CHAPTER-I

Urbanisation in India: A pre-British Experience

Among the forces that have triggered off massive changes in human society during the last two hundred years or so, urbanisation is one of the most potent ones. Therefore, very often the level of urbanisation is treated as an indicator of development and catholicity of a society. No matter how valid this notion is, the fact that urbanisation, development and social change are interrelated cannot be denied. One impacts the other rather directly and hence the issue is important not only from academic angle but from policy and planning angles.

What gives rise to urbanisation? Is it a product of growth in population, or a change in the pattern of population distribution? Or is it a social change, a break from traditional past? Or is it a change in economic growth or a product of industrial revolution?

Sociologists look at urbanisation as a process as well as an instrument of modernisation and social change-a break from traditional past. It connotes a change from a parochial to cosmopolitan outlook and from personal and sentimental to impersonal, contractual and utilitarian relationships. Geographers look at urbanisation as a process by which human beings or population and their activities congregate spatially to give rise to towns and cities of various sizes.[1] Prof. Hauser and Duncan[2] use 'urbanisation' just in this sense when they characterise urbanisation as a "change in the pattern of population distribution. It involves an increase in the relative size of the urban population, a growth in number and size of urban settlements, a place and an increasing concentration of the population in such places." Hope Tisdale Eldridge[3] also echoes a similar opinion when he says that there can be no meaning of it (urbanisation) but a process of population concentration which involves two elements: multiplication of points of concentration and the increase in the size of individual concentrations. Economists lay emphasis on cities as engines of economic growth, so much so that the level of urbanisation is frequently used as proxy for the level of economic development.[4] Again, some would stress the political aspect as Prof. B.Bhattacharya[5] puts it, 'as

seats of administration...,thus political role took a very important part in setting the urban pattern..."

While some scholars consider the social factor as responsible for urban growth, others give the same place either to economic, political or geographical factors. We do not suggest that these factors are meaningless in the context of urban development, but we assert that none of these factors was independently sufficient enough to transform a rural settlement into an urban centre. An isolated factor is simply incapable of giving birth to a system/ organisation/ institution which encompasses within its orbit and, in turn, affects the whole societal system.[6]

Hoselitz, Hauser and Lerner were the foremost among the scholars who emphasised the study of urban growth with particular reference to its bearing on social change, economic development and cultural change.[7] Hoselitz's[8] argument is that urbanisation, economic growth and cultural change are interrelated. Hoselitz has classified cities into two types viz., 'Generative' and 'Parasitic'. A city will be designated as generative if its impact on economic growth is favourable. A city will be considered as parasitic, if it exerts an opposite impact.

Hauser[9] too has analysed urbanisation in relation to economic development and social change. He argues that industrialisation and urbanisation produced not only a changed physical environment and new forms of economic organisation, but also profoundly affected the social order and man's conduct and thought. "Urbanisation produced not only the city as a physical and economic structure, but also urbanism as a way of life."

Lerner[10] has attempted to investigate the relationship between urbanisation and some non-economic variables. In his pioneering study of the Middle East, Lerner has tried to show how increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy and in turn has led to wider economic and social participation.

Urban development is therefore a complex process defying any simple and isolationist explanation. As it is the epitome of a society advancing towards more civilised way of life, it can be studied and viewed properly only in a total societal framework. Any explanation of this emerging pattern becomes lopsided if one or the other aspect of its growth is over emphasised at the cost of other equally

relevant factors. Indeed, urbanisation is a process by which man transforms his agricultural based rural habitat into essentially non-agricultural urban functions and places and a change of his homogeneous habitat into a large heterogeneous mass.[11]

As there is no universally acceptable definition of urbanisation, so also there is no universally acceptable population size norm for a place to be called a town. In Greenland, for example, a place with 300 or more inhabitants is called a town while in the Republic of Korea an area must have at least 40,000 inhabitants to be called a town. A place with thousand can qualify for township in Canada and 2,500 in the U.S. Clearly numbers alone mean very little. There are circumstances in which numerically small settlements may have urban characteristics like density, markets, and administrative functions. In India, for instance, a town must not only have more than 5,000 inhabitants but some other conditions are also to be met. These conditions are: at least 75 percent of people must be engaged in non-agricultural functions; it must be incorporated in a municipality for urban governance and it must meet certain infrastructure standards.[12] United Nations, for international comparability, has recommended a population of 20,000 as the cut off point for a place to qualify for township.[13]

I

Substantive research on urban problems in India belonging to the post-Independence period reveal a long history of urbanisation beginning with the Indus Civilisation down till the independence of India and even of the later period. The first phase of urbanisation in the Indus valley is associated with the Harappan civilisation dating back to 2350 B.C. The cities of this civilisation flourished over a period of more than 600 years up to about 1700 B.C and this was followed by a prolonged period of over a thousand years in which we have no evidence of urban development. From around 600 B.C, we again come across towns and cities associated with two major, but closely related, cultural streams of India, namely the Aryan Civilisation of the North and the Dravidian civilisation of the South. From this period onwards India has had more or less a continuous history of urbanisation. Once towns came into existence in the early historic period they suffered decay and

decline but they did not completely disappear unlike the Harappan towns.[14]This phase of urbanisation in Indian History has been termed as the second urbanisation.

What can be understood from the above account is that the story of urbanisation in India in historical times is a story of spatial and temporal discontinuities. The earliest urban developments were confined to the Indus valley and the adjoining parts of Rajasthan, Punjab and to some extent western Uttar Pradesh. Other parts of the country remained outside the pale of urbanisation. In the early historical period urbanisation took place in the southern part of the Indian peninsula, while the areas in between had no known cities. During much of the historical period, vast parts of the country were untouched or only partly affected by urbanisation. Spatial discontinuities in urbanization continue to be an important aspect even in modern India.[15]

In view of the distinctive features of our social, economic and political systems, the causative factors behind urbanisation varied from time to time, leading to not one but several urbanisation processes at different points of time. In the prehistoric period, urbanisation was synonymous with the origin and rise of civilisation itself, thus manifesting itself essentially as a cultural process. In the historical periods, from ancient times to the British period, urbanisation was inextricably related to the rise and fall of kingdoms, dynasties and empires and thus in effect urbanisation during this period has been associated with industrialisation and economic development. In this sense, urbanization is essentially an economic process.[16]

The history of urbanisation in India therefore reveals different processes of urbanisation at work throughout the historical period. Geographer for example R. Ramachandran suggests four processes of urbanisation at work. These are: (a) the emergence of new social relationships among people in cities and between people in cities and those in villages through a process of social change; (b) the rise and fall of cities with changes in the political order; (c) the growth of cities based on new productive processes, which alter the economic base of the city, and (d) the physical spread of cities with the inflow of migrants, who come in search of a means of livelihood as well as a new way of life.[17]

Recent trends in urbanisation problem have given rise to debates in the study of urbanisation in India, its processes and classification. While R. Ramachandran suggests the study of urbanisation in terms of rural-urban relationship, production categories, settlement pattern,[18] historians on urbanisation hold a different theoretical position to study urbanisation in India. They suggest classification of urban centres in terms of the feudal mode of production. The historians involved in this debate are R.S Sharma,[19]D.N Jha,[20] V.S.N Yadav[21] and Terrance Bies,[22] Harbans Mukhia[23] etc. B.D Chattophadhya[24] and R. Champakalaxmi[25] have enriched the quality of debate. The major points of debate are the following:

(a) R.S Sharma holds the view that urban centres during the time of second urbanisation in India prove on account of state feudalists. Sharma borrowed the argument of Henry Pirenne. D.D Kosambi nomenclatured this type of feudalism as feudalism from above. Sharma is of the view that decline of second urbanization is explained by the decline of state feudalists.[26]

(b) B.D Chattophadhya and R. Champakalaxmi suggest that after the decline of second urbanisation, a third phase of urbanisation took place in the early medieval India on account of the growth of the local trading communities and trade centres. "The majority of urban centres of this period were primarily nodal points in local exchange networks, the numerical strength of settlements and a growth in the number of locality elites tended to result in the proliferation of urban centres of relatively modest dimensions."[27] Thus, the third urbanisation with some characteristic features are being explained by them as the product of decentralised feudals. Kosambi[28] classified them as products of feudalism from below.

