhist might again object that the gṛhītagrāhi source engages itself in re-producing a piece of valid knowledge which has already been produced by the agṛhītagrāhi source, but since a thing which has been produced once cannot be re-produced again, the attempt of the gṛhītagrāhi source in doing so would be a fruitless endeavour. But the Naiyāyikas

answer that the knowledge produced by the gṛhītagrāhi source here is numerically different from that produced by the agṛhītagrāhi source, and hence the charge of re-producing an already produced entity does not hold good. Moreover, if the knowledge produced by the gṛhītagrāhi source was every found to be cancelled, it could have been regarded as a case of apramāṇa, but it is never found to be so and hence the claim of the gṛhītagrāhi as a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) cannot be dismissed.[36]

It may be urged by the Buddhists that if the gṛhītagrāhi source of knowledge be regarded as a case of pramāṇa, then smṛti or recollection also being gṛhītagrāhi, should be treated as a genuine source of knowledge. But recollection is never recognised by the Naiyāyikas as a source of knowledge. As a source of knowledge. As against this Jayanta Bhatta answers that recollection is not regarded as a source

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36. Yadapi pramāṇa-viśeṣaṇamanadhigtārthagrāhitvamabhidhīyate paraistadapi na sāmpratam. Pramāṇasya gṛhītataditaravisayapravṛttasya prāmānye viśeṣabhāvāt. Nanu gṛhītaviṣaye pravṛttaṁ pramāṇam kiṁ kuryāt ? Pramāmiti cet gṛhyetāpi tāmeva vidhātum. Kṛtāyāḥ karaṇāyogāditi cenna pramāntarakaraṇāt ..... Pramāṇasya tu na kiñcit vādhyaṁ paśyāmo yena tadapramāṇamiti vyavasthā-payāmaḥ., Ibid,p.172.

of knowledge, not because that it is a gṛhītagrāhi source but because that it is not caused by the object to be recollected.[37] The recollection of an entity even after its destruction is a clear evidence that smṛti is not caused by the object in question(arthajanya).

The Buddhists have raised another fresh objection against the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-saṁplava. It is urged by them that if sense perception and inference were cognisant of the same objective reality as is maintained by the Naiyāyikas, then the difference in contents of the two cases of cognition in question cannot be accounted for. In perceptual cognition an object is cognised with all its vividness and distinctive individuality. But in inferential cognition the supposedly identical object is felt as less vivid and less distinct. It is a blurred picture of reality which cannot be specifically identified with this or that individual that is cognised with its distinctive identity in perception. We know from the testimony of perception that one individual cow is different from

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37. Na smṛter pramāṇatvaṁ gṛhītagrāhitakṛtam, Api tvanarthajanyatvaṁ tadaprāmāṇyakāraṇam. Ibid,p.175.

another individual cow. But the evidence of inference gives us knowledge not of this or that individual cow, but of the cow in general a knowledge in which the mutual difference between the individual cows has faded out. Certainly this difference in contents of the different kinds of cognition in question cannot be successfully, explained, if they are supposed to be cognisant of the self-same objective reality.[38]

But the Naiyāyikas refuse to be convinced by this argument of the Buddhists. They are of opinion that the Buddhists' contention that the difference in contention that the difference in contents is incompatible with the sameness of object is not true as a matter of fact. The same object which is clear and distinct when perceived from close vicinity is pale and blurred when viewed from a considerable distance.[39] In fact the difference between the contents of perceptual cognition and inferential cognition consists, hold the Naiyāyikas, not in the difference

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38. Yadi ca pratyakṣaviṣaye śabdānumānayorapi vṛttitiṣyate, tarhi pratykṣasaṁvitsadṛśīmeva te api buddhiṁ vidadhyātāṁ na caivamasti., Ibid, p.230.

39. Dūrāvidūradeśavyavasthitapadārtha pratītivat, Ibid, p.266.

of their respective objects, but in the difference of the ways (upāya) in which the same object is cognised. Their difference isn not viṣayagata strictly speaking but upāyagata.[40]

Apart from this, another line of explanation has been adopted by some Nyāya thinkers to account for the difference in contents between perceptual cognition and inferential cognition. Their difference, according to them, is not qualitative but quantitative. The contents of a perceptual cognition are only in excess of those of an inferential cognition. The excess is due to the different qualities of the thing that are cognised in perception alone. But in so far as the identity of the object, irrespective of the excess of diminution of qualities is taken into account, there is absolutely no difference between perceptual and inferential cognitions. Thus, for instance, the perception of a cow and the inference of a cow have a common content, which is due to the common substance,which is due to the

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40. Viṣayāsamye'pi-upāyabhedāt pratītibhedo bhavati, Ibid,p.266.

common substance, viz. and individual possessed of the cow-universal (gotva). Hence there is no qualitative difference in the content of consciousness relating to the substance. But a substance is cognised with a greater number of qualities in perception and so felt to be more vivid and distinct. In inferential cognition, on the other hand, the number of qualities cognised is much less, as sensible qualities are not cognised in it, and hence the content of inferential cognition is felt to be more pale and hazy. The so-called qualitative variation in the contents of perceptual and inferential cognitions has, therefore, reference to the numerical ratio of adjectival qualities that are perceived or unperceived along with the substance and has nothing to do with the substantive core of reality.[41]

From the discussion above it is evident that the Buddhists' attempt to dismiss the Nyāya theory of pramāṇa-saṁplava is an utter failure and their own theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā upon which they try to base their phenomenalistic theory of universals has not legs to stand

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41. Bahutarālpataradharmavaddharmibhedaviṣayatvam eva stutāsfutapratibhāsatvam, nādhikam. Raghunāth Śiromani, Ātmatattvavivekadīdhiti (Bibl. Indica), p.336.

upon. It, therefore, should be rejected as offering no solution of the problem of universal.

