

CHAPTER - II

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

1. Reality of the object in Perception

Perception is the one instrument of knowledge admitted by all schools alike.¹ The obvious conception of a contact between sense-organ and object (*indriyārthasannikarsa*) was the starting-point for the development of the doctrine, and appears in the Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā sūtras.² But the ambiguous character of the 'object' suggested doubts as to its reality at a very early period: so that the defence of the validity of perception assumes at a very early stage the form of a 'refutation of idealism'. An early statement of the refutation is fortunately preserved in Śabara's Bhāṣya on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, and forms as convenient preface to the doctrine of perception.

The *Vṛttikāra's* refutation, embodied in Śabara, falls into three parts each of which meets a distinct difficulty; and the first and third parts deal with the two difficulties which, according to Vātsyāyana's interpretation, led to the insertion into the *Nyāya-Sūtra's* definition of the two words *avyabhicārī* and *avyapadeśyam*. The second part meets the 'idealistic' argument from dreams which is dealt with in a later section of the *Nyāyasūtra* in the course of a polemic against Buddhist views.³ The three difficulties are (1) the existence of erroneous 'perceptions' side by side with true perceptions ; (2) the existence in dreams of 'perceptions' which admittedly have no basis (*nirālambana*) in an external object present to sense, and (3) the impossibility of characterizing (*vyapadiś-*) cognitions without reference to the objects cognized, so that thought without things seems empty, void, or nothing (*śūnya*)³. And, as things have already been shown to be unreal, the paradoxical conclusion emerges that everything is void and nothing (*śūnyavāda*).

FIRST DIFFICULTY

Perception and Error

The argument in Śābara is as follows. The opponent says that the means of cognition need examination, because they sometimes err (*vyabhicārāt parīkṣitavyam*). “For in as much as mother of pearl has the look of silver, thereby perception errs; and inference and the other means of cognition err because they are based on perception.” It is replied: “This is not so. That which is really perception does not err; and what errs is not perception”. The opponent asks for a definition of perception so understood, and the *Vṛttikāra* answers with an amended version of the *sūtra*: - *tatsamprayage puruṣasyendriyāṅām buddhijanma sat pratyakṣam* – “When a man’s sense-organs are in contact with that, the arising of cognition is true perception”. In other words, perception, properly so called, is cognition which has as its object the very thing with which the sense-organs is in contact (*yadviṣayakam jñānam, tenaiva samprayoga*).⁴ The opponent asks : “How is it known that in the one case (i.e. that of real perception) the organ is in contact with an object which is the object –as –cognized, while in the other case (that of error) it is in contact with something other than the object-as-cognised, while in the other case (that of error) it is in contact with something other than the object-as-cognised ? A man who apprehends silver where there is actually mother of pearl thinks that his visual organ is in contact with silver.” The reply is that it is known when a conflicting cognition arises, so that the man says to himself ‘this was a mistaken cognition and arose when the organ was actually in contact with something different – yes, but how could it be known before the conflicting cognition arose? Since at that time there was nothing to distinguish a true perception from an erroneous apprehension, - It is answered that false cognition arises when either the organ is affected by obscurities or the object by impediments to perception such as minuteness. Contact of organ and object is the cause of (true) perception, while defects affecting either factor (organ or object) are the cause of false

apprehension. – Yes, but how is it known that defects are or are not present? The answer is: “If after looking for defects carefully we do not find them we accept the experience as not impaired by defects: because there is no proof that it is so impaired.

Vātsyāyana, commenting on the word *avyābhicārī* in the definition of perception given in the *Nyāya Sūtra*⁵ answers the same objection to the validity of perception in the same way.⁶

In the summer the sun’s rays commingle with earth-warmth and become tremulous. These coming in contact with the visual organ of a person at a distance,⁷ the cognition of water arise from contact of organ and object. And (as it ‘arises from contact of organ and object’) it would turn out to be perception” (and so perception, which is supposed to be a *pramāṇa*, an instrument of *pramā* or truth, is an instrument of error).

“It is with reference to this possible objection that the word *avyābhicārī* is introduced into the definition. Cognition of ‘that’ in what is not that (*atasminis tat*) is characterized as *vyābhicārī*: while cognition of ‘that’ in what is that is *avyābhicārī*, non-erroneous. Perception is non-erroneous cognition.”⁸

The first phase of the discussion, of error in perception may be regarded as ending with the limitation of the name perception to *true* cognitions of sense. But obviously the difficulty can recur in an acuter form as soon as analysis reveals the distinction between the “bare impression of sense’ and ‘fictions of imagination’: for the application of the formula *tasmin tad iti jñānam* - ‘knowing that as that’ — is seen to be less simple than it looked at first when the ‘ideal element’ in perception is insisted on. The discussion then passes into another phase: a phase which may be said to crystallize in the term *kalpanāpodha*, “stripped of ideas,” by which Dinnāga describes pure perception.

SECOND DIFFICULTY

Perception and Dreams (Idealist Argument)

The second part of Śabara's argument is the part to which the appellation of a refutation of idealism may most appropriately be given, the analogy between perception and the baseless fabric of our dreams being in the characteristic vein of idealism.

The objector argues: "All ideas are without external objects, like dreams (*sarva eva nirālambanāḥ svapnavat pratyayāḥ*). An idea has no ground in external objects : reality (*svabhāva*) is falsely attributed to a dream ; and the waking person's apprehension of 'a post' or 'a wall', too, is no more than an idea (*pratyaya eva*) ; and therefore it, too, is not grounded in any external object (*tasmāt so 'pi nirālambanah*)".

It may be said in reply: - The waking man's apprehension of a post was perfectly certain (*supariniścita*): how shall it prove false? But the apprehension in the dream was perfectly certain in exactly the same way: prior to waking there was no difference in this respect. But there is a difference, for dreams are found to be erroneous, while error is not found in the waking cognition.

The opponent retorts that his point is that error will be found in waking cognition, seeing that the waking cognition resembles dream-cognition (*tatsāmānyāt*). If the dream-cognition is false because it is an idea (*pratyayatvāt*), the same must be true of waking-ideas. The mere fact of having an idea is enough to establish falsity, - and it is impossible to say that waking-cognition is *other than an idea*.

The answer to this is that the falsity of dream-cognitions is known from something else than from their being ideas, namely from their conflicting

character. And if it be asked 'whence comes this conflicting character?' the answer is that it comes from the impaired efficacy of the internal organ in sleep. Sleepness is the cause of the erroneous character of dream-ideas. Therefore a waking person's ideas are not erroneous (since then the internal organ is not thus impaired).