II

Amidst an ocean of tiny, autarchic villages, urban centres had sprung up and existed for centuries in India.[29] Even after going through extremely difficult situation on one or on innumerable occasions during the early medieval period, the Indian urban centres embarked on a vigorous flourishing career.[30] This indomitable life force so characteristic of Indian urban centre is gathered from the unique location as well as the rich economic situation enjoyed by them. Political disturbances, much shorter in duration than the spells of peace, could hardly affect

these inherent qualities so that the cities could easily spring back to normalcy as soon as the difficult times passed off.[31]

The Muslim rulers came to India to stay in India. It therefore follows that the Muslims had offered to the countries they had conquered something more substantial than Islamic faith and fraternity alone. Whatever other factors might have been incorporated in their programme of consolidation, urbanisation was one of the major items on the agenda. The vast territories could properly be governed through the deputies appointed by the Caliphs in a series of well dispersed towns. Thus, the foundation of new towns or resuscitation of the older ones was undertaken primarily under the stress of political necessity. But, by introducing this new element of multiplication of urban centres the Muslim conquerors had shifted the focal point from rural communities to urban agglomerations. As a result of this approach, the appearance of new towns became almost a routine matter in the Muslim empire.[32]

Contemporary historical treatises are full of reference on the foundation, decline and other relevant aspects of urban centres. These sources clearly bring out how skillfully Muslims had handled towns in India, possibly because of their urban background. Borrowing from their past traditions the Sultans set up *thanas* or military posts at appropriate points and placed them under their nominated incumbents. These *thanas*, big or small, old or new, formed the nucleus of towns that were to be nurtured and raised in due course of time into large thriving populous urban centres.[33]

The Muslim rulers also did not fail to understand that urban prosperity ultimately enriches the royal exchequer, and this is only possible under an able administration, taking care of the productive organs and helping the safe movement of goods from one place to another.[34] Therefore, since the accession of Lodi Sultans their developmental activity was largely focused on building roads connecting distant outposts of the empire, plantation of shady trees on either sides of the highways,[35] construction and maintenance of *Sarais* or resting places for the travellers at fixed stages of journey and furnishing these *Sarais* with lodgings, wells, mosques and separate boards for Muslims and Hindus and fodder for their animals.[36] The charges of these *Sarais* were nominal. Manucci[36] paid glowing

tribute to the system of *Sarais*. The *Sarais* were fortified places, built of stone or brick, offering accommodation to 800 to 1000 persons or more, in many cases along with their horses, camels, and carriages. Construction of *Sarais* was an old tradition of the Muslim rulers prevalent in the Islamic world.[37]

The Urban pattern and structure that evolved demonstrated the rise and acceptance of the need of uniformity and hierarchy. The urban structure thus, had in its apex sixteen metropolitan cities of Agra, Sikri, Delhi, Ahmedabad, Cambay, Ellichpur, Burhanpur, Ajmer, Ujjain, Mandu, Awadh, Lucknow, Varanasi, Jaunpur, Bihar and Cuttack. The empire was divided into 15 Subas and 105 Sarkars or districts. Abul Fazl records that there were 2837 cities in 1594, but only the larger cities numbering around 180 are mentioned in his works. All the provinces, whether Bengal in the East, Berer, Khandesh or Malwa in the South, Gujrat in the West, or Lahore, Multan or Kashmir in the North contained many city of importance, besides numerous small towns and large villages of some consequence. From the literary evidences it becomes clear that the smaller urban places noted for their craftsmen. prospered considerably. All this led to an ever-expanding urban system with a hierarchy of settlements, each performing a number of economic. administrative and military functions.[38]

In the Southern fringe of the empire, the rise of the Marathas. the Bahmani Kingdom, Vijayanagar Empire and later the Nizam of Hyderabad gave rise to Pune. Golconda, Hyderabad, Bijapur and Aurangabad. Mughals carried their administration down to the village level and for this they appointed a series of intermediate level functionaries, (Governors and Mansabdars) who were instrumental in creating new market centers and townships in their areas of jurisdiction.[39] Thevenot, traveling in India in 1666 provides us with information about widespread nature of urban development. There were thirty towns in the province of Gujrat[40]In the province of Agra there were forty towns.The province of Multan had many good towns.The country constituting Bengal and Orissa is full of castles and towns. There were great many trading towns in Rajasthan. Between Aurangabad and kalvarala, a distance of about 60 leagues had eight towns and in the Kingdom of Bijapur there were many good towns.[41]

It was basically from industry or trade and commerce that urban centres of the time got their source of support. The entire industrial structure was based upon different guilds and crafts of the village and urban communities having long traditions in the individual sphere of activities. The important industries, developed on the basis of this traditional skill could withstand every political upheaval as the producing units being house-bound were invariably small in size and thus could remain obscure at the time of unrest. Thus, the lack of state guidance during the sultanate period to the industrial and commercial activities did not hamper their normal progress. During the time of the Mughals the situation had certainly changed as the rulers had not only set up *Karkhanas*, but also participated in trading activities. The industrial and commercial activities, thus, were no longer the absolute monopoly of the state capital, in other words, capital- function was not the only decisive factor for giving rise to urban centres.[42] Manucci[43] giving an account of the country in his time (1656-1717) reveals the existence of several prospering urban centres. The province of Agra abounded in white cloth, silk stuff, and cloth of gold and silver of great fineness and indigo. The province of Lahore produced fine white embroidered materials, carpets, saddles, swords, coarse woolen stuffs etc. Ajmer, Benaras, Allahabad were famous for very fine white cloth and great quantities of grain, milk, butter, salt, turban, waist-belts, womens' wear etc. The vast region of the province of Dhaka produced the prodigious quantity of fine white cloth and silken-stuff of which the nations of Europe and elsewhere transport several shiploads. The urban industries also produced articles of luxury for the aristocratic and wealthy strata of the society, it produced equipments for the army, forged weapons of war and undertook the construction of military forts, erected magnificent palaces, imposing temples and even such monuments of rare art or engineering as the world celebrated *Taj Mahal* and *Kutub Minar*. It was the urban industry which undertook to construct canals.[44]

The town handicrafts of India, during centuries of their existence in pre-British India, had reached a high level of development. The fame of their products which were varied and of great artistic quality had spread to distant countries. The Indian industries, consequently, commanded a world market. V.F Calverton[45]

remarks '...from ancient days, when Indian fabrics, tapestries, gems, carpets, enamels and mosaics adorned the private and public buildings of Rome down to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the world looked to India for its most arresting and exiting wares.' The specialty of Indian products regarded as rarities by foreigners gave India a highly esteemed position which could not have been achieved without a strong urban foundation. It was this richness of India, preached by her fascinating products that attracted the west towards her, finally culminating in her exploitation.

