Chapter 2

SIMILARITY AND IDENTITY

We have taken similarity to be a relation. That indeed it is. There is little in our linguistic usages, as far as we could see, by which we might be led to misconstrue it otherwise, e.g. as a quality or substance or such like. Our business now is to find an account of similarity *vis-a-vis* its cognates.

1.1. The cognates, on a random listing, may be said to cover, *inter alia*, such relations as are designated by 'likeness', 'equality', 'equivalence', 'parity', 'parallelism', 'agreement', 'correspondence', 'commonness', etc. But this apparent multiplicity need not be taken too seriously. For, each such relation, we suppose, may well be understood as a variant or mode of a wider relation which is *identity* or *sameness*. Thus we assimilate the cognates of similarity under the common matrix of identity, partial or complete, pure or modified. This has a methodological advantage : it ensures a degree of simplicity for our enquiry.

But getting straight into our job, i.e. undertaking a comparison of similarity with identity, proves a bit inconvenient on account of one particular reason. The reason, interestingly, is 'similarity' and ' identity',the words themselves. Both are abstract substantives, and being so they tend, like other abstract substantives, to present "the aspect of a blank and very high wall",[1] to produce in us a sense of helplessness about them ; we do not know how, exactly, to deal with them. So, evidently, what is necessary for us, as a matter of method, is to replace the notion of similarity and that of identity by some less abstract or less intangible substitutes for each. Such substitutes, for us, are mainly two :

(1) Uses of such words or phrases as 'similar', 'similarity', 'resemblance', 'to resemble', and their synonyms (s-words) in language and the uses of such words of phrases as 'identity', 'identical', 'same', 'sameness' and their variants (i-words).

1 Truth, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey (1964),p.2.

(2) Sentences stating similarity (s-sentences) and those stating identity (i-sentences).

We distinguish (1) and (2), because the 'use of a s-word' and a 's-sentence' do not seem to mean exactly the same thing. And the same is to be said also about the 'use of an i-word' and an 'i-sentence'. Take the s-sentence 'A is similar to B in being red'. The sentence involves the use of a s-word and is at the same time a s-sentence, i.e. sentence stating similarity. But must a s-sentence employ a s-word? What about the sentence 'A and B are both red'? It exemplifies a s-sentence but not the use of any s-word. Likewise, consider 'A is identical with B' which is an i-sentence exemplifying at the same time a use of an i-word. But we can well have the same i-sentence also without the use of an i-word, e.g. 'A is B'. But is not 'is' in 'A is B' an i-word in the sense that it is a synonym of the word 'identical'? The point is not without all force. Yet it remains true that 'is', insofar as its use in our ordinary language is concerned, is not an explicit synonym

of 'identical' or a synonym in any absolute sense; for, 'is' may be employed also to designate relations other than identity, e.g. causal relation (as in 'Knowledge is power' which means 'knowledge produces power'), implication (as in the case of 'To assert that p is to believe that p'), and so on. 'Is' may be made absolute synonym of 'identical' only by definition.

S-sentences or i-sentences taken by themselves, are independent respectively of any s-word or i-word. The function of a s-sentence in language is to record or state a similarity-situation; while that of a s-word may be said to categorise or name it as such. Thus the s-sentence above, 'A and B are both red', ends its job by recording or stating a similarity-situation. But the other sentence, 'A is similar to B in being red', insofar as it involves a s-word, records a similarity-situation and, at the same time, also names or categorises the situation as one of similarity. The same analysis holds good of i-sentences and i-words. While an i-sentence, qua itself, is supposed only to depict an identity-situation, an i-word is used to name it explicitly as

such. In short, the function of a s-word and an i-word may be said to provide labels respectively for what is stated by a s-sentence and what is stated by an i-sentence.

Thus in a less abstract or less intangible form, i.e. in the form in which it would perhaps be less difficult for us to handle it, our business of understanding similarity in reference to identity would amount to

(a) that of understanding s-sentences in reference to i-sentences, or,

(b) of understanding the use of s-words in reference to the use of i-words.

