THE VEDĀNTA:

ITS PLACE AS
A SYSTEM OF METAPHYSICS

(Sreegopal Basumallik Fellowship Lectures for

By

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PREFACE

Prof. Max Müller, in his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, with several other Orientalists, has bitterly complained of the sad indifference with which the Philosophical Systems of Ancient India have been treated by the Western World, and demanded for, at least, the two foremost of them, the Vedānta and the Sankhya, "a place of honour" amongst the metaphysical systems of the West. But unfortunately, very little has hitherto been done to place what may be called truly methodical and metaphysical expositions of the aforesaid systems before the philosophically disposed public in the West, competent to form a correct opinion on their merits. On the side of the Vedānta, the foremost of the Indian systems, there are only four works in the field, worthy of mention, *viz.*, Prof. Max Müller's own Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Prof. Deussen's System of the Vedanta, Mr. Gough's Philosophy of the Upaniṣads and Dr. S. N. Dasgupta's History of Indian Philosophy. Prof. Max Müller's work deals, more or less exclusively, with the historical aspect of the subject, and contains very little of philosophy, properly so-called. The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads by Mr. Gough may be characterised as a pure misnomer. Prof. Deussen has, it must be admitted, given Sankara's system the best possible treatment it admits of. But, in his uncritical acceptance of the perilous guidance of Sankara, he has gone far away from the Vedānta, and, has, in the place of Vedāntic Panentheism, given us an Indian edition of Eleatic Metaphysics. Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has, in his History of Indian Philosophy, also failed to do justice to

the Vedānta. The Upaniṣads, he tells us, are full of contradictory teachings and he fails to see that the so-called contradictory utterances are, as we shall see hereafter, but inter-related elements of a comprehensive system of thought, namely the Panentheism of the Vedānta. In these pages, an effort has been made to bring out a clear metaphysical exposition of the Vedāntic Epistemology and Ontology, and indicate the place of the Vedānta as a system of metaphysics, among the kindred systems of the West—a venture, the very first of its kind, and, at the same time, full of difficulties. But the writer of the Thesis has reasons to presume that, in his presentation of the Vedānta, he has been able to throw a good deal of new light on the whole problem, and, more particularly, in the exposition of the Vedāntic problems treated in chapters II, III, IV, V, VI and IX. He has, he presumes, been able also to throw some new light on many of the historical questions connected with the literary side of the philosophical movement in Ancient India, discussed in the Introduction, as well as on the questions dealing with the various Vedāntic Schools (*vide*, pp. 31-42) and the Western interpreters of the Vedānta (*vide*, pp. 44-77). And he will deem his labours amply rewarded, if, by this humble effort of his, he can hasten, even by a single day, the dawn of the glorious consummation so devoutly longed for by the great Orientalist and earnest seeker after truth named above, now long silent in the land of the West.

THE AUTHOR.

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INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

The "Chinese, Indian and Egyptian antiquities," said Goethe, "are never more than curiosities."* Such was the enlightened public opinion in the West, about the achievements of the East during the closing years of the eighteenth century. But this angle of vision did not last long. Subsequent events soon clearly proved that the so-called enlightened opinion was really unenlightened, and based on ignorance and prejudice. The change was clearly noticeable even in Goethe's own life-time; and Goethe himself was soon after obliged to think and feel differently. Sir William Jones' translation of Śakuntalā came out in 1789. And "the first appearance of this beautiful specimen of dramatic art created.....a sensation throughout Europe, and the most rapturous praise was bestowed upon it by men of high authority in matters of taste."† The English edition of the work was followed by its translations in French, German, Italian, Danish and Swedish (*ibid*, p. 1, note). Foster's German translation of the masterpiece of Kālidāsa appeared in 1791. And it produced such a profound impression on Goethe, that, as a mark

Varied estimates of India's contributions.

Goethe.

* "The Maxims and Reflections of Goethe," No 325, Bailey Saunders' Translation.

† Max Müller, Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 1859, p. 1.

of his great appreciation, he composed his well-known epigram* on Śakuntalā the very same year. And the impression produced was so deep and lasting, that, in imitation of the prelude of Śakuntalā, Goethe wrote the theatre prologue of Faust in 1797, and even quite "as late as 1813, the poet thought of adapting the Indian play for the Wiemer stage."† Since of late the change in the angle of vision has been still more remarkable. And "no Hellenist can now afford to profess complete ignorance of the Babylonian and Egyptian culture which forms the bedrock of European institutions. Even China has been brought into touch with Europe; while the languages, literature, art and philosophy of the West have been proved to be connected by innumerable bonds with those of India."‡ Such is the frank testimony of an up-to-date historian of no mean repute. Similar testimonies have come from several other quarters as well. "Even the loftiest philosophy of the Europeans, the idealism of reason, as it is set forth by the Greek philosophers," says Frederick Schlegel, in his work on Indian Language, Literature, and Philosophy (p. 471), "appears, in comparison with the abundant light and vigour of Oriental idealism, like a feeble Promethean spark in the full flood of heavenly glory of the noon-day sun—faltering and feeble, and ever ready to be extinguished." "When we read with attention the poeti-

V. Smith.

Frederick Schlegel.

* Translation of the Epigram: "Wilt thou the blossoms of spring and the fruits that are later in season, Wilt thou have charms and delights, Wilt thou have strength and support, Wilt thou with one short word encompass the earth and the heavens, All is said if I name only, Sacontala, thee." Max Müller, *ibid*, p. 1, note.

† Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature, 1900, p. 416.

‡ V. Smith, Early History of India, Oxford, 1908, p. 2.

cal and philosophical monuments ....of India," likewise observes Victor Cousin, " we discover there so many truths, and truths so profound and which make such a contrast with the meanness of the results at which the European genius has sometimes stopped, that we are constrained to bend the knee before that of the East, and to see in this cradle of human race, the native land of the highest philosophy."* The Vedānta Philosophy is " a system," says Professor Max Müller, " in which human speculation seems to me to have reached its very acme."† " It is surely astounding," he adds, " that such a system as the Vedānta should have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an ancient Gothic cathedral. None of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has ventured to erect such a spire, never frightened by storms or lightnings. Stone follows stone in regular succession, after once the first step has been made..... A student of the Vedānta philosophy has to climb like a mountaineer, undismayed by avalanches and precipices. He must be able to breathe in the thinnest air, never dismayed even if snow and ice bar his access to the highest point ever reached by the boldest explorers. Even if he has sometimes to descend again, disappointed, ...he has seen views such as are never seen in the valleys below." (*Ibid*, pp. 240-41.)

Victor Cousin.

Max Müller.

The above testimonies are quite frank and unequivocal, and they speak for themselves. And what

* Cousin, History of Modern Philosophy, p. 32.

† Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, 1899, p. v.

a contrast between the old angle of vision and the new! But the change, though remarkable, is still confined to a small group of specialists. And beyond its narrow limits the old prejudices still prevail, and it is still widely believed that Indian and Egyptian antiquities are really no better than curiosities. India, in fact, "suffers to-day in the estimation of the world," aptly observes V. Smith, in agreement with Mr. Aiyār, whom he quotes, "more through that world's ignorance of the achievements of the heroes of Indian history than through the absence or insignificance of such achievements."* Professor Max Müller and several other eminent Orientalists have also bitterly complained of the apathy and ignorance of the West about India, and have, in the interests of truth and fairplay, urged her to do justice to India. We recall to our mind the most earnest and passionate appeal Professor Max Müller has made in his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, for an adequate recognition of the philosophical systems of ancient India. The Vedānta and the Sānkhya systems, "with some other less important views of the world, as put forward by the other systems of Indian philosophy, constitute," says he, "the real object of what was originally meant by philosophy, that is, an explanation of the world. This discriminating idea has secured even to the guesses of Thales and Heraclitus, their permanent place among the historical representatives of the development of philosophical thought by the side of Plato and Aristotle, of Descartes and Spinoza. It is in that Walhalla of real philosophers that I claim a place of honour for the representatives of the Vedānta and Sānkhya. If hitherto no one would have called himself

Change confined to a few.

Müller's last appeal.

* V. Smith, *ibid*, p. 3.

a philosopher who had not read and studied the works of Plato and Aristotle, of Descartes and Spinoza, of Locke, Hume and Kant, in the original, I hope that time will come when no one will claim that name who is not acquainted at least with the two prominent systems of ancient Indian philosophy, the Vedānta and the Sānkhya" (P. xvii.) With these passionate words the great Orientalist earnestly advocated the cause of the ancient philosophical systems of India, and demanded a place of honour for at least some of these, among the philosophical systems of the world.

Our hope and ambition

Now, the above inspiring words were uttered in 1899, and were the last that fell from the weary lips of a devoted scholar, and earnest seeker after truth, now long gone to the land of his rest. But, although nothing has yet been done to remove the anomaly he and his friends so strongly resented, yet it is impossible to think that so sincere and frantic an appeal will remain a cry in the wilderness for ever. There is an unmistakable ring of prophecy in the concluding words of the appeal, and they are bound to tell sooner or later. And the time may not be far off, when the clouds that have hitherto darkened the sky and obscured the vision shall pass away, and the world, roused from its slumber of ignorance and prejudice, will be inclined to view the question philosophically, and to do justice to the demands of the various systems of thought of ancient India, the hoary witnesses of a hoary civilisation, and to find out for them their proper places in the great Walhalla of the world's philosophical systems. Professor Max Müller has also called upon the Indian students of philosophy to come forward to do their best towards the furtherance of this great cause, and, after "having studied the Western systems," to devote, "themselves to the

honourable task of making their own national philosophy better known to the world at large," and thereby to assist all true seekers after truth in their " attempts to secure a place to thinkers such as Kapila and Bādarāyaṇa by the side of the leading philosophers of Greece, Rome, Germany, France, Italy and England." (*Ibid*, p. xx.) We shall deem our labours amply rewarded, if we can, by our present humble attempts, hasten even by a single day, the glorious consummation so devoutly longed for by that disinterested lover of truth now silent in death.

The dawn of metaphysical speculation.

" There is nothing more ancient and primitive, not only in India but in the whole Aryan world," says Professor Max Müller, " than the hymns of the Rig-Veda." If the Rig-Veda is the oldest known record of the Aryan world, the Vedānta is also the oldest monument of the speculative genius of the Aryan race, and the oldest system of metaphysics extant. The Vedāntic speculation, no doubt, took time adequately to unfold itself, and to grow into a clean-cut and well-shaped system of its own. But its first dawn is evidently at least as old as the last book of the Rig-Veda itself. The vague sense of cosmic unity inherent in human nature soon comes to be disturbed and rudely shaken with the growth and free play of the logical understanding. The awakened man is left to gaze with wonder and surprise, bewildered and dismayed, at the mysteries and diversities of the world of experience, and seeks to have a peep into their hidden meaning and significance. " The position of the primitive man in the world may be compared," says Venn, " to that of a stranger who has wandered into a gigantic foundry or workshop. He can touch nothing without the risk of being burned. He does not know where he can stand without being knocked down; at every moment he may be crushed by a steam-hammer,

blinded by a spark, or swept away by a revolving band." It was more or less so with the early ancestors of the Hindus, as with all primitive peoples all the world over. In the Rig-Veda we accordingly find the imagination of the early Vedic poets wholly engrossed with the problem of the multiplicity of forces at work in the universe. But as the people advanced more and more in reflection, a change came upon them; and the conception of unity behind plurality and differences, of order and harmony amidst opposition and disorder, slowly dawned upon their minds. And with such a change in their vision, the problem of the origin of the universe as a whole, and of the ultimate ground of its unity and harmony presented itself, and pressed more and more for solution. The last book of the Rig-Veda—and there are stray utterances of the same description here and there in other books as well—abounds in reflective and quasi-philosophical poems, wherein their respective authors are clearly seen boldly to have faced the great problem of the ultimate ground of the cosmic order, and to have endeavoured to have a peep into the secret chamber of Nature to discover the ultimate ground of harmony and unity of the plurality of experience.

But the Upaniṣads are the original Vedāntas; and of these the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and the Chhāndogya are probably the oldest. And yet in these two Upaniṣads we find ourselves in a new world of thought altogether. The dim, feeble and broken streaks of light, which through the misty atmosphere of the hymnal epoch, are found struggling hard for an expression, do here burst forth, all on a sudden, with the radiance of a bright mid-day summer sun. The germs of speculation, found in a slow process of making, here and there in the hymnal literature, suddenly present themselves here in the splen-

did form of a matured and clean-cut magnificent system. The Vedāntic speculation, it is true, received its final systematisation in the hands of Bādarāyaṇa, in his epoch-making work, the Vedānta Sūtras, Aphorisms on the Vedānta. But the Bṛihadāraṇyaka and the Chhāndogya Upaniṣads stand only next to the Vedānta Sūtras in importance, and are rightly regarded as the two of the strongest bulwarks of the Vedānta philosophy. In elegance and richness of diction, as well as in depth and sublimity of speculative insight, these two works stand simply unsurpassed in the whole range of Indian speculative literature. "For wealth of illustration, fervour of conviction, beauty and elevation of thought, this piece," rightly observes Professor Macdonell, in dealing with the dialogue between Janaka and Yājnavalkya (IV. 3-4), "is unequalled in the Upaniṣads or any other work of Indian literature."* To this remark, we must, however, add that it applies with equal force and cogency to several other parts of the Bṛihadāraṇyaka and to portions of the Chhān. Upanisad as well. And these two works do, at the same time, form the main quarries which have, in a later age, copiously supplied the exponents of the various rival Vedāntic schools with all necessary materials to forge their sharpest weapons of offence and defence. In these two works we do, indeed, for the first time, come across a lucid and elaborate exposition of the central problems of the Vedāntic philosophy.

The Vedānta and its three Institutes.

The ancient Vedāntic literature is divided into three main strata, known as the three Institutes, Prasthānatrayam, namely, the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, and the Vedānta Sūtras. The term Vedānta means the

* Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature, 1899, p. 236.

end or final part of the Veda, or the ultimate conclusion of the teachings of the Veda. And it is in the Upaniṣads that the varied unsystematised utterances and suggestions found scattered in the hymnal literature and the Brāhmaṇas have been matured and brought to a focus. These are, therefore, very aptly designated as the Vedāntas. Thus the Upaniṣads are the Vedāntas in the primary sense of the term. But scholars are often apt to ignore this fact and to restrict the term Vedānta exclusively to the Vedānta Sūtras alone. "We cannot deny," says Professor Max Müller, "that the germs of many of the most recondite thoughts of Vedānta metaphysicians are really there embedded in the Upaniṣads."* Again, referring to the teachings of Parmenides, Garbe says "all these doctrines are congruent with the chief contents of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta Systems." (Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 32.) These are rather loose statements. The Upaniṣads are as much Vedāntas as the Vedānta Sūtras. To be more accurate, the term Vedānta is primarily applicable to the Upaniṣads alone, and it is only secondarily applied to the Vedānta Sūtras, wherein the philosophical teachings of the Upaniṣads have been finally systematised. As a matter of fact, some of the Upaniṣads have actually claimed this title as their own proper designation. The Svet. Up. VI. 22), for instance clearly tells us that "the secret doctrine" taught in it was also "taught in ancient times in the Vedānta." The Mund. Up. similarly describes (III. 2, 6) Brahman, the ultimate Reality, as "the subject-matter of the science of the Vedānta." This very expression, with the whole verse

(i) Upanisad.

* Müller, The Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy, p. 136.

containing it, is also found in the Tait. Āraṇyaka, X. 12. Even Bādarāyaṇa nowwhere claims the title for his own work. On the contrary, he always applies it to the Upaniṣads themselves. He has most emphatically told us (Ved. Sūt. I. 1, 4) that the Vedic teachings have found their ultimate resolution in the Upaniṣadic doctrine of Brahman. And in III. 3, 1, he has actually applied the term Vedānta to the Upaniṣads themselves. Nimvārka, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and other commentators, in their commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtras, have also invariably applied the term ' Vedānta ' to the Upaniṣads themselves.* The Upaniṣads then are evidently the original Vedāntas.

The term Upaniṣad is derived from the root *Sad* with the prefix *ni* (to sit near); and it originally meant according to Max Müller, the act of sitting down near a teacher and of submissively listening to him. According to Deussen it means " Secret instruction." There are passages in the Upaniṣads which clearly show that the word is really used in this sense. Max Müller also accepts this meaning. Śaṅkara, however, derives the word from the root Sad (to destroy), and holds that it is so-called because it destroys ignorance and imports to the reader the right knowledge.

There are over 150 Upaniṣads in all. All these treatises do not, however, come under the category of the Vedānta in the strict sense of the term. A very large number of the so-called Upaniṣads can neither be

* *Cf.* Nimvārka Bhāṣya, I. 1, 4; I. 1, 11; I. 4, 28; II. 2, 10, etc.

Śaṅkara's Commentary, I 1, 4; I. 2, 1, 14; I. 4, 23; 27; II. 3, 29, etc.

Rāmānuja's Commentary, I. 1, 12; I. 4, 27, etc.

Viṣṇu Purāṇa, VI. 4, 39.

regarded as parts of the Vedas, nor as genuine outcome of that stream of metaphysical speculation, first originated in the Vedas, which regards the world of plurality as expressions or modes of one Ultimate Spiritual principle, Brahman. Most of the later Upaniṣads are distinctly sectarian in their character, and teach nothing but narrow, unphilosophical doctrines of their respective sects. Each of the various main Hindu sects, the Śaiva, the Śākta, and the Vaiṣṇava, has its Upaniṣads. With the growing popularity and importance of the genuine Upaniṣads, many spurious imitations of the same subsequently sprang up, for the propagation of sectarian doctrines under the false Upaniṣadic garb. Āllāh Upaniṣad is a spurious production of this latter class, written evidently for the furtherance of the Moslem faith. Now, of the huge number of works called Upaniṣads, twelve are the most well-known, and universally treated as genuine and authoritative; and these are Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Chhāndogya, Kauṣītaki, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Īsa, Kena, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Māṇḍūkya, Praśna, and Śvetāśvatara. Śaṅkara has written commentaries on all of these except the Kauṣītaki, and has in his voluminous commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, referred to, or cited from them all except the Māṇḍūkya. Of these, Bṛih., Chhān., Ait., Tait., Kaṭha, Īsa and Kauṣ., are found in the existing recensions of the Vedas, Brāhmaṇas, or Āraṇyakas. In the course of our present discourse, we shall always use the term Upaniṣads to denote these twelve authoritative works alone.

(*ii*) The Gītā.

(*iii*) The Vedānta Sūtras.

The term Vedānta is, however, as already seen, applicable in a secondary sense to the Vedānta Sūtras and the Bhagavadgītā, a work which, both for dignity and elegance of its diction, and for its highly attractive and

sublime presentation of the Vedāntic doctrine, rightly enjoys universal popularity among all classes of people in India. This popular work contains the very cream of the Upaniṣads. But the Upaniṣads are known as the Vedānta Śrutis, the Revealed Vedānta, and the Gītā as the Vedānta Smṛiti, the Vedānta other than revealed; and to this latter class also belongs the great work of Bādarāyaṇa. These three constitute the three institutes of the Vedāntic literature. "The great Upaniṣads are the deep, still mountain tarns," to use the words of the English translator of Professor Deussen's System of the Vedānta, Mr. Johnston, "fed from the pure water of the everlasting snows, lit by clear sunshine, or, by night, mirroring the high serenity of the stars. The Bhagavadgītā is, perhaps the lake among the foot-hills, wherein are gathered the same waters of wisdom, after flowing through the forest of Indian history, with the fierce conflict of the Children of Bharata. Then, in the Brahma Sūtras, we have the reservoir, four-square, where the sacred waters are assembled in ordered quiet and graded depth, to be distributed by careful measure for the sustenance of the sons of men."* Such are the three great institutes of the Vedānta.

There is, however, a difference of opinion, in some quarters as to the real teachings of the Bhagavadgītā. "The doctrine of the Bhagavadgītā," says Dr. Thibaut, "represents a fusion of the Brahman theory of the Upaniṣads with the belief in a personal highest being, Kriṣṇa or Viṣṇu—which in many respects approximates very closely to the system of the Bhāgavatas; and the attempts of a certain sect of Indian commentators to explain it as setting forth pure Vedānta may be set aside."† "It is

* Deussen, System of the Vedānta, Preface, pp. v-vi.

† Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, p. cxxvi.

beyond doubt,'' says Mr. Gough, on the contrary, '' that the teaching of the Śvet. Upaniṣad and of the Bhagavadgītā, notwithstanding their Sānkhya phrases and Sānkhya references, is as purely Vedāntic as that of any Vedāntic work whatever.''*

We, however, regret we are unable to accept Dr. Thibaut's view stated above. The Gītā bears the title of Upaniṣad and its commentators have all unanimously upheld its claim to that title in the wider sense of the term. It is indeed almost universally regarded in India as containing the very essence of the teachings of the Upaniṣads. '' The Upaniṣads are the cows,'' says the Vaiṣṇavīya Tantrasāra, '' the cowherd's son, Śrīkriṣṇa, is the milkman, Pārtha is the calf, and the nectar-like Gītā is the excellent milk.'' The Gītā is indeed held by a hoary tradition, as one of the great institutes of the Vedānta. It is really '' the serene forest lake,'' to use Mr. Johnston's words, '' wherein are gathered the sacred waters of wisdom '' of the Upaniṣads. And, in spite of its Paurānic garb, it teaches nothing but the Vedāntic doctrines in their most genuine and unadulterated form. Sadānanda also in his definition of the term Vedānta, in the Vedānta Sāra, clearly tells us, '' The Vedānta denotes the Upaniṣads, and such other auxiliary treatises as the Brahma Sūtras and the like.''† The expression ' and the like,' ' ādi,' means, says the commentator, '' the Bhagavadgītā and other Adhyātma Śāstras, spiritualistic Scriptures.'' These three then, the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Vedānta Sūtras, constitute the three institutes of the Vedāntic literature. The commentaries written

* Gough, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 200.

† Vedānta Sāra, ed. Colonel G. A. Jacob, p. 3.

on these institutes, as well as such later works, as Panchadaśī by Mādhavāchāryya, Vedānta Sāra by Sadānanda, Upadeśa-Sahasri, and Vivekacūdāmaṇi ascribed to Śaṅkara, Vedānta Paribhāṣā by Dharmarajadhvarīndra, Advaitaśiddhi by Madhusūdana and the like, though often loosely called Vedānta, are really works on the Vedānta. The aforesaid three institutes alone constitute the genuine Vedāntic literature. And in our treatment of the subject we shall confine ourselves chiefly to those works alone.

Three-fold division of the subjects treated in the Vedānta.

But, while dealing with the Vedānta, we must always bear in mind that the term Vedānta really connotes a particular type or system of thought. Vedāntism, like Stoicism, in ancient Greece, stands for a system of teachings, which, like tributaries of a river, have united into one identical channel, and blended and formed into a single system. And as such the term Vedāntic literature should, strictly speaking, always be understood in a restricted sense. It may be that true and genuine Vedāntic teachings may be found occasionally to exist side by side with non-Vedāntic teachings within the limits of the same work. Even some of the foremost Upaniṣads need not necessarily be supposed to contain nothing but pure Vedāntic doctrines. As a matter of fact, even some of the oldest Upaniṣads contain elements other than strictly Vedāntic in character. Only those parts of these treatises should therefore be called the Vedānta which teach genuine Vedāntic doctrines. And although the contents of the above-mentioned works are mostly Vedāntic in their character, the subjects dealt with in them are, however, divisible into three heads, namely, the old Mythological beliefs and traditions, historical references to the teachings of pre-Upaniṣadic teachers, and genuine Vedāntic teachings. For a clear

comprehension of the import of the Vedāntic speculation, such a division of the subject-matter of the Vedāntic treatises is of the highest importance. The Vedāntic teachings contained in these works represent the high-water mark of philosophical speculation in India. And it would be absurd to maintain that the popular beliefs and myths and the opinions of the pre-Upaniṣadic teachers found in them can claim any place whatever amongst the genuine Vedāntic teachings. The Upaniṣads themselves have made a clear distinction in this respect. They have themselves most emphatically declared the futility of all such teachings as do not impart to the learner the knowledge of the ultimate Reality. The Śvet. Up. IV. 8) most clearly declares, " what shall he do with the Rich-hymns, who do not know the imperishable Being? Blessed are those alone who know Him." The Muṇḍ. Up. (I. 1. 4-5) declares still more clearly, that " there are two kinds of knowledge, superior knowledge and inferior knowledge," (dvê vidyê veditavye iti...parā aparā ca). The Rig-Veda, Yajur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharva-Veda, etc., etc., constitute the inferior knowledge, and that alone is to be regarded as higher knowledge by which the imperishable Being can be known." (Atha sā parā yayā tadakṣaramadhigamyatê). In these utterances a clear distinction was made between the genuine Vedāntic teachings and the non-Vedāntic teachings contained in the aforesaid treatises. "It is not a plain and simple rule," says Dean Farrar, in his work, " The Bible : Its Meaning and Supremacy," " that everything which is not in accordance with the love, the gentleness, the truthfulness, the purity, of Christ's Gospel, is not God's Word to us, however clearly it stands on the page of the Scriptures?" But the promulgators of the Vedāntic speculation had made even a much clearer distinction be-

tween higher knowledge and inferior learning thousands of years before it was examined in the West.

Bādarāyaṇa's mistake; and the present necessity.

It was, however, a great mistake on Bādarāyaṇa's part not to have emphasized and acted upon the distinction, so indicated by the Upaniṣads themselves, in his otherwise monumental work. The historical and mythological portions of the Upaniṣads, no matter howsoever clearly they may stand on the pages of the Upaniṣads, form absolutely no part of the Vedāntic doctrine. It is purely a matter of accident that in many of them, and more particularly in the oldest ones, they are found existing side by side with genuine Vedāntic teachings. It is quite evident that the authors of the later authentic Upaniṣads were fully conscious of the defect in the older works. And this explains why they so strongly emphasize the distinction referred to above. It is also interesting to note that the non-Vedāntic elements have entirely disappeared from many of these later authoritative Upaniṣads. The distinction between Karma-Kānda and Jñāna-Kānda, ceremonial teachings and speculative teachings, is indeed as old as the very dawn of the Vedāntic speculation, and has always received universal recognition among the Hindus. Even in a later age, Sāyaṇa, for instance, in dealing with the Tait. Up., in his commentary on the Sānhitā Up., plainly says, "The Tait. Upaniṣad consists of three parts, Sānhitā, Yājñikī, and Vāruṇī. And of these, Vāruṇī, which teaches the knowledge of the divine Self, is the highest in importance."* But though the distinction between two kinds of learning was clearly recognised, yet efforts were made to represent the two as complementary teachings. Work or Karma, no doubt, through its chastening and discipli-

* See Müller, Ancient Sanskrit Literature, p. 114.

nary influence, helps the attainment of true knowledge. But there are ' karmas ' and ' karmas.' The generic title of ' karma,' work, was, however, made use of as a mask to hide this simple and great truth. Interests other than philosophical were certainly responsible for it. But it is a matter of great regret that even great minds, who certainly clearly saw through the veil, did tolerate this practice. Bādarāyaṇa has, however, put his case as clearly and squarely as possible without giving offence to long-established theological interests. In the Vedānta Sūtras, III. 4, 26, for instance, he at first tells us that " the sacrificial rites are but means to the attainment of the knowledge of Brahman, the ultimate Reality, just as horses are to the attainment of destinations." But he adds soon after (IV. 4, 33), " Exceptions are also known when men have attained true knowledge even without having previously gone through ceremonial observances." It is, however, evident that in the treatment of the problems discussed in the last two books of the Vedānta Sūtras, purely philosophical motives have not always been his guide. But nevertheless, there is no reason why modern thinkers and writers should not in their presentation of the Vedāntic doctrine be guided by purely speculative motives, and separate the non-Vedāntic elements in the Vedāntic literature from the genuine Vedāntic teachings. And that was exactly what was also very likely intended and demanded by the emphatic declaration of the distinction between higher knowledge and inferior learning, made in the Upaniṣads themselves. The description of the transmigration of the soul, which is found in the older Upaniṣads has, it is clearly noticeable, completely disappeared from some of the later authoritative Upaniṣads. And this also clearly proves that the promulgators of these Upaniṣads treated this belief

The provisional necessity.

as forming no part of the genuine Vedāntic doctrines. It is also clear from the manner of the very treatment of the subject in the older Upaniṣads that it was even then treated as forming no integral part of the Vedāntic teachings, properly so-called. Wherever references have been made to it, the sole object of the teachers concerned was to convince the people of the utter futility of ceremonial observances and legalistic rites. So, even though the Upaniṣads contain references to this belief, these references, it should be borne in mind, form no integral part of the Vedāntic literature, properly so-called. But the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul is widely regarded as a part of the genuine Vedāntic teachings. And that is what makes it all the more necessary to be on one's guard in this respect in the presentation of the Vedāntic doctrine.

The Vedānta Sūtras: its effects.

While the Upaniṣadic doctrine had busied itself with the one concrete Ultimate Reality and its manifestations in the world of plurality, other systems of thought grew up side by side. The Sāṅkhyas split up the one Ultimate Reality of the Vedānta into two independent principles, the innumerable puruṣas, individual minds, and the Prakṛti, the primal matter. The Chārvākas denied the independent reality of the puruṣas, and held the objective world to be the only reality. The Buddhists, on the other hand, denied the reality of both self and not-self, and resolved all existents into unconnected moments of consciousness. In opposition to this sensationalism of the Buddhists, the Vaiśeṣikas propounded their theory of physical atomism. The Bhaktas, in their search after the Reality, represented it as an extra-cosmic Being, above and beyond the world of change and generation. And amidst the clamours of these anta-

gonistic schools of thought, Bādarāyaṇa appeared on the field, and took upon himself the task of a new enunciation and methodical presentation of the Vedāntic standpoint. Kāśakṛtsna, Kārsnajini, Bādari, Ātreya, Āśmarathya, Audulomi and Jaimini, and probably many others had already been, or were still, at work, towards the same end, but grave differences of opinion, as we gather from Bādarāyaṇa's own work, had arisen among them. Bādarāyaṇa, however, in his epoch-making work, has not only supplied us with a most consistent and comprehensive presentation of the Vedāntic viewpoint of Reality, but has, at the same time, completely silenced, for good, the exponents of the rival systems in the land of his birth. He has shattered the very foundation of the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, crushed Buddhistic sensationalism and Jainism, dismissed in a word Yoga, and we believe Nyāya also, as beneath his notice, and smashed the Pancharātras and the Jaimineyas. And this explains the great and abiding popularity of the Vedānta Sūtras. In the whole range of Sanskrit reflective literature, there is, indeed, hardly any other work, except perhaps portions of the Bṛih. Up. and the Bhagavadgītā, wherein the traces of a really master mind are so conspicuous as in this great encyclopaedic work. It is, therefore, no wonder if it has always enjoyed the greatest esteem among all classes of thoughtful men in India, and made its author's name immortal. And the various appellations, the Brahma Sūtras, the Vedānta Sūtras, the Vyāsa Sūtras, the Bhikṣu Sūtras, the Bādarāyaṇa Sūtras, the Brahma Mīmānsā, the Śārīraka Mīmānsā, the Aupaniṣadi Mīmānsa, and the Vedānta Darśana, by which this great work is known, may be mentioned as an indication of the unbounded esteem and popularity it enjoys.

Commentaries on Vedānta Sūtras.

"The interpreters of the Hegelian Philosophy," says Wallace, "have contradicted each other almost as variously as the several commentators on the Bible. He is claimed to be their head by widely different schools of thought, all of which appeal to him as the original source of their line of argument." It applies with equal, or perhaps greater force and cogency to the Vedānta Sūtras. "There are few Hindu sects," to use Dr. Thibaut's words (Vedānta Sūtras, p. xvi), "not interested in showing that their distinctive tenets are countenanced by Bādarāyaṇa's teachings. Owing to this, the commentaries on the Sūtras have, in the course of time, become very numerous, and it is at present impossible to give a full and accurate enumeration even of those actually existing to-day, much less of those referred to and quoted." Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall has, in his Bibliographical Index, mentioned fourteen commentaries, but his list, as has long been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut, is inaccurate. He has, in his list, included some works which are not commentaries, in the strict sense of the word, and has excluded many more which ought to have been included in the list.

The commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtras are divisible into four main classes, wherein the Vedānta philosophy has been interpreted from four different standpoints. Upavarṣa, the teacher of the celebrated Grammarian Pāṇini was, it seems, the oldest representative of one class. He must have lived, as we shall see hereafter, about the middle of the fifth century B.C. He interpreted the Vedānta from the standpoint of Unqualified Monism, or Adaitavāda. Gauḍapāda (about seventh century A.D.), the teacher of Govinda, whose pupil was Śaṅkara, subsequently took up his work. To-day we know nothing of Upavarṣa's writings except

occasional references about him in Śaṅkara's own commentaries. In Gauḍapāda's well-known Kārikā, expository stanzas, on the Maṇḍ. Up., we, however, have succinct yet clear and bold expression of unqualified Monism, which has subsequently received its final shape in Śaṅkara's voluminous commentary, Śārīraka-Mīmānsā-Bhāṣya. Śaṅkara, in his interpretation of the Vedānta and formulation of the theory of Illusion, Māyā, was immensely influenced by the teachings of Gauḍapāda, and he has actually borrowed almost all the similes and metaphors used in his exposition of the Illusion theory from Gauḍapāda.

Baudhāyana was the oldest representative of another Vedāntic school. He wrote, as Rāmānuja tells us, an elaborate commentary, known as Vṛttiḥ, on the Vedānta Sūtras, which was subsequently abridged by Dramiḍācārya, Taṅka, Nāthamuni and Yamunācārya. Rāmānuja (twelfth century A.D.) has, as he himself states in his great commentary, Śrībhāṣya, simply followed in their footsteps in his interpretation of the Vedānta. This position is known as Qualified Monism, Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vāda. The works of Rāmānuja's predecessors are all lost, except stray citations from them found here and there in Rāmānuja's commentary and other works. In his Vedārtha Sangraha, Rāmānuja names three more of these old teachers. The works of many of these teachers existed, it appears, at Rāmānuja's time, and must have been superseded by his own monumental commentary, a work of great "intrinsic value," which "strikes one throughout," as Dr. Thibaut justly says, "as a very solid performance due to a writer of extensive learning" and of great calibre and logical acumen, and which "in its polemic parts, directed chiefly against the school of Śaṅkara, not infrequently

deserves to be called brilliant even," and at the same time, " shows evident trace.....of resting on an old and weighty tradition." (Vedānta Sūtras, p. xvii.)

The Śrībhāṣya is, the oldest commentary extant next to Śaṅkara's. The Vedānta Pārijāta Saurabha of Nimvārka, the oldest representative of a third school of commentators is, however, in some respects, the best living commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. Nimvārka is the founder of one of the old Vaiṣṇava sects, known after him the Nimvārka sect. His commentary has been enlarged by his pupil, Śrīnivāsācāryya, in his own commentary. These two excellent commentaries have only recently been published, and have not yet been translated into English. The sooner it is translated into English, the better. Nimvārka's standpoint is known as Unity-in-difference View, Vedāveda-Vāda.

Viṣṇusvāmi, the founder of another Vaiṣṇava sect, also wrote a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras. In his interpretation of the Vedānta Philosophy, he took a position intermediate between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, known as Viśuddhādvaita-Vāda. His work is hardly available now.

Madvācāryya represents another school of interpreters. His standpoint is deistic. Valadeva in his commentary has taken a position intermediate between Rāmānuja and Madva. Vijñānabhikṣu in his commentary has taken rather an original view of the Vedāntic doctrine of causation; but unfortunately he has not been able to stick to it consistently. There are many other commentators on the Vedānta Sūtras and the commentaries of many of these are still available. What an immensely profound and lasting impression must have been created by Bādarāyaṇa's work to have attracted so many generations of thinkers and scholars to do their

very best to explain and elucidate its teachings for the benefit of humanity in general and their countrymen in particular!

Different Vedānta Schools: their teachings.

Unqualified Monism.

Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara stand to-day as the foremost representatives of Unqualified Monistic Vedānta. *There is, according to them, only One Reality, Brahman. Brahman is Pure Being, entirely homogeneous, characterless and immutable. The world of change and generation is, accordingly, a mere appearance of delusion caused by Ignorance, Māyā, or Avidyā.* The world of plurality, we are told, is like the objects experienced in a dream. The latter last as long as the dream lasts. The world of experience, likewise lasts as long as Ignorance lasts. And, as soon as the individual is roused from ignorance and realises his identity with the Absolute, the world of plurality vanishes, as dream-objects vanish on the return of consciousness. Both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara have compared the manifold of experience sometimes with dream-objects, sometimes with fictitious magical appearances, and again sometimes with such other kinds of optical illusions as mirage and the like. Śaṅkara has, however, often failed to adhere consistently to his position. He has sometimes described Māyā, Illusion, the central plank of his system, as an inscrutable and mysterious power associated with the very nature of the Absolute, under whose influence, Brahman, which alone is real, appears to be broken up into fictitious appearances of a world of plurality. The consciousness of the difficulty involved in such a position, however, soon forces him to shift his position, and to ascribe Avidyā, Ignorance, to man, and to represent it as a veil screening from the unenlightened soul its true nature, its infinitude, and thereby giving rise to the fictitious appearance of a world of plurality, phantoms of

its own unenlightened imagination. Sometimes again, though very rarely, he takes another view of Illusion, the only view consistent with the teachings of the Vedānta, and represents it as Ignorance, which makes the individual regard the world of plurality as existing independently of, and apart from Brahman, and identify his self with his body, the physical adjuncts. But immediately he runs away from this position, and describes the body itself as a phantom of fictitious creation of Illusion. Under the influence of Ignorance, the unenlightened soul, says he, thinks himself to be an agent, and as subject to pleasure and pain, though in reality there is "neither pleasure nor pain, neither degeneration nor death." "The dawn of true knowledge procures freedom from this bondage of Ignorance; and the dream of the world of plurality, of action and change, of generation and death, forthwith vanishes." This is Saṅkara's Unqualified Monism. The modern followers of Saṅkara, conscious of his constant shifting of the ground, have necessarily been driven to maintain that Illusion possesses the two-fold property of veiling and distorting, and that it causes the individual to set a limit to its infinitude, and to regard himself as subject to change and vicissitudes, and at the same time makes the Reality itself appear as other than what it is, and split up into a world of fictitious finite existents. Saṅkara's view of the world is sometimes described as Image-View, the doctrine of Reflection or Pratibimba. The universe is to the Reality what Reflections or images of the sun, for instance, are to the sun itself. The sun alone is real, but the reflections are unreal. "Suppose that the sun is shining on the sea," said Xenophanes, "and that his light is broken by the waves into a multitude of lesser lights, of all colours and of all forms; and suppose

that the sun is conscious, conscious of this multitude of lights, this diversity of shifting colours, this plurality of dancing forms; would this consciousness contain or represent the truth, the real? Certainly it would not. .....Take away the sea, and these various reflections no longer are.'' With the disappearance of Ignorance, likewise says Śaṅkara, after Gauḍapāda, the world of plurality forthwith vanishes. Śaṅkara's position can be best summarised in these words of Pancadaśī, '' The world, though unreal, appears as real, like elephants, etc., seen in a dream. And, as soon as the consciousness of duality vanishes and the conviction that nothing exists but Brahman, becomes firm and lasting, the individual is said to have attained salvation, even in this life.'' (II. 47 and 68.)

This is how Śaṅkara himself summarises his position in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras at the end of the first four Sūtras :—'' The Vedānta leads us to the comprehension of the identity of Brahman and the self, and that, as soon as the knowledge of the non-dual Self and the unreality of the not-self supervenes, all objects and knowing agents or subjects vanish.''

Unity-in-Difference.

With Rāmānuja also Brahman is, of course, the only Ultimate Reality. But, according to him, it is not a Pure Being. It, on the contrary, contains within itself the very germ of the world of plurality, as it were, and accordingly manifests itself in an endless process of change and generation. The world of plurality, he holds in opposition to Śaṅkara, are manifestations or modes of the Ultimate Reality. And, as modes of the Real, their reality and independence is only relatively real. Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the manifold of experience, and everything that exists is the expression of the Reality. The elements of plura-

lity were latent in the very nature of Brahman, and in creation the unevolved elements became manifest. Brahman as the principle of change and generation evolves all plurality from within, as modes of its own self-manifestation, and exists in them all as their common indwelling Spirit, internal Guide and Ruler. Every individual soul has, according to Rāmānuja, an individuality of its own, and at the same time, it lives, moves, and has its being in the all-embracing unity of Brahman. Thus Brahman's unity is not opposed to the plurality of modes and their individual differences; these are, on the contrary, necessary modes of the Absolute's self-manifestation. Salvation does not, according to him, imply denial of the world of plurality nor the absorption of the individual self into the universal and the consequent cessation of individuality, as it is with Śaṅkara; it, on the contrary, consists in the individual's conscious union in will with the Infinite Spirit, immanent both in the world of self and not-self, and in a living participation in the untold wealth of the larger and wider life of the Absolute. But such union and living fellowship is not attainable, says he, through knowledge alone, but through knowledge combined with love, obedience and reverence, Bhakti.

Bhedābheda-vāda. Viśuddhādvaita-Vāda.

Nimvārka's stand-point is, in all essential respects, except one, substantially the same as that of Rāmānuja. Both strongly emphasise the reality of the world of plurality as necessary modes of the Absolute's self-manifestation, and as materials and means of its conscious life as concrete Spirit. But Nimvārka in opposition to Rāmānuja, equally strongly emphasises the fact that the Reality at the same time transcends all its modes, and, as an infinite fountain of energy, is not exhausted in them. Rāmānuja has not been able satisfactorily to ex-

plain those teachings of the Vedānta which deal with the transcendent aspect of the Reality. In Nimvārka's system alone, we meet with a clear and comprehensive exposition of the Vedantic Panentheism. And this is what imparts to his commentary a special value of its own. Nimvārka has, moreover, nothing to do with what Professor Max Müller calls ' Mythology ' in Rāmānuja's system. From " Brahman, according to Rāmānuja," to use Professor Max Müller's words (Six Sys., 246), " springs Saṁkarṣaṇa, the individual self, from Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna, mind, from Pradyumna, Aniruddha, or the Ego." In Nimvārka, the Vedāntic view of Unity-in-difference has found its clearest and best expression. The view of Chaitanya, the great founder of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, was also the same. He strongly condemned Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Vedāntic teachings, his theory of Illusion, and characterised it as distinctly anti-Vedāntic. The Vedānta, he held, distinctly teaches the unity-in-difference view of Reality.

Viśuddhādvaita-Vāda.

Viṣṇusvāmī took a position intermediate between Rāmānuja and Nimvārka, on the one hand, and Śaṅkara on the other. Like the former two, he also held the world of plurality to be real; but, in opposition to them both, he held final liberation to consist in the complete absorption of the finite soul into the Infinite Spirit.

Deism.

Madhva, also known as Ānandatīrtha, held the world of plurality, as created in time, and as having an independent existence, apart and outside of Brahman, and conceived the latter as an extra-cosmic Creator and Ruler of the universe. He entirely ignored or endeavoured to explain away all those Vedantic passages wherein the unity between Brahman, the Cause, and the finite existents, the effects or modes, was emphasised, as did Śaṅ-

kara ignore or explain away the passages of the opposite kind.

Viñjānabhikṣu has, in dealing with the Vedāntic doctrine of Causality, represented Brahman, the Ultimate Reality, as the Adhiṣṭhāna-Kāraṇa, 'Ablative Cause,' if we can use such an expression of the world of plurality. The world of plurality, as evolved and existing in it, is but a partial expression of the Reality. The Reality is only inadequately manifested in all its modes, and it, at the same time, forms the support of all its modes. He therefore distinguishes his conception of causal doctrine from those of both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. According to Śaṅkara's Distortion theory, Vivartavāda, the world of plurality is a perversion or distortion of the Reality, as the mirage is the distortion of the sandy scene in the desert. According to Rāmānuja's modification theory, the world of plurality is the manifestation of the Reality. But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that, as the world of plurality is evolved out of the ultimate Reality, rests in and is supported by it, and as it does not exhaust the infinite of the Absolute, the Vedantic doctrine of causality should properly be called the 'Ablative Causality,' Adhiṣṭhāna-Kārana-Vāda. As the Reality is only partially manifested in its modes, and, as it forms their ultimate bond of unity and support, it constitutes the Adhiṣṭhāna-Kāraṇa, 'Ablative Cause,' of the universe. This doctrine of 'Ablative Causality' offers a clear representation of the unity-in-difference view of the Reality, held by Nimvārka. Vijñānabhikṣu has not, however, been always consistent with this position, and has often fallen into a modified type of deism.

Theological prejudices.

A difficult system of thought naturally gives rise to various interpretations. The unconscious influence of theological interests also often interferes with the cor-

rect understanding of a system. It is, therefore, no wonder if the Vedānta has been so differently interpreted by the representatives of different schools of thought and theological interests. "Both Rāmānuja and Śankara," says Professor Max Müller, "are anxious to show that they themselves are in perfect agreement with Bādarāyaṇa. Both, however, approach to the Sūtras as if they had some opinions of their own to defend and to bring in harmony with the Sūtras.....Dr. Thibaut, therefore, seems to be right when he says that both Śankara and Rāmānuja pay often less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing Bādarāyaṇa to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophical theories." (Six Systems, p. 250.) We are not prepared to accept Professor Max Müller's indictment without some qualification. Though we do not always see eye to eye with the great Vaiṣṇava commentator, Professor Max Müller has, we are obliged to say, done a grave injustice to Rāmānuja. Dr. Thibaut, whom Prof. Max Müller has mentioned in corroboration of his view, is quite clear on this point, and has, on the whole, most emphatically declared his verdict in favour of Rāmānuja. "The system of Bādarāyaṇa," justly says he, "had greater affinities with that of the Bhāgavatas and Rāmānuja than with the one of which Śankarācāryya is the classical exponent." (Vedānta Sūtras, p.c.) The Vedānta Sūtras "do not set forth," he adds, "the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman," as Śaṅkara thinks they do; "they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Īśvara (the Absolute and God) in Śaṅkara's sense; they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world; and.....they do not, with Śaṅkara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest self."

