The Phenomenological Movement

Ini : What Phenomenology Is

1

The central aim of the present dissertation is to criticize phenomenology in general and Husserlian phenomenology in particular. The other aim of this dissertation is an attempt at an appreciation of the same. Both the aims call for a brief story of the phenomenological movement for a better understanding of the philosophical situation created by phenomenology in order to well appreciate the criticisms and the appreciations hereinafter put. Hence this introductory chapter : 'The Phenomenological Movement'.

But before all that we must strive for an initial clarity about the term 'phenomenology' which is being used with diverse connotations. Some of the explanations of the term 'phenomenology' are as follows:

i. Encyclopaedia Britanica: "a term used in philosophy and psychology to denote a study of the varying forms in which something appears or is manifested, as opposed to studies of causal origins, real constitution, significance, etc., which go beyond what is apparent" (1).

ii. Anthony Quinton in 20th Century: "In course of time, indeed, and to the distress of his followers, Husserl came to think of phenomenology not merely as a method of philosophical inquiry into the nature of the mind's objects and activities but as the basis of a new kind of idealistic metaphysics. In other

words, he erected a system based on theoretical assumptions — the very opposite of his original intention to establish a means of objective inquiry" (2).

iii. Encyclopedia of Psychology: It is "The theory of phenomena, or appearances. The phenomenological approach is to examine an object from the standpoint of its appearance. This may be appearance in the external world of the senses, apprehensibility in the experimental sphere, or even the symbolic visual representation of mental structures or processes. The word 'phenomenology' is used in a narrow and a wider sense. In the narrow sense, the word stands for a philosophico-psychological method initiated by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) that has spread significantly in philosophy and science" (3).

iv. Dagobert D. Runes in his The Dictionary of Philosophy: "Since the middle of the Eighteenth Century, 'Phänomenologie' like its English equivalent, has been a name for several disciplines, an expression for various concepts. Lambert, in his Nine Organon (1764), attached the name 'Phänomenologie' to the theory of appearances fundamental to all empirical knowledge. Kant adopted the word to express a similar though more restricted sense in his Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft (1786). On the other hand, in Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) the same word expresses a radically different concept. A precise counterpart of Hegel's title was employed by Hamilton to express yet another meaning. In 'The Divisions of Philosophy' (Lectures on

Metaphysics, 1858) after stating that 'philosophy properly so called' is 'conversant about Mind' he went on to say : 'If we consider the mind merely with the view of observing and generalising the various phenomena it reveals, ... we have ... one department of mental science, and this we may call the Phenomenology of Mind'. Similarly Moritz Lazarus, in his Leben der Seele (1856-57), distinguished Phanomenologie from Psychologie : The former describes the phenomena of mental life, the latter seeks their causal explanation" (4).

v. William L. Reese in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion : "In general, phenomenology is an approach to philosophy centering on analysis of the phenomena which flood man's awareness" (5).

vi. James Drever in his A Dictionary of Psychology: Phenomenology is "the systematic investigation of conscious experience as experience, regarded as the true method of approach to psychology" (6).

vii. Understanding Human Behavior (24 Vols.) : Phenomenology is "The study of mental processes and the way in which the brain interprets and understands sensations from the external world"(7).

viii. Cofer and Appley in their Motivation: Theory and Research : "Phenomenology refers usually to a way of looking at experience" (8).

ix. William Ernest Hocking : "The 'phenomenology', proposed by Edmund Husserl in Germany, invites us to distinguish in

experience the 'that' and the 'what', i.e., the particular and the general, or the existential and the conceptual; and to discard from attention the existential element in order to note with precision the meaning or intention of the concepts there involved"(9).

x. Edwin G. Boring in his A History of Experimental Psychology: "It (phenomenology) means the description of immediate experience, with as little scientific bias as possible" (10).

xi. Norman L. Munn, et al, in their Introduction to Psychology: "Psychologists have maintained an interest in the subjective aspects of human life, but later investigations were concerned with describing precisely various kinds of experiences without analysing them into smaller or simpler elements. To-day, the study of experience is known as Phenomenology" (11).

xii. Brian M. Foss in his New Horizons in Psychology: "Laymen, and I think scientists in other disciplines too, tend to think of psychology as the study of human experience, its development and vicissitudes, so that the psychology of visual perception is expected to be concerned with discussing immediate perceptual experience. This view is represented in psychology too, by the so-called phenomenological approach, an approach that has contributed very greatly to the development of scientific psychology" (12).

xiii. James M. Edie in the Introduction to Pierre Thivenaz's What is Phenomenology: "Phenomenology is neither a science of

objects nor a science of the subject; it is a science of experience. It does not concentrate exclusively on either the objects of experience or on the subject of experience, but on the point of contact where being and consciousness meet. It is therefore, a study of consciousness as intentional, as directed towards objects, as living in an intentionally constituted world. The subject (noesis) and the object (noema) are studied in their strict correlativity on each level of experience (perception, imagination, categorical thought, etc.). Such a study is transcendental in the sense that it aims at disclosing the structure of consciousness as consciousness, of experience as experience; it means to unveil the noetic-noematic relationship which we call consciousness of ... In short, phenomenology is a study of phenomena. As such it is more fundamental study than logic or psychology; it goes to the fundamental structures of conscious experience which constitute the very conditions of the possibility of any conscious experience whatsoever" (13).

xiv. Quentin Lauer in his Phenomenology : Its Genesis and Prospect: "The consciousness with which the phenomenologist is ... concerned, is not consciousness as a psychic function, in the way it is, for example, to the experimental psychologist. He is concerned with consciousness as a kind of being which things exercise, the only kind of being directly available to the investigator. Thus, to him, consciousness is best expressed by the German

word Bewusstsein, which means the kind of being an object of knowledge has in being known. This is necessarily an identication of being and being known, but it is an assertion that the only key we have to being is in experiencing its being-known" (14).

xv. Peter Koestenbaum in Religion in Philosophical and Cultural Perspective edited by J.C. Weaver and M. Horosz : "Phenomenology contends that ordinary categories of description are philosophically unwarranted ..., since they involve a plethora of assumptions about the nature of man, the nature of the world, the nature of emotions, and the like.... The key to understanding art lies in the realization that emotions and moods are projected into the world and thereby change the appearance of the world. But the experience of the world thus transfigured does not automatically seperate itself into mood and fact. ... phenomenology avoids unwarranted assumptions entailed by these inarticulate world views by describing experience —— experience with which knowledge about anything must begin —— so it truly manifest itself. Phenomenology thus develops its own categories of description" (15).