1.2. It would be enough for our purpose to follow only (a). This reformulation alone, however, does not seem enough to clear the path to our business completely. (a) tends to become a source of some special difficulty. The difficulty arises all over the identification i-sentences.

Samples of s-sentences are not difficult for us

to obtain. They can well be modelled after different types of similarity sorted out by us in the preceding chapter. But which sentences, exactly, may be said to count as unmistakable examples of i-sentences? We don't have any equivocal and ready answer on this point. Identification of i-sentences in language is not too easy a job. We are not in possession of any clear guideline for the purpose. What is more serious, the matter is considerably obscured by controversies among philosophers. So, as a preliminary, it seems essential that we should undertake some analysis with a view to isolating instances of genuine and relevant i-sentences.

We may take off with the following which apparently are paradigm instances of i-sentences.

(a) ' 1 = 1 '

(b) ' 2 + 3 = 3 + 2 '

(c) 'Gourishankar = Everest '

(d) 'Nehru = The first Prime Minister of India'.

What is peculiar about these sentences is that the component terms of each of them are distinct occurrences of the same or distinct singular terms referring undividingly to the same object. But a problem arises

over the sign '=' in them, the functioning of it. What, exactly, does it purport to do? May it be said to go between the object referred to by the one term and that referred to by the other? Or, should we understand it as going between the signs in which the terms consist? Quine apart, most philosophers are inclined to accept the former alternative. These philosophers tend to interpret the role of the sign '=' as being that of upholding a claim to relate the objects referred to by the terms by way of identity; and, thereon, they are led to react adversely against the notion of identity or i-sentence itself, on the ground that the claim is spurious. Thus, for example, Hume would find nothing relational in the so-called relation of identity sought to be upheld by '=' in the above sentences, because it appears to him to relate an object to itself. Similarly, according to Wittgenstein, "to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing"[2]. And the same position is upheld by Bradley when he says that such sentences

2 Tractatus, 5.5303.

"while professing to say something" "really say(s) nothing".[3] For, in each of these sentences the predicate is not different from the subject, and "... if you predicate what is not different, you say nothing at all."[4] Thus, taken as typical specimens of i-sentences, the sentences of the kind under consideration disillusion Hume, Bradley and Wittgenstein among others ; they find in them no record of relation; nor any informative value.

Quine, however, has no occasion to be disillusioned by the examples of i-sentences. The sentences, on his interpretation, are not to be taken as purporting to posit any relation of identity between objects. Thus The '=' in them, according to him, is a 'relative term'[5] joining the signs in which the component terms consist. And understood in this light, i-sentences of the above kind need not be necessarily uninformative. (c) and (d) in our examples do indeed contain information. Identity that is a

3 The Principles of Logic, Vol I, Oxford University Press, London (1963), p.141.
4 Appearance and Reality, Oxford (1897),p.17.
5 Word and Object, Cambridge (1960), p.115.

relation, according to Quine, is to relate objects, not to join signs. Not just that. The objects must also be numerically different. This means that the sine-qua-non of a genuine i-sentence is that its component terms must be s such as have different referents. The following lines quoted from Quine and read together would perhaps sum up his position.

> Identity is expressed in English by those uses of 'is' that one is prepared to expand into 'is the same object as'.[6]

> Identity is intimately bound up ~~which~~ with the dividing of reference. For the dividing of reference consists in settling conditions of identity : how far you have the same apple and when you are getting into another.[7]

Thus it is widely agreed that sentences like (a)-(d) are not genuine examples of i-sentences. In whatever other way one may characterise them, they cannot be viewed as records of any relation between objects. They are not in fact cognates of s-sentences

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.

and are, in that sense, irrelevant for us. That is to say, there is no point in undertaking to understand s-sentences in reference to them; for s-sentences, whatever else they may be, are, basically, records of relation between objects.