Having thus failed in this direction, the Buddhists take another line of approach in defence of their nominalistic theory. They say that the Nyāya and the Mīmāṁsa realists had to postulate the ontological reality of the universals apart from the particulars to account for the uncontradicted notion of identity (anuvṛitipratyaya) which we have with regard to all individual objects belonging to a certain class. When we experience an individual object, we experience it not merely as an individual unit but as a member belonging to a certain class. This classification of an individual object at the time of its experience is possible only , argue the realists, if we have experienced in it a common character which runs identical through all other members of the class in question. The genesis of the notion of identity (anuvṛttipratyaya) with regard to an individual object of experience as explained above cannot be accounted for unless an ontological principle

residing in the individual in question is held to be its cause or ground. This ontological identifical character shared by the individual members of a given class has been termed as universal (sāmānya) by the realists.

But the Buddhists object against the above contention of the realists that it is not necessary that the notion of identity should always be grounded upon or caused by one identical ontological universal. Several individual objects having nothing in common may yet give rise to an identical notion. It is a matter of common observation, argue the Buddhists, that a particular entity without having the slightest bit of similarity with other objects may yet produce a similar result along with the others. The plant gudûci, for example, which is said to have a febrifuge effect to medicine has nothing in common, neither in shape, nor in stuff, not in colour with other plants which are said to have the same febrifuge effect. In the same way the svalakṣaṇa particulars, though they

do not share a common identical character called universal, may yet be the cause of the notion of identity (anuvṛttipratyaya) in our mind. It should be noted there that the Buddhists do not deny the notion of identity itself; what they are at pains to deny is that there is a corresponding ontological universal which causes this notion of identity. They are of opinion that the discrete particulars are endowed with such a capability (śakti, sāmarthya) as to produce directly the notion of identity without being grounded on one ontological universal.[42] That the notion of identity can be sometimes explained without the help of a corresponding ontological universal has been admitted even by the Naiyāyikas themselves. It has been said by them (Naiyāyikas) that the different universals, e.g., a horse-universal (aśvatva) a cow-universal(gotva) etc. are so many self contained units of reality without sharing a common identical universal. The Naiyāyikas do not admit a universal inhering in other universals to avoid the

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42. Vide sec.-I, foot-note No.6, p. 149.

fallacy of indefinite regress (anavasthā). But nevertheless these universal-units are all referred to by a common concept and a name, viz. universal. So if in some cases the notion of identity can be explained without an identical ontological principle called universal, the Buddhists demand that we may with equal propriety and cogency explain the notion of identity with regard to experience of an individual cow without taking recourse to a corresponding universal called cowness (gotva).

But the Mīmāṁsa and the Nyāya realists do not admit the validity of the above argument of the Buddhists. They argue that even admitting for the sake of argument that discrete particulars having nothing in common in the shape of an identical universal are yet endowed with a capability (śakti) of producing the notion of identity in our mind, one has the right to ask: (i) is the capability cognisable or non-cognisable and (ii) is it different in each individual or one and the same for all ? If it be one

and cognisable, then it amounts to the admission of an ontological universal, only expressed in a somewhat different phraseology.[43] If, however, the capability (śakti, sāmarthya) itself be held to be non-cognisable, how can it lead to the cognition of something else, that is, an identical universal ? If the capability itself is not cognised, how can that which is said to be produced by the capability be cognised ? In that case, it will lead us to the rejection of the notion of identity itself, because no object is accepted by mere existence unless it is, in some form or other, actually cognised.[44] But to reject the notion of identity itself will be going against the actual deliverence of experience. Even the Buddhists do not deny it, though they dony its corresponding ontological universal.

Again, if the capability (śakti, sāmarthya) be different in each individual and something wholly different from the individual itself, how could it lead

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43. Gṛhyate yadi saikā ca jātirevānyaśabdikā, Kumarila, Ślokavārtika (Ākrtivāda), Śloka No.13.

44. Bhavennirviṣayā buddhiryadi śaktirṇa gṛhyate, Nai hi sadbhāvamātreṇa viṣayaḥ kaścidiṣyate, Ibid, Śloka No.14.

to any single notion of identity by means of the individuals that are many and diverse ? Even granting that it can do so, it can not explain our feeling that this notion of identity or the idea of the universal embrances all the individuals coming under it, since it is an entity which is wholly different from the individuals.[45] Moreover, if the capability of each individual be identical with it, we could have no other entities save those of the individuals; and these individuals being many and diverse, they could not form the basis of any single notion of identity.[46]

Again, the Buddhist argument, that is, the several cases of universal which are referred to by the same name and concept, viz., universal' without recognising any higher universal presiding over them, does not afford any advantage to the Buddhists. The fact that the universals do not possess any higher universal in common does not prove that lower universals

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45. Sāmarthyam yadi ... prativyakti bhinnam, na tarhi tasyānugatayikalpotpādaniyāmakatvam, mitho vyābhicārād. Raghunāth, Atmatattvavivekdīdhiti (Bibl. Indica), p.389.

46. Bhinnatve vā 'pi śaktīnāmekabuddhirna labhyate, Viśeṣaśaktyabhede ca tābanmātramatirbhavet. Kumārila, op. cit, Śolka No.16.

are ontologically unreal or the ideas of them logically unsound. Kumārila makes the situation clear by means of an analogy. The forest is nothing apart from the trees within it. Hence though the ideas of forest apart from the trees is clearly a mistaken one, yet the ideas of the trees themselves cannot be so. Similarly, in the present case, though the idea of the universal corresponding to different universals may be mistaken, that of the universals themselves like cowness (gotva), horseness (aśvatva) etc. cannot be so.[47]

Moreover, the Naiyāyikas point out that though the universals do not admittedly possess a higher universal, their identity of reference is not ungrounded in a common objective character. The common character in question may be defined as the character of existing in all the individuals of a class without existing in the individuals of other classes.[48] This common character is not a universal but that does not argue that is not

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47. Banopanyāsatulyo 'yamupanyāsaḥ kṛtastvayā, Bhrāntitvana hi naitasyā bharāntirgotvādidhīrapi ibid, Śloka No.20.