To the objection that when a person is awake, too, there may be defects in the instruments of cognition which cause falsity of ideas, the answer is that if there were such defects they would be known. As for the objection that at the time of having the dream-ideas the impairment of the internal organ is not realized, though present, the answer is that on waking the person realizes that his internal organ was overcome with sleep.

DIALECTIC OF WHOLE AND PART

The treatment of the dream-argument in the *Nyāya* is confined to four sūtras (NS IV, ii. 31-34) and forms a small part only of the general polemic directed against the Buddhist denial of reality (NS IV. ii. 4-37). The general purport of the skeptical dialectic which this passage as a whole meets is perhaps best described in a couplet found in the *Lañkāvatāra Sūtra* -

Buddhyā, vivicy amānānām svabhāvo nāvadhāryate ato nirabhilapyās te nihsvabhāvāś ca darśitāh.

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is accepted as one of the four means of knowing (*pamāṇa*) accepted in Nyāya-Logic. In fact, it has been accepted as eldest among the four means of knowing (*Pramāṇajyeṣṭha*) on account of the fact that other *pramāṇas* like inference (*anumāna*) etc. are dependent on perception. In the case of inferential cognition (*anumiti*) the perceptual knowledge of *hetu* (prabans) and the invariable relation between *hetu* (prabans) and *sādhyā* (prabandum) are essential. The knowledge attained through comparison (*upamiti*) depends on the

perceptual knowledge of similarity (*sādrśyajñāna*). Even the testimonial knowledge (*śābdajñāna*) would not be possible, and thereby no perceptual knowledge of word etc. Hence, the Indian Logicians in general and Naiyāyikas in particular have given much emphasis on the theory of perception and its primacy. Considering its importance in Indian epistemology Gautama has mentioned perception at the very beginning and afterwards the mention of inference etc. is made.

Let us concentrate on some of the definitions of perception given in various texts of the Nyāya system of Indian Philosophy.

II

Kesava Misra in his *Tarkabhāṣa* has interpreted term '*Sākṣātkāra*' as perceptual knowledge and the term '*pratyakṣa*' as the means of perceptual knowledge.⁹

According to some thinkers like Uddyotakara etc, the term '*pratyakṣa*' literally means what is related to the senses, while others like Prasāstrapāda etc. are of the view that the term '*pratyakṣa*' literally means 'knowledge which is dependent on the senses.'¹⁰

In the Nyāya system perception is defined as the knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object.¹¹

But in the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama the definition of perception is quite different from the above-mentioned one. To Gautama – perception is the knowledge which is produced out of the contact of the sense-organ with object and is not caused due to words (*avyapadeśya*), is certain (*vyavasāyāmaka*) and invariably connected with the object (*avyabhicārī*).¹²

It may be argued that the definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas is defective. Because in the case of perception there is a contact between object and sense-organ which is associated with mind which is again connected with *ātman* or self. So self and mind are vital causes of perception which cannot be

denied, but the role of self and mind is not mentioned in the above-mentioned definitions.¹³

In reply, the Naiyāyikas may argue that in the definition of perception, the special cause or the uncommon cause (*kāraṇa*) of it has been mentioned. *Kāraṇa* is defined as “*Vyāpāravat asādhāraṇakāraṇam kāraṇam*,” (i.e., the uncommon cause along with intermediary is called a *kāraṇa*). But self, mind etc. are not the uncommon causes but the common causes of perception by virtue of the fact that they are common in inference, comparison and testimony also. Hence, it is necessary to mention the characteristics of the perceptual cognition which are different from other sources of valid cognition. It is not at all necessary to mention the role of *ātman* and mind in the definition.¹⁴

According to the Naiyāyikas, sense-object-contact is the primary cause and self-mind-contact is the secondary cause of perception, which is explained with the help of the following metaphor. A person sleeps soundly; suddenly he wakes up hearing a loud sound or a violent push. Here the primary cause of his waking up is the sense-object-contact and not the conscious-guidance of his mind by the self. So sense-object-contact is primary and self-mind-contact is the secondary cause of perception.

It may be objected that the definitions of perception given in *Tarkasamgraha* and *Nyāyabhāṣya* is not applicable to God's perception and hence it suffers from the defect called *avyāpti*. God's perception not caused by sense-object-contact does not come under the purview of the above-mentioned definition.

In order to accommodate such perception the Neo-logicians have given the another new definition of perception which runs at follows: “*Jñānakāraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*” or the knowledge in which the knowledge is not the instrument is called perception.¹⁵ As inference is based on the knowledge of invariable concomitance, comparison on the knowledge of similarity, verbal testimony on the knowledge of words, they are described as

jñānakāraṇaka-jñāna (i.e. the knowledge arising out of the instrumentality of another knowledge). As perception does not depend on other knowledge, it is called *jñānakāraṇakajñāna*. This new definition has been introduced by the Neo-logicians so that God's perception may come under the purview of perception.¹⁶

Let us explain and examine the definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas. Regarding this a question may arise why the terms 'sense-organ' (*indriya*) 'object' (*artha*) and 'contact' (*sannikarṣa*) are inserted in it. The Sanskrit term '*indriya*' does not stand for sense-organ in the physiological sense. For, the definition of *indriya* is that which, not being the seat (*anāśraya*) of a manifest (*udbhūta*) specific quality (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) other than sound is the seat of that conjunction with *mānas* (*manahasamyoga*) which is the condition of cognition (*jñānakāraṇa*). According to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, the conjunction of *indriya* with *mānas* which is a quality inheres in the sense-organ as well as in the *mānas* or mind. So *indriya* is the seat (*āśraya*) of that conjunction which is one condition of perception. Again it is not the substratum (*anāśraya*) of manifest specific quality other than sound. The first part of the definition (i.e. not being the locus of the manifest specific quality other than sound – '*śabdetarodbhūtavīśeṣaguṇanāśrayatve sati*') has been given so that self or *Atman* does not come under sense-organ. Though self is the locus of the contact of the mind, the cause of knowledge, it is the locus (but not the non-locus) of the manifest specific quality other than sound. So the definition of sense-organ cannot be applied to the ear as it is the locus of sound, which is the manifest specific quality. So, the adjunct 'other than sound' (*Śabdētara*) has been inserted in the definition. As the specific qualities like colour etc. exist in eye etc. the definition of sense-organ cannot be applied to them and hence the adjunct 'manifest' (*udbhūta*) has been inserted in the definition. As the colour etc. are not manifest specific qualities, they cannot be taken into consideration.¹⁷ There are five external sense-organs and one internal sense-organ. The perceptions

caused by external sense-organs are known as olfactory (*ghrāṇaja*), the gustatory (*rāsana*), the visual (*cākṣuṣa*), the cutaneous (*spārśana*) and the auditory (*śrāṭra*) organs. Perception caused by internal sense-organ is known as *Mānasa*. Each and every sense-organ has a particular object of its own i.e. different sense-organs have different objects e.g. the function of olfactory sense-organ is to receive smell which is the object of this sense-organ etc.¹⁸