Thus examples of genuine i-sentences are not available to us within the range of tautologies, which do not express any relation at all. So we fall back upon such non-tautologies as

(e) 'Socrates is wise',

(f) 'Roses are red',

(g) 'This is that shade of green',

and such like.

They seem to provide genuine instances of i-sentences, i.e. sentences which express the relation of identity, on proviso that we are prepared to expand them, as per Quine's dictum, respectively into

(h) 'Socrates is the same person as a wise man',

(i) 'Roses are the same objectsx as some red things',

and (j) 'This shade of green is identical with that shade of green.'

The sentences satisfy the two basic conditions laid down by Quine. They posit relations between objects. That is one thing. Besides, the objects referred to by their component terms are not also the same.

For Bradley, however, sentences of the kind (e)-(g) can count as i-sentences only in a qualified sense. Unqualified identity, and therefore, an unqualified i-sentence is, for him, an "ideal"; "Where there is no diversity there is no identity at all ..."[8] There can be no two objects between which identity may ever be said to hold; and accordingly, there can be no sentence which can truly claim to express it. Every identity, according to Bradley, is "identity-in-difference" or only "partial identity". "Identity without difference", says Bradley, "is nothing at all. It takes two to make the same ...";[9] and this

8 Appearance and Reality, Oxford (1897), p.526.
9 The Principles of Logic, Vol.I, Oxford University Press, London (1963), p.141.

"numerical distinction", as said by him further, "is not distinction without difference ..."[10] "Without difference in character there can be no distinction, and the opposite would seem to be nonsense."[11]

We shall not go into the tenability or otherwise of the Bradleyan analysis of identity or of his idea of identity-in-difference or partial identity. That, in fact, is not necessary. We have ruled out the claim of tautologies (a)-(d) to exemplify i-sentences. So, the only sentences that remain, for us, to fall back upon as the samples of i-sentences are those like (e) to (g). Indeed we shall treat them as i-sentences. What, really, is wrong in that; if we remain non-committal about the exact nature of the identity they express? Bradley's view that they can make a claim to state only partial identity or identity-in-difference does not seem to come in the way, even if it is taken for true; for, identity, no matter that

10 Appearance and Reality, Oxford (1897), p.531.
11 Ibid, p.532.

it is partial or with difference, is, after all, a mode of identity.

1.3. Thus we have sorted out a few sentences as samples of i-sentences. The problem for us is one of deciding how s-sentences stand in relation to them. A priori there are at least four possibilities. They are as follows :

(1) S-sentences and i-sentences are two distinct and mutually exclusive classes of sentences, so that there is no question of one being understood in reference to the other.

(2) S-sentences and i-sentences are two logically indistinguishable classes of sentences, so that the range of one would be co-extensive with that of the other, and to understand one would mean understanding the other.

(3) A s-sentence must necessarily be understood in reference to some i-sentences and not conversely, so that i-sentences (and for that matter, identity-relation) are to be looked upon as more fundamental than s-sentences (and for that matter similarity-relation).

(4) Every i-sentence must necessarily be understood in reference to some s-sentence, and not conversely, so that s-sentences (and for that matter, similarity-relation) are to be viewed as more fundamental than i-sentences (and for that matter, identity-relation).

We shall examine the four possibilities.

1.4. (1) has indeed very little plausibility which is not hard to see. We are not aware of any philosopher who has, in actuality, seriously maintained that s-sentences and i-sentences are two mutually exclusive classes of sentences and, therefore, neither has any relevance whatever for the purpose of understanding the other. A casual glance at the range of the two types of sentences will provide us with instances which are contrary to this possible supposition. To mention just a few such instances; that will be enough to illustrate our point.

Consider, for example, the following s-sentences :

(1.4a) Glass and diamond resemble in being transparent.

(1.4b) The two sisters are alike in being talkative and extravert.

What are the components, sentential or otherwise, in terms of which (1.4a) is to be analysed? Whatever other things the components may or may not include, they must obviously include at least two sentences, namely,

(i) Glass is transparent,

and (ii) Diamond is transparent.