And even Prof. Max Müller himself has, elsewhere, practically expressed a similar opinion. "It is quite possible," says he (*ibid*, p. 53), "that Baudhāyana, like Rāmānuja, represented a more ancient and more faithful interpretation of Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras, and that Saṅkara's philosophy, in its unflinching monism, is his own rather than Bādarāyaṇa's. "The two points," observes Prof. Max Müller elsewhere more explicitly (*ibid*, p. 301), "which are most likely to have caused difficulty, or given offence to ordinary consciences, would seem to have been the total denial of what is meant by the reality of the objective world and the required surrender of all individuality on the part of the subject, that is, ourselves..... They certainly formed the chief stumbling block to Rāmānuja and those who had come before him, such as Baudhāyana and other Pūrvāchāryyas (earlier teachers), and led them to propound their own more humane interpretation of the Vedānta." There can be, in fact, absolutely no doubt that, as from Saṅkara's standpoint, no reality is allowed to the individual soul and to the world of plurality his interpretation of the Vedānta Sūtras is flatly opposed to the teachings of Bādarāyaṇa, as well as to those of the Upaniṣads, systematised in Bādarāyaṇa's great work. Prof. Garbe's statement that "the expositions of Śankara agree in essential points with the system which was laid down in the Brahma Sūtras," need not at all be taken seriously; for he himself frankly admits that, since the aphorisms are not "intelligible *per se*, we are unable to prove.....that Śankara was always right in his exegesis.* Under the influence of the views of Mr. Gough, as embodied in his Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, a

* Garbe, Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 18

strange view has, however, been expressed in some quarters; and it has been suggested that, although the Vedānta Sūtras lend no support whatever to the theory of Illusion, yet it is a natural development from the teachings of the Upaniṣads, "a development from within," but not an "addition to the system from without,"—"no graft but only growth."* And we are simply surprised to find that even Dr. Thibaut has at the end of his otherwise excellent Preface to his Vedānta Sūtras, virtually abandoned his own entire position, and accepted this view. Mr. Gough's view is, however, entirely based on a misreading of the Upaniṣads; and this we shall prove quite conclusively in the concluding chapter of our work.

Confession of Jacobi and its lesson.

A difficult system is always liable to misapprehension; and the more complicated it is the greater the room for misinterpretation. And theological interests and prepossessions often only aggravate the difficulties of right understanding. The confession of Jacobi is a well-known instance in point. Jacobi had the courage to confess to his friend Lessing, with Stoic frankness, his inability to prove, in opposition to Spinoza, the personality of God, and to tell his friend that he had accordingly been obliged to take refuge "in a *salto mortale*, from knowledge to faith," and thus to remain "a Christian with the heart, but a heathen with the head." This extraordinary confession, we are told, evoked from Lessing an equally frank reply. "Your *salto mortale*," said he, "by no means displeases me .....Take me with you when it comes." "If you would only step on to the spring-board," forthwith re-

* Gough, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, 1882, p. 247.

plied Jacobi, " it would come of itself." " But a leap is also necessary, which," said Lessing, " I dare not exact from my old legs and heavy head."* Jacobi's confession, inspite of Schleiermacher declaration to the contrary,† is both amusing and highly instructive, but we only want to add that both ' the stepping on the spring-board,' and ' the required leap ' do, as a matter of fact, often come unconsciously, without waiting to be ' exacted.' It is, therefore, no wonder, if it actually so happened in some cases in India in the interpretation of the Vedānta Philosophy.

PART II.

Western interpreters of the Vedānta.

But, if some of the Eastern commentators of the Vedānta have grossly misunderstood the true import of its teachings, the Western Vedāntic scholars, with rare exceptions, have, we are, with utmost pain and reluctance, constrained to observe, fared no better. They have, almost one and all, lavished unstinted praises on the Vedānta; but, strange to say, their presentations of the same are hopelessly at variance with one another. Here are some of the estimates which will speak for themselves :—

Sir Monier Williams.

" The Hindus," says Sir Monier Williams, "were Spinozists more than two thousand years before the existence of Spinoza, Darwinians, many centuries before the doctrine of evolution had been accepted by the scientists of our time, and before any word like evolution existed in any language of the world."

* Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 24.
† *Ibid*, p. 213.

" It is impossible to read the Vedānta," says Sir William Jones, a classical scholar of great repute, " without believing that Pythagoras and Plato derived their sublime theories from the same fountain with the sages of India." (Works, Calcutta Ed., Vol. I, p. 20.) Sir William Jones.

" The discovery of Indian Literature, and more particularly of Indian Religion and Philosophy," says Prof. Max Müller, " was like the recovery of an old and the discovery of a new world; and, even if we can throw but a passing glance at the treasures of ancient thought which are stored up in Sanskrit Literature, we feel that the world to which we belong has grown richer, nay, we feel proud of the unexpected inheritance in which all of us may share." (Three Lectures on Vedānta, p. 112.) " Brahman," adds he, " as conceived in the Upaniṣads, and defined by Śankara, is closely the same as Spinoza's ' Substantia '."....." If we ask what the objects of his (Brahman's) eternal thought could have been," he adds (*ibid*, p. 140), " the Vedāntist answers : ' Names and forms ' (nāma-rupe). You will perceive at once the extraordinary similarity between this theory and the Platonic theory of ideas, and still more the Stoic theory of the Logos." Again, " if the Vedānta could elaborate an ideal Monism," he says elsewhere (Six Systems, p. 79), " why not the Eleatics as well?" " Here we have," he says again, referring to the Vedānta, " in fact the Holenmerian theory of Plotinus and of Dr. Henry More, anticipated in India." (*Ibid*, p. 227.) Max Müller.

" Bhāratakhanda (India) has produced," says Colonel Jacob, " men who would have been an ornament to any society, and it has been pre-eminently a land of thinkers.....The Vedānta philosophy...is supposed to be the finest outcome of Indian thought; yet it abolishes God, as an unreality, and substitutes an impersonal 'It' Jacob.

with no consciousness, whilst its highest notion of bliss is the annihilation of personality.'' (Vedānta Sāra, Preface, p. xi.)

Hopkins. '' Plato is,'' says Professor Hopkins in his ' Religions of India,' '' full of Sānkhyan thought, worked out by him but taken from Pythagoras. Before the sixth century B. C., all the religious-philosophical ideas of Pythagoras are current in India. If there were but one or two of these cases they might be set aside as accidental coincidences, but such coincidences are too numerous to be the result of chance.'' (P. 559.)

Deussen. '' Brahman, the power from which, according to the Vedānta,'' says Prof. Deussen, '' the worlds proceed, in which they subsist, into which they finally return,—this eternal, omnipresent and omnipotent power—is identical with our Ātman, with that in each of us which we must consider our true self, the unchangeable essence of our being, the Soul. This idea alone secures to the Upaniṣads an importance reaching far beyond their land and time, for, whatever means of unveiling the secrets of Nature a future time may discover, this idea will be true for ever, from this mankind will never depart,—if the mystery of Nature is to be solved, the key of it can be found only there where alone Nature allows us an interior view of the world, that is, in ourselves. This world is Māyā, is Illusion; it is not the very reality, that is the deepest thought of the esoteric Vedānta, attained not by calculating *tarka* (reasonings), but by *anubhava* (direct inner consciousness), by returning from this variegated world to the deep recess of our own self....., a timeless, spaceless, changeless reality;.....and whatever is outside of this only true reality, is mere appearance, is Māyā, is a dream..... The accord here of Platonism and Vedāntism is wonderful.'' But this truth was

reached, says Deussen, both by Plato and the Hindus by "intuition," unlike Kant, who, adds Prof. Deussen. reached the same truth, not by intuition, but by "the way of abstract reasoning and scientific proof." "The world is Māyā, is Illusion, says Śankara—it is a world of shadows, not of realities, says Plato;—it is 'appearance only, not the thing-in-itself,' says Kant..... My Ātman (self) cannot be illusive, as Śankara shows, anticipating the *cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, for,—he also would deny, but, even in denying it, witnesses its reality .....The conclusion is that the Jīva (the individual self), being neither a part, nor a different thing, nor a variation of Brahman, must be Paramātman (the Supreme Self) fully and totally himself, a conclusion made equally by the Vedāntic Śankara, by the Platonic Plotinus, and by the Kantian Schopenhauer."*

Gough.

According to the Vedānta, says Mr. Gough, "Brahman *per se*, is the principle of reality, the one and only being; Self alone is, and all else only seems to be .....The image of the sun upon a piece of water expands with the expansion, and contracts with the contraction, of the ripples on the surface, and is severed by the breaking of the ripples.....It is in a similar manner that the real Self (as says Śankara) is reflected upon its counterfeits, the bodies, the sentient creatures, and thus fictitiously limited, shares their growth and diminution, and other sensible modes of beings.....Apart from the various counterfeits, the Self (Brahman) is changeless and unvaried." Plotinus likewise, adds he, "speaks of One life in all things living, like the one light shining in many houses, as if itself many, and yet

* Deussen, Outlines of Indian Philosophy: the Philosophy of the Vedānta, pp. 22-23, 55-59.

one and undivided.....like one face seen upon a multitude of mirrors.....In all the forms that surround me," likewise says Fichte, continues Mr. Gough, " I behold the reflection of my being, broken up into countless diversified shapes, as the morning sun, broken in a thousand dew-drops, sparkles towards itself." (Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, pp. 45-50.)

Schopenhauer.

" In the whole world," says Schopenhauer, "there is no study so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Upaniṣads. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death."

Garbe.

" The most striking resemblance,—I am almost tempted to say, sameness,—is," says Prof. Garbe, " between the doctrine of the All-One in the Upaniṣads, and the philosophy of the Eleatics.....Parmenides holds that reality is due alone to this Universal Being, neither created nor to be destroyed.....that everything which exists in multiplicity and is subject to multiplicity is not real. All these doctrines are congruent with the chief contents of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta system." (Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 32.)

The aforesaid estimates examined.

It is needless to multiply instances. There is, no doubt, a clear and unmistakable ring of sincerity running through every line of the above estimates. But what do they indicate? Vedāntism has, in those estimates, been held by various thinkers to resemble the teachings of the Eleatics, Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Spinozism, Kantianism, as well as the systems of Fichte and Schopenhauer. Nay, the same scholars have, in their estimates, been eager to show its likeness with two and even with three of these Western systems. Prof. Max Müller, for instance, discovers a close resemblance between the Vedāntic Brahman and Spinoza's Substance, and at the same time, perceives a striking similarity be-

tween the Vedāntic Brahman and the Eleatic One, and again between the Vedāntic conception of Brahman with ' names ' and ' forms,' the unevolved manifold of the world of sense, as its eternal object of thought, and the Platonic theory of Ideas, and still more, with the Stoic theory of Logos. Prof. Deussen, again, finds a remarkable agreement between the supposed Vedāntic conception of the unreality of Nature and Ātman (self), the ground of all Illusion, on the one hand, and the Platonic, Neo-Platonic and the Kantian conception of Nature, and its ground, on the other. Mr. Gough, again, discovers a striking similarity between the Vedāntic Brahman or Supreme Self, on the one hand, and Neo-Platonic and Fichtean conception of God, on the other. *Such comparisons do betray, to say the least, a good deal of looseness and confusion of thought. These Western systems have, no doubt, several points of similarity amongst them, as well as with the Vedānta. But these points of similarity are more superficial than fundamental in any sense of the term. They lie on the surface, whereas the differences among these various systems are radical and deep-seated. In fact, no two of the aforesaid systems can be treated as fundamentally alike. And yet, the Vedānta is represented to have a remarkable agreement with so many of more or less radically unlike Western systems of thought!*

To begin with Spinoza and Plato, for instance. With Spinoza, Substance is the cause of the universe, " as the apple is the cause of its red colour," as Weber puts it, or " as milk is the cause of its whiteness, sweetness and liquidity." It is the immanent cause of the universe with its multiplicity of things and beings, which are but modes of Substance, and do, in their totality, constitute substance itself. " The words

Spinoza, Plato, Eleatics, and the Vedānta contrasted.

God and universe,'' with Spinoza, stand for one and the same thing. They are the same Reality, looked at from two different standpoints. Conceived as the ground of the universe, God is *natura naturans*, and viewed as effect, as the totality of all existents, is *natura naturata*. But with Plato, the Idea is immutable and transcendent, far above the world of change and generation. It furnishes us no explanation of real change, real process in the world of generation. In addition to the Idea, Plato requires a second principle, ' empty space,' though he calls it, a subtle principle of '' pure quantity, containing in some mysterious way the element of sense,''* as co-eval with it, to represent and materialise the Ideas. This second principle does not certainly limit the Idea, but is inadequate to represent it fully and thereby becomes the ground of all imperfections in the world. Plato represents his second principle as ' non-being.' But he errs in separating the two, and in representing the genus or type as a transcendent entity. His mistake was not in '' exalting *νους over αισθησι*,'' as Weber puts it (*ibid*, p. 101), '' but in making two separate and even incompatible principles of *νους* and *αισθησι*.'' † Plato has, no doubt, endeavoured to bring into somewhat closer connection and harmony the world of Ideas and the world of experience, but to use Adamson's words (*ibid*, p. 132), '' the effort is a failure.'' *The ideas put outside of the particulars, serve neither to explain the existence of the particulars, nor our knowledge of the same.* Thus, with Plato, there is an inherent antithesis, an unbridgeable gulf, between the transcendent world of eternal and immutable ideas,

* Adamson, Ancient Greek Philosophy, p. 127.

† Weber, History of Philosophy, pp. 93, 101.

and the world of change and generation. But with Spinoza, the world of change and generation, the Substance revealed in its multiplicity of modes, and viewed as an eternal process, is all in all, and constitutes the only Reality. Again, with Plato, creation is but the realisation of an End, the Idea of the Good, though an external End, somehow superimposed on a material more or less foreign to it in character. But Spinoza rejects final causes altogether. With him, creation is but a determination from within, the outcome of a mere unconscious spontaneity. Thus, the two systems widely differ from each other, and can, by no means, be brought into harmony with each other without materially altering their essential character.

Plato, however, never regarded the world of change and generation as unreal in the sense of illusive appearances. With him, the world of generation not only exists, but it is eternal. And herein, again, Plato is distinctly opposed to the Eleatics. With the latter, the world of change and generation is a mere ' illusion,' a ' dream '; whereas with Plato, the Ideas are only more real than the objects of sense. The Ideas are, with him, the ultimate realities, and the objects of sense possess only *a borrowed and dependent reality*, a reality which they receive from the Ideas. The Ideas form the Archetypes, the eternal patterns, and the objects of sense are only their copies, *their imitations and imperfect reproductions*. The world of sense requires something other than itself for its explanation, namely, the Ideas; and it is in this sense alone, besides being mere imperfect reproductions of the Ideas, that the objects of sense are less real than the Ideas, which contain in themselves their own ground of existence and are, therefore, more real. But all indivi-

dual differences are merged in the All-One of the Eleatics, which is eternally immutable,—" One only God," wherein there is " neither generation nor corruption, neither change nor origin. (Adamson, *ibid*, p. 32), and which, is by its very nature, above all qualifications, all relation, all multiplicity and all change. It alone exists, in its eternal purity and self-sufficiency, without movement and without action; and " everything else is merely an accident, an appearance, an illusion." (*Vide* Weber, *ibid*, pp. 27-29.) The Pure Being of Xenophanes and Parmenides, as totally devoid of all positive contents, is evidently an abstraction pure and simple. " It resembles the garment of the King," in the fable, as Weber's puts it (*ibid*, p. 32), " the finer texture of which everybody," admired, " until, at last, a little child exclaimed in the simplicity of his heart : 'why, the king is naked.' *Instead of being the richest of the categories, Pure Being is, indeed, the lowest and poorest of them all. Divorced of all positive contents, it is equivalent to empty nothing, mere vacuum and, as such, incapable of explaining even the least and smallest of the existents.* Thus Plato also essentially differs from the Eleatics.

In the Vedānta, however, as we shall see hereafter, the special features of both Platonism and Spinozism stand harmoniously blended together as elements of one consistent and indivisible organic whole. Spinoza's erroneous conception of Substance was the weakest point in his system. Substance is not a *substratum*. It is the essence or reality considered as a necessary principle of activity, as Weber puts it. It is a living and energising totality of its modes. But though a totality of its modes, it is not in any sense, a mere mechanical aggregate, as it is in Spinoza's system. It is a living totality, united with all its modes by an organic tie. It

is the efficient and dynamical cause of its modes and not a cause in Spinoza's sense, and, as expressions of one identical Reality, the modes are but its effects or modifications. The Vedāntic Brahman is such a Substance, and as the dynamical cause of its expressions, it is indissolubly bound up with, and immanent in, the effects; the effects also, as expressions of the self-same cause, are inseparable from it. "Modes are unfolded, revealed, and expressed substance; the effect is the cause, affected, explicated, manifested." As organically united with the cause, the effect does, at the same time, react, in its turn, on the cause. And it is the power of reaction of the effect upon the cause which enhances its importance and gives the effect an element of freedom, which is entirely lacking in the effects in Spinoza's system. The effects are not, indeed, "so many slaves," to use Weber's words, "following the triumphal chariot of the First Cause, which excludes all other causality, and with regard to which the relative cause are nothing; but each cause takes part in the Absolute.....In reciprocal action, the two spheres, in which being is divided when it becomes essence and phenomenon, are re-united, and thus become typical totality." Such a conception of Substance is however, entirely foreign to the Spinozistic system; and this is what vitiates his entire system. But this very notion of Substance constitutes, as we shall see hereafter, the basic principle of Vedāntism. Moreover, creation, according to the Vedānta, is the realisation of an end, an end which is immanent in the creative principle itself, and in the manifold of creation. Creation is thus, according to the Vedānta, a conscious process of self-differentiation on the part of the Ultimate Reality. *Evidently, therefore, Vedāntism is the synthesis of the two opposed systems of Pl[illegible]nism and Spino-*

zism, and is, at the same time, widely different from each of them, taken by itself. Such a synthesis, Plotinus at Rome, Philo at Alexandria and Proclus in Syria, endeavoured to accomplish in Neo-Platonism; but they failed. Śaṅkara's Unqualified Monism has certainly much in common, as Prof. Garbe rightly thinks, with the Eleatic speculation. But one should by no means identify the same with Vedāntism, which as we shall see clearly hereafter, radically differs from Śaṅkara's Abstract Monism.

Neo-Platonism and Vedāntism.

In Neo-Platonism, more particularly in the teachings of Plotinus, the Greek genius made its last serious attempt, to state clearly the results of the ten centuries of reflection and to express its final conclusions concerning God, the world, and the human soul. While both Plato and Aristotle placed God far above Nature, and the Stoics completely merged him in the world, and regarded the latter as God himself, the Neo-Platonists endeavoured, as the Vedāntists had done long before in India, a synthesis of these two phases of thought. But, in order to attain this end, they unfortunately followed a wrong track, and the longed-for synthesis was never reached. To attain the aforesaid end, a distinction was made between the essence and power of God; and, by uniting the *Pneuma* doctrine with Aristotle's conception of God, the forces operative in Nature were represented as the workings of Pure Spirit. God in his essence still remained " as the absolutely One and Unchangeable," " exalted above all finite determinations and oppositions," and it is only in relation to his workings, which made up the world of plurality, that he came to be conceived as the Infinite One. The workings of the Deity were conceived not as self-differentiations into which the substance of the First divides, not as ' emanations ' in

the proper sense of the term, but rather as " overflowing by-products ," which in no way affect the ultimate nature of the Substance itself, even though proceeding from the very necessity of its essence. And it was held that " workings of the One and Good as they become more and more separate from their source, the individual spheres, become more and more imperfect, and at last change suddenly into the dark, evil opposite matter "* —like a stream of light, gradually decreasing in radiance and intensity, as it travels further and further away from its original source, and finally losing itself completely in darkness.

Thus, with Neo-Platonism, the universe emanates from the Absolute, as light radiates from the sun, or heat from the fire. But there is a conscious or unconscious desire, we are told, in all things so emanated, to return to their original source and to be absorbed into it. Individuality is thus not an ultimate form of existence, but merely a transitory stage, " a passage from God, the principle of things, to God, their final goal." (Weber, *ibid;* pp. 170-171.) Released from the All-Soul, as one of its endless workings, the individual soul is thus cast into the sensuous body out of its prior state of purity, " on account of its guilty inclination towards what is void and vain." And the ultimate end of its existence is to get rid of its sensuous desires to purify itself, so as to be able to return to the Deity from which it came.

Now, the most important feature in Plotinus is his interpretation of Nature in terms of psychical life. With him, even corporeality is an expression of the soul, and the material is but the outer husk or gross embodiment of active souls and spirits, working in and through

* Windelband, History of Philosophy, 1914, pp. 244-45.

it. But the weakness of his system lies in the very nature of his conception of the universe as an overflow, a diffusion of the divine life. The stages in the overflow are spirituality, animality, and corporeality. The succeeding emanations are more and more imperfect than the preceding ones. And the "creation is a fall, a progressive degeneration of the Divine." (Weber, *ibid*, p. 171.) And this is exactly where Neo-Platonism differs from Vedāntism. The Neo-Platonic conception of creation was, however, a corollary necessarily following from their fundamental position. In their veneration for an empty abstraction, its promulgators exaggerated the transcendency of the Supreme Principle. In spite of his idealisation of the corporeal world, the Deity, even with Plotinus, remained far beyond "the intellectual as well as the sensuous world, and therefore without consciousness and without activity." And his followers, Proclus and Jamblichus, "set above 'ἐν' of Plotinus a still higher, completely ineffable One," and altogether relieved him of his "share of the governance of things," now committed to the custody of "the secondary unities emanating from it."* It was, therefore, no wonder if they declared the Absolute as "for ever unknowable; and if in their systems magic took the place of religion and ethics. *Reality, according to the Vedānta, on the other hand, contains in its very nature, the principle of change and plurality; and the creation is a free and conscious process of self-manifestation, and not a 'fall' of the Absolute.* And this is what makes the two systems, in spite of their apparent similarity, widely opposed in character.

* Windelband, *ibid*, pp. 237-8.

Kantianism and Vedāntism.

Kant's great contribution and failure.

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tells us that the forms and principles underlying our experience, though empirical in their origin, are only capable of an empirical use, and that knowledge is entirely limited to phenomena and that the thing-in-itself, the transcendent object, is unknown and unknowable. But Kant nevertheless holds that the existence of the thing-in-itself, even though as a mere limiting idea, a something-I-know-not-what, is a necessary assumption involved in our very experience. Nay, there are utterances here and there in all his Critiques, which clearly indicate that Kant was, at times, inclined to regard "the thing-in-itself not merely as the cause of the matter of knowledge, but also as the cause of the definite forms under which we apprehend and arrange the matter."* And when this admission or suggestion of Kant is taken into consideration, and the corollaries necessarily following from it are drawn, Kant's whole system undergoes a great change, and much of the apriorism and phenomenalism, and inconsistencies of his system, as Höffding points out, vanish. But, in spite of such occasional suggestions, Kant distinctly tells us that nothing can be definitely known about the transcendental object. "Even when the thing-in-itself is regarded as the cause of the form, as well as of the matter of our knowledge, there is, we are told, very little that we can know about it, absolutely nothing definite, a great X, which admits of no scientific determination."†

In the Critique of the Practical Reason, however, Kant first comes, in the categorical imperative of the

* Höffding, History of Modern philosophy, Vol. II, p. 61. *Cf.* Critique of Pure Reason, 1st Ed., p. 494.

† Höffding, *ibid*, p. 62. *Cf.* Prolegomena, 32 and 57.

Moral Law, indirect touch with the Supersensuous world, and discovers that man is "a citizen of two worlds," and that as a member of the intelligible world, he is self-legislative, and lays down law for the guidance of his own self, as a member of the phenomenal world—that "he is at once law-giver and subject." Here he discovers for the first time, that to find the unconditioned, he need not go beyond himself. He is, moreover, now forced to assume that, to make morality possible, virtue and happiness must, in the long run, coincide, and that there must, therefore, be "a deep underlying harmony between the world of nature and that of freedom," and that we must, accordingly, "postulate a power which is able to reduce the two worlds to inner harmony, so that morality shall not feel itself an alien in this world." (Höffding, *ibid*, p. 95.) *In this admission Kant came within the very sight of the pinnacles of the fabric of Vedāntic speculation, and a further advance along the right road would have brought him straight into it. But he followed a wrong track, and sought for that ground of unity and harmony between the two worlds in something like a Leibnizian extra-cosmic, supra-mundane divine Monad.* The Critique of Judgment, however, offered Kant a fresh opportunity to re-consider his position, and to bridge over the wide gulf created in his earlier Critiques, which threatened to separate the world of nature and necessity from that of ends and freedom. The recognition of the deep-seated inter-connection of all things in the universe, and of the universal cosmic order and harmony had once led Kant, in his pre-critical days, to think that the whole universe, as a system of inter-related existents, must have its ultimate ground in an Absolute and all-comprehensive principle— "One infinite power which stirs in each particular element," and

is, at the same time, the "common background," wherein "both the mechanical order and the purposiveness of nature find their explanation."* Even amidst the bustles and tumults of the critical period, the conviction of his youth returned to him from time to time. And now it came once again, and it again appeared to Kant that, though mechanism and teleology seemed opposed in nature, yet "in the hidden ground of Nature, the mechanical and teleological forms of combination may be united in one single principle." (Höffding, *ibid*, p. 108.) In the universality of the sentiments of the Beautiful and the Sublime, and more particularly, in the adaptations and designs visible in the organic world, he once again found "reasons *a priori* for regarding Nature as a whole," to use Windelband's words, "from the point of view of purposiveness, and for seeing in the vast mechanism of her causal connections the realising of a supreme end of reason," which owing to the primacy of the practical reason, could only be regarded as "the expression of the Moral Law,"—"the divine world-order." But Kant failed to work out the idea, and thus remained far away from the conception of Vedāntic Panentheism.

Fichte and the Vedānta.

"The Ego which we know in experience is," with Fichte, to use Höffding's words, "always limited, enclosed in a system of limitation." It has objects, outside of it, which is not of its own production. The world of non-ego must, therefore, be attributed to the operation of some principle which is "active in our consciousness," and is yet "more comprehensive than the finite

* Hoffding, *ibid*, pp. 34, 42, 43, 109. *Vide* Kant, General Physiogony and Theory of the Universe (1755) and 'Only Possible Ground of Proof for the Being of God' (176

ego." In such a principle, in pure or infinite Ego, we can, according to Fichte, discover an explanation and ground of the world of objects which surrounds and sets a limit to the finite ego, and, through such opposition, enables it to become what it is, a self-conscious subject. This ultimate principle, by its subtle operation, thus gives rise both to the finite ego and to the non-ego, but, as nothing can set a limit to its free activity, we can, Fichte tells us, never know or discover it by reflection. With a sound and right conscience, we can, however, understand, why there must needs be an actual world to serve as a condition of our very existence as a self-conscious rational and moral being, as a condition of our self-consciousness and moral freedom and self-realisation. A world of duty, however, presupposes, says he, a belief in a moral world-order, a conception of an order of things wherein it is possible for us always to do our duty and work towards complete spiritual freedom as the ultimate end of our existence,—" an order of things which does not indeed appear in sensuous experience, but of which, nevertheless, I feel myself a member every time that I act from purely ideal motives." But it is an order which consists in continuous and endless development, and is not finished once for all—it is a universal and necessary order, and not a mere " contingent order, presupposing in its turn, the existence outside ourselves of a being to whom the order is due." Every particular action must be done in life, as part of a series which leads the agent to complete spiritual freedom. And "in this way the infinite ego is realised in the empirical world." (Höffding, *ibid*, pp. 148-49.)

In spite of Fichte's repeated protests, he has failed to extricate himself from the charge of subjective idealism. The non-Ego, in his system, is nothing but a

product of the unconscious ego. "In order to become a reality, the ideal ego," as Weber puts it, "divides itself into a plurality of historical subjects, and realises itself in the moral relations established between them..... Considered apart from the individuals which realise it, the Absolute or ideal ego is," in Fichte's system, "a mere abstraction. The real God is.....the God-man." But, under the influence of Spinoza's teachings, Fichte modified his views, and said, "the subject is a limited being, and God cannot be conceived as such. God is the moral order of the world, the freedom that gradually realises itself in it; he is nothing but that." (Weber, *ibid*, p. 486.)

In spite of all his protestations to the contrary, it is evident that Fichte has done scanty justice to the concreteness and reality of nature, and has merely hypostatised an abstraction under the name of Moral Order. "No order," as says Lotze, "is however separable from the ordered material in which it is realised, still less can precede (as it does in Fichte's system) such material as a conditioning or creative force; the order must ever be a relation of something which exists, after or during its existence. Hence, if it is nothing but Order, as its name says, it is never that which orders, which is what we seek." "Could that World Order," adds he, "ever bring together any plurality to the unity of any definite relation, or maintain such a unity, if it were not, at the same time, present in each individual of the plurality, and sensitive to every state occurring in all other individuals, and capable also of bringing the reciprocal relations of all into the intended form, by an alteration of position determined by reference to their remoteness from the point aimed at?"* There can evidently be

* Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Edinburgh, 1887, Vol. I

only one answer to this query. The fact is that Fichte, in order to avoid the seeming dualism between 'sense' and 'form' in the Kantian system fell into an opposite blunder, and then, to get rid of the charge of Subjective Idealism, he was unconsciously driven to hypostatise an abstraction, under the name of Moral Order. *The Moral Order, to be of any meaning, must needs imply an ordering principle stirring and pulsating in the individual elements belonging to the order, and unifying them all into the unity of an organic whole*, and, at the same time, imparting to each of its members a reality of its own, so as to enable it to live, move and have its being in the same, and to contribute in harmony towards one common end. The Moral Order, referred to by Yājñavalkya in the Brih. Up., as we shall see, is exactly of this latter kind; and, as such, the Vedāntic conception of the Moral Order has hardly anything in common with that of Fichte.

Schopenhauer and the Vedānta. Schopenhauer's great contributions and failure.

In opposition to Hegel, Schopenhauer very rightly held that the most essential and fundamental principle in us is the Will, and that the reason or thought is but a "derived and secondary phenomenon," a modification of the Will." And what is the deepest and most fundamental in us, he aptly argued after Leibniz, must needs also be the ultimate principle and essence of all existents. Matter is only the sensuous manifestation, the visible form, of the Will, and the world, considered in its essence, is a Will, that objectifies itself, and gives itself a form and visible existence. Thus the Will, or the Will-to-be, is, according to Schopenhauer, the ultimate principle of organisation. But, in assuming form, and in producing specific things, and beings, the Will, he held, worked as an unconscious or blind impulse; and that it was only in higher forms of exist-

ents that this unconscious impulse attained sentiency, consciousness, or self-consciousness, as the case might be. But, though the manifestations of the Will thus obeyed the laws of time and space, they were not applicable to the Will in itself. "The Will is a perpetual desire to be, the never-ending source of the phenomenal world. The individuals come and go, but the Will, the desire which produces them, is eternal. Birth and death do not apply to the Will, but only to its manifestations." (Weber, *ibid*, p. 552.) The inner essence of things and beings is thus, we are told, eternal and imperishable; and bodies, alone as mere expressions of the wills inhabiting them or rather as mere pulsations made visible, of one eternal and universal Will-to-be, are subject to the laws of generation and death.

Schopenhauer, it is true, asserted that "the world is my idea," but he, like his master, Kant, never denied its reality. He only distinguished between the world as it is in itself and as it appears to be. He, no doubt, regarded the phenomenal world as the product of the very constitution of the human mind, but nevertheless he held that it is the manifestation of a Reality which exists independently of all finite sentient and thinking beings. Though the world of phenomena is the product of our intellectual organisation, there is still a higher Reality, an Absolute, a thing-in-itself, he tells us, which reveals itself to us through our sensibility. The sensations are received from without and come from a real cause existing independently of us; and the understanding refers them to an external cause conceived as existing apart from our bodies and acting in time. But the World-Will, we are told, being a blind and impetuous impulse, a mere "Will-to-live-and-enjoy" is not only the source of all life, but of all evils as well. And "the world,"

says he, " instead of being the ' best possible world,' is the worst of all." All history, he adds, " is merely an interminable series of murders, robberies, intrigues and lies," and " the alleged human virtues.....are nothing but refined egoism, *splendida vitia*." (Weber, p. 552.)

The real significance and value of Schopenhauer's system lies in the fact that, in his search for the ultimate Reality, he appealed to inner experience. It is here, indeed, that we have an immediate peep into the secret chamber of the activities of the Absolute, and are directly in touch with " a part of existence," as Höffding puts it, " as it is in itself;" and we, accordingly, naturally and rightly infer that the essence of the rest of the world, being the manifestation of one identical principle, must also be more or less similar to that of our own selves. Schopenhauer's great contribution was thus to describe the essence of all things and beings by its right name : Will. " No substance," Leibniz had said long before, " without effort;" and ' effort ' is only an expression of Will. *Schopenhauer, rendered a great service in emphasising this great truth and in representing the ultimate world-principle as Will.* The Will is, indeed, at the basis of all things. It is, to use Weber's words (*ibid*, p. 600), in the ultimate analysis, " the higher unity of Force and Idea, the common denominator, and the only one to which physics and morals can be reduced : it is being in its fulness. Everything else is mere phenomenon. Matter and thought are nothing but accidents." Materialism has failed to explain the ego. Bi-substantialistic spiritualism which regards thought, the essence of mind, as opposed to extension, the supposed essence of matter, is incapable of explaining nature and the possibility of knowledge. ' Extended substance ' and ' thinking substance ' are

but logical abstractions. Concrete Spiritualism alone, which treats Will as the ultimate basis of all things, is, indeed, the only truly universal metaphysics.

But Schopenhauer completely misunderstood the ultimate nature of the Will. He unfortunately failed to distinguish the accidents of his own life, his own impetuous and tumultuous individual propensities and passions, which caused him so much troubles all his life, from what may be called normal and healthy expressions of the Will, and "made a truly romantic attempt," to use Prof. Höffding's words, "to make his own experience of life the measure of all existence." (*Ibid*, p. 237.) Will does, no doubt, strive after being, but it does so not merely to be and enjoy, but to realise its *summum bonum*, the highest good of its existence. A life of greed and reckless self-indulgence always frustrates its own end. And, in the economy of nature, he alone lives and thrives, who lives for an ideal, for something that is higher and nobler than mere life and enjoyment. The World Will does, indeed, strive after being, but it does so with a view to realise, through all finite and relative ends, an ultimate end, the absolute good. Had the essence of the ultimate ground of things been there Will-to-live at any cost, the voluntary self-sacrifice of a patriot or a martyr would have been impossible, and remained a riddle and an enigma. The moral law clearly reveals to us that there is something much higher than mere Will-to-live, and that there is above our individual Will a higher and nobler Will which strives after an ideal, *Wille zum Guten*, and inspires us in our daily life, to set our own individual Will in accord with it, and to work out our salvation by regulating our impulses, thoughts and activities in response to its demands. This, and not the *Wille zum Leben* of Schopenhauer, is the true essence

of the ultimate World-principle, and, therefore, also of all finite existents.

Schopenhauer also failed, equally lamentably, to do justice to the element of personality in man, which is of real value and true worth to us all as living beings. He regarded human individuality as entirely transitory and ephemeral, as a mere frail water-bubble, accidentally brought into being on the surface of the sea, as it were, only to disappear and sink, in the twinkling of an eye, back into the dark, bottomless abyss, out of which it arose. Thus, if Leibniz and Herbart sacrificed the unity of the universe to the plurality of the individuals, Schopenhauer, like Spinoza, fell into the opposite blunder, and sacrificed the reality of the individuals, which is of supreme value to us, to the principle of Unity. And it was his metaphysically erroneous and morally unsound conception of the nature of the creative Will that vitiated his entire system, and made it impossible for him to see that it was quite possible to deduce the differences of the phenomenal world, consistently with the fact of the relative independence and reality of a plurality of existents, from a single principle, which stirs and pulsates in all things, gives them their being, relative freedom and individuality, and unites them all, at the same time, in its all-embracing totality, seeking in and through them, as finite and relative ends, the ultimate attainment of the highest good.

Schopenhauer was, it will not perhaps be out of place to mention here, also guilty of a grave Psychological error. "The will always remains," says he, "the same at all stages, however different knowledge may be .....Knowledge is called into being to serve the will; but good servant though it may be, it, in its turn, exercises no influence on the will." And yet, we are told,

" true remorse and true virtue arise with the dawning conviction that individuality is an illusion," and that perfect peace and tranquillity is only attainable by those " who through complete resignation entirely negate their own will-to-live.* The two statements are evidently contradictory. If knowledge " exercises no influence on the will," it is certainly absurd to talk of " the dawning conviction " of the unreality of the individuality as a source of " true remorse and true virtue," and of " complete resignation," and ' negation ' of the will-to-live, or attainment of Nirvāṇa. In fact on the hypothesis of the futility of knowledge, deliverance, even in Schopenhauer's sense of the term, becomes a psychological impossibility.

The various estimates of the Vedānta referred to above must then be regarded, to say the least, as haphazard and superficial. *The different Western systems, to which the Vedānta has been likened, have their deep-seated and fundamental differences, in spite of their outward resemblances. And this alone most conclusively proves that there must be something quite unsound inherent in the very attempt which seeks to establish the similarity of the Vedānta to so many Western systems fundamentally different from one another.* Dr. Thibaut is, however, one of the very few, who have done some justice to the claims of the Vedānta. And we must heartily endorse Prof. Max Müller's estimate of his contributions to the cause of the Vedānta. His English translation of the Vedānta Sūtras (with Śaṅkara's commentary), with his own valuable Preface to it, is really " the most useful book " (Müller, Six Systems, p. 114), on the Vedāntic literature hitherto placed in the hands

Dr. Thibaut's estimate of the Vedānta.

* Höffding, *ibid*, pp. 233-235.

of the foreign students of the Vedānta. But to our great surprise and disappointment, Dr. Thibaut has, at the end of the otherwise valuable Preface, as we shall see in the last Chapter, entirely abandoned his earlier and really sound position, and has given up all that was really valuable in it. But be it what it may, no attempt has yet been made by any Vedantic scholar to give a systematic exposition of the Vedānta, and to indicate its place as a system of metaphysics among the World's systems of thought. Prof. Deussen has, no doubt, in his "System of the Vedānta," done his very best to give a metaphysical presentation, if metaphysical we can call it, of Śaṅkara's system. But in his uncritical adherence to Śaṅkara, he has completely misunderstood the true import of Vedāntic Panentheism. It is, therefore, a crying need of the time to determine the true nature of the Vedānta and to indicate its place as a system of metaphysics among the kindred systems of the world. And this is our only excuse for our present difficult and arduous undertaking.

Part III.

Chronology of the Upaniṣads.

It will not perhaps be out of place briefly to examine here some important questions connected with the history of the philosophical movement in ancient India and its literature. "The oldest group" of the Upaniṣads, says Prof. Macdonell, "consisting in chronological order, the Brih., Chand., Tait., Ait., Kauṣ., is written in prose which still suffers from the awkwardness of the Brāhmaṇa style. A transition is formed by the Kena, which is partly in verse and partly in prose, to a decided later class, the Kaṭha, Īśa, Śvet., Muṇḍ., Mahānārāyaṇa,

which are metrical, and in which the Upaniṣadic Doctrine is no longer developing but has become fixed..... The third class, comprising the Praśna, Maiṭ., and Māṇḍ., reverts to the use of prose, which.....approaches that of Classical Sanskrit writers. The fourth class consists of later Atharvan Upaniṣads, some of which are composed in prose, others in verse." (History, Sans. Lit., p. 226.)

In the above classification, an attempt has been made,—and this has also been done by several other scholars,—to determine the relative chronology of the Upaniṣads by a reference to their style. But the language test, though fairly reliable on the whole, as applied to the different groups, is not, and cannot, evidently be convincing, when applied to the members of the same group. We shall therefore examine this question a little more critically. The Vedas, it is well-known, were originally divided into three. The works containing references to the three Vedas alone must, therefore, necessarily be regarded as older than the fourth Veda. Now, of all the Upaniṣads, in the Brih. and Chhānd. Upaniṣads alone, we meet with such references.* And this alone conclusively proves the priority of these two works to the rest of the Upaniṣads. But in the Brih. Up. (IV. 5, 11) we also meet with a reference to all the four Vedas.† This again clearly proves that the part containing this reference was the composition of a later date. And it is well-known that both the Brih. and the Chhānd. Upaniṣads are compilations of works of different periods. There is another important fact which also

* Brih. I. 5, 5; V. 6; Chhānd. Roer's Ed., p. 288; Muir, Sans. Texts (Vol. II, p. 200, etc.).

† Muir, *ibid*, Vol. III, p. 8. Brih., Roer's Ed., p. 455.

clearly proves the priority of these two Upaniṣads. The members of the Indian warrior caste, it is well-known, played an important part in the propagation of the Vedāntic teachings in India. But it is not equally widely known, even among Vedāntic scholars, that this philosophy originally arose, and remained, for a time, exclusively confined among the scholars of the warrior class. Reformation often begins from the laity. In ancient India also the first impulse for philosophical speculation and desire for reforms came from amongst the members of the royal class. And this marked the dawn of a new movement which ultimately developed into the philosophy of the Vedānta, on the one hand, and the Buddhistic movement of social reform on the other. The proud Brahmins, for a time, it seems, ignored the new movement. But very soon they came to see the inferiority of their hereditary learning. They now began to approach the Kṣatriyas, members of the royal class, versed in the new wisdom, for instruction. Now, the Brih. and the Chhānd. Upaniṣads are the only two Upaniṣads wherein we meet with the clearest evidences on this point. The Brih. Up. (VI. 2, 8) narrates the story of a learned priest, Uddālaka, also called Gautama, who came to the Pāncāla king, Pravāhana Jaivāli to learn the new philosophy. Jaivāli received him cordially, and promised to teach him the new wisdom. But, while about to do so, the king, it is interesting to note, addressed the following significant words to Gautama: "The knowledge, you seek (Oh, Gautama), has not, as you know it well, as yet been tasted by any Brahmin. I shall, however, impart it to you. Who can refuse one who speaks like you (*i.e.*, who is so eager to learn)?" The same incident has also been recorded in Chhānd. Up. (V. 3). And there also it

is clearly stated that Gautama was distinctly told that this knowledge had not gone to any other Brahmin before him, and had, till then, " belonged, in all the worlds to the Kṣatra (warrior) class alone " (Sarveṣu lokeṣu Kṣatrasyariva praśāsanamabhūt). Now, that this fact has been recorded in these two Upaniṣads alone is an additional proof of their priority to the rest of the Upaniṣads. We also learn from the Kauṣ. Up. (I. 1) that the same Gautama again appeared, with his son, Śvetaketu, before another king, Citra Gārgyāyani, with fuel in hands, like pupils, for instruction. The fact that the same Gautama appears in the Kauṣ. Up., also proves that these three Upaniṣads must be, more or less, of the same age. There is, however, a peculiar pathos in the report contained in the Brih. Up., which lends it the appearance of priority, not only to the Kauṣ. but also to the Chhānd. Up. Pravāhana Jaivāli is also represented in the Chhānd. Up. 1. 8, as having first silenced the proud Brāhmans and then imparted to them the true knowledge of Brahman. The Chhānd. Up. V. 11, also narrates the story of five Brāhmans who, with Uddālaka Āruni at their head, came to the Kṣatriya King Aśvapati Kaikeya anxious to know " what is our self and what is Brahman." The king, we are told, imparted to them the knowledge they had come for. This story is also recorded in the Śatap. Brāh. X. 6, 1, 1). Again, both the Briḥ. Up. (II. 1, 15-20), and the Kauṣ. Up. (IV), tell us that Ajātaśatru, king of Kāśī, taught another learned Brahmin, Gārgya Bālāki, the new philosophy. The expression : " *Brahma mê Vakṣatīti vyêva tvā jnapayisyāmīti* " (you ask ' Tell me on Brahman,' and I shall let you know clearly) is quite significant. Several other instances of this kind have also been recorded in these three Upaniṣads, and in the Śatap. Brāhmaṇa.

We learn from the latter source that King Janaka was honoured as one of the originators of this new speculative philosophy. In the same Brāhmaṇa Yājñavalkya also adheres as a pupil of Janaka (XI. 4, 5). Yājñavalkya, the author of the Śatap. Brāh. is also the central figure in the Brih. Up. This also is an additional proof of the great antiquity of the latter work. Professors Max Müller and Weber, from a mis-construction of one of Pāṇini's rules (IV. 3, 105) held that, in Pāṇini's time, the Śatap. Brāh. was regarded as a comparatively modern work. But the mistake has long been pointed out by Dr. Goldstücker, in his learned work, "Pāṇini: His Place in Sanskrit Literature." (p. 138.) It is quite clear from Kātyāyana's Vārttika and comments on the same by the grammarians Patañjali and Kaiyata, as pointed out by Dr. Goldstücker, that even in Pāṇini's time, the Śatap. Brāh. was, on the contrary, regarded as an ancient work. The Brih. Up. must, therefore, also be of very great antiquity. And there are very good reasons to hold, as we shall see presently, that it is at least as old as the ninth century B.C.

Prof. Rapson assigns the Vedic collections between 1,000-800 B.C. and the oldest Upaniṣads to 600 B.C. (Ancient India, 1914, p. 181). The oldest of the Upaniṣads, however, according to Prof. Macdonell, "can hardly be dated later than about 600 B.C., since more important doctrines first met in them are presupposed by Buddhism" (History of Sans. Lit., p. 226). Prof. Deussen places what he calls 'New Vedic' philosophical literature consisting of the Saṁhitās, Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads between 1,000-500 B.C. (Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 5). Prof. Max Müller has placed the oldest Upaniṣads about 700 B.C. (Six Systems., p. 6). Dr. S. N. Dasgupta has, in his History of Indian

Philosophy, placed the older Upaniṣads between 700-680 B.C.

We are, however, unable to accept any of these dates. "The Śakyas had," we learn from Prof. Rhys Davids, "already acknowledged, in the seventh century, the suzerainty of Kośala," and several unsuccessful invasions of Kāśī by the Kosalas, under their kings, Vanka, Dabbasena and Kamsa, are referred to a date before the Buddha's time. Kāśī was finally conquered and annexed to Kośala by Kamsa, as is evident from his epithet, 'Conqueror of Benarès,' "a standing addition to his name" (Buddhistic India, 1903, p. 25). In the seventh century, the same authority tells us, the most important kingdom in India was the Northern Kośala (*ibid*, p. 44). Kośala must have attained this position after her annexation of Kāśī. Kāśī, or Benares, while the capital of an independent kingdom, was "about 85 miles" in extent (*ibid*, p. 35). The invasion of Kāśī must have begun after she had commenced to decline; and even then, she successfully resisted her invaders at least for two generations. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to infer that Kāśī must have been at the summit of her glory about the second half of the eighth century B.C. Now, when King Janaka of Videha was at the zenith of his glory, Ajātaśatru, king of Kāsi, was, we learn from the Brih. Up. envying his reputation. Conscious of the inferiority of his own position, as a patron of learning, he is reported to have once remarked in despair, "Verily, all people run away saying, 'Janaka' is our patron." (Brih. Up. II. 1, 1.) Evidently then, when Janaka was in the acme of his glory, Kāśī, under King Ajātaśatru, must have been only rising in power and eminence. Janaka must, accordingly be placed about the middle of the ninth century B.C., and Kāśī under Ajātaśatru, was

then gradually rising in importance. The Vedānta philosophy, even in its fully developed shape, as contained in the Brih. Up., is then in all probability, quite as old as the ninth century B.C. And such a date alone is consistent with the fact that, even in Pāṇini's time, Yājñavalkya, the central figure in the Brih. Up., and author of the Śatap. Brāh., was regarded as an old authority. Professor Garbe has, therefore, come very near the truth when he says that "the older Upaniṣads originated approximately in the period from the eighth to the sixth century, B.C." (Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 53). Prof. Oldenburg is still more correct in placing the origin of the Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and older Upaniṣads "somewhere between the 9th and the 7th centuries before the Christian era" (Buddha, p. 18). Prof. Rapson has correctly placed the compilation and the fourfold division of the Vedas between 1,000-800 B.C. But he has failed to see that, as the best portions of some of the oldest Upaniṣads had come into existence even before the appearance of the fourth Veda, they must be placed before 800 B.C., and that 600 B.C., the date he has assigned to them, is too late.

A considerable portion of the Brih. and the Chhānd. Upaniṣads were, as already noticed, composed even before the origin of the fourth Veda. Of these two, however, the former clearly appears to be somewhat older than the latter. Two reasons, in support of this conclusion, have already been mentioned. We shall mention here a third, and a very good reason. A careful perusal of the two works leaves hardly any doubt in the mind of the reader that, in the exposition of the central Vedāntic doctrines, the Chhānd. Up. has closely followed the method adopted in the Brih. Up., and has, in so doing, advanced, at several places, almost the very

same arguments and analogies as used in the Brih. Up. In the latter Upaniṣad however, those arguments and analogies appear distinctly improved, both in their diction, and manner of presentation.* Wherever the same arguments and illustrations appear in both the treatises, they have invariably been stated with much greater force and lucidity in the Chhānd. Up. than in the Brih. Up. This also clearly shows the close proximity of the two works in origin, and the priority of the Brīh. Up. We are glad to see that this last mentioned fact has received the consideration it deserves in the hands of Prof. Deussen. Of all the Upaniṣads, says he, "two oldest are the Brih. Up. and Chhānd.....but it can be clearly proved that there are passages in Chh. which are not only younger than the parallel texts in the Brih., but even depend upon them. This is evident from the fact that several passages of Brih. recur more or less literally in Chh., but are no longer understood in their original meaning" (Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 23-24). The texts, he also tells us, in the Brih. Up., connected with the person of Yājñavalkya contain "the oldest germ of the doctrine of the Upaniṣads, and consequently of Indian Philosophy" (*ibid*, p. 24). Of all the Upaniṣads, the Brih., he adds, is the most "distinguished by its age, length and intrinsic importance," and, next to it comes the Chhānd. (p. 21). And we have given adequate reasons in support of this fact. Again, Uddālaka, the central figure in the Chhānd. Up., appears in the Brih. Up., in several considerations, as a mere learner of the new philosophy and even as a rival of Yājñavalkya at

* *Cf.* Brih. IV. 5, 6-10; Chhānd. VI. 1, 3-6; Brih. IV. 5, 12; Chhānd. VI. 13, 1; Brih. IV. 4, 22; Ch. VIII. 4, 2; Brih. IV. 3, 31 and IV. 5, 15; Chh. VII. 24, 1, etc.

the court of King Janaka (Brih. Up. III. 7); he plays a rôle much inferior to that of Yājñavalkya. This also proves the priority of the Brih. Up. to the Chhānd. Up. And for reasons already stated, the Kauṣ. probably comes third in the chronological order.

Two Ajātaśatrus confused.

Prof. Max Müller has, with several others, placed King Ajātaśatru as "later than Janaka" (Six Systems, p. 18). But the Brih. Up., as already noticed, clearly describes him as a contemporary of Janaka, whose great reputation as a patron of learning, he is reported to have envied. King Ajātaśatru of Kāśī has, again, been wrongly identified by several orientalists with the Magadha king of the same name. Even Prof. Max Müller was not free from his doubts on the point. Ajātaśatru, "the son of a Videhi princess," says he, (Six Systems, p. 31), "sends two ministers.....to Buddha to consult him.....It has been supposed by some scholars that this is the same Ajātaśatru of Kāśī who..... silenced the Brāhman Bālāki (Kauṣ. IV. 2, 1). But according to others, Ajātaśatru.....should be taken..... as a general title of royalty; not as a proper name (S.B.E., XI, p. 1, note) However that may be, the coincidence is certainly striking, and requires further explanation." Such confusions are, however, quite groundless. Well-attested tradition brands king Ajātaśatru of Magadha as a patricide,—and he himself confessed his crime to Buddha,—and he, it is well-known, became king about 500 B.C. (V. Smith, Early History of India, p. 13); whereas Ajātaśatru of Kāśī was a contemporary of Janaka, himself a great Vedantist and a patron of learning, and he flourished about the end of the 9th century B.C., when Kāśī was rising steadily in importance under his rule. These two persons were thus widely opposed in character and temperament,

ruled over two different kingdoms, and lived at least three clean centuries apart.

Bhagavadgītā: its age and authorship.

There has been a good deal of discussion as to the age and authorship of the Bhagavadgītā. By a hoary tradition, it has been attributed to Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, the compiler of the Vedas. And all the commentators on the Gītā have unanimously accepted this tradition. It also bears the title of the Upaniṣad. Prof. Max Müller thinks that " it may belong to the end of the Upaniṣad period " (Six Systems, p. 81). There is, however, great difficulty. The term ' Brahma Sūtras ' occurs in the Gītā. " Hear and learn from me," so says the Gītā, " of the Supreme Soul that has been declared in many ways by the seers in various metres, and by the words of the Brahma Sūtras, which are definite and well-reasoned " (XIII, 4). It has been inferred from this that the Gītā here refers to the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, and that the former must, accordingly, be a later work. But this inference does not appear to be very sound. From the presence of the term ' Brahma Sūtras ' in the Gītā there is absolutely no reason to suppose that it refers to the work of Bādarāyaṇa. Bādarāyaṇa has, we know, himself frequently referred to older teachers and workers in the same field, such as Āṭreya, Vādari, Āśmarathya, Kārṣṇajini, Kāśakṛtsna, etc., some of whom were regarded as high authorities on all great philosophical questions at his time. Many, or all of them, as system-builders, must have composed Brahma Sūtras (aphorisms on the Vedānta) of their own, and Bādarāyaṇa has actually quoted their views in several places in his own work. It is, thus quite clear that Bādarāyaṇa's great work must have been the last of a series of similar productions, which, by reason of its great intrinsic merits

and superiority, must have naturally driven the rest out of the field. This has occurred more or less in all departments of thought, in Ancient India; Yāska for instance, has mentioned many Niruktakāras; the Viṣṇu Purāṇa has named Śākapūṇi as a Niruktakṛt and Śākapūṇi has even been quoted by Yāska. Another Niruktakṛt, Sthalaṣṭîvi, has also been mentioned by Yāska. In the domain of Sūtra literature, the same has also been the case. Śaunaka, we know positively on the authority of Saḍguru Śiśya, had torn into pieces his voluminous Kalpa Sūtra in favour of the better work composed by his pupil, Āśvalāyana (Sahasrakhandam Svakṛtam Sūtram Brāhmaṇasannibham Śiṣyāśvalāyanaprītyai Śaunakena Vipāṭitam) (see also Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 238). This has also occurred, we know on the authority of Pāṇini in the domain of grammar as well. It, therefore, follows that "The Sūtras, or aphorisms which we possess," as Prof. Max Müller also frankly admits, "cannot possibly claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment; they must rather be the last summing up of what had been growing up during generations of isolated thinkers" (Six Systems, p. 98). And we have conclusive and definite proof in support of this contention. The expression, Vedānta-Vijñāna-Suniśchitārthāh (Mund. III, 2, 6), is quite significant. It clearly proves that many thinkers had already been in the field at the time of the Mund. Up., actually engaged in the difficult task of the preparation of systematic manual on the Vedānta philosophy. Again in the Brih. Up. (II. 4. 10; IV. 5. 11), we meet with references to 'Sūtras' and 'Bhāṣyas' (Commentaries), which must have been in existence at its time. The presence of the term, 'Brahma-Sūtrapadaih.' "according to the words of the Brahma Sūtras,"

in the Gītā, does, accordingly, as little prove its posteriority to Bādarāyaṇa's work as that of 'Vedānta-Vijñāna-suniśchitārthāh' in Mund: Up. does the latter's posteriority to it. Evidently, therefore, the expression in the Gītā must be taken, as Prof. Weber aptly suggests (Indian Lit., p. 242, note), " *as an appellative rather than as a proper name.*" Many attempts at the systematisation of the Vedāntic teachings must have been made before Bādarāyaṇa's appearance in the field. And this is quite clear from the " Vedānta Sūtras " itself. The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa contain repeated and distinct references to other system-builders, as already noticed, as well as to the Gītā, to which Bādarāyaṇa has appealed, in corroboration of his own views.* In the Vedānta Sūtras we also meet with unmistakable references to passages in other parts of the Mahābhārata as well.† Evidently, therefore, the expression, " Brahma-Sūtra-padaih," occurring in the Gītā must be taken as appellative, and not as a proper name, and the Gītā must be treated as prior to the Vedānta Sūtras.

The problem of the authorship of the Gītā is, however, an extremely difficult one. The Gītā forms an integral part of the Mahābhārata, attributed to Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana Vyāsa. But what is the age of the Mahābhārata? The terms " Bhārata " and " Bhāratadharmāchārjjāḥ " (in same MSS. " Mahābhāratadharmāchārjjāḥ") occur in Āśvalāyana's Gṛhya Sūtras (III. 4). Lassen, Max Müller, Goldstücker and several others have accordingly held that the great Epic was known in Āśvalāyana's time. And Prof. Macdonell has concluded

* Vedānta Sūtras, I, 2. 6; II, 3. 44; IV, 1, 2 and 10; IV, 2, 20, etc.

† *Ibid*, IV, 2. 18; III, 4. 37, etc.

that the great Epic probably came into being "about the 5th century B.C.," the date generally ascribed to Āśvalāyana (History of Sans. Lit., p. 285). But there are reasons to think that the great Epic had existed, though not exactly in its present form, much earlier still.

In the Śatap. Brāh. (XIII. 3, 1, 1), we meet with a statement of the various kinds of sacred books required to be read in connection with the celebration of the Aśvamedha sacrifice. On the 8th day of celebration which lasted for ten days in all, "the presiding priest," we are told, "says, 'the Itihāsa-Veda is the Veda, this is the Veda,' and then he recites an Itihāsa." The same account is also given in the Śānkhāyana Sūtras (XVI. 1), and Āśvalāyana Sūtras (X. 7). In the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka (II. 7) we also meet with the expression "the Brāhmaṇas, the Itihāsas, and the Purāṇas," as included among sacred works. The same expression also occurs in the Śatap. Brāh. (XI, 7, 1) and also in the Brih. Up. (II, 4, 10; IV. 1, 2; IV. 5. 9). Again in the Chhānd. Up., at the beginning of the ninth Prapāṭhaka, "a mention of the six Vedāṅgas might be expected.....under somewhat unusual names—the Rig-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Atharvaṇa (which is) the fourth, the Itihāsa and Purāṇa (which are) a fifth and (Grammar, or) the Veda of the Vedas" (*cf.* Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 112). In all these places the term, 'Itihāsa' evidently stands for the great Epic. And Sāyaṇa, in his commentary on the Taittirīya Āraṇyaka, has also identified the term with the Mahābhārata. And from Paṇini's rule IV. 2, 60, we gather that the term, 'Itihāsa,' really stood for a written work then in existence, as was long pointed out by Weber (*vide* Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 41 note). And we further know that, by a hoary tradition, the

Mahābhārata is also known as the "Kārṣṇa-Veda," after its reputed author Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vyāsa, and not from "Kṛṣṇa, a form of Viṣṇu," as Prof. Macdonell wrongly holds (see History of Sans. Lit., p. 284, and also Mahābhārata, I, 2300; Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 42 note; Lassen, Indian Antiquity, I, 789). But 'Kṛṣṇa-dvaipāyana,' we know from the Vanśa or dynasty list of teachers given in the last book of the Śatap. Brāh., was the teacher of Vaiśampāyana, the teacher of Yāska Paingi, the teacher of Tittiri, who, it seems, was a contemporary of Yājñavalkya, the author of the Śatap. Brah. If, therefore for reasons already mentioned, we have to place the Śatap. Brāh., in the 9th century B.C., we must place the Mahābhārata or the Kārṣṇa-Veda in the 10th century B.C. But the difficulty still remains, and we have yet to ascertain the original character of the Epic. The great Epic, as it stands to-day, consists of 100,000 slokas. Some copper plates have recently been discovered and the inscription written on one of these plates, dated very likely 462 A.D. or at the latest 532 A.D., runs as follows :—"It has been declared in the Mahābhārata, the compilation embracing 100,000 verses, by the highest sage Vyāsa, the Vyāsa of the Vedas, the son of Parāśara, etc., etc." (see Macdonell, History of Sans. Lit., 287). It is, therefore, quite clear that the Mahābhārata, as it stands to-day must be at least as old as about 500 A.D. But at the same time, we know clearly from the announcement made in Book I of the great Epic itself that the original Epic was much smaller, and that, before the incorporation of the stories or episodes into the Epic, it contained 24,000 slokas, and that originally it consisted of only 8,800 slokas. We must, therefore, conclude that Kṛṣṇadvaipāyana Vyāsa was evidently the author of this original Epic. But

what the exact nature of this work was it is very difficult to say. It is, however, clear that the Epic was regarded as a sacred work from the very beginning. We are, therefore, inclined to think that the original Epic also contained the Gītā in some form or other, although the Gītā we possess to-day appears from its style, to be of much later origin.

Two Vyāsas confused.

Some writers, and Colebrooke was one of them, have, however, wrongly identified Bādarāyaṇa with Veda-Vyāsa, the compiler of the Vedas. Śaṅkara, in his Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras (II. 3, 47 : II, 3, 32) has repeatedly referred to Kṛṣṇa-Dvaipāyana, the compiler of the Vedas, and reputed author of the Mahābhārata, and has told us that he lived during the period of the transition between the Dvāpara and Kali Yuga, but he has nowhere stated, as was first pointed out by Prof. Windischmann, that the Vyāsa of the Epic was the same as the author of the Vedānta Sūtras. And this fully convinced the said Professor that Śaṅkara himself never regarded them as identical. And "this judgment," aptly observes Prof. Max Müller, "ought not" to be "lightly disturbed."* But there are ample positive evidences as well directly opposed to the identification in question. Yājñavalkya, whose teachings are repeatedly referred to in the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, was, it appears, a contemporary of Tittiri, a pupil of Yāska Paingi, a pupil of Vaiśampāyana, himself a pupil of Vyāsa, the compiler of the Vedas. Evidently, therefore, Vyāsa, the compiler of the Vedas, and teacher of Vaiśampāyana, could not possibly be identical with Vyāsa Bādarāyaṇa, who, in his work, Vedānta Sūtras,

* Müller, Six Systems, p. 148. *Cf.* Weber. Ind. Lit., p. 243.

has frequently distinctly referred to the teachings of Yājñavalkya. The Sāma-Vidhāna Brāhmana,* in a somewhat mysterious teacher's chronological list, also shows the two Vyāsas separated from each other by three intervening names. What this means we shall see hereafter. But it is quite evident from their list also that the two Vyāsas were separated from each other by a long interval of time.

Sāṁkhya and Yoga elements in the Vedānta.

It is now established both by literary and inscriptional evidences that both the kindred heterodox movements of Jainism and Buddhism arose in the 6th century B.C. But two such extensive and powerful movements which brought about so tremendous a revolution, intellectual, social and religious, in their train, must have long been in their process of making. A considerable period of hard spade-work must have preceded their actual outbreak. "Centuries seem to be necessary," to use Prof. Rapson's words, for "the accomplishment of transformations of so far-reaching a character." The ground had, without doubt, largely been prepared by the teachings of the Upaniṣads, for the acceptance of the principles of social equality and of the futility of externalism in religion. It is now widely accepted that these movements originated from Sāṁkhya teachings. The later authoritative Upaniṣads, which are distinctly pre-Buddhistic in origin, clearly testify to the existence, side by side with the pure Upaniṣadic teachings, of ideas and principles, which, though originally grown, it appears, within the Vedāntic fold, subsequently separated from the Vedāntic movement, and took different shapes in the Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems. The expressions,

* *Cf.* The closing list in the Sāma-Vidhān Brāh.; Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 190; Weber, Indian Lit., p. 240, note.

' attainable by the Sāṁkhya and Yoga methods,' (VI. 13) ' Pradhāna,' the primal matter, (VI. 16), ' Kapila,' occurring in the Śveta. Up., are quite well-known. The same Upaniṣad also opens with the query—" Should Time or Nature or Necessity or Chance or the Elements be considered as the cause (of the universe), or He who is called Puruṣa, the Supreme Spirit?" (I. 2.) When these lines were composed, Sāṁkhya, Vaiśeṣika and various other schools of thought or kindred systems of teachings had evidently already been in the field. Again, in the Kaṭha Up., we come across expressions like " the unevolved primal matter is prior to the mind, and Puruṣa is prior to the primal matter " (III. 11). Now, these passages and similar other expressions met here and there in pre-Buddhistic Upaniṣads clearly prove the existence of Sāṁkhya and Yoga ideas before the appearances of Jainism and Buddhism. The passage, " Some say, this (the world) did not exist before, Nothing alone existed; and out of Nothing this has come into being " (Chhānd. Up. VI. 2, 1), also contain a clear reference to the existence of even a type of thought analogous to the Buddhistic doctrine of the origin of the world out of Void. It is, however, very interesting to note that all the references to Sāṁkhya and Yoga teachings found in the later authoritative Upaniṣads, *are distinctly theistic in their Vedantic sense.* The earliest references to the Sāṁkhya conception of evolution and the Yoga teachings of union with the Absolute Spirit, in their Vedantic sense are found even in the oldest Upaniṣads, and more frequently and distinctly in the Kaṭha and Svet. Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata. In all these places, these ideas stand distinctly in their strictly Vedāntic form indissolubly blended together with the fundamental teachings of the Vedānta.

Even in the Brih. and the Chhānd. Upaniṣads, we meet with the conception of the cosmic evolution from one Spiritual principle, in its developed form.* In fact, the entire Vedāntic doctrine of creation is in fact, evolutional in character. "As from an invisible seed this huge Nyagrodha tree has come into being, so has this universe been evolved from the Self,"—this is the substance of Uddālaka's instruction to his son, Śvetaketu (Chhānd. Up. VI. 12, 3). In the Tait. Up. (II. 3), we are likewise told "From this Self the space has evolved, from space the air, from air the heat, from heat, water, from water, the earth, and from earth, the plants, etc." In the Brih. Up. (IV. 4, 17), we even meet with a reference to the twenty-five elements, and these elements, together with space, we are told, are sustained in the Self. Similar conceptions are also found, in clearer forms, both in the Mahābhārata, the Gītā, and the later authoritative Upaniṣads. We have, therefore, reasons to think that Sāṁkhya and Yoga teachings originally arose within the fold of Vedāntism itself, and existed as one of its integral parts. In the Mahābhārata, Yājñavalkya is, besides, presented as a great Yogi, devotee (Mahābhā. XII, 11898,566). In the Brih. Up. also, he appears as a great devotee. In the Yājñavalkya Smriti (III. 110), which must be the metrical version of an original, now lost, Yājñavalkya, definitely describes himself as the author of the Āraṇyaka, which the commentator has naturally identified with the Brih. Āraṇyaka, as well as of the Yoga-Sūtra (Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 239, note; Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 330). In all the references found in the authorita-

* Brih. I. 4, 10; II. 1, 20; IV. 4, 17, etc. Chh. VI. 2; VI. 12, etc. Tait. Up. II. 3 and 6; III. 1, etc.

tive Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata and the Gītā, the term Yoga is invariably used in its Vedāntic sense of union of the finite with the Divine Spirit. It is, therefore, evident that both Sāṁkhya and Yoga ideas were originally theistic and arose within the Vedāntic fold itself, and that it was only subsequently that they bifurcated along a different channel, and developed into the modern Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems. And it is these, in their later forms, which Bādarāyaṇa has criticised in the Vedānta Sūtras. We are tempted to go even a step further, and say that even at the time when the Gītā declared that "He alone sees truly, who treats Sāṁkhya and Yoga as identical," the two types of thought, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, existed in their Vedāntic form, and that the bifurcation just referred to was then only about to take place. On such a supposition alone, we can fully understand the significance of the said passage in the Gītā. This is however a point on which nothing can be said now definitely. But it is interesting to note that, in the Tattva-Samāsa, we meet with a type of Sāṁkhya philosophy, wherein Puruṣa has been identified with Brahman, the Supreme Self, and which, as says Prof. Max Müller (Six Systems, p. 296), "points certainly to an earlier and less pronounced Nirīśvara, or Lordless character of the ancient Sāṁkhya." The authorship of this curious work is unknown; but very likely it teaches, as observes Prof. Max Müller (Six Systems, p. 295), "an earlier form of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy than that we possess in the Kārikās or in the Sūtras. When it agrees with the Kārikās, sometimes almost verbatim, it is the metrical text that seems to pre-suppose the prose, not the prose the metrical version." This criticism is quite sound. And in this work, Tattva-Samāsa, we find a type of Sāṁkhya teachings more akin to the

Vedānta than otherwise. "Puruṣa is," says this work, "without beginning, it is subtle, omnipresent, perceptive .....eternal, seer, experiencer, etc." This is certainly more Vedāntic than anti-Vedantic. And the same may be said of the Yoga ideas as found in the authoritative Upaniṣads and the Gītā, and the Mahābhārata.

Philosophical Manuals of Six Systems: their relative priority.

The Sūtra literature probably opened with the Śrauta Sūtras. Of the aphorisms of the Six Systems of Philosophy, the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali, from the author's reticence about other systems, have wrongly been regarded by many as the oldest philosophical Sūtra work, now extant, and, exactly for the opposite reason, the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, as the latest. "The priority of the text-book," says Prof. Macdonell, referring to the Yoga Sūtras, "is rendered highly probable by the fact, that it is the only philosophical Sūtra work which contains no polemics against the others" (History of Sans. Lit., pp. 396, 399). And "in contrast to the two older and intimately connected dualistic schools of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga," he adds, "there arose about the beginning of our era the only two, even of the six systems of philosophy, which were theistic from the outset, namely, the Pūrva Mīmānsā and the Uttara Mīmānsā." The age of the Mīmānsās, likewise observes Prof. Garbe, "we can place approximately at the beginning of the Christian era" (Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 16). But these views, we know to-day, are entirely wrong. The fact that the Vedānta Sūtras referred to other systems of thought does not at all prove its posteriority to the existing philosophy-manuals of the systems criticised in it. It seems evident that, while criticising the anti-Vedantic positions, Bādarāyaṇa had none of the existing anti-Vedantic philosophical manuals before him. And we are glad that Prof. Weber has

frankly admitted the force of this argument (Ind. Lit., p. 242). In fact, the age of Patañjali, the author of Mahābhāṣya, has, on most definite and conclusive historical grounds, been already placed in the second century B.C.;* and he has been identified with the author of the Yoga Sūtras. The age assigned to Patañjali has long been generally accepted, but his identification with the author of Yoga Sūtras, though accepted by many, has been rejected by Max Müller. "Nor has it been positively proved," says he, in his Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (p. 156), "that Patañjali, the reputed author of Yoga Sūtras, was the same person as Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya.....Some scholars have rushed at this conclusion.....but this would force us to ascribe the most heterogeneous works to one and the same author." But is not the alleged difficulty purely imaginary? Be it what it may, Saḍgurusiṣya, in his commentary on Kātyāyana's Sarvānukrama, has most clearly told us that the great grammarian, Patañjali, is also the author of the Yoga Sūtras. "The Mahāvārttika (of Kātyāyana)," says he, "was like a boat on the great ocean of Pāṇini's grammar. The rules promulgated by him were explained by the Reverend Patañjali, the teacher of the Yoga Philosophy, himself the author of the Yoga Śāstra and the Nidāna."† This evidence is evidently most conclusive; and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Patañjali, the great grammarian, was also the author of the Yoga Sūtras, and lived in the 2nd century B.C.

Age of the Yoga Sūtras.

* Goldstücker, Pāṇini, pp. 229-30; Bhandārkar, Early History of the Deccan, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, p. 339; V. Smith, Early History of India, p. 337, note.

† *Cf.* Saḍgurusiṣya's Commentary on Sarvāṇukrama.
Cf. Max Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., pp. 235, 239.

Age of the Mīmānsa work.

There are equally strong reasons to prove that both the Vedānta Sūtras and the Pūrva Mimānsā of Jaimini are much prior to the Yoga Sūtras in origin. Pāṇini has in his grammar (IV. 3, 110), referred to the Bhikṣu Sūtras, and has named Pārāśarjya as its author. Now both Vācaspati Miśra and Tārānath Tarkavācaspati have definitely identified the Bhikṣu Sūtras of Pārāśarjya with the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.* But Prof. Max Müller is reluctant to accept this identification. "Pārāśarjya could have hardly been," says he, "chosen as the titular name of Vyāsa" (Six Systems, p. 128). We are, however, unable to accept this criticism as valid. It is not at all unusual in Sanskrit to use patronymics to denote sons or descendants, particularly when both are well-known personages. In the Rig-Veda, for instance, King Sudās is often called "Paijavanaḥ," the son of Pijavana.† Likewise, in Rig-Veda, VI. 26, 8, we meet with the expression, 'Prātardani,' the descendant of Pratardana. But we need not go so far back. Rāmānuja himself has, in his Preface to his Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, used the very word, 'Pārāśarjya,' as a synonym for Bādarāyaṇa. There he has characterised the Vedānta Sūtras as "the nectar fallen from the lips of Pārāśarjya," 'Pārāśarjya vachah-sudhām.' In fact, such patronymics are very common in Sanskrit literature.‡ Nor is there anything unusual in applying the term, 'Bhikṣu-sūtras,' to Bādarāyaṇa's work. The Mund. Up. (I. 2, 11) clearly

* Siddhānta Kaumudi, Vol. I, p. 592.
Cf. Max Müller, Six Systems, p. 154.

† R. V., VII. 18, 19.

‡ *Cf.* The Dynasty List of the first branch of the Bhrigus in Āśvalāyana's Śrauta Sūtras, XII, 10, *seq.* Also the closing list of teachers in Sama-vidhāna-Brāhmaṇa. See Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., pp. 119, 385.

describes the Vedāntic teachers and devotees as ' Bhaikṣā-cārjya-ratāḥ,'' as leading the life of the ascetics. Both Śvet. (VI. 21) and Mait. (IV. 3) Upaniṣads mention ' Āśramins,' monks, who were evidently Vedāntists. Nay, Yājñavalkya himself tells us in the Brih. Up. (III. 5, i) that ''the Brahmins having known the Self transcend all desires for sons and riches, and live as ascetics,'' (Tamātmānam viditvā Brāhmanāh putraiṣaṇāyaścha vittaiṣaṇāyāścha... Vyuatthāyāṭha bhikṣācharjyam charanti.'') This is quite conclusive. And we further know that Yājñavalkya also at last left his family, and lived as a monk (Brih. Up. IV. 5, 15). So, it was quite natural for Pāṇini to designate the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa as the Bhikṣu Sūtras. Besides, there is no other Sūtra work known to us whose author was a Pārāśarjya. Evidently, therefore, Vedānta Sūtras must be held as even prior to Pāṇini. There are other weighty evidences as well in support of this conclusion. Śaṅkara himself has, in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras (III. 3, 53), quoted Upavarṣa as an old commentator on the same work, and Kathā-Sarit-Sāgara, a work of Somadeva Bhatta (early 12th century) of Kashmir, has identified him with the teacher of Pāṇini (Müller, Six Systems, p.153). And it has not been gainsaid by any one. Śaṅkara, it is true, does not say even a word by way of Upavarṣa's introduction. But he mentions him as ' Bhagavad ' or ' Saint;' and the very way in which he refers to him leaves absolutely no doubt as to the identity of the person. He evidently deemed any introduction of so well-known a person as entirely superfluous. We further learn from Rāmānuja's preface to his commentary that ' Bhagavad-Baudhāyana ' was also one of the ancient commentators on the Vedānta Sūtras, and that his own stand-point is exactly the same as that of Baudhāyana.

Dr. Thibaut is not, however, sure whether this Baudhāyana " is to be identified with the author of Kalpa Sūtras and other works " (Vedānta Sūtras, p. xxii) of the same name. Prof. Max Müller has, however, frankly accepted this identification. In fact, the identity of Upavarṣa with Pāṇini's teacher and of Baudhāyana, the commentator on the Brahma Sūtras, with Baudhāyana, the author of Kalpa Sūtras rests on a tradition too weighty to be lightly set aside. And, if both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are silent on the point, it is simply because they considered the facts too well-known to need any special mention. We must, accordingly, conclude that, by the term, ' Bhikṣu Sūtras,' Pāṇini must have meant the Vedānta Sūtras, and that Upavarṣa, the teacher of Pāṇini, was one of its oldest commentators. We must, accordingly, hold the Vedānta Sūtras as prior in origin to Pāṇini.

And, from their mutual references, as well as for reasons to be stated hereafter, the two Mīmānsās must be held as contemporary works.

There is, however, much difference of opinion amongst scholars about the age of Pāṇini. Prof. Macdonell thinks that Pāṇini " flourished about 300 B.C." (History, Sans. Lit., p. 431). Prof. Weber has also placed him " subsequent to Alexander " (Ind. Lit., p. 22, note). But none of these statements can be accepted as correct. Prof. Max Müller has, with very good reasons, placed Kātyāyana " in the second half of the 4th century " before the Christian era (Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 242). But he is clearly wrong in holding Pāṇini as a contemporary of Kātyāyana. There is absolutely nothing to show, except the statement made in Somadeva's work, mentioned by Max Müller,

Pāṇini lived in post-Buddhist age, about the end of the century

which evidently is not meant to be taken seriously, that Kātyāyana ever saw Pāṇini, even in the latter's old age. On the contrary, it is quite clear that, when he wrote his Vārttika on Pāṇini's Grammar, Pāṇini was not alive. Dr. Bhāndārkar placing Pāṇini in the pre-Buddhistic period, must be regarded as equally untenable (Pāṇini His Place, pp. 12, 243). Pāṇini must be placed between Bādarāyaṇa and Kātyāyana, that is, about the end of the 5th century B.C. The fact that the word ' Nirvāṇa ' was used by Pāṇini (VIII. 2, 50) in the sense of " not blowing as wind," and by Kātyāyana in the sense of " blowing out," as pointed out by Dr. Goldstücker, does not necessarily support Goldstücker's contention (Pāṇini : His Place, p. 227), namely, Pāṇini's priority to Buddha. In all probability, the word Nirvāṇa was originally used in Buddhistic literature exactly in the sense of ' cessation of desires ' and the tranquillity of the mind caused by perfect self-control. And thus understood, Nirvāṇa would really mean " not blowing as wind." Nirvāṇa, in the sense of ' blowing out ' or better ' blown out,' evidently represents the Buddhistic ideal in a later stage of the movement. And all that can be reasonably inferred from such differences between the two grammarians in their use of the term is that Pāṇini lived in the earlier part of the Buddhistic movement, and Kātyāyana during its second stage, which is also exactly our contention. Moreover, Pāṇini, it is clear, did not know ' Āraṇyakas ' as independent treatises; and he has, as has also been pointed out by Dr. Goldstücker, used the word to mean " living in the forest;" whereas Kātyāyana has remarked in his Vārttika (IV. 2, 129) that the word was also used in the sense of " read in the forest." This fact also has been a great riddle to many; and Goldstücker and Bhāndārkar have inferred from it the priority of Pāṇini to the

origin of the Āraṇyakas. We are, however, unable to accept this conclusion. All of the Āraṇyakas, with the exception of the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, parts whereof are attributed to Śaunaka and Āśvalāyana, and which is, therefore, comparatively later in origin (Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., pp. 335-36), were originally included in their corresponding Brāhmaṇas as integral parts of the same and did not exist as independent works. The above differences in the meaning of the word accordingly only indicate that Āraṇyakas did not exist as separate and independent works in Pāṇini's time, and that it was only later that their independence, as a distinct type of sacred literature, received general recognition. "The Brāhmaṇas," Madhusūdana tells us, "consist of three parts: of commandments, additional explanations, and Vedānta doctrines, the latter being more particularly represented by the Upaniṣads" (Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 344, note). This indicates that originally the Brāhmaṇas included their respective Āraṇyakas and the Upaniṣads as their integral parts, and that in Pāṇini's time these latter were not recognised as independent works. In Kātyāyana's time, these, however, evidently received such recognition and independent position; and hence must be the difference between Pāṇini and Kātyāyana in the use of the word, Āraṇyaka. Moreover, the Aryans of the north were not familiar, as Bhāndārkar pointed out long ago (Early History of the Deccan, p. 6), "with the Southern countries and tribes in the time of Pāṇini, but were so in the time of Kātyāyana." Patañjali, however, shows an intimate acquaintance with the South, and also "notices variant readings of Kātyāyana's Vārttika," found in the texts of different schools of Grammarians. It also clearly shows that the three Grammarians were separated from one another by long intervals of time.

And if Patañjali lived in the 2nd century B.C., we have to place Kātyāyana about 350 B.C., and Pāṇini one century earlier about 450 B.C. Again Pāṇini's rule IV, 3, 105 shows, as was long pointed out by Dr. Goldstücker (Pāṇini : His Place, p. 138), that Yājñavalkya was regarded as an ancient teacher even in Pāṇini's days. This rule was totally misconstrued as already noticed by Max Müller. But Yājñavalkya lived, as we have seen, about the end of the 9th century B.C. We must, accordingly, place Pāṇini at least four centuries later. This consideration also leads us to place Pāṇini about 350 B.C. In fact, Dr. Goldstücker's frank admission on this point makes it impossible for him at the same time to place Pāṇini in the pre-Buddhistic age. It seems, there is no escape from the conclusion that Pāṇini lived several centuries later than Yājñavalkya and about a century before Kātyāyana. We must, accordingly, place Pāṇini about the middle of the 5th century B.C. And there can indeed hardly be any doubt that Pāṇini flourished between Bādarāyaṇa and Kātyāyana. And as Upavarṣa, Pāṇini's teacher, was one of the oldest commentators on the Brahma Sūtras, we must place Bādarāyaṇa at least very early in the 5th century B.C.

Philosophical Manuals on Sāṁkhya.

The Sāṁkhya-Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa is the oldest authoritative text-book on the Sāṁkhya philosophy as we find it to-day. Its author himself tells us at the end of his work, that the Sāṁkhya philosophy was originally promulgated by Kapila, and that Āsuri received it from him, and Pancaśikha from Āsuri—and he, we learn it from Tattva Samāsa, communicated the same to Patañjali, and that, through a succession of generations of teachers, it at last reached Īśvara Kṛṣṇa himself.* The

* Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, VV. 70, 71.
Cf. Müller, Six Systems, p. 293.

Sāṁkhya Sūtras is, as has long been pointed out by Dr. Hall (Sāṁkhya Sāra, Preface, p. 12) a spurious production of the 14th century at the earliest. Vācaspati Miśra, who lived about 1150 A.D., and has written a commentary on the Kārikā, was not, it appears, aware of its existence. Nor was it known even to Mādhava, the author of the Sarvadarśana-Sangraha, who lived in the 14th century. Vijñānabhikṣu (in the 16th century) has written a commentary upon it. The Sāṁkhya-Kārikā was translated into Chinese between 557 and 587 A.D., with Gauḍapāda's commentary on the same. The Indian tradition regards the Kārikā as a production of the 1st century B.C.

Two Gauḍapādas confounded.

Gauḍapāda, the commentator on Sāṁkhya-Kārikā, has been confounded by scholars with his namesake, the teacher of Govinda, preceptor of Śaṅkara, and author of the Kārikās on the Mund. Up. The former must have lived about the 5th century A.D., and the latter about two hundred years later.* And this clearly explains Prof. Max Müller's reluctance to accept the information supplied by Mr. Beal about Gauḍapāda's commentary on the Sānkhya-Kārikā as having been translated into Chinese before 582 A.D. "How is that possible," asks he, "without upsetting the little we know of the date of Gauḍapāda, the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of Śaṅkara, whose "literary career began, as is generally supposed about 788 A.D.?" (Six Systems, p. 293.) But this apprehension is altogether groundless; for the two

* *Cf.* Macdonell, History of Sans. Lit., p. 393; Müller, Six Systems, p. 293; Gough, Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 240; Weber, Ind. Lit., pp. 236-7; Colebrooke, Mis. Essays, 1837, Vol. I, pp. 95, 104, 233; Garbe, Sānkhya Philosophy, p. 61; Deussen, System of the Vedānta, p. 25; Śāstri, Doctrine of Māyā, 1911, p. 84.

Gauḍapādas are not identical. Pancaśikha, as the Kārikā tells us, was the chief disseminator of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, whose Sūtras must have been superseded by the Kārikā. Prof. Max Müller is, however, inclined to attribute Tattva Samāsa, a small work written in prose, already referred to, to him. It is now impossible to say what particular works on Sāṁkhya and other systems Bādarāyaṇa had before him while refuting them in his Vedānta Sūtras. These must have disappeared long ago.

Works on Yoga System

We have already referred to Patañjali, the founder of the modern Yoga philosophy. The Yoga philosophy of Patañjali is only a semi-theistic presentation of the Sāṁkhya system. The metaphysical basis of both the systems is the same. And the union of Yoga practices and belief in an extra-cosmic personal God with Sāṁkhya doctrine was Patañjali's work. "The ultimate end of both these systems is," to use Prof. Max Müller's words, "the same, namely, the attainment of Viveka, or the power of discrimination between the self and the objective world, Puruṣa, and Prakṛti" (Six Systems, p. 426). According to both, the ultimate end of existence is freedom from desires and perfect detachment from the world of sense and attainment of Stoic self-control and self-centredness. Patañjali introduced into his system "devotion to God" merely as a means to the attainment of this ultimate end. The idea of communion and realisation of the ultimate unity of the Individual Self with the Universal Self, which formed the essence of the Vedāntic Yoga, is altogether foreign to Patañjali.

The title of Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras, it is, however, interesting to note, is "Atha Yogānuśāsanāni," 'Now begins the instruction on the Yoga.' The title of his Mahābhāṣya is also 'Atha Sabdānuśāsanam,' 'Now

begins the instruction on Words. The similarity between the two titles is highly suggestive, and distinctly indicates their common origin. Moreover, the term, 'Anuśāsanam,' 'Instructions based on older teachings' is quite significant. "Wishing to collect together" the essence of the teachings of different forms of Yoga, "Patañjali commenced," Mādhava tells us, "his Anuśāsana" (Sarvadarśana Sangraha, Ed. Cowell, 1882, p. 231). In fact, the very word 'Anuśāsana,' used by Patañjali himself as an appropriate title of his philosophical manual,—and this remark also applies to his great work on Pāṇini's grammar,—is a clear admission from Patañjali himself that he never regarded himself as the original founder of the Yoga philosophy, and that he, on the contrary, was only a worker following more or less in the footsteps of teachers who had gone before him. Pāṇini too, we know, teaches the formation of the word Yogin. Bādarāyaṇa had also refuted the Yoga system in the Vedānta Sūtras. It is also interesting to note here that, in the Vedānta Sūtras, having first refuted the Sāṁkhya doctrines, Bādarāyaṇa has simply named the Yoga system and observed, "Yoga is also refuted thereby" (Vedānta Sūtras, II. 1, 3). And, although subsequently Sāṁkhya and other systems were re-examined more fully, he has not said anything more about the Yoga philosophy. It is, therefore, evident that, even in Bādarāyaṇa's time, doctrines analogous to those of Patañjali's Yoga had existed, and that, even then, Yoga and Sāṁkhya systems were metaphysically virtually alike as they are found to-day. And that was what led Bādarāyaṇa to think that the refutation of the Sāṁkhya system also amounted to that of the Yoga. For reasons already stated, we are, however, inclined to think that originally both Sāṁkhya and Yoga ideas grew within the

Vedāntic school, and that it was only subsequently that they took their anti-Vedāntic shapes. Vyāsa has left a commentary on the Yoga Sūtras. Bhoja Rāja has also written a commentary on the same. We have another well-known commentary, Yoga-Vārttika, from Vijñānabhikṣu. Vijñānabhikṣu is also fully convinced that, however different may be the roads followed by the Vedāntists and the Sāṁkhya Yogins, the conception of God in both the schools was originally much the same (*cf.* Müller, Six Systems, p. 439).

Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya Systems.

Of the two remaining systems, Vaiśeṣika (Atomism of Kaṇāda) and Nyāya (Logic), the former is evidently older in origin. In the very opening lines of the Śvet. Up., as already noticed, there is a distinct reference to a system analogous to it. We must therefore regard it as pre-Buddhistic in origin. The Vaiśeṣika doctrines criticised by Bādarāyaṇa in the Vedānta Sūtras evidently do no more form parts of the existing Sūtras of the school than do the doctrines of other schools criticised in it form part of theirs. These must have been the teachings of the school as known in Bādarāyaṇa's time, or necessary corollaries following from those then in existence. It is difficult to determine the age of the Kaṇāda Sūtras and the Gautama Sūtras (Gautama's Philosophical Manual on Logic). Mahādeo Rājārām Bodā has placed them both "in the 5th or 4th century B.C." (Müller, Six Systems, p. 476). "Kaṇāda was clearly acquainted," says Prof. Max Müller, "with Gautama, while Gautama attacks... certain doctrines of Kapila and Bādarāyaṇa." But conclusions drawn from such considerations, he adds, "have no weight in the literary history of India" (Six Systems, p. 287). The very fact, however, that the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika system (Atomism) have been refuted in the Vedānta Sūtras, whereas Nyāya doctrines have nowhere

been noticed in the encyclopædic work of Bādarāyaṇa, clearly indicates, as it was long pointed out by Colebrooke, (Mis. Essays, Vol. I, p. 352), the priority of the former. But the question is, can it be said positively that Bādarāyaṇa has nowhere referred to the Yoga system, though it is generally believed to be so?* It is difficult to answer this question in the affirmative. Bādarāyaṇa, having successively dealt with Sāṁkhya and Yoga doctrines, has, we know, observed at the end of his criticism of the Vaiśeṣika system, that, as it has been rejected by all decent and cultured men, it is unworthy of further consideration (Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 17), Bādarāyaṇa had, however, made a similar remark once before (Vedānta Sūtras, II. 1, 12). And there having generally dealt with both Sāṁkhya and Yoga systems, he had told us " and thereby all such systems as are rejected by men of culture are also refuted " (II. 1, 12). Here also the Atomic system of Kaṇāda was evidently referred to. But here Bādarāyaṇa had used the plural form, ' all such systems;' and the very use of the plural form inclines us to think that Bādarāyaṇa here, along with the Vaiśeṣika system, probably also referred to its kindred system, the Nyāya, as well. And, if this interpretation of the aforesaid statement of Bādarāyaṇa is correct, Nyāya (Logic) system must have also existed in Bādarāyaṇa's time. Gautama or Akṣapāda, as Mādhava calls him, has been identified with Gautama, the author of Pitṛmedha-Sūtras, belonging to the Sāma-Veda, by Anantayajvan in his commentary on the same (Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 245, note).

Prasthānapada wrote a commentary on the Sūtras of Kaṇāda. Gautama Sūtras were annotated by Pak-

* Macdonell, History of Sans. Lit., p. 403; Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 245.

ṣilā Swāmī, and subsequently defended by Udyotakara, in the 6th century A.D., against the violent onslaughts of Dignāga. This controversy was revived, from time to time, until Vācaspati Miśra, entirely crushed the heterodox interpretation of the Nyāya Sūtras, and re-established the Brāhmanical view. The Western scholars have placed Vācaspati Miśra in the 11th century A.D. But this view is untenable. From what Vācaspati Miśra himself says in his Nyāyasūcinibandha about his age.* We must place him in the 9th century A.D. A recently discovered copper plate also shows him as a contemporary of Dharmapāla the ruler of Gauḍ, who flourished in the 9th century A.D. and made grant of four villages near Pauṇḍravardhana to Vācaspati Miśra. Both the systems were originally atheistic in character, but became theistic later; and their theology was first developed about the 12th century in Udayanācārjya's Kusumāñjali† wherein God has been conceived as an extra-cosmic Ruler of the universe, as a special all-controlling Soul among other co-eternal individual souls and atoms (*cf.* Cowell's note to Colebrooke's Mis. Essays, Vol. I, p. 282). The two systems have been finally amalgamated by Gangeśa in his well-known work, Nyāya-Cintāmaṇi. And since then they have passed through one and the same channel.

The relative priority of

The age of the Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa has already been established. Colebrooke held Jaimini to be

* *Nyāyasūchīnibandho' asāvakari sudhiyām mude*: *Śri Vāchaspati Miśreṇa Vasvankabasubat. Vasu*—8; *Anka*—9, therefore *Vasvankavasuvatsare* means in the year 898. Number is to be read from the right to the left, 898 Samvat—842 (878-54) A.D.

† Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 405.

prior to Bādarāyaṇa (Mis. Essays, Vol. I, p. 239). Prof. Max Müller, however, holds them to be contemporary. "While Bādarāyaṇa begins his Sūtras," says he (Six Systems, p. 261), "with 'Athāto Brahmajijñāsā,' 'Now, therefore, the desire of knowing Brahman,' Jaimini (also), apparently in imitation of it, begins, with 'Athāto Dharmajijñāsā,' 'Now, therefore, the desire of knowing Dharma or Duty.'" Moreover, both Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini have quoted each other in their respective works. And from their mutual quotations, Prof. Max Müller has reasonably concluded them to be contemporary thinkers. The question is, however, a difficult one. In the closing list of teachers in the Sāma-Vidhāna Brāh., Jaimini is shown as prior to Bādarāyaṇa. This list represents Nārada to be the first human promulgator of the teaching of the Sāma-Vidhāna, and shows Bādarāyaṇa as a remote descendant of Parāśara, and as removed from Jaimini, on the list of teachers, by two intervening names. (*Cf.* Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 190. Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 240, note). Prof. Weber has discovered in this list, as he thinks, a very strong argument in support of his contention that the two Mīmāṁsā Sūtras of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa "were not really composed by these teachers themselves," as their mutual references naturally imply, "but only by their respective schools" (Ind. Lit., p. 241). But he has, we fear, over-shot his mark. From the mention of Jaimini as the teacher next in chronological order to Vyāsa Pārāśarjya, by which evidently the compiler of the Vedas is meant here, it may at first appear that the two were contemporary workers, and that Jaimini succeeded Veda-Vyāsa immediately after the termination of the latter's tenure of office. But it is not so. To understand this list properly, it must be interpreted in the light of other connected facts. The teachers cited in

Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa.

the two Mīmāṁsās "may be pointed out," as Prof. Weber himself admits, "in the Taittirīya Prātiśākhya, and the Śrauta-Sūtra of Kātyāyana," or of Aśvalāyana, and therefore, as belonging to the Sūtra period. In addition to mutual references to their respective authors, they also contain the names of at least three teachers, Ātreya, Bādari, Kārṣṇajina, common to them both (Weber, Ind. Lit., pp. 141, 242). Moreover, we know that "of the tree of the Yajur-Veda, there are twenty-seven branches, which Vaiśampāyana, the pupil of Vyāsa, compiled, and taught to as many disciples," and that Yājñavalkya, the promulgator of the White Yajur-Veda, was also a disciple of Vaiśampāyana (Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 279). Evidently therefore, Veda-Vyāsa belonged to a much earlier age, and was separated from Jaimini by centuries. It is at the same time clear, from the authorities quoted in their works, that the authors of two Mīmāṁsās both lived in the Sūtra period, and were contemporary. And yet Jaimini is traditionally known as the promulgator of the Sāma-Veda* (Weber, Ind. Lit., p. 58); and Prof. Weber also frankly admits it (*ibid*, p. 240). The fact is that, after the division of the hymnal literature by Vyāsa into Rich, Yajus and Sāman, his immediate disciples, owing to the greater importance of the first two Vedas, applied themselves immediately to the promulgation and teaching of the same, and the Sāma-Veda, it appears, was, for generations together, left in the background, until at last Jaimini took necessary steps for its dissemination. And that is why Jaimini is known as the promulgator of the Sāma-Veda, and is yet shown in the above list as the successor of Veda-Vyāsa. Prof.

* Śāṅkhāyana Grih. Sūtra, VII. 6. Viṣṇ. Pur., III, 4, 8, 9.

Max Müller has, in his Ancient Sanskrit Literature, also referred to this list, and was, it appears, also conscious of the difficulty involved in it. But he has not—nor has, so far as we are aware, anyone else—tried to explain it. We have, however, seen, why Jaimini is, by tradition, known as the promulgator of Sāma-Veda, and shown in the above list as the successor of Vyāsa, though separated from him by centuries. But the second part of the list is rather perplexing; for there Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa are shown separated from each other by two teachers. We shall hazard an explanation of this fact. We learn from the Pañchatantra that Jaimini was killed by an elephant, "a statement which, considering the antiquity of this work," as Prof. Weber himself is inclined to admit, "is always of some value" (Ind. Lit., p. 240, note). Now, if we turn to the three successors of Jaimini, mentioned in the list, we find that his immediate successor was Pāuṣpimji, a man unknown to name and fame, and that the second was Pārāśaryyāṇa, a Yajur-Veda* teacher, and that the third was Bādarāyaṇa, a profound Vedāntist. It is also interesting to note that none of these three, not even Bādarāyaṇa, has left any work on this branch of the Veda, and that real work of the school began only with Taṇḍi, who followed Bādarāyaṇa, and wrote the most important and oldest Brāhmaṇa of the school, the Pañchaviṁśa or Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa. The very fact that three such persons having nothing common among them successively stepped into the office vacated by Jaimini, and that none of them has left any fruits of their work during this period,—although at least one of them, Bādarāyaṇa, with his great calibre and acumen, would

* *Cf.* Vaṁśa list in the Madhu Kāṇḍa of the Satap. Brāhmaṇa; also Müller, Ancient Sans. Lit., p. 439.

have certainly been the last person to do so, had the work been a part of his regular vocation,—lends a strong support to a hypothesis that it was only to meet a sudden and unexpected emergency that these three teachers successively stepped into the vacant office, for a short period, just to keep the work a-going, until Taṇḍi was found to take up the work permanently. Very likely on Jaimini's sudden death, Pāuṣpimji, probably the only person immediately available, took up the work, to be soon succeeded by a Yajur-Veda teacher. And probably it was soon found difficult for a Yajur-Veda teacher also to teach Sāma-Veda; and so, Bādarāyaṇa had to step into the office, until proper men were found to take it up. Some such hypothesis alone seems to explain how Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa, though contemporary workers, are shown in the above list as separated by two teachers. Be that what it may, from their mutual references and the citation of common authorities, as well as judged in the light of the tradition, the two Mīmāṁsās must be treated as of the same age, though probably Jaimini was senior of the two writers; and that is probably why Mādhava calls his work prior "prāchi."*

Works on Purva-Mīmāṁsā: Maṇḍana's wife as umpire in philosophical disputations, between Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra.

The oldest commentary extant on the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is that of Śavaar Svāmin, which again was commented on by Kumārila. Maṇḍana Miśra, Kumārila's pupil, was a rival of Śaṅkara. Maṇḍana's wife, Ubhayabhāratī, it is interesting to note, acted as the referee during the great controversy that took place between Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara. This lady, it is stated, was well-read in the Vedas, with all the auxiliary branches of learning, and in all the six schools of philosophy. And, when she found her husband, himself a

* Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha, p. 122, 1, L. 3.

veteran scholar and the greatest authority of the time on his subject, giving way, she, with Śankara's permission took her husband's side, and kept his opponent at bay for a while. At the end, both husband and wife acknowledged Śaṅkara's superiority, and became his disciples. This controversy, which lasted for several days, was, with its attendant circumstances, a unique and remarkable event. And it would have indeed been an honour to any other country in the world in any epoch of history.

CHAPTER I

Early Philosophical Speculations in India

Search for the ground of unity amidst diversity in the hymnal literature.

"While Brahmanical teaching and conduct of life were surrounding the existence of Indian peoples in ever denser toils, we see," to use Prof. Deussen's words (System of the Vedanta, p. 17), "ripening on the branch of Brahmanism itself a world concept, which, though outwardly bound up with it, was inwardly opposed to it in its very basis. Already in the Rig-Veda, strong movements of a certain philosophical tendency make themselves manifest. We perceive a special seeking and asking after the Unity, which finally lies at the basis of all diversity; we see many attempts being made to solve the riddle of creation; to grasp through the motley changes of the world of appearances, through the more and more richly developed variety of the Vedic pantheon, the one formless principle of all that has form," one principle which manifests itself in various forms, and stirs and pulsates in them all, as finite centres of the self-manifestation of the Infinite.

"The rest and peace which are required for deep thought or for accurate observation of the movements of the soul, were," says Prof. Max Müller (Three Lectures on the Vedanta, p. 8), "more easily found in the silent forests of India than in the noisy streets of our so-called centres of civilisation." There may or may not be much truth in this observation. But the fact remains that the Indian speculative genius was very deeply stirred by profound philosophical problems very early, and that there are distinct traces of sublime movements of the soul even in their oldest records. In the hymns of the last book of the Rig-Veda, we first come across the clear

dawn of this speculative movement. Many of these hymns present their authors boldly to have faced the great problem of the origin of the cosmic order and of the ultimate ground of the unity and harmony, underlying the plurality of experience, of one Ultimate Principle or Reality manifested in all existents.

The celebrated Nāsadīya hymn (R.V., X. 129) represents one of the earliest instances of such attempts at solving the supreme mystery of the universe. The poem tells us of the One which, before the origin of the world, breathed alone without air, with the ' non-Being,' the unevolved manifold of experience, latent in it, and of the ' being,' the evolved manifold, as having sprung from it. In the third stanza of the poem, we are told, " the sages searching in the heart by wisdom discovered the root of ' being ' in ' non-being '." The last stanza of the poem runs thus :—

> " He from whom this creation arose, whether he made it or did not make it; the highest seer in the highest heaven, he forsooth knows it; or even he does not know! "

" The poet himself is not quite clear," says Prof. Max Müller (Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 65), " in his own mind, and he is constantly oscillating between a personal and impersonal or rather super-personal cause from whom the universe emanated. But this step from a sexual to a sexless god, from a mythological πρῶτος to a metaphysical πρῶτον had evidently been made at that early time, and with it a decisive step from mythology to philosophy had been taken." Prof. Deussen also regards the poem as " the most remarkable monument of the oldest philosophy " (Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 13). The poem is, indeed, the ex-

pression of a deep and profound yearning, clothed though it is in somewhat obscure language, as such thoughts are bound to be when first conceived. It is a bold attempt on the part of the poet for comprehending the ultimate source of the cosmic order—the ground "from which, as an eternal, unfathomable and unspeakable unity, all gods, worlds, and creatures" have evolved. But Prof. Garbe has found in it nothing but "unclear, self-contradictory trains of thought" (Philosophy of Ancient India, p. 1). The indecision expressed in the last stanza of the poem is highly significant; and it is absurd to take the poet to task for it. Is the ultimate ground of the world of plurality an unconscious or subconscious principle, or is it a spiritual principle which has consciously evolved the world of plurality from within as materials of its own life? This is, in fact, the question at issue here; and the very fact that such an interrogation could have been so clearly formulated, in so remote an age, is itself a great thing, and a clear proof of a distinct advance towards speculative philosophy.

The significance of the hymn, R.V., X.121.

In R.V., X. 121, we meet with what may probably be regarded as a still more remarkable expression of the conception of the cosmic unity. The poem speaks of an all-pervading Reality, revealing itself in and through the cosmic forces, and tells us that the snow-capped Himalayas and the seas with the rivers flowing into them are but the expressions of his glory, and that all quarters are his arms, and that the sun rises and shines in him (*Yatra sūraḥ uditaḥ vivhāti*). The poem ends with the following exclamation :—

"Than thou, O Lord of the universe, there is none else, who holds in his embrace the whole universe." The

conception embodied in this poem is indeed very deep and lofty. The sense of the cosmic unity as the expression of an ultimate spiritual principle has, here, found a distinct expression. This poem has, however, been greatly misunderstood. From the expression, "To which god shall we offer our sacrificial offerings?" which is the burden of the poem and has been repeated at the end of each stanza, Professors Weber and Max Müller, as well as several other scholars, have treated the poem as an invocation to the 'Great Unknown,' and have accordingly, regarded the concluding couplet, wherein Prajāpati, the Lord of creation, has been mentioned, as an interpolation (Müller, Six Systems, p. 62). The great commentator Sāyana, following a confused tradition, has, on the other hand, regarded the poem as an invocation to 'Kaḥ,' used as a synonym for Prajāpati "the Lord of the creation." Thus the real implication of the poem, and of the query in particular, has, it seems, been completely misunderstood. The poem is not at all an invocation to the Great Unknown, nor is the last couplet an interpolation. The poem is consistent from beginning to end. It is the outcome of a living consciousness on the part of the poet, of the ultimate Reality, manifested in the world as Viśvarupa. In the ecstasy of such realisation, the poet naturally felt the absurdity and vanity of the old forms of worship. There is an ellipsis to be supplied in each stanza, immediately preceding the query. After "In whom the sun rises and shines," etc., for instance, comes the ellipsis in that particular stanza. And the lines, together with the ellipsis supplied, will stand thus :—

"In whom the sun rises and shines, etc.—
(He alone is to be known and meditated on)
To which god shall we offer sacrificial offerings?"

The answer evidently is—" There is none to be so worshipped." And the term, Prajāpati,—not in its deistic sense, but in the sense of the internal Ruler of the cosmic order—naturally presented itself as the right appellation for the Deity, conceived as the Universal Spirit. That this is the real implication of the query, can also be easily gathered from the expression, " Than thou there is none else," occurring in the last line but one. And thus understood, we also find a perfect unity and continuity of thought running through the poem. The poem, in fact, represents the dawn of a new vision of the Reality, which is distinctly Vedāntic in character. And Prof. Max Müller also seems to be, to some extent, aware of it. The sentiment embodied in the poem is, says he, much deeper than " the Semitic demand for a god above all gods, or for a father of gods and men, as in Greece,.....The ground for this lies deeper" (*Ibid*, p. 56).

In R.V., X. 81, we meet with another and an equally sublime expression of the ultimate ground and unity of the plurality of experience. In R.V., X. 125, Vāch, the word, is, again, represented as declaring herself as both the constituent element (material cause) and the ultimate ground (efficient cause) of the cosmic-order. In the third stanza of the poem, Vāch has been represented as declaring—

> " Me have the gods in many forms displayed,
> Me living everywhere, and entering all things."*

The conception embodied in these lines is highly significant. Colebrooke has identified Vāch with the creative

* For English translation of the poem, see Colebrooke, Mis. Essays, I, p. 28; Müller, Six Systems, p. 86; Griffiths, I, 171; etc.

power of Brahman proceeding from him. Prof. Weber has discovered a remarkable similarity between the Vedic Vāch and the Neo-Platonic conception of Logos (Ind. Stud., Vol. IX, p. 473), and is inclined to hold that "the growth of the Neo-Platonic idea was influenced by the like views of the philosophical systems of India." Prof. Max Müller also admits the remarkable resemblance between the Indian Vāch, on the one hand, and the Logos, and more particularly, the Sophia of the Old Testament, but he thinks that here "there is nothing, as yet, approaching to the conception of the Word, as the Creative power." (Six Systems, p. 87.)

Puruṣa-Sūtra and its implications.

The speculative genius of the hymnal period has, however, reached its acme, perhaps, in the celebrated Puruṣa Hymn (R.V., X. 90). It represents the entire cosmic-order, with its multiplicity of things and beings, as the outcome of a process of self-differentiation on the part of the Ultimate Reality. Here are some lines of the poem which will speak for themselves :—

> "The embodied Spirit has thousand heads, thousand eyes, thousand feet. He pervades the whole world and transcends it by a (clear) space of ten fingers. All that exists, all that has been, and all that shall be, is this Self (Puruṣaḥ). He is the Lord of immortality."

How significant are the words, "All this is the Self: all that is, has been, and is yet to be is He!" (*Puruṣa eva idam sarvam, yat bhūtam yacca bhavyam*). This hymn also contains references to the four-fold division of the Vedas, as well as to the four-fold division of labour. The latter division was originally based on the principle of the division of work according to individual aptitude, capacity or fitness, and it was only later that

it has degenerated into the morbid and unhealthy institution of caste. And it is evident, from these references, that this hymn is of comparatively late origin. Originally, the Vedas were three in number and the Atharva-Veda came into existence some centuries later. The presence of a reference to the fourth Veda in the Puruṣa-Sūkta has therefore naturally led some scholars to regard it as an interpolation. It is really difficult to avoid the conclusion that, if not the whole of the Puruṣa-Sūkta, at least the portions containing the above references must be regarded as composition of a much later age. But, apart from these references, the poem may be regarded as really representing the high-water mark of the philosophical speculation of the hymnal age. We shall here refer to one other Rig-Vedic passage, which has, it seems, escaped the attention of Vedic scholars; and this shall be our last. In R.V., I.164, 20, we meet with a highly significant, though clumsily expressed, representation of the intimate and organic relation between the individual soul and the Absolute Spirit, manifested in the world of plurality, as its indwelling Spirit. They are metaphorically represented as two beautiful birds, devoted to each other, and dwelling together on the same branch of a tree, one of them (individual soul) receiving his nourishment from the other, and the other offering the same with utmost delight, and requiring nothing for his own nourishment. These and similar other reflective and quasi-philosophical poems, scattered here and there in the Rig-Veda, formed the quarries wherein we discover the earliest rudiments of the Vedāntic speculation in their slow process of crystallisation.

Philosophical Speculations in the Brāhmaṇas.

Here however we are confronted with a difficulty. Even in the oldest Upaniṣads, the cardinal principles of the Vedāntic doctrines are found already fully worked

out. But is it conceivable that the dim and broken rays of thought which had been struggling hard for an outlet, through the thick mists of the hymnal atmosphere, flashed forth all on a sudden into the glories of a bright, mid-day summer sun in the oldest of the Upaniṣads? This, though probably possible physically, is certainly impossible psychologically. To get rid of this difficulty, we are forced "to admit," to use Prof. Max Müller's words (Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. 6-7), "a long familiarity with philosophical problems before the time that gave birth to the Upaniṣads which we possess." As India is fertilised by numerous systems of rivers, he continues, "all pointing to the snowy mountains in the north, we can see the Indian mind was being nourished through ever so many channels, all starting from a vast accumulation of..... thought, of which we seem to see the last remnants only in our Upaniṣads, while the original springs are lost to us for ever." The intermediate period between the hymns and the Upaniṣads was evidently a very fertile one. Its main defect was, it seems, a lack of systematic and critical examinations of individual doctrines. This is very likely the cause why the speculative literature of this period has been virtually superseded by the systematic speculation of the Upaniṣads, and why, except stray citations, met with here and there in the Brāhmaṇas and Āraṇyakas, we have nothing of the activities of this period left to us. The semi-philosophical hymns in the Rig-Veda were only the index of a new line of speculation, a new order of thought in a slow process of making, a new streamlet bound to grow and expand more and more, and ultimately to swell into a torrent. And historical evidences are not altogether lacking to show that it actually so happened, and that the transition from the pale dawn of speculation in the

hymnal period to its vigorous outburst in the Upaniṣadic literature was not an abrupt one. In R.V., X. 81, the poet had asked—

"What was the Wood, what was the Tree,
From which the earth and the heaven were hewn?"

In the Tait. Brāh. (II.8, 8-10) the same question has been repeated, and an answer has been given to it in the following words :—

"Brahman (the Supreme Self) is the Wood,
Brahman the Tree,
From which the earth and the heaven have
been hewn."

Again, in the Śatap. Brāh., IV.2, 2, we find the following, "All this (the plurality of existents) is the Self." (*Sarvam hi ayam Ātmā*). In the same Brāhmaṇa (XIV. 7, 2, 28) we are again told—

"Having become tranquil, self-subdued, supremely indifferent, patient, full of faith and intent, let him (the individual) see the Soul in the Soul.*

Now, it is in these utterances that we first come across such terms as Brahman, in its Vedāntic sense of the Absolute, and Ātmā, the Supreme Soul. These words, in their connotation, are evidently distinctly Vedāntic. They form members of one definite and comprehensive system of thought. And it must have been impossible for them to have obtained currency in the pre-Upaniṣadic literature in isolation from the other inter-related members of the group. And their very presence in the

* *Cf.* Cowell, Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha, p. 255.

pre-Upaniṣadic literature is an unmistakable proof that the whole system of thought implied in them must have been in existence even before the appearance of the oldest of the Upaniṣads. The systematic philosophy of the Upaniṣads must have superseded the kindred literature of this period; and that is why it is almost completely lost to us.

The aforesaid and similar other stray philosophical utterances, found in the pre-Upaniṣadic literature, gave a rude shock to the hymnal theology, with its rituals and ceremonials. But it continued to hold its sway upon popular imagination until the advent of the Upaniṣads. And it was in the Upaniṣads themselves that the old and semi-animistic theories of the origin (and periodical dissolutions) of the universe were, for the first time, definitely and finally discarded, and the Cosmological problem was re-formulated in a strictly metaphysical form. And this came as a death-blow which completely shattered the foundations of the hymnal theology, and paved the way for the dawn of a new era of awakening in the land, which, on its practical side, found its partial yet bold expression in the great ethico-social movement as represented in early Buddhism.

CHAPTER II

VEDANTISM : WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT

The Aristotelian and the Kantian currents of thought unified in the Vedānta.

"Democritus had regarded the atoms and their motion, Plato the Ideas and their final causation," to use Windelband's words (History of Philosophy, p. 139), "as the causes of phenomena—causes different from the phenomena themselves." Aristotle, however, determined the true reality—that which is—as the essence which unfolds in the phenomena themselves. He denounced the attempt to think out as the cause of phenomena something different from them (a second world), and taught that the Being of things, possesses no reality apart from "the phenomena in which it realises itself" —that Being is "the essence which constitutes the one and the only ground of its individual formations, but is real or actual only in these themselves, and all phenomenal appearance or coming into being" is but "the realisation of the essence." The opposition between the Heraclitic and the Eleatic metaphysics was thus virtually solved by Aristotle. Again, "the Greek theory assumed 'the objects' as given independently of thought, and regarded the intellectual processes as entirely dependent upon the objects; at the most, it was the mission of the intellectual processes to reproduce these objects by way of copy, or allow themselves to be guided by them. Kant discovered that the objects of thought are none other than the products of thought itself" (*Ibid*, p. 544). Now, these two currents of thought, the Aristotelian and the Kantian movements, had been unified in the Vedāntic speculation in India. at least as early as about 800 B.C. The world of plu-

rality, as perceived by the senses, unconnected and discrete, and appearing as existing independently of thought, was the foundation of the pre-Vedāntic position in India. But experience, involving both the subject and the object as two factors of an inter-related whole, and the consequent rejection of the aforesaid sensuous view of reality, formed the starting-point of the Vedāntic speculation. The world of self and the world of not-self are but two manifestations of one Ultimate Reality, one eternally self-differentiating spiritual principle, Brahman, which is realised in the plurality of existents, finite centres of the Infinite's self-manifestation, and includes and unites them all in its all-embracing Unity, which is pure " inwardness," and has nothing external to it, and " wherein the terms external and internal lose all their meaning and application." This is the central conception of the Vedānta.

The term Brahman defined.

The concept of Brahman, as an eternally self-differentiating spiritual principle, is, indeed, the pivot, on which the entire Vedantic Panentheism rests. The term Brahman, says Prof. Max Müller, is derived from *brih*, to break or burst forth. " If *brih* meant originally," says he, " to break or burst forth, *brahman* would have meant at first what breaks forth, an utterance, a word, and in this sense, in the sense of prayer, brahman is of very frequent occurrence in the Veda. It might, however, at the same time, have meant, what bursts forth, in the sense of.....creation or creator, particularly when creation was conceived, not as the making, but as a coming forth."* Ānandagiri, in his gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary on the Tait. Up. derives the term " from *brih*, to grow, to expand," and ob-

* Müller, Three Lectures on the Vedanta, p. 149.

Cf. Deussen, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 20.

serves that the term is " an expression of growth and greatness." The term Brahman, as used in the Vedānta, has, indeed, a double significance. The creation, regarded as an effect, a modification or self-differentiation, of the ultimate causal principle, is nothing but a 'bursting forth,' self-differentiation, or expansion of Brahman, the Ultimate Reality. But the term also means the all-comprehensive and all-transcending Reality, Bhūmā, the Infinite, Niratiśayabrihat, as Rāmānuja puts it. Vijñānabhikṣu, in dealing with the same question, likewise observes, " the Self is called Brahman, both by reason of its infinitude, and of its bursting forth, or self-differentiating expansion."* And it is evident from the Vedānta itself that the term connotes both these ideas. The Vedānta Sūtras, at the very outset (I.1,2) defines Brahman as " the principle which evolves from within, the cosmic order, sustains it, as its ultimate ground and support, and re-absorbs (to be understood only in logical sense of posterity and not as an event in time) it on its dissolution." † Thus, the cosmic order, the Vedānta tells us, is the bursting forth, or self-differentiation of the universal Self, which manifests itself into a world of plurality, as means of its self-manifestation, includes and unifies them all, and, as the ultimate

* *Cf.* Rāmānuja's Commentary on Vedānta Sūtras, I.1,2; also Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary on the same.

† The Vedāntic passages referring to prior-existence of the plurality, in a latent state in the Absolute, as well as those referring to the final dissolution of the plurality, should always be taken in their logical sense, and never as events in time. The Vedāntic Brahman is an eternally self-differentiating principle; and as such creation is the eternal self-manifestation of the Infinite.

ground and support of all its modes, transcends them. The Chh. Up., VII. 24.1, again, defines Brahman in its aspect of Bhūmā, the all-embracing Reality, the Infinite, "wherein nothing else (separate from and independent of it) is to be seen, nothing else is to be heard, nothing else is to be conceived, and nothing else is to be known."* The first definition represents Brahman as both the efficient and material cause of the plurality of existents, both its source and support, Adhiṣṭhāṇa-Kāraṇa (Ablative Cause, if we can say so), as Vijñānabhikṣu aptly designates it.† Brahman desired, the Upaniṣads accordingly tell us, to grow or differentiate itself, into many forms, and it modified itself and assumed many forms, abiding whole and complete in each of the modes.‡ "He, who wakes while all are asleep," says Kaṭha (II.2,8 and 12), "That alone is the Light of the world, That is

* This passage, and similar other passages, have been grossly misinterpreted by Śaṅkara, Gough, Deussen and others, as implying a denial of the plurality. Here, however, plurality is not at all denied; it is only represented as necessary materials of the life of the Infinite, and as having no independent existence.

† In opposition to Śaṅkara's Distortion or Illusion Theory, Vivarta-Vāda, on the one hand, and Rāmānuja's Modification Theory, Pariṇāma-Vāda, on the other, he offers his doctrine of 'Ablative Causality,' as best describing the true relation between Brahman, as cause and ground, and the world of plurality, as effect. The theory of Ablative Causality includes evidently the Modification Theory of Rāmānuja, and nicely fits in with the Unity-in-difference view of Reality held by Nimvārka, and really taught in the Vedānta. It clearly brings out that particular aspect of Vedāntic Panentheism which refers to the transcendence of the Reality and its inexhaustibility in the world of plurality.

‡ Tait. Up., II. 6; Brih., I.4,5; 7; 10; IV. 4,13; IV. 5,7, etc.; Chh., VI. 2,3; VI. 8,4; VII. 14, 1-2, etc.; Muṇḍ., I.1, 7-8; II 1, 3-4; Praśna, I.4; IV. 7; Kaṭha; II.2, etc.

Brahman, That verily is called the Eternal Being. In Him rest all the worlds, and nothing transcends Him. He is One Ruler, the Soul of all existents, who manifests His One Self into many forms. The sages who see Him as manifested in their own souls alone have eternal peace, and not others." "All these are regulated by Reason (Prajñānetram)"; likewise declares Ait. Up., III.3, "rest in Reason (Prajñāne pratiṣṭhitam). The world is led by Reason, Reason is its support (Prajñā pratiṣṭhā); Reason is Brahman." "All these existents," similarly says Uddālaka (Chh., VI. 8, 4 and 7), "live, move, and have their beings in this Eternal Being.....All existents are but modes of the Self." The Vedānta Sūtras also echo and re-echo the same ideas in a hundred different ways, and represent the cosmic whole as a system of inter-related reals, the finite modes of the self-manifestation of the Supreme Spirit.

It is "not in a Substance as severed from its finite modes—as existing in a way which is not their mode of existence—that we can look for the ultimate explanation of the universe. A universal, which is simply the negation of the particular elements, can in no way be reconciled with these. A substance or ground of existence which is but the negation of all finite existence can, to use Adamson's words (Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 66) "in no way serve as their bond of union."* The Vedāntic Brahman is not such a negation of all finite existences. It is, on the contrary, "a differentiated Unity," to use Dr. McTaggart's words,† "in which the Unity has no meaning but the differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the Unity. The differentiations are individuals, for each of

Brahman, a differentiated, unitary spiritual principle.

* Adamson, Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 66.
† McTaggart, Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 19.

whom the Unity exists, and whose nature consists in the fact that the Unity is for them, as the whole nature of the Unity consists in the fact that it is for the individuals." Bādarāyaṇa is indeed never tired of bringing out this fact of correlation between Brahman and the plurality of existents, its modes of self-manifestation,—of showing their essential non-difference and unity, and yet emphasising their equally real difference and opposition, as finite centres of the Infinite's self-manifestation.*

Brahman is thus not only an eternal principle of change and generation, but, as the Self of all, it is also their universal internal Guide and Ruler. It is ever active, self-conscious, Universal Will, eternally manifesting itself through an infinity of finite centres, the world of plurality. The creation is thus an eternal process of the self-revelation of Brahman, and 'names' and 'forms,' the plurality of existents, are self-evolved objects of its eternal consciousness. Thus understood, Śaṅkara's special pleading on the point becomes quite superfluous and meaningless. "What then is the object," asks he, "to which the knowledge of the Lord can refer previously to the origin of the world? Name and form, we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with Brahman nor as different from it, unevolved, but about to be evolved" (Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, p. 50). This special pleading is, we say, quite unnecessary, from a strictly Vedāntic point of view. Creation, according to the Vedānta, is eternal; Brahman is an eternally self-differentiating Unity, and 'names'

* *Cf.* For Unity in Difference, I.3, 23-27; II.1,13;18;22;III.2,11; 27-28; etc.
For Non-difference, II.1, 15-19; etc.
For Difference, I.1,17-22; I.2,1-24; etc.

and 'forms,' as modes of Brahman's self-manifestation, have been the objects of its eternal consciousness.

Materialism and Idealism are both one-sided systems. Materialism has completely failed to explain the unity of the cosmic order, and the origin of the individual souls. To be able to produce intelligence, matter must contain it, at least potentially. Again, to make reciprocal inter-actions among a plurality of existents possible, the constituent elements of the world-whole must have some common bond of unity and inter-dependence and these prove the utter inadequacy of materialism. The idealistic thinkers have, on the contrary, been confronted with insuperable difficulties in their attempts to pass from the ideal to the real. The difficulty of the task compelled Plato greatly to compromise his position, and to take recourse to the hypothesis of a non-being to explain the world of change and generation. Hegel solved the difficulty by declaring the identity of thought and being. But "the idea which involves reality, thought which implies force, is," to use Weber's words, "more than an idea, more than thought." The reconciliation of these two opposed positions and a true synthesis of Idea and Form must be sought for in a higher principle, which constitutes the ultimate essence of both matter and thought. And such a higher principle is will. "No substance," said Leibniz, "without effort." Modern science has also resolved matter into force. But, to make effort, is to will; and, if 'effort' or 'tendency to move' forms the essence of matter, we must seek for the basis of substance in the will. Thought also implies effort. *In the will, then, lies the synthesis of thought and matter.* It is being in its fulness and matter and thought are nothing but its accidents, ulterior products and developments. The Will

is, in fact, at the basis of everything. It is not only the essence of the human soul, but the basis and the substance of all things and beings, the only Absolute principle. On this principle, says the Vedānta, as did Aristotle in a later age, " depend the heavens and all the worlds." Thus the philosophy, which regards Will as the ultimate ground and essence of all existents, is the only true universal metaphysics, and contain, to use the words of Leibniz, " Whatever there is of good in the hypothesis of Epicurus and of Plato, of the greatest materialist and the greatest idealist."

Schopenhauer was the first in modern age to call the ultimate basis of all existents by its right name, the Will. But, although he tried to work out a speculative metaphysics on a realistic basis, he completely misunderstood the nature of the Will. The Will is not a mere will-to-be, but it strives after an ideal. Such a Will alone, *Wille zum Guten*, and not the will-to-be-at-any-cost, *Wille zum Leben*, of Schopenhauer, constitutes the true essence of the ultimate world-principle, the one ultimate reality which manifests itself in the world of plurality as the principle of change, generation and progress, supports the heavens and the worlds, and reveals itself in man as the Self of his self, and as the ultimate ground and foundation of his moral aspirations. And such a Will is the Vedāntic Brahman, an eternally self-differentiating spiritual principle of change and generation, evolution and progress.

Schopenhauer's view of matter is only a modification of Leibniz's pan-psychism. Prof. Stout, in his Manual of Psychology, Intro., Chap. III, has also puheld pan-psychism, and says that there is a psychical element in matter. Prof. Bosanquet, however, holds pan-psychism to be "a gratuitous hypothesis" (Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 366). As the world-whole is the mani-

festation of the Will, the Vedānta also maintains that there is a psychical element in matter, and that all existents are ultimately 'feeling things,' 'reals.' There are, however, different grades of 'reals.' And man alone is fully conscious of his 'realness,' of his living self-existence, as a finite centre of the Infinite. And this is what makes him an end to himself, in the strict sense of the term. He alone is distinctly conscious of the infinitude of his being, as well as of his capacity gradually to realise the divine in him by his individual efforts.

How to read the Vedānta.

Now, to elucidate the Vedāntic view-point of Reality, the manner or process of its self-differentiation into the world of plurality, as well as the nature of the relation between the One, the variously diversified Reality, and its various individual modes, the Vedānta has used two kinds of analogical arguments side by side. One set of these is intended to bring out and emphasise the element of difference between the finite modes and the Reality, and the other set to indicate and explain their ultimate essential unity, and the moment-to-moment dependence of the modes on the Reality, whose modes they are. But this sort of treatment of the subject-matter, has, evidently, an inherent drawback of its own. If, for an apprehension of the Vedāntic doctrine, one ignore the second set of arguments, and entirely rely on the first set, he will discover nothing but pure and unmixed dualism in the Vedānta. If one, on the other hand, ignore the first set of arguments and illustrations, and rely on the second set exclusively, he is sure to fall into the opposite blunder, and to think that Vedāntism is nothing but a magnified type of Eleatic metaphysics. But both these interpretations of the Vedānta are equally wrong and anti-Vedāntic. The Vedāntic teachers themselves were clearly aware of this defect in their treatment of the subject. They have, accordingly, left no stone unturn-

ed to warn their readers, while dealing with the Vedānta, always to be on their guard, and never to divorce the two sets of arguments from each other, and destroy their organic unity. Bādarāyaṇa himself has most distinctly told us (Vedānta Sūtras, III. 2.20) that an illustrated simile is always meant to illustrate one point only, and not all, *omne simile claudicat*, for otherwise it would not be a simile at all, and that, as such, a simile must always be taken strictly in the sense it is intended to convey, and must never be understood in a wider sense. Nimvārka, Śankara, Rāmānuja and scores of other commentators on the Vedānta have also echoed and re-echoed this warning. But, in spite of all such warnings, the Vedānta has been grossly misunderstood. And what is worse still, some of the commentators have fallen into the very same dark pitfalls against which they themselves have cautioned their readers. And this has naturally made confusion worse confounded. Śankara himself, as we shall see fully in the last chapter, has been one of the greatest offenders in this respect. He has completely ignored, or tried to explain away, the first set of arguments, and has transformed the eternally self-differentiating Vedantic Brahman, the eternal spiritual principle of change, or generation, into an ever-immutable ' Pure Being ' of the Eleatics, and has been driven to declare the plurality of existents as illusions, fictitious appearances—as mere phantoms of unenlightened human imagination, Ignorance, or Avidyā. And an overwhelming majority of scholars in the West, and many in the East as well, having implicitly relied on Śankara as an infallible guide, have only unawares been hurled into the same abyss. Another class of Orientalists, of which Prof. Oldenburg is one, have fallen into the opposite blunder, and discovered clear and unmistakable germs of Sānkhyan dualism and pessimism, as Prof. Oldenburg

calls it, in the concrete spiritualism of the Vedānta. We shall fully discuss Śankara's position, as well as that of the Western scholars who have followed him, in the last chapter. Here we shall briefly examine Prof. Oldenburg's contention, and point out its absurdity.

Prof. Oldenburg's mistake.

"The doctrine of the Brāhmanas regarding the Ātman," Prof. Oldenburg tells us (Buddha, 1882, pp. 33, 39-40), "do not form a system," and in them "the most irreconcilable differences remain in juxtaposition, probably without their inherent contradictions having been even noticed." "The Ātman," he adds, "pervades things, as the salt, which has dissolved in water, pervades the water; from the Ātman things spring, as the sparks fly out from the fire, as threads from the spider, as the sound comes from the flute or the drum. As all the spokes are united together in the nave and the felly of a wheel, so in the Ātman are united.....all the worlds, all gods, all beings, all these egoities.....' He who dwells in the earth,' it is said of the Ātman, ' being in the earth, whom the earth knows not, whose body is the earth,.....that is, the Ātman.' " And, accordingly, "we may infer," says he, that "the Ātman is to the Indian certainly the sole actuality.....the only significant reality in things; but there is a remainder left in things, which he is not," and that, "the Ātman, as the sole directing power, is in all that lives and moves, but that the world of creatures operated on stands side by side with the directing power, pervaded by his energy, and yet separate from him.....Since then there remains in things a residue which is not Ātman,.....naturally comes the expectation that it was conceived to be matter or dark chaos, which, formless in itself, receives its form from the Ātman, the Source of form and life." Again, "if the Ātman," he continues, "be commended ' who is above hunger and death,' who is there who does not

detect in such words a reflection, though it be not openly expressed, on the world of the creature, in which hunger and thirst, sorrow and confusion are at home, and in which men grow old and die?'' (*Ibid*, p. 42.) In such utterances we find, Prof. Oldenburg concludes, ''the birthplace of Indian pessimism,'' and one feels naturally disposed to infer that ''that the One, the happy Ātman, has chosen to manifest itself in the world of plurality, of becoming and disease, was a misfortune : this is not openly stated.....but they cannot have been very far from this thought when they proposed to man as the highest aim of his effort, the undoing in his case of the manifestation, and the finding for himself a return from the plurality to the One.'' (*Ibid*, 42-43.)

Now, the above lengthy extract clearly explains Prof. Oldenburg's position. But evidently, partly owing to his Neo-Platonic prepossessions, and partly to his having approached the Vedānta through a wrong track, he has entirely misunderstood the real significance of the Vedantic Panentheism. There are two points in his contention, namely, the alleged presence of Sānkhyan dualism in the Vedantic teachings, and their pessimistic drift and the conception of metem psychosis. We shall examine his second point in a subsequent chapter. Here we shall briefly examine his first point. It will be evident, from the following passages of the Chh. and the Brih. Upaniṣads themselves, from which Prof. Oldenburg has selected the passages mentioned above, that his contention is entirely groundless. Uddālaka asked his son, Śvetaketu, on the latter's return from his preceptor's house, on the termination of his studentship, '' Have you, my dear son, ever asked for that instruction, by which all that is unheard becomes heard, all that is unperceived becomes perceived, all that is unknown becomes known?'' '' What is that instruction, revered

father?'' asked the son. '' As, my dear son,'' replied the father, '' from one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only in the modifications signified by their names, arising from speech, but the truth is that all is clay; and as, my dear son, from one nugget of gold, all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only in the modifications signified by their names, arising from speech, but the truth is that all is gold.....Thus, my dear son, is that instruction '' (Chh. Up.* VI.1, 3-6). This memorable passage has been a veritable bone of contention between Śankara on the one hand and most of the other commentators on the other. But, read between the lines, it evidently admits of one interpretation alone. In spite of all individual differences, the various modifications of clay or gold, as the case may be, have their essential identity, inasmuch as they are all modes of one and the same substance, variously modified in them. Thus, by knowing the substance, its modes are virtually known; or better, the substance can alone be known in and through its modes, and, when so known, the unknown modes of the substance also becomes known in their essence. This is the great truth which Uddālaka has, in this famous passage, tried to impress on the mind of his son. The expression, that '' the difference lies in the names alone,'' does not, in any way, at all negate or deny the reality of the modes, as Śankara and his followers wrongly think it does. Here the term ' names ' is evidently to be understood as ' signs ' for ' things sig-

* *Cf.* Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 164 S.B.E., I. p. 92.

The whole dialogue has been translated by Deussen, Gough and several others, after Śaṅkara's interpretation of it.

nified.' So the expression only means that the differences are due to the various modifications signified by their respective names; but that their substance is the same—that the same substance exists in them all, diversified in different ways. So, by knowing a clod of clay, or a nugget of gold, or Brahman, as the case may be, all its modes become known. In this memorable dialogue the father's object was evidently to teach the son the great truth that all existents, in spite of their individual differences, are but different modes or finite centres of the self-manifestation of one Ultimate Reality, Brahman, that stirs and pulsates in each of them and reveals itself in and through them all. "In the beginning," the father added, "there was, my dear son, That only, which is, One only without a second.....It thought, 'May I be many, may I grow forth?' And it became all these." "All these are modes of the Self," "*Etadātmyam* idam sarvam." The word, 'ātmyam,' the mode of the Self, is quite significant, and involves a clear admission of the existence and reality of the world of plurality, as modes of one Ultimate Reality, the Self. (Chh. Up. VI. 2, 1 and 3; VI. 8-7.) Bādarāyaṇa has also taken this passage exactly in this sense (*cf.* Vedānta Sūtras, II.1, 13 and 14). The Brih. Up. (I.4, 10), similarly declares, "That became all these" (*Tat sarvam abhavat*). The same Upaniṣad in the Madhu-Vidyā still more clearly tells us, "This Self shaped itself after the shape of everything, that it might unfold its essence." The Katha Up. (V.9-12) also tells us, "He Who manifests himself in many forms." This is in fact the one cry of the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta Sūtras, and it is writ large in letters of gold on every page of the Vedānta. Evidently then, the Vedantic viewpoint of Reality is Unity-in-difference; and there is absolutely no germ of Sānkhyan dualism in the Upaniṣads,

The Vedantic Panentheism.

nor do the Upaniṣads have anything to do with the immutable ' Pure Being ' of the Eleatics.

It is evident, from above, that the Vedānta teaches nothing but Concrete Spiritualism. The two sets of analogical arguments referred to above must, under no circumstances, be divorced from each other ; for they are intended only as two halves of one organic system of thought. In the sea of the Vedānta, the mariner has, therefore, to be always on the watch-tower, and must know how to steer clear of the Scylla and the Charybdis referred to above, which have, unfortunately, been the grave of the reputation of many a good sailor.

CHAPTER III.

Epistemology and the Vedanta.

Philosophy: Its Aim.

The word philosophy was originally used in its general sense of love of knowledge or wisdom. It is believed to have been first introduced, in Europe, by Pythagoras, about 530 B.C. More than a century later, the term was brought into common use by Socrates, and in opposition to the pretentious claims of his opponents, the Sophists, who called themselves *Sophistae*, wise men, Socrates, with his characteristic modesty, called himself a philosopher, a lover of wisdom, but the word has long undergone a great change in its connotation. It has long ceased to be a concern of mere intellectual or aesthetic curiosity, and come to be treated as one of great practical importance. Philosophy now aims at a consistent and satisfactory explanation of the world-whole, and a clear conception of men's place, function and destiny, as factors of the cosmic order—a conception perfectly consistent with facts of experience, and adequate for the satisfaction of the needs and demands of our moral nature. Philosophy is, thus, " the search for a comprehensive view of nature, and an attempt at a universal explanation of things " (Weber). It is, however, " the science of the universe, not in its particular details, but in respect of the principles which condition all its particulars " (Ueberweg). It is, in other words, " such knowledge of those things which are, or happen, as will enable us to understand why they are, or happen " (Wolff), and what they are. Philosophy, says Aristotle, is " the science of principles,"

The origin and development of philosophical speculation in the West from Pythagoras to Kant.

There is a slight ambiguity in this definition. If construed as the science of the first principles of knowledge, the science of the most fundamental notions involved in our judgments, it becomes identical with Epistemology. If, again, it is taken as the science of the ultimate principles underlying the world of plurality, it becames the same as Ontology. But Epistemology is barren without Ontology, and Ontology is blind without Epistemology. The two must go hand in hand. Kant's definition of philosophy as "the science and criticism of knowledge," is, evidently, too narrow. Knowledge cannot be divorced either from an enquiry into the nature of the object known or of the knowing subject. Philosophy, with Herbart, is " the elaboration of concepts," a clear and consistent presentation of the fundamental categories involved in judgments as correlated factors of one comprehensive system of thought. With Hegel, philosophy is " the Science of the Absolute Idea." The universe is, with him, the realising of an idea or end—the product of the activities of a single principle seeking the realisation of an inherent end. And the end of philosophy is to understand the nature, process, and end of the evolution, of the cosmic-order, and thus to think over again in terms of finite consciousness the Aboslute Idea realised in it.

Vedantic formulation of the aim of Philosophy.

As rational beings, we are always confronted with problems as to the ultimate nature of the factors and forces at work in and about us, our position and function in the world-whole, and the relations in which we stand to one another and to the basic principle, or principles, working in it. These problems irresistibly thrust themselves upon us. And, consciously or unconsciously, we have to solve them, rightly or wrongly. Thus, every man is bound to have a philosophy of his own, good or bad, which, consciously or unconsciously, regulates his

thoughts and conduct. In some form or other, these problems have always engaged the thought and attention of men of every age and in every clime. The problem of philosophy is, therefore, virtually as old as humanity itself. In some remote past, these very problems also engaged the serious attention of the best minds in India; and different thinkers endeavoured to solve them to the best of their light and ability. And the Six Systems of Philosophy of Ancient India to-day preserve the final results of these attempts. Of these various systems of the East, the Vedānta stands in the fore-front. In the Śvet. Up. I.1-2, we find the problem thus formulated; "Is Brahman (the Universal Self) the cause (of the cosmic-order)? Whence have we come into being? Whereby do we live? What is our ultimate (moment to moment) support? Tell us, O ye, who know Brahman, by what power we are led and guided in life, be it in happiness or misery. Is Time the Cause or Nature or Necessity, or Chance, or the Elements? Or is the Supreme (all-pervading) Spirit to be regarded as the cause and the support of all existents? The union and co-operation of the elements cannot be the cause (of this orderly cosmos), for such co-operation implies the guidance of an intelligent principle. Nor can the finite self, frail and subject to pleasure and pain as he is, be regarded as such." Philosophy aims at, says Mund. Up. (III.2, 6; II.2, 5), "the knowledge of Brahman (the Ultimate Reality), wherein the heavens, the earth and space, with all living and thinking beings, lie supported. Know that Self alone, leave aside all other words." "That is the highest knowledge (Parā Vidyā)," it adds, I. 1, 5-6, "by which that eternal (invisible, non-sensuous, self-existing all-pervading) Reality (the ultimate source and ground of all existents) can be known." The Chhān. Up. (VII, 24.1) speaks as already noticed, of one Ulti-

mate Reality, Bhūmā, " wherein nothing else is to be seen (as separate from and independent of it), nothing else is to be heard, nothing else is to be conceived and nothing else is to be known." The Brih. Up. likewise tells us : " the self is to be seen, heard, remembered and meditated on, O Maitreyi, where the self is seen, heard, remembered or known all these are known.....All these forsake him who know all these elsewhere than in the self...All these are (the modes of) the self (IV. 5, 6-7)." This is how the philosophical problem was originally formulated in India as early as about the 9th century B.C. ; and the solution it received is the Panentheism of the Vedānta.

Epistemological problem in the West.

But how is knowledge at all possible? In modern philosophy, criticism of knowledge began with Descartes. But his criticism only took the shape of provisional doubt ; and he was too easily satisfied. The formulation of *Cogito ergo sum* was, indeed, an epoch-making achievement, but Descartes failed to grasp its full significance, and to make its proper use. In the rest of his work, he, accordingly, proceeded as dogmatically as did Reid and his followers in Scotland. Locke next took up the problem, and, from an inadequate analysis of knowledge, endeavoured to show that all knowledge was derived from experience, and that " nothing was in intellect which was not previously in the senses." He, however, failed to avoid dogmatism, and contradicted himself in various ways. Hume, by a consistent application of Locke's aforesaid dictum, subsequently laid the foundation of sensationalism, and resolved all existents into mere clusters of sensations. Sensationalism of Hume, ended in universal agnosticism and scepticism in metaphysics. To Locke's empirical dictum, Leibniz had already suggested an important modification, namely,

Descartes.

Locke, Hume, and Mill.

'Except the intellect itself.' But he had gone to the other extreme, and endeavoured to explain knowledge as the product of reason alone. The task of Kant was to mediate between the sensationalism of Hume, and intellectualism of Leibniz, and to show that sensations by themselves are blind, and that notions without the given presentations of sense are empty, and that sensations, only when rationalised by the organising activities of reason, can give rise to knowledge, and enable us to build up a world of experience, and thus to rise from discrete and unconnected sensations to the conception of an orderly world of inter-related factors, with fixed and immutable laws. Kant's criticism, however, also ended in a modified scepticism. The world of experience is, with him, a mere orderly construction of complexes of sense-intuitions, due to the activity of self-consciousness,—merely an empirical world of appearances; and the transcendent world of things-in-themselves, though implied in knowledge, is unknown and unknowable. Criticism is thus "both idealistic and realistic, and yet, strictly speaking," as observes Weber (History of Philosophy, p. 475), "it is neither the one nor the other."

But what is the thing-in-itself? Kant tells us in reply, "he does not know, and does not need to know, since it is never to be found in experience." He does not even know whether it is within or without us. With him, it is only a limiting concept, but is, in itself, unknown and unknowable. He never questions its existence; he rather assumes it as an absolute reality, and even asserts that "objects, as things-in-themselves, give the matter of empirical perceptions; they contain the ground for determining the faculty of imagination, according to its sensibility." (*Cf.* Critique of Pure Reason, 1st Ed., p. 571; Prolegomena, p. 104.) At times, he

even attributes "the whole of the connection and extent" of our perceptions to the thing-in-itself (Critique, 1st Ed., p. 474). Nor is, with him, the constructive activity of self-consciousness to be treated as, in any way, dependent on any individual concrete subject. No, he openly declares, this activity belongs to the pure Ego, consciousness in general, and not to any individual conscious subject, and suggests that it may, after all, belong to the thing-in-itself. Thus, in Kant's analysis of knowledge, the notion of the thing-in-itself appears as a mere negative concept, and the unity of self-consciousness as a logical unity. In the second Critique, however, when taken in conjunction with the fact of free activity under a non-empirical law, " the notion of thing-in-itself acquires a certain positive significance.....But it is hard for Kant to define further what is to be understood by this positive significance." (Adamson, Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 249.) Here, however, he declares man to be "a citizen of two worlds." As a member of the intelligible world, says he, he lays down the law for his own guidance, as a member of the empirical world; he is thus " at once law-giver and subject." Man, therefore, here he tells us, " need not go beyond himself—only beyond his sensuous nature—to find out the unconditioned." He further adds that " there must be a deep underlying harmony between the world of nature and the world of freedom," or else morality would have found itself " an alien in this world " (Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, II, pp. 81, 95). He has made equally significant suggestions in his last Critique as well.

But Kant has failed to see that it is one identical reality in us that operates both in the theoretical and practical spheres, now manifesting itself as the free organising principle, engaged in unifying and interpreting the given data of sense, and now as the active law-giver

and controller of our desires and conduct. In both these spheres, we are directly and immediately aware of the presence and operation of a non-empirical reality in us, self-revealed in and through its organising activities. "A succession of perceptions," and "a perception of succession," are not, as Kant himself points out, identical. But he does not see that, to be able to combine isolated and discrete presentations of sense into the unity of a single experience, the synthesising principle must experience the presentations as revealed through its own states, and itself as their common subject and witness, and that, in so doing, it must needs be aware of itself, as an abiding reality, which, amidst all variations of states, always remains identical with itself, variously modified at various moments of its continued existence. "We, in short, have experience in which there is no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling in knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins.....and, if you remove this direct sense of my momentary contents and being, you bring down the whole of consciousness in one common wreck" (Bradley, Truth and Reality, p. 159). Moreover, to make knowledge possible, we have to conceive, as Kant himself admits, the cause of our sense-presentation as things outside of us, and as exercising causality in producing affections in us, but we are directly aware of existence as a continued and unbroken unity, amidst variations of states only in ourselves. It is only in and through our own inner experiences that we are directly and immediately aware of ourselves as active principles having a continued existence and exercising causality, and thereby bringing about changes. And, had it not been for this direct knowledge of continued self-existence, substantiality, and causality in our own selves, it would not have been at all

possible for us to apply such terms in our interpretation of sense-presentations, and thereby to understand them as revealing a world of inter-related objects lying outside of us. Thus, the synthesising activity of one identical principle, as the common subject and witness of all the successive presentations of sense, and as, at the same time, aware of itself as such, alone renders experience possible. But Kant misunderstood the nature of this active self-conscious principle in man, and hypostatised, in its place, a logical abstraction, under the name of Transcendental Ego. And this was his fundamental mistake. In fact, it is the self-same reality in man that reveals itself now as the active law-giver and organiser of desires, and now as the common subject and interpreter of the presentations of sense. So, if the intelligible world stands revealed through the Moral Law, the same stands equally self-revealed through theoretical experience. In fact, "the pure ego of the theory of knowledge and of the theory of activity alike," to use Prof. Sorley's words (*Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 441), "is a logical abstraction. It has no being separate or separable from the being of the Self with its character.....Any adequate theory of the mode of mental activity must recognise that the self is never without character, that it is a diversity in unity, that subject without qualities is empty just as qualities without subject is blind."

But at the same time, the individual subject is not shut up within his barren individuality. The 'cosmos of our experience' and the world of things-in-themselves can, as Kant has pointed out here and there, by no means, be two wholly unrelated worlds. Had there been no intimate connection and correlation between the synthesising principle in us and the transcendent world, the ultimate source of the data of knowledge, different

men would have constructed different worlds of experience, and there would have been an end of all knowledge, and of the universal order and immutable laws in the world. But the very fact that it is the one and the same world that we all alike experience, clearly shows that experience is not a cob-web of man's own making, which he weaves, and in ignorance and delusion, calls it a universe. And this proves that the individual subject is more than an individual and that each of us is only a finite self-conscious centre in and through which the Infinite seeks to realise itself. The synthesising principle operative in man, and the objective world of inter-related units without, must have, as Kant himself admits, one all-embracing principle, as their common ground of unity and support, to make correlations between them, and, therefore, experience itself possible. And in such a hypothesis alone, as Kant himself suggests, lies the only possible explanation of the objective validity of knowledge. And, since not only the given data of sense, but also the concepts, applied by the thinking subject in the interpretation of sense-presentations, come from the thing-in-itself, knowledge must needs be "more than phenomenal." And directly the significance of these suggestions of Kant is brought out clearly, and all its consequences unfolded, "Kant's whole system," as aptly observes Prof. Höffding (*ibid*, p. 62), "undergoes a change."

Epistemological Problem in India.

What are the ultimate sources or canons of knowledge or Pramāṇas? This was the form, the epistemological problem took in ancient India. The word Pramāṇa, however, admits of a double significance. It means both an original source of knowledge, as well as a proof or demonstration of what is already known. This ambiguity in the meaning of the word has largely been responsible for a good deal of differences of opinion

among Indian thinkers on the problems connected with the canons of knowledge. The great controversy as to the nature of the authority of the Vedic word, was also largely due to this ambiguity. The pramāṇas, in their loosest enumeration, are held to be eight in number. Iśvarakriṣṇa, however, reduced them into three only, perception (sense-perception), inference and verbal testimony. But, of these three, perception alone is regarded as an independent source of knowledge. It is both an original source of knowledge, and also possesses a great demonstrative value. Inference has demonstrative value alone. And verbal testimony, Śavda, is also really inferential in character, though it has been regarded as an independent source of knowledge by the orthodox schools. Evidently then, both chronologically and logically perception is prior to the other two; and it is accordingly known as the foremost and most fundamental canon of knowledge. The Chārvākas accepted sensuous perception as the only original source of knowledge. The Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas accept perception and inference as pramāṇas; the Sānkhyas, the Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas (Logicians) accept all the three. Dogmatism has always assumed ' the objects ' as ' given ' independently of thought, and ' ideas ' as mere copies of objects. This popular view subsequently received a methodical presentation in the school of the Logicians. Under the influence of Buddhistic criticism, the foundation of dogmatism, however, crumbled into pieces. In their analysis of knowledge, the Buddhists resolved, as did Hume and Mill, in Europe at a later age, all existents into mere bundles of sensations.

The Non-Vedantic Schools.

Vedantic Epistemology.

The Vedanta, however, in opposition to popular dogmatism, had always held self-consciousness, or Ātmapratyaya, as the ultimate foundation of all know-

ledge. Buddhistic sensationalism and nihilism, on its advent, accordingly met with the fiercest opposition from the Vedanta, and also received its death-blow from it. The Vedantists had given a deeper significance to the term perception, made a distinction between sense-perception and intuition, and had held the unity of self-consciousness as the ultimate basis of all knowledge. Mere sensations do not constitute knowledge. To make knowledge possible, they must, says the Vedanta, be interpreted and synthesised by the rationalising activity of the thinking subject, and, in so doing, the thinking subject, the Vedanta tells us, knows itself as the common subject or witness of its sensations, and the latter, as its own states or affections, caused by stimulations from without. It is only through such organising activities of the self, as the common subject of all its sensations, and as aware of itself as such, and, therefore, as always identical with itself, amidst all variations of states, that discrete and unconnected sense-presentations can be united into the unity of a single experience. "If there is such a thing," declares the Vedanta with Green (Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 34), "as a connected experience of related objects, there must be operative in consciousness a unifying principle, which not only presents the related objects to itself, but at once renders them objects and unites them in relation to each by this act of presentation, and which is single throughout the experience. The unity of this principle must be correlative to the unity of experience." We can doubt or deny, says the Vedanta, the reality of all other things, but it is impossible to doubt the reality of the 'doubter,' or to deny the 'denier,'—the self or thinking subject in us that doubts or denies, and is, so doing, immediately aware of itself as the common subject of all its doubting and denying activities. The Indian sensationalists

also made the fullest use of the Association Theory in their efforts to account for experience. But Bādarāyaṇa, following in the footsteps of Yājñavalkya (*vide* Brih. Up., IV. 5, 7), pointed out that discrete and unconnected sensations can, by no means, relate and combine themselves into the unity of knowledge, and that "a sensation can only form an object of experience in being determined by an intelligent subject, which distinguishes it from itself, and contemplates it in relation to other sensations and, in so doing, combines them all into the unity of a single experience. The fact of the possibility of memory caused Mill so much trouble, but the Vedantist had seen in it a clear and unmistakable proof of the continuity and unity of the thinking subject, and of its consciousness of itself as such.* Thus, the thinking subject is, according to the Vedanta, in a sense, above time and space. In the light of self-consciousness, adds the Vedanta (Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 28-30), we are also aware of an orderly system of inter-related objects without us. Thus such consciousness not only reveals the self, as our identical knowing subject, and common witness of all mental states, but also an orderly world of existents without us. This is how Śankara, in commenting on Bādarāyaṇa's arguments, states the Vedantic position :—

"(1) The knowledge of self is not contingent in the case of any person; for it is self-evident. The self is not established by proofs of the existence of the self. Perception and other proofs, which are employed in the case of things, not proved, but to be proved, belong to

* Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 47.
Cf. Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 19-20; 25; 28-31.

it. No one assumes such things as ether and the like as self-evident and needing no proof. But the self, being itself the condition of employing proofs.....is accepted as evident even before the employment of proofs...nor is it possible for us to deny such a reality; for it is the very essence of him who would deny it. Fire cannot reject its own warmth.....It is ' I ' who know what is present. It is I who knew what is past, and what is more remotely past. It is I who shall know the future, and what is more remotely future (and have anticipations of them). *In these cases, though the objects of knowledge differ, the knowing subject does not change; for it is always present, and is in a sense above time and space*'' (*cf.* Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, with Śankara's Commentary, Vol. II, II. 3, 7).

(2) Bādarāyaṇa has argued against the Association Theory of the Buddhists, that, '' On account of their (sensations') momentariness (*Kṣanikatvāt*)'' the sensations cannot unite themselves into a connected whole. Śankara in dealing with the same has observed as follows :—''What you call the *Ālayavijñāna* (Association), and conceive as the support of mental impressions cannot be any more than the *pravrittivijñāna* (discrete sensations) because you admit it to be momentary, and, therefore, impermanent, for, *unless there exists one relating principle in the past, present and future, one which is unchangeable, and sees all things, the facts of remembrance, recognition, etc., which depend upon mental impressions, requiring space, time, and occasional causes, cannot be explained.* If, on the other hand, you admit your *Ālayavijñāna* (Association) to be something permanent, you abandon your own doctrine of the impermanence of everything '' (Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 31, p. 427).

(3) Bādarāyaṇa urges against the Buddhists that "the non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them.)" *Nābhāvaupalavdheḥ* (Ved. Sūt., II. 2, 28). And Śankara thus expounds it—"The non-existence of external things cannot be maintained, because we are conscious of external things. *In every act of perception, we are conscious of some external thing, corresponding to the idea.....and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist.* If the Bauddha should reply that he does not affirm that he is conscious of no object, but only that he is conscious of an object apart from the act of consciousness (or idea), we answer that he may indeed make any arbitrary statement he likes, but that he has no arguments to prove what he says. That the outward thing exists, apart from (individual's) consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself.....*The invariable concomitance of idea and thing has to be considered as proving only that the thing constitutes the means (occasion) of the idea, not that the two are identical.....The thing and the idea are distinct.* The same view is to be held with regard to the perception and the remembrance of a jar (for instance); there also, the perception and the remembrance only are distinct, while the jar is one and the same.....*Further, the ideas, which occupy different moments of time, and pass away as soon as they have become objects of consciousness, cannot apprehend or be apprehended by each other.* From this, it follows that certain doctrines forming the part of the Bauddha System, cannot be upheld; *so the doctrine that everything is momentary, void, etc.; the doctrine that a former idea leaves an impression giving rise to a later idea; and the doctrine of the non-existence of existents, the self, and the system of objects without,—*

based on a confusion of the characteristics of existence, with those of non-existence '' (*cf.* Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 28, pp. 420-23).

(4) Bādarāyaṇa has urged against the Buddhists that '' On account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream,'' '' Vaidharmmyācca na Svapnādivat,'' and Śankara has thus expounded the same :—'' We now apply ourselves to the refutation of the averment made by the Bauddha, that the ideas of posts and so on...may arise...just as the ideas of a dream, both being ideas alike. *The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing....The things of which we are conscious in a dream are negated by our waking consciousness.* In an analogous manner, the things (appearances) of which we are conscious when under the influence of magic, illusion, and the like, are negated by our ordinary consciousness. *Those things, on the other hand, of which we are conscious in our waking state...are never negated by any state.*''

'' *Moreover, the visions of a dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of the waking state are acts of immediate consciousness,* and the distinction between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognised by everyone as being founded on the absence or presence of the object '' (Thibaut, *ibid,* pp. 424-5).

(5) And lastly, Bādarāyaṇa tells us (Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 30) *that the existence of mental impressions is not at all possible without the perception of external things,* '' Nā bhāvo'nupalavdheḥ.'' And *the implication is that our very mental life, as knowing subjects, accordingly, implies, as its correlate, a system of objects without us* (*cf.* Thibaut, *ibid,* p. 426).

We shall mention only one other point in this connection. From a misconception of the Vedantic Epistemological position, many of the abstruse utterances of Yājñavalkya have been grossly misunderstood by scholars. "How should the knower," says he, for instance, in Bṛih. Up. II. 4, 14, "know the knower?" By this he means that the self knows itself only as a knowing subject, but never as an object, as not-self. It always knows itself as the subject of its cognitive activities; and even in moments of self-consciousness, it knows itself as such. *That which is the subject of all knowledge, says Yājñavalkya, can never be an object. In self-knowledge, the self is immediately aware of itself, and all distinction of subject and object, the knower and the known, vanishes for the moment, and 'being' and 'knowing' become identical.*

In his analysis of conduct, Bādarāyaṇa, as we shall see fully hereafter, declares man to be a citizen of two worlds, a finite reproduction of the Infinite, an abyss concentric with another Abyss. And concludes, with Śvet. Up., V. 9, that, though finite, "the individual is bound for infinitude," *Sa cānantyāya kalpate.*

The unity of self-consciousness, is thus, with the Vedanta, the ultimate foundation of all knowledge. And this is one of the most momentous contributions of Ancient India to the cause of metaphysics. It virtually contains the last word of Epistemology. Few Orientalists have, however, adequately grasped the significance of this contribution. "If we take philosophy," says Prof. Max Müller, for instance (Six Systems, p. 280), "in the sense of an examination of our means of knowledge, or with Kant, as an enquiry into the limits of human knowledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in India." But what is the testimony of facts?

Facts are more eloquent than the raciest of tongues, and we leave the fore-going facts to speak for themselves.

Meaning of Vedanta's appeal to the Veda.

To the Vedantist, the next important canon of knowledge is the Vedic word, Śabda. But the Vedānta appeal to the Veda is not a blind or uncritical appeal to an external authority, though outwardly it appears to be so. No, it is nothing of the sort. The Vedānta knows no higher tribunal than reason and intuitive self-consciousness. But the Vedantic position, in this respect has been greatly misunderstood, both in the East and in the West. Prof. Max Müller has, however, done some justice to the Vedānta in this respect. "Though the Vedanta appeals to the Veda," says he (Six Systems, p. 186), "it appeals to it, not as having grown out of it, or as belonging to it, but rather as an independent witness, looking back to it for sanction and confirmation." This estimate is however, only approximately correct. We object to the word 'sanction.' If Bādarāyaṇa has, at times, appealed to the Veda, he has done so, more to satisfy the requirements of the objective method of investigation, appealing to it, to use Prof. Max Müller's words, "as an independent witness, looking back to it for confirmation," but not "for sanction." He appeals to the united testimony of the gifted and pure-minded Vedantic teachers of the Upaniṣads,—and not to any Vedic teachings indiscriminately,—for additional confirmation, in support of truths, carefully attested by him independently by the speculative method of investigation, and capable of being similarly verified by anyone else. Such an appeal for confirmation is, he seems to think, only a necessary requirement of the objective method of investigation, and is meant as such.

The orthodox view of the authority

But, before we proceed to establish our contention, it is interesting to note, in passing, on what grounds the orthodox thinkers of the Mimāṁsaka School advocated

of the Vedic Word.

the doctrine of the eternality of the Word. As there is a remarkable similarity between their interpretation of the eternality of the Word and the Platonic doctrine of Idea, and the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the Logos, we naturally feel inclined briefly to refer to it here. Mere letters do not constitute words. Letters or sounds are merely sensuous representations of words; their essence consists in their meanings, the concepts they connote. Now, a concept, or Sphota, connotes a class and not an individual; it is the verbal embodiment of a generic conception. Individual objects have their individual peculiarities, in addition to the essence of their respective classes. And, when we think of objects, it is this universal, and permanent element in them, which must invariably be present in our consciousness, side by side, with their variable individual characteristics. These latter are variable and ephemeral, but the generic concepts are constant and eternal. Now, if generic concepts are eternal, they can, it is argued, only exist in an Infinite Mind; and, as such, all knowledge exists in the Divine Mind. The Veda, therefore, as a collection of generic words, expressive of such universal and eternal concepts, must, it is said, also be eternal. It is, thus the eternal Word, or self-revelation of the Eternal Mind; and the Vedic sages, it is held, are merely the recipients, or seers, of these revelations, and not the makers of the Veda. This doctrine was first systematically formulated by Jaimini about 500 B.C., and subsequently elaborated by the great philologist, Pāniṇi. (*Cf.* Sarvadarśana Sangraha, Cowell's Translation, Chap. XIII.)

The Vedantic position.

Now, if the orthodox thinkers were so reluctant to accept the authority of the Vedic word, dogmatically, without a word of explanation in justification of their position, the Vedantists must have been infinitely more so. What is then their position? They have first sub-

jected the Vedic teachings to the severest scrutiny, and weighed them in the balance. And those only of the teachings, that have stood the acid test, were pronounced as really deserving of a Vedantist's concern and esteem. And it is to such teachings alone that Bādarāyaṇa has subsequently appealed for additional confirmation. And this alone explains why Bādarāyaṇa has, at times, identified the Veda with Pratyakṣa, direct knowledge. "There are two kinds of knowledge," says the Mund. Up., I. 5-6, " the superior and the inferior; the Rig-Veda, the Yajur-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Atharva-Veda, etc., etc., all constitute the inferior knowledge (Aparā Vidyā), and that alone is superior knowledge by which that Eternal Being (the ultimate Source and Support of the world of plurality, the all-pervading Reality immanent in all existents), is known." " What shall they do with the Rich-hymns," likewise declares the Śvet. Up., IV. 8, " who do not know the all-pervading Eternal Being, therein declared, in whom all gods (and other existents) lie supported? Blessed are they alone who know him." These utterances are quite significant. They clearly reveal the attitude of the Vedantists towards the Veda. In his relentless crusade against the non-Vedantic schools, such as Sānkhyan Dualism, Buddhistic Sensationalism, Atomism of Kaṇāda, Pluralism of Yoga, and Deism of Bhāgavatas, Bādarāyaṇa has, in fact, taken his stand on a solid and masterly array of arguments of unimpeachable validity. Nay, even in his constructive work of the exposition of the Vedantic position, he has invariably chiefly relied, as we shall see hereafter, on speculative considerations. It is only in dealing with such unimportant questions as the state of the disembodied soul in the next world, that he has rather uncritically appealed to the Veda. Where reason cannot help us, he seems to think, faith is our only resource. But,

as these questions are mere side-issues, and form absolutely no part of the fundamental Vedantic teachings, such appeals do not affect the Vedantic position, and a Vedantist can safely dispense with them. With regard to the fundamental Vedantic teachings, however, Bādarāyaṇa's method of exposition has throughout been strictly critical and speculative, and a critical study of the Vedānta Sūtras hardly leaves any doubt on the matter. Bādarāyaṇa has frankly stated in the Vedānta Sūtras (I. 4, 14)* that, although contradictions are met with here and there among Vedanta-passages, with regard to such unimportant questions as the number of elements and the order of their evolution from one Ultimate Reality, there is absolutely no conflict with regard to the fundamental Vedantic problem, namely, the ultimate nature of the world-evolving principle, and its relation to the world of plurality. And, having established this main problem by the speculative method, Bādarāyaṇa has also appealed to the Veda by way of confirmation. The Vedic passages thus appealed to, have, however, been always those whose validity has also been independently established. *So, on its ultimate analysis, the so-called Vedantic appeal to the Veda, as far as the fundamental problems are concerned, only amounts to Vedanta's appeal to its own self, or, at the most, to other independent authorities for confirmation, but not for sanction.* Bādarāyaṇa has also appealed to the Smṛtis here and there in his work. This also clearly shows that he simply referred to other independent witnesses in corroboration of the validity of the conclusions reached by him by speculative methods of reasoning.

* *Cf.* Saṅkara's Commentary on the same. Also Thibaut's Vedānta Sūtras, pp. 263-66.

Moreover the very fact that the Upaniṣads have made a distinction between Parā-Vidyā and Aparā-Vidyā, and described the four Vedas and other connected branches of learning as inferior knowledge, Aparā-Vidyā, most conclusively proves that the Vedanta, in its efforts to establish its fundamental doctrines does not uncritically appeal to any external authority as valid.

CHAPTER IV

The Fundamental Problems of Philosophy and the Vedanta

Implications involved in Knowledge.

There are certain fundamental notions, or categories, which underlie all our judgments. In thinking of a thing, we have to think of it as something standing in certain relations to, and capable of affecting, or producing effects on, other things, and, in its turn, being acted on by them. Things, in other words, can only be conceived in their interrelations to one another, in and through the reciprocal actions and reactions, by which they manifest themselves, and give evidence of their own existence and reality. "It belongs to the notion and nature of existence," to use Lotze's words (Microcosmus, Vol. II, p. 587), "to be related," and to say "that existing things, devoid of relation, is conceivable" is not to "speak metaphysically of existent things, but logically of what is possible, but not actual, and hence certainly not existent." The consciousness of "only such things," as Rāmānuja puts it, "as are qualified by attributes," or distinguishing characteristics of their own, is alone possible; and there can be no knowledge of what is "unqualified" or unrelated. "Perception does apprehend distinctions; and distinctions so apprehended establish differences, not only between one qualified thing and another, but also between the distinguishing attributes themselves."* An unrelated thing is, indeed, a mere abstraction, an empty nothing, "like

* *Cf.* Śribhāṣya, I. 1, 2; "Na nirviśeṣavastu-siddhiḥ."

the son of a barren mother,'' as Rāmānuja puts it. To think of the world-whole, we must, accordingly, think of it as a system of existents, existing side by side in space, and occasioning changes in one another in time, through their inter-actions. In what follows, we shall briefly consider the fundamental problems of philosophy.

The Problem of Substance.

By Substance naïve Realism understands something which *stands under* or *supports* its attributes, the substratum of its qualities. Hume and Mill went to the opposite extreme, and denied the substantiality or essence of things altogether, and resolved all existents into mere bundles of unrelated attributes, mere 'permanent possibilities of sensations.' But the real truth lies in the golden mean. Substance or ' real ' and attributes or its manifestations, are but correlative aspects of reality; and the one implies the other. The essence of a reality, which manifests itself in and through its attributes, is the substance; and the attributes are but different moments or expressions of the life-history of what is called substance, its powers of resisting, re-acting on, and affecting in various ways, other things, or ' reals,' for self-preservation and self-development. The so-called attributes are thus the manifestations of the reality itself, during its continued existence from moment to moment—the self-revelations of one identical self-sustaining principle, which works in different ways, under different circumstances, and yet remains identical with itself, amidst all variations of states and activities. In our experiences of the inner life alone, we are directly '' acquainted with a part of the existence, as it is in itself,'' to use Höffding's words and here alone, we discover the true meaning of substantiality. Here we find that the reality in us, the self, does not pass away with its changing states, and that it is, on the contrary, their common subject and witness, their common point of

reference, something which experiences them all, as moments of its own continued being, persists, and endures in and through them, feels its present states and relations, remembers the past ones, and, in the light of the experiences of the past, anticipates the future, and, through such recollections of the past and anticipations of the future, regulates its own activities for self-preservation and self-perfection.

Kant, having completely demolished the naïve realistic view of substance, has, however, found it necessary to make a distinction between the ' subject of our inward experiences,' and ' the unity of the self,' considered as a ' real,' a thing-in-itself. He admits the unity of the former, but prohibits any inference from the unity of the thinking subject to that of the thinking self. He thinks that the consciousness of our own identity amidst variations of states and activities, is somehow possible, even without the actual continued existence of the self, through them all, as one identical individual and indivisible unit. But this is, as already seen, an impossible position. " The soul is," to use Lotze's words (Met., Vol. II, p. 431), " what it shows itself to be, unity whose life is in definite ideas, feelings and efforts. This is its real nature.....Within this sphere, the soul shows itself to be, to a certain extent, an independent centre of actions and reactions; and, in so far as it does so, and so long as it does so, it has the claim to the title of substance," in the sense of an individual centre of feelings, ideas and efforts, but not in the sense of any mysterious substratum of these. Now, in the light of our inner experience alone, we can understand the true meaning of substantiality or ' realness.' Every existent then, in so far as it is a ' real,' must be understood as the common point of reference of all its states, variations and efforts, as something which resists all

other existents, to keep them off from its own limited sphere of existence, and, in so doing, manifests all its characteristics, called attributes. We thus always distinguish between the passing states or modifications of a reality, and the reality itself, their common subject and point of reference, something which persists and endures, and is thus in a sense above time and change. The reality of a thing then ultimately consists in its continued existence, as a self-maintaining and self-developing power, in being something for itself, in and through all its changing states.

The Problem of Space.

Naïve Realism treats space as an objective reality, as an object among objects. Hume holds it as a mere appearance and therefore subjective. Leibniz also, though from an opposite point of view, held space as unreal and subjective. Kantian doctrine of space represents an intermediate position between realism and intellectualism of Leibniz. There are two points which stand out prominently in Kant's conception of space. First, it is perceptive, an intuition, and not a concept; secondly, it is subjective, a form of our perception. As an element involved in the content of the very apprehension of the objective, space is certainly connected with the perceptive side of our experience; and, as such, it must be regarded as something ultimately due to some objective fact in the very constitution of existents, and therefore as real. "The space-character, in certain contents of our sense-experience," as observes Adamson (Development of Modern Phil., Vol. I, p. 292), "seems that which gives the first line of distinction between subjective and objective." The distinction between spatial and non-spatial is, in fact, a condition of consciousness and intelligence itself. Our very existence pre-supposes a distinction between extendedness and non-extendedness, with, very likely, an element of feeling, as says Adam-

son, as its positive and necessary accompaniment. Space-element must, therefore, be regarded as real. But " to be extended, might fairly enough be called the ' form ' of externality; and, to that extent, there seems to be justification of Kant's way of defining space as the form of the outer sense." But, nevertheless, it is " impossible to represent mind as, in its own nature, and from its own possessions, responsible for the clothing of sense-material, with the form of space " (*ibid*, p. 295), and therefore to treat space as purely subjective, though logical or conceptual space is, no doubt, so. Thus, space-element, though largely phenomenal, is real. It is, however, sometimes urged that Kant calls space subjective, only in respect to mind, universal and general, but that he does not deny the reality of space-element, as involved in our very apprehension of the objective. There is, it seems, some truth in this statement, although consciousness in general must be treated as a meaningless abstraction. Aristotle has shown, once for all, that the universal is real only in the particular. Lotze thinks that, although there must be something in the reality corresponding to what we apprehend as spatial, yet that something may not possess the characteristics we ascribe to space, and that space, as apprehended by us, may, after all, be largely the result of reaction. We must admit that the reality constituting the essence of the objective, manifests itself in resistance and inertia, and thereby gives rise to the space-element of things, and determines their reciprocal relations of externality and inter-dependence. Space, as represented in developed consciousness, with its conceptual additions of unity, continuity and homogeneity, is, however, purely subjective.

Problem of Time.

Change is a fundamental fact of experience. But does it form an aspect of reality? The contrast between

the changeable and the short-lived, and the unchanging and permanent, ordinarily seems to resemble that between the apparent and the real. There is, accordingly, a deep-seated tendency in human nature to regard the ultimate Reality as changeless. This tendency has found a bold expression among the thinkers in ancient Greece, and in Herbart in modern philosophy. Herbart's 'reals' are above all change an relations; and change is, with him, merely the result of variable relations among the 'reals.' But the relationless and changeless self-identity he ascribes to his 'reals,' is a mere abstraction.

With Kant, time is a mere form of sensuous perception; and, although, in the content of our sensuously determined experience, change, and therefore time, is real, yet, with respect to the transcendent world, lying above sensuous experience, time and change, we are told, have no application. But the Kantian position is refuted by our own inner experience. The element of change, which constitutes the essence of time-relation, belongs to the ultimate nature of reality. The experience of time-perception evidently pre-supposes both sequence and duration, permanence and succession. And our inner experience reveals to us a reality which persists and endures amidst variations of states. Here we clearly discover change to be an aspect of the reality. And change in the world without must also be regarded as constituting a feature of the reality. The unknown can only be explained by the known.

Problem of Causality.

Ordinarily, change and causation are believed to be due to transference of energy from one object to another. But this explains nothing, for nothing is actually seen so to pass. Nor is anything gained by substituting motion for energy. To avoid the difficulty, involved in

these explanations, Hume and Mill have reduced all causality to a mere relation of immediate and invariable sequence. But they evidently evaded the difficulty instead of solving it. The empirical account of causation does, in fact, explain neither the 'how' nor the 'why' of it. Causation, we know to-day, consists in the transformation of energy. Cause and effect are but two different aspects of the same energy; effect is merely the cause in a modified form.

But there is a much deeper problem involved in causation. The universe, as a system of inter-related units, always appears to us as an ever-changing equilibrium of innumerable inter-connected factors, in a never-ending process of adjustment and re-adjustment. But how do these changes at all take place? Do the constituents of the world-whole really stand isolated from one another? If so, how can they be in reciprocal interaction and inter-dependence, and how can modifications in any one of them be also occasions for corresponding modifications in others? The mechanical theory of causation is unable to answer these questions. Lotze, accordingly, suggested that " it is only if individual things do not float independently or left to themselves in a vacuum, across which no connection can reach—only if all of them, being finite individuals, are, at the same time, only parts of one single Infinite Substance, which embraces them all, and cherishes them all within itself, that their reciprocal action, or what we call as such, is possible. For only then can the change, which any of them experiences, be, at the same time, a state of the Infinite, so that it is not necessary for its influence to extend across a gulf which can never be filled up, in order to produce this state; only then can the result which this state produces in the Infinite, in accordance with the truth of its own nature, appear, at the same time, as a

change of other individual things."* The world-whole must then be represented as a system of inter-related modes of the self-manifestation of a single Infinite Reality. "Only in this way is the isolation of things from one another to be overcome"—an isolation which, "if strictly insisted upon, defeats," as also observes Adamson, the very "*thought of causal connection.*" But what must be the ultimate nature of the Infinite, so as to make such inter-connections possible? Lotze's reply is, that it must be represented "as having the nature of a mind." For "only in that kind of connection, which obtains among the parts of such a whole, is there possible determination of parts by the whole, and, at the same time, real modification of the parts themselves."

The question, however, is not only, How change occurs, but Why it occurs at all? Why should not things always remain stationary? We know from our inner experience that change is real. It must, therefore, be due to a cause equally real. Why do things then change at all? Here also the experiences of our inner life alone supply us with an answer. Every change in our conscious life implies a longing for something desirable, some better state of existence, an end to be realised. Now, if the world-whole has to be regarded, as we are bound to regard it, as a complex system of inter-related factors, it must have, like a man-made machine, an end of its own, a purpose which it is intended to fulfil; and all its processes must, accordingly, be conceived as means towards the attainment of that end. A slight change, anywhere in a machine necessitates corresponding changes in all other parts, to make it

* Lotze, Microcosmus, Vol. II, p. 598. *Cf.* Adamson, Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 323-24.

workable. But, in the case of a machine, all such re-adjustments of parts are only possible through human interference from without. Similar re-adjustments are, however, always found to occur in living organisms from within, under the organising influence of an immanent end. The changes amongst the constituent parts of the world-whole, and the universal order and harmony that prevail in it, amidst constant changes, likewise, indicate that, not only do these factors have a common ground of their origin and moment-to-moment existence and unity,—some common principle that gives them their being, unity and function,—but that the changes themselves must be represented as ultimately due to, and connected with some hidden processes of re-adjustments of the whole system under the guidance of an immanent end. The changes in the cosmic order with its universal reign of law and harmony do, indeed, become intelligible only when conceived, as connected with the operations of an immanent all-embracing and all-organising principle, seeking to realise an end, and therefore as teleological.

The Vedantic Position.

The inner experiences of life made it quite clear to the Vedantist, that the reality in him, the self, is a self-maintaining and self-developing spiritual principle, which always remains identical with itself, differently modified from time to time, amidst all variations of states. In opposition to the Dogmatic Realism, on the one hand, and Buddhistic Sensationalism and Nihilism, on the other, the Vedanta, accordingly, declares that substance or ' real ' is neither a mysterious substratum of its attributes, nor a mere aggregate of its manifestations or modes, as it was with Spinoza. It is, on the contrary, a living reality, a self-maintaining unit, which persists and endures in and through all its manifestations, whose modes are the manifestations, which lives

in them all, relates and unites them all as inter-related moments of its own continued and abiding self. The substance thus, is according to the Vedanta, more than its modes. The modes are only the manifestations of reality in time and space; but they do not exhaust the wealth of the being of reality. The reality, we are aware of in ourselves, reveals itself as such an inexhaustible principle, as an inexhaustible fund of energy and potentiality. And the inter-connections among the factors of the cosmic order and the inner experiences of life, necessarily forced upon the Vedantist the conviction that the world of plurality is the self-manifestation of one Ultimate Spiritual principle, Brahman,—mere self-evolved materials and means of the conscious life of the Absolute, and that the Absolute is immanent in them all, persists and endures in and through them all, and yet, as the ultimate ground of their unity and connection, transcends them all, and is inexhaustible in time and space.

The Doctrine of Causality constitutes, one may say, the very corner-stone of the Vedantic metaphysics. The ordinary conception of causation represents the effect as a new creation, an origin out of nothing. In Vedantic terminology, this position is known as Asatkārjya-Vāda, the theory of origin out of void, or more precisely, the theory of (previous) non-existence of the effect in the cause. This popular view of causation, in a later age, found a formal and methodical expression in the Nyāya Philosophy. The Buddhists, following a quite different line of thought, had also propounded a form of the same doctrine of origin out of nothing. All existents, they held, were momentary. The cause of a previous moment must have, therefore, ceased to exist, they argued, before the effect came into being. Every effect was, therefore, an origin out of nothing. In opposition to the

common-sense view, the Vedanta had, however, held that the effect is only a new modification of the cause, a new presentation of what previously existed in some other form as the cause, or better, in the cause. The Vedantic doctrine of causation is, accordingly, known as Tadātmya-Vāda, the doctrine of essential Identity of Cause and Effect. "If the effect is already in the cause," asks the advocate of the theory of origin out of void, "why at all an effort to produce it?" We have the well-known retort of Śankara against this. "*If the effect,*" *says Śankara,* "*is not already in the cause, why an effort to produce it, and how can any effort at all produce it?*" "*If the effect could be produced without its prior existence in the cause,*" *adds he,* "*why can curd be produced from milk alone, and not from clay, and a pitcher from clay alone and not from milk?*"* "We maintain, therefore," he continues, "that milk and other substances are called effects when *in the form of curd and so on, and that it is impossible ever, even in a hundred years, to bring forth an effect which is different from its cause* (*i.e., did not pre-exist in some form in the cause*)." The effect is, thus, according to the Vedanta, merely a new presentation of what existed before in some other form. The law of the conservation of energy or the correlativity of forces, is one of the greatest discoveries of the Modern Age. But the sublime truth underlying it was metaphysically known in India thousands of years ago. *This Vedantic doctrine of the essential Identity of Cause and Effect, is another momentous contribution of ancient India to the cause of metaphysics.*

* Saṅkara's Commentary on Vedānta Sūtras, II. 1, 18.
Cf. Thibaut's Vedānta Sūtras, Vol. I, p. 341.

It necessarily follows from the above, that one and the same reality may exist in various modes, and that the effects of a cause are but the various modes of its manifestation. And, looking at the universal adaptation and inter-connections in the world of plurality, the Vedanta accordingly declares, that the whole cosmic-order is pervaded and sustained by an infinite spiritual principle, which is immanent in all its parts, stirs and pulsates in them all, and guides and regulates their activities as their common internal Guide and Ruler. " The sun and the moon, O Gargi," says Yājñavalkya (Bṛih., III. 8, 9) " the heavens and the earth all abide in, and move under the guidance of, the imperishable Being," their internal Ruler and common ground and support. " Who is immanent in all existents," he adds (see Bṛih., III. 7, 1-23) "and yet transcends them all, whom the existents do not know, whose modes (body) they are (Yasya sarvāṇi bhūtāni śarīram), who guides them all from within, he is thy Self, the imperishable internal Ruler... He who is in our reason, and yet transcends it, whom the reason does not know, whose mode the reason is, who rules it from within, he is thy Self, the imperishable, internal Ruler." The Bṛih. Up., II. 3, 6 furthtr tells us that " Brahman has two modes, the movable and the immovable, the conscious and the unconscious, etc., etc...and it adds the Brahman is not this (alone), is not this (alone), that this is not that there is nothing beyond this (the plurality of modes), but there is an existence beyond this as well." The Vedantic Brahman is thus a Principle of unity-in-difference, an eternally self-differentiating and self-revealing Principle, which manifests itself in a world of plurality, stirs and pulsates in them all and supports them all in its all-embracing totality as their ultimate ground and cause with a view to realising an ultimate end.

Vedānta, moreover, does not believe in the objectivity of empty space. The existents making up the world of plurality are not, according to it, so many self-exclusive things unconnected with one another, but they are, on the contrary, the finite points of self-manifestation of one Infinite and Eternal Principle, which pervade them all and supports and unites them as inter-related elements of single whole; and space-relations are ultimately due to the externality of mutual relations among existents. Thus, nearly three thousand years ago, Vedānta anticipated Lotze's conception of Reality, and of the space-relations of existents, as finite points or centres of self-manifestation of the Infinite, yet, like Lotze, denied the objectivity of space.

The Vedānta Brahman is an Eternal Principle of change and generation, evolution and progress. The Vedānta, therefore, believes in the reality of Time and treats change as a characteristic of Reality, and holds creation to be an eternal and never-ending process of self-manifestation of one Spiritual Principle, which lies un-exhausted in the world of plurality, and all cosmic changes as determined by immanent ends. In defining Brahman, the Chhānd. Up. (VIII. 14, 1) accordingly tells us "*That which evolves the 'names' and 'forms' (the world of plurality) from within, and wherein they all lie supported* is Brahman" ("Nāmarupayornirvahitā te yadantarā tat Brahma"). Bādarāyaṇa in summarising the Vedantic position similarly tells us that the world of plurality is a system of effects due to the self-differentiations of the Ultimate Spiritual Principle, Brahman, Ātmakṛtaḥ pariṇāmāt (Ved. Sut., I. 4, 26).

CHAPTER V.

THE THEORIES OF THE WORLD : AND THE VEDANTA.

The true function of Philosophy is to explain experience. Philosophy, accordingly, starts with the plurality of existents, which experience reveals to us and tries to rise from a world of plurality to a consistent and comprehensive conception of the world-whole as a system of inter-related units. But different hypotheses have been started by different thinkers as to the origin of the world, the nature of the existents constituting it, as well as their reciprocal relations and ultimate end. We propose briefly to examine here some of these positions.

Dualistic and Semi-Dualistic theories.

Sāṁkhya is usually regarded as a Dualistic system. It assumes, it is said, two ultimate principles, Prakṛti, primal matter, and Puruṣa, the Soul, and seeks to explain the world of plurality from their union. At the end of a period, according to Sāṁkhya, dissolution follows and then another evolution; and thus the cycle goes on for ever. Discriminative knowledge and detachment from the world of sense it brings with it procure deliverance.

The Sāṁkhyan Puruṣa, the Soul, is, however, really a collective designation for innumerable individual souls; and, as such, Sāṁkhya system is more pluralistic than dualistic. Prakṛti, primal matter, according to Sāṁkhya, is alone active, and Puruṣa, the Soul (rather individual souls), is passive; and the creation is the evolution of the primal matter, which contains the

germ of plurality latent in it. For her evolution, however, Prakṛti, the material principle, needs the proximity, or unconcerned gaze, as it were, of Puruṣa, the paternal principle. Puruṣa, the Soul, cannot accordingly be really passive, as he is here represented to be. To avoid this difficulty, it has been suggested that Puruṣa, the Soul, though himself passive, can make Prakṛti, primal matter, to move along her process of evolution, just as a lame man, seated on the shoulder of a blind one can guide the latter, and make him move about, himself remaining unmoved. But the analogy is an extremely poor device as was long pointed out by Bādarāyaṇa himself (Ved. Sūt., II. 2, 7). The lame guide, even while carried about on the shoulder of the blind in question, is, in his guidance, fully active with his eyes; and so the analogy completely fails. Nor does the illustration of a needle moving towards a magnet, advanced to overcome the difficulty, serve any better. The Sāṁkhya, it is evident, fully recognised the impossibility of explaining the cosmic order from the spontaneous activity of a blind and irrational principle, and the supreme need of rational guidance, to explain the same. But it made a great mistake in placing the ideal principle outside of that needing direction and guidance, the orderer above and outside of the material to be ordered and organised. And it was a still graver mistake to represent the rational principle as absolutely passive, even in its guidance. *Passive guidance, it failed to see, involves contradiction in terms.* The term, 'Sāṁkhya,' is derived from ' Saṁkhyā,'' the number, meaning the number of the supposed twenty-five successive emanations, or stages, through which Prakṛti, primal matter, passes, to complete her evolution.

Lassen and Garbe on Sāṁkhya.

Profs. Lassen, Garbe, and several other Orientalists, have treated Sāṁkhya and Neo-Platonism as kindred

systems of thought. "In passing to Neo-Platonism, we find," says Prof. Garbe (Philosophy of Ancient India, pp. 49-50), "that here Lassen has valued the influence of the Sāṁkhya doctrines to its full extent. Though there is a good evidence of harmony between the pure Sāṁkhya doctrine and the Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, there exists even a closer connection between the latter one and that branch of the Sāṁkhya philosophy which has assumed a theistical and ascetical character..... under the name of the Yoga philosophy." But we are unable to agree with Prof. Garbe. The similarity between Sāṁkhya and Neo-Platonism, on the one hand, and Yoga and Neo-Platonism, on the other, is more apparent than real. In Sāṁkhya, the primal matter is an out-and-out non-spiritual and independent principle, whereas, with Plotinus, as already seen, corporeality is but an expression of the soul or the spirit dwelling in it, and the entire universe is a mere overflow or a diffusion of the divine life. Moreover, in Sāṁkhya, Puruṣas, the Souls, whose proximity helps the primal matter in unfolding its latent resources, are innumerable, eternally independent principles; whereas, in Neo-Platonism, all the different stages of existents (spirituality, animality, and corporeality), are mere "workings of the One and Good," although He is placed far above the world of change and generation, and declared unknown and unknowable. In Neo-Platonism again, the highest end of earthly existence for man is to get rid of all sensuous desires and impurities, in order to be able to secure a return to God, the Ultimate Source of all existents; whereas, in Sāṁkhya, deliverance consists in the attainment of the power of discrimination between the self and the sensuous world, and thereby to attain "freedom, aloofness, or self-centredness," to use Prof. Max Müller's words, *i.e.*, complete detachment from the world of

Yoga, and Neo-Platonism.

sense. In Sāṁkhya, again, there is no room left for God. Though God is not actually denied there, yet it is stated that there is no proof of his existence. Sāṁkhya and Neo-Platonism are thus almost radically unlike. And it is also the same with the Yoga system, which stands on the same metaphysical basis with Sāṁkhya. Although Yoga believes in God, yet matter and individual souls are represented in it as co-eternal with God. The Yoga religious practices do, no doubt, to some extent, resemble those of Proclus and his followers; but these practices and the Yoga 'devotion to God' are mere means to the ultimate end of the attainment of self-centredness and detachment from the world of sense, and not to securing the soul's return to God as in Neo-Platonism. In as much as Neo-Platonism represents God as far above the world of change and generation, it may however, be treated as a semi-dualistic system. But both Sāṁkhya and Yoga are, properly speaking, pluralistic, and both treat the primal matter as an entirely independent eternal non-spiritual principle.