In the definition of *pratyakṣa*, the term '*artha*' is rendered as 'object' which stands for a 'real thing', but it does not stand for anything of which one may be aware without the contact of the sense-organ. So the word '*artha*' is used in the sense of only perceptible object. Perception will not be possible without a contact between such an object and the sense-organ. In the *Nyāyasūtra*, the word '*artha*' means the five qualities belonging to the five elements that are earth (*prthivī*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and empty space (*ākāśa*) from which the senses originate.¹⁹

To the Naiyāyikas, our perception is dependent on the contact of the sense-organ (*indriya*) with the object (*artha*). This contact or relation is known as '*sannikarṣa*' which is the 'operative relation'.

Gautama has included the term '*sannikarṣa*' instead of the terms '*saṁyoga*' or '*samavāya*', as *sannikarṣa* embraces both the entities (i.e. object and sense-organ).²⁰

In the *Nyāyabhāṣya* Vātsyāyana says that *indriyārthasannikarṣa* is the special cause (*kāraṇa*) of perception. And the sensible objects i.e. quality (*guṇa*), action (*kriyā*), universal (*jāti*) etc. do not have any relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) with the sense-organs. So Gautama in his *sūtra* has used the term '*sannikarṣa*' (instead of the term '*saṁyoga*') through which the other relations including *saṁyoga* are to be understood.²¹

This sense-object-contact is of six kinds.²²

First, we have a case of direct contact which consists in the conjunction (*saṁyoga*) between sense and its object. For example, in perception of a substance like a pot or a cloth, we may perceive either by visual or by tactual sense-organs. In both kinds of perception the visual sense-organ (*cakṣu*) or the tactual sense-organ (*tvak*) comes in direct conjunction (*saṁyoga*) with the substance which is the operative relation.²³

Secondly, we have a case of indirect relation (*paramparāsambandha*) which is called 'inherence in the conjoined' (*saṁyukta-samavāya*) between the sense and the sensible qualities of the object. For example, in the case of perception of a pot we cannot have direct perception of the colour of it. The relation between the sense and the colour is not directly perceived by the sense. So the relation between the sense and the quality is called 'inherence in the conjoined' (*saṁyuktasamavāya*).²⁴

Thirdly, not only the colour i.e. red colour of the pot but the universal i.e. 'redness' which inheres in the particular colour is also perceived. Here the operative relation between the sense-organ and the universal is called 'inherence inherent in the conjoined' (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*) in the case of the perception of redness of the pot, we have an indirect relation with redness which inheres in the substance 'pot'.²⁵

Fourthly, the indirect sense-object-contact is known as inherence (*samavāya*) which remains in the perception of sound by the auditory sense-organ or ear. According to the Nyāya School, the ear which is a sense-organ is the space (*ākāśa*) limited by auditory passage (*karṇaśaṣṭkulyavacchinnaṁ nabhaḥ*) and sound is a quality. As quality always exists in a substance through the relation of inherence, sound as a quality exists in the space (*ākāśa*) which is a substance through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).²⁶

Fifthly, the sense-object-contact called 'inherence in the inherent' (*samaveta-samavāya*) remains not only in the perception of sound by the ear but in the perception of 'soundness' also which inheres in the sound which again is

related to ear through the relation of inherence. The relation between soundness and ear is called *samavetasamavāya*.²⁷ These five kinds of relation remain between the sense-organs and the positive entities. Sixthly, there is the relation between the sense-organ and the negative entity which is called the relation of 'characteriser and characterised' (*viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva*). For example, 'I am seeing the absense of a jar on the ground'. According to the Naiyāyikas, an absence is as much a fact as presence. The case may be cited in a different way if we turn the sentence as 'I am seeing the ground endowed with the absence of a jar'. Here my eye which is the sense-organ is in conjunction with the ground which is characterized by the absence of a jar. So there is the operative relation between the eye as the sense-organ and 'the absence of a jar' as the object. This relation is described as the relation of 'characteriser-characterised.'²⁸

In order to accommodate absence in perception, the Naiyāyikas admit this sixth kind of sense-object-contact (relation of characteriser-characterised). According to this view, non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) and presumption (*arthāpatti*) are not separate *Pramāṇas* but they are included in perception and inference respectively. So the Naiyāyikas have to admit the sixth kind of sense-object-contact, where it is stated that absence can come in contact with the sense-organ.

According to Vātsyāyana, it is the function of a lamp to reveal the object which exists and also which does not exist. So when a man cannot see an object with the help of a lamp, he would come to the conclusion that the object is not there. If it were present there, it would have been seen with the help of the lamp. In the same way, when an object is not known with the help of a particular *Pramāṇa*, it would be treated as absent. The knowledge of the absence of an object through a particular *Pramāṇa* proves the non-existence of it. So the *Pramāṇa* (particularly perception) which reveals the existence of an object also reveals the non-existence of other object.²⁹ That is why, the Naiyāyikas do not

accept 'anupalabdhi' as a separate source of valid knowledge (*Pramāṇa*).

According to them, this non-existence of an object can be perceived through the relation called 'characteriser-characterised' (*viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva*).

In the super commentary *Nyāyabodini* on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasamgraha* three types of contact in the case of the perception of absence have been accepted. They are qualifier in the conjoined (*samyukta- viśeṣaṇa*), qualifier inherent in the conjoined (*samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa*) and qualifier inherent in the inhered conjoined object (*samyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa*). In the case of the perception of a jar, we also perceive the non-existence of clothness in it. Here the absence of clothness inheres in the jar which comes in contact (conjunction) with the eye, because in a jar there is the distinction (*bheda*) of a cloth, which is also revealed simultaneously. So there is another case of the perception of non-existence. This contact between 'the eye' as the sense-organ and 'the absence of clothness in the object' is called *samyukta- viśeṣaṇa* (i.e. conjoined qualifier).

Again, while perceiving a jarness (existing in a jar) the absence of earthness in it is also revealed. Here the absence of earthness inheres in the jarness (through the relation of inherence) which also inheres in the jar which is in conjunction with the eye. So the perception of the non-existence of earthness in jarness is possible through the contact called *samyukta-samaveta- viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier inherent in the conjoined).

