

## FOREWORD

The problem that I have addressed in the dissertation is a critical statement of Bertrand Russell's philosophy of Mathematics, with special reference to his famous paradox. Russell's philosophy of Mathematics has a number of presuppositions, namely, his concept of logic, the relation of his position to such of his predecessors as Peano and Frege, and his thesis that mathematics is logic. I have opened the discussion by classifying the concept of paradox, and its modes, semantic and syntactic. Opinions have differed as to which of these Russell's paradox belong to. However, I have a feeling that Russell's paradox is conceptually related to the Liar's paradox.

Secondly, in presenting Russell's paradox I have closely followed his own statement of the matter in Principles of Mathematics and Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, together with the introduction to the second edition of the Principia Mathematica.

I like to put on record that I could not always lay my hand on certain texts of Peano and Frege's. For that I had naturally to depend upon secondary sources. But the materials available have been rich enough to give a fairly adequate idea of the thrust of their arguments.

I am indebted to many persons regarding the successful completion of my thesis. They have been acknowledged separately in the following pages. It is my duty to express my gratitude to all of them.

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