2

Let us now request Husserl himself to introduce his phenomenology. In the Introduction to his Ideas he wrote : "Pure phenomenology, to which we are here seeking the way, whose unique position in regard to all other sciences we wish to make clear, and to set forth as the most fundamental region of philosophy, is an

essentially new science, which in virtue of its own governing peculiarity lies far removed from our ordinary thinking, and has not until our own day therefore shown an impulse to develop. It calls itself a science of 'phenomena'. Other sciences, long known to us, also treat of phenomena. Thus one hears psychology referred to as a science of psychical, and natural science as a science of psychical 'appearances' or phenomena. So in history we hear speak occasionally of historical, and in the cultural sciences of cultural phenomena, and similarly for all sciences that deal with realities. How differently as the 'phenomenon' may be used in such contexts, and diverse as they may be the meanings which it bears, it is certain that phenomenology also deals with all these 'phenomena' and all their meanings, but from a quite different point of view, the effect of which is to modify in a determinate way all the meanings which the term bears in the old-established sciences. Only as thus modified do these meanings enter the phenomenological sphere" (16). Only two pages after, in the same opus, he again hastens to say that phenomenology is essentially an eidetic science : "... <u>pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a science of essential Being</u> (as 'eidetic' science); a science which aims exclusively at establishing "knowledge of essences" (<u>Wesenserkenntnis</u>) and <u>absolutely no facts</u>" (17). Husserl was determined to establish a rigorous science under the rubric of phenomenology ___ a science which will be the common foundation of all other sciences.

It was Husserl who for the first time adequately realized the profoundity of the epistemological problem. Descartes had an inkling of it and so he began with cogito, but he did not inspect it beforehand. Once the cogito is vitiated, the whole philosophy falls through. In fact, this is the cause why philosophers disagree so much among themselves, and also why they fail in their handling of the philosophical problems. Certainty about the epistemological problems is a sine qua non of a sound philosophy. To steer clear of the iceberg of the epistemological problem, Descartes adopted the method of doubt : nothing is to be admitted as true until its non-existence is impossible to be proved. Nevertheless he came out a cropper because he took the cogito at face value and did not question the purity of it. Even Kant was no better than Descartes. He assumed two constituting factors of knowledge —— one coming from the object, from the given, and the others issuing forth from the mind. The former is the sensibilities and the latter are the categories of understanding. Kant's categories correspond with the cogito of Descartes. Like Descartes as regards his cogito, Kant did not think it necessary to ascertain the nature of the categories, to wit the nature of the understanding. He did not ask himself if the understanding was pure or no.

3

Now, what do we mean by the purity of the cogito? Our ordinary cognition is not free from presuppositions. Suppose,

for example, that I get the sensation of a certain red patch. I have not yet been able to determine the nature of the source of my sensation. Nevertheless, I am certain about a few things *a priori* about this red patch. For instance, I know that this red patch must be in a certain space and in a certain time, that it must be independent of my experience of it, that it must belong to a certain thing, etc. All these are my presuppositions about the 'object' which is the red patch. We accost reality with all these or such other presuppositions. Husserl calls this our habit of having had presuppositions in our epistemological confrontation with the world our natural attitude. If I endeavour to know reality with all these presuppositions in my mind, my committing of errors about the knowledge of the world is only consequential, because my cogito is already vitiated by the presuppositions. Reality is, as if, screened off us by the presuppositions. Phenomenology here comes to our succour ___ it helps us in clearing through the presuppositions and get at the 'raw' experience ___ the phenomenon. Phenomenology, qua phenomenology, is not interested in the nature of facts; it is interested in the heart of the matter ___ the Essential Being. But, before knowing the Essential Being, we must, first and foremost, understand the nature of the cogito or consciousness (in Husserl). To Husserl, consciousness is a "set of tentacles attached to objects. Hence there can be no such thing as a study of consciousness as such, detached from the objects to which it is fixed. To study consciousness is to study awareness of something beyond consciousness, which inserts itself into and becomes part of conscious processes. This description of

consciousness of objects, Husserl calls 'phenomenology' " (18). And by purity of consciousness we mean the presuppositionless consciousness.

About the objective of phenomenology Husserl very plainly said that "We are accustomed to concentrate upon the matters, thoughts, and values of the moment, and not upon the psychical 'act of experience' in which these are apprehended. This 'act' is revealed by a 'reflection'; and a reflection can be practised on every experience. Instead of the matters themselves, the values, goals, utilities, etc., we regard the subjective experiences in which these 'appear' " (18a). And, following Husserl, Jerome D. Shaffer said : "If I reflect properly on my states of consciousness (and Husserl offers a number of rules to be followed in doing this), I will be 'learning thus what is the nature of the psychical, and comprehending the being of the soul', and when I follow this procedure to the very end, 'I am free to face at least with the ultimate structure of consciousness' " (18b).

4

Peter Koestenbaum finds three fundamental features in phenomenology.

1, "In brief, phenomenology holds that all knowledge about the world must being, in the last analysis, with our highly personal experience". (19)

ii, "True to the spirit of radical empiricism, phenomenology concentrates on descriptions of experience" (20).

iii, "Phenomenology contends that ordinary categories of description are philosophically unwarranted and consequently misleading...." (21)

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Phenomenology is essentially a descriptive science concerned mainly with epistemological problems. We may perhaps very briefly discuss the four fundamental tenets of phenomenology for a first-hand acquaintance with it. This will help us criticize and appreciate our candidate — phenomenology.

i, Phenomenological Epoché : Husserl learned from his teacher, Brentano, that all lived experiences are intentional. Our everyday consciousness of the manifold is always coloured by a host of attitudes, beliefs, prejudices, theories, aptitudes, etc. "The phenomenological epoche is a process of setting aside or 'bracketing' all beliefs, theories and attitudes about the world and oneself that are normally taken for granted. One neither affairms nor denies the natural attitude; it is simply brought into question. Since the belief in the independent existence of the world is a component of the natural attitude, it too comes into question. This epoché prepares consciousness for the reception of apodictic truth" (22).

