

TRANSMUTATION OF APPLIED ETHICS TO PRACTICAL ETHICS: DOES HERMENEUTIC-PHENOMENOLOGY HELP?

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Prelude

The rise and growth of applied ethics has been phenomenal since 1960. However, there are a number of misconceptions due to the ignorance that unlike moralism and theoretical prophecy, applied ethics as a systematic and serious inquiry under ethics is not about picking moral dilemmas and solving them by virtue of application of normative theory rather, it is concerned with *critique of models* of ethical application in cases of well identified value-loaded practical problems of urgency that trouble people having different occupations and professions. For instance, among other models, applied ethics aims at critical evaluation of the popular but unfounded model of picking cases and solving them with the help of standard normative theories.

The objectives of this research article are: (a) critical evaluation of the deductive and inductive or more popularly called, theory based and anti-theory models of ethical application to justify that despite enjoying methodological advantages, anti-theory models are fraught with the problems of *structuralism* and *limit* to application; (b) another aim is to explore the nature and significance of Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Research basic to pragmatic and empirical ethics that tries to bridge the chasm between empirical enrichment and ethical resolution; (c) furthermore, it is important to *justify* that the pre-pragmatic or pre-experimental research work namely, hermeneutic-phenomenological research (HPR), is crucial in understanding that applied ethics transmutes to practical ethics giving the needed rigor to value-resolution.

I

Critique of theory based and anti-theory models of ethical application

Theory based ethical application is traditional, involving the following steps: (a) identification of value loaded practical problems for moral resolution; (b) subsequent attempt to resolve problems on the basis of standard theory or theories of ethics such as utilitarianism and Kantianism; (c) helped by the official moral philosophers or ethics experts having complete knowledge of these theories and possibility of their

application theoretically; (d) theory based resolution of moral dilemmas are final and acceptable to the parties facing dilemmas and (e) formulating decision-making rules and policies helped by theory non-coopted exercise. A careful look at the steps reveal serious flaws: first, there is a division of labour (unwanted and unethical) assuming people facing problem on the one hand, helpless for being ignorant of ethical theories and the required skill of applying them to fitting cases, and on the other hand experts of substantive ethics and skilled technicians of ethical theory application. If this is the basic assumption of ethical application, ethical experts are both omniscient and omnipotent in resolving value crises because they know theories and solve problems much like skillful jigsaw puzzle gamers. This is the nature of what A. L. Caplan calls, “engineering model” of ethical application: “the applied ethicists on the engineering model serve as a go-between for theoreticians of normative ethics and denizens of everyday world”¹. Apart from the sweeping comments made above, Caplan argues that the model is defective (and unethical) on at least five counts: (a) The model is silent over an overreaching normative theory thus allowing picking theories and fitting them mechanically and artificially; (b) picking theories is completely wishful; (c) why should moral philosophers by virtue of knowing moral theories be the best experts, is unclear; (d) how an expert ethicist would remain neutral in value resolution is not clear and (e) applied ethics does not imagine programmed people who fit theories to cases and do nothing else (at least participate in a moral dialogue). In fact, ethical engineering is deducing moral conclusion from assumed sacrosanct moral principles artificially and thus “deductive model” is not appropriate in value-resolution.

Caplan thinks that though moral deductions from theories are possible at least theoretically, moral philosophers need to focus primarily on “the skills of discerning moral issues and classifying moral problems”². Applied ethicists (not necessarily and sufficiently the official moral philosophers), across fields need to be primarily apt at moral diagnosis to “(a) see moral issues others have missed; (b) anticipate issues before they actually occur and (c) properly classify the moral problems which arise in the ordinary ebb and flow of events in public and professional life. A knowledge of moral theories, traditions and concepts allowed the moral philosopher to see the norm more directly involved do not and sometimes will not”³. It is very important to

understand after Caplan that moral theoreticians need not unