Chapter II

DAVID HUME ON THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

David Hume is one of the most brilliant minds the modern era has produced and at the same time the real father of positivist philosophy. The actual meaning of Hume's philosophy has repeatedly given rise to discussion. I will pass over controversial questions, however, and confine myself to summing up those of his leading ideas in the Reason-versus-Faith controversy that may be regarded as characteristically positivist.

According to Hume, criticism of the concepts of cause and substance bids us suspend all judgment concerning being as distinct from perceived qualities. The same criticism destroys irrevocably every attempt to find in nature something on basis of which to make inferences concerning a divine intelligence ordering it. Hume's writings contain a very extensive critique of religious belief. It is directed not only against all *a priori* proofs for the existence of God, but also against all arguments based on causality or the existence of a rational order in nature. The absurdity of the ontological proof is merely one particular case of the absurdity that characterizes all attempts to prove the existence of anything *a priori*, not to mention the fact that even if this proof were valid, it would not tell us anything about God's presence in the world, his activity as its creator, as guardian and source of love, and hence it would be irrelevant to those truths upon which every religion is based. Nor do proofs of God's existence derived from the order of the visible world have greater force. Whatever reasons we may advance in favour of his existence, we can never get away from the principle that the cause ought to be proportionate to the effect. Following this principle it is impossible to infer the infinite attributes of God from finite things; it could more reasonably be invoked to prove, on the basis of the world's imperfections, the imperfection of God. More generally, correct understanding of causality rules out any kind of demonstration in this domain, for a satisfactory causal inference requires us to avail ourselves of at least a certain number of constantly observable cases in which an *analogous* relation obtains. This task is impracticable, since to do this we should have to know many

worlds and the conditions under which they had been created. But the universe is one, by definition. It compasses 'all', and we cannot reason about it by analogy. That the world is 'contingent' in the sense that its existence requires the assumption of a non-contingent being, namely, one whose essence implies existence, cannot in any way be proved by experience. What reasons than are left upon which to base religious conviction? Hume ostensively resorts to the well-tested method of defence by capitulation : he says - and the theme recurs several times in his writings - that religion, though resisting all rational, *a priori,* or experimental attempts to demonstrate its truth, has its legitimate place thanks to the needs of the human heart. We may keep our faith *qua* faith, though we must renounce as hopeless all attempts to transform it into knowledge.

Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* has appeared ambiguous to several commentators. But the ambiguity is deliberate and constructive, not the product of clumsiness or confusion. There is intellectual work behind every sentence he wrote, and his writings touch on everything of importance in the intellectual life of his time. He was possessed of universal curiosity, he also believed that to determine the limits of human knowledge is a matter of practical importance, for a sense of such limits liberates us from superfluous questions, discussion of which too readily degenerates into bitter dispute and makes it impossible to bring order and clarity into every sphere of human life.

I

Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* is one of the most famous works criticizing theistic proofs. He began writing the *Dialogues* around 1761. Over the years, he revised the manuscript many times, and finally, just before his death in 1776 he made his final revisions. Finally, in 1779, the work appeared, gaining both immediate success and notoriety. It has remained one of the classic texts in discussions about the nature of evidence presented to prove the existence of God and the character of his attributes.

The *Dialogues* are patterned after Cicero's work on the same subject, *The Nature of the Gods,* in which a Stoic, an Epicurian, and a Skeptic discuss the arguments about the nature and existence of the gods. Hume begins the *Dialogues* with a letter from Pamphillus to his friend, Hermippus. Pamphillus explains that the dialogue form is most suitable for discussing theology, because the subject, on the one hand, deals with a doctrine, the being of God, that is so obvious that it hardly admits of any dispute, while on the other hand, it leads to philosophical questions that are extremely obscure and uncertain regarding the nature, attributes, and decrees and plans of God. The dialogue form, presumably, can both inculcate the "obvious truth", and explore the difficulties.

After having Philo and Cleanthes debate the merits of skepticism in Part I, Hume presents Philo and the orthodox Demea as agreeing that human reason is inadequate to comprehend divine truths. They concur in the view that there is no doubt concerning the existence of a deity, but that our natural and rational information is insufficient to justify any beliefs concerning the nature of the deity. It should be interesting to note that the Section XI of Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding,* entitled "Of a particular Providence and of a future state" is in fact a prolegomena to the *Dialogues.* However, Philo sums up the case by asserting that our ideas are all based upon experience and that we have no experience at all of divine attributes and operations. Thus, the nature of the Supreme Being is incomprehensible and mysterious.