48. Vastutaḥ sāmānyeṣva api taditarāvṛttive sati sakalatadvṛttitvam upādhisāmānyaṃ ekam asti, Ātmatattvavivek, commentary by Śaṁkar Miśra (Bibl. Indica), p.390.

objective. In fact it has been admitted by the Naiyāyikas that there are two types of common character (sāmānya) viz. (i) universal (jāti) and (ii) non-universal(upādhi) and it is on the latter that the identity of reference of the various universals is grounded.

Thus we find that the Buddhists' attempt to explain the genesis of the awareness of identity (anuvṛittipratyaya) by means of the individuals alone without admitting any ontological identical universal proves, on closer examination, to be a failure. But the Buddhists advance many other arguments to disprove the ontological reality of the universals. Let us examine these arguments one by one.

One of the most important and serious charges that the Buddhists put forward against the Naiyāyikas is that, even granting the ontological reality of the universals for the sake of argument, it cannot be decided with certainty whether these universals exist everywhere (sarva-sarvagata) or whether they exist only

in their corresponding individual objects(vyakti-sarvagata). Both these alternatives are fraught with insuperable difficulties which we have already discussed in our previous section and so we need not repeat them here. But these difficulties, the Buddhists hold, would not arise at all if the universals be regarded as the imaginary construction of our understanding (kalpanā).

Now this question — whether the universals are omnipresent or present only in their corresponding individuals - has given rise to a difference of opinion between the Naiyāyikas, on the one hand, and the Vaiśeṣikas, on the other. The Vaiśeṣika philosophers in general contribute to the vyakti-sarvagata theory of the universal and deny its omnipresence. They argue that in accordance with the omnipresence theory, the universal cowness (gotva) would be present not only in the individual cows but also in dogs, horses etc. Therefore, when someone would be asked to tether a cow, he might rush to a horse leaving a cow, since (cowness'

is present in a horse as well. This would cause great chaos and confusion in our practical behaviour. The Buddhists also repeat the same argument against the omnipresence theory of universals.

But the Naiyāyikas like Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhatta, Udayana and others who endorse the sarva-sarvagatatva of universal do not admit validity of the above argument of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Buddhists. They are of opinion that the supposed difficulty in our practical behaviour will not arise at all, since, though the universal cowness(gotva) is present in dogs, horses, snakes, etc., these animals cannot manifest the universal in question and hence it cannot be perceived in them. A universal is said to be manifested only by the ākṛti or the form of its corresponding individual so that the perception of this akṛti is an essential pre-requisite of the apprehension of the universal in question. What is ākṛti then ? It is the specific arrangement and relation subsisting among the different parts of an individual whole (vilakṣaṇa-avayava-saṁyoga). An

individual cow is a whole (avayavi) composed of parts (avayavas). But there is such a peculiarity in the arrangement and relation among its different parts as is not found in the relation and arrangement among the various parts of a horse or a dog etc. That is why an individual cow, having this specific ākṛti of its own can manifest its corresponding universal cowness whereas an individual horse cannot do it, because a horse lacks that specific arrangement and relation among its parts(ākṛti) which is found in a cow. Similarly the ākṛti of an individual horse is capable of manifesting the universal horseness(aśvatva) only, not the universal cowness, through the latter co-exists with but does not inhere (samaveta) in the former.

The whole (avayavi) inheres in its parts(avayavas) by the relation of samavāya and the universal inheres in the whole by virtue of the same relation. Though the universal is related with each and every part of the whole, yet these parts separately cannot manifest

the universal. All the parts should be arranged and related into a definite form or ākṛti in order to manifest its corresponding universal. That is why if any particular part of the whole, e.g., the tail, ear, or eye of an individual cow is lost or destroyed, that defective whole still continues to manifest its respective universal, because the manifestation of the universal does not depend on any particular part of the whole but upon the specific arrangement of its different parts taken together (ākṛti) and the loss of any particular part of the whole does not mean the loss of the internal ākṛti of the whole in question.

Though as a general rule the ākṛti of an individual is the revealer (vyañjaka) of its corresponding universal, it should be noted here that all universals are not thus revealed through ākṛti. For example there is no specific ākṛti of the individual qualities(guṇas) and actions(karmas). Hence the universals corresponding to these entities, viz., guṇatva and karmatva cannot be revealed through ākṛti. In such cases the

manifestation of these universals will entirely depend upon their inherence (samavāya) in their corresponding individual loci. The universal gunatva, inspite of its presence in the different individual karmas, can inhere only in the individual gunas and nowhere else. That is why 'gunatva' becomes manifested only by the individual gunas and we perceive 'gunatva' in the gunas only, not in the karmas. Similarly, the universal karmatva, though it is present in the different gunas, can inhere only in its corresponding individual karmas and be manifested by them. That is why karmatva can be perceived only in the different karmas, not in the gunas.

Now, if this distinction between the existence of the universals and their manifestation only through certain individuals is kept in mind., there will be no difficulty in upholding the omnipresence theory of the universals (sarva-sarvagatavāda). Though a universal is omnipresent, it is not perceived everywhere simply because it is not manifested everywhere. It can only

be perceived in its corresponding individual object which alone posses the capacity of manifesting it.

The realists are of opinion that the universals are eternal entities (nitya padārthas) free from origination and decay. If the universal cowness(gotva) were a non-eternal entity like the individual objects, argue the Naiyāyikas, it would be destroyed along with the death of an individual cow and thereafter all other cows of the world would cease to be cows. To avoid this absurdity, the eternity of the universals must be admitted.

Here, the Buddhists might raise an objection that if the universals in question were eternal, it would have been perceived eternally. But the 'cowness' is not perceived in a place in the interval between the death of an individual cow and the birth of another. This proves conclusively, argue the Buddhists, that the universals are born or destoryed along with the birth and death of the individuals.

The answer of the Naiyāyikas to the above objection is the same as before: Non-perception is not the only mark of a thing's non-existence. The universal cowness (gotva) is eternally present in the interval between the death of an individual cow and the birth of another, but it is not perceived there simply because an individual cow having a definite form (ākṛti) which alone possesses the capacity of manifesting the universal in question is absent at that time.