III

European impact on urbanisation in India was evident as early as 16th century when the Mughal Empire was on ascendancy. The Portuguese traders established themselves at Panaji in 1510 and Bombay in 1532. Within a quarter of a century the Portuguese were not only able to oust the Arabs from their exclusive control of the Indian trade but also succeeded in establishing their settlements all over the western coast. The Portuguese achievements were followed by the Dutch, the English, and the French contest for monopoly of oriental commerce. The Dutch established themselves in Machilipatnam in 1605 and Nagapattinam in 1658; the English established their factories at Madras in 1639 and Calcutta in 1690 and the French at Pondicherry in 1673 and Chandernagore in 1690. All these European settlements and the European presence as traders in large number of existing Indian ports and inland cities, continued throughout the Mughal period, but, without having any marked impact on the level of urbanisation in India. It is only in the early 19th century that the British established a firm territorial hold in India, and India came under the British crown in 1858. From that time, until 1947, the British exercised unquestionable sway over the entire subcontinent including 500 odd princely states. The entire country, without exception, came under one political umbrella. This was unprecedented in Indian history. The course of urbanisation after 1800 in all parts of India was determined by British economic policies and social attitudes.[46]

The consolidation of territorial power by the British and the end of a period of political instability brought about surprisingly, a period of stagnation and decline

of urban centres in India, which lasted for well over a century. Towns and cities long famed for their specialised products faced a continually shrinking market, the entire industrial structure crashed down under stiff competition from imported goods resulting in the slackening of the activities in the commercial centres.[47]This was largely a result of the industrial revolution in England and the growth of the textile industry in Manchester. To this was added an unsympathetic, almost hostile attitude of the new rulers to Indian industries which gradually languished under the pressure of unequal competition and forcible closure of foreign markets. By the end of the 19th century England emerged as a major industrial economy of the world and India was the main market for British goods. India's traditional urban centres which depended on the export of its industrial products, declined rapidly as a consequence.[48] The old populous manufacturing towns, Dacca, Murshidabad (which Clive had described in 1757 to be as extensive, populous and rich as the city of London), and the like, were in a few years rendered desolate.[49]

The 19th century urban scenario stands out in contrast to the Mughal period of urban growth. A major feature of the early 19th century was the decline of the pre- British cities. The towns and cities hitherto acting as centres of political and economic activities of independent kingdoms lost their freedom of action. Their functions being restricted in many fields, the very purpose for which the cities existed became largely superfluous. The entire economy of the country was going through a devastating change necessary to serve the needs of the ruling power. The towns and cities had to fit into this changing pattern. Their obligations and responsibilities were not the same as before. Their economic or political functions were replaced by a role in general administration for which most of the important towns and cities were converted into some tamed administrative headquarters of the British India. This meant a great curtailment of activities in a much wider field which quite naturally could not be conducive to their growth. Decadence slowly crept in the urban life.[50]

The first Census report undertaken in 1872 shows that within five decades Benaras was brought down from 1st position in 1820 to the 5th position in 1872. whereas the important places of English settlement- Calcutta, Madras and Bombay.

all of English origin, had emerged as the three largest cities of India. Other examples of the decadence of pre- British cities are- Agra which was once an imperial city was surrounded by extensive ruins all around at the first quarter of the 19th century, Vijayanagar a great metropolis of the 16th century was mostly in ruins, Cambay, the sea port and one of the most important metropolises of India represented a collection of uninhabited streets, ruined mosques, and mouldering palaces.[51]The list can be lengthened considerably by citing examples of Delhi, Lucknow, Ahmedabad, Srinagar, Patna, Gaya, Baroda, Indore etc. By 1872, when the first census was undertaken the urban population of India had declined from 11 percent in 1800 to 8.7 percent in 1872. There were only 16 cities with a population of one lakh or more and, in all, only 43 places had a population of 50,000 or more. While the pre- British cities showed a marked decline in population, the British cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras showed remarkable growth.[52] Known as colonial cities they acted as headquarters of political and economic activities in India and so, they naturally enjoyed privileged positions and care than the other cities.[53] Having rather a free- hand in building these settlements, the English tried their best to make these towns an exact replica of English towns. The city's focal point was the central commercial area, with tall European- style buildings, representing the banks and headquarters of commercial and industrial houses. The city's administrative nerve centre was no less impressive. Dalhousie Square in Calcutta and Fort St. George in Madras were close to the central commercial area and had massive buildings which were British variants of Roman styles. To the native Indians, these structures provided a glimpse into European culture, while for the Europeans; they were reminders of their home.[54]

It is rather strange that the peace offered by the British administration in India did not help much in the proliferation of urban activities in the country. The reason seems to be that the urban activities being reduced to administrative functions, supplemented by commerce mainly in foreign goods, followed by a planned systematic demolition of the old industries had destroyed the basic sustaining force for urban growth. The changes, thus, introduced in the urban functions had a great effect on the urban life in general. Those cities (originating

long before the arrival of the British) which could survive the shock had to lean on other means, such as, enlarged administrative and military importance and managed to make an existence out of them. It is interesting to know that in 1891, 21 out of 26 first grade towns and another 20 out of the total 47 second grade towns of the country had either forts or military cantonments in them.[55]The cantonments were most often built near major towns for considerations of security. Originally they were built for housing British officers and men of the armed forces. Indian soldiers were housed in separate areas within the cantonment.[56]

Another modification which added a new feature to the urban landscape of India and which at the same time satisfied the racial pride of the British was the 'Civil Lines'.[57]The civil lines and cantonments were planned settlements and stood in sharp contrast to the indigenous town. The 'civil lines' contained the administrative offices and courts as well as residential houses for the officers. The civil lines had well-laid streets, widely spread buildings introducing English architectural styles into Indian cities and enough of green and open space to breathe in air of ease. They had basic civic amenities, schools, churches, hospitals, recreation areas in the form of gymkhana, clubs, game courts and race course. The 'civil lines' area thus stood apart from the native city.[58]

The civil lines and cantonments highlighted the social distance deliberately maintained by the British from the mass of Indian urban dwellers. Their racial pride and alien identity kept them detached from the people they ruled. The city thus became more firmly divided within itself and the social distance between the urban and rural areas increased.[59]

IV

A unique contribution of the British to the urban landscape of India was the creation of hill- stations. A number of hill-resorts were established at selected spots for the specific use of the British administrators, for temporary shifting of their capital to these places during the hot summer season. Initially chosen as sanatoria, hill- stations eventually turned out to be important administrative apparatus for the colonial masters thus giving rise to a new set of urban centres.