Cleanthes immediately objects and states the theory that Hume analyses in great detail throughout the Dialogues. The information and evidence that we have about the natural world, Cleanthes insists, enable us either to infer both the existence and nature of a deity. He then presents what is called "the argument from design", an argument that had been current in both ancient and modern theological discussion, but which had become extremely popular in the form in which it was stated by Issac Newton. Look at the world, Cleanthes declares, and you will see that it is nothing but one vast machine, subdivided into

smaller machines. All of the parts are adjusted to one another, so that the whole vast complex functions harmoniously. The adaptation of means to ends through all of nature exactly resembles the adaptation which results from human design and intelligence. Since natural objects and human artifacts resemble one another, we infer by analogy, that the causes of them must also resemble one another. Hence, the author of nature must be similar to the mind of man, though he must have greater faculties, since his production is greater.

Philo proceeds to criticize the argument from design by pointing out first that the analogy is not a good one. The universe is unlike a man-made object, such as a machine or a house. Also, we discover causes only from our experience; for example, from seeing houses being built or machines being constructed. We have never seen a universe being produced, so we cannot judge if it is made analogously to human productions. We have perceived many causal processes other than human design, processes like growth, attraction, and so on. For all that we can tell from our experience, any of these may be the cause of the natural world.

Cleanthes insists, in Part III, that the similarity of the works of nature to the works of human art is self-evident and undeniable. When we examine various aspects of nature in terms of the latest scientific information, the most obvious conclusion that we come to is these aspects must be the result of design. By citing several examples, Cleanthes tries to show the immense plausibility of the argument from design. In other works such as the *Natural History of Religion* (1755), Hume always stressed the fact that a reasonable man could not help being impressed by the order and design in nature, and could not avoid coming to the conclusion that there must be some sort of intelligent orderer or designer of nature. However, Hume also insisted, as he did over and over again in the *Dialogues,* that no matter how convincing the argument may be, it is not logical, and can be challenged in many ways.

To counterattack, Hume has Demea point out another failing of the argument from

design. If we gained knowledge about God by analogy with the human mind, then we would have to conclude that the divine mind is as confused, as changeable, as subject to influence by the passions, as in man's. Such a picture of God is incompatible with that presented by traditional religions and by the famous theologians. In fact, as Philo and Demea point out in Parts IV and V, if the argument from design is accepted, then strange theology will ensue. Since man's mind is finite, by analogy so is God's mind. If God's mind is finite, he can err and be imperfect. If we have to judge God's attributes from the effects that we are aware of, what can we actually ascertain about God's nature? We cannot determine, from looking at the world, whether it represents a good achievement, as we have no standards of universe-construction by which we can judge. We cannot tell if the world that we perceive was made by one God or by many deities. If one takes the analogy involved in the argument from design seriously, all sorts of irrelevant conclusions are possible and any conclusion about the type of designer or designers is pure guesswork. "This work, for aught he [man] knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant Deity, who, afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance; it is the work only of some dependent, inferior Deity; and is the object of derison to his superiors; it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force, which it received from him..." These and all sorts of other hypotheses are all possible explanations, by means of the argument from design, of the order in the universe.

Philo, in Parts VI-VIII, maintains that other explanations can be offered to account for the order in the world besides the explanation of a designer, and that these alternatives can be shown to be at least as probable. Two theories are considered, one that order results from a generative or growth process, and the other, that order is just the chance result of the way material particles come together. Over and over again we see order develop in nature as the result of biological growth. Seeds grow into organized plants. We do not see any outside designer introduce the order. Hence if we judge solely by our experiences, one genuine

possibility is that order is an unconscious result of the process of generation. The world, for all that we can tell, generates its own order just by developing. Since every day we see reason and order arise from growth and development, as it does in children maturing, and never see organization proceeding from reason, it is a probable as well as possible hypothesis to suppose that the order in the world comes from some inner biological process in the world, rather than from some design giving cause outside it.