(i) and (ii) are the inalienable elements of (1.4a) : the latter would not be there and would be completely unintelligible without the former. But (i) and (ii) are both i-sentences. So i-sentences are not absolutely unrelated or external to g-sentences and, therefore, not also in all cases inessential or irrelevant for the interpretation of the latter. Likewise, (1.4b) also contains a number of i-sentences without which its meaning cannot be understood. These i-sentences may be taken to comprise, e.g.

(iii) Sister^1 is talkative,

(iv) Sister^1 is extravert,

(v) Sister^2 is talkative,

(vi) Sister^2 is extravert.

Thus any supposition to the effect that *s*-sentences and *i*-sentences belong to distinct sentential categories and have nothing to do with each other is palpably wrong. In *some* cases at least, as we can see, *s*-sentences presuppose *i*-sentences and are unaccountable without them. But it is to be made explicit that in saying so we do not intend to say that *s*-sentences in *all* cases do, as a matter of fact, or as a matter of necessity, refer to *i*-sentences. We are, in fact, not in a position to commit anything as regards this possibility. So it would be judicious to remain non-committal pending further enquiry, to be precise, examination of (3) hereafter.

Our rejection of the supposition that *s*-sentences and *i*-sentences are absolutely distinct and mutually exclusive may be confirmed also, conversely, by an analysis of *i*-sentences. True, we are not in a position to make any commitment to such effect as that *i*-sentences in all cases necessarily presuppose *s*-sentences as their logical components, pending consideration of (4) above. Yet there indeed are

some i-sentences which seem to involve s-sentences as their components and are, on that account, unintelligible without reference to the latter. Let us take

(1.4c) Socrates is wise,

(1.4d) Roses are red,

two examples of i-sentences, to illustrate the point. Whatever else it may or may not involve (1.4c), i.e. 'Socrates is wise', would be unintelligible unless it is taken to refer to such s-sentences as

(vii) Socrates resembles a wise man in respect of possessing wisdom,

(viii) Socrates resembles a wise man in respect of being a lover of truth,

and so on. Similarly, (1.4d), i.e. 'Roses are red', also derives its sense by referring, among other possible things, to such s-sentences as

(ix) Roses are similar to red things in respect of colour,

(x) Roses are similar to red things in respect of being pleasing to the eyes,

and so on.

Thus (1), the supposition that s-sentences and i-sentences are totally different, and are understandable in all cases without any reference whatever to each other appears wrong. But should it be taken to imply that the two classes of sentences are logically indistinguishable? Obviously not. The matter, in fact, cannot be decided pending exploration of (2) which embodies such a hypothesis.

1.5. To take up (2). Are i-sentences and s-sentences logically indistinguishable from each other? Do they really belong to one and the same class of sentences under different names? One could indeed answer affirmatively if it were, among other things, such :

(1) that, in all cases, the information which a s-sentence purports to communicate could be conveyed to us exhaustively in terms of one or more i-sentences,

or (2) conversely, that in all cases the information which an i-sentence purports to communicate could have been communicated to us exhaustively in terms of one or more s-sentences.

Neither of the two alternatives, we are afraid, will hold good. Failure of (1) may be illustrated by reference to common examples of s-sentences. Take

(1.5a) The two brothers resemble each other.

(1.5b) The two brothers resemble in being tall.

To describe in terms of i-sentences (1.5b) implies

(i) Brother (1) is tall,

and (ii) Brother (2) is tall.

(i) and (ii), then, are no doubt information which (1.5b) purports to convey. But, obviously, that is not the sufficient ground for saying that (1.5b) is logically indistinguishable from (i) and (ii). To maintain such a position one is to show that the former says nothing more than the latter. But this does not seem plausible. (1.5b) does not just say (i) and (ii) ; it purports, in addition to that, to describe the relation that holds between brother (1) and brother(2) on account of (i) and (ii) being true. Thus a s-sentence, while it may cover what its component i-sentences say, says a lot more.