Kamalaśīla, a famous Buddhist philosopher, argues that if the universal were a separate ontological category as contained in its corresponding particulars, we could have reflected it distinctly just like a fruit in a basket (kuṇḍavadarāvat). But as it is psychologically impossible to have an abstract idea of generality apart from the idea of particulars, the existence of the universals as a separate ontological category (padārtha) should be dismissed as a figment of our imagination. Incidentally it is

interesting to note that Berkeley, a famous British empiricist of the eighteenth century, offered almost the same ground as given by Kamalaśīla to disprove the ontological reality of the universals. Berkeley argued that because the formation of abstract general ideas apart from the ideas of the particulars is a psychological impossibility, the objective existence of the universals corresponding to the former kind of ideas is simply an illusive notion of our mind.

The Naiyāyikas answer that the above objection of the Buddhists - why should not a universal be perceived distinctly like a fruit in a basket if it were really an existent entity in an individual - is ambiguous. If by distinct perception it is intended that it should be perceived outside an individual, the answer is that the universal has no medium of manifestation outside the same. Hence it is always perceived as contained in the individual, not outside it. But the case is entirely different with a fruit as contained in a basket. The fruit is a whole (avayavi) which inheres in its parts(avayavas) outside the basket.

Had the universal also been a composite entity composed of parts just like the fruit, it could have subsisted in its parts outside its particular locus. But the universal is an unanalysable simple entity devoid of part. It can inhere only in its corresponding individual objects. Hence it is never perceived outside its individual locus.[49]

The question where the universal should inhere can be decided by the evidence of experience alone. That the cow-universal inheres in the individual called 'cow' and not in the horse is proved by the very fact that it is felt there and not elsewhere. The ultimate nature of things is to be accepted on the evidence of experience exactly in the way in which it manifests itself (svabhāva eva pratīti-sakśikah). It will be over-stepping the limit of our jurisdiction to expect things to behave according to our preference. Therefore, the question why does the universal inhere in its relevant individuals only and not in anything else is not legitimate, because it is the very nature

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49. Vyaktivṛttitvā jāteh pṛthagdeśatayā'nupalambhaḥ, Tadagraho vā na punastadatiriktāyā abhāvādeveti. Jayanta Bhatta, Nyāyamañjarī (Chowkhamba, 1936), p.284.

(svabhāva) of certain individuals to allow their corresponding universals to be realted with them by the relation of inherence (samavāya).

But the opponent might observe that the Naiyāyikas' appeal to the ultimate nature of things (svabhāva) is only a trick for concealing the failure of rational explanation. If the unquestionable nature of things can be accepted as an explanation of a philosophical problem, the Buddhists also can make the same appeal. The Buddhists deny the existence of universals and assert that it is the individuals themselves which, inspite of their lack of a common identical nature, do possess a natural capacity (svābhāvika sāmarthya) for generating idential concepts. And this attempt to take shelter under the ultimate nature of the individuals does not stand in a position of disadvantage as compared with the similar appeal made by the Naiyāyikas.

But the Naiyāyikas point out that the two cases mentioned above are not similar. The appeal to the

ultimate nature of things is the last resource which is necessitated by the failure of other possible explanations. The postulation of a universal distinct from the individuals is dictated by logical necessity as well as experimental evidence and the consequential problem of its relation with the individuals demands an explanation. And when an explanation is not available except one based upon the nature of things, we have to accept it as a metaphysical necessity. The Buddhist hypothesis could be accepted if the universal were found to be an impossible finction.

We started our discussion of this point by way of refuting Kamalaśīla's objection that if the universal were an ontological reality, it could have been perceived distinctly as a fruit in a basket(kuṇḍavadaravat) and we marked an ambiguity in the expression "perceiving distinctly as a fruit in a basket". If this expression means that the universal is not perceived outside its corresponding individual, then, as we have shown, it would be a malicious distortion of the position of the

Naiyāyikas. But if it means that the universal and its corresponding individual are not perceived as logically distinct entities inspite of their ontological inseparability, the Naiyāyikas emphatically assert that they are perceived as distinct entities and never felt to be identical with each other. The numerical difference of the universal from the individuals is attested by the fact that it is felt as different from the individuals in which it was previously perceived when it is perceived in a new individual. And even when it is perceived in a new individual, it is felt as distinct from the individual and as related to it. If the cow-universal were identical with any one of its corresponding individual, it could not have been shared then by the other individual cows of the world and consequently there would be no other individual cows save that one with which the universal cowness is identical. But that the cow universal is shared by innumerable cows is a matter of direct experience. This proves conclusively that the individual cow and its corresponding universal are

logically distinct entities and are never felt to be identical with each other.[50]

The Buddhists advance many other arguments against the ontological reality of the universals and most of these arguments are based on showing that the relation between the universal and its corresponding individuals is an unexplained mystery. Dharmakīrti, a famous Buddhist logician, points out[51] that the cow-universal can become related with a newly born individual cow in three different ways : (i) it can move forward to the newly born calf from another individual cow; or (ii) it can pre-exist there even before the birth of the calf or (iii) it can be born along with the birth of the calf. But none of these explanations are logically tenable. The universal cannot move forward from one individual to another, since in that case the universal would cease to be a universal and would turn out to be a substance(dravya) which alone possesses locomotion. Nor can it be supposed that the universal pre-exists there even before the

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50. Bhedena tūpalabhyte eva, piṇḍāntarāsaṁsargini piṇḍe 'nubhūyamāne tat saṁsargitayānubhavāt. Udayana, Ātmatattvaviveka(Bib. Indica),P.402.

51. Dharmakīrti, Pramānavārtika,1/153.

birth of the cow, because it is not perceived and cannot be acted upon at that time. Nor can it be said that the universal is born along with the birth of the individual, since it is an eternal entity free from origination and decay.