Prof. Weber, with several other Orientalists, wrongly held, as has already been pointed out by Rajendralal Mitra, that the object of the Yoga practices was to attain "absorption into the Supreme Godhead" (Indian Literature, pp. 238-9). L. Von Schroeder has similarly held—and Prof. Garbe has already pointed out his mistake (*Ibid*, p. 16)—that "Yoga bears throughout a theistic character, it assumes a primitive soul, from which individual souls proceed." But it is not so. In the Yoga system, matter and individual souls are co-eternal with God.

Platonism.

There is much less similarity between Sāṁkhya or Yoga, on the one hand, and Platonism on the other. In as much as the Idea is above the world of change and generation, and in as much as Plato is obliged to assume

" a secondary or necessary cause," empty space though he calls it, to make it possible for the phenomenal world to be formed out of it, Platonism may also be regarded as a form of semi-dualistic system of thought. But his second principle, ' non-being ' as he calls it, differs greatly from Sāṁkhya primal matter. Again, Sāṁkhyan Puruṣa is only a collection of innumerable independent individual selves. Moreover, with Plato, creation is the realising of the Divine End, the Good. The empty space, or the ' non-being,' assumes forms " in order to become like the world of Ideas." But, in Sāṁkhya, creation is a snare, a bondage, and therefore an evil. And here alone there exists some resemblance between Sāṁkhya and Neo-Platonism; for, according to the latter also, creation is an " evil, in so far as it has part in matter, or the Evil " (Windelband, History of Philosophy, pp. 128, 247).

Bādarāyaṇa on Sāṁkhya.

The wonderful adaptations and designs displayed in Nature, and the unity of the cosmic order, Bādarāyaṇa argues in his violent onslaught against Sāṁkhya in the Vedānta Sūtras, cannot be the outcome of the self-evolution of an irrational principle (II. 2, 1). Nor can it be maintained, says he (II. 2, 4), that the primal matter evolves the cosmic order under the influence and guidance of Puruṣa, the Ideal principle; for the latter is held as entirely passive, and therefore incapable of guiding the primal matter in its movement towards evolution, not even like a lame man seated on the shoulder of a blind, guiding the latter, or a magnet drawing a piece of iron (II. 2, 7). Again, all change or causation on its ultimate analysis is teleological; unconscious matter is therefore, incapable of it and of explaining the cosmic order (II. 2, 2-3).

All dualistic systems are, in fact, open to the objection that the very assumption of two independent and

self-existing eternal principles, involves an inherent self-contradiction. Moreover, on such an assumption, it is impossible to explain their co-operation and unity, as reflected in the unity of the cosmic order.

Aristotle.

Plato's mistake was to have hypostatised his subjective Universal, and to have represented it as "a One alongside of many," as Aristotle characterised it. Something more than the Unchangeable is needed to explain the world of change and generation. Aristotle, accordingly, substituted for Plato's subjective universal, his own objective universal, the essential form, and gave it its proper place in the primal matter, and the particulars evolved from it. Matter, without the Idea, said he, is as much an abstraction as the Idea without matter. Matter is "the germ of the form, the potential form," and the form is "matter in actuality." "Matter is the beginning of all things, the Idea is the goal, for which it strives; matter is the rudimentary or imperfect state, the form is the perfection or completion;" and the transformation of the former into the latter, he called evolution. As the final cause of the universe, and the highest Good, God is both in the things as their immanent essence, as well as transcends them. "Discipline exists, both in the army, as well as outside of it, in the general. God is, likewise, both the law and the lawgiver, the order and the orderer of things...Everything is organised, ordered, and harmonised by him and with a view to him. And, since he is One (matter alone is manifold), there can be but one single, eternal universe. Conversely, the unity which prevails in the world proves the unity of God" (Weber, History of Philosophy, pp. 112-114, 116-117). In his metaphysics Aristotle thus solves the opposition between the Heracleitian and Eleatic metaphysics, and declares, as Yājñavalkya, had done long before (Bṛh. Up., III. 8, 9). "On this prin-

ciple of principles depend the heavens and nature." But, unfortunately, in his theology, he abandons his position altogether and flatly contradicts himself. The Supreme Being, here he tells us, as absolute perfection, must be immaterial, and above matter, which, though potentially perfect, is a mark of actual imperfection; and God, as immovable prime mover of all movements, must be outside the world of change. Matter, he adds, has an inherent hankering for perfection, the eternal Idea, its goal; and the goal sets it in motion, itself remaining unmoved. *Sṛṁkhyan Dualism, if such we can call it, reappears here,* but certainly in an optimistic and much higher form.

Pluralistic Theories.

The materialistic Atomism of Democritus and Gassendi, and of Kaṇāda in India, and the spiritualistic Atomism of Leibniz and Herbart, belong to this class; the Yoga system occupies an intermediate position.

Materialistic Atomism.—It seeks to explain the origin of the universe from fortuitous combinations and recombinations of an infinite number of self-existing and inter-acting atoms, eternally scattered in space. It has found its best expression in the mechanical theory of evolution of Darwin, as modified by Lamarck.

Atomism of Kaṇāda and Bādarāyaṇa.—The ultimate elements, ether, air, heat, water, and earth, do, according to Kaṇāda, consist, each, of an infinite number of formless, colourless, inextended and indivisible atoms. These atoms, we are told, unite with one another, within the limits of the same species, according to a law, called Adṛṣṭa, tendency to union remaining dormant, during the continuance of the period of the dissolution of the world, but setting the atoms at work on the eve of every new creation, and building up the world by their combinations and re-combinations.

Now, the arguments urged against Sāṁkhya, says

Bādarāyaṇa (II. 1, 12), apply with equal force and cogency to the atomism of Kaṇāda. Mere fortuitous combinations and re-combinations of atoms cannot, says he, explain the endless differentiations and adaptations visible in the world. All change and causation must, besides, be ultimately teleological. Again, if the atoms are really in-extended, formless and colourless, how can they, asks he (II. 2, 15), by their combinations and re-combinations, at all originate form and extension, and such wonderful diversities of colour. The tendency to union must, moreover, either be inherent in the atoms, or not inherent in them. If inherent, creation must be eternal, and there can be no dissolution; and, if not inherent, there can be no creation at all. Again, if the tendency to union is supposed to be inherent, and yet not so, from the very start, its sudden appearance on the eve of every new creation, and its disappearance during the dissolution, remains totally unexplained (II. 2, 12 & 14). Bādarāyaṇa adds, in conclusion, that, as Atomism has found no adherents among men of culture, it is unworthy of further consideration.

Atomism, in its attempt to represent the cosmic order as the result of mere chance, has clearly demonstrated its utter helplessness. The mechanical theory of causation is, in fact, wholly inconsistent with any proper understanding of the nature and meaning of causality and change. We must look for the secret of change in the very constitution of things. All change and causation must be regarded as ultimately teleological. In that particular domain of nature, where alone we are immediately in touch with the workings of reality, *change is always found to be teleological.* And the movements and changes in the world without also become intelligible, only when so conceived. And the very endless connections among parts of the cosmic whole

themselves, clearly point to their inner unity and correspondence. The theory of evolution becomes intelligible only on the supposition that the whole universe is the realisation of a rational plan or end immanent in it. And thus understood, natural selection becomes ' rational selection.' Moreover, if the mind has been evolved from matter, the matter must have the possibilities of the mind, already latent in it. The evolutional theory rightly understood, therefore, spiritualises matter, rather than it materialises the mind.

Spiritualistic Atomism.—The only reality we are directly aware of is the self or ego in ourselves, which is an indivisible entity. Leibniz has, accordingly, held that all monads are indivisible units, potentially or actually similar to the self in us, and has endeavoured to explain the world of experience by a reference to the inner activities of an infinite number of such ultimate and self-inclusive monads. Herbart's ' reals ' also closely resemble Leibniz's monads. His ' reals ' are absolutely simple, and exclude all diversity of properties, change and movement. Change only modifies their mutual relations. Every sensible object is, therefore, a mere integration of ' reals.' But, like all pluralists, both Leibniz and Herbart have completely failed to explain the fact of inter-connections and harmony in the cosmic order. Leibniz tried to get over the difficulty by his hypothesis of Pre-established Harmony. But, in separating the organising principle from the materials to be organised, the orderer from the order and the units to be ordered, and, thereby, in denying the units themselves their only possible ground of correlation and unity, his solution proved too poor a device to serve any purpose. The unrelated ' reals ' of Herbart are, again, mere logical abstractions. The theory of ' Accidental Views ' does not solve the difficulty in any way. The ' reals,' though

completely self-inclusive and isolated, are, it is said, capable of reciprocal inter-actions, without, thereby, in any way, affecting their inner independence and isolation. But variable relations, reciprocal interaction, among things must needs involve modification in the things themselves. Besides, inter-connections among a plurality of units necessarily implies the immanence and operation of an all-embracing principle, as the ultimate ground of their being, function, and unity, as was pointed out by Yājñavalkya long long ago in his description of the nature and function of the Eternal Internal Ruler (*vide* Bṛh. Up., III. 7, 3-23).

The Monistic theories.

Monistic theories, apart from the Acosmism of Spinoza, have assumed three different forms, which we shall briefly consider here :—

Eleatics, Gauḍapāda and Śankara.—The Ultimate Reality is, with the Eleatics, Pure Being, which is above all change and differentiation And, as it is above all change and movement, the world of plurality is, it necessarily follows, nothing but appearances and illusions. The position of Gauḍapāda and Śankara in India, greatly resembles that of the Eleatics. "The whole world," according to Śankara, "is but an erroneous appearance, as unreal as a snake, mistaken for a piece of rope, by a belated traveller, and disappears, just as the imagined snake does, as soon as light of true knowledge has arisen" (*cf.* Thibaut, Vedānta Sūtras, pp. cxix-cxx). In his commentary on Vedānta Sūtras (II. 1, 14), Śankara describes the world of plurality as an outcome of Ignorance, or Avidyā. In explaining Vedānta Sūtras (II. 1, 23) he again characterises plurality of existents as resembling "objects seen in a dream." "Perception apprehends," says he, "only pure and unqualified existence...External objects are invariably

apprehended as compounded of existence and appearance, and.....in all perceptive cognisance, existence alone unvaryingly persists, while the differentiating peculiarities of things are seen to vary from thing to thing.'' Śankara accordingly concludes, '' *pure, unqualified existence alone* is real '' (Rangachāriya, and Baradaraja, Śrībhāṣya, trans., p. x). Parmenides, likewise, ascribes reality to the Universal Being alone, and holds everything which exists in multiplicity, and is subject to change, as unreal. Before Śankara, Gauḍapāda had held exactly the same views; and Śankara has only reduced his teachings into a system. All multiplicity, says Gauḍapāda, in his Kārikās, on the Māṇḍ. Up., II. 1, is unreal. The world of plurality is no more real than a dream-world. '' The two worlds are alike; the only difference is, one is external, and the other is internal.'' And Śankarā, in commenting on the same, observes : '' as in a dream, the objects seen are false, so too in waking. Their capability of being seen is the same. Therefore, in the waking condition too, they (the objects seen) are false '' (*cf.* P. D. Śāstrī, Doctrine of Māyā, p. 87). Thus, from the fact, that both the waking-world and the dream-world are '' capable of being seen,'' they are treated alike, and the unreality of both is inferred.

But Pure Being is a mere logical abstraction. '' It is an abstraction formed in a perfectly legitimate way, which aims at embracing the common element that is to be found in many cases of Being, and that distinguished them from Not-Being.'' But '' it does not admit, as it stands, of application to anything real. Just as an abstract notion cannot take place, just as it never occurs, but in the form of velocity, in a definite direction, so Pure Being cannot in reality be an antecedent or substance of such a kind as that empirical existence, with

its manifold determinations, should be in any sort, a secondary emanation from it, either as its consequence, or as its modification '' (Lotze, Met., Vol. II, p. 31). By denying the reality of the world of change and generation, unqualified Monism has indeed evaded the real issue, and confessed its utter helplessness and poverty as an explanation of the world of experience. Even Śankara himself, has, in dealing with the Vedānta Sūtras, II. 2, 29, flatly contradicted himself, and been forced to admit the absurdity of treating ' waking experience ' and ' dream experience ' alike. We deny, says he, '' that the ideas of posts, and so on...may arise (in the waking state) in the absence of external objects, just as the ideas of a dream, on the ground of their both being alike ideas. The two sets of ideas, we maintain, cannot be treated on the same footing, on account of the difference of their character '' (Thibaut, *Ibid*, pp. 424-25). This is a clear admission of the reality of plurality. But Śankara seems to think he is not bound to be consistent; and he, accordingly, denies its reality next moment! Philosophy aims at an explanation of the world-whole. But Unqualified Monism, by lightly denying its reality, evades the whole problem, instead of solving it.

Cartesian Monism.—The ordinary view of absolute creation of the world out of nothing is a modified form of Abstract Monism. It holds the Ultimate Reality to be one only, and affirms that, before creation, God alone existed, and that, at a certain point of time, the world of finite existents was brought into being, out of nothing, by a mere divine fiat, and was given an independent existence, with powers and laws of its own, to keep it agoing automatically. It is thus held that God has voluntarily put a limit upon his own infinitude and freedom, and made room for all finite existents, and

assigned to them an independent existence of their own. This is the position of Descartes, Reid and his followers.

But this view makes the world of plurality, by its existence outside the Absolute, necessarily a limit to its infinitude and freedom. If, moreover, the plurality is once allowed an independent position, it may as well be conceived as having been in that position from all eternity. And this is actually claimed in the Yoga system of Patañjali. Such a view of creation, besides, assigns to the world merely a contingent existence, and makes the relation between God and the world entirely arbitrary, mechanical and unthinkable, and, at the same time, fails to give a satisfactory explanation of reciprocal inter-connections among existents, as correlated factors of a single whole.

Concrete Spiritualism.

The most fundamental problem of philosophy is to explain the relation between the One and the Many, the Unconditioned and the Conditioned. Pantheism, by its denial of the reality of the world of existents, evades the real problem; whereas Abstract Monism by its connection of creation in time, by an arbitrary divine fiat out of nothing renders the relation between the two altogether mechanical, arbitrary and unthinkable. The reality of the manifold of experience is indubitable. Self-consciousness bears a clear testimony to the reality of both self and not-self, as well as of their correlation and unity. Through it, we are directly aware of the existence of a self-sustaining and self-developing principle in us. It, at the same time, forces upon us the reality of an objective order of inter-related units without. Experience, thus presents to us an orderly system without, and a domain of reality in us. In this latter domain, we see that the reality in us has its own ways of self-manifestation or modes—modes in and through which it maintains and develops itself, and re-

veals itself as a principle of unity-in-difference,—and that these inter-related modes are but self-manifestations of one identical principle in us. And the consciousness of an intimate correlation and correspondence between the two worlds, irresistibly forces upon us a conviction that the entire cosmic order must, similarly, be the self-evolution of a single Eternal and Infinite Reality, which has evolved the plurality of existence from within, as modes or finite centres of its self-manifestation, assigned to them their respective places, functions and ends, as inter-related factors of a single system, and sustained them all within its all-embracing unity, as their common and ultimate bond of union.

Kant.—Kant, in his brilliant work, General Natural History and Theory of Heavens (1755), as already noticed, first clearly brought out the true implication of the world-wide causality and inter-connection among things. "It is this very mechanical order of Nature, embracing all phenomena," there he tells us, "according to whose laws the particular elements act and re-act upon one another, which witnesses to one common ground of the universe, one infinite power, which stirs in each particular element. The individual atoms are points of forces, not small extended particles, and the fact that they act and re-act upon one another, according to laws, proves that there is no original and absolute separation between them. Had every element in the world its own particular nature, it could only be an accident if they fitted together so as to render a connected system of things possible. Their reciprocal connection would be impossible, if they were not collectively dependent on a common ground. In this common ground, both the mechanical order and the purposiveness of nature find their explanation" (Höffding, History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. II, pp. 42-43). This

was an epoch-making declaration, but, amidst the tumult and bustle of the activities of the critical period, Kant often lost sight of the old track of his thought, and was even led, in his first Critique, to regard 'change' as merely applicable to 'empirical reality.' But, even during this period, Kant's old vision, as already noticed, re-appeared from time to time. "That which lies at the base of the matter of our knowledge," he frankly suggested even in his first Critique, "may be identical with that which determines the form, under which we arrange the same—and that which underlies material phenomena may be the same which underlies the Spiritual phenomena." In the Critique of Practical Reason, he was similarly led to think of "the possible identity of the basis of the world of nature with that of the world of freedom" (Höffding, *Ibid*, pp. 104-5). In his Critique of Speculative Psychology, he was also driven to think that "that which underlies outer phenomena may be the same as that which underlies inner phenomena. If this were so, there would be an end to dualism, and also to all difficulties which have arisen concerning the reciprocal action between soul and body" (*Ibid*, p. 63). In his last Critique, the same vision returned to him once again, and he declared, once more, probably, "that which underlies the causal relation between things, also underlies the purposiveness and the harmony of Nature;" and "that the world of nature and the world of freedom are not absolutely separate, but must have a common foundation" (*Ibid*, pp. 109, 107). Kant, however, failed to work out the idea involved in these suggestions, but he was quite confident that philosophy, to be worthy of its name, must carefully consider the fact of the world-wide inter-connection among the various parts of the cosmic system, and that between the

world of nature and the world of freedom, and the full implication and significance of such inter-connections, in its attempt to offer a satisfactory explanation of the world. He, in fact, regarded the conception indicated in the afore-said utterances " as a final view, a concluding hypothesis of very great value for enquiry." And " the continuity of Kant's philosophical development," as Höffding aptly observes, displays itself most clearly at this point. And his speculative followers took up the work where he had left it.

Herder.—The same conception also very strongly presented itself to Herder, a contemporary of Kant, and found a bold expression in him. He transformed Leibniz's doctrine of Monads into a doctrine of ' organic forces;' and these, he held, in analogy with the active forces operative in us, operate, in different degrees, and at different stages throughout the whole of Nature. "The force, that thinks and works in me," said he, " is, in virtue of its nature, a force as eternal as that which holds the sun and the stars together " (*Ibid*, p. 114).

Hegel.—In Hegel, this conception found a still clearer expression. Though Nature and the mere life of mind seem to stand opposed to, and independent of each other, yet they exist, said he, as necessary factors and complementary elements of the concrete Reality. An orderly external world is indispensable, as a necessary correlate for the existence of a self-conscious mind. In order to exist as a self-conscious spirit, the mind must needs be conscious of an objective, orderly and inter-related world of plurality. And, as the highest form of reality, we are aware of, is our own self-conscious spirit, in the very core of Reality, Hegel concluded, nature and mind must exist as complementary elements of one concrete whole; and the Ultimate Reality must be a principle of unity-in-difference,

a spiritual principle, both a plurality and a unity. It must be " a differentiated unity," as Dr. McTaggart puts it, " in which the unity has no meaning but the differentiations, and the differentiations have no meaning but the unity. The differentiations are individuals, for each of whom the unity exists, and whose whole nature consists in the fact that the unity is for them as the whole nature of the unity consists in the fact that it is for the individuals " (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 7).

Hegel, however, committed a great mistake in thinking that his Logic was identical with Absolute knowledge, and that its categories were " the explication of the Absolute," the expression of "God's nature in thoughts as such." In so far as human knowledge grasps, and lays hold of Reality, it may be said, to coincide with the innermost essence of existents, as real constituents of its very being, and not as merely subjective. But it is absurd to think that the philosopher's knowledge of Reality, however complete it may be, actually covers its whole content. And yet, Hegel, in the intoxication of the consciousness of the significance of his great contributions, actually advanced such a pretentious claim on behalf of his Logic, and presumed that his categories really amounted to an explication of the Absolute Mind. Even if we are fully satisfied, that the world in its essence, or full reality, is spiritual, and that on no other supposition, is the unity and order underlying it explicable, yet we have to confess that a comprehensive knowledge of it in its ultimate essence—such a knowledge of it as would be a knowledge of God—is impossible to us. " To know God," as Green puts it, " we must be God. The unifying principle of the world is indeed in us; it is our self. But, as in us, it is so conditioned by a particular animal nature that,

while it yields the idea of the world as one which regulates all our knowledge, our actual knowledge is a piecemeal process. We spell out the relations of things one by one, we pass from condition to condition, from effect to effect: but, as one fragment of truth is grasped, another has escaped us, and we never reach that totality of apprehension, through which alone we could know the world as it is, and God in it '' (Works, Vol. III, p. 145). Hegel's mistake was to ignore this fact. But nevertheless, the real object of the dialectical method is, undoubtedly, to show that all existents stand intimately inter-connected, as the thoughts of the mind—that they all form an organic totality. '' In fact, for Hegel, as for Aristotle, truth and knowledge are,'' as Adamson puts it (Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 274), '' but different expressions for the same; and the assumption, that thoughts form a complete system, the abstract expression of reality, is but saying, in other words, that truth is a systematic whole, which stands in no need of extraneous support.''

The term ' thought,' by which Hegel designated the ultimate essence of reality, was also somewhat unhappy. But, by thought, he certainly meant, as Prof. Bosanquet points out (Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 65), '' much what most people mean..... when they speak of feeling.'' Thought is in part intuitive, and in its character of immediate apprehension, it indeed, resembles the nature of feeling.

But Hegel's greatest mistake was to think that he could deduce the forms of reality from one ultimate principle. In his system, light, weight, magnetism, electricity, chemical processes, and organic life, have all been represented as necessary phases in the gradual self-evolution of the Absolute. Not only so, bold attempts have been made in it to show that all plants and living

organisms have been evolved, one after another, in a regular succession. But it was " a delusion to suppose," to use Lotze's words, " that the forms of reality, while still inaccessible to observation, could be deduced from a single fundamental principle. All that could be done.....was to reduce to it the material already given by experience, with its attendant residuum of peculiarity, which cannot be explained, but must be simply accepted as a fact " (Met., Vol. II, pp. 378-79).

Lotze.—Lotze, in avoiding Hegel's blunder, took up the problem where Kant had left it. A plurality of real elements, in reciprocal action, constitutes the foundation of the mechanical conception of nature. " But what is the relation," asks Lotze, " between the elements and the inter-connection, in which they exist? Could they, apart from the inter-connection, exist independently?.....Reciprocal action and inter-action cannot take place in the air, over or between the elements; it pre-supposes their inner unity," and, as the ground and basis of that unity, " an infinite all-embracing Being, of which the moments, or points of action, are the particular elements " (Höffding, *Ibid*, pp. 513-14). Could there be a world-order, he asks, without its being based on an infinite and all-embracing principle, capable of bringing together " any plurality to the unity of any definite relation," or of maintaining such a unity, "if it were not, at the same time, present in each individual of the plurality, and sensitive to every state occurring in all other individuals, and capable also of bringing the reciprocal relations of all into the intended form by an alteration of position, determined by reference to their remoteness from the point aimed at?" (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Vol. II, p. 675.) And, if the conception of a cosmic order implies the presence of such an infinite and all-pervading ordering Being, as the ultimate basis and

support of the world of plurality, the conception of a moral order, adds Lotze, carries us further still. The world is, not only a system of inter-related factors, but also contains unmistakable traces of organic, social, and moral evolution. And, if the world is a moral order, as it undoubtedly is, the all-pervading ordering Being must needs be a spiritual principle,—a Being, who can consciously regulate the activities of the elements, assign to each its own proper place and function in the system, discriminate between good and bad, and is, at the same time, capable of realising the good, with his "own living love." The world of plurality must, therefore, be regarded, as a system of necessary and inter-related modes of the self-manifestation of one Ultimate Reality, which, as the agent, that evolves them, and as the subject, that thinks, designs, and regulates them, eternally maintains itself in and through them, materials of its own conscious life, as the Absolute Spirit.

Romanticism tried to deduce the forms of reality from the highest idea; and this proved an impossible task. Lotze, however, starting from the former, has reasoned back to their ultimate pre-supposition. And from a plurality of elements, in reciprocal inter-connection, he infers the presence of one infinite spiritual principle, as their ultimate ground and support. It is only in our own selves that we have a direct vision of the ultimate nature of reality, "*a cognitiorei*, as distinct from a *cognitio circa rem*." And, as all inter-related factors of the system, and the basic principle underlying the same, must needs be homogeneous in character, to make their unity and inter-connection possible, all existents, Lotze argues, must be "feeling beings," animated in different degrees, and the Ultimate Reality, realised in them all, must be a self-conscious spiritual principle, seeking to realise an end. As

the ultimate ground and support of all its modes, it is immanent in them all; and yet, as an eternal and inexhaustible fountain of resources, unexhausted in the totality of its modes, it transcends them all. This is Lotze's Panentheism.

"Not deduction," says Lotze, "but reduction is possible." In the Vedānta, we, however, meet with both these attempts having been made side by side. But the Vedāntic attempt at deduction was, as it was then bound to be, very modest in its nature, and it never assumed the character of a pretentious attempt at the explication of the content of the Absolute. Tht Vedāntists knew that the creative thought, like the reproductive thought of man, begins with the most abstract, the most intangible. The concrete forms of reality, they accordingly thought, must have been gradually evolved at different stages of creative evolution. But, at the same time, they were fully conscious of the inscrutable ways of the self-manifestation of the creative principle. And hence, in their attempts at the deduction, if deduction we can call it, of the plurality of existents from the Reality. They always spoke with diffidence and in a faltering voice. These attempts have, accordingly, taken the shape, of mere general statements. And, even in these general statements, thinkers are divided amongst themselves nay, even the same thinkers have, at times, advanced different analogical arguments in support of their positions. And the Upaniṣads themselves bear witness to these differences of opinions.

The profound sense of the cosmic unity must have engaged the most serious attention of the Vedāntists, and have been the starting-point of their philosophical speculation. And the inter-actions among the plurality of existents, and the unit, order and harmony in the world-whole, coupled with the inner experience of life,

naturally forced upon them the conception of an ultimate source and inner bond of the world of plurality. And the pages of the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta Sūtras, and the Gītā, abound in utterances containing vivid and clear expressions of this sense of the cosmic unity. "All these existents, my dear," declares Uddālaka to his son (Chān. Up., VI. 8, 4), "have their being, unity and support in the Reality" (*Sanmūlāḥ somyemāḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ, Sadāyatanāḥ satpratiṣṭhāḥ*). "This Self," adds the same Upaniṣad (VIII. 4, 1), "is the support of all these worlds—the bond of their unity and existence." "That all-pervading Reality," it further adds (VIII. 14, 1), "which has evolved from within the world of plurality, and wherein they all exist, is Brahman (the Supreme Self)." The Bṛh Up. similarly declares (II. 5, 15), "He is the internal Ruler of the plurality of existents. As the spokes of a wheel are united together in the nave and the felly, so in this Self are united.....all worlds, all gods, all beings, and all individual souls." In the same Upaniṣad (III. 7, 2-23), Yājñavalkya, in reply to Uddālaka declares, "He who is immanent in the earth, and yet transcends it whom the earth knows not, whose mode (body) the earth is, who regulates and guides it from within, He is thy Self, the imperishable internal Ruler. He who is in water, and yet transcends it, whom water does not know, whose mode water is, and who regulates and guides it from within, He is thy Self, the imperishable internal Ruler. He, who is in the fire, yet transcends it, whom the fire knows not, whose mode the fire is, and who regulates it and guides it from. He is thy Self, the imperishable internal Ruler.....He who is in all existents, and yet transcends them all, whom these existents know not, whose modes they are, and who regulates and guides them from within, He is thy Self, the imperishable, internal Ruler.....He who is our

reason, and yet transcends it, whom the reason comprehends (knows) not, whose mode it is, and who regulates and guides it from within, He is thy Self, the imperishable, internal Ruler.....He sees unseen, hears unheard, thinks unthought of, knows unknown. There is no other seer beyond Him, no other hearer beyond Him, no other thinker beyond Him, no other knower beyond Him, He is thy Self, the imperishable, internal Ruler. Everything different from Him is transient.'' In the same Upaniṣad (IV. 4, 13 & 22) we are further told, '' He is the ' evolver ' of the world of plurality; He is the moulder, guide and ruler of all. He is the support of the world; He is the Soul of all these....He is the Lord, support of all existents, their common guide, and ruler and their ultimate ground and bond of union and existence.'' The Kaṭha, II. 2, 12, likewise declares, '' He is the one Ruler, the Soul of all things and beings, *who manifests His one Self into many forms* (*Ekaṁ rupaṁ vahudhā yaḥ karoti*). Those sages, who see Him in themselves, alone have peace eternal, and not others.'' The Śvet. Up., III. 15, likewise declares, '' Being is all this, all that has been, and all that is to be.'' The same Upaniṣad (VI. 12-13) again says, '' He is the Guide and Ruler.....He evolves many forms from His own essence. *He is the Real of the reals* (*Nityo nityānām*), *the Consciousness of the conscious* (*Cetanaścetanānām*), *and alone provides the needs of the world of plurality* (*the many*). *The sages, who see Him in their own selves, alone have peace eternal, and not others.*'' '' That bright One is immanent in all things, and is all-pervading,'' it adds (VI. 11), '' He is the inner Soul, and Guide of all existents, the Regulator of their activities, the universal in-dwelling Spirit, the universal Witness and Inspirer, and the self-existing Ultimate Reality, and Who is, at the same time, beyond and above all

His modes." The Īśa, 517 similarly declares, "He *is immanent in all, and also transcends all. All he, who sees all existents in the Self, and the Self in all, hates none, and is above all sorrows and delusions.*"

These utterances,—and the Upaniṣads are full of such declarations,—are quite significant. In these declarations, we have, no doubt the final conclusions clearly stated and summed up, with the intermediate steps and reasonings undeveloped or left out. Instructions, in those days, were imparted orally. It is, therefore, no wonder if, in the records of the teachings, the intermediate steps were generally omitted, or left undeveloped. But, although the intermediate steps are not there, the final conclusions stand there conspicuously, and their import is quite unmistakable. The intermediate steps, though left out, are also clearly indicated in the conclusions themselves. But are the intermediate steps really left out entirely? No, by no means. Bādarāyaṇa has distinctly told us, in dealing with Sāṁkhyan Dualism, the Atomism of Kaṇāda, and other non-Vedāntic schools, that the cosmic unity is inexplicable except on the supposition that all the elements constituting it have a common ground of their unity, and that the wonderful adaptations and organisation displayed in the universe most conclusively proves that the world-evolving principle is an Infinite Spirit. As integral parts of one systematic doctrine, all the arguments employed by Bādarāyaṇa in demolishing the non-Vedāntic doctrines, must be understood as forming parts of the utterances just considered. And, thus understood, in these utterances and arguments, we find a constructive exposition of the entire Vedāntic Panentheism.

No metaphysics has, however, ever been able to explain how the plurality of existents actually came into being out of one Ultimate Reality. Nor is it the busi-

ness of metaphysics, as Lotze points out (Met., Vol. II, p. 416), to answer how " the inorganic elements of the earth's crust found themselves united in the form of crystals, capable of inhibition, and in systems endowed with life and growth; or again, how the atmosphere of the primitive world settled upon the earth, in the shape of protoplasm, and there struck roots of the most various kinds." These are questions for the sciences to investigate. The function of metaphysics is to start with the facts of experience, and to point out the nature of the general principles involved and pre-supposed in them, the principles in the light of which alone the facts of experience become intelligible. The Vedānta has, also, frankly confessed its inability to answer questions like the above. But it has, nevertheless, endeavoured, in its own way, to explain the most inscrutable problems of the transformation of the One into a world of plurality, and to make it generally intelligible. And it is interesting to consider here some of these attempts. This is how the Tait. Up., II. 6, describes the process of creation metaphorically,—" He (the universal Will) desired, 'I shall be many—I shall evolve many.' He then reflected, and evolved all these existents, and entered into them all, and thus became all that is visible and all that is invisible.....all that is conscious, and all that is unconscious." " Alone He delighted not," the Bṛh. Up., I. 4, 1, tells us, " He wanted duality, and split Himself into two." Bādarāyaṇa, in his attempt to show the plurality, as mere modes of the self-manifestation of One causal Reality, describes the plurality as arising from the self-transformation of the Supreme Will. Brahman, " like curd arising from milk." (Kṣiravaṭi, II. 1, 23). " Potters can make pots," says Nimvārka, in dealing with the passage, " only if equipped with necessary means and materials. We must

not, therefore, suppose, that Brahman (the Supreme Self) being devoid of all external resources, is not the cause of the world. *By virtue of the inscrutable powers inherent in itself, Brahman transforms itself into the world of plurality, just as milk transforms itself into curd.*" Bādarāyaṇa again compares (Vedānta Sūtras, II. 1, 18), the origin of plurality to "the unfolding of a folded canvas" (*Paṭavat ca*), and again to "the self-expansion of a coiled snake" (*Ahi-kuṇḍalavat*, III. 2, 27). "As the earth transforms part of its contents into minerals of various descriptions, so does the Self," he again says, in Vedānta Sūtras, II. 1, 22, "manifest itself into a plurality of existents." As the waves are, he further suggests (II. 1, 13), mere modes of the sea, so are all existents the modes of Brahman. In I. 4, 26, he further tells us that the world of plurality are mere self-differentiations of Brahman, caused by self-modification (*Ātmakṛteḥ pariṇāmāt*). We are further told in this connection that *Brahman is both the Efficient and the Material Cause of the world of plurality* (*Prakṛtiśca*—I 4, 23) and that Brahman is everywhere described in the Vedānta as existing in two forms, as manifested in the world of plurality and yet as unmanifested and transcending the same (*Parasya Ubhayalingam Sarvatra hi*) (III. 2, 11).

It is evident, from above, that the Vedāntic Reality is a spiritual principle of unity-in-difference, an eternally self-differentiating principle, manifesting itself in a plurality of modes with a view to realising an end. Yājñavalkya most emphatically tells us, Bṛh. Up., II. 3, 1, "The visible and the invisible, the perishable and the imperishable, things without motion, and moving existents, the conscious and the unconscious, are the two modes of Brahman (*Dve Brahmaṇo rupe*)." But Brahman is more than the sumtotal of its modes

*The modes do not exhaust the Reality....He, accordingly, adds,—" Not these alone, not these alone; it is not that there is nothing beyond these (modes). There is also an existence beyond all these. He is therefore known as the Real of the real. The vital airs, etc., are real; He is the Real of these reals."** In the Gītā, we are likewise told, in the mouth of the Absolute, as it were (VII. 10 and 12), " *Know Me, O Pārtha, as the germ of the world of plurality...Know all existents as evolved from Me. I am not in them (not exhausted in them); they are in Me.*" (*Vījaṁ Māṁ sarvabhūtānāṁ viddhi Pārtha sanātanam: Matta evetāṇ viddhi na tvahaṁ teṣu te mayi.*) It again declares, IX. 4-5, " My invisible being pervades this world of plurality. *All existents are in Me; I am not (contained) in them..... I am the ultimate ground and support of all existents; and that which supports them all is not (exhausted) in them.*"

In some places in the Upaniṣads, the origin of plurality has been described as an organic growth. " You cannot see, my dear, this tiny seed," says Uddālaka, for instance, to his son, Śvetaketu, in Chān., VI. 12, 2-3,

* This significant passage, like several other passages of its kind, has been grossly distorted and misinterpreted by Saṅkara. Prof. Deussen, Dr. E. Roer, Mr. Gough, and several others, have simply uncritically followed Saṅkara. It is one of the clearest utterances of Vedāntic Panentheism. The above rendering of it is based on the only possible interpretation the passage admits of, and accepted unanimously by Nimvārka, Rāmānuja, Vijñānabhikṣu and Baladeva. Bādarāyaṇa himself has, in Ved. Sūt., III. 2, 22, distinctly indicated this to be the only meaning of the passage, and has told us that the Vedānta here " denies only so-muchness (*etāvatvam*) of Brahman; for it declares it to be more than all these." (*Na hi etasmāditi neti, anyat param asti*).

" out of which this huge Nyagrodha tree has arisen. Believe me, my dear, this world of plurality has, likewise, arisen from one subtle invisible principle. All these are but modes of the same, the Self." The Mund., I. 1, 7-8, again declares, " as a spider evolves its cobweb from within, as a bright fire emits thousands of sparks, as plants grow from the earth, and as hairs from a living body, so has the world been evolved from the Eternal Being. *Brahman expanded itself, from an inner impulse; and hence arose the primal matter, thence vital energy, the mind, and all existents.*"

Now, these passages clearly reveal the mind of their authors. In their various attempts to state the Vedāntic position, they make no secret of their ignorance as to the manner of the origin of the plurality; nor do they like to dogmatise on the point. All they want to say is that the plurality has evolved from one universal Will, Brahman, whose modes of manifestation they are. The cosmic order is thus, according to the Vedānta, a system of such inter-related modes, evolved from within sustained and pervaded by One Purpose or spiritual principle which, in obedience to a conscious inner impulse, has manifested itself in many forms, given them their places, connections, and functions, and also supports them all as necessary materials of its own self-conscious life, as Concrete Spirit.

CHAPTER VI

The Individual and the Universal

Mechanism or Organism contrasted.

A mechanical system consists of multiplicity of parts, skilfully adapted, and co-ordinated in order to make them all co-operate towards one common end. But a machine is a manufactured article, and an artificial product, and not a product of self-evolution. Its parts are foreign and externally related to one another, and are shaped, arranged, and co-ordinated together by a power equally external and foreign, and the energy, which it is intended to transmit from part to part, also forms no property of its own. An organism, on the other hand, grows, and is self-made, evolved by the very self-evolving activity of a single in-dwelling force, which, automatically differentiates the original form into parts, and re-integrates the parts into a complex organic whole, with its constituent parts subject to the common control of one immanent end. Here the active principle is, from the very beginning, immanent in the germ, and retains its unity through all differentiations and re-integrations of parts, shaping them differently according to requirements, and making them all subservient to one ultimate end. This active principle in the organism is called life.

But how to account for the first appearance of life in the world? The theory of special creation, in its ordinary or modified form, assigns to the world of plurality a purely mechanical and arbitrary existence, and is therefore metaphysically unintelligible and un-

The origin of life and its meaning.

tenable. It has, accordingly, been held by a class of thinkers that the life-power, which evolves plants and animals, is a mere modification or concentration of the universal life, which evolves and sustains the universe. The universal life, it is held, is operative everywhere. But wherever it has evolved the necessary antecedent conditions, favourable for the manifestation of organic life, it transforms the materials so evolved into an individual centre of life capable of self-preservation and self-development. It is, accordingly, held that the purposive energy of the universal life unites the scattered mechanical and chemical forces, co-ordinates and moulds them into an organic whole, to serve as an instrument or medium for self-expression. The universe is a systematic whole, organised in its minutest details. The formation of germ-cells and their variations must, therefore, be conceived as determined and regulated by the purposive activity of the very world-evolving principle, and the life and history of the world as the outcome of its own purposive activities.

The Soul.

But what is the soul? There are reasons to think that the soul is nothing but life in a higher form of self-manifestation. At a certain stage, when the differentiation of organs, and co-ordination of functions, becomes so complete as to make it possible for the energy evolving the organism to become quite self-sustaining, life manifests itself as soul, and becomes a self-sustaining individual. In this stage of its existence the finite and individualised form of the Reality rises, to a great extent, superior to the limitations of its finitude, and becomes, not merely aware of its own changing states and capable of discriminating between them, as in the lower forms of life, but it also learns to distinguish itself, as the common subject of all its affections, from the affections themselves, and thus becomes aware of itself

as a self-sustaining, self-developing individual, with an end or destiny of its own, realisable largely through its own free activities. It now becomes a self-conscious individual agent, a self-controlling and self-developing 'real,' an ego or self.

Self and the Personality.

The adaptations of means to ends, of many to one, and of the present to the future, so conspicuous in the organic world, and in the instinctive activities of animals, evidently affords unmistakable proof of the presence and operation of reason in the very core and constitution of the universe. The intelligence and foresight displayed in organisms and animal instincts is not, however, the property of the plants and animals themselves. They are not its masters, in the proper sense of the term, but are mere unconscious or semi-conscious medium of its expression, instruments of its operations. It must therefore be inherent in the very energy which works in nature, and evolves the world of plurality, as finite centres of its activities. But, of all finite centres of the Infinite's self-expressions, men alone are conscious inheritors of divine reason. As self-conscious rational beings, they alone are clearly aware of their positions, functions and destiny, as factors of the world-whole, as well as of their capacity to realise the *summum bonum* of their life, by the right and proper exercise of their reason and freedom. *And, in such consciousness of position, functions by destiny, and capacity for self-determination and self-perfection, lies the essence of man's self-hood and personality.* An individual, in as much as he is conscious of possibilities latent in him, and consciously and freely regulates his own activities for self-preservation and self-perfection, is a person, and an end to himself.

Personality, however, admits of degrees. Men, as finite and relative beings, can exist only in inter-action

with other inter-related members of the cosmic whole. As members of an organic whole, their interests are indissolubly bound up with those of their fellow-beings. Self-realisation, on the part of an individual, therefore, largely depends on that of the rest. Besides, the highest good of an individual life must needs, in the long run, be but a means to the attainment of the larger destiny of the whole, the cosmic good. Moreover, although capable of gradual expansion, man's knowledge and resources are always limited. Human personality is, therefore, only finite and restricted. As a man advances in life, his personality widens more and more; but still, it always remains limited. The Absolute alone can be said to exist *entirely for itself*, and *by itself* as the only self-existing and self-maintaining Ultimate Reality, and as *wholly independent of anything extraneous, and completely self-determined. Complete personality, therefore, belongs to the Absolute alone.*

Bādarāyaṇa on Personality.

In opposition to the Buddhist Sensationalism, Bādarāyaṇa has argued that it is impossible for mere discrete sensations to combine themselves into the unity of a series, and much less, to be aware of themselves as such, and " that the various facts of comparing ideas, and referring them to one another, are themselves, in turn, reciprocally related; and this relation brings a new activity of comparison to consciousness. And so our whole inner world of thoughts is built up; not as a mere collection of manifold ideas, existing with, or after one another, but as a world, in which these individual members are held together, and arranged by the relating activity of this single pervading principle, the Self; and that the Self is distinctly aware of itself, as such, as well as of the states or experiences of its own.* The

* Lotze, Met., p. 423; *cf.* Ved. Sūt., II. 2, 22; 25; 28-31.

Self is, adds Bādarāyaṇa, directly aware of itself, as an abiding reality, which persists and endures in and through all its states, maintaining and perfecting itself in inter-action with all objective realities, revealed to it through its sensations. Man, he further tells us (Ved. Sūt., II. 3, 32) in his analysis of conduct, is a free agent; and all injunctions enjoining on men to seek liberation and freedom from the bondage of ignorance and desire are, in fact, based on this fundamental fact of immediate experience. Different men, adds he, differ in their experiences, and seek different ends; and every individual is immediately aware that he is free to act as he likes, and to seek whatever he desires (*ibid*, II. 3, 36; 39; 51). Every individual's actions morally affect, and elevate or degrade the doer alone (*ibid*, II. 3, 48 and 50). In his nice psychological discrimination, he also points out (*ibid*, II. 3, 37), that *agency cannot belong to the intellect, which is rather instrumental, and that it belongs to the will alone,* wherein lies the very basis of human personality. And it is the " positive awareness of an area or quality of self-maintenance," to use Prof. Bosanquet's words (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 250), "that, after all, the self aspires to;" and "it is this," we learn from Bādarāyaṇa also, which constitutes " the real foundation of self-hood " and personality. But man is a citizen of two worlds. And, although finite and limited, he is, adds Bādarāyaṇa, potentially infinite (*ibid*, II. 3, 28 and 31);—a finite reproduction of the Infinite, "Āvāsa eva," as he puts it (*ibid*, II. 3, 49), *an abyss concentric with another Abyss.*

Arguments against Divine Personality examined.

But does personality belong to the Absolute? A class of thinkers have maintained that consciousness and personality necessarily imply duality and opposition, and that, as such, the Absolute must be unconscious and impersonal. The consciousness of the existence of the

non-ego, contends Dr. McTaggart, for instance, is an essential condition of the personality of man. "Such a consciousness," says he, "the Absolute cannot possess. For there is nothing outside it, from which it can distinguish itself...We know of no personality without a non-ego. Nor can we imagine what such a personality would be like. For we certainly can never say 'I' without raising the idea of the non-ego, and so we can never form any idea of the way in which the Absolute would say 'I'" (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, pp. 68-69). The Absolute is, he adds, a "unity of individuals, each of whom is a perfect individual, through his perfect unity with the rest;" but it (the Absolute) is not so. And, as personality is an essential characteristic of God, we must say, he concludes, "that the Absolute is not God, and, in consequence, there is no God" (*ibid*, p. 26).

But the objection is not valid. The real condition of self-consciousness is *opposition and diversity*, and not *the externality of the non-ego to the ego*. The ultimate secret of self-consciousness and personality, lies in *change*. Personality "can never belong to any unchangeably valid truth, but only to something, which changes, suffers, and re-acts." But changes in finite minds, by reason of the very limitation of their character, as such, need stimulations from without to occasion them. And that is why the development of the personal consciousness of the finite always depends on and presupposes external influences, and needs contrast with something alien. But the Infinite Being needs no such external stimuli, to call forth its life and activities. *We must regard change as an eternal fact, an aspect of the Reality itself; for it can never be extracted from rest or an immutable Ultimate Duality*. And, as an eternally self-differentiated Reality, the Infinite necessarily posses-

ses in its very nature, the requisite conditions for self-conscious existence. As an ever-changing and ever-suffering Reality, its self-conscious existence needs neither to be initiated nor to be continuously fostered and developed—stimulations from something other than itself—but "manifests itself," to use Lotze's words, "within itself, with spontaneous action, that is, eternal." The very conception of the universe *as a moral order*, which it is, renders such a conception absolutely imperative. It is impossible for a blind and unconscious principle, that "cannot consciously," as Lotze points out, "indicate the place of each individual, and appoint his work, or distinguish what is good in good action, from what is bad in a bad action, or will and realise the good with its own living love," to impart to the cosmic order, with blind and purposeless activities, "those ameliorating impulses, by which alone the thorough-going dominion of good can be established." "Perfect personality is," therefore, "in God only; to all finite minds, there is allotted but a pale copy thereof.....The finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of this personality, but a limit and a hindrance to its development. It is an ideal, which, like all that is ideal, belongs unconditionally only to the Infinite" (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, pp. 684-8). Again, "it is in the highest of our own experiences," as Prof. Bosanquet very rightly observes (*Individuality and Value*, p. 250), "that we must seek for the clues to the fullest reality. And that we experience our self most completely, just when we are least aware of its finite selfness, is a clue which must not be forgotten." Limitations are indeed, merely necessary incidents of finitude. They "cannot constitute the really significant essence even of a finite being. It is positive awareness of an area or quality of self-maintenance that, after all, the self aspires to...and it

is this, the real foundation of self-hood, that is, in some way, possessed by the self in the Absolute, and the Absolute, so far as analogous to a self.'' Moreover, what are the immediate materials even of our finite consciousness? They are evidently nothing but our own mental states; and we are conscious of the not-self only indirectly, as revealed through them. In all self-consciousness, we are, thus, directly aware of our own mental states, and of ourselves, as producing or suffering them. And it seems to make little essential difference whether these states are initiated, as in our case, by stimulations from without, or are called forth, as in the case of the Absolute, by the free and inner self-evolving activities of the Reality.