ii, Eidetic Reduction : "After the method of epoché reduced lived-experience a to the pure transcendental subject and its intention —— the stream of cogitationes [a,] the philosopher using this phenomenological method subjects some aspect of lived-experience (reality) to an eidetic reduction. The eidetic reduction is designed by Husserl to make evident the invariant, essential characteristics of any phenomenon. The philosopher in the transcendental attitude produced by the epoché investigates whatever phenomenon from various perspectives; e.g. perception, memory, and fantasy. Fantasy is especially helpful in this investigation, for it varies the phenomenon in question into 'pure' possibilities while no regard is given to the ontological status of the possibilities. In this eidetic analysis, the invariant characteristics of the object in question will become intuitively and apodictically evident as the various different perspectives are taken in examining it. Whatever cannot be varied belongs essentially to the object in question; it alone is the objects, 'eidos' " (23).

iii, The Problem of Constitution: The phenomenological epoché reveals to us that the only being which is 'absolute' and which is apodictically known is the transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity or consciousness knows the world as phenomenal or relative to this consciousness. But in our natural attitude we know the world as objectively existing —— independent of us. How is this possible?

Husserl, in fact, could hardly answer this question satisfactorily. In his Cartesian Meditations he wrote that as a rigorous science absolutely grounded, philosophy must be "first a self-explication in the pregnant sense, showing systematically how the ego constitutes himself ... as existent in himself and for himself; then, secondly, a self-explication in the broadened sense, which goes on from there to show how ... the ego likewise constitutes himself something 'other', something 'objective', and thus constitutes everything without exception that ever has for him, in the Ego, existential status as non-ego" (24).

iv. Transcendental Idealism: Husserl categorically identified the task of philosophy as the explication of the transcendental subjectivity and its constitutive acts. In this identifying the role of philosophy, Husserl determined the status of philosophy as transcendental idealism.

6

Perry in his Philosophy of the Recent Past has shown that Husserl held three factors in consciousness ---- act, object and content. Following Perry, Prof. D.M.Datta wrote: "Describing the phenomenon of consciousness as an apprehension of meanings he (Husserl) distinguishes the following six factors : (1) The 'I' who means, (2) his meaningful attitude, (3) the datum with which he means, (4) the way (no sign or revelation of object) in which he takes the datum, (5) he must mean something (the sense of his meaning) and (6) he must mean this something (the object)" (25).

7

"One famous example [of phenomenological method] is William James' conception of the stream of consciousness, in which he emphasized the continuity of personal experience by describing it as a flowing stream. ... Another example is Sigmund Freud's extensive investigations of anxiety, where he postulated varieties of this emotional state such as neurotic anxiety, which arises without objective justification, primal anxiety, presumed to occur at birth through separation from the mother, and realistic anxiety, where there is a tangible cause" (26).

Phil : Phenomenology & Psychology

8

Phenomenology is very easy to be confused with two apparently identical subjects, i.e, psychology and phenomenalism and as such we should be on our guard against any possible substitution or proxy. The distinction between phenomenology and psychology may be summarized as follows:

i, Phenomenology is an eidetic science, while psychology is an objective science.

ii, Phenomenology is concerned with the description of phenomenon. It is a descriptive science. But psychology is after the cause-effect explanation of human behaviour.

iii, Psychology, as all other sciences do, has to take certain axioms. Phenomenology strives to understand and describe these axioms.

iv, Phenomenology is fundamental to psychology.

v, Phenomenology is transcendental, while psychology is immanental.

Moritz Lazarus in his Leben der Seele (1856-57), distinguished between phenomenology and psychology. According to him, Phenomenology describes the phenomena of mental life, while Psychology explains the causal relations between mental phenomena or between mental and physical phenomena (vide Dictionary of Philosophy by Runes; Entry : Phenomenology).

E.iii : Phenomenology & Phenomenalism

9

The word 'phenomenon' has a long history. It must not be confused with Phäinomena, a poem of 1,154 hexameter by Aratus of Soli written about 275 B.C. (27) "In Modern philosophy the word is sometimes used for what is immediately apprehended by the senses before any judgment takes place; but it has never become a technical term, most philosophers preferring more artificial words such as 'sense datum' (hence such terms as phenomenalism and phenomenology). In English versions of Kant the word is often used to translate Erscheinung ('appearance') Kant's word for the

immediate object of sensory intuition, the bare datum which becomes an object only when interpreted through the categories of substance and cause. Kant himself uses it for the object interpreted through the categories as opposed to the noumenon, or thing-in-itself, to which the categories do not apply" (28). Encyclopaedia Britannica wrote about phenomenalism: It is "a philosophical theory of perception and the external world. Its essential tenet is that propositions about material objects are reducible to propositions about actual and possible sensations, or sense-data, or appearances. According to the phenomenalists, a material object is not a mysterious something 'behind' the appearances which we experience in sensation. If it were, the material world would be unknowable; indeed the term 'matter' itself would be unintelligible unless it could somehow be defined by reference to sense experiences. In a phenomenalist analysis of material-object propositions, it is of course essential to mention possible sensations and not merely actual ones. The wall which someone sees just in front of him is hard and rough, though he is not at the moment touching it. But it is true that, if he were to stretch out his hand, he would experience tactual sensations of hardness and roughness. These tactual sensations are possible, though not at the moment actual. Moreover, material objects continue to exist at times when they are not being observed at all. ... In this way, the phenomenalist claims, we can give an 'empirical cash-value' to the concept of matter, by analyzing it in terms of sensations (29).

However, Husserl was careful enough to distinguish phenomenology from phenomenalism. The chief differences between the two may be summarized as follows:

i, Phenomenalism studies phenomena as real, while phenomenology is concerned with the constitution of phenomena.

ii, Phenomenalism takes phenomena passively, but phenomenology says that phenomena are created by the intentionality of the subject.

iii, Phenomenology has got its own methodology which is quite different from that of phenomenalism.

B) : Historical Background : Science

10

No science can grow out of a vacuum. The history of the development of human thought shows it as a continuous process. For the same reason (as phenomenology is a science) we must not be outlandish in assuming a background for phenomenology. In my opinion, the historical background of phenomenology may be divided into three distinct streams —— that of science, of psychology, and, lastly, of philosophy.