But the Naiyāyikas point out that the above-mentioned difficulties alleged by Dharmakīrti are nothing but the figment of his imagination. A Naiyāyika never holds that the universal moves forward from one individual to another, nor that it is born with the individual. Since a universal is an eternal entity, it is existent all the while and even before the birth of the individual and after its destruction. The non-perception of the cow-universal during the internal of time between the death of a cow and the birth of another is not the proof of its non-existence; it is simply not manifested at that time due to the absence of an individual cow which is said to be its revealer (vyañjaka). In fact, the universal is a self-existent principle independent of the existence and non-existence of its corresponding individuals. It may be objected

by the Buddhists that the existence of the cow-universal in empty space and time before the birth of the individual cow or after its death should make space and time understood as a cow just as the existence of a cow-universal in an individual makes the letter understood as a cow. The Nyāya answer to this objection is that it is not merely the existence of the universal rather its inherence (samavāya) that makes the individual understood as a cow. The cow-universal, though it exists, does not inhere in space and time and so the question of the latter appearing as a cow does not arise.[52] This also disposes of the further objection of the Buddhists that the co-existence of all universals in the same locus will result in confusion. In accordance with the omnipresence theory of the universal (sarva-sarvagatavāda), it is a fact that the cow-universal co-exists with the horse-universal in a same individual locus. But that does not make a cow to be understood as a horse or vice-versa. It is inherence (samavāya) and not mere existence that determines the cognition of an individual in terms of class-character. The horse-

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52. Yady api aparicchinna-deśāni sāmānyāni bhavanti tathāpy upalakṣaṇaniyamāt kāraṇa-sāmagrī-niyamācca sva-viṣaya-sarva-gātani antarāle ca saṁyoga-samavāya-vṛtty-abhāvād avyapadeśyāni. Praś astapādabhāṣya (Benares,1895),p.314.

universal inheres in the individual horse and not in the cow. If the different universals were admitted to co-inhere in the same individual, the difficulty allged by the Buddhists would be irrefutable. But the Naiyāyikas never admit the possibility of co-inherence of two such different lower universals (i.e., apara sāmānyas) in the same individual locus. Nor can there be any inherent impossibility in the co-existence of different universals in the same locus since they are not objects of limited dimension. It is only seen in the case of limited entities that one excludes the other from its locus. The horse and the cow cannot co-exist in the same substratum. But the entities like space and time which are not subject to limitations of dimension are in different position. In these cases the existence of one does not cancel the existence of the other in the same locus since the opposition imposed by dimension is absent. Universals also share this character and so their co-existence in the same individual locus does not involve any difficulty.

The distinction between its existence in and by itself (svarupa-sāmānya) and its inherence(samaveta-sāmānya) and consequential manifestation in a individual is essential to the understanding of a universal and its relation with the individuals. The difficulties raised by the Buddhists mainly spring from their deliberate refusal to subscribe to this distinction. The universals are self-existence principles. The individual only serves to manifest its being and the existence and the non-existence of the individual does not affect the being of a universal. The proposition "the cow-universal is in the cow" would be illegitimate if it were understood to connote the actual assistance of the cow-universal in the individual. The position would be legitimate if the copula 'is' meant 'is manifested'.[55] Our ordinary assertions such as there is no cow here or its explanatory form "it does not possess cowness(gotva)" are only loose modes of expression. The denial of the universal cowness in such propositions is to be understood as nothing more than the denial of manifestation due to the non-existence of an individual.

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53. Antargaḍum nirūpakamātram na tu gotvasyādhāramityarthaḥ. Tathā ca piṇḍe gotvāmiti vyavahāro na mukhyaḥ kintu lākṣaṇika ityarthaḥ. Ātamatattvaviveka, commentary by Śaṁkara Miśra(Bibl.Indica),p.407.

It does not mean that the universal in question was not existent at the time when the individual was non-existent. The universal is self-contained so far its existence is concerned. The individual is required only to make the universal related to it.

It may be urged by the Buddhists that the relation of inherence(samavāya), being eternal like the universal, cannot also be non-existent like the latter. So the universal and the inherence being present all the time the former should always appear as related. But it does not appear to be related so long as the individual is not present. The Naiyāyikas answer that this objection of the Buddhists is based on the forgetfulness of the fact that the apprehension of relation presupposes not only the actual existence of relation (sambandha) but also the terms or the entities to be related (samabandhis). It is true that the cow-universal and the relation of samavāya, being eternal, are always present. But the individual cow which is a perishable entity may not be always present

on the scene. Yet it is one of the terms of the relation of inherence. Hence so long as the individual cow does not present itself, the relation of the cow-universal with it is not apprehended. The situation can be made clear by a concrete example. Suppose a man stands in a place and somebody puts a stick in his hand. The man may then be legitimately stated to be one who bears a stick. Suppose then that somebody else takes away the stick from him and this makes a difference in the quality of the man and this can be expressed in the form that the man does no longer possess a stick. The case is similar with the universal and its relation with the individual. The universal cowness is all the while there, but when an individual cow appears on the scene, we say — "there is a cow here" and when the same individual departs from the place we say "there is no cow here". The universal which is always present may be compared with the man of our example and the individual which is present occasionally with the stick. The presence and absence of the individual do not mean the corresponding

change of attributes so far as the universal is concerned.[54]

As regards the Buddhist charge that the universal cannot exist either in its entirety or in its partial extension in the individuals, the Naiyāyikas answer that the universal does not admit of degree of dimension. So the question of extension is irrelevant here. It exists in its own nature which is non-dimensional. In this respect it is rather on a par with spiritual entities to which the question of demension is entirely repugnant.