Again, in the case of the perception of colourness (existing in the colour of a jar), we also perceive the non-existence of blueness in it. The absence of blueness inheres in the colourness which also inheres in the colour which again inheres in the jar. This is conjoined with the eye. So, the contact between the eye as the sense-organ and the absence of blueness as the object is called *samyukta-samaveta-samaveta- viśeṣaṇa* (i.e. qualifier inherent in that which is again inherent in the conjoined).³⁰

In the definition of perception viz., *indriyathasannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakṣam*, etc Vācaspati Mīśra is of the opinion that the term '*utpanna*' is the indicative of the fact that the sense-object-contact is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.

In the adjunct '*Indriyārthasannikarṣa*' of the definition, the term '*artha*' has been inserted after keeping some purpose in view. It is to indicate the fact that the object should be knowable in shape and size.³²

Let us consider the purpose of the inclusion of the term '*avyapadeśyam*' which means 'unnameable' or 'non-expressible' through words. According to Vātsyāyana, every individual manifestation of knowledge of an object which is produced out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object is expressed by words like colour, taste etc. The cognition which is expressed through words would be taken as produced from verbal testimony. In order to exclude this possibility the term *avyapadeśya* has been inserted in the definition. It has further been stated that the name of the perceived object is necessary when this knowledge is being communicated to others. The main purpose of the use of the term is to point out that the knowledge produced from the sense-object-contact can never be considered as verbal comprehension.³³

Some scholars think that the term *avyapadeśyam* has been inserted in the definition in order to include indeterminate perception (which is not expressed through words) under perception. When our sense-organ has got contact with a particular object, the knowledge of that object cannot be expressed at first. But the existence of such knowledge cannot be ignored, as it becomes the cause of the later knowledge endowed with name, universal etc. Hence the term *avyapadeśyam* indicates that the indeterminate perception is also a kind of perception.³⁴ Moreover, this adjunct removes the charge of impossibility of the definition given by *Bhāṛhari*.³⁵ According to *Bhāṛhari*, there is no knowledge in this world which cannot be expressed through words and hence we always come across an object qualified by words.³⁶

So far as this theory is concerned, one might think that the definition of perception unduly extends to the verbal cognition leading to the defect of impossibility, as each and every individual manifestation of knowledge is expressed through words. Through the insertion of the above-mentioned term Gautama wants to indicate that there is at least the existence of a state which is not endowed with a word, its denotation and their relation. Though the judgements like 'this is a cow' are verbalized knowledge, there is the initial sense-perception which is capable of being defined and this has become possible through insertion of the adjunct *avyapadeśya*.³⁷

Let us consider the significance of the insertion of the term *avyabhicārī* in the definition of perception. When we attain the knowledge of water in the case of mirage connected with sunrays during summer, it (i.e. the knowledge of water) would come under the purview of perception as it is produced out of the sense-object-contact. The insertion of the term *avyabhicārī* entails that such type of knowledge would not be considered as a perceptual one. The perceptual knowledge would always be non-deviated (*avyabhicārī*) and hence it is always the right cognition of an object. That is, when an object is known as such, it is called non-deviated knowledge and an object known otherwise is called deviated (*vyabhicārī*).³⁸

One may have doubt (regarding the nature of an object seen at a distance) in the form – 'Whether it is smoke or dust.' Such type of dubious knowledge would be treated as a perceptual one as it is produced from the sense-object-contact. In order to exclude such type of knowledge from perception, the term *vyāvasāyātamaka* has been inserted in the definition. The cognition which being produced from the sense-object-contact becomes certain in character is called perception.³⁹

It may be argued that doubtful cognition is produced from the contact of the self with mind and not by sense-object-contact. So, there is no necessity for incorporating the term *vyāvasāyātamaka* in the definition.

The above-mentioned view is not tenable.⁴⁰ For when one sees an object with the help of eye, one has a doubtful cognition. It is found that in all cases of perception our sense-organ is operative. The doubtful cognition would be included in perception on the basis of having the characteristic 'sense-object-contact'. In order to exclude such type of cognition from the purview of perception the adjunct '*vyavasāyātmaka*' has been inserted in the definition. To Vācaspati Miśra doubtful cognition has already been excluded from perception with the help of the term *avyabhicāri* (i.e. non-deviated) and hence the term *vyavasāyātmakam* has been inserted only to include determinate perception under the purview of perception. This point or interpretation has not been mentioned by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara as it is very simple to them and needs no explanation.⁴¹

As per the nature of the sense-object-contact which is instrumental to all perceptions, perception has been divided by the Naiyāyikas into two broad classes viz. *laukika* or normal and *alaukika* or supernormal perception. Again, normal (*laukika*), perception has been divided into six classes i.e. olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, auditory and mental perception due to six kinds of sense-organ. There is another classification of normal perception viz., *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate perception and *savikalpaka* or the determinate perception.

Though the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perceptions is generally recognized in Indian philosophy, there is difference of opinion among the different systems as to their exact nature and validity. To some thinkers, *nirvikalpaka* is not at all a case of perception; and hence all perceptions are *savikalpakas*. But according to the Naiyāyikas, *nirvikalpaka* is as much a case of perception as *savikalpaka*.

Literally *nirvikalpaka* means that in which there is no *vikalpa* and *savikalpaka* means that in which there is a *vikalpa*. Now what is to be understood by the term *vikalpa*? The term *vikalpa* means name, universal, a

quality or a relation of 'characteriser-characterised' (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*). So, *nirvikalpaka* perception is a perception which is not endowed with name, universal, quality or relation of characteriser-characterised.

In other words, *nirvikalpaka* cognition means *niṣprakāra* which means that which has no *prakāra* or qualifier. *Prakāra* denotes 'something having some character' (i.e. *viśeṣaṇa*). *Nirvikalpaka* cognition is thus a cognition whose object is not given as having some character. That is to say, an indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka* perception is a cognition which does not apprehend the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand. But in the case of determinate perception there is the apprehension of the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand. When a jar is known, there is apprehension of qualifier (i.e. jariness), qualificand (jar) and their relation (i.e. inherence). But *nirvikalpaka* cognition of a jar would be the cognition of something which is not characterized by the specific features of the jar. The object of *nirvikalpaka*-cognition would be simple entity and not anything complex. How can the reality of the *nirvikalpaka* perception be proved?

The reality of such perception is proved with the help of an inference in the following way:

The cognition of a qualified entity (*viśiṣṭa*) is due to the cognition of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). The cognition of 'cow' is the cognition of a qualified entity.