The Indian hill-stations as high altitude settlements were originally established by the British in India. The beginning of such a culture can be traced back to the early 19th century period when a group of hill-tops from Terai to the borders of Ladak came under British protection as a result of the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814-16. The treaty of Sagauli in 1816, gave the British a direct control over the Himalayan Districts of Kumaon and Garwal. Since this time onwards, the English dream of having settlements on hill tops away from the heat and dust of the tropical plains was realised. The British contact with the Himalayas therefore, gave rise to a new set of urban centres catering to the British needs. There emerged an extensive Himalayan frontier of India dotted with hill-stations[60] like Simla, Mussorie, and Almora followed a decade later by Darjeeling in the northeast. From the start, these highland sites attracted visitors in search of rest and relaxation but, they also served as forward positions in the strategic reconnaissance of neighbouring states and as launching pads for commercial probes into Central Asia. Mahabaleshwar was founded within a decade of the defeat in 1818 of the Peshwas which concluded the war against the Marathas. The establishment of Cherrapunji was made possible by the acquisition of Assam in 1824. In the south, the relationship between the conquest of territory and establishment of sanitaria was less direct. It took nearly thirty years after the defeat of Tipu Sultan in 1799 for the British to explore and settle southern India's highest mountains, the Nilgiris.[61]

The first hill-stations were established as early as 1815 and by 1870 there were over 80 hill-stations in four different areas in India serving the four major metropolitan cities of Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay and Madras. These areas were (a) Simla-Mussoorie-Nainital near Delhi, (b) Darjeeling-Shillong near Calcutta, (c) Mahabaleshwar in the Western Ghats near Bombay and (d) the Nilgiri-Kodaikanal area in Tamil Nadu.[62] However, the first resort that comes to mind when the Himalayas are mentioned is Simla where the hill-station concept was born and nurtured. As early as 1830, a Frenchman Monsieur Jacquemout, described Simla as "the resort of the rich, the idle, and the invalid."[63] Following the rapid development and quick popularity of Simla other resorts soon appeared in the Himalayan foothill.

The hill-stations of British India shared similar characteristics but, they differed greatly in size, function and clientele. Nora Mitchell has proposed the following five categories: (a) the official multifunctional hill-stations, (b) the private multifunctional hill-station, (c) the single purpose hill-station, (d) the minor hill-station and (e) the satellite hill-station. Among the stations that fall in the first category are Simla, Darjeeling, Nainital, and Octacamund. They were government headquarters as well as social, recreational, and educational centres for the British. Kodaikanal, Matheran, and Mussoorie are examples of stations in the second category. They served much the same array of social functions as the first group but did not possess any official purpose. The three remaining categories are a good deal more difficult to distinguish from one another. Many of these stations could be described with equal justice as minor, single-purpose, and satellites of larger stations. Most stations of these categories were cantonments for British troops. Some were enclaves of missionaries, planters, pensioners, railway workers, and so on. Dharmkot for instance, was dominated by Presbyterian missionaries. Lonavala by employees of the Bombay railway system and Madhupur by retired civil servants.[64]

The second half of the 19th century was the age of consolidation for hill-stations. Far fewer new stations were founded in this period but, existing stations became larger and more important to the British in India and their development became a matter of state policy. There emerged in hill-resorts Swiss-Gothic type of residential buildings, hotels, restaurants, market-places including facilities, the mall, the garden and the Public Schools offering British systems of education.[67] It was around this period that the hill-stations also acquired political importance. The great turning point, however, was the 1857 revolt which deepened British anxieties about their security on the plains and heightened their appreciation of the safety of the hills. As a result, civil and military authorities began to shift their headquarters to hill-stations wherever feasible. Simla obtained official recognition as the summer capital of the Raj in 1864, when the Secretary of State for India allowed the Imperial Council to accompany the Viceroy on his annual migration to the hills. By the early 1870s, most of the provincial governments had obtained sanction to

establish seasonal headquarters in hill-stations. The political importance of the official stations was underscored by the inauguration of large and costly public-building projects. Simla's physical appearance was transformed in the 1880s by the construction of the grandiose viceregal lodge and an array of other government buildings. Governors' or lieutenant governors' mansions were established in Darjeeling in 1879, Octacamund in 1880, Mahabaleshwar in 1886 and Nainital in 1896. A profusion of clock towers, bandstands, fountains, and statues evidenced a heightened civic pride and prosperity even among the smaller hill-stations. As railways extended feeder lines into remote areas, journeys to the hills became increasingly easy and inexpensive. [65] The growing importance of many hill-stations led to a number of them adopting corporate identities and becoming municipalities. Naini Tal was the first to leave the starting gate in the Mayorial stakes as early as 1845, with Mussoorie and Darjeeling the minor place- getters in 1850 and Simla a surprising fourth in 1891. Devolution of authority came to Ooty, Almora, Coonor, Dalhousie, Hazaribagh and Ranchi in 1860s, Lonavala and Kurseong in 1870s and Kodaikanal in 1899.[66]

The hill-stations located at elevations of 1,500 to 3,000 metres above sea level attempted to replicate the ambiance of the English countryside for which the English in India longed nostalgically. It had been always true that tropical diseases and health hazards caused by them had been the single important pre-occupations of the British to induce them to set up stations at the hills for recuperation of the diseased. But, it had other underpinnings which had been underlined by Dane Kennedy. The hill regions of India correspond to the topography of the highland of Welsh and Scotland from which British aesthetic sensitivity towards landscape could be said to have originated. The natural ambiance of an undulating green meadow abandoned to a state of soundlessness and infrequently visited by a shepherd with his flock of sheep had framed the British imagination. Indian hills had appealed to them because they had more green and loneliness than even those landscapes with which the British had been familiar. Gradually, they had augmented courage to reduce a part of it to 'human proportion'. The other important aspect which Kennedy has made out regarding British preoccupation

with hill-stations was their feeling of exclusiveness. This feeling arose because of their racial prejudice against the Indians and their pride of being the rulers. While establishing the administrative headquarters in the plains they sought to preserve this exclusiveness by being sequestered in a settlement contraption called 'civil lines' not being frequented by Indians. In spite of the cordon sanitaire, which they had woven around, it was only the hill stations, which would have fulfilled their dreams of being at home away from home. In spite of it being sustained by Indian labour, the hill- stations could be very British in all details that were required by the British pride and prejudice. Thus, while determining the settlement policy three objectives were always kept in view that (I) the hill stations would provide the ambiance for exclusive living by the white denizens on the topmost regions of the ridges with exclusive down town facility, (ii) the availability of the domestics who would be settled at a safer distance at the foot of the ridges, and (iii) health and education facilities of the white soldiers and children respectively. The urgency to have these facilities realised had further introduced the hill-station planner to develop a new kind of hill architecture that was a blend of the Swiss villas and the new-classical architecture. As the hill-stations grew they assumed importance even as political head quarters or centres of power from where the English would issue and execute orders with an air of omnipotence. [67]

What comes out clear from the above account is that urban centres in India be it in the plains or in the hills have originated in diverse circumstances and have derived their rationale for existence from diverse causes. Historical studies of individual town have also used the approach that every city is unique, a discreet entity occupying a unique history. In studying the process of urbanisation of Gangtok we will notice this uniqueness amply exhibited. The study will also reveal that though Gangtok's urbanisation owed to certain causes such as its use an an administrative headquarter of the British Agency in Sikkim, its strategic importance and importance as a route to Indo-Tibetan trade. Yet, in the absence of other factors, it could not have been urbanised.

Since the days of Warren Hastings, the British in India cherished the desire to develop trade of Bengal with Tibet and to communicate with China via Tibet. They endeavoured to advance their influence in the Himalayas into Kumaon, Garwal, the Sutlej Valley, Spiti, Lahul and Kashmir on the west, and into Sikkim, Bhutan and the Himalayas in the east. But the British authorities ultimately put the maximum emphasis on Sikkim because through Sikkim ran the shortest route from the plains of Bengal to the Tibetan capital at Lhasa. In fact, Tibet was the cause and Sikkim was the effect of British Himalayan policy.[68] On the other hand, China was a controlling factor in Tibet's trade. She, with the help of the Tibetan monasteries made good business with her vassal states in the Himalayas, particularly in tea. Naturally, she kept close watch on the movement of the British in the Himalayas. So, before the British entering into alliance with Sikkim, the Chinese Amban in Tibet had written a number of letters to the Sikkim Durbar desiring to place troops at Gyantse and Phari for the "convenience of making enquiries into the movement of Feringis (Europeans) and that the Sikkim Durbar need not entertain any fear on that score..."[69] Thus, Sikkim was sandwiched between China and the British India. Her immediate necessity was restoration of her lost territories. She got back her territories by the Treaty Titalia in 1817. However, in the process of the British policy of de-Tibetanisation, Sikkim gradually began to lose her territory and freedom. Without any regular police or military force and with poor economic condition, Sikkim could not defend herself against the militarily strong and commercially aggressive colonial authorities in India. Consequently, she became an easy prey of British colonialism.[70]

The beginning of a formal relation between the East India Company and Sikkim can be traced back to 1814 when the Company was involved in a war with Nepal. The Company became interested to establish its relation with Sikkim because of its strategic importance. In fact, it was rumoured that Nepal and Bhutan were allying together against the British and so to be friendly with Sikkim, who was still suffering from the burn of Nepalese and Bhutanese onslaught, was the diplomatic necessity of the British.[71] In view of the above reasons, the East India Company deputed Captain Barre to establish contact with the Maharaja of Sikkim.

Captain Barre promised the ruler of Sikkim to recover the territories lost to Nepal in 1790. Thus, the Maharaja of Sikkim was brought in contact with the East India Company. After the Anglo-Nepalese war and the signing of the Sugauli Treaty on 2 December 1815, the Nepalese ruler was asked not to disturb the *Raja* of Sikkim. It was agreed by the rulers of both these country that they would accept the arbitration of the British in case of all the differences arising between Sikkim and Nepal.[72]

To establish sound relations with Sikkim, the British restored all the territories between Mechi and Teesta to Sikkim by signing the Treaty at Titalia on 10 February 1817. But, the British reserved to themselves the right to arbitrate in any dispute that might arise between Nepal and Sikkim.[73] The political freedom of Sikkim was thus restricted and the company was benefited in respect of trade up to Tibetan frontier.

Between 1817 to 1826, no important transaction took place between Sikkim and the Company. However, the Company remained busy to acquire a place in Sikkim from where it could promote its trading interests. In 1826, a quarrel between the *Raja* Tsugphud Namgyal and his Lepcha Dewan Buljeet Karjee (also known as Chagzod Bolod), resulting in latter's assassination called for British intervention. After Bolod's assassination, some Lepcha chiefs with around 800 Lepchas left Sikkim and went to Illam in Nepal. The Sikkim *Raja*, in spite of the support given by Tibet and China failed to get the returns. At this juncture, both the parties applied to the British for help. This was a golden opportunity for the British to enter Sikkim and explore their interest in the region. Captain G.W. Lloyd and G.W. Grant were deputed to investigate and settle the dispute. During their visit, they noted the importance of Darjeeling as a place of health resort and in 1829, they again visited Sikkim accompanied by a surveyor named Captain J. D. Herbert. They emphasized on Darjeeling's importance as health resort as well as the importance from political and commercial point of view. Thus, Darjeeling came to the notice of the British. In 1830, Lord William Bentinck the Governor General proposed to his Council to send Lloyd to open negotiation with the Sikkim *Maharaja* for transfer of Darjeeling to the British Government "in return for the equivalent in land or money". [74] Bentinck also wrote to the *Raja* that the object of

possessing Darjeeling was not pecuniary but "solely on account of the typical weather". [75] But the *Raja* put forward certain conditions to the proposal for cession of Darjeeling: (a) grant of Debgong (Debgram) to Sikkim (b) arrest of one Rummoo Pradhan against whom the Raja advanced claim for the revenues of the Morung for three years and the (c) extension of the boundary of Sikkim upto Koshi. The claims appeared to Bentinck to be impracticable.[76] Regarding the first condition Lloyd replied that it was beyond his power. On the arrest of Rummoo Pradhan, Lloyd did not comment anything. Lloyd assured the Raja that he would try to settle the dispute between the Lepchas and the latter. Although the *Raja* was informed that climate was the only factor for wanting the transfer of Darjeeling, Lloyd wrote to the Secretary to the Government of India that the cession of Darjeeling should not consist of the spot alone but should also include part of the mountains over which the road to Darjeeling could be constructed so that tea cultivation, construction of native bazaar and settlement of Indian merchants could be taken up.[77] Thus, the British were bent on acquiring a permanent place from where they would operate and spread their influence throughout the Himalayas.

After prolonged discussion and communication, the *Raja* was made to cede Darjeeling to the British. On 1 February 1835, the *Raja* affixed his red seal and the deed of grant of Darjeeling was ceded to the British in India. But the *Raja* did not consider the cession to be unconditional. The British Government conveyed the *Raja* through Campbell that he would be granted Rs.1000 annually provided he agreed to the "free intercourse between Darjeeling and interior of Sikkim". [78] The *Raja* was suspicious of the British promise. Ultimately in September 1841, the Sikkim *Raja* was granted Rs. 3,000 per annum as compensation for Darjeeling[79] which the Raja had to wait till June 1847 to get the arrears of compensation since 1835.[80]

In spite of the Darjeeling settlement, the relations between Sikkim and the Company were not so friendly. Problems cropped up on the question of surrender of slaves to Sikkim who took refuge in Darjeeling as well as the criminals taking refuge in Sikkim from British India. Both the sides refused to co-operate with each other in apprehending the slaves or criminals.[81] The Sikkim *Raja* was also annoyed

with the British because of the loss of Ontoo Hill in 1839 to Nepal by the arbitration of Campbell centering which a dispute had started between Sikkim and Nepal since 1827.[82] Campbell charged the *Raja* of causing vexations, delays and regular money exactions from the people of Nepal, Tibet and Sikkim who were trading with Darjeeling, failing to comply with the demand for surrendering criminals from India, objecting to accept new road from Besar Batti to Siliguri as boundary on the ground that by ceding Darjeeling, the *Raja* had given no lands other than the mountain lands; preventing his people from coming to Darjeeling for labour and trade; prohibiting the people of Bhutan from coming and settling at Darjeeling; refusing to sell Sikkim's lime deposits to the British; applying frequently for surrender of slaves settling in Darjeeling. Campbell threatened the *Raja* of depriving of his possession in the Morung for his unfriendly course.[83] Campbell's bullying tactics paid dividends and in August 1846, the *Raja* sent his *Dewan* Illam Sing to Darjeeling to settle disputes. Campbell was informed that duties were levied on the Tibetan traders according to their means and after due enquiry but Illam Sing denied all the other charges.[84] The *Raja* also granted the use of lime deposits at Singmare(presently in Darjeeling) in Sikkim.[85] Government of India decided to increase the Raja's allowance from Rs. 3,000/- to Rs.6,000.[86]

The *Raja* of Sikkim was not happy with Campbell for the Latter's over lording him. But the Government of India refused to comply with the *Raja*'s request for the replacement of Campbell.[87] Relation with the British further deteriorated when Doctor Campbell and Hooker during their unauthorized exploration inside Sikkim were made prisoners in 1849. This action of the Sikkim authority was a sign of annoyance towards the policy of the British in Sikkim. But in its turn, such action resulted in a punitive expedition against Sikkim. The *Raja* was forced through an ultimatum to release Campbell and Hooker and once this was accepted, the British took revenge upon the Sikkim authority by the annexation of the Morung (Sikkim Tarai). At the same time the British also annexed "the portion of Sikkim Hills bounded by the Ramman on the North, Rangeet and Tista on the East and by Nepal frontier on the West, a tract of country containing about 500 souls". The grant of Rs. 6,000 per annum which the Raja had been receiving

since 1846 was also withdrawn. These annexations brought about significant changes in the relations between Sikkim and the British India. Previously, Darjeeling was an enclave in the British territory but after the above annexations, it became contiguous with the British districts of Purnea and Rangpur in the plains. At the same time, the Sikkim *Raja* was cut off from access to the plains except through the British territory.[88]

It is evident from the above account that the crisis of 1849 had brought into focus the real position of Sikkim vis-a-vis the Government of India. When the Company established its relation with Sikkim in the second decade of the 19th century, it regarded the *Raja* as an ally and later granted him the Morung suitable to that situation. But within three decades and a half, the position of the *Raja* was so reduced that he was contemptuously regarded as a "Hill Savage". The decline in the status of the *Raja* was the outcome of Sikkim's reduced size and importance. In 1815, Sikkim was given importance as Nepal was then still unsubdued. With the growth of Anglo-Nepalese concord, Sikkim's importance correspondingly diminished. Moreover, by the Treaty of Titalia the Company had gained substantial influence over Sikkim, which also marked the beginning of the end of Sikkim's independence. Since the Titalia event, Sikkim began to lose her territory one after another. The cession of Darjeeling in 1835 took away the faith that Sikkim had on the British and by 1849; the Colonial authority in India was virtually at war with Sikkim. The Company did not annex the whole of Sikkim because of the political expediency of maintaining the kingdom as a separate identity. Interestingly enough, the non-annexation of the whole of Sikkim brought no positive result in the increase of British influence there. This was actually due to the strength of the Tibetan (nationalist) faction in Sikkim led by the Tibetan *Dewan* Dongyer Namgyal better known as *Pagla Dewan* who had succeeded *Dewan* Illam Sing and in whose hands rested the real power. Though ostensibly dismissed after the 1849 crisis, he staged a dramatic comeback and within a mere few years became a power to be reckoned with. The *Raja* of Sikkim Tsugphud Namgyal, an old man of nearly 80 years had relinquished all cares of the state and retired to Chumbi in Tibet. Though Tibet did not actively intervene on behalf of Sikkim during the crisis but continued

to grant the *Raja* an allowance when the British stopped his compensation for the Darjeeling grant. This gesture increased the Tibetan influence so much that in the next decade the Government of India was forced to undertake another military expedition into Sikkim to re-establish its position.[89]

Immediately after the retirement of the *Raja* to Chumbi, Dongyer Namgyal took over the administration of Sikkim. In March 1859, Dongyer Namgyal in the name and with the knowledge of the *Raja* sent a deputation to the Government of Bengal demanding the payment of the enhanced annual allowance of Rs. 12,000 or as an alternative the restoration of Sikkim's territory confiscated in 1850. The request was rejected by the Government of Bengal and it was informed to the Governor General that the *Raja* was in receipt of all the arrears due to him. This was followed by raids into Darjeeling. British Indian subjects were carried off and sold as slaves or detained in Sikkim.[90] Campbell now requested the Government of Bengal to send a strong military force to crush Dongyer's activities in the state and force the ruler to comply with the English demands such as (a) restoration of the kidnapped British subjects (b) compensation to those who had been plundered (c) payment of the cost of occupation (d) security against future aggression. But when the *Raja* refused to comply with the demands, a British force under Campbell entered Sikkim. The force had to withdraw and return back to Darjeeling as a result of Dewan Namguay's sudden attack on them. At this juncture, the Governor General decided to replace Campbell. The Governor General therefore deputed Ashley Eden (Joint Secretary to the Board of Revenue) as envoy and special commissioner to Sikkim.[91] It was made clear to Eden that the Government of India did not want to annex any portion of Sikkim because its existence as an independent country was the need of the hour.[92] After thorough examination of the situation in Sikkim, Eden asked the *Raja* to arrange for the surrender of Dongyer Namgyal to the British and the release of all the British subjects arrested. The *Raja* was further asked to make an apology of his past misconduct and create a healthy situation to improve relations with India.[93]

The British Government sent a very strong force in 1861 under J.C Gawler and Ashley Eden as a retaliatory measure. The force met Dewan Namgyal on the

banks of River Tista. But before the British force took the final steps, Dewan Namgyal fled to Tibet.[94] British took advantage of the situation and forced a treaty upon Sikkim on 28 March 1861 at Tumlong. The Treaty was signed on behalf of the Government of India by Ashley Eden and by Sidkeong Namgyal the son of the *Raja* Tsugphud Namgyal. According to the provision of the Treaty, all the former treaties between the Colonial Government and Sikkim were to be cancelled. Sikkim became the de-facto protectorate of India and the annexation of Darjeeling was confirmed. The British also got the right to construct roads through Sikkim to the Tibetan border and the *Raja* was to be designated as the *Maharaja*. The Sikkim Government agreed not to allow Dewan Namgyal or his blood relations to enter Sikkim or hold any position of power. The Maharaja also agreed to allow British merchants to pursue duty free trade inside Sikkim.[95] In short, it can be said that the position of the Government of India in Sikkim had reached to such a firm and advanced position that it could annex Sikkim any time if desired. But, the tactful Colonial Government of India rather preferred a weak Sikkim and avoided immediate annexation. Sikkim as a buffer between India and Tibet suited British interest more than an outright annexation. The Government of India was inclined to maintain the separate identity of Sikkim as a protectorate. The British motive was political. At the time of expedition of 1861, Ashley Eden was advised not to say or do anything which might create suspicion that the British rule would be planted permanently in any part of Sikkim. They apprehended that in case Nepal and Bhutan could make common cause with Sikkim against the British. Annexation might also lead to quarrel with Tibet because Sikkim had close religious and cultural affinities with Tibet. Tibet also considered Sikkim as her tributary. Besides, in its policy towards Sikkim, the British Government of India considered trade with Tibet of more importance and it could not took risk by antagonizing Tibet by annexing Sikkim. So, the Colonial Government of India preferred to maintain Sikkim as a buffer state between Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet and British India.[96]

In 1862, the *Maharaja* Tsugphud Namgyal abdicated the throne in favour of his eldest son Sidkeong Namgyal whose rule saw the happiest period in the history of Indo-Sikkimese relationship. The annual allowance on Darjeeling was increased

from Rs 6,000 to Rs 9,000 per annum and further increased in 1873 to Rs 12,000 on the request of the Maharaja of Sikkim to the Government of Bengal, but on the condition that the Maharaja should help the British Government in India in respect of trade whenever necessary. Thus the rule of Sidkeong Namgyal did not see any ups and downs in Sikkim's relation with the British. He died in 1873 and was succeeded by his half brother Thudop Namgyal, a candidate of British choice.[97]

It is worth noting that Ashley Eden who had brought the British military expedition to Sikkim to a successful conclusion by forcing the *Maharaja* to enter into a treaty with the Government of India in 1861, expressed the hope that within a few years a very considerable trade would spring up between Lhasa and Darjeeling by the Sikkim route and the Tibetans would be too glad to exchange gold dust, musk, borax, wool and salt for English cloth, tobacco and drill. The optimistic tone of Eden's report and the stupendous development of tea industry at Darjeeling increased the interest of the Government of India in the Tibetan trade via Sikkim.[98]

The Government of India was trying its best to open Tibet for trade while in England a similar movement was started by the mercantile community. Fascinated by the immense possibilities of trade in the Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan region, the traders began to press the British Government to secure the early opening of Tibet for trade for which they presented a memorandum to the Government of India.[99] In fact the suggestions in the memorandum were more or less intone with the aims of the Government of India. The importance of the memorandum however lies in the fact that it had concentrated its attention on the Sikkim route to the exclusion of all other routes across the Himalaya.