The Naiyāyikas are of opinion that the relation between the individual and its corresponding universal is one of support and the supported (ādharādheya sambandha). But a support, say the Buddhists, is always a cause which modifies the nature of the thing supported, just as an apple which naturally would fall down to the ground is transformed into a non-falling-down object when supported by a basket. Similarly, if

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54. Deśakāle sāmānyasvarupam asti, piṇḍopagamāpagamādinā goura asti gouranāstitivyavahāraḥ, yathā avicalati. Caitre daṇḍopaga-māpagamābhyāṁ dandī Caitro nāyaṁ dandīti vyavahāraḥ iti praghattārthaḥ, Ātmatattvaviveka commentary by Śaṁkara Miśra (Bibl. Indica), p. 410.

the individual supports the universal, the latter would also get modified by the former. But this would be in flat contradiction with the Nyāya standpoint which holds that the universals are eternal entities(nitya padārthas) incapable of any kind of modification.[55]

As an answer to this objection, the Naiyāyikas would point out that the appeal to the fruit-basket relation cannot successfully refute the case of relation between the individual and its corresponding universal, because the two cases are not similar. The relation which holds between an apple and a basket is a mechanical separable relation (saṁyoga) while that which holds between a universal and its corresponding particular is necessary and isepatable (samavāya). To impute the analogy of one to the case of another which are by no means similar may be a tactful verbal sophistry but not a logically sound position. Moreover, the relation of samavāya which holds between a universal and its corresponding individuals cannot modify the terms related

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55. Vācaspati Miśra, Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā (Chowkhamba),pp.185, 484.

by it. Such an explanation would be inadmissible in view of the pluralistic metaphysics advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

C O N C L U S I O N

The main objective of our thesis, as it has been stated in the opening chapter, i.e., Introduction, is to critically evaluate the realism-phenomenalism controversy in Indian Philosophical literature. To say something about realism in Indian philosophy we should confine our attention to the study of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, as this philosophical school largely represents the Indian realism. On the contrary, the Buddhist philosophy may be designated as the phenomenalógical school, since in consonance with the main tenets of European Phenomenalism, Buddhism tries to interprect both the external world and the internal mind in terms of experienced qualities and sense data only without posulating any underlying substance which lies beyond the scope of sense-experience. Consequently, our discussion has basically been concentrated on these two schools — Nyāya and Buddhism.

Like the Western philosophy, the controversy between realism and phenomenlism is centered round the following issues :-

i) The reality of substance as a separate category.

ii) The existence of whole (avayavin) apart from the parts (avayavas).

iii) The reality of universals(sāmānya) apart from the individuals or particulars(vyakti). All these issues have been taken up for elaboration along with the arguments and counter arguments.

In the first chapter of our dissertation, entitled In Defence of Substance, we observe that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have analysed an object as the conglomeration of qualities (gunas) and substance (dravya). This substance (dravya) is an underlying agent in which the qualities play and all these qualities or attributes inhere in the substance. In support of the notion of substance the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists argue that we should admit the reality of substance (dravya), otherwise, we have to imagine the attributes or properties as homeless or 'attributes of nothing' which contradicts the fact. Thus the Nyāya-realists have established concept of substance as a separate entity.

The Buddhist phenomenalists, on the otherhand, like the phenomenalists of Europe, have denied the existence of substance and advanced almost the same arguments like the European phenomenalists to refute the substance as a separate category. Their basic point for non-acceptance of the notion of substance is its non-perceptibility. They hold that an object is nothing but the assemblage of properties and there is no unchanging underlying substance to hold the qualities together. The so-called substance(dravya) is nothing but the figment of our imagination(kalpanā), having no objective reality(vastusat) whatsoever. Moreover, the Buddhists argue that since the so-called substance and qualities are always felt together, they must be supposed to be identical. The Buddhists consider the perception of svalakṣaṇas or unique particulars as the only valid perception. This perception, according to the Buddhists, is indeterminate(nirvikalpa) which is free from association with names, class characters etc.(nāmajātyādyamukta). The

determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa), on the otherhand, that is, the perception of objects associated with names and other qualifications, to the Buddhists, is no perception at all, it is mere inference; because the perceptual knowledge with the qualities comes only after the recollection of the class-concept by means of which a determinate perception takes place. And, since the idea of substance enters into determinate perceptual knowledge, it can not be an object of perception. Thus, the Buddhists have established the 'so-called' substance' as unreal and imaginative.

All these arguments of the Buddhists, specially the arguments of the Buddhists logicions like Śāntarakṣita, Kamalśīla, and Dharmakīrti, to refute the Nyāya concept of substance have been put forward with much logical rigour and consistency. But if we critically observe these arguments and contrast these with those of the Naiyāyikas, it will be clear to us that all these Buddhist arguments have not been fully

worked out whereas the Nyāya arguments have been done. The Naiyāyikas, in defence of substance, argue against the Buddhists by saying that, as a matter of fact, our exprience manifests itself in the shape of a synthetic judgement consisting of two items delivered by two separate sense organs in one whole when we say,'The jār that I have touched is the same as what I see'. How can these two acts of touching and seeing refer to one and the same thing, unless two sensible qualities are supposed to co-exist in the same substratum (darśana sparśanavyāṁ ekārtha grahanāt)? And if this is admitted, the reality of substance cannot be denied. Moreover the Naiyāyikas argue as against the Buddhists that if the perception of the so-called 'substance' is nothing more than the sensible qualities alone, then the knowledge of identity of one inspite of the change of its qualities would be unaccountable. So, an abiding substance over and above the qualities must be admitted. Moreover the Naiyāyikas opine that substance itself without its attributes, is perceiptible. We may cite Udayana here.