Even the ancient hypothesis of Epicurus, that the order in the world is due to "the fortuitous concourse of atoms" and that there is no external or internal designing or organizing force, suffices to account for the world as we know it. From our experience, it is just as probable that matter is the cause of its own motions as that mind or growth is. Also, nothing that we perceive proves that the present order of things did not simply come about by chance. Philo concludes the discussion on this point by asserting that empirical theology, based solely on information gained from experience, would be inadequate to justify acceptance of any particular hypothesis about the source or cause of order in the world, or any particular religious system about the nature of the force or forces that govern the universe.

In the last part, XII, Philo offers what has been taken as a summary of Hume's own views about religion. Everywhere in nature there is evidence of design. As our scientific information increases, we become more, rather than less, impressed by the order that exists in the universe. The basic difficulty is that of determining the cause or source of the design. The difference between the atheist and the theist, and between the skeptic and the dogmatist, on this matter, is really only a verbal one. The theist admits that the designer, if he is intelligent, is very different from a human being. The atheist admits that the original principle of order in the world bears some remote analogy to human intelligence though the degree of resemblance is indeterminable. Even a skeptic like Philo has to concede that we are compelled by nature to believe many things that we cannot prove, and one of them is that

there is in the universe order which seems to require an intelligent orderer. And the dogmatist has to admit that there are insoluble difficulties in establishing any truths in this area as well as in any other. The skeptic keeps pointing out the difficulties, while the dogmatist keeps stressing what has to be believed.

When these arguments are taken into account, Philo points out, we are still in no position to assess the moral character of the designer. The evidence from the observable world is that works of nature have a greater resemblance to our artifacts than to our benevolent good acts. Hence, we have more basis for maintaining that the natural attributes of the deity are like our own than for maintaining that his moral attributes are like human virtues. As a result Philo advocates an amoral, philosophical, and rational religion. In 1776 Hume added a final summation : "The whole of natural theology ... resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy* to human intelligence." Nothing more can be said, especially concerning the moral character of the cause or causes.

The *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* has been a central text in discussions about religious knowledge ever since its publication. It is generally recognized as presenting the most severe criticisms of the argument from design, in showing its limitations as an analogy and as a basis for reaching any fruitful conclusions about the nature of the designer of the world. Since Hume in the *Dialogues* discusses only the natural evidence for religion, some later theologians, especially Kierkegaard, have insisted that Hume's arguments only make more clear the need of faith and revelation as the sole basis of religious knowledge.

II

The *Dialogues* is in all respects Hume's maturest work and is beyond any doubt the greatest work on philosophy of religion in the English language. Kant saw a German

translation of it. The *Dialogues* says virtually all that is worth saying about the argument from design.

We may now try to indicate something of the structure of the argument and see if the alleged ambiguities are properly understood.

The protagonists are unevenly matched as they are in Plato's *Dialogues,* or in Berkeley's. The philosophical lessons have to be learned from the conversations as a whole, rather than from the contributions of one of the speakers taken singly. In this respect Demea who combines orthodoxy with a belief in *a priori* proofs of God's existence and shows no capacity for dialectic whatsoever is represented as holding views that Hume wishes to dismiss. It is in the interplay between Cleanthes and Philo, the empirical theologian and the careless skeptic that Hume's lessons are primarily to be found. Kemp Smith has suggested that for most purposes Hume holds to the arguments presented by Philo. This implies that Hume embraces the 'careless scepticism' that Philo is said to hold to. Then the overall import of the *Dialogues* is wholly negative toward Cleanthes's version of the argument from design and its empirical theism. But it is not quite obvious that it is wholly negative toward theism in all its possible versions. Philo's position undergoes changes in the final part and he concludes on a far less unorthodox note than on which it begins. Nelson Pike has recently argued for a more positive reading of this part.

Between Cleanthes and Philo it is agreed to putting aside the *a priori* arguments of speculative metaphysicians. Hume uses not Philo, but Cleanthes to refute the *a priori* arguments for God's existence that Demea expounds.