Thus a s-sentence has an informative job of its own. The information it purports to convey to us is not reducible exhaustively to that contained in its component i-sentences. As a matter of fact, the informative content of a s-sentence qua s-sentence seems in a way independent of i-sentences. This becomes clear, among other things, on consideration of the example of s-sentence (1.5a), viz. 'The two brothers resemble each other'.

This s-sentence says that a certain relation of similarity holds between two individuals. This is clear by itself. But may not all these be said to depend on one or more i-sentences which this s-sentence may possibly be said to involve?

The peculiarity of this s-sentence vis-a-vis (1.5b) is that it does not spell out explicitly in what specifically the similarity consists. Now, consider those philosophers who are not inclined to look upon similarity as necessarily definable in terms of any common or identical property. For such philosophers, the s-sentence need not have to refer to

any i-sentence at all; so that, for them there is no i-sentence in terms of which the informative content of the s-sentence may be said to come in for being formulated. The informative content of the s-sentence, in their eyes, is independent of that of any possible i-sentence. The question of reducing the former to the latter does not arise.

But what about those who are prone to define similarity of things in terms of their common property? Are they not committed to admit one or more i-sentences as the component of the s-sentence, 'The two brothers resemble each other'? Well, in the s-sentence, there is no explicit reference to any particular aspect in which the brothers are said to resemble. So, naturally, the philosophers are not in a position to spell out the alleged i-sentences in concrete terms, i.e. in terms of such sentences as :

(i) Brother(1) is tall,

(ii)Brother(2) is tall,

and so on. Nonetheless, they would maintain that the s-sentence involves i-sentences of the following form:

(i) Brother(1) is x,

(ii) Brother(2) is x,

and so on. But how can these bare forms of *i*-sentences bear in any way on the informative content of *s*-sentences? Being themselves devoid of informative content, they add nothing to the informative content of the *s*-sentence; which means the *s*-sentence without them loses nothing by way of the information it purports to convey.

1.6. Thus (1) and (2) are both untenable. *S*-sentences and *i*-sentences are not two distinct or mutually exclusive classes of sentences. Nor are the two such as are, contrarily, logically indistinguishable from each other. This, however, by itself does not entail the falsity of (3) and (4), which, unlike (1) and (2), make far weaker claims about the relation of *s*-sentences and *i*-sentences. So, to examine (3) and (4).

To repeat, (3) is a hypothesis to the effect that a *s*-sentence is always to be understood in reference to an *i*-sentence (though it may not be the case that the former is logically indistinguishable from the latter).

The chief exponent of this view is F.H.Bradley. Similarity, according to Bradley, is not the same as identity, in other words, s-sentences cannot be reduced to the class of i-sentences. Nonetheless, similarity, for him, is only a "secondary relation"[12]; it is "to be based always on, partial identity,"[13]; which, obviously, means that no s-sentence, i.e. sentence reporting similarity, can be understood without reference to an i-sentence, i.e. one reporting identity. Similarity, Bradley says,

> is based always on partial sameness; and without this partial sameness, ... there is no experience of resemblance (similarity), and without this to speak of resemblance (similarity) is meaningless.[14]

Similarity (or a s-sentence), according to Bradley, presupposes identity (or an i-sentence). The former derives from the latter.

Earlier we mentioned examples of s-sentences which,

12 Ibid, p.534.
13 Collected Essays, Oxford University Press, London (1969), p.288.
14 Appearance and Reality, Oxford (1897), p.533.

although they are not logically equivalent to i-sentences, are, nonetheless, partly analysable in terms of the latter. However, the tenability or otherwise of the Bradleyan view would depend obviously on the existence or otherwise of a particular kind of s-sentences in our language. These sentences have, in fact, nothing whatever to do with i-sentences. They are understandable perfectly and completely without reference to i-sentences, in other words, the logical components of no such sentence in any case will include any i-sentences.