Though phenomenology is a quite distinct discipline away from phenomenalism, yet it is not unjustifiable to say that

phenomenalism contributed towards the origination of phenomenology. Of course phenomenology had had its birth mainly in the emotional antagonism nursed by Husserl against psychologism. But Husserl was also aware of the lacunae inherent in the assumptions of phenomenalism. And in his effort to eradicate all these, he subsequently developed what he himself christened as phenomenology. Phenomenalism, therefore, contributed towards the origination of phenomenology only negatively, as did psychologism.

11

Phenomenalism, really, has a long history. Patricius was a phenomenalist. "In his Pancosmia of 1591 he advocated the idea that for scientific purposes we should cease to make the distinction between what the planets really do, and what they seem to do" (30). George Berkeley also was a phenomenalist : "Berkeley's philosophy takes its start from a denial of the notion that our perception of an object is something different from the object itself, perhaps just an idea excited in us by an object we do not really see" (31). Sir Benjamin Brodie, professor of chemistry at Oxford, also can be called a phenomenalist. "What, he asked, were the characteristic chemical phenomena? There are operations by which the substances are prepared, and the relative weights they have produced. Chemical reactions are really weight distribution changes brought about by chemical operations. Considered strictly from the point of view of the phenomena, a chemical element is a simple weight, that is a kind of space-occupant which always, throughout all chemical operations, preserves the same weight" (32).

Sir James Jeans, in his The New Background of Science, speaks of the new attitude of science towards matter. He asks the imaginary physicist : "What is this object which we call a chair?" and he receives the answer : "He tells us in the first place that all sense-impressions which come to us from the external world originate in what he calls 'matter'. This cannot of itself make a direct impression on our senses; such impressions are only made by physical 'events' occurring in matter. Strictly speaking, we do not see the sun; we see events taking place in the sun. The sun only affects our senses because a continuous re-arrangement of electrons in the solar atoms results in the emission of light. In the same way, we do not see a chair. If we stumble against the chair in the dark, we do not feel the chair, but the events of a transfer of energy and momentum between the chair and our bodies" (33). Thus the concept of the physicist ___ the concept of concrete 'substance' or 'thing' gradually evaporated. The 'thing' came to mean something different. The subjective component gradually intruded in the concept of the 'thing'. This subjective component gained some moment also from Albert Einstein's theory of relativity : "Space belongs to appear merely as a fiction created by our own minds, an illegitimate extension to nature of a subjective concept which helps us to understand and describe the arrangements of objects as seen by us, while time appears as a second fiction serving a similar purpose for the arrangement of events which happen to us" (34).

Thus the concept of 'absoluteness' upheld by Newton, Descartes and Kant was shaken. In physics, Heisenber's principle of indeterminacy (1927) denied the theory of causality : "All statements in physics, he said, are relative to the means of observation used" (35). Subjective factors in the observation and interpretation of the external object, thus are accruing to the objectivity of science. Besides Einstein's introduction of the concept of light quantum, Niels Bohr's further experiments with it and Max Planck's experiments on thermodynamics, ___ all contributed to the denial of absolulist conception of the world and the permanency of the object. Physics, therefore, gradually began, since approximately this time, to think not in terms of matter but in terms of events or what in the terminology of Husserl is a cognition of phenomena. We are not certain about the 'thing' behind the phenomenon, but about the phenomenon itself we are. As such the idealistic trend in philosophy was coming back as a result of this new dimension of thought in the physical sciences. Sir James Jeans explains this new turn in the physical sciences in this way : "We have already described recent progress in physical science as resulting from a continuous emancipation from the purely human point of view. Our last impression of nature, before we began to take our human spectacles off, was of an ocean of mechanism surrounding us on all sides. As we gradually discarded our spectacles, we see mechanical concepts continually giving place to mental. If from the nature of things we can never discard them entirely, we may yet conjecture that the effect of doing so

would be the total disappearance of matter and mechanism, mind reigning supreme and alone. "Others may think it more likely that the pendulum will swing back in time. "Broadly speaking, the two conjectures are those of the idealist and realist ___ or, if we prefer, the mentalist and materialist ___ views of nature. So far the pendulum shows no signs of swinging back, and the law and order which we find in the universe are most easily described ___ and also, I think, most easily explained ___ in the language of idealism. Thus, subject to the reservations already mentioned, we may say that present-day science is favourable to idealism. In brief, idealism has always maintained that, as the beginning of the road by which we explore nature is mental, the chances are that the end also will be mental. To this present-day science adds that, at the furthest point she has so far reached, much, and possibly all, that was not mental has disappeared, and nothing new has come in that is not mental. Yet who shall say what we may find awaiting us round the next corner" (36). In this fertile soil of idealistic trend in the physical sciences, the seed of Husserl's idealistic philosophy found a favourable environment and impetus to germinate. Perhaps this new trend in the thought of physics did not contribute directly towards Husserl's thining, but such a trend certainly helped form the conducive climate. To quote for the last time from Sir James Jeans (1930's) : "That time has now come. The old philosophy ceased to work at the end of the nineteenth century, and the twentieth century physicist is hammering out a new

philosophy for himself. Its essence is that he no longer sees nature as something entirely distinct from himself. Sometimes it is what he himself creates or selects or abstracts; sometimes it is what he destroys" (37). This new scientific view of the world had points of agreement with the world-view of Husserl. Sir Jeans wrote this in the 1930's, but the same intellectual climate had been prevailing since a few decades earlier.

B11 : Historical Background : Psychology

12

It is well-known that phenomenology grew out of a reaction against psychologism. Everett W. Knight, in his Literature Considered as Philosophy : The French Example, wrote : "Toward the end of the century [19th century], relativism assumed a particularly acute from known as 'psychologism', a theory according to which all intellectual pursuits, since they involve the mind, are based in the last analysis, upon psychology. This view was widely held when Husserl began his career, and it is in reaction against it that phenomenology finds its point of departure" (37a).

Phenomenology has a rich background in the history of psychology. It is very significant to note that Husserl dedicated his Logische Untersuchungen (1900) to Stumpf, the psychologist, "in honor and friendship" (38). To understand the psychological background of phenomenology, we have to go back more than a little.