Therefore, the cognition of 'cow' is due to the cognition of a qualifier.

From the cognition 'a person possessing a stick' (*dandi puruṣah*) we have the cognition of something having the character 'with a stick'. But without the cognition of 'stick' one cannot have the cognition of 'one with a stick'. The cognition of stick is the cognition of qualifier. Here the cognition of 'one with a stick' (*viśiṣṭa*) is followed from the cognition of a 'stick' (*viśeṣaṇa*). The cognition of 'stick' again is followed from the cognition of its qualifier, i.e. 'stickness' if stick is taken as a qualified object. And the cognition of 'stickness'

is here the *nirvikalpaka* cognition. To claim that it establishes the reality of *nirvikalpaka* is to claim that the cognition of a qualifier is the cognition of something that is not itself qualified. Because if the cognition of qualifier were taken to be determinate or *savikalpaka* the defect of *infinite regress* would crop up. For example, the cognition of a qualified entity 'cow' is due to the cognition of its qualifier 'cowness'. Again the cognition of the entity 'cowness' is dependent on the cognition of 'cowness-ness' and in this way it will lead to the defect called *infinite regress*. So in order to avoid this difficulty the Naiyāyikas accept the qualifier of a qualified entity as *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate. So here the cognition of 'cowness' is cognized in itself, that is, without any further qualifier. And the actuality of *nirvikalpaka* perception is proved in this way.

III

From the above discussions the following comments may be made. First, the definition of perception given by Annambhatta is to some extent different from that given by Gautama. In the later, three terms viz., *avyapadeśyam*, *avyabhicārī* and *vyavasāyātmakam* have been included but these are not found in the former. It is perhaps the intention of Gautama to include both the definition and classification in the same *sūtra*. For the characteristic feature of a *sūtra* is to discuss all the matters in a very minimized way.⁴¹ In the *sūtra tatpūrvakamanumānam pūrvavacchāvat-sāmānyatodrṣṭaṅca* (1.1.5) the first part is the definition and in the second part the account of classification has been given. In the same way, it can be said that the first part of the *sūtra (indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam)* gives the definition of perception and the terms *avyapadeśyam* and *vyavasāyātmakam* existing in the second part indicate the two types of perception- determinate and indeterminate respectively.

The term *avyabhicārī* is given only to exclude illusory perception from perception as state earlier. But in *Tarkasamgraha* Annambhatta does not feel any necessity to include these terms, as he at first divides the valid presentative cognition into perception etc.⁴² So the question of coming of illusory perception

under purview of perception does not arise at all. But in *Nyāyabhāṣya* Vātsyāyana feels necessity to include this term as there is possibility of undue extension of the definition of perception to illusory perception.

Secondly, it is already said that absence (*abhāva*) which is already taken as a category (*padārtha*) is capable of being perceived with the help of the contact called qualifier-qualificand-relationship (*viśeṣaṇa –viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa*). This contact is, I think, of a peculiar nature, since in our daily life we do not think this in such a way. When the ground is seen without a jar, it is generally said that there is no jar on the ground (*bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti*). The verbal expression is of this type but it is not generally expressed in the form of 'qualifier and qualified'. Though there is no basic difference between these two types of expression, the earlier one directly pinpoints to the expression while the latter one indirectly expresses the experience. We generally do not take recourse to the 'qualifier-qualificand-form' when we feel the absence of money at the end of the month in the form – 'I am endowed with the absence of money' (*arthābhāvāvān aham*), but it is expressed as – 'I have no money'. The qualifier-qualificand-form is done by an individual to indicate such expression artificially as he has every right to express himself in his own way according to his own desire (*vivakṣā*). In spite of this, it is not a normal way of expression. Thirdly, the perceptuality of absence is not accepted by some schools like Advaita Vedānta etc. who admit that absence is known through a separate means of knowing called *anupalabdhi*. If we ponder over the fact how the absence of an object comes under the purview of perception or perceptual cognition, we will find that there is no contact in the sense of *Sannikarṣa*, as absence is not a positive entity (*bhāvapadārtha*). Had there been contact, it would have been a positive object. In other words, it may be asked how a negative fact becomes an *artha* (object) with which sense-organs can be connected. When the absence of a jar on the ground is known, there is the contact of the eye with the ground from which the absence is presumed. The argument runs as follows: 'Had there been a

jar on the ground, it would have been perceived', there is no jar at all. Obviously there is the role of perception in discovering the absence of a jar, but perception, one may argue, cannot reveal it directly through sense-object-contact because contact is directly related to ground from which the absence is assumed indirectly. For this reason only the Buddhists (specially Dharmakīrti) incorporate it under inference, the probans of which is *anupatabdhi* (non-apprehension) and Advaitins regard this a special source of knowledge called *anupalabdhi*.

In order to remove these difficulties the Naiyāyikas retain their original position about the perceptuality of absence by way of adducing the following arguments. To them, as soon as an individual sees the ground, he perceives the absence of a jar also simultaneously. The perceptual knowledge of "bare ground" or "empty ground" gives rise to the knowledge of the absence of a jar. Actually the knowledge or 'bare ground' incorporates the knowledge of the absence of a jar etc. Otherwise how does the awareness of 'bareness' or 'emptiness' come into being? In fact, the terms 'bare', 'empty' entails that ground is having some absence (*abhāvavat*). Without the help of such contact in the form of qualificand-qualifier relation (*viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa*) the perceptual knowledge of the absence of a jar on the ground is not possible. In our everyday life we also express the absence as 'empty pocket' i.e. money-less pocket. In these cases also we have the awareness of the qualifier-qualificand-relationship. Though we do not adopt the sophisticated way of presentation like. 'The ground is endowed with the absence of a jar' (*ghatābhāvavad bhūtalaṁ*), the same thing is expressed in another way of as *Śūnyam bhūtalaṁ* (empty ground). In this context 'śūnya' '(empty) stands for 'abhāva' (absence) of something, which is obviously a *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) of the ground, the qualificand (*viśeṣya*). To the Naiyāyikas such an awareness of qualifier-qualificand-character is spontaneously grasped by us, which becomes an *instrumental* (in the sense of *sannikarṣa*) to the perceptual awareness of a

negative fact. Hence, the Nyāyā position can be defended if this aspect of instrumentality is taken for granted.

Fourthly, some novel thoughts are found in the *Nayāyabodhini* on *Dīpikā of Tarkasamgraha*, which, I think, deserves a special mention. It may be taken as new focus on the *Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaya-bhāva* – contact which is accepted as a sixth normal contact revealing a negative fact.