Cleanthes states his argument from design in 143 of the *Dialogue.* The argument tells us that the world is a vast machine, consisting of an infinite number of lesser machines. The machines, and their parts, are 'adjusted to each other', and show a constant 'adaptation of means to end'. Such adaptation is manifested by objects that men have produced. Since

the effects are similar, we are justified in inferring a similarity in their causes. Hence the 'author of nature' can be concluded to be an intelligence like ourselves.

Philo's criticisms include four main attacks. (1) The argument openly depends upon an analogy. Arguments that depend upon analogy are as strong or weak as the analogy on which they depend. In this case the analogy is weak because of the extravagant vagueness with which the comparison is drawn. The likeness required is between the whole universe on the one hand and human artifacts, such as houses, on the other. While some vague analogy may perhaps be said to exist, it is surely not exact enough for such a conclusion,

(2) Not only is the alleged likeness very imprecise, the comparison is of the oddest kind. It is not the comparison of one object, or set of objects, with another, but of the *whole* of the universe with certain selected *parts* of it. Such a comparison has no more force than one between the growth of hair or a leaf and the generation of a man or a tree.

(3) Even if such comparisons are permissible, it is arbitrary to pick out intelligence as the causal force within the universe, and say that it, rather than other observed causal forces, is the creative source of the universe as a whole. In fact, as Philo repeats elsewhere, if one compares the whole universe with *all* the 'machines' in the universe, and does not confine oneself to human artifacts (and on the terms of the argument one should do this), then one has to face the fact that in our experience it is only in the case of the human artifacts that the order and adaptation we find is observed to be the effect of intelligence. In other cases it is apparently the effect of non-intelligent causes, such as animal or vegetable reproduction. To deny that these are the *real* causes is to depart from experience and assume the argument's conclusion in stating the evidence.

(4) Our knowledge of causes and effects comes from our observing phenomena of one kind being succeeded regularly by phenomena of another kind. So no causal inference can have any weight unless the causes and the effects under consideration belong to *classes* of phenomena with which we are familiar. But the universe is clearly unique, and belongs to

no class. When astronomers have seemed to compare worlds, the worlds they compare are not universes, but individual planets, however refined, cannot do more than masquerade as an example of causal reasoning of a scientific kind.

We may now note a couple of other points that occur in the *Dialogues.* There is an appeal to a direct apprehension of design made by Cleanthes. He asks Philo to imagine the case of a loud and melodious voice coming from the clouds, heard by all nations, conveying a wise message. No one could reasonably hesitate before deciding that this voice is of a benevolent and powerful being. This point is not directly answered by Philo. This case occurs in Part III of the *Dialogues.* Cleanthes makes some other points worth taking note of. For example, he says that to deny the similarity of the divine mind to the human mind is to expouse atheism unknowingly, since a God with a mind that is wholly unlike ours would have no mind at all. Philo of course draws consequences of this sort of anthropomorphic understanding of God. In Part V Philo remarks that (1) an argument from an effect to a cause will only establish the existence of a cause adequate to produce that effect. If the world has to have a mind to cause it, then that mind will not to be on infinite mind, but will have all limitations consistent with its product. (2) If God's mind is like ours, why do we assume that he is not mortal as we are? Why do we assume that God has no body?

Philo points out further that heterodox cosmogonies can also be argued for. One such argument merits mentioning. Philo explores the possibility that the world as we know it has come to exist, as the Epicureans maintained, by blind Chance, through the fortuitous assemblege of atoms. The obvious difficulty about this is the *persistence* of order and predictability in our world. But this can be accounted for by the suggestion that once chance had thrown up an orderly assemblage of particles, the very order it had fortuitously introduced served to sustain itself against destructive forces. Order, in other words, may be a preserving force, but not itself be the result of anything other than accident. This is a preview of the doctrine of Natural Selection, and it has the same explanatory force as that

doctrine does. The reason we see order around us is simply that those conglomerations of particles that do not exhibit it have not survived. Cleanthes objects to this hypothesis saying that it would not explain why we find forms of adaptation that seem to be better than is required for sheer survival. Philo does not answer this objection, though his position is consistent : that one cosmic hypothesis is likely to be as strong or as weak as another, through the very vagueness of the analogies on which it depends. This does not destroy Cleanthes' hypothesis, but renders it in no way superior to an indefinite variety of other possibilities.