Germany, the birth-place of phenomenology, had two distinct groups of modern psychologists ——— one, that of Fechner, Helmholtz, Wundt and G.E. Müller; the other that of Hering, Brentano, Mach and Stumpf. The first group is called, in William James' phraseology, tough-minded and the second tender-minded. Prof. Edwin G. Boring, in his A History of Experimental Psychology wrote : "The first group stood for rigorous experimental technique, descriptive analysis and the importance of learning in perception. The other group believed in phenomenological description and nativism in perception (the dependence of perception upon the inherited properties of the organism). They argued a little more and experimented a little less, although that is a fine point to attempt to make about the argumentative polemical Germans .... Stumpf turned 'tender' under Brentano's influence while he held the chair in Prussian Berlin which 'should' have been the toughest chair in Germany" (39). As a student of Brentano and Stumpf, Husserl was profoundly influenced by both of them.

13

The history of phenomenology can be traced back in the writings of the great German poet Goethe (1749-1832) and Purkinje (1787-1869). Goethe was a strong supporter of keen observation as the means of scientific discovery and we should not forget that phenomenology puts the heaviest emphasis on observation. However,

Goethe's power of observation was certainly astounding. May be Goethe influenced Darwin (1809-1882) in the latter's revolutionary explanation of the biosphere : "Goethe contributed to the theory of evolution by his principle of the metamorphosis of homologous parts in animals and plants. This is the doctrine that parts of different kinds of organisms correspond : a double flower has more petals but fewer stamens, as if stamens had been transformed into petals; a vertebrate has arms, forelegs, wings or fins, one homologous part being substituted for another" (40). In his phenomenological investigation Goethe found an antagonism (Goethe was found wrong lalerly) in Newton's theory of colour and he wrote in down in his Zur Farbenlehre (1810). The phenomenological approach of Zur Farbenlehre stimulated Purkinjie's methodology: "Purkinjie, Czech physiologist of considerable importance, published two volumes of excellent visual phenomenology in 1824-1825, dedicating them to Goethe who was by then one of the most reverenced persons in Germany. Purkinjie was, indeed, an excellent phenomenologist and is known to psychologists to-day for the phenomenon which bears his name, the shift of the relative brightness of colours in night vision" (41). However, the contributions of these two thinkers and scientists towards phenomenology were only heuristic and seminal.

In the tradition of psychologists influencing phenomenology, Ewald Hering, probably, stands the most prominent. "Hering believed that sensations lie in consciousness and that the description of conscious phenomena is basic to the understanding of psychological

fact" (42). Edwin G. Boring treated summarily the contributions of Hering towards phenomenology, in his A History of Experimental Psychology, by saying that "No account of Hering is, however, complete without noting how he placed his influence behind the phenomenological tradition" (43). Though a student of the physicist-psychologist Fechner, Hering had more confidence in Goethe's method of 'trained observation' than in any other methods. However, Husserl had been influenced by this new trend of psychology prevailing then.

III. Historical Background: Philosophy

14

Phenomenology originated as a new movement in epistemology and gradually reached the status of a full-scale philosophy, even at the hand of Husserl. It is, therefore, only natural to presume that it grew out of a fertile philosophical background. Traces of phenomenological thinking could be found even in the ancient Greek philosophies. Husserl derived the word 'phenomenology' from the Greek word, phainomenon meaning 'appearance'. This word, phainomenon had been used by the ancient Greek philosophers with a connotation different from that of Husserl. But, nevertheless, it may be assumed that Husserl was influenced by the thoughts of some ancient Greek philosophers. Take, for instance, the case of Pyrrho (c. 360-270 B.C). According to Pyrrho's disciple Timon, Pyrrho

believed that we cannot be certain about the nature of reality. (Pyrrho is said to travel to India with Alexander the Great. It is not, therefore, unlikely that he was influenced by the Saptabhangi Nyaya of the Jainas. Bhikkhu Nanajivako also supports this view. Vide his article "The Indian Origin of Pyrrho's Philosophy of Epoche" in Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 4, 1985). The first Husserlean commandment of epoche has some similarity with the philosophy of Pyrrho.

15

St. Augustine (354-430) of the medieval period also had some phenomenological components in his thought. Alexander and Selesnick in their The History of Psychiatry wrote : "St. Augustine was not only the first forerunner of Husserl's phenomenology and of existentialism but also a forerunner of psychoanalysis" (44). F.J.E. Fuller and P.H. McMurrin in their A History of Philosophy traced the origin of phenomenology in the ancient Greek philosophy and in the Scholastic and cartesian philosophies. "Brentano's theory of mind was developed under Aristotelean, Scholastic, and Cartesian influences and centered on the scholastic concept of 'intentionality' " (45). The modern term 'intentionality' corresponds with the Scholastic intentio. This may be guessed from Brentano's definition of the psychical. " 'We can define psychical phenomena', says Brentano, 'by saying that they are phenomena which intentionally contain an object in themselves' "(46).

Intentionality (Intentionalität), in Husserl, in the broadest sense, also implies the character of anything as pointing beyond itself.

16

But the most urgent and pressing environment in which phenomenology, in the Husserlean sense, grew in the modern philosophical current. Foremost among the modern philosophers that gave a fillip to the advance of phenomenology was Brentano. Brentano, in his turn, was very much influenced by the German idealist F.A. Trendelenburg who attempted to substitute the concept of motion for Hegel's dialectics. Brentano was a Professor extraordinary at Wurzburg. He had only 38 publications of which Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte is the best known work and has some bearing on phenomenology. According to him "phenomena possess immanent objectivity when they refer to a content — are directed upon an object, have that object 'inexisting intentionally' within them. These phrases become intelligible only when it is realized that psychical phenomena are to be thought as acts. When one sees a color, the color itself is not mental. There is, however, no meaning to seeing unless something is seen. The act always implies an object, refers to a content. The color as content of the act, 'seeing', thus 'inexists' by intention within the act. A psychical act is therefore not self-contained but contains its object within itself intentionally; that is to say, it is characterised by immanent objectivity. Physical

phenomena, on the other hand, are self-contained because they do not refer extrinsically to objects. Superficially, the difference between psychology and physics seems to be that between act and object; fundamentally, however, this difference lies between the possession of intention or reference by the psychical act and of intrinsic completeness by the physical phenomena" (47). The concept of inexistence is a borrowing from medieval philosophical terminology and it is this same concept, handed down by Brentano, which influenced Husserl the most. Brentano was a charismatic personality that influenced not only Husserl but also Sigmund Freud who attended his lectures on logic. (48) However, Husserl had very little else than the concept of intentionality to receive from Brentano.