Our attention is drawn towards the fact that, when we perceive a jar, there is the awareness of the absence of a cloth endowed with clothness (*paṭatva*). The Naiyāyikas generally explain ‘mutual absence’ (*anyonyābhāva*) which is otherwise called *bheda* with the example – *ghaṭo na paṭah* i.e. the jar is not a pot. To know ‘a jar’ is to know it as different from ‘non-jar’ or ‘a cloth’. The Buddhists, I think, have accepted the theory of *apoha* (the negative way of argumentation) after considering this aspect of knowledge. From this, it may be concluded that the awareness of each and every positive object amounts to the awareness of the absence of other objects excepting the particular one. Hence, the prior – knowledge of the absence of other objects is known as soon as a positive entity is known. It is quite natural that when a jar is as a positive entity is known. It is quite natural that when a jar is perceived, the absence of clothness (existing in a cloth) is known by us simultaneously. In this context the absence of clothness is known as inhered in the jar which is again connected with the eye, because in a jar there is the distinction (*bheda*) of a cloth which is also revealed simultaneously at the time of the perception of a jar. The absence of clothness inheres in the jar connected with eye, which is called *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier conjoined with something). In other words, the contact between an eye and “the absence of clothness” is called *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇa* (conjoined qualifier). In the same way, while perceiving jariness (existing in a jar) the absence of earthness in it is also revealed. To know something as jariness is to know as absence of earthness in it applying the same logic of *bheda* or *anyonyābhāva*. This awareness is acquired through the contact called *saṁyukta-*

samaveta-viśeṣaṇa (qualifier inherent in the conjoined). The perceptual awareness of earthness which is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) inhered (*samaveta*) in a jar which is connected with the eye (*samyukta*). While perceiving colourness (existing in the colour of a jar) the absence of bluness in it is also perceived with the help of the *samyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa* (i.e. qualifier inhered in an object which is again inhered in the conjoined). In a particular case 'the absence of bluness' is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) inhered (*samaveta*) in the colourness existing in colour which is again inhered (*samaveta*) in the jar connected (*samyukta*) with eye.⁴³

These three sub-types of the qualifier – qualificand-contact (*viśeṣaṇa - viśeṣya-bhāva-sannikarṣa*) is really an addition to the history of Nyāya literature. This contribution to Nyāya theory of *śānnikarṣa* done by the author of *Nyāyabodhinī* opens a new horizon in the field of Nyāya-epistemology. Though these three are different types of *viśeṣaṇa -viśeṣya-bhāva-śānnikarṣa*, the insight found in analyzing these is really praiseworthy and thought-provoking.

The justification of the insertion of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* in the definition of perception as given by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra is not at all tenable. *Vātsyāyana* opines that this term is inserted in order to exclude doubtful cognition from the purview of perception. The doubtful cognition though produced from the sense-object-contact cannot be called perception as it is not certain (*vyavasāyātmaka*). To Vācaspati Miśra doubtful cognition has already been excluded from perception with the insertion of the term *avyabhicārī* (i.e. non-deviated) and hence the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is inserted in the definition to include determinate perception (*savikalpakajñāna*) under the definition of perception. So far as my understanding goes, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is not used to exclude doubtful knowledge, because in the earlier *sūtra* '*Pratyakṣānumāno-pamānaśabdāḥ Pramāṇāni* (1.13) it is said that perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the sources of valid cognition. In the *sūtra* perception is already taken as a valid cognition and hence in the

definition an object is rightly known through the contact of the sense-organ with an object. There is no question of having deviated cognition (*vyabhicārī*) of an object and hence the term *avyabhicārī* is not at all useful in the definition. That which is expressed with the help of language is called *vyavasāyātmaka* (determinate cognition). As it is a form of valid cognition, it is always valid and hence determinate. The validity of a piece of cognition is determined by verification which is possible in the case of determinate perception only. The indeterminate perception is not verifiable as it is formless and not expressed in language. So, the question of validity cannot be determined. So the term '*vyavasāyātmaka*' should not be included in the definition on account of the fact that it is already taken as a form of *pramā*. Hence the use of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is superfluous and redundant.

Following the line of the Advaita Vedāntins Vācaspati Mīśra has said in his *Bhāmatī* commentary that, though perception is taken as eldest among the *Pramāṇas* (*Pramāṇajyeṣṭha*), it is not superior to *Āgama* i.e., testimonial knowledge so far as the validity of the statements like '*Svargakāmo yajeta*' etc. is concerned. Because, the verification of such statements is not at all possible. If the statements about some this-worldly fact or description are concerned, they are taken as perceptually true as verification is possible in such cases which have got empirical validity (*vyavahārikaprāmāṇya*).⁴⁴

The Naiyāyikas, though believer in *Śruti* or *Āgama*, do not solely depend on them for determining the validity of the statements given in *Śruti*. Hence, they are of the opinion that the validity of such statements can be determined through transcendental perception (*yogajapratyakṣa*) which is accepted as one of the supernormal means of knowing. The statements given in *Śruti* may not be taken for granted by all. Those who are non-believers of *Śruti* can be convinced through some practical means. If they practise *yoga*, they would be in a position to realize the truth of the statements through this method.⁴⁵ Hence, the primacy or supremacy of perception has to be retained according to Nyāya.

The Mīmāṃsakas say that the idea of an object is void – nothing. How so? Because we do not find any difference of presentational form (*ākāra*) between the thing and the cognition of it. It is our idea that is, the object of perception (*Pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ*), and so the supposed something in the shape of a ‘thing’ separate from the thought is nothing at all. This would be so if the thought had the form of the thing, but our thought has no form (*nirākāra*); while the external thing has form (*ākāravat*), since it is perceived as connected with external space. For perceptual cognition has the thing for its object (*arthaviṣayā hi pratyakṣabuddhiḥ*), and has not another thought for its object (*na buddhyantaraviṣaya*). For thought is momentary, instantaneous (*kṣanika*), and will not endure through the time of another thought. – The view that thought is known just in its coming to birth, and that it makes known something else, like a lamp, is wrong. For no one apprehends a thought where a thing is not apprehended. But when a thing is apprehended a man knows that there is thought, as the result of an inference. Simultaneousness (of apprehension of the thing and apprehension of the thought) is impossible in this matter. It may be objected that it is after the thought has arisen that we say ‘the thing is known’, and not when the thought has not (yet) arisen. Therefore, the thought arises first, and afterwards the thing is known. To this we reply that it is true the thought arises first; but it is not known first. For it sometimes happens that even when a thing has been apprehended we say that we have not apprehended it (*jñāto py arhaḥ san ‘ajñāta’ ity ucyate*). Nor can we apprehend the precise character (*rūpa*) of the thought without designating the thing (which is the object of the thought (*na ca arthavyapadeśam antareṇa buddheḥ rūpopalambhanam*). Therefore thought cannot be designated (*na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ*);⁴⁶ and what cannot be designated is not the object of perception. Therefore thought is not the object of perception.