In the meantime trade on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier was stopped by the Tibetan authorities in 1873. The Government of India could not afford to accept this at a time when it was actively involved in developing Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan trade. It was afraid that its hope of developing commercial ventures with Tibet would be doomed unless something was done to prevent stoppage on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. The Bengal Government therefore, felt it necessary to send a British official to the Sikkim-Tibetan border to enquire into the causes and significance of the frequent stoppages of trade. The Government of India accepted

the proposal of the Bengal Government and accordingly deputed J.W.Edgar Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling to Sikkim in October 1873 with the instructions to understand the actual condition in Sikkim-Tibet frontier, the best line for the road to take off and the advisability of opening one .[100]

In October 1873, Edgar entered Sikkim and visited the passes into the Chumbi valley of Tibet and talked with the Tibetan officials like the *Jongpens* of Phari and ex-*Dewan* Namgyal. Edgar felt that by meeting the ex-*Dewan* he would be able to find out the latter's exact position and influence as well as his present sentiments towards the British Government. Moreover, he felt that he would be able to get more information regarding Tibet from ex-*Dewan* Namgyal than from any one else. And in fact Edgar obtained more information regarding Tibet from him than from any other sources.[101]

The *Amban* on learning of the proposed visit of Edgar to Sikkim and Tibetan frontier wrote a letter[102] to the *Maharaja* of Sikkim ordering him not to allow the Britishers (Peling Sahibs) to cross the frontier. The *Maharaja* was warned in the following strong terms:

"Your state of Sikkim borders on Tibet. You know what is in our minds and what our policy is, you are bound to prevent the Peling sahibs from crossing the frontier; yet it is entirely through your action in making the roads for the sahibs through Sikkim that they are going to make the projected attempts. If you continue to behave in this manner it will not be well for you."

Edgar, on learning about the *Amban's* letter to the *Maharaja* of Sikkim, gave up the idea of entering into Tibet. He however took the opportunity to explain to the *Jongpens* the British policy towards the Himalayan states which he stated as one of "encouragement of trade to the utmost of our power and the maintenance of strong friendly states along the frontier". [103]

After his return to Darjeeling from Sikkim in 1873, Edgar made a number of proposals to the Government of India to improve its relation with Tibet. First, he suggested that the British Minister at Peking should make an effort to get from the Chinese authority a declaration that the exclusion of the British subjects from Tibet was not authorized by the Chinese Government. Secondly, he suggested that the

British officers should cultivate friendly relation with the Tibetan frontier officials. Thirdly, he advocated the establishment of a trade mart on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier. Lastly, he recommended the construction of a road to the Tibetan frontier through Sikkim. He was surprised as to why steps were not taken to construct a road after the Treaty of 1861.[104]

The Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal Sir Richard Temple believed that trade with Tibet through Sikkim could be developed simply by improving the communication. He therefore, endorsed Edgar's proposal for the construction of a road to the Tibetan frontier through Sikkim and wanted that it should be completed within three or four years.[105]The Government of India unlike the Bengal Government did not react favourably to Edgar's proposal for the construction of a road to the Tibetan frontier through Sikkim. It felt that the time was not ripe for its implementation since the main obstacle for the development of the Tibetan trade namely, the Chinese and Tibetan opposition was not removed.[106] Even though the Government of India did not accept the proposals of Edgar, the latter's visit to Sikkim was not in vain. It had in fact, resulted in the increase of the British influence in that kingdom. The *Maharaja* supported Edgar's proposal for the establishment of a trade mart on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and the construction of a road up to the Tibetan frontier. He also agreed to assist the Government of India in the construction of the road. So from 1873-1877, events in Sikkim were in tune with the British paramount position in that kingdom. A road was constructed from Darjeeling to the Tibetan frontier at *Jelep* Pass. In this work, the Government of India received the active assistance of the Sikkim State and met with no objection from Tibet.[107]

Some secret explorations by Sarat Chandra Das, Headmaster of Bhutia School at Darjeeling who was deputed by the Government of India in 1879 and again in 1881 made the Tibetan authorities very suspicious about the British moves. Therefore, trade on Sikkim-Tibet frontier was stopped. So the Government of Bengal according to the advice of the Government of India deputed its Finance Secretary, Colman Macaulay to visit Sikkim and the Tibetan frontier in 1884 to (a) discuss with the *Maharaja* questions regarding the administration of Sikkim and his

relations with the British Government; (b) to visit the Lachen valley to examine its potentiality as trade route towards the province of Tsang in Tibet and (c) to endeavour to establish friendly relations with the Tibetan authorities of the districts adjacent to Sikkim on the north.[108]

On his arrival some of the pro-British officials of Sikkim such as, Phodong Lama and Khangsa Dewan advised Macaulay to persuade the *Maharaja* to reside in Sikkim permanently and not to go to Chumbi as they hoped that this would promote the British views regarding development of trade and friendly relations with Tibet. The *Maharaja* was asked by Macaulay to stay at Tumlong and to carry out the administration from there and to supply potters for the roadwork. The *Maharaja* also promised to do his utmost to secure the withdrawal of stoppage of trade by the Tibetan authorities and pointed out that trade was continuing in spite of efforts of the Tibetan authorities to stop it. He also agreed to keep up the *Jelep* road.[109]About this time trouble broke out between Tibet and Bhutan and the *Maharaja* was allowed to go to Chumbi to find out the reason behind the trouble and to use his influence to open up the trade. [110]

On 8 November 1884, Macaulay met the Tibetan official, the *Jongpen* of Khamba, (a small town north of the Sikkim-Tibet border) who advised Macaulay to secure China's consent to open Tibet for trade and make it free from all restrictions. Macaulay attached too much importance to the opinion of the *Jongpen* and advocated for the dispatch of a mission to China to plead the British case for free admission of Indian traders to Tibet without any obstruction through Sikkim-Darjeeling route.[111]Macaulay's proposals though made the Bengal Government enthusiastic, was received by the Government of India with coldness. However, Macaulay was able to convince Lord Randolph Churchill the Secretary of State for India, about the need of a mission. Macaulay was thus permitted to go to China to arrange for the passports to go to Tibet. After some opposition passports were granted to Macaulay in November 1885. The mission was organized and assembled under Macaulay at Darjeeling in early 1886. The Tibetans were alarmed at the news of the mission and they warned that it would be resisted. To convince the Tibetans, Macaulay sent letters to the Tibetan frontier officials through the *Maharaja* who

was still at Chumbi expressing the peaceful intention of the projected mission.[112]But the Tibetan opposition was determined and the Macaulay mission had to withdraw.