It is significant that Philo confesses that in spite of his freedom in argument, "no one has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the divine being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature" (DR 214). Philo speaks at ease with Cleanthes, with whom he lives "in unreserved intimacy". He goes on to say that a purpose, an intention, or design strikes everywhere, and no man can or should reject it. He declaims that a philosopher would be obstinate to doubt a supreme intelligence in the face of such evidence. Philo, in spite of his scepticism, leave us in doubt that he treats the argument from design with due respect.

Philo twice says that the theist and the atheist do not have any genuine conflict. Both times his description is this : it is evident that natural phenomena have a 'great analogy' to human artifacts, even though there are also 'considerable differences'. If we ask about their causes, we should infer that these causes resemble the causes of human artifacts in the same manner. The theist and the atheist will follow Philo thus far, but he points out, that at this point it is a matter of wholly unreasoned preference whether the original intelligence which both have arrived at is one that should be said to be greatly different from ours, though resembling us, or said to be very like us, though immensely different. The decision what to *call* this originating cause will depend on whether one is by temperament sceptical, in which case one will be reluctant to use the language of human personality, or temperamentally dogmatist, in which case one will be struck by the practical value of doing so.

III

There is a change of heart on Philo's part in the final passages of the *Dialogues*. How shall we explain it ? Commentators are divided on this issue. Kamp Smith thinks that Philo's change of heart is feigned, and that Hume's position is consistently negative. Terence Penelhum, however, does not think so. He mentions the 'suspicious covering phrases' in Philo's speeches in support of Design hypothesis. Is it not somewhat odd to hear Philo say that the hypothesis is obviously cogent and that disputes between theists and atheists are merely verbal ? One might recall Hume's similar move concerning liberty and necessity in Book II of the *Treatise*. We have referred to Nelson Pike's advocacy for a positive reading of the final part of the *Dialogues*. It must be admitted that it is no easy matter to decide just which of the positions represented in the *Dialogues* was the one held by Hume. Charles Hendel has suggested that he held all three of them, and John laird that he held one.

In the *Enquiry* (Section IV, Part I, pp.30-31) Hume makes it quite plain that the question discussed in the *Dialogues* is in principle unanswerable. In that case, James Noxon suggests that Hume should be taken to be an agnostic.

Each of these interpretations has its own merit and persuasiveness. Yet it appears that Philo, if he be taken to represent Hume, espouses one fundamental part of Cleanthes's position, namely, that the orderliness which the world exhibits does have a cause which bears some analogy to human intelligence. Is it that Hume is indecisive on the issue? Or is the agreement more social than intellectual, as Penelhum has suggested ? The irony in Hume's writing is so delicate that one is apt to overlook it, and take Philo's proclamations at face value. Philo is not, as most of us are, wholly disillusioned with the design argument, even though it is undermind formally. He may not have any theory to account for this and takes this fact seriously. And so did Kant.

It is also remarkable that Hume has abandoned his usual analytical method in the *Dialogues.* Judging by the methods employed in the *Treatise,* we should have expected him first to have considered the meaning of the word 'God'. If this word has meaning, it must, according to Hume, for some idea, and there must be some possible impression corresponding to this idea. Furthermore, if the idea of God is a simple idea, we must already have had the simple impression corresponding to it. That is to say we must have seen God. If the idea of God is a complex idea, then we have to account for how people come to believe in the existence of the impression corresponding to this complex idea. Then we should have expected Hume to give some account of the origin of our belief in the existence of God, independently of the truth of that belief. In short, we should have expected his treatment of God to follow the lines laid down in his treatment of causation, the material world, and the self. But he does not attempt this. All he does is to consider some ancient arguments for the existence of God, and expose their weaknesses, and conclude that belief in God is not rationally founded. He does this in other cases too, but there he goes on to explain how people acquire a belief which is not rationally founded, and this is the most interesting and original part of his work. One is left wondering what caused him to refrain from a full treatment on his own lines. The *Dialogues* have been said to be only a prolegomena to a full treatment on Humean lines. But is this opinion correct ?