Moreover, granted that in case the cognition and the object cognized were identical in form there would be no such thing as cognition, this would not

establish the non-existence of the thing, which is the object of perception (*arthasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ na (Abhāvah)*). And (as a matter of fact) the thought and the thing are not identical in form; for the thought, the existence of which we infer, is without shape or form (*anākārameva*); while the thing, which we apprehend as the object of perception (*pratyakṣam evāvagacchāmah*) has shape or form (*sākāra*). Therefore thought has the thing as its support, i.e. depends on things (*arthālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*. Cf. just below - *na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*). Moreover, the thought of a cloth has a cause restricted to the case (i.e. only arises) when threads are present (*niyatanimittāḥ tantuṣvevopadiyamanesu paṭapratyayaḥ*): if it were not so, the idea of a jar would sometimes occur, in the case of a man ~~with~~ with senses unimpaired, even when threads are present. But this does not happen. Therefore thought is not independent of things, i.e. it refers to external things (*na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*). And therefore perception is not an erroneous process (*na vyabhicarati pratyakṣam*).

The passage in which Vātsyāyana explains the word *avyapadeśyam*⁴⁷ in NS I.i.4 is closely parallel to the third part of Śabara's argument.⁴⁷

What Vātsyāyana has in mind is that there is no way of naming cognitive states except through the names of their objects. How can we distinguish the perception of colour from the perception of taste, except by saying that the former is the apprehension of colour - *rūpam iti jānīte*, - and that the latter is the apprehension of taste - *rasa iti jānīte*?

The words '*rūpa*', '*rasa*', denominate the object of the perceptions (*viṣayanāmadheya*), and not the perceptions as such. And yet thereby (*tena - viṣayanāmadheyena*) the perceptions are in fact expressed (*vyapadiśyate*).

From this, which Vātsyāyana would accept as so far a correct statement, some appear to have drawn a further conclusion which Vātsyāyana rejects, and which, as he thinks, the *sūtrakāra* intended to reject by the insertion of the word *avyapadeśyam* in his definition of perception. This conclusion is stated in the

words: *nāmadheyasābdena vyapadiśyamānam sat śābdam prasaiyate* - the perception, being expressed by a word which is the name of the object, turns out to be an affair of words – verbal⁴⁸.

The difficulty is to see just how this conclusion is justified by these premises: a difficulty due to the fact that we do not know the precise nature of the doctrine which Vātsyāyana here criticizes.⁴⁸ In what sense can it be held that the perception is ‘verbal’ on the ground that you can only express it (*vyapadis-*) by using the word which is the name of the object perceived?

The position seems intelligible. As expounded by Vātsyāyana, it starts out from the assertion that wherever there is a distinct thing, there is a distinct word for it – *yāvad artham vai nāmadheyasābdāḥ* - : and the implication of this is that if there is a supposedly distinct thing which has not distinct name, then it is not after all a distinct thing. Now cognition, as such, comes under this description, for it has no name other than the name of the object of which it is the cognition. Therefore, it is nothing distinct from the object, - or, if it can be at all distinguished, then thoughts are just the names themselves as distinguished from the things. There are things: and there are names of things: but there is nothing else, - no third distinct entity ‘cognition’.

Vātsyāyana replies that the distinct status of the apprehension as such is shown by the fact that there is apprehension of the object before the union of word and thing has come into play (*anupayakte śabdārthasambandhe*): and even after the naming has taken place the same remains true – the cognition remains distinct from the names. This is what the *sūtrakāra* asserts by the word *avyapadeśya*, - i.e. distinct from names’. When it is necessary to speak of the cognition as such – as it is for practical convenience (*vyarahāra*) – we can of course indicate what particular cognition we refer to : the ‘indication’ (*vyapadeśa*) being made by the name of the object followed (in Sanskrit) by the particle *iti*. The idea is not the object; but it can be indicated as being of the object.

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13. "Na tahrīdānīmīdam bhavati? ātmā mānasā samyujiyate, mana indriyenendriyamārthena 'iti,'" – *Nyāyabhāṣya* on 1.1.4.
14. Nedaṅ kāranāvadhāranametāvat pratyakṣakāranamiti kintu viśiṣṭakāranavacanamiti, yat pratyakṣajñānasya viśiṣṭakāranam

taducyate, yattu samānamanumānādijñānasya na tannivartata iti”
Nyāyabhāṣya on 1.1.4.

15. Íśvara-pratyakṣantu na lakṣyaṁ, indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam
 avyapade-śya mavyashicāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣamiti sūtra
 tathaiivoktatvāt” *Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse – 52.
16. Athavā jñānakaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam, Anumitau Vyāpti-jñānasya
 upamitau sādṛśya-jñānasya, śāddavodhe pada-jñānasya, smṛtāvanubha-
 vasya ca karaṇatvāt tatra tatra nātivyaptih idam lakṣaṇamīśvara –
 pratyakṣa-śadhāranam” - *Siddhanatamuktāvali*, on verse 52.
17. Śabdetarobhūtaviśeṣaguṇānāśrayatve sati jñānakāraṇamaṇṣam – yogā-
 śravatvam indriyatvam.” *Tarkasaṁgraha – Dīpika* P-VII (Gopinath
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 śabdetareti, viśeṣaguṇasya rūpādeścakṣurādāvapi sattavāt – Ubhūteṭi”. –
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27. "Rūpatvasāmānyapratyakṣe saṁyuktasamavetasamavāyah sannikarṣaḥ,
 cakṣuhsaṁyukte ghatarūpaṁ samavetaṁ, tatarūpatvasya samavāyāt." –
Ibid.
28. "Srotrena śabdaśātkāre samavāyah sannikarṣaḥ." – *Ibid.*
29. "Sabdatvaśātkāre samavetasamavāyah sannikarṣaḥ
 śrotrasamavetaśābde śabdatvā syasamavāyāt", – *Ibid.*
30. "Abhāvapratyakṣe viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāvah sannikarṣaḥ ;
 ghatabhāvadbhūtaṁ ityatra cakṣuḥ saṁyukte bhūtale ghātabhāvasya
 viśeṣanatvāt." – *Ibid.*
31. "Yathā darśakena dipena dr̥ṣṭye gr̥hyamāne tadiva yanna gr̥hyate tannāsti
 yadyabhaviṣyadidamiva vyajñāsyatañānābhāvānnāstīti, evaṁ
 pramāṇena sati gr̥hyamāne tadiva yanna gr̥hyate tannāsti
 yadyabhaviṣyadidamiva vyajñāsyata vijñānābhānnāstīti, Tadyeḍam sataḥ
 prakāśakaṁ pramāṇamasadapi prakāśayatīti", – *Nyāyabhāṣya* –
 Introduction to *Sūtra* no. 1.1.1.
32. "Pañcasannikarṣeṣu, madhye saṁyogasthāne saṁyuktapadaṁ ghatayitvā
 samavāyāsthāne samavetapadaṁ ghatayitvā abhāvasthale nirvāhyam
 Tathāki Dravyādhikaranakābhāvapratyakṣe saṁyukta-viśeṣanatā.