(1.6a) The first obvious examples of such s-sentences are of course those like

(i) The brothers resemble one another,

(ii) Games resemble one another,

and so on, which exemplify what is called 'family resemblance'. These sentences are isolated from ordinary s-sentences precisely on the ground that the similarity reported by them cannot be traced to any particular point of identity, alternately, they

do not contain any i-sentences among their analysans.

(1.6b) Secondly, following William James[15], who happens to uphold a position explicitly opposite to Bradley's, we may perhaps locate some more s-sentences of this kind. These are sentences designating simple resemblance characterising sensible qualities which form a series, e.g. colours in a colour scale, sounds in a musical scale, etc. These qualities, according to William James, may have resemblance without identity. To state the matter in James' own language :

> So here any theory which would base likeness on identity ... must fail. It is supposed perhaps, by most people, that two resembling things owe their resemblance to their absolute identity in respect of some attribute or attributes, ... This ... breaks down when we come to simple impressions.[16]

As against this, Bradley, however, maintains that the identity of the qualities in the series spoken

15 Vide The Principles of Psychology, Vol.X, Dover Publications, New York, Chap.XIII.
16 Ibid, p.532.

of by James, even though it may be undetected, is no doubt there; for otherwise there would be nothing to explain the unity of the series. To quote Bradley :

> ... a particular kind of resemblance, degrees of which make the unity of a series, seems to me to imply resemblance in and through a particular point. But, if so, with that we have a resemblance based on identity.[17]

However, in our opinion, this argument of Bradley's, seems to possess little force against William James'. In the first place, there is, as it appears to us, an element of what might be called begging the question.

The issue is whether or not resemblance is necessarily based on identity. So, whatever might be said by one to count as an argument in this context must not be such as would already construe resemblance in terms of identity, or, conversely, identity in terms of resemblance. But what Bradley does is exactly the otherwise of it : he defines similarity or resemblance in terms of identity. For plainly the notion of resemblance, as he pictures it, is a relation which is

17 Collected Essays, Oxford University Press, London (1969), p.289. (Italics ours).

unintelligible without reference to a 'particular point' of resemblance, in other words, identity.

But why are things belonging to a series, supposed by Bradley, to resemble in a 'particular point' or be identical? The answer : Well, otherwise, their unity, according to him, would remain unaccounted for. But this, as is not difficult to see, is tied to the position that the unity of a series or class is necessarily grounded on identity. But what guarantees this position? It does not have the validity of an axiom. Nor, again, is it indispensable. For, someone may well claim that the unity is based on similarity as such, or that the unity is ultimate, and so on.

(1.6c) There also are more s-sentences which may be said to be independent of i-sentences which may be said to be independent of i-sentences. These are those which happen to be incompatible with i-sentences. As a specimen we may mention the sentence, 'It looks like Smith'. It is taken from Jon Wheatley's examples of similarity-locating sentences.[18]

18 Vide "Like", Proceedings of the Aristotlean Society, 1961-62, pp.108-110.

The sentence 'It looks like Smith', in a certain context, one may say, is identity-independent, i.e. its understanding is not dependant on its referring to any i-sentences. It is rather not compatible at all with the latter. Let us illustrate this, following Wheatley.

Imagine someone, say A, who has a poor vision. Suppose that he sees a man on the road and he is not sure that it is Smith, so that he cannot say 'It is Smith'. To 'hedge a bet' he, therefore, says non-committally 'It is like Smith'. This excludes i-sentence 'It is Smith' in the sense that in certain idiomatic exchanges it becomes incompatible with 'It is Smith'. As for example, someone else, say B, who knows for certain that it is Smith will answer A by saying "Don't be silly, it is Smith".[19] Similarly, there are occasions when we use the s-sentence 'He looks like Smith' to mean 'He reminds me of Smith'. Here also the s-sentence excludes i-sentence 'He is Smith', because it is incompatible with the latter. When one is in a position to say 'He is Smith', it becomes indeed silly to say 'He looks like Smith'. For, the "logic of

19 Ibid, p.108.

'remind' is such that we violate it in saying that Smith reminds us of Smith".[20]

1.7. Thus (3), that is, the position that s-sentences are never understandable without reference to i-sentences, is rejected by us. Let us, finally, turn to examine the opposite of it, i.e. (4) which, as we know, says that i-sentences are always to be understood in terms of s-sentences.