17

Another great force behind the growth of phenomenology was the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853-1920). Meinong studied under Brentano at the University of Vienna. His principal contribution lies in his separation of being (Sein) from its character (Sosein). "Thus, golden mountains and round squares are objects even though they have no being. The not-being-the-case of a golden mountain is very different from the not-being-the-case of a round square; their character has to be regarded as independent of our thoughts or expressions about them" (49). Meinong called the basic doctrine which is involved in the separation

of Sein from Soseln the doctrine of Aussersein. He called his theory Gegenstandtheorie or theory of objects.

According to Meinong, "The independent objects upon which the 'of-ness' of consciousness lays hold are, he tells us, by no means limited to physical existences. They include things like the Platonic ideas — mathematical entities, essences like blueness or goodness, logical propositions, and self-contradictions like round squares. In a word everything that can be thought about or mentioned is equally independent of being thought or talked about. To distinguish abstract, logical objects from the concrete, physical objects, Meinong uses the term 'subsist', instead of 'exist'. Concrete things exist. Logical essences subsist. Logical absurdities are neither existent nor subsistent. Nevertheless they are in a sense there and have being, since we can refer to them. None of these objects would be destroyed if consciousness were destroyed. Physical things would still be there, essences would remain intact, some propositions would still be true and others would still be absurd — ready and waiting for a newly born consciousness to come along and perceive them and conceive them and recognize their valid or self-contradictory characters" (50).

But the more important thought of Meinong is about the relation of mind to object : "The relation of objects to minds is in a way equivocal. The object is in the mind and outside it. Whatever the nature of the object may be — whether it is round-square which can neither exist nor subsist in itself, or a

proposition that subsists, or a physical fact that exists, or a future or past event ---- it is present and existent in the mind of which at the time it is the object" (51).

18

The next philosopher to influence Husserl was Carl Stumpf (1848-1936). Stumpf had a rich background in music. Around 1865, he came under the magnetic influence of Brentano. In 1873, he began to work on his famous Tonpsychologie which dealt with tonal fusion. The influence of Stumpf on Husserl can be seen in the fact that Husserl dedicated his first phenomenological work, Logische Untersuchungen, to Stumpf (52).

Stumpf classified the experiences of the immediately given into three primary classes:

i, First, the experiences of the phenomena, sensory and imaginal data like colors, tones and images, which constitute the subject-matter of phenomenology.

ii, Second, the psychical functions, like-perceiving, grouping, conceiving, desiring, and willing. These functions are the equivalents of Brentano's acts; the two words are almost interchangeable. Brentano and Husserl called these Akt but Stumpf and Kulpe called them Funktions.

iii, Thirdly, relations. These come immediately into experience and yet they are not sensations.

Stumpf distinguished between a psychical function and a phenomenon. The two are independently variable. "The function changes without the phenomenon, when an unnoticed phenomenon becomes noticed without change in itself, as when a musical chord or a touch blend or a taste blend is analyzed. The phenomenon changes without a change in the function, when the room gets darker at twilight without the change being noticed, or when sensations change continuously but we notice the change abruptly and only at intervals of the just noticeable difference" (53).

Though Stumpf exerted a great influence on Husserl, we must be cautious not to confuse the phenomenology of Stumpf with that of Husserl. For Stumpf phenomenology was only a propaedeutic science (Vorwissenschaft) which studied the antecedent experimental material only. But Husserl, starting from almost the same point, claimed phenomenology to be a science of the description of the pure Being by immanent inspection. Stumpf appears to be a psychologist, and an experimentalist at that, but he was "primarily a philosopher" (54).

19

Besides all these direct influences upon himself, Husserl had had certain indirect currents of influences from some modern philosophers. Foremost among them were Descartes (1596-1650), David Hume (1711-1776), Kant (1724-1804), Hegel (1781-1848) and Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1817-1881). Husserl's indebtedness to

Descartes can be observed in his work Cartesian Meditation. Husserl reevaluated the cogito of Descartes. According to Husserl, "The Cartesian discovery was not that of the existence of the individual ego but the existence of transcendental subjectivity as the first absolute datum, one which founds and includes objectivity. Since the conditions and assumptions of being in individual e go had been 'bracketed', the first datum must be referred to the transcendental ego. At this point we are given flow and continuity on both sides of the stream. A constant objective identity, and a constant subjective identity. On the one hand we are given the world, on the other hand transcendental subjectivity, and the two justify each other. Out of this flow we constitute both a concrete ego and individual objects" (55).

Hume and Kant exerted a great influence upon Husserl, though the influence was silent. Husserl called Hume's epistemology fictionalism which tried to reduce the objective world to a series of discrete sensations. Hume shook off the dogmatic idea of the concrete objective world. This position in turn contributed to the growth of the subjective explanation of the reality. Kant developed the Humean position. With the help of the categories the subject organizes the discrete data of the objective world. Kant's Ideas of Reason even pointed out the truth of the transcendental ego of Husserl.

Hegel had no less influence over Husserl. Hegel was dissatisfied with the Kantian scepticism. "For Kant, knowledge is possible only in so far as experience is arranged in accordance

with the forms of space and time and the categories. These are what we contribute, what we impose upon reality; therefore we can only know things within these forms, not things in themselves" (56). Hegel was against this status of philosophical enquiry. He was keen on "a programme for the phenomenology : the overcoming of Kantian scepticism, the demonstration of the possibility of knowing things in themselves" (57). According to him "science must vindicate itself not by being measured against some pre-conceived criterion, but through a descriptive examination of its characters as a specific phenomenon, from which its validity will emerge. This is what Hegel understands by a 'phenomenology' " (58).

Hegel went on finding a means of correspondence between concept and object : "So Hegel's talk of correspondence between concept and object would refer also to the closing of this Kantian gap. The aim of the Phenomenology would be to reach a point where there is no longer a contrast between the categories which are valid 'for us' and things as they are 'in themselves' ". (59). Hegel's influence on Husserl can be perceived in these few words of Richard Norman in his Hegel's Phenomenology: "The notion of 'phenomenology' has been introduced as that of an 'exposition (which) has for its object only phenomenal knowledge' ____ that is to say, an exposition of knowledge as a phenomenon, as it actually appears, not insofar as it conforms to some preconceived model. This idea, that philosophy must find its starting-point within ordinary consciousness, bears on an initial resemblance to two other philosophical movements. The first of these is the

later phenomenological movement initiated by Husserl, where the underlying idea is that of philosophy as a direct description of consciousness prior to any theory or explanation in terms of which it is interpreted" (60).