According to him "it is also possible to perceive a substance without its qualities. For example, an ill person perceives a concheshell as yellow; its orginal quality, white, is not seen. Here the conch is perceived but not its quality 'whiteness'. This shows that perception of the substance is independent of that of its qualities". Again, to reply to the objection of the Buddhists, i.e., the indeterminate perception is real perception whereas determinate perception is mere inference, the Naiyāyikas point out that the determinate perception is as real as the indeterminate one, because the sense function, which is a necessary condition of all perceptual knowledge, is equally present in the case of determinate perception as well. For example, we can not get a determinate visual judgement by simply recalling the name, if we shut up our eyes immediately after the sense object contact. So, there is no reason for disbelieving in the objective validity of determinate knowledge, and consequently for impunging the objectivity of substance. Moreover, the

Buddhist phenomenalists explain an object as the cluster or conglomeration of atoms, or, point-instants(paramānupuñja) , and these atoms are invisible. But the Naiyāyikas point out that, if a single atom by itself is invisible, a collection of atoms must also be invisible. So the visibility of gross physical objects remains unexplained on the basis of the Buddhist theory of paramānupuñjavāda. We have seen, on the otherside, that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have clearly explained the construction of an object and its visibility from the conjunction (saṁyoga) of invisible atoms. According to them from the combination of these atoms the gross material objects are originated. The process of origination is as follows : Two atoms conjoined together give rise to a binary compound which is technically called dvyanuka. The dvyanuka is infinitely small and therefore imperceptible. Three such binaries suitably adjusted produce a triad or trasareṇu which is the minimum visible entity. Its magnitude is finite and all other finite objects are made out of it. Thus the

Naiyāyikas have explained the origination of physical object and its visibility. Moreover, this theory of the Naiyāyikas corresponds to the fact of experience also, because, we do not call an object as '<u>paramānupuñja</u>', as the Buddhists opine rather we give a name to it and suppose it to be a unity. For example, we do not call a book as the collection of book atoms, we call it a book unity. And this unity is not possible without an unifying agent. This unifying agent is called substance. So, we have to admit substance. Again, we have the common experience that though the quality, i.e., the colour of a baked jar is completely different from an unbaked one, yet we call both of them as jar. The Buddhists can not explain that having the different qualites why and how these two jars and called as jar ? The Naiyāyikas assert that this is possible due to an unchangeable substance which belongs to these two jars. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have advanced more resonable and fact oriented arguments

than the Buddhists to establish the notion substance and have defined substance as that which possess actions and qualities and is the inherent cause (kriyā gunavat samavāyī kāranaṁ iti dravyam).

In the second chapter entitled the Whole and Part, we see that the whole, according to Naiyāyikas, is not only the coglomeration of parts, it is some thing over and above the parts (avayavas). This whole(avayavin) is ontologically different from its parts and it has its own reality. To establish the whole as a separate entity the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists advocate that the production of sensible material order from infrasensible atoms is explainable only on the basis of the assumption that the whole is different from its parts. On the other hand, the Buddhist phenomenalists do not accept the reality of whole as a separate entity over and above the parts. The parts according to them, are the only reality and the so-called whole(avayavin) is our mental construction(kalpanā), the 'whole'(avayavin) is mere

assemblage of parts (avayavas). The Buddhists argue that the perception of the 'whole' is not possible. The knowledge of the so-called 'whole' comes through inference. The so-called perception of the empirical objects like an apple or a tree which the Naiyāyikas call the determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) is really the construction of human mind on the basis of the indeterminate perception of the 'unique-particulars'. To prove the inferability of the 'whole' the Buddhists offer an example such as : In the perception of a 'whole' tree we perceive only the front part of the tree with which our sense organs are in contact, but what about the unperceived back part ? In fact in such case what happens is this: On perceiving directly the front part, our intellect indirectly infers or interprets that there exists a back part of the tree with which our visual senses are not in direct contact. This intellectual interpretation, according to the Buddhists, is inference. Hence, the

inferability of the whole is proved. In this way the Buddhists deny the existence of the whole and its perceptibility. But if we critically observe these arguments and compare these with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika arguments we may say that the Buddhist arguments are not sufficiently clarified and their view fails to explain the facts of experience for the following reasons: The Buddhists analyse a 'whole' table as the aggregates of parts (avayava-samūha). Now the question may arise that if a table is conglomeration of parts or atoms, then how do wee see them as 'one' ? The Buddhists do not have any clear explanation on this question. They explain such perception of unity (perception of one) as illusory (bhākta), it has no objective basis(vastusat). But the Nyāya realists argve that every illusory perception presupposes a valid cognition of the illusory object in the past. So, the perception of unity can not be explained as illusory. Again, the Buddhists can not account for āśraya-āśrayī sambandha

or the relation between container and the content. In experience we come accross many things existing in some locus as its contents, i.e., the book on the table, the table on the floor, the pen in the hand,the cloth in the threads and so on. But the Buddhists can not explain how the table is on the floor or the cloth in the threads, because they do not admit any type of relation neither saṁyoga nor samvāya and the relation between the two entities, i.e., the relation between the container and the contained. But we have observed in our disscussion that the Nyāya realists have clear explanation on the above problem. The cloth, for example, is according to them, in the threads by the relation of inherence samavāya. Here, the threads are the container (āśraya) and the cloth is contained(āśrayī). Hence, the āśrayī is related to the āśraya by the inherent relation or samvāya sambandha. Thus the Naiyāyikas explain the relation between the whole (contained) and the parts (container).

The Buddhists again argue that if the avayavi and avayavas are completely two a distinct entities then they can not occupy the same space, but the fact is otherwise. The avayavin and avayavas, whole and parts, occupy one and the same space,(samānadeśavṛtti). Therefore, they should be adjudged to be one and the same. The Naiyāyikas in reply say that due to the relation of inherence they do not occupy different space. Samavāya is āśraya āśrayī sambandha, it is the relation of substrate and content between two inseparables. The samaveta resides in the samavāyi, the cloth in the yarns. The content naturally occupies the space of the substrate, and these two, therefore, come to occupy the same space, cloth occupies no other space than that yarns. So, the Buddhist argument on the ground of space to refute the Nyāya theory of whole, does not hold water.

Again, the Buddhists have tried to prove that the part and whole are contradictory notion and therefore,

they can not belong to the same locus. But it is not the fact. How do the contradictories appear together even in false perception ? Is it possible to perceive, even falsely, that a thing is both a rope and a snake at one and the same time ? It seems to us that the concept of '*virodha*' or contradiction can not be adequately formed without reference to experience, and in this respect the Buddhists contention, i.e., the whole is nothing but conglomeration of parts, is not acceptable.