The classical exposition of this view is found in William James' The Principles of Psychology (1980), Volume I[21], Identity, for William James, is not more basic than similarity; so that the universal dependence of s-sentences on i-sentences for their understandability, according to him, is a wrong hypothesis. The truth about the relation of similarity to identity, in other words, of s-sentences

20 Ibid, p.109.
21 Vide Dover Publications, New York, pp.530-549.

to i-sentences, is just the reverse. " ... qualitative identity", says William James, "is ... nothing but the extreme degree of likeness."[22]

"So ... any theory which would base likeness on identity, and not rather identity on likeness", James maintains, "must fail."[23] "... likeness überhaupt", he concludes, "must not be conceived as a special complication of identity, but rather that identity must be conceived as a special degree of likeness ..."[24] Formulated in the terminology of 's-sentences' and 'i-sentences' this position of James' would plainly amount to that i-sentences are always to be treated as derivative of s-sentences, alternately, that the former are completely reducible to the latter as a sub-class of it.

But this position need not concern us too seriously. It seems, in fact, to be as a much untenable

22 Ibid, p.532.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p.533.

as its opposite, i.e. (3). It is vitiated by a good number of difficulties though we need not elaborate all of them. It would perhaps be enough to mention only one which, we think, is quite fundamental. And also simple.

In (1.5) above, we mentioned a certain example of the s-sentence and compared it with i-sentences which might be said to be incorporated by it. We have found that the s-sentence has a job of its own in addition to that performed by its constituent i-sentences. In other words, the s-sentence has a larger logical or informative content than the i-sentences. Now, it is precisely in such cases, among others, that James' hypothesis will totally fail. For, obviously, to reduce the i-sentences to the s-sentences, in other words, to read s-sentences in any i-sentence, would amount to reading in the latter much more than it contains. Which means to understand an i-sentence in terms of a s-sentence would really be one way of misunderstanding it.

2. Now, to sum up our investigation so far of the relation of similarity to identity viz. that of s-sentences to i-sentences.

Similarity is a relation with peculiarities of its own. To understand it fully one is to approach it finally for itself. It is not reducible to any mode of identity, and, in that sense, it may be called ultimate also.[25]

Conversely, similarity is not also such that it may be said to assimilate in its range the different modes of identity as its variants.

Nor, again, is similarity so related to identity that the two are utterly distinct or that they completely exclude each other. They do, as a matter of fact, refer to and involve each other. And in that there is perhaps nothing unnatural; nor anything which might be inconsistent with the position as embodied in (3). For, identity and similarity happen to constitute the respective bases of the two principles which govern our knowledge of the world of things

25 However, by calling it ultimate, it should be remembered, we are not echoing a nominalist who denies causal explanation to similarity. Whether or not similarity has a cause is a very different issue. We remain non-committal as regards it.

and which also refer to and involve each other. These principles, to use the expressions of Stuart Hampshire's,[26] are : 'the principle of individuation' and 'the principle of classification'. By the former we differentiate things from one another, and by the latter we order them in classes.[26(a)]

26 Vide Thought and Action, Chatto & Windus, London (1965).

26(a) One incidental observation to avoid misunderstanding. Our analysis above of similarity and identity vis-a-vis each other has been conducted via analysis of s-sentences and i-sentences. It involves no metaphysical (factual) motive to find out the 'basic facts'. As such, there has been no occasion for us to bring in the notion of what is called 'new level', or 'directional', or 'philosophical' analysis, or to get into any consideration of the distinction of this type of analysis from what is known as 'same level' analysis. The matter, we are afraid, might have been out of place and, that way, might have the effect only of obscuring our central issues.