Bernard Bolzano anticipated Brentano. "Standing against the tendency of his time to reduce propositions to the judgments in which they occur, Bolzano held to a firm distinction between thinker and thought, the proposition being an independent constituent of the judgment" (61). The last important influence upon Husserl came from the physiologist-psychologist-philosopher Lotze. His theory of space-perception had some bearing upon phenomenology. "Lotze began it [the theory of space-perception] by asserting that the mind is capable of the notion of space and that it is compelled by this notion to arrange sensory content spatially, even though that content was nothing in itself inherently spatial" (62). Lotze thus made a distinction between the content of thought and thought itself, thus leading towards Husserl's distinction between thought and the transcendental ego. Thus Lotze's idealistic "ideas paved the way for the 'phenomenology' of Husserl" (62a).

II.1 : Ramification : Phenomenology and the Theory of Value (Anthropological Phenomenology).

20

After Husserl phenomenology proliferated into different regions of human knowledge. Husserl's disciples and close associates began to think of utilizing the phenomenological method in the regions of problems other than those of epistemology and ontology ---- the only two areas envisaged by Husserl. As against Husserl's pure phenomenology, their phenomenology may be called applied phenomenology. Thus Max Scheler (1874-1928) extended the phenomenological analysis to the field of values. He began as a true Husserlean phenomenologist and believed in the essential correlation between the essences of objects and the essences of intentional experiences. But soon he settled accounts with Husserlian phenomenology. He now engaged himself with the problem of values. "Scheler sought to overcome the presumed relativity of values. His analysis held that values, no less than percepts and concepts, have objective as well as subjective poles. There is a hierarchy of values ascending from sensory values through life values (aesthetic, ethical, epistemological) to religious values. Values are not temporal essences possessing an objective validity" (63). Scheler believed that emotional experiences, especially that of love, can disclose the nature of being. He posited a hierarchy of concrete or 'material' values as against

formal values. Scheler is also famous for his views about the 'person'. " 'Intentionality' was the central concept of his theory of the person : the person forms the center of acts and by his very nature cannot become an object. According to Scheler's famous formulation (1916), man and animal have a fundamentally different relationship to the world : the animal has environment (Umwelt), man has world (Welt)" (64).

Edward von Hartmann (1842-1906), a military man turned philosopher, also applied the phenomenological method in the field of morality. His principal writing in this area is Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness. "Hartmann believed that a phenomenology of the moral consciousness, by which he meant an inventory of the empirical facts of moral awareness, was an essential preliminary to the discovery of moral principles" (65). Hartmann was so much concerned with the problems of value that he was one of the first to use the term 'axiology'.

The other Hartmann ___ Nicolai Hartmann ___ late of the University of Berlin, deserves more attention than Edward von Hartmann, at least in this regard. In his three-volume Ethics published in 1925, Nicolai Hartmann expressed his belief in the absoluteness of values. To him (a) values are absolute and (b) these absolute values can be known a priori. " 'The apriority of values', says Hartmann, 'floats, as it were, in the air'. But there is an a priori access to the value essences, the inner and autonomous voice of conscience, which, unsummoned and with an emotional mystery, is the 'ideal world' speaking to the moral

consciousness, determining its moral decisions or convicting it of guilt" (66).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was also an anthropological phenomenologist, but of a different genre. His main concern was human perception. "Influenced both by Gestalt psychology and Husserl's phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty merged and broadened these approaches. The result was a phenomenology of perception capable, at least in his view, of coming to terms with the real world. One consequence of this method was his ability to provide an alternative to dualism. Opposing the Cartesian mind-body dualism, Merleau-Ponty presented the elements of the identical problem as a matter of variety of conceptual levels in the study of human behavior; e.g. the physical level, the biological level, and the mental level. The latter presuppose the former, but are not separable from them" (67).

III.d : Ramification : Psychological Phenomenology

21

A. Pfänder (1870-1941) was the pioneer of this field of enquiry. His most important work, Phanomenology des Wollens, which is a study of the phenomenology of volition, "uses an emphatic form of categorical intuition and rigorous descriptive style" (68).

III.iii : Ramification: Phenomenological Sociology

22

Phenomenology has found a very fertile ground in the region of sociology. Thomas Luckmann in the Preface to Phenomenology and Sociology edited by him showed how with the phenomenological method sociology is heading forward to solve various sociological problems. He wrote : "Phenomenology places between brackets the ontological claims which are an intrinsic trait of our everyday experience and at the same time describes the sources of these claims. It neutralizes, as best as it can without abandoning language as a recording device for its descriptions, the heavy overlay of 'theory' without which scientific as well as common-sense 'facts' are plainly unthinkable. It shows on what conscious activities such theories necessarily rest. Phenomenology describes the constitution of our experiences by recourse to the most direct evidence available. Its criteria of verification differ, however, from those used to good purpose in the social sciences. In contrast to the epistemologically naive observations and 'measurements' of more or less public events that we practice in the social sciences when we look for 'data', the 'data' of phenomenology are of a more elementary nature. We find them by inspection of our own experiences. By using the method of phenomenological 'reduction' we proceed step by step from the historically, biographically, socially and culturally concrete features of everyday experience to its elementary structures. This is a procedure

that differs from the 'inductive' generalizations of empirical sciences. Evidently, the results of inspection and 'reduction' can be communicated in a further step to fellow-men. By recourse to evidence of the same kind on their part they can be intersubjectively verified. But this is a different method of verification (or corroboration) from that used in fact or appealed to as an ideal in the social sciences. The goal of phenomenology is to describe the universal structures of subjective orientation in the world, not to explain the general features of the objective world" (69).

Phenomenological sociology says that historical and social knowledge are not relative ___ they are rather perspectivistic and relational. This idea was developed by Karl Mannheim, though he was not a phenomenological sociologist. "Mannheim expresses the same idea by citing Husserl's theory that even our conception of physical objects depends on the 'location of the observing, interpreting subject'. The 'different historical pictures', Mannheim continues, 'do not contradict each other in their interpretations, but encircle the same materially identical given historical content from different standpoints and at different depths of penetration" (70).