In the third chapter of our dissertation entitled the Universal and Particulars, we have observed that the Naiyāyikas designate the category of universal as a synthetic principle which assimilates the individual objects into an indentical mode of being. But the Buddhists are vehemently opposed to this view. According to them, the external world consists of discrete and detached bits of reality called 'unique particulars' (*svalakṣaṇas*). The so-called 'universals', according to the Buddhists, are nothing but mental images or

conceptual constructions of our Productive Imagination (kalpanā). The Buddhists opine that any individual a cow, a jar, or a man - is not real particular, the real particulars are the transcendental point-instants which underlie these phenomenal individual objects. They refute the concept of so-called 'universal' as a separate category over and above its corresponding particulars on the ground of its non-perceptibility. Perception, according to the Buddhists, is nothing but the pure receptivity of senses, the pure momentary sensation of an efficient point instant (svalakṣaṇas) of external reality and is absolutely devoidof the forms of the understanding(kalpanāpodam). This momentary sensation of unique particulars, that is, indeterminate perception(nirvikalpakapratyakṣa) is true perception. And when all these unique-particulars are qualified or attributed with class or class-characters they become the object of enduring perception. And this enduring perception with universal - determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) - is not perception in true sense, as they are conceived by understanding.

In other words these svalakṣaṇas with universals according to the Buddhists, have no objective reality (vastusat), they are nothing but conceptual constructions, and thus they are the object of inference. Thus the Buddhists have denied the perceptibility of universals and have established their inferability. But in the course of our discussion we have seen that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers have advanced more logically sound arguments to refute the above charge of the Buddhists. They opine that both the indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and the savikalpaka pratyakṣa or judgemental perception are caused by the sense-object contact (indriyārtha sannikarṣa). The difference between these two kinds of perception is, according to them, one of quantity. All the elements of determinate perception (Judgemental perception) are directly present in our pre-judgemental level of perception as self-contained units, not qualifying one another and as realities outside. So, there is no qualitative

difference between these two kinds of perception - determinate and indeterminate. Their difference consists in a qualified and non-qualified cognition of the perceived objects, not in the passive receptivity of senses and the spontaneous construction of understanding as conceived by the Buddhists. Thus the Naiyāyikas have established that both the momentary- sensation (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) and Judgemental perception (savikalpaka pratyakṣa) are based on sense-object contact. Consequently, the universal being the determinate object have perceptual basis. Thus the Naiyāyikas have advanced more logically sound arguments to refute the Buddhist theory that universals can not be cogniged through sense-perception.

Moreover, the natural classification of worldly objects is not possible, the Naiyāyikas may argue, without the reality of universals. We observe different individual cows in the empirical world. Each cow differs from another cow in shape, size,colour etc. But still we call them 'cows' because they share a

common character, i.e., cow universal(gotva).

Again, to substantiate their position that the universal is an ontological category, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists argue in the following way : Things are perceived as different in some respects and identical in others. An individual cow is perceived as existing in a particular time and occupying a particular place. It stands apart from other objects as an individual existent and can be distinguished from them by its peculiarities. But it is not altogether different. Inspite of its peculiar mode of existence it is an existent like other animate and inanimate existents. It is an animal like a horse and a buffalo. It is a cow like other cows. In language we have two kinds of names - proper name and common name or general words. Proper names denote individual things and common names denote their classes. A proper name is applicable to one individual only, but a common name is applicable to a number of individuals. When an object of perception is determined to be a cow we are conscious of its oneness with other objects which

also are known as cows. Cowness is a predicate commonly shared by a number of individual animals. There is a conciousness of difference and also of unity when a number of animals called cows is perceived, and both of them must have corresponding realities as their bases. The objective basis of the consciousness of difference is the nutually exclusive nature of individual things and that of the consciousness of unity is their common nature. Common names refer to this latter. The reality of the common nature of objects can not be denied. Objects are always conceived in a two fold ways, which would not be possible if they are not of a double nature. The double nature of an object consists in its specific individuality and its class-character. The reality corresponding to our class concepts is called universal, because it is not confined to this or that particular individual but is common to a number of them. There are many universals as there are class-concepts. Cowness is a universal residing in all past, present and future cows. Similarly, there are such universals as 'humanity', 'horseness', 'redness' etc. The universals are of a verying extension

according to the number of particulars in which they reside.

The Buddhists deny the reality of universals and hold that only unique particulars are real. They say that there is nothing common in them. The Vedāntins deny the reality of particulars and say that the being (sattā) alone is real. But both these views are not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas point out that the Buddhists cannot explain the consciousness of identity in different particulars. If a universal cow is unreal there is no sense in calling certain animals by the common name 'cow'. And if particulars are unreal, as the Vedāntins opine, why should a particular thing be perceived as different from another ? As a matter of fact universal and particulars are relative to eachother, so that a denial of one means a denial of both. There can be no universal. Unless there are particulars and there can be no particulars unless there is a universal to be particularised. Thus the Nyāya realists have established that neither the idea of universal is never

contradicted nor that of particular. Therefore, both of them must be grounded in reality.

Again, the Buddhists argue that the idea of universal is secondary and that it is derived from the same causal efficiency(arthakriyā) possessed by a number of particulars. Now a question may crop up, the Naiyāyikas point out, that why should a number of particular animals, cows for instance, should possess the same causal efficiency if they are totally different from one another ? A functional unity of diverse particulars presupposes their structural identity. The actions of A and B can not be the same unless they share a common nature. Moreover,if there is no universal at all, how can an action of A be the same as an action of B ? And if two different actions can be identical, why should two particular cows not be identical ? So, the universal can not be derived from such causal efficiency. The Buddhists assert again that like the universals the particulars are also idea, only the transcendental point-instants

(svalakṣaṇas) are real. But the Buddhists are also wrong. All valid ideas, according to the Nyāya realists, have corresponding real objects as their bases. We have such ideas as 'this is cow', 'that too is a cow', 'this cow is different from that cow' etc., and all our practical activities are based on such ideas. Therefore, they are valid and universal and particulars must be their objective counter parts.

Thus in the Nyāya-Buddhist controversy we have tried to champion the cause of Nyāya-realism and vindicate its position.

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