Immediately after the withdrawal of the Macaulay's mission Tibetans advanced thirteen miles inside northern Sikkim across *Jelap* pass and occupied Lingtu. Disputes arose regarding the jurisdiction of the lands above and below the *Jelap* pass. The Tibetan authorities disagreed to accept the British allegation that the Tibetans had no right on the lands below the *Jelap*. They took the Sikkimese to task for failing to defend their own territories and their officers acting as guide to the British and working as coolies in roads upto the frontier. Tibetans even threatened to take back the disputed lands which they had transferred to Sikkim. The *Maharaja* could not deny the truthfulness of Tibetan complaints and admitted that Sikkim land had been considered as included within the Tibetan territory since the days of the first Sikkim *Maharaja* Phuntsog Namgyal.[113]In fact, the Maharaja had entered into a treaty with Tibet in 1886 promising to prevent persons from crossing the Sikkim-Tibet boundary and agreeing that Sikkim was subject only to Tibet and China.[114] The Colonial Government in India felt that it was a violation of the Treaty of 1861 and the *Maharaja* was asked to return to Sikkim or his allowance would be stopped. But the *Maharaja* declined to return due to the opposition of the Tibetan authorities and informed that the Tibetans had constructed a fort at Lingtu and stopped all trade.[115]

Thus, fearing the decline of British influence in Sikkim, Steuart Bailey the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal wanted to adopt some stern measures. The inactivity of the Government of India was also subject to criticism in England by the Chambers of Commerce and by tea planters in Darjeeling and Doors.[116]So in October 1887, Lord Dufferin made up his mind to expel the Tibetans from Lingtu without further delay. The British expelled the Tibetans from Lingtu and reached Chumbi in September in 1888. The *Maharaja* was arrested at Chumbi and on his return was instructed never to go to Chumbi in future. He was further asked to act according to the counsel of Phodang Lama and Khangsa *Dewan*, leaders of the pro-British faction in Sikkim. The *Maharaja's* close associates were ill-treated.[117]It was

at this juncture that Edgar suggested to the Government of Bengal for the future arrangements of Sikkim's administration and proposed for the direct administration of Sikkim by a British Officer. The suggestion was accepted by the Bengal Government and accordingly J.C. White was appointed as the first British Political Officer in Sikkim to look after her administration with the help of a Council consisting of important pro-British faction like Phodong Lama, Khangsa *Dewan*. Shew *Dewan* and others.[118]

From the above account, it is evident that from 1817 to 1889 the British Government in India did not interfere directly in the internal affairs of Sikkim. The Grant of Darjeeling in 1835 to the East India Company by Tsugphud Namgyal did fulfill to a certain extent the British desire of having a suitable place through which they could enhance trade prosperity. In 1861, Sikkim became a British Protectorate by the Treaty of Tumlong which also confirmed the annexation of Darjeeling. Although Sikkim became a British Protectorate, the Officer In-Charge of Darjeeling was entrusted with the responsibility to look after the affairs of Sikkim. The British thus tried to achieve their goal by keeping the internal affairs of Sikkim undisturbed. They thought that this policy would keep the Tibetan authorities in good humour and their purpose would be served. But when they felt that the situation was not favourable to their requirements, they decided to arrange the administration of Sikkim according to the need of the British. J.C White, an Engineer in the public works department was accordingly appointed as the first Political Officer of Sikkim. The ruler was placed in the throne with nominal power and the entire administrative responsibilities were taken over by the Political Officer who in fact became the de-facto ruler. From about 1889-1890, the residence of the Maharaja was shifted to Gangtok from Tumlong[119] because of the fact that Gangtok would serve a better opportunity to the British for realising their aims and objectives. It was also felt that geographically Gangtok was centrally located to communicate with Tibet and British India. One interesting fact worth noting is that the plan of removing the residence of the Raja to Gangtok was initiated by Sidkeong Namgyal way back in 1873 but the work was interrupted by his death.[120] With the transfer of the capital of Sikkim to Gangtok and the creation of the post of

Political Officer, steps were taken to transform the entire internal set-up of Sikkim in tune with the requirements of the British administration. Our study of these measures in the subsequent chapters will bring to light the steady transformation of Gangtok into an urban center. With the arrival of the subsequent Political Officers, Gangtok gradually emerged with some pronounced characteristics of the nearest hill station namely Darjeeling. Though Gangtok succeeded to retain some of its pre-colonial traits on the whole it assumed a shape that would be compared to the hill-station culture on justifiable grounds.

VI

Hill areas are endowed with different, varied potentialities for urbanisation and thus their problems differ from the plain areas. Town planning in the hills has to be exclusively based on the potentialities of the hills and their particular problems. Due to the ruggedness of the terrain, lack of suitable sites for human settlements, particularly large agglomerations and various environmental constraints, many difficulties are faced while constructing and maintaining hill towns. The world history of urbanisation indicates that towns are the product of two distinct processes: endogenous and exogenous. In the endogenous process urban centres or towns come into existence as a result of two factors: (i) due to excess agricultural products a village gradually grows into an urban centre where surplus agricultural products are brought or assembled from surrounding villages due to various reasons for transactions. These towns can be called market towns where inter-related secondary and tertiary activities start in consequence. In this case, the strength of an urban centre depends on the supply of products from the hinterland. The urban centre will break down consequent to the weakening of the rural system. (ii) Non-agricultural product based towns emerge due to endogenous locational factors, namely halting places or trade routes or highways and mountain passes, sea and river ports, centres of learning, pilgrimage, administrative and strategic location, recreation and others. (iii) The increase in population of a village beyond the carrying capacity of an agriculture system where its inhabitants diversify the means of subsistence from primary to secondary and tertiary sector lead to a village automatically acquiring an urban character.

(2) In the exogenous process, urban centres are established due to external locational factors such as the establishment of towns for specific purposes; industry, mining, administration, medical, tourism, power stations, transport junctions or other reasons. In this process towns emerge first followed by the development of other urban facilities. They appear to be grafted or planted settlements on the rural fabric. Such towns do not grow from the rural systems but they influence the rural system in the course of time to its benefit. The survival of such town is externally controlled. Broadly speaking the endogenous category of urbanisation can be associated with the agricultural or pre-industrial society and the exogenous with the industrial society.[121]

Most of the hill towns seen today in India are the products of exogenous forces and have been planted on the rural fabric without any real inter-connection with the villages. Such urban agglomerations are generally the seats of administration with a few office buildings, residential quarters, schools, hospitals and a *bazaar* line. They do not have all the urban amenities or functions and land use. The centres of administration thrust upon the hills lack true hinterlands and do not act as nodal or growth points. Some degree of urban-rural interaction begins after the formation of such towns, but this is sufficient to create a spatio-temporal-functional hierarchy and pattern in the human settlements and land use of the area.[122]

The whole of Sikkim remained rural in character till the beginning of the 20th century with the exception of Gangtok acquiring urban qualifications to some extent from this period onwards. The rural economy of Sikkim never reached the surplus stage to generate endogenous urbanisation. Though inter-village barter or exchange of products existed, the entire hill ecosystem of Sikkim did not provide sufficient potential for urbanisation. The urban characteristics of Gangtok were the product of exogenous forces as was the case with other hill-stations of India which came into existence during the British period. Although Sikkim was a semi-colony the fact that Gangtok as an urban area was the creation of a few British Political Officers to cater to their needs cannot be denied. From the last decade of the 19th century onwards Gangtok, the capital of Sikkim saw its gradual transformation from a rural economy into an area having some urban qualifications due to external or exogenous factors.

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