Dravyasamavetasamavetādhikaranakābhāvapratyakṣe samyuktasamaveta-
samavetaviśeṣaṇatā ca sannikarṣaḥ. Tatra ghaṭe patatvābhavaḥ samyukta-
samveta viśeṣantaya grhyate. Ghaṭasamaveta-ghatavadau
prthivītvābhavaḥ samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā grhyate.
Ghaṭasamaveta-samaveta-rūpatvādu ānīlatvābhāvasca samyukta-
samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā grhyate iti saṁkṣepaḥ” *Nyāyabodhini*
on Tarkasamgraha p. 46, Ed. (Satkari Sarma bangīya), Chowkhamba,
1976.

33. *Nyāyavārtikātparyatīka* on 1.1.4.

34. C.D.Bijlwan (Ed.): *Indian Theory of Knowledge*, p. 70-71, Heritage, New
Delhi.

35. “Tatredamindriyārthasannikarṣādutautpannamarthajñānaṁ rūpamiti vā
rasa ityevaṁ vā bhavati rūparasāśabdāśca viśayanāmadheyam. Tena
vyapadiśyate jñānaṁ rūpamiti jānīte rasa iti jānīte. Nāmadheyaśabdena
vyapadiśyamānaṁ sacchābdam prasajyate ata āha avyapadeśyamiti”.
Nyāyabhāṣya, on 1.14.

36. “Yat prathamāksasannipātasamaye eva jñānāmanullikhitaśabdakam
śabdānusmarane hetubhūtamupajāyate tadaśabdam, Aśabdāvachchinna-
viśayamavyapadeśyamindriyārthasannikarṣaika-karanamavikalpaṁ
pratyakṣam”. – *Nyāyamañjarī* p. 76 (Chowkhamba), 1971 Ed.
Sūryanārāyaṇa Śuklā, Henceforth, *Nyāyamañjarī*.

37. "Tasmāt pratyakṣasya lakṣyaṣyāsadbhāvāt kasyedem lakṣaṇamupkrāntam itī asambhavadōṣamāsāṅkyāha – avyapadeśyamiti" – *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 76.
38. "Tathāha Varṭharīḥ – Na so'stipratyayo loke yāḥ śabdānugamādṛte anuviddhamiva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena grhyate – *Ibid.*
39. "Tasmād gaurityādijñānaṁ Śabdātve' pi tathāvidhasya jñānasya lakṣyaṣya sadhbāvāna vyartham lakṣaṇamityevamasambhavadōṣanirākaraṇarthamavyapadeśyamiti - *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 76. "Grīṣme marīcayo bhaumenōṣmaṇā samsṛtāḥ spandamānāḥ dūrasthasya cakṣusā Sannikṛśyante, tatrendriyārthasannikarṣādudakamiti jñānamutpadyate. Tacca pratyakṣam prasajyata ityata āha 'avyabhicāriti. Yadataṣmimstaditi tadvyabhicāri, Yattu transmimstaditi tadavyabhicāri pratyakṣamiti." – *Nyāyabhāṣya* on Sūtra – 1.1.4.
40. "Svalpākṣaramasandigdhamiḥ sāravad viśvato mukham. Astobhamanavadyaṅce sūtram sūtravido viduḥ". – Śrīmohan-Tarkatīrtha : *Bhāmatī*, Introduction, p. 44, 1973.
41. "Yathārthānubhavaścaturvidhah Pratyakṣānumityupamitiśābdabhedāt" *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 35.
42. *Nyāyabodhini* on *Tarkasaṅgraha*, p. 46.
43. "Na hyāgamajñānaṁ samvyavahārikam pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyamupahanti yena kāraṇābhāvāna bhavet api tu tāttvikam. Na ca tat tasyotpādakam atāttvikapramāṇebhyo'pi śamvyavahārikam pramāṇebhyastattvajñānot-pattidarsānāt." *Bhāmatī* on *Adhyāśabhāṣya*: Ed by Śrīmohan Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1973, pp. 20-21.

44. *Bhāsāpariccheda Verse no. 66. Siddhāntamuktāvali* on the same.
45. With this cf. *avyapadeśyam* in NS I.i.4 and particularly Vātsyāyana's exposition, p. 12.1.3 to 14.1.6. The passages in Śābara and Vātsyāyana explain each other.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Vācaspati Miśra does violence to the *Sūtra and Bhāṣya* in his anxiety to father on the early authorities of the Naiyāyika school 'Trilocana's' doctrine of two kinds of perception – perception without qualifications (*nirvikalpaka*) and perception with qualifications (*savikalpaka*). He interprets the *sūtra* as mentioning both kinds – *nirvikalpaka* in the word *avyapadeśya*, and *savikalpaka* in the word *vyavasāyātmaka*. The doctrine however is later, and seems to have arisen in answer to the Buddhist view of perception as *kalpanāpodha*, i.e. the bare impression of sense divested of all additions made by the understanding. That this *Bauddha* interpretation of *avyapadeśya* as *kalpanāpodha* is a not unnatural interpretation is evidenced by Dr. Jhā. He says "it would seem that the *Bauddha* definition of perception as *kalpanāpodham abhrāntam* were a true rendering of Vātsyāyana's view ". But it seems to me that Vātsyāyana's view (which I believe represents the probable meaning of the *sūtra*) is different both from the *Bauddha* view and from Vācaspati's.
48. Vācaspati appears to connect it with the philosophical grammarians and quotes in this connection two passages from Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadiya*. I. 124 and I. 126 *Nyāyavartikātparyatīkā*, p. 83.