IV. Reification : Religion and Phenomenology

23

Phenomenology has found a very good ground for study in religion. Peter Koestenbaum in his article "Religion in the

Tradition of phenomenology" (71) has dealt extensively with what phenomenology has, or can have, done with the problems of religion. Phenomenology, he says, is concerned with the first-person data or experiences in the field of religion. According to him "True to the spirit of radical empiricism, phenomenology concentrates on descriptions of experience. Phenomenological descriptions differ from descriptions of other types in that they deal with the ambiguous fringes of experiences —— say, the feelings of guilt and euphoria —— rather than with simple shapes and colors. These descriptions have been useful in recasting psychological categories and are equally helpful in understanding the nature of religion and its place in the life of man. It follows that the phenomenological approach to religion consists in carefully describing the experiences which give rise to typically religious statements and beliefs. Phenomenological descriptions of religious states of consciousness have a dual advantage : they disclose the structure of the experiences in uncommon detail and they justify the disclosures of these experiences on philosophical foundations that are far sounder than the traditional arguments of rational or natural theology" (72). According to phenomenology the distinction between man and other objects is fundamental. Man cannot be studied as a piece of stone. "To study man objectively is to study him the way an entomologist studies a butterfly" (73). Therefore, phenomenology studies man and other things introspectively or intuitively. "How do these considerations affect the study of religion? In approaching the study of

religion, phenomenology disregards the common and sharp distinctions made between soul, body, world, creator, emotion, reason and the like. It endeavours, instead, to discover what in human experience the notions of God, faith, prayer, immortality, perfection, salvation, and the rest correspond to" (74). Rosenbaum differentiates between the phenomenological approach on the one hand and philosophical, theological and logical approach on the other. In this connection what he said about the distinction between the God of religion and the God of the metaphysician may be quoted with some profit : "In this connection, the distinction between the metaphysical and the religious God is in order. Aquinas presumably proves the existence of a primum mobile. The Unmoved Mover is a metaphysical principle. As such, it is no more worthy of reverence and worship than the law or force of gravitation. .... The arguments for the existence of God may be relevant to the metaphysical principle needed to account for the existence of motion in the world, but they are quite beside the point in relation to the problem of the ultimate meaning and fulfilment of human existence, the problem of death and the like. Here, the religious God becomes relevant, and that God is to be understood in terms of the experiences that evoke him" (75).

IIIv : Other Branches of Knowledge and Phenomenology

24

In recent years, the influence of phenomenology has permeated throughout almost every branch of human thoughts —— law, literature, aesthetics, art, etc. The influence of phenomenology on literature has been via existentialism. The influence of existentialism on modern literature is undeniable and existentialism was developed, and is being constantly fed, by phenomenological researches. The impact of phenomenology on Marcel, Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, for example, was observed by the Soviet philosopher V. Davidov : "It no longer appears possible to make a serious study of Joyce without reference to the philosophy of Freud and Jung; of Hemingway and Camus without analysing the assortment of ideas they had assimilated from the philosophy of Nietzsche; of Lawrence and Faulkner without relation of their work to their philosophy of life; of Marcel, Sartre or Simone de Beauvoir without remembering the connection between their views and the existentialist philosophy of Jaspers and Heidegger, and even with the phenomenology of Husserl"(italics mine) (76). Ivasheva has detected phenomenological influence in the novels of Colin Wilson, particularly in his philosophical book Introduction to the New Existentialism" (77).

III : Phenomenology in the Wide Intellectual World: Different Countries.

25

It is very astonishing to know that though Husserl's phenomenology is a very important movement in philosophy, yet it has not been able to draw the attention of all the different philosophical circles of the different countries. Husserl's phenomenological ideas were seminally propounded firstly in his Ideas on a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy which was published in English translation in the year 1913. This important work was followed by others in English translation, such as Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Inner Time Consciousness, edited by Heidegger, in 1928, Cartesian Meditations in 1931, The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology in 1936, etc. But all these important works were not even taken notice of in Bertrand Russell's works, such as Philosophical Essays (1910), The Problems of Philosophy (1912), An Outline of Philosophy (1927), A History of Western Philosophy (1946), etc. The lastly mentioned work — an introductory work and intended for the general reader — does not even contain the names of Brentano, Meinong or Husserl. A.N. Whitehead's works also do not refer to the phenomenological movement. In general and to be brief, the phenomenological movement has almost not been allowed entrance in the great philosophical tradition of England even to-day.

However, there are signs that this attitude of England may soon change.

26

In France Sartre was the first to be influenced by phenomenology. But soon he began to use it as a tool for the service of his existentialism. Merleau-Ponty, another French philosopher of considerable intellectual acumen did a yeoman's service to Husserl's phenomenology. His main contribution is in the field of perception, in which he applied the phenomenological method. His leading work came out in English translation in 1965 under the title Phenomenology of Perception. Besides, the other French existentialists were also influenced by the phenomenological movement, directly or indirectly. Yet we can say that phenomenology has so far very marginally influenced the French philosophical style.

27

In the U.S.S.R. and other communistic countries, phenomenology is almost an anathema. Yet some Soviet philosophers have shown considerable interest in phenomenology. V.A. Lektorsky, in his Subject Object Cognition, for instance, very beautifully discussed the problems of phenomenology (78). In the U.S.A., phenomenology has only started gaining ground. But in the West European countries, the phenomenological movement which originated in Austria, has to

some extent irradiated itself. About the status of phenomenology in Europe and America, Fuller and McMurrin wrote in 1938 : "In recent years phenomenology, grounded in Husserl's 'phenomenological method', has had some success, in both Europe and America, as a more or less independent philosophical movement" (79). But E.G. Boring in his A History of Experimental Psychology wrote in 1950 : "It is tempting to suggest that phenomenology is more at home in Austria and Southern Germany than in Northern Germany and Prussia. We associate Vienna, Prague, Graz and even Munich with the freedom from scientific rigidity that is proper to phenomenology and act psychology and look to Berlin for the rigors of experimentalism" (80).

In India, the modern European philosophical current has not yet planted its roots deep into the soil and consequently India is lacking in the spirit of phenomenology of the Husserlean type, though phenomenological thinking is not new in India. Here, Dr. J.N. Mohanty, Dr. Debabrata Sinha and a few others are currently doing researches in phenomenology. However, it may be hoped that the journal Husserl Studies edited by J.N. Mohanty and Karl Schuhmann, whose first volume was issued only in 1984, will go a long way in disseminating the spirit of phenomenology throughout the wide world (81).

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