The Vedāntic Position.

As an eternally self-differentiating Reality, Brahman, the Vedānta tells us, possesses plurality of existents, as objects of its eternal consciousness. The world of plurality are not, however, alien to it, but are its own modes of self-manifestation. There is, therefore, nothing foreign to and no duality in Brahman.* And this is exactly what Yājñavalkya means, when he declares, Bṛh., IV. 5, 15, '' Where there is, as it were, duality, one sees another (external to itself), one smells another, one enjoys another, one speaks to another, one hears another, one knows another. But, where all existents are merely (modes of) the Self, how can one see another (external to itself), how can one smell another.....how can one hear another, how can one know another?'' *As concrete universal Spirit, Brahman*

* The world of plurality is not different from Brahman, the Ultimate Reality (*Tadananyatvam*, Ved. Sūt., II. 1, 14), Brahman transformed itself into the world of plurality (*Ātma-kṛtaḥ, pariṇāmāt*, Ved. Sūt., I. 4, 26).

is pure "inwardness as opposed to externality," to use Prof. Bosanquet's words, and includes "diversity without disassociation," and is, therefore, eternally self-conscious. This great truth was fully realised by Yājñavalkya, at least as early as 800 B.C. "This Infinite Self," says he (Bṛh., IV. 5, 13), "embraces all *existents, and is all inwardness, and to Him, the terms, external and internal, do not apply. He is pure consciousness*" (*Anantaro'vāhyaḥ kritsno rasaghanaḥ prajñānaghanaḥ*). In Him, there is no duality. "*Not that,*" adds he (Bṛh., IV. 3, 23 & 30), "*the sight of the Seer ceases to exist, for that is imperishable; there is no duality, distinct and separate from it, to be seen.....* Not that the knowledge of the Knower ceases to exist, for that is imperishable; there is *no duality, distinct and separate from* it, to be known" (*Na hi Draṣṭurdṛṣṭer-viparilopo vidyate avināśitvāt, etc.*).

Vedānta and Bosanquet, McTaggart and Bradley.

The Vedānta is thus quite ready to join with Prof. Bosanquet in calling the Absolute as "the Ultimate Individual," on the ground that, as pure inwardness, it includes all existents "in the circulation of the total life," and has "no other individuals to be distinguished from it" (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 69-70). But it adds that, in as much as "the degree of individuality," as Prof. Bosanquet himself admits, depends on the measure of conscious, "explicit and free self-determination" (*ibid*, pp. 202-3), and on "the quality and comprehensiveness of purpose" (*ibid*, p. 70), and, inasmuch as "the real foundation of self-hood" rests on "the positive awareness of an area or quality of self-maintenance" (*ibid*, p. 250), it necessarily follows that *perfect self-hood and perfect personality belong to the Perfect Individual alone. Indeed, the Perfect Individual, who is perfectly conscious and completely free in self-determination, and in the realisation of its own*

absolute end, is, for that very reason, also the Perfect Person. The Vedānta also fully endorses Prof. Bosanquet's statement that " it is in the highest of our experience that we must seek for the clues to the fullest reality" (p. 250). But " personality always impresses us," as aptly observes Dr. Mertz (*Religion and Science*, p. 174), " as the most powerful of individual existence;" and the more advanced a man is, and the greater is his self-effacement in the cause of truth, righteousness and humanity, the more marked his personality. And, if it is in the highest of our experiences that we must seek for the clues of the highest reality, *it follows necessarily that highest personality* belongs to the most Perfect Being alone. Again, as the ultimate ground and support of all its modes, *the Absolute must possess what is best and highest in the modes themselves.* The Highest must, accordingly, possess, as very aptly observes Prof. Webb (*God and Personality*, pp. 174-78), "that spiritual life, of which our personality is but a faint and imperfect likeness." The Vedānta further adds, that the Absolute, though the Perfect Individual, is, at the same time, a Unity of individuals, a " Unity of persons." The Tait. Up. clearly tells us that the Absolute having evolved the world of plurality entered into them each (*Tat sṛṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśat, tadanupraviśya sat ca tat ca abhabat, vide*, Tait., II. 6). Dr. McTaggart rightly describes the Absolute as a " Unity of persons;" but he adds, that it is not " a person " (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 58). The arguments we have urged against Prof. Bosanquet, apply with equal force and cogency to Dr. McTaggart and Mr. Bradley as well; and we fail to see how they can deny personality, what is of highest value to us, to the Absolute. In the narrow and restricted sense of the term personality, namely in its " character of being a subject of right and duties

amongst other similar subjects" (Bosanquet, *ibid*, p. 270), the Absolute cannot, certainly, be called a person. But there is absolutely no reason why the term 'personality' should be used in that restricted sense. If the term, 'individual,' admits of a wider significance, as it does when applied to the Absolute, so does the term 'personality.' And it is in this wider sense alone and not in the sense of a subject of duties or rights among other subjects that the Absolute is the Perfect Individual, as well as the Perfect Person, and, at the same time, as the ground or support of a plurality of existents, is also a "Unity of persons."

It is interesting to note, incidentally, here, that the aforesaid observations of Yājñavalkya apply, ideally evidently, to the truly liberated sage, as well. Liberation, according to the Vedanta, depends on the vision of the all-comprehensive unity of the Self, and, therefore, of one's own unity, as a mode of the Self, with all existents, as its modes. When this perfect vision is attained, "the soul in the bosom of the Self," says Yājñavalkya (Bṛh., IV. 3, 21 and 23), "is conscious of nothing within or without, even as a man in the embrace of the beloved wife, ceases to be conscious of anything within or without. Not that the soul loses its sight, for that is imperishable; but, because then there remains nothing *distinct and separate from the Self* to be seen." The individual, as a mode of the Absolute, is, to use Prof. Bosanquet's words (*ibid*, p. 287), "a world of experience, whose centre is given in the body, and in the range of externality, that comes by means of it, but whose limits depend on his power" of conscious union and reconciliation with all that lies beyond. "He is a world that realises, in a limited manner," and, in a healthy state, with ever-widening expansion, "the logic and spirit of the whole." The liberated sage, declares

the Vedānta (Īśa, 6), accordingly "sees all existents in the Self, and the Self in all existents; and, from such vision, he bears none ill-will." In such vision, all duality vanishes, and the sage experiences the living "sense and fact of identity with men, nature, and God."* The individual soul, as a finite centre of the self-manifestation of the Infinite, is, as the Vedānta puts it, conditioned; it is fettered, because of its limitations. It is these limitations, *upādhis*, that set a limit to the limitless, and cause the Absolute to manifest itself, under the limitations of finitude and relativity, as the individual self. But the greatest blunder of Śankara was, to regard these limitations as unreal, as illusions, caused by Ignorance, and thus to deny the plurality of existents altogether. In his pantheistic zeal for Pure Being, he completely ignored experience, sought to suppress all that is finite, in favour of the Infinite, and regarded individual freedom, self-hood and personality, all that is of supreme value to the individual souls as fictitious and empty, and extolled the "majesty of the One, upon whose formal properties of immensity, unity, eternity, and inexhaustible fulness," he concentrated all his reverence, forgetting that such a Pure Being was a mere phantom of imagination, "a bare abstraction of the Holy of holies," "an empty shrine."

Śaṅkara's mistake.

But is any room left for man's religious consciousness in such a conception of the Absolute as that upheld by the Vedānta? We must answer it in the affirmative. The Supreme Will for good, which all finite minds experience in and through their moral struggles and the

Place of Religious Consciousness.

* The aforesaid utterances of Yājñavalkya have been grossly misunderstood by Saṅkara, and by almost all the Orientalists, and wrongly interpreted as implying a denial of plurality.

conflict of the Ideal and the real, is an obvious fact of experience. It has been the foundation and basis of all social and moral progress and evolution in individuals, as well as in communities and nations. It can be doubted, as aptly observes Bradley, if there is anything more real than the conflict of the Ideal and the real, in our moral consciousness. It is the voice of the Infinite indwelling in man, " the internal Guide and Ruler," which has, from age to age, inspired all true sages, seers and reformers to wage crusade against all shams and follies, sanctified by usage, and centuries' ignorance and superstition. And, in all morally social regeneration, it has always been the great regulator of "individual likes and dislikes," and the moulder of " the voice of the people." And, if all moral and social progress rests on this eternal rock, the sanctifying influence of this indwelling Supreme Will, it also constitutes the ultimate basis and foundation of religion, properly so-called. "There is an Infinite," says Victor Hugo, "outside of us. Is there not also an Infininte within us? There two Infinites (Fearful plural!)—Do they not rest super-posed, one upon another? Does not the Second Infinite underlie the First, as it were? Is it not the mirror, the reflection, the echo of the First—an Abyss concentric with another abyss.....To place, by process of thought, the Infinite below with the Infinite above, is Prayer." These lines, though somewhat clumsily expressed, contain, in a nut-shell, the whole of *philosophy* and religion. They express the clear recognition of the supreme mystery and significance of the human soul—a true and philosophic vision of man's relation with the Infinite—a true estimate of man's worth and dignity, and a true enunciation of prayer and worship. " For religion," to use Bradley's words, " If this one in-dwelling Spirit is removed, there are no spirits left " (*Essays on Truth and Reality*,

p. 435). To try to base religion on any other foundation, is, in fact, bound to end in confusion and ruin.

The immanence of God does, indeed, constitute the very foundation of religion. But, it, by no means, excludes the complementary doctrine of divine transcendence. The whole universe, according to the Vedānta, is the sanctuary of the Absolute; but the human soul is the holy of the holies, where a direct union and fellowship between the individual and the Universal, is at all possible. And, only after the Supreme Spirit has been thus experienced within, its presence can be properly realised in the universe as well. The Vedānta, accordingly declares (Muṇḍ. Up., II. 2, 5; II. 1, 10),—" Know that One Self, wherein the heavens, the earth, and the space, with all beings and minds, lie supported. Leave aside all other words...He, who knows Him, my dear, as immanent in the soul, breaks asunder the bonds of ignorance, even here on earth."

But does such a conception of religion leave any room for personal relationship with God? Bradley is not quite sure about it. " Banish all that is meant by the in-dwelling Spirit of God, in its harmony and discord with the finite soul," says he, " and what death and desolation has taken the place of living religion! But how this Spirit can be held consistently with the external individual Person, is a problem which has defied solution " (*Truth and Reality*, p. 437). The indwelling divine Spirit cannot, certainly, be represented as " the external individual Person," and, as soon as it is so represented, there must be an end of living religion, as Bradley aptly observed,—but still, the relationship with the in-dwelling Spirit can be conceived and experienced as a personal one. And, in the ecstasy of a conscious and living union of the finite spirit with the Infinite, Arjuna, as the Mahābhārata tells us, declares :—

"I know the sanctions of the law; yet I am not inclined to follow them;
I know the prohibitions of law, but am not disinclined against them;
Thou art my in-dwelling Guide and Inspirer; and I move whither thou leadest me!"

The well-known Chhāndogya passage "All this is Brahman. All this is evolved from, and sustained by, and is (at the end) re-absorbed in, the same. Being calm, mediate on it (Brahman) (*Sarvam khalvidam Brahma tajjalāniti, śānta upāsīta*). The Vedānta clearly holds religious consciousness as perfectly consistent with the Vedāntic conception of Brahman, its relation with the world of plurality. And the Upaniṣads are full of such utterances.

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, however, holds that there are various opposed and mutually irreconcilable currents of thoughts found existing side by side in the Upaniṣads, and is inclined to think that the Vedāntic conception of Brahman, rightly understood, hardly leaves any room for religion. "If we overlook the different shades in the development of the conception of Brahman in the Upaniṣads and look to the main currents," says he (*A History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 50), "we find the strongest current of thought which has found expression in the majority of the texts is this that the Ātman or the Brahman is the only reality and that besides this everything else is unreal. The other current of thought which is to be found in many of the texts is the pantheistic creed that identifies the Universe with the Ātman or the Brahman. The third current is that of theism which looks upon Brahman as the Lord controlling the World. It is because these ideas were still in the melting-pot in which none of them were systematically worked out,

that the later exponents of Vedānta, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and others quarrelled over the meaning of the texts in order to develop a consistent systematic Philosophy out of them."

Dr. Das Gupta's contention is evidently based on a misreading of the Upaniṣads. The so-called three opposed currents of thought mentioned above are not really opposed in character. They, on the contrary, form three inter-related elements of one comprehensive current, namely, the pantheism of the Vedānta. We find the same to be true both in the system of Hegel as well as of Lotze. To regard the aforesaid three currents of thought as mutually opposed in nature only betrays a complete misconception of the nature of pantheism. In fact, in the aforesaid Chhāndogya passage, as in several other places in the Upaniṣads all the three currents of thought exist side by side as integral parts of one comprehensive system of thought. The Vedāntic conception of Brahman is thus found to be perfectly consistent with the religious consciousness in man. Bādarāyaṇa also clearly supports our contention.

CHAPTER VII

The Ideal Life: Liberation in Life-time

"Nowhere do we find," says Prof. Max Müller, (*Three Lectures*, p. 13), "what we find in India, where philosophy is looked upon as the natural outcome of religion; nay, as its most precious flower and fragrance. Whether religion leads to philosophy, or philosophy to religion, in India, the two are inseparable, and they would never have been separated with us, if the fear of man had not been greater than the fear of God or of Truth." Although the above remark does not, unfortunately, apply to India as a whole, yet it most faithfully describes the position of the Vedānta. In the Vedānta, philosophy and religion, indeed, stand organically united together, a phenomenon really rare, if not unique, in the world. To be more accurate, religion and philosophy are interconnected in the Vedānta; and they are two different aspects of one and the same thing. "Verily, a husband is not dear," says Yājñavalkya, in the course of his parting dialogue with his wife (Bṛh., IV. 6, 6-7), "that you may love the husband; but that you may love the Self, a husband is dear. Verily, a wife is not dear, that you may love the wife; but the wife is dear, that you may love the Self. Verily, the sons are not dear, that you may love the sons; but the sons are dear, that you may love the Self. Verily, wealth is not dear, that you may love wealth; but wealth is dear, that you may love the Self. . . . Verily, all things are not dear, that you may love them, but they

are dear, that you may love the Self. The Self alone is to be seen, heard, and minded, and meditated upon. Verily, this Self being seen, heard, minded, and known, O Maitreyi, all these things are known." These parting words of Yājñavalkya contain, in a nut-shell, a clear representation of the Ideal Life, a Vedāntist is intended to aspire after. Liberation, the Vedānta tells us, consists in the vision of all things and beings, as the modes of the Supreme Spirit, and in conscious and living union with all resulting from such a vision. "He who sees all existents in the Self," accordingly declares the Īśa Up., 6-7, "and the Self in all existents, bears none any ill-will. When the seer sees all existents as the Self, the seer of such unity transcends all confusions and all sorrows." Now, it is evident, from the above, that the highest end of existence, according to the Vedānta, consists in the vision of the essential and organic unity and harmony of all things and beings in the Absolute—a vision, which alone enables one to transcend the flesh, and the desires and cravings of the individual life, and to realise one's organic unity with the rest of the world, and to live in perfect harmony, and be at one with the entire humanity. Liberation then implies freedom from the fetters of ignorance and desires resulting from it. Ignorance, on the contrary, consists in seeing things as existing apart from and independently of the Supreme Spirit, and in identifying the self with the body, and consequently in mean and selfish distinction between the self and others, arising from such false identification. In fact, the Vedānta recognises no other ignorance than this. And that is why it repeatedly asks us to see the Self in all existents and all existents in the Self. Such a vision alone can effectually eradicate and uproot all vanities and selfish desires and cravings, and enable the indi-

vidual to transcend his individuality and to identify himself with humanity at large. "By knowing the Self, as manifested in all things. . . and as one all-pervading Reality," accordingly says Śvet. Up., III. 7-8, "men become immortal. . . By knowing Him alone one overcomes death, there is no other road to liberation." Thus liberation implies seeing things in their true perspective, as members of an inter-related whole, and a complete self-identification with one's own fellow-beings, and a life of complete self-effacement and self-abnegation in the cause of truth, justice, and righteousness. And such a liberation, says the Vedānta, is not only possible in this life, but should, by all means, be attained while here. "Pity to the man," says Yājñavalkya, Bṛh. Up., IV. 4, 10, "who passes away from this world, O Gārgi, without knowing this imperishable Being (and attaining a conscious unity with all resulting from such knowledge); and he alone is a Brahmin, who knows this imperishable being before passing away from this world." Again, Kena Up., II. 5 most emphatically tells us, "If one knows Brahman while here, he attains the goal of his existence. If one fails to know Brahman while here great misery (destructive) befalls him." The same cry is repeated in Kaṭha Up., II. 3, 14 and in Muṇḍ. Up., II. 1, 10. "He who sees (knows) Brahman immanent in the self (as its ultimate ground and support)," says the Kaṭha passage, "overcomes the fetters of ignorance even here." There are utterances too clear to need any comment.

The meaning of liberations in the Vedānta.

Vedāntic liberation then, depends on genuine knowledge, a vision of things in their right perspectives. As inter-related members of one comprehensive system,—as modes of one eternally self-differentiating Spiritual Principle, manifested in the world of plurality and yet

transcending the same as its cause and moment-to-moment support. But true knowledge presupposes a previous course of self-discipline and self-restraint. The knowledge of the unity of things, must be genuine, deep, and whole-hearted, and not a mere intellectual assent. And hence, the supreme need of self-restraint and self-discipline. The Kaṭha Up., I. ii. 22-24, accordingly tells us, " One who has not yet abstained from evils, and is restless in mind, without self-restraint, cannot attain Brahman, the Self, even by knowledge. One who has, on the other hand, attained true culture, is quiet in disposition, self-controlled, and always pure at heart, attains Him (and liberation)." Self-discipline and self-conquest are then indispensable conditions of true knowledge, and therefore, of liberation. The means of self-discipline and self-culture, laid down in the Vedānta, are known, in the Vedāntic terminology, as the four-fold disciplines. And none but earnest, honest, and devoted enquirers and seekers after truth, who had passed through these disciplines, were admitted to the instructions on higher knowledge, *Brahma Vidyā;* for such alone were deemed capable of the knowledge of things in their true perspective, and of a life of complete self-effacement in the cause of humanity resulting from such knowledge. But, at the same time, the Vedānta enjoins on all alike to pass through the necessary disciplines, and to seek true knowledge and liberation.

Farquhar's misconception about Vedānta-liberation.

A class of writers have, however, held that morality has no place whatever in the Vedāntic scheme of liberation. In the Vedānta, says Rev. J. N. Farquhar, " emancipation is not conceived as being dependent on morality in any way. It arises altogether from knowledge " (*Crown of Hinduism*, 1913, p. 230). " Christianity sees the essence of man in will," likewise observes

Prof. Deussen, "Brāhmanism in knowledge; therefore, for the former, salvation consists in a transformation of the will, a new birth, whereby the old becomes the new man; for the latter, in a transformation of knowledge, in the dawning of consciousness, that one is not an individual, but Brahman, the totality of all Beings. In this respect, we think the Christian view the more profound, but, for that very reason, the more incomprehensible; for a transformation of the will (of that which is fundamental in us and in all being), is totally beyond our understanding" (*System of the Vedānta*, pp. 403-4). But what is knowledge according to the Vedānta, and how is it attainable? By knowledge, as we have seen, the Vedānta means spiritual insight, an awakening of the individual soul or consciousness to the fundamental unity of all existents, and a profound sense of solidarity with the world-whole resulting from such an awakening. And such a sense of unity, the Vedānta tells us, ultimately depends on perfect self-discipline, self-control, and purity of heart. "A strict moral discipline is laid on everybody," as Prof. Max Müller rightly observes, "before he is even allowed to approach the study of the Vedānta; and . . . all authorities teach that no one could possibly enter into its spirit, who has not previously subdued his passions and abominations of the human heart" (*Three Lectures on the Vedānta*, p. 163). Nothing could, indeed, be more preposterous than to say that the Vedāntic emancipation does not depend on morality. The fact is, rather, the reverse. Emancipation, according to the Vedānta, no doubt, depends on true knowledge, an awakening of consciousness and profound conviction of one's unity with the rest of the world through Brahman. But such knowledge, however, always presupposes complete self-control and purification of the

heart. And true knowledge in its turn, procures freedom from the yoke of all selfish desires, and perfect self-effacement, in the cause of humanity. Muṇḍ. Up., III most emphatically tells us that knowledge purifies the soul and then procures a vision of Brahman. In the very next passage the Muṇḍ. further tells us that the pure in heart alone can see Brahman. And the same cry is echoed and re-echoed from hundred different passages in the Upaniṣads. In fact in the Vedānta, we find, to use Prof. Max Müller's words, "*Ethics in the beginning, ethics in the middle, and ethics in the end*" (*ibid*, p. 190), and the mystery and incomprehensibility, Prof. Deussen finds in the Christian doctrine of the transformation of the will, as the essence of morality, in moral regeneration or re-birth, will forthwith vanish, if he tries to understand it, in the light of the above analysis of the Vedāntic scheme of salvation. A complete and lasting transformation of the will, and moral re-birth is possible through true knowledge, or spiritual awakening alone, —through a living sense of unity with humanity and there is no other road leading to a real moral regeneration.

Thus in the Vedāntic Scheme of liberation, true knowledge and morality are interdependent, and they go hand in hand. Rev. Farquhar further tells us that in the Vedānta, "Brahman is declared to be reality, consciousness, bliss, but he is never said to be righteousness or as being the source or centre of the moral order" (*ibid*, p. 227). Here fantasy has evidently been allowed to run riot! In hundreds of different connections, the Vedānta has described Brahman, the Self, as 'pure,' 'without blemish,' 'supremely holy,' 'the good,' 'pure and above all abominations,' 'spotless,' 'stainless,' and the Vedānta has moreover stated cate-

gorically that, to deserve union with Brahman, one must be pure and stainless as well.* This is not all. In the Vedānta, we occasionally even meet with prayers offered for divine guidance and inspiration. "Lead us," thus runs one of these passages (Bṛh. Up., I. 3, 28), "from untruth to truth, lead us from darkness to light, and lead us from death to life eternal." Again, the Upaniṣads, the Vedānta Sūtras and the Gītā abound in hundreds of passages, where the Supreme Self is conceived and represented as "One Guide and Controller of all the in-dwelling Soul of all." and as the "imperishable internal Ruler." The Chhān. Up., VIII. 4, 1, and the Bṛh. Up., IV. 4, 22, declare in one voice, "He is the bridge and the bond that preserves these worlds from falling into confusion and ruin." And this cry has been echoed and re-echoed in a hundred different ways, from the various Upaniṣads, the Gītā, and the Vedānta Sūtras (*cf.* Muṇḍ., I. 1, 6 and 7, II. 2, 1 and 5; Kaṭha, VI. 2, IV. 5 and 12, III. 12; Kena, II. 4, I. 1-8; Īśa, 5 and 6.

Liberation, then, according to the Vedānta, implies an awakening of the soul, the dawn of a true sense of its unity, as a mode of Brahman, with the cosmic whole, and the attainment of perfect freedom and emancipation from all selfish and mean desires and cravings resulting from it. "The fire of knowledge," says the Gītā (IV. 37), "burns all legalistic works." Lawful and unlawful actions (in their legalistic sense), both proceed, we are told, from egoistic motives, from desires for rewards, either here or hereafter. The sage, who has attained knowledge, and transcended his individuality, and is at

* *Cf.* Muṇḍ., II. 1, 2; II. 2, 7; Īśa, 8; Śvet., IV. 14 and 16; V. 15; VI. 19 and 21, etc., etc. Vedānta Sūtras, I. 1, 20-21; III. 2, 24-26, etc.

one with all, is, therefore, above them both (*cf.* Muṇḍ., III. 13). He lives and moves in the Self, for the good of the world, and moves whither the in-dwelling voice of the imperishable, internal Ruler leads him.

Śaṅkara's blunder.

Some thinkers are, however, of opinion—and Sankara, as we shall see clearly hereafter, belongs to this class—that liberation, according to the Vedānta, brings with it a sense of the complete identity of the Individual with Brahman, as well as of the unreality of the world of popular thought. But this view is not at all tenable. Vedāntic liberation consists in the vision of things and beings as inter-related modes or elements of a comprehensive system with Brahman as its cause and support, and in a sense of the individual's unity with the rest of the world-whole, resulting from such vision. And Ignorance, according to Vedānta, consists in assigning to the world of plurality an existence independently and outside of Brahman as well as in the identification of the 'self' with the body. All existents, the Vedānta tells us, are but the modes of Brahman, and live, move and have their being in it, and nothing exists independently and outside of Brahman. And liberation consists in such a knowledge or vision of things,—and not in the sense of their unreality,—and in the individual's sense of unity with the world of plurality through Brahman, and his complete self-effacement in the cause of truth and righteousness, resulting from such knowledge. The world of plurality is nowhere denied in the Vedānta. The existents are only denied positions outside and independently of the Ultimate Reality, Brahman. It is, therefore, a mistake to think that liberation, in the Vedāntic sense of the term, brings with it a sense of the complete identity of the individual himself with Brahman, and that of the unreality of the world of plurality. Bādarāyaṇa clearly

tells us that the world of plurality as modes of Brahman, possess essential similarity in nature with the ultimate cause that realises itself in and through them (*Tadananyatvam*, Ved. Sūt., II. 1, 14) and that yet it differs from them and is more than they (*Adhikaṁ tu bheda-nirdeśāt*, II. 1, 21). Evidently, then, there can be no question of the complete identification between Brahman on the one hand and the world of plurality or any member of this world on the other, nor of the unreality of the world of plurality in the Vedānta.

It is clear from above that the hypothesis of the complete identity between the individual and Brahman is nowhere advanced in the Vedānta, and is also philosophically untenable. The liberated sage is no doubt said to be united with Brahman. But this union only consists in the unity or oneness of will. It is in this sense that Jesus claimed his unity with the Father, and declared, "I and my Father in Heaven are one." Bādarāyaṇa, in his discriminating analysis of conduct, has also clearly told us that the hypothesis of the complete identity of the individual with the Universal Self is utterly untenable and that had the individual self been really infinite and all-comprehensive, there would have been absolutely no difference between man and man either in respect of their desires, "*Abhisandhyādiṣvapi caivam*" (Ved. Sūt., II. 3, 51), or in their acquisitions and enjoyments, "*Asantatescāvyatikaraḥ*" (Ved. Sūt., II, 3, 48). Bādarāyaṇa further tells us that 'to know the right' and 'to do the right' are not identical, and that it is a fact that men often know the right, but yet fail to act accordingly, this also proves, says he, that individuals are but finite and progressive beings, subject to various kinds of limitations, that they are only potentially infinite, but not identical with Brahman, in any sense of the term, "*Upalab-*

dhivadaniyamaḥ'' (Ved. Sūt., II, 3, 36). We are further told that the complete-identity hypothesis involves an inherent self-contradiction, and compels us to hold that individuals are both liberated and unliberated, omniscient and limited in knowledge, perfect and imperfect at the same time, which is utterly impossible (Ved. Sūt., II. 3, 31). Bādarāyaṇa has also most emphatically told us that even after death, the liberated sage is united with Brahman only '' in the enjoyment of desires '' (*Bhoga-mātra-sāmyalingāt ca*). The complete-identity hypothesis is therefore, out and out non-Vedāntic, and is at the same time philosophically indefensible.

It is true that the Vedānta has declared here and there that the knower of Brahman realises (becomes) Brahman, '' *Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati.*'' But this is only an ideal. As the individual advances in his acquisitions, he becomes more and more perfect. But perfection will always remain an ideal and can never be an accomplished fact.

CHAPTER VIII

The Future Life and the Vedanta

Hegel and Green on the Future Life.

A class of thinkers are disposed to treat the problem of the life to come rather lightly, and to think the question to be one of mere theoretical interest, if not, of idle curiosity. Hegel has said very little explicitly on the subject. But, in spite of his reticence and the paucity of his explicit utterances on the point, it seems clear, as Sterling, than whom, perhaps, there is no greater authority on Hegel observes, that " the whole tendency of the writings of Hegel supports belief in the immortality of the soul " (Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, p. 440). Dr. McTaggart is also of the same opinion. The finite spirit, with Hegel, is not anything apart from, or independent of, the Infinite. It is only an essential and necessary aspect or moment of the Infinite Spirit. And, as such, it has necessarily the mark of immortality stamped upon it. Very likely, therefore, Hegel was not, as Dr. McTaggart suggests, personally much interested in the problem. In his belief that, in the Absolute, man is eternal, he probably did not think it worth his while to devote much of his attention to the question of personal immortality. But both his *Logic* and his *Philosophy of Religion* contains utterances, which do hardly leave much doubt about Hegel's position. Here is one of his positive utterances on the point. Speaking of genuine freedom, he says, " Freedom itself, and reconciliation in worship or devotion, are, in the first instance, formal reconciliation and freedom : if the subject is to be adequate to its conception or notion, it is necessary

that its notion, that Absolute Spirit, be for it Object *as* Spirit, for only by bringing itself into relation with its Essence in that absolute content can the subjective spirit be free in itself. The truth is that it remains absolute for itself, and as infinite subjectivity has the consciousness that it has infinite worth for itself, or on its own account, and is the object of the infinite love of God " (*Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. I, p. 230). Now, what Hegel himself believed to be " the object of the infinite love of God," and of " infinite worth," could evidently be hardly conceived by him as perishable.

T. H. Green is, however, much more explicit in his utterances on the subject, although he too does not say anything positively. " The spiritual progress of mankind is," says he (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 195), " an unmeaning phrase, unless it means a progress of personal character and to personal character—a progress of which feeling, thinking and willing subjects, are the agents and sustainers, and of which each step is a fuller realisation of the capacities of such subjects. It is simply unthinkable, unless understood to be in the direction of more perfect form of personal life." " We may, in consequence, justify the supposition," he adds, " that the personal life, which historically or on earth is lived under conditions which thwart its development, is continued in a society, with which we have no means of communication through the senses, but which shares in, and carries further, every measure of perfection attained by men under the conditions of life that we know. Or we may content ourselves with saying that the personal self-conscious being, which comes from God, is for ever continued in God. Or we may pronounce the problem suggested by the constant spectacle of unfulfilled human promise to be simply insoluble. But, meanwhile, the negative assurance at any rate must remain, that a capa-

city, which is nothing except as personal, cannot be realised in any impersonal modes of being.'' He further states, '' Since it is only through its existence as our self-consciousness that we know anything of spirit at all, to hold that a spirit can exist except as a self-conscious subject, is self-contradictory '' (*ibid*, p. 194). These utterances are quite unmistakable in their significance.

Dr. McTaggart is quite right in treating Hegel's reticence on a problem of so vital interest to humanity, as a defect in his work. '' This is a question,'' as Dr. McTaggart rightly observes (*Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 6), '' which no philosophy can be justified in treating as insignificant.'' '' A philosopher may answer it affirmatively or negatively, or may deny his power of answering it at all. But, however he may deal with it, he is clearly wrong,'' adds he, '' if he treats the problem as unimportant. For it does not only make all the difference for the future, but it makes a profound difference for the present.....We can scarcely exaggerate the difference which will be made in our estimate of our place in the universe, and, consequently, in our ideals, our aspirations, our hopes, the whole of the emotional colouring of our lives.'' Prof. Bosanquet, however, is not, it seems, inclined to treat the question of personal immortality as of primary importance. '' It is the moulding and the greatness of souls,'' says he (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 26-27), '' that we really care for.....The destiny or conservation .....of particular centres is not what primarily has value.....What has value, is the contribution which the particular centre.....brings to the whole.....Its particularity.....is connected with its special contribution. But the value of the particular is indirect, and depends on what it helps to realise.'' But we are unable to accept the above criticism. The value

of the individual centre may, in a sense, no doubt be said to depend on, and to enhance with, his contribution to the whole. But his contribution to the whole itself, as Bosanquet himself admits, is always relative to his own greatness or perfection. In fact, the two are inseparable and yet the latter is logically prior; and the individual's contribution to the whole depends entirely on the measure of his own greatness. But the realisation of the latest greatness of the particular largely depends on a consciousness of its own ultimate nature and destiny, and the more acute the consciousness of personal existence after death, the greater the measure of self-realisation. The problem of the destiny of the individual can, therefore, under no circumstances be treated as insignificant. Nay, "our ultimate standard of worth is," to use Green's words (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 193), "an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in, a person. To speak of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind, except as relative to some greater worth of persons, is to use words without meaning."

Vedānta on Personal Immortality.

"The human mind is a germ," says Prof. Hobhouse (*Development and Purpose*, p. 371), "for whose maturity provision is already made." But the Vedānta declares, as did Kant, in a later age, that its maturity itself pre-supposes infinite time and personal immortality. "Every created thing will continue," says Lotze (*Met.*, Vol. II, p. 432), "if, and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world." The Vedānta regards the abrupt extinction of the bright promise, with the infinite possibilities contained in the germ, as unthinkable and utterly inconsistent with any rational view of the universe. Our ultimate ground of belief in the existence of things, of which there is no direct evidence, is

that the facts of experience become irrational and unintelligible without them. And our unshaken faith in the rationality of cosmos demands a continuance of personal life even after the dissolution of the body, to make the realisation of the hitherto unrealised potentialities of life and the conservation of moral progress already attained possible.

Although finite and limited, man is, Bādarāyaṇa tells us, "an individualised reflection or mode of the Infinite" ("*Ābhāsa eva ca,*" Ved. Sūt., II. 3, 49). And as such, though in a sense, he is non-different from the Infinite, and has no independent existence, apart from the Infinite; yet, as a finite expression of the Infinite, he differs from the Infinite, which is only partially manifested in its modes.* (*Aṁśo nānāvyapadeśādanyathā cāpi,* Ved. Sūt., II. 3, 42). As a limited expression of the Infinite Spirit, man is finite. But, as one with God, he is infinite. There is, therefore, a natural inclination in the finite spirit to seek the resolution of the contradiction involved in the very constitution of its being, and to be, in actuality, what it is in possibility. And this is what makes moral progress possible, and personal immortality a necessary assumption. Our life here is a training ground. On the dissolution of the organism, which here serves as the instrument of the spirit's activities, the individual spirit, the Vedānta holds, continues to exist, unfolding itself more and more, in a wider and larger sphere of existence, and attaining, further and further, the com-

* *Cf.* Vedānta Sūtras, for difference between the and the Infinite,—I.1, 17-18, 20-22; I.2, 12, 14, 19, 23-1, 5; I.3, 7-11, 16; II.1, 21-22; etc.

Non-difference,—I.4, 23-27; II.1, 14-18; etc.

Unity-in-difference—III.2, 11, 22; etc.

pletion of its being, in order to be in actuality what it is in potentiality. "As during our life-time," accordingly declares the Gītā, "we survive the decay of the infantile body, the body of the youth, and the mature body successively, and retain our individuality, so, after the decay of the old body, we shall survive, live, and retain our individuality, and continue to exist through eternity." The Gītā again says, in Chap. XIV. 26 "He (the liberated sage), having transcended all *guṇas* (virtues and limitations of the physical nature), is fit to become more and more like the Infinite Spirit (Brahman)" The Svet. Up., V. 9, likewise, as we have seen, declares, "Though finite, he (the individual) is bound for infinitude." The Ait. Up., II. 4, 6, in referring to the condition of the liberated sage, Vāmadeva, on his death, declares, in conclusion "He became immortal. He became immortal." Bādarāyaṇa, in closing his great work, similarly declares, that a sage, on the dissolution of the body, becomes immortal, "never to return thence; never to return thence!" (Ved. Sūt., IV. 4, 22.) These are significant utterances, and their import is unmistakable. "He, who has lived for truth and goodness, has built upon a rock that will not fail him, if there be a God, who governs and manifests Himself in the universe. He has become a part of the divine life, and he and his work must remain" (Edward Caird, *Lay Sermons*, p. 282). Referring to Vāmadeva, the Vedānta, has likewise, declared having known Brahman, he obtained all his desires in heaven (after his death) and became immortal, became immortal" ("*Amṛtaḥ samabhavat samabhavat*," it Up., III. 8). In Kena Up. (IV. 9) we meet with an cho of the same cry and are told that the knower of rahman "being free from all sins, attains his station the infinite and highest heaven, obtains his station here). ("*Pratitiṣṭhati pratitiṣṭhati.*")

Dr. Thibaut on the Vedāntic view of Final Liberation.

Dr. Thibaut however thinks that there are passages in the Upaniṣads, " in which the final, absolute identification of the individual soul with the Universal Self, is indicated in terms of unmistakable plainness. ' He who knows Brahman, becomes Brahman ;'.....' As the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, losing their name and form, thus, a wise man goes to the divine person.' And, if we look to the whole, to the prevailing spirit of the Upaniṣads, we may call the doctrine embodied in passages of the latter nature (*i.e.*, those mentioned here), the doctrine of the Upaniṣads. It is, moreover, supported by the frequently and clearly stated theory of the individual souls being merged in Brahman, in the state of deep, dreamless sleep " (*Vedānta Sūtras*, pp. cxxi-cxxii).

We shall briefly examine Dr. Thibaut's views here. There are, no doubt, isolated passages in the Upaniṣads, of the above description. But nothing can be inferred from such isolated expressions. Besides, analogies and illustrations used in the Vedānta must not, we are distinctly told, be taken literally. The few passages quoted by Dr. Thibaut, do not, therefore, prove anything. His references to the passages dealing with the state of the soul in deep sleep do not at all support his contention. Here is a typical illustration in point : " As a man, locked in the embrace of his beloved wife, knows nothing, external or internal, so does the individual, locked in the embrace of the Supreme Self," says the Brih. Up., IV.3, 21 and 22, " know nothing, external or internal (Here the state of a man in deep sleep and that of the liberated sage, are both described) : verily, he then sees nothing ; even, though seeing, he does not see. *The sight of the seer does not cease to exist, for that is imperishable ; but, because there is no duality to be seen, separate from the Self.*" As applied to the state of profound sleep, the

pression evidently implies, and refers to a state of momentary self-forgetfulness and ecstasy, on the part of the individual. "*Even though seeing he sees not,*" "*Even though smelling, he smells not,*" "*Even though knowing, he knows not.*" *These expressions can have only one meaning. They do not at all imply the extinction of the individuality, but simply, a state of complete self-enjoyment and self-absorption, and of consequent non-perception of duality* [*Viśeṣajñānābhāvavatvam,* as Śrīnivāsāchārjya, the disciple of Nimvārka (*vide* his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, IV. 4, 16) puts it]. And in this particular aphorism, Bādarāyaṇa has also taken it and similar other passages exactly in this sense. It, therefore, does not at all support Dr. Thibaut's contention. Again, in the Śvet. Up., I. 7, the knower of Brahman, even when alive, has been described as "merged in Brahman" ("*Linā Brahmaṇi* "). And it is quite evident, from this, and similar other expressions, found in various Upaniṣads, that the liberated sages even while alive, have been represented in the Vedānta as "merged in Brahman." And such passages do not evidently lend any support to the hypothesis of complete absorption. It is, therefore, clear that Dr. Thibaut's contention is not at all tenable. The passages we have quoted before clearly indicate the general drift of the Vedāntic position on this question; and they clearly support the doctrine of personal immortality. Bādarāyaṇa has also in several other connections, most emphatically supported our contention (*Vide* Ved. Sūt., IV, 4, 17 and 19-22).

Metempsychosis not truly Vedāntic

Is Metempsychosis an integral element of the Vedāntic metaphysics? We think, it is not so. On a critical perusal of the Vedānta, it becomes quite clear that the belief in metempsychosis has been countenanced in the Vedānta, simply because of its general prevalence in the land at the time. But, although this popular belief has

crept into the Vedāntic literature, yet it has only been tolerated in the Vedānta, in order to show the utter futility of legalistic works and piety for the attainment of liberation, and to impress on the minds of the people the supreme need of knowledge, for the aforesaid purpose. The Muṇḍ. Up., I. ii, 7-8, distinctly tells us,—" Those who value and esteem legalistic works and duties highly, move repeatedly between disease, decrepitude and death." Again, we are told (Kaṭha, IV. 2 and 4), " Shallow-minded fools seek temporal and perishable pleasures (through legalistic observance), and fall into the fetters of Death (referring to transmigration), spread all around. But the wise, knowing the Imperishable Being, do not long for anything ephemeral here..... By knowing that great and all-pervading Self, the wise man transcends all sorrows." The Vedānta abounds in similar other significant utterances, and it is impossible to misunderstand their import. The Vedāntic acceptance of the belief in transmigration, therefore, means hardly anything more than countenancing a popular belief in order to convince people of its utter vanity and futility, and of the supreme necessity of true knowledge, as a means to the attainment of self-realisation and freedom from fetters of selfish desires. There was, it appears, one other reason, that led to its entrance into the Vedāntic literature. The universe, according to the Vedānta, is the self-manifestation of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. But then, how to account for the presence of evils and sufferings in the world? The Vedāntists treated all evils as moral evils, and as due to human follies. They naturally thought that they found a clear and ready solution of the problem of Evil in the popular belief in Metempsychosis. As a man sows, so does he reap. " As a man acts," says the Brih., IV.4, 5, " as he conducts himself,

so does he become." Likewise says Bādarāyaṇa, II. 1, 33, " All differences and inequalities, evils and sufferings in the world are simply the effects of human works and follies, and are accordingly no reflection on Brahman, who is all good and all holy, and therefore above all evils." But how to account for their first appearance in the world? Here evidently the argument fails completely; and Bādarāyaṇa simply seeks an escape from the difficulty, and has only to say (II.1, 34), " But human actions are eternal." The solution is, evidently, too easy to be of any use; and a Vedāntist can safely dispense with it. Moral progress needs the presence of difficulties to be overcome, and of sufferings to be borne. Their presence is absolutely necessary in a world, where progress is the ultimate goal, and not pleasure. And, as necessary means to the up-building of character and attainment of moral perfection, which is the ultimate end of the cosmic order, they are perfectly in accord with the moral order of the universe. But yet, it seems clear that, had it not been for the apparent solution of the difficult problem, discovered in the popular belief in transmigration, and for the other reasons stated before, there would have been absolutely no room for it in the Vedāntic literature. The very fact, that many of the later authoritative Upaniṣads have made a clean sweep of it, is quite significant. The authors of those Upaniṣads certainly saw that it formed no part of the genuine Vedāntic metaphysics.

Metempsychosis philosophically untenable.

The doctrine of Karma is generally believed to contain a satisfactory solution of the existence of evils in the world, as well as of all perceptible differences between man and man. But does it really do so? Bādarāyaṇa tells us that the said evils and the differences have been in existence from all eternity because " human works are eternal " (II. 1, 34). But are human works really

eternal? No, not at all. Men appeared in the world in time, and before the appearance of man in the world, pain, sufferings, struggles, death and differences, we know from science, had existed in the animal and vegetable world. These evidently could not be due to man's work in any sense of the term. Hence the doctrine of Karma fails to account for the origin of evils in the world. In the well-known Gītā passage, "that those who have fallen from their *yoga* (in a previous birth) are born here in the house of the rich and the virtuous," contains in a nut-shell the supposed explanation of all differences and evils in the world. But is this position philosophically tenable? A moment's examination will show that it is not. Men who lived virtuous lives and practised, though unsuccessfully, *yoga*, we are told in the above passage, are reborn in wealthy families and that those who led sinful lives are reborn here amidst sufferings and poverty. But does not our experience give a direct lie to this supposition? Habits, good or bad, once formed die hard. The habits formed in the previous life, if there be any such, are, therefore, sure to accompany the individuals concerned in their present lives as well, in the form of Saṁskāras, predilections with their momentum more or less unaffected. But are any traces of good and healthy habits, supposed to have been formed in the previous life, visible in the majority of the youths born in aristocratic families? Is it not, on the contrary, a fact that they, as a rule, are more addicted to frivolous enjoyments and dissipation than those born under different circumstances? Statistics clearly show that the percentage of the good and noble-minded men coming from the middle and the poorer classes is much higher than that found among the aristocrats. If those born in aristocratic families lived better and nobler lives in the previous life, there should have been a continuity of the

same in the present life of the persons as well, and those who led sinful lives before should have, as a rule, continued to do the same here also. But the facts are found to be quite contrary, and render it utterly impossible for us to believe that those born in wealthy families led a much better life in their previous existence than those now born in poorer families. Again, the object of punishment is correction; and correction presupposes a memory of the misdeeds done before. But where is the memory of misdeeds or good deeds done in the previous life? Does a man born blind, for instance, remember why he has been punished with blindness from his very birth? Certainly not. And the hypothesis completely breaks down here. In the absence of a recollection of the evils committed before, no correction is possible. And as no such recollection exists in the sufferer, it is absurd to hold that his sufferings are meant as punishment for his misdeeds in his previous birth. Thus the doctrine of metempsychosis as based on work is philosophically entirely untenable. And it is equally clear from what has been stated before that this doctrine was tolerated in the older Upaniṣads, because of its general prevalence in the land in those days, and also partly because it seemed to offer an easy solution of the problem of evils. But rightly understood it should be regarded as forming no integral part of Vedānta metaphysics. And Bādarāyaṇa made a great mistake in not treating it as such.

CHAPTER IX

The Vedantic Maya and Avidya *versus* Sankara's Theory of Illusion.

The word, 'Māyā,' has frequently been used in the pre-Vedāntic Literature. But it has, as we shall see presently, nowhere been used in Śankara's sense of "illusion." In the Rig-Veda alone, the word, Māyā, occurs in scores of places in different forms (see Śāstri, *The Doctrine of Māyā*, 1911, pp. 6-9). But, in the majority of these instances, Sāyaṇa has, after Yāṣka, taken the word to mean 'wonderful mental power.' In some cases, as in III. 53, 8, it has been used to mean 'wonderful power of the will.' In a few cases, as in V. 30, 6, it simply means 'power.' In some cases, again, it has been used in the sense of 'deception,' or 'stratagem.' The word Māyā also occurs in the Atharva-Veda in several places. But here, in keeping with the context, it has invariably been used to mean magic, or mysterious power. In the Brāhmaṇas also, the word occurs here and there (Śatap. Brāh., III. 2, 4, 1; XIII. 5, 4, 12; XIV. 5, 5, 19; Tait., III. 10, 8, 2, etc.), and has generally been used in the sense of divine or supernatural powers. Thus, nowhere, in the pre-Upaniṣadic literature, the word Māyā has been used in Śankara's sense. In the authoritative Upaniṣads, the word Māyā occurs only once in the Brih. Up. (II. 5, 19), once in the Praśna (I. 16), and five times in the Śvet., (in three passages (I. 10; IV. 9-10). "That bright world of Brahman belongs to those," says the Praśna Up. passage, "who are free from insincerity, falsehood and hypocrisy

Māyā and Avidyā used in pre-Vedāntic Literature.