IV

The general tendency in Hume scholarship is to focus on the negative, critical, and sceptical side of Hume's work. The *Dialogues* are not exempted. Recently scholarship has been concerned with bringing out Hume's positive contribution in the *Dialogues.*

What is the point at issue in the *Dialogues ?* Initially, the issue may be taken to have been put forward by the orthodox interlocutor and disputant, Demea : "The question is not concerning the *being,* but the *nature* of God" (D141). This position is also assented to by the

sceptic Philo and Cleanthes, who formulates the design argument and at no time disputes it. Philo asks Cleanthes, as allied in this cause with Demea, to adopt "mysticism" (D172), and defends "the adorable mysteriousness of the divine nature" (D146). This is in accord with Hume's position in the *Treatise* : "the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us" (T159), and the "ultimate cause [of impressions] is ... perfectly inexplicable by human reason"(T84). It may then be said that the extension of the notion of incomprehensibility to God is a corollary of Hume's general position that knowledge of the essence, but not of existence, of ultimate principles is impossible.

Cleanthes states the design argument in Part II (D143), and the argument is based on analogies between machines and the universe. In order for something to be a machine, it must have the following characteristics :

1. An accurate adjustment of the parts to each other.

2. An adaptation of means to ends, and more importantly,

3. The cause of the machine's ordering of parts must be external to the effect.

Cleanthes takes the third characteristic of a machine for granted, and it is a key point in his argument. He makes two points, namely, (a) the means-end relationship, and (b) the coherence of parts typify a product of design, thought, wisdom and intelligence. Since both human artifacts and the universe are characterized by such properties, their causes must be intelligent as well. Again, because both artifacts and the universe are machines they both have external causes. Hume notices that the design argument requires to prove not one but two propositions : (a) that the universe has an intelligent order, and needs an intelligent cause, and (b) that this cause must be external to the universe. It is not sufficient to prove (a). It is also necessary to prove (b) to save the argument from design. Philo points out that this task is impossible.

We have already mentioned the view suggested in the *Dialogues* that the dispute

between the theist and the atheist is merely verbal. Philo compares the operations of nature and "the structure of human thought in 218 of the *Dialogue.* The operation of nature is illustrated by the rotting of a turnip, the generation of an animal. The structure of human mind is ordered from within by a rational principle. The universe is internally structured by a rational cause. The two are compared in a qualified manner, the original principle of order in the universe is compared not to the human mind itself but rather to its economy or order. George J. Nathan puts a significant interpretation of the passage. Philo, or for that matter perhaps Hume nonetheless, prefers the phrase "mind or thought" to "a mind or intelligence". Why ? Nathan suggests that the term 'Mind' that designates the internal cause, forming both the structure of the human mind as well as the structure of all other natural organism, is rational, and it is the ultimate explanation for all order in the universe. And as such it could be so called, though this usage of the term 'Mind' is at the remotest connection with the one traditionally conceived, Nathan calls it Hume's "immanent God", immanent in the world as its structuring force and not transcendent to it as a designer. This immanent principle, Nathan explains, is responsible for the order in the universe. It is rational or intelligent in as much as it resembles the intelligently ordered objects of human artifice. Both natural and artificial objects have parts related to each other by the reciprocal relation of cause and effect, and contribute to some general purpose of the object as a whole. Nature is distinguished as the dynamic, internal structuring principle in the universe. Nathan thinks that God or Mind is such a force, and Hume intends to identify this force with Nature.

Mind, for Hume, consists of a number of ideas or perceptions united together by certain relations. Nature is the principle which arranges and structures the ideas, though it is not the ideas or perceptions themselves. It is the same principle which orders ideas in the mind and also matters in the universe. In the case of men and animals there is awareness of causal connections. The operations of Nature, like instinct, vegetation and generation of order is produced unconsciously. God or Nature is then the impersonal, immanent and rational orderer of the universe. If one so wished, one would say that in lieu of the design

argument Hume develops in the *Dialogues* a concept of the principle of order as incomprehensible, rational and internal. In arguing this point Nathan is opposing the natural belief in design and in a designing God. The two interlocators in the *Dialogues* Demea and Cleanthes expound the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God, the rationality of the Ultimate Cause in their turns. Philo seeks to prove that a principle internal to the universe is required for explaining the order, and this alone can be a necessary and sufficient condition of order. Hume's is not an argument *from* design, rather an argument *in* design.

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