(māyā).'' In the Brih. passage, it simply means 'creative power.' The Śvet. passages have, however, been much misunderstood. Referring to Śvet. Up., IV. 10, says Prof. Max-Müller (*Ancient Sans. Lit.*, pp. 321-22), '' Māyā or Delusion is called the principle '' of creation, '' and the Great Lord Himself, the deluded.'' But this is a distinctly wrong interpretation of the passage. In all the Upaniṣadic passages, except the one in Praśna, just mentioned, the word 'māyā' has always been used to mean inscrutable divine creative power; and, in this passage also, it is used exactly in the same sense. The passage runs thus: *Māyāṁ-tuprakṛtim vidyāt—Māyinaṁ tu Maheśvaram.* Here Prakṛti or cosmos considered as an effect of the creative power of Brahman, is identified with 'Māyā,' as its cause and Maheśvara with the possessor of the creative power, *Māyin.* In Śvet. Up. (I. 3), as Mādhava has also pointed out, Brahman's own power of evolving, not sustaining the manifold of existents has clearly been described as the ultimate creative principle inscrutable of the world. Evidently, therefore, nowhere in the Upaniṣads, the word 'māyā' has been used in Śankara's sense of Illusion. Again, in Śvet. Up., IV. 9-10, as well as in several other passages, the reality of the manifold has been distinctly admitted, and described as the modes of Brahman's self-manifestation. Māyā also occurs in Śvet., I. 10, in the compound word, '*viśvamāyā-nivṛttiḥ*;' and it means simply the 'cessation of all bonds or selfish attachments,' *sarvapāśāpahāniḥ*, occurring in the very next passage. '' One Lord regulates both the world of matter and the world of mind,'' says the passage, and '' by meditation and concentration of mind on Him, and through the attainment of a sense of unity with Him, all bonds (of ignorance by selfish attachments) completely vanish in

Māyā as used in the Vedānta.

the end." Here, the reality of the plurality, with Brahman as their ultimate ground and support, is evidently most unequivocally admitted. It is, therefore, clearly wrong to take the term in the sense of "cessation of cosmic delusion," as understood by Śāstrī (*Doctrine of Māyā*, p. 17, note). Such an interpretation will, on the very face of it, render the passage utterly self-contradictory and meaningless. Thus, nowhere in the Upaniṣads also, the word, 'māyā,' has been used in Śaṅkara's sense.

'Avidyā' as used in the Vedānta.

The word, *Avidyā*, also occurs in several places in the Upaniṣads. "The indwelling Soul, the Puruṣa, . . . always dwells," says the Kaṭha, VI. 17, "*in the heart of all individuals*. He is to be calmly distinguished from the body, like the soft core of the *muñja* grass lying hidden in its hard cover, and thus that bright and immortal Being is to be known (as the self of the self)." In II. 13, of the same Upaniṣad, we are again told that the mortal, to attain immortality, must distinguish the self from the body, and know the indwelling Self (as the self of the self). The Śvet. Up., I. 8, likewise, tells us that man is fettered by desires for pleasure (arising from his identification of the self with the body), and that the knowledge of Brahman, and the attainment of a sense of the individual's essential unity with it, frees him from all entanglements. It is evident, from these and similar other passages, that the term 'Avidyā' has primarily been used to mean false identification of the self with the body, and the bondage of desires resulting from such identification. This 'Avidyā' also gives rise to longings for pleasures in the life to come, supposed to be attainable by legalistic piety and observances; and these longings have also been severely condemned in the Vedānta as due to Avidyā (*cf.* Mund., I. 2, 7-9). A super-

analysis shows, as we shall see hereafter, *that the word 'avidyā' has generally been used—in the Vedānta, to mean the non-recognition of the inner and organic unity of all existents in the Self.* But this is only ultimately due to the false identification of the self with the body, which is the root of all ignorance, or 'Avidyā.' The Vedāntic position in this respect is so clear and unmistakable, that even some of the later Vedāntic works have, in spite of self-contradictions, been compelled to recognise it. "*The God-made duality,*" *says Pañcadaśī, IV.* 31 *and* 47, "*is not an entanglement, but is, on the contrary, helpful to the attainment of knowledge and liberation: liberation in one's life-time is best attained through the renunciation of man-made differences* (differences between man and man) caused by the false identification of the self with the body, *jīvadvaita vivarjanāt.* And we shall see still more clearly hereafter that nowhere in the Vedānta the world of plurality has been denied, and the term, *Avidyā*, has been used in the sense of 'admission or non-denial of the world of plurality,' as it means in Śaṅkara's system.

Māyā and Avidyā in Śaṅkara's system.

But what do the terms Māyā on Avidyā mean in Śaṅkara's system? Here also Śaṅkara is self-contradictory. To take a few of his characteristic utterances. In dealing with Ved. Sūt., I. 4, 3, "*Tadadhīnatvādarthavat,*" Śaṅkara tells us. "some previous state of the world, such as the one assumed by us, must necessarily be admitted, since it is according to sense and reason. For, without it, the highest Lord could not be conceived as creator, as He could not become active, if He were destitute of the potentiality of action." "That causal potentiality is," adds he, "of the nature of Nescience (avidyā); it is rightly denoted by the term 'undeveloped'; it has the highest Lord for its substratum; it is of the

nature of an illusion (māyā) (Thibaut, *Ved. Sūt.*, Pt. I, p. 243). Here Saṅkara has at first clearly attributed creative power to Brahman and admitted the reality of the world of plurality. But later on he has tried to explain them away and has described the plurality as unreal appearances caused by Brahman. In dealing with Ved. Sūt., II. 1, 32 he again tells us, "We rather declare" (Ved. Sūtra, II. 1, 22), " that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is pure cognition and freedom, and which is . . . different from the embodied self, is the creative principle of the world. . . For the scriptural passages . . . show Brahman to be different from the individual soul, and, if it be objected that there are other passages declaratory of non-difference. . . and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist, because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar. Moveover, as soon as. . . the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at once. . . for the entire apparent world. . . is a mere illusion and does not exist at all. Here also the reality of the world of plurality is at first admitted. But subsequently it is represented as an illusion caused by ignorance due to the absence of the consciousness of non-difference between Brahman and the individual on the part of the latter" (Thibaut, *ibid*, Pt. I, p. 244). Saṅkara, again, tells us in connection with Ved. Sūtra, I. iii, 2, " The conception that the body and other things contained in the sphere of the not-self are our self, *i.e.*, false identification of the self with the body, constitutes Nescience; from it there spring desires with regard to whatever promotes the well-being of the body and so on, and aversions. . . fear and

confusion. . . All this constitutes an endless series of the most manifold evils, with which we are all acquainted." Thus Śaṅkara has used the word Avidyā in three different senses. Sometimes he has attributed Avidyā to Brahman, to mean Brahman's power of creating the illusion of plurality, like a juggler. He has again in several other places—and one of these has just been mentioned—attributed it to the 'unenlightened' individual, as he puts it, as veiling as he says, the Reality, and giving rise to the fictitious appearance of a world of plurality. He has again used 'Avidyā,' Ignorance, to signify the individual's false identification of the self with the body, and the consequent non-recognition of the essential unity of all existents with the Self. But the first two meanings are purely non-Vedāntic and it is only in its third sense that the term, Avidyā, has been used in the Vedānta. Śaṅkara has, however, generally used the term in either of the first two senses, which has led him to deny the reality of the world of plurality but the word Avidyā has, as we shall see more clearly hereafter, nowhere been used in the Vedānta in any of these senses.

Illusion Theory unknown among the old Teachers.

Bādarāyaṇa, in his difficult task of the presentation of Vedāntic Panentheism, has very wisely referred to the views of several other system-builders, already in the field, on some of the most important problems. On the problem of the relation between the individual and the universal for instance, Āśmarathya holds, Bādarāyaṇa tells us (Ved. Sūt., I. 4, 20-22), that the individual souls, regarded as effects or modes, are neither absolutely different nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, the Cause, and that they stand related to each other "like sparks to the fire." Audulomi, on the contrary, holds, says Bādarāyaṇa, that the finite soul is altogether different from Brahman, the Supreme Soul, owing to its limita-

tions or association with the *upādhis*, limiting adjuncts; but that, on final release, it is merged into the Universal Soul, and ceases to exist altogether. Kāśakritsna, however, finally upholds, and Bādarāyaṇa also endorses his view, that the soul, as a finite mode of the Infinite, is "absolutely non-different from Brahman (the Supreme Self)," which, in some way or other, presents itself (under the limitations of finitude and relativity) as the individual soul. Again, on the problem of the characteristics of the soul, after final liberation in the life to come, Audulomi, we are told (IV. iv. 5-7), holds that the liberated soul exists in the Supreme Self as pure consciousness or thought. Jaimini, on the contrary, thinks that the released soul continues to possess holiness and freedom from sins, and similar other exalted virtues. Bādarāyaṇa, however, combines the two views into a higher synthesis, as the true solution of the Vedānta.* Now, it is evident, from these references, that the ancient teachers often differed from one another, even on points of vital importance, and that they did not uncritically follow any external authority. The first of the above two cases, however, has a special bearing on the point at issue here. It clearly shows, as Dr. Thibaut aptly points out (*Vedānta Sūtras*, Pt. I, pp. xix-xx), that none of the recognised authorities, deemed worthy of being quoted in the Vedānta Sūtras, held Śaṅkara's view of the "absolute identity" of the individual with the Universal, on which his whole system rests. And this conclusively proves that Śaṅkara's interpretation of

* In these and connected passages, personal immo[illegible] most distinctly and emphatically upheld. To set a[illegible] whatever to the development of the finite mode of the [illegible] must be regarded as entirely arbitrary.

the Vedānta, based on his doctrine of Illusion or Māyā, was entirely unrecognised by (if not positively unknown to) the ancient teachers. In dealing with the Ved. Sūt. I. 4, 20, Bhāmati refers to the 'absolute identity' view, but dismisses it as absurd, with the remark that, if individual souls were identical with Brahman, and therefore omniscient, they would be indistinguishable from Brahman and from one another, and there would, further, remain no necessity for instruction (*cf.* Thibaut, *ibid*, pp. 277-278, note). This is quite a frank and plain presentation of the difficulties involved in the absolute identity view, and hardly needs any further comment. Bādarāyaṇa had also argued in a similar manner against the absolute identity hypothesis (*vide* Ved. Sūt., II. 3, 31, 48 and 51). The scholars have, however, been long divided as to whether the Illusion theory, in Śaṅkara's sense, forms a part of the original Vedānta or not. Colebrooke was evidently guilty of a palpable blunder, as has long been pointed out by Cowell and Gough, in maintaining, in his Essay on the Vedānta, that he saw nothing countenancing it (the Theory of Illusion) even "in the gloss of Śaṅkara" on the Vedānta Sūtras. A hasty perusal of portions of Śankara's commentary, particularly those that deal with the important problem of the non-difference of the cause and the effect, as well as those dealing with anti-Vedāntic schools, is, no doubt, apt to leave such an impression in the mind of the reader, but the Illusion theory looms too large in Śaṅkara's Commentary to escape one's notice. And, although Mr. Gough's statement, that one is sure to find "the tenet of Illusion theory stated or supposed on every page," in Śankara's Commentary, is not correct, yet "it is hard to understand how Colebrooke could have made such a mistake" (*Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 239). Such

Orientalists on Śaṅkara's Illusion theory.

a mistake in Colebrooke's time may, however, be excusable. But Mr. Gough, in his defence of Saṅkara, has gone to the other extreme, and been, as we shall see presently, guilty of an opposite blunder, in holding that "the sole reality of the impersonal Self is the very cosmic conception of the Upaniṣads," and that "the doctrine denoted by the term Māyā (Illusion), if not the term itself, is to be found in the Sūtras" (*ibid*, pp. 238-39). "The tenet of Māyā," adds he, after a slipshod examination of some isolated passages severed from their context, "is thus no modern invention. The thought, if not the word, is everywhere present in the Upaniṣads, as an inseparable element of the philosophy, and the word itself is of no infrequent occurrence. The doctrine is more than implicit in the Upaniṣads, and explicit in the systematised Vedānta. No earlier Vedānta, such as Colebrooke supposes, could have been complete and consistent without this element, and it is no graft of a later growth. In fact, the distinction between an earlier and a later Vedānta is nugatory. There has been no addition to the system from without, but only a development from within; no graft, but only growth" (*ibid*, p. 248).

M. Paul Rignaud has, in his Materiaux, taken a position intermediate between these extreme views. "The doctrine of Māyā," says he, "although implied in the teachings of the Upaniṣads, would hardly become clear and explicit before the system had reached a stage of development necessitating a choice between admitting two co-existent eternal principles (which became the basis of the Sāṁkhya Philosophy), and accepting the predominance of the intellectual principle, which, in the end, necessarily led to the negation of the opposite principle" (Thibaut, *Vedānta Sūtras*, Pt. I, pp. cxvi-cxvii).

Dr. Thibaut has, however, in his valuable Introduction to his *Translation of the Vedanta Sūtras*, very rightly maintained that neither the older Upaniṣads nor the Vedānta Sūtras, do "hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world," and "the absolute identity of the individual with the highest Self;" nor do they "set forth the distinction of a higher and a lower knowledge of Brahman," as necessarily implied in Śaṅkara's Illusion theory; and based on a corresponding "distinction of Brahman and Iśvara (God) in Śaṅkara's sense." "Brahman is indeed sometimes described," adds he, "as *saguṇa* (differentiated), and sometimes as *nirguṇa* (above all differentiations), to use later terms; but it is nowhere said that thereon rests a distinction of two different kinds of knowledge, leading to altogether different results. The knowledge of Brahman is one, under whatever aspects it is viewed; hence, the circumstance that in the same Vidyās (Instructions or Disciplines) it is spoken of as *saguṇa* (differentiated) as well as *nirguṇa* (above all differentiations)" (*ibid*, pp. cxv-cxvi). Dr. Thibaut's critical examination of this problem, in the first part of the Introduction of his work, has been a really valuable contribution to the Vedāntic literature. In this part of the Introduction, he has thrown a considerable light on the Vedāntic view of Reality. From a careful perusal of this part of his work, it seems impossible, as observes Colonel Jacob (*Vedānta-Sāra* by Sadānanda, Jacob's Ed., p. iv), "to resist the conclusion at which he arrives, namely, that the old Upaniṣads and the Sūtras do not propound it (the Illusion theory), that is to say, they do not set forth the distinction of a higher and a lower knowledge of Brahman (as implied in the Illusion theory), they do not acknowledge the distinction of Brahman and Iśvara (God), in Śaṅkara's

sense; they do not hold the doctrine of the unreality of the world; they do not, with Śankara, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual and the highest Self."

Contradictory utterances of Thibaut and Jacob, and Max Müller.

These are undoubtedly clear and most emphatic admissions. In these utterances, it is most clearly asserted that the Illusion theory is distinctly non-Vedāntic. But Dr. Thibaut has, suddenly, at the end almost wholly abandoned his entire position and has flatly contradicted himself. "We may admit," says Dr. Thibaut, in dealing with Mr. Gough's views in the latter part of his Introduction, "that some passages (of the Upaniṣads), notably of the Bṛh., contain, at any rate, the germ of the later developed Māyā doctrine, and thus render it quite intelligible that a system like Śankara's should evolve itself, amongst others, out of the Upaniṣads; but that affords no valid reason for interpreting Māyā into the other texts which give a very satisfactory sense without that doctrine.....or are even repugnant to it.....But *what I object to is that conclusions drawn from a few passages of, after all, doubtful import, should be employed for introducing the Māyā doctrine into other passages which do not even hint at it, and are fully intelligible without it*" (*ibid*, pp. cxvii, cxxi). This is to be sure, a very emphatic denial of Śankara's position. But unfortunately Dr. Thibaut, does not stop here. The above emphatic denial is, to our infinite surprise, followed by a most startling statement! "*It has been said before*," he here tells us, "*that the task of reducing the teaching of the whole of the Upaniṣads to a system consistent and free from contradictions is an intrinsically impossible one. But, the task once being given, we are quite ready to admit that Śankara's system is most probably the best which can be devised.* While unable to allow that the Upaniṣads recognise.....the distinction of a lower and higher Brahman, we yet ac-

knowledge that the adoption of that distinction furnishes the interpreter with an instrument of extraordinary power for reducing to an orderly whole the heterogeneous material presented by the old theosophic treatises. This becomes very manifest, as soon as we compare Śankara's system with that of Rāmānuja. The latter recognises only one Brahman.....a personal God, and he therefore lays stress on all those passages in the Upaniṣads which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal God, such as omniscience and omnipotence. Those passages, on the other hand, whose decided tendency it is to represent Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferentiated mass of impersonal intelligence, Rāmānuja is unable to accept frankly and fairly, and has to misinterpret them more or less, to make them fall in with his system. The same remark holds good with regard to those texts which represent the individual soul as finally identifying itself with Brahman...Śankara, on the other hand, by skilfully ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine, somehow manages to find room for whatever the Upaniṣads have to say. *Where the text speaks of Brahman, as transcending all attributes, the highest doctrine is set forth. Where Brahman is called the all-knowing ruler of the world, the author means to propound the lower knowledge of the Lord alone...Śankara's method thus enables him, in a certain way, to do justice to different stages of historical development.*.....It is not only more pliable, more capable of amalgamating heterogeneous material than the other system, *but its fundamental doctrines are manifestly in greater harmony with the essential teaching of the Upaniṣads, than those of the other Vedāntic system.* Above we were unable to allow that the distinction made by Śaṅkara between Brahman and Īśvara (God) is known to the Upaniṣads; but we must now admit that, if, for

the purpose of determining the nature of the highest being, a choice has to be made between those texts which represent Brahman as *nirguṇa* (above all differentiations), and those which ascribe to it personal attributes, Śankara is right in giving preference to the texts of the former kin...*The older Upaniṣads, at any rate, lay very little stress upon personal attributes of their highest being, and Śankara is right in so far as he assigns to his hypostatised personal Īśvara a lower place than to his Absolute Brahman*...And, although the Māyā doctrine cannot, in my opinion, be said to form part of the Upaniṣads, it cannot yet be asserted to contradict it openly...And I fully agree with Mr. Gough when he says regarding it that there have been no additions to the system from without, but only a development from within: no graft, but only growth. Deepening speculation on Brahman tended to the notion of Advaita (unity) being taken in a more and more strict sense, as implying not only the exclusion of any second principle external to Brahman, but also the absence of any elements of duality or plurality in the nature of the one universal being itself; a tendency agreeing with the spirit of a set of texts from the Upaniṣads. And, as the fact of the appearance of a manifold world cannot be denied, the only way open to thoroughly consistent speculation was to deny, at any rate, its reality, and to call it a mere illusion, due to an unreal principle with which Brahman is indeed associated, but which is unable to break the unity of Brahman's nature, just on account of its own unreality" (*ibid*, pp. cxxii-cxxv). This is a most astounding statement! And more so, as coming from one who had arrived at quite an opposite conclusion at an earlier part of the same Introduction. Colonel Jacob has also been guilty of a similar inconsistency. "There are, however," likewise observes he, "a few passages (in the Upaniṣads)

of which the Māyā-Vāda (Illusion theory) may be a development; and it may also be admitted that, if the *impossible task of reconciling the contradictions of the Upaniṣads, and reducing them to a harmonious and consistent whole, is to be attempted at all, Śankara's system is about the only one that could do it. But more than this it would seem impossible to concede*" (*ibid*, p. iv). Colonel Jacob is, no doubt, guarded in his expressions; and the concession he here makes in favour of Śankara appears to have been made rather with reluctance. But that makes little difference. Prof. Max Müller has also, in his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, after a good deal of vacillation, at last ended with an echo of the same cry. "If these conflicting utterances of the Upaniṣads had to be reduced to a system, we can," observes he (p. 251), while referring to Dr. Thibaut's work, "hardly blame Śankara for his taking refuge in the theory of a higher and a lower Brahman (based on the theory of Illusion)."

The so-called contradictions; and their reconciliation in Panentheism and not in Illusion theory.

But what are those contradictions in the Upaniṣads, which are alleged as capable of being solved by Śankara's Illusion theory alone? These passages have been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut himself in his Introduction, and had beautifully been reconciled by him, without the help of any such artificial and spurious prop as the theory of Illusion affords. There are passages in the Upaniṣads, he tells us in this connection, "which ascribe to Brahman the attributes of a personal God," existing side by side with passages "whose decided tendency is to represent Brahman as transcending all qualities, as one undifferentiated mass of impersonal intelligence." But do these passages at all involve any real contradictions? Is it at all necessary to invoke the theory of Illusion to solve their seeming contradiction? No, not at all, Brahman, as an eternally self-differentia-

ting spiritual principle, has been represented throughout in the Vedānta both as manifested in the world of plurality, and yet as their ultimate ground and support as exhausted in its modes and, as transcending them all. Thus, Brahman, the absolute is both differentiated, and yet, as the ultimate ground and support of all its differentiations, transcends them all, and is thus above all differentiations. And this was also clearly seen by Dr. Thibaut himself in an earlier part of his work. Although Brahman has been described, both as having qualities, and as transcending all qualities, it is, he tells us here (pp. cxv-cxvi.), *nothing but* " *one and the same entity*," *viewed* " *from two* (*different*) *aspects*...When the mind of the writer dwells on the fact that Brahman is that from which all the world originated, and in which it rests, he actually applies to it distinctive attributes, pointing at its relation to the world; Brahman is then called the Self and life of all, the inward Ruler, the omniscient Lord, and so on. When, on the other hand, the author follows out the idea that Brahman may be viewed in itself as the mysterious Reality of which the whole expanse of the world is only an outward manifestation, then it strikes him that no idea or term derived from sensible experience can rightly be applied to it, and that nothing more can be predicated of it than that it is neither this nor that."

But it is necessary to point out, at the very outset, that " Neither this nor that," is a gross mis-interpretation of the expression " *neti neti*," referred to in the concluding lines of the extract and occurring in Bṛh. Up., II. 3, 6, and in many similar passages. The expression means " Not these (alone) not these (alone)." " *It is not that there is nothing beyond these* (*na hi etasmāditi neti*) as Yājñavalkya himself tells us, " *there is an existence beyond these as*

well (anyat param asti); and that is why it (Brahman) is known as the Real of the reals (atha nāmadheyaṁ satyasya satyam iti)." The passage in question is one of the best and clearest expressing an exact exposition of the Vedāntic Panentheism. It opens with a statement that "The visible and the invisible, the movable and the immovable...the conscious and the unconscious...are *two modes of Brahman (dve bhāva Brahmano rūpe)*;" and then we are told, "Brahman is not these alone, not these alone; it is not that there is nothing beyond these. There is an existence beyond these also." But, in spite of the misinterpretation of the passage in question, Dr. Thibaut is quite correct when he says that the two above representations of Brahman are "*only two aspects of the cognition of one and the same reality.*" (The italics are ours.) Where then are the supposed "irreconcilable contradictions," in the Vedānta to reconcile which Śankara's Illusion theory must be invoked? Their only reconciliation lies in the solution suggested by Dr. Thibaut himself in the above lines, namely, in the Vedāntic doctrine of Panentheism, and not in the spurious theory of Illusion. Bādarāyaṇa has also distinctly told us that everywhere in the Vedānta Brahman has been represented both as manifested in the world of plurality and yet as transcending the same (*parasya ubhayalingaṁ sarvatra hi*). And thus understood, the supported contradiction in the Vedāntic passages in question vanishes completely. *Śankara's so-called reconciliation consists in the complete and wholesale rejection of one set of passages, namely, those that describe the Reality as manifested in the world of plurality, and in the consequent transformation of Vedāntic Panentheism into Eleatic Unqualified Monism.* And yet we are told that the seeming opposition between the two sets of passages referred to above

can only be reconciled by Śankara's theory of Illusion, and the consequent denial of the world of plurality. *This is not reconciliation at all, it is nothing but the rejection of the Vedānta.*

Śaṅkara's own admissions.

Now, to turn to Śankara himself. Śankara has frankly admitted in scores of places that the Vedānta has, in hundreds of passages, represented Brahman, the Supreme Self, as a principle of Unity-in-difference. "Brahman (the Self) is surely represented (in the Vedānta) in two forms," says Śankara himself in his Commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras, I. 1, 11, "namely, as manifested in the finite modes of 'names and forms,' and also as lying beyond them, and (thus free) above all specifications...Thus, *in a thousand ways (Vedānta) passages represent the double aspects of Brahman's being.*" "*There are many Śrutis (Vedānta passages),*" *Śankara again tells us, in connection with Ved. Sūt.*, III. 2, 11, "*indicative of Brahman's two-fold aspects (santi ubhayalingāḥ śrutayaḥ).*" "*Brahmaviṣayaḥ.*" In scores of other places, Śankara has repeated the same admission. *He is, however, unable to see how to reconcile such passages, and frankly proposes to explain away, or, if necessary, even to reject one set of passages altogether. And this is what he has actually done in his so-called reconciliation.*

Śaṅkara's so-called reconciliation.

We shall briefly examine here two typical instances of Śankara's so-called reconciliation of the seeming contradictions in Vedānta passages referred to above. The Ved. Sūt., III. 2, 11, is one of the most characteristic Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa. It runs thus:—"*No (wrong), even if (Brahman is described as) related to (limited) space, (as indwelling in all its modes), for, verily, Brahman's unity in spite of differentiations (ubhayalingam) is (stated) everywhere.*" Now, "there are Śrutis (Vedānta passages)," says Śankara, in dealing

with this aphorism, as already noticed " indicative of the two-fold aspects of Brahman's nature, ' All-active, All-desiring, etc.' describing Brahman as having qualities; again, ' neither large nor small, etc.' describing it as without qualities. From such Śrutis, are we to infer Brahman, as a principle of Unity-in-difference (as having both the aspects), or merely as having one aspect? And, if merely as having one aspect, should we infer it as qualified or unqualified? *If it is argued that, since both the aspects are assigned, Brahman should be understood as having them both; we say, in reply, ' Not so,—Brahman cannot have both the aspects.' One thing cannot be differentiated and yet otherwise (i.e., exist as transcending all differentiations) on account of self-contradiction (involved in such an admission).....Even by reason of the limitations pertaining to the modes, one thing cannot be something and its opposite...Hence, if Brahman is to be understood as having only one aspect, it must be understood as without specifications and unqualified and not otherwise; for everywhere, in passages dealing with Brahman's ultimate nature, Brahman is described as beyond all specifications.*" (Thibaut's translation, *Vedānta Sūtras*, Pt. II, pp. 152-53). But is this reconciliation? Is it not, on the contrary, a frank and clear rejection of one set of passages altogether? Again in dealing with V. 1,1, having first repeated his admission that there are innumerable passages in the Vedānta describing Brahman as a principle of unity-in-duality Śankara most frankly confesses his inability to understand how one and the same Reality could be both differentiated and yet exist as transcending all differentiations,—how Brahman could be conceived as manifested in the world of plurality, and yet as above all differentiations. " *But is it not a fact, it may be urged*

against us,'' says Śankara here, '' that there are many analogical arguments (in the Vedānta), such as the sea and its waves, and the like, (introduced) to illustrate the two-fold aspects of Brahman. And, if so, what makes you say, that it is self-contradictory for one and the same thing to have unity-in-difference? But we answer, this can be true of other things. We do hold unity-in-difference to be self-contradictory when applied to an eternally formless object, but not so, when applied to material objects. And hence, (by reason) of contradiction between Śruti (the revealed Scripture), smṛti (the law-book) and logic, such a hypothesis is inconceivable. Rather far better to discard the Upaniṣads than to accept such a hypothesis (asyāḥ kalpanāyāḥ varamupaniṣad-parityāga eva).'' This is, indeed, a most frank confession! But unfortunately, Śankara has not stopped here. If he did so, there would have been an end of all confusions on the subject. But, instead of adhering to his confession of inability to understand the significance of passages describing the two-fold aspects of the Reality, and leaving them to take care of themselves, he has made most frantic efforts, in vain, to explain away the passages describing the Reality as differentiated, and to make his triangular hypothesis of Illusion fit into the round hole of Vedāntic Panentheism, regardless of flagrant self-contradictions and inconsistencies, resulting from such attempts. *In the concluding part of the above extract, he frankly declares his readiness rather to discard the Vedānta than to accept the statement that the Reality, the absolute, can be both differentiated and yet be above all differentiations, both as manifested in its modes, and yet as unexhausted in them, and therefore transcending them. It is therefore no wonder if Śankara has made frantic efforts and tried all possible dodges to get rid of one set of passages, and has at last*

been forced to evolve his theory of illusion to accomplish this impossible task. And this is Śankara's so-called reconciliation of the seeming contradictions in the Vedānta!

Śaṅkara's contradictory admissions.

We would have understood Śankara, in spite of all differences of views, if he consistently adhered to one particular position. But has he done so? He must be a very bold man who can say, 'Yes.' We shall consider three typical instances here. "It may be argued," says Śankara, in dealing with Ved. Sūt., II. 1, 24, *Kṣīravaddhi* "that the statement that intelligent Brahman, who is One without a second is the cause of the world, cannot be accepted, on account of the absence of necessary means and materials...*But there is nothing wrong in that. It so happens, like milk (transforming into curd), by reason of its inherent characteristics. In the world, milk or water is, by nature, modified into curd or ice, independently of all external means. One Brahman does likewise modify itself (into the world of plurality), by reason of its inscrutable powers.*" Again in dealing with Ved. Sūt., IV. 4, 19 (*Vikārāvarti cha tathāhi sthitimāha*), (Brahman is also above all its modes), Śankara is still more explicit in his self-contradiction, and has frankly accepted the Vedāntic view of Reality. "*The ever-free divine essence,*" *says he here,* "*is also above all its transformations, and not merely revealed in its manifestations in the solar orb and the like. The Vedānta accordingly refers to his (God's) two-fold existence (tathā hi asya dvirūpām sthitimāha āmnāyāḥ),* 'all existents are the manifestations of this Being,'...' all existents are (only) its part (partial manifestation)...and the like.' " (*Cf.* Thibaut, *ibid,* Pt. II, p. 417.) The utter helplessness and inconsistency of Śankara's position is quite evident here! We shall consider one more instance of this kind, and this will be our last. "In

some passages (of the Vedānta),'' Śankara again tells us, in connection with Ved. Sūt., II. 2, 27 *Ubhayavyapadeśāt tu ahikuṇḍalavat* '' *the distinction between the individual self and Brahman is referred to;* ' then (the individual) absorbed in meditation sees the Holy Being :' here the distinction is one of the Sustainer and the sustained, as well as of the seer and the seen;...' He who, immanent in them all, regulates all existents :' here the distinction is one of the regulator and the regulated. *In some passages, again, their non-separation is indicated;* ' That thou art,' ' This thy soul is immanent in all '...*Thus, both distinction and non-separation having been indicated (in the Vedānta), if non-separation alone be taken as ultimate, the relation of distinction will be off its support. Hence, to indicate both the aspects of the Reality, the relation between the highest Self and the individual soul has been described as analogous to that of the snake and its coils. Viewed as a whole, the snake is one, non-different; while an element of difference appears, if we view it with regard to its coils, hood, erect posture, and so on* '' (*Evam Ubhayavyapadeśe sati yadi abheda eva ekāntaḥ parigṛhyeta, bhedo vyapadeśo niravalamvana eva syāt. Ata ubhayavyapadeśa darśanāt ahikuṇḍalavat atra tattvam bhavitum arhati*). (*Cf.* Thibaut, *ibid*, Pt. II, pp. 173-4). This admission is also quite significant. *These are only three of innumerable instances of flagrant self-contradiction, scattered all over Śankara's commentaries. In every one of those extracts Brahman has been described as a principle of Unity-in-difference—a view which Śankara has flatly rejected in several other connections. And yet, we are told that Śankara's is the only position in keeping with* '' *consistent speculation,*'' *and adequate to satisfy the demands of* '' *deepening speculation.*''

Does Vedānta deny plurality anywhere?

But are there passages in the Upaniṣads which really contradict Vedāntic Panentheism, and deny the reality of plurality, as finite modes of the Infinite? Śankara thinks there are such passages. We shall examine here briefly three of the most important passages mentioned by him under this head, namely, Kaṭha, IV. 10, Chhān., VI. 1, 4; and VI. 12, 3, Śankara has, as we shall see presently, completely misunderstood the significance of these passages; and they lend absolutely no support to Śankara's position. They, on the contrary, teach nothing but pure and unadulterated Panentheism.

To take the Kaṭha passage first. That "fr m which the sun rises," says Kaṭha, IV. 9-12, "and in which it sets, therein lie supported all the gods, and none transcends it: this is that Self. That, which is here (in this body), is also there (in the universe without), that, which is there, is also here. *From death to death goes he, who sees plurality here (existing independently of, and distinct from Brahman). This is to be borne in mind, that there are no plurality here. From death to death goes he, who sees plurality here. Puruṣa (the Supreme Self).....dwells in this body. He is the Lord and Guide of the past and the future. By knowing him, one bears none ill-will. This is that Self.*" Soon after it adds (Kaṭha, V.2), "That Self is the sun in the firmament; it is the air in the middle space; it is the fire on the earth as its altar; it is the guest in the house; it dwells in man; it dwells in the gods.....it is born in the waters, as aquatic animals; it is born on the earth as barley, rice, and every other plant.....it is born on mountains in the form of rivers. It is the Real, the Infinite." In these lines, we have evidently a most glowing picture of the Vedāntic conception of the Reality, as an eternally self-differentiating spiritual principle. The reality of the plurality of existents is most unequivocal-

ly admitted here, and described as finite modes of the self-manifestation of the Infinite, living, moving, and having their being in it, and, as having no existence apart from and independently of it, whose modes they are, and who, as the Self of their selves, is immanent in them all, and yet sustains them all in its all-embracing unity as their ultimate ground and support. In fact, *What is denied here, is not the existence of the plurality as finite modes of the Infinite, but their existence independently of and apart from Brahman.* But such a denial of plurality does not help Śankara even in the least. It, on the contrary, most emphatically establishes the conclusion Śankara seeks to evade. That this is the real meaning of the Vedāntic denial of the plurality, has also been frankly admitted by Śankara himself in scores of places. In dealing with Sūt. II.1, 14, *Tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ,* for instance, he tells us, "The effect is this manifold world.....and the cause is the highest Brahman. Of the effect, it is understood that, in reality, it is non-different from the cause. How so? ' On account of the scriptural word " origin " and " others ".....This parallel instance (' By one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known etc.' Chhān. VI.1, 4) is given with reference to Brahman; applying the phrase, ' having its origin in speech to the case illustrated in the instance quoted, we understand that *the entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.*" Now, it is most amusing to note here that this very passage is one of Śankara's so-called most invulnerable points in support of the supposed Vedāntic denial of plurality. Here evidently Śankara forgot to interpret it in that sense. But, after this clear admission, Śankara seeks to run away from it. He is, however, obliged to repeat the admission immediately after. " *So this manifold world,*" *adds he now,* " *with its objects of enjoyment and enjoy-*

ers, and so on, has no existence apart from Brahman..... If the doctrine of the *independent existence* of the individual soul has to be set aside, then the opinion of the entire phenomenal world.....having *an independent existence*, is likewise to be set aside.....*Scriptural passages* also (*such as ' When the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' Bṛh. Up., II. 4, 13*) *declare that, for him who sees that everything has its self in Brahman, the whole phenomenal world with its actions, agents, and fruits of actions, is non-existent* '' (Thibaut, *ibid*, Pt. I, pp. 320-23). Here, in the last sentence, Śankara evidently quibbles on the word ' *non-existent*,' and seeks to run away from his previous admission. '' The effect must be viewed,'' he again tells us, under Ved. Sūt., II. 1, 7, '' as ' existent,' and through the self of the cause, before its origination, as well as after it ; for, *at the present moment also, this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause ; according to such scriptural passages as, ' Whoever looks for everything elsewhere than in the Self, is abandoned by everything* (*Bṛh. Up., II. 4, 6*)' '*Bhūtāni taṁ parāduḥ yo' anyatra ātmano bhutāni veda, sarvaṁtaṁ parādādyo' anyatra ātmanaḥ sarvaṁ veda...idaṁ Brahma idaṁ kṣtaraṁ ime lokā ime devā imāni bhūtāni idaṁ sarvaṁ yadayamātmā*)...The effect, with all its qualities does not exist without the self of the cause, either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect)'' (Thibaut, *ibid*, Pt. I, p. 309). All those are most unequivocal admissions of Vedāntic Panentheism, and involve a complete abandonment of the Illusion theory.

Now, to pass on to the next two passages in the dialogue between Uddālaka and his son, Śvetaketu, already briefly noticed by us before. Both in elegance of diction and depth of penetration, this dialogue is one of the best pieces in the entire Vedāntic literature ; and it

teaches nothing but pure and unadulterated Panentheism, as we shall see presently. Here is an extract from this long and interesting dialogue. Uddālaka said to his son on the latter's return from his preceptor's house at the termination of his pupilage, " Śvetaketu, as you are so conceited, considering yourself well-read, and so stubborn, have you, my dear son, ever asked for that instruction by which we hear all what is not heard.....we perceive all what is not perceived.....we know all what is not known?' ' What is that instruction, Sir?' asked he. The father replied : ' My dear son, as by one clod of clay, all that is made of clay is known, the modifications signified by the names, having only come into being with the words (signifying them), and the truth being that all is clay ; and, as, my dear son, by one nugget of gold, all that is made of gold is known, the modifications, signified by the names, having only come into being with the words (signifying them) and the truth being that all is gold.....Thus, my dear son, is that instruction '.....' In the beginning, my dear son, there was that only which is, one only without a second. Some say, in the beginning, there was that only which is not (void only), one (Void) only without a second ; and from that which is not, (Void), that which is, was born.' ' But how could it be so, my dear son?' the father continued. ' How could that which is, be born of that which is not? No ; my dear son, only that which is, was in the beginning, one only without a second.....*Yes, all these existents, my dear son, have their root in the Reality* (*Sanmūlāḥ*), *they are pervaded by the Reality* (*Sadāyatanāḥ*), *they exist in the Reality* (*Satpratiṣṭhāḥ*).....*All these are modes of the Self* (*Ātmyamidaṁ sarvam*). *That is real. He is the Self. That thou art,* O Śvetaketu.' " On being requested to explain it still more clearly, the father continued. " 'Fetch me thence a fruit of the Nya-

grodha tree.' 'Here is one, Sir,' 'Break it.' 'It is broken, Sir.' 'What do you see there?' 'These seeds, almost infinitesimal.' 'Break one of them.' 'It is broken, Sir.' 'What do you see there?' 'Not anything, Sir.' *The father said, 'My dear son, that subtile essence (in the tiny seed), which you cannot see, of that very essence, my dear son, this great Nyagrodha tree exists. Believe it, my dear son, that which is the subtile Essence, in it all that exists has its self. That is real. He is the Self. That thou art, O Śvetaketu.'* "* Śankara and his followers, both in the East and in the West, think that this dialogue contains expressions, which imply a most emphatic denial of the world of plurality. "The Indian school-men," says Mr. Gough, referring to the opening analogical arguments (*Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, p. 245), "are never tired of quoting this text, and proclaiming that the visible and nameable aspects of the world, as they fictitiously present themselves, in place of, and veil, the one and only Self, are nothing more than 'a modification of speech, a change, a name.'" The passage, referred to by Mr. Gough, has been grossly misinterpreted by many other Orientalists as well. Prof. Max Müller has taken it to mean, "the difference being only the name, arising from speech." It means, according to Mr. Gough, "being nothing more than a modification of speech, a change, a name." Prof. Deussen has taken it to mean, "the changes dependent only on words, a mere name" (*The System of Vedānta*, p. 262); and all of them have taken it as implying a clear denial of the reality of all modifications. But the passage has absolutely no such implication. A modification, as an event in time, is known, when it is distinguished from others,

* Chhān., VI. 1, 3-6; 2, 1-3; 8, 4 and 7; 12, 1-3. *Cf.* Müller, *Six Sys.*, p. 163, *et seq.*

by a distinguishing name of its own. All modifications, of a reality, therefore, virtually come to exist in time, *i.e.*, when they are so distinguished from others by their respective names. The moment of their knowledge is accordingly also the moment of the origin or first application, of the designative names. Every modification is, accordingly, stated here, as arising from the moment of a name being assigned to it. The modification itself, as an event in time, was unreal before its origin. The original, of which it is a modification, has, on the contrary, been always in existence, and, as such, the latter possesses a higher reality than the former. The modifications are, moreover, mutually exclusive; but the original embraces and includes them all alike. In this sense also, it possesses a higher reality. As the modifications arise from the original, and *the reality of the modification rests on that of the original, so does the reality of the world of plurality depend on that of the Supreme Self, Brahman, of which modes they are. This is the real implication of the expression in question, and not the denial of the existence of the modifications in any sense of the term. The existence of the modifications is, on the contrary, most clearly implied in the very expressions, "All things made of clay," "All things made of gold," and the like. Had the object of the speaker been to deny the reality of the modifications, such expressions would have been altogether meaningless. Moreover, it has been most emphatically declared in the same connection that all existents live, move, and have their being in the Reality, and that "all these are modes of the Self"* ātmyamidaṁ *sarvam.* The expression "That thou art, O Śvetaketu," following it immediately, evidently means, '*Thou art also such a mode.*' To take it in any other sense, would simply mean a complete mis-reading of the entire dialogue. And Śankara himself has, in the extract quoted

in connection with the point discussed in the preceding paragraph, also taken it exactly in this sense. There he has most clearly told us that, " We understand (by this passage) that the entire body of effects has *no existence apart from Brahman*." This is a clear admission of the reality of plurality as modes of the Infinite. Bādarāyaṇa has also taken this sense. In this connection he clearly tells us that Brahman constitutes both the efficient and the material cause of the world of plurality : *Pratijñā Dṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt*, 1.4, 23. The world of plurality is therefore most emphatically admitted here. So this dialogue also does not help Śankara, even in the least. It, on the contrary, teaches pure and unadulterated Panentheism and represents the world of plurality as so many finite modes or centres of the Infinite's self-manipulation.

Śankara's false idea of Reality.

Śankara has a false idea of Unity. Unity, he thinks, must needs not only be opposed to independent existence of anything other than itself, but also to difference and relativity, to relations and differentiations. *He therefore asks, though the Vedānta has, in a hundred different connections, described Brahman as a principle of Unity-in-difference, yet how are we to conceive such a Reality?* He fails to see how it may be possible for the Reality to exist as a self-differentiating unit, as existing in all its individual modes, embracing them all in its all-pervading unity, and giving them all their respective being, connection, end, and function, as inter-related factors of one organic whole and yet transcending them all as their ultimate ground of support. And he has often most frankly admitted that every individual soul is but a finite mode of the Infinite. " Brahman alone," he, for instance, emphatically tells us in connection with Ved. Sūt., II.3, 45, is " immanent in all existents, and exists in the shape of individuals." " There is no viola-

b n of the promissory statement," he says still more c arly, in connection with Ved. Sūt., II.3, 17, "be- v se of Brahman assuming the individual form, whole l d undivided. *The distinction in the characteristics of e two is only due to the limitations of 'name and form' ssumed (by the Infinite).*" These are clear admissions n favour of Vedāntic Panentheism. He has repeated the ame admissions in scores of places. But Śankara's doubt soon reappears; and, unable to see clearly how the Reality can be both differentiated and yet remain unexhausted in its differentiations, and retain its unity in and through them, he forthwith runs straight away from his admission, and tries to explain away the passages describing the Self as an eternally differentiating Reality. And in such a moment of confusion and bewilderment, Śankara was once driven to declare, as we have seen, "it is better to reject Upaniṣads than to accept such a self-contradictory position" (*asyāḥ kalpanāyāḥ-varam-upaniṣad-parityāga eva*). (*Vide* Śankara's commentary on Brih. Up., V.1, 1). And his inability to grasp the significance of Vedāntic Panentheism has driven him to take recourse to his theory of Illusion, which is out and out anti-Vedāntic. The Vedānta teaches nothing but pure and unadulterated Panentheism from beginning to end.

Śankara in his search after the Reality placed himself at the very outset on a wrong track, and started with a denial of change. This was his initial blunder; and his whole system, as based on the theory of illusion, followed from it as a necessary corollary. It is in ourselves that we are directly and immediately in touch with a domain of the Reality. And if Śankara looked within himself, and tried to understand the nature of the reality in him, he would have seen that the reality which constitutes the ego or self of an individual is a spiritual prin-

ciple which lives, acts and seeks to develop and perfect itself as a concrete individual-self through a diversity of states or modes, and in the nature of his own individual-self he would have found a clue to the knowledge of the true nature of the Ultimate Reality. He would have then clearly seen that the two-fold existence of one and the self-same Reality, as existing in a diversity of modes and yet transcending the same and remaining identical with itself amidst all its variations, is more real, in the case of an invisible spiritual principle than in visible and extended organic objects. And with such a vision, his confusions would have forthwith vanished. The Vedānta has also clearly told us how to regulate our activities in our search after the Ultimate Reality. "*We should seek to know Brahman,*" says Śvet. Up. (II.15), "*in the light of the knowledge of our own selves as with a lam*
Ātma-tattvena tu Brahmatattvam dīpopamena prapaś
If Śankara followed this guidance all his confusio would have been at an end; and he would have seen tha change constituted an aspect of the Reality and that the Abstract Universal Spirit through its never-ending process of change, generation and evolution always sought to realise itself as the concrete Universal spirit, and that the individual self was only a finite mode of the Infinite's self-manifestation. Self-introspection would have moreover, revealed to him that the individual self whic constitutes a man's ego, limited though it is in its actua acquisitions, is potentially infinite, and is organically an indissolubly united with an Infinite Spiritual Principl Brahman, as the Self of its self and its Internal Rul and moment-to-moment ground and support. Such vision would have revealed to him that through his finite self, the Infinite always sought more and more to maniftst itself. In such a vision he would have also clearly understood the significance of

the Vedāntic description of the Individual and the Universal, as "two beautiful birds mutually attached as friends, dwelling on the one and the same tree, with one (the individual) eating delicious fruits from (the hands of) the other (the Universal), and the latter itself remaining without fruit and yet delighted to see the former so receiving its nourishment" (Śvet. Up., IV. 6). But Śankara followed a wrong track, and thus failed to understand the supreme mystery of the self and the nature of Brahman, as a Principle of Unity-in-difference; and individual self appeared from time to time repressed, and his doubts and confusions strangled all that was healthy life-giving and noble in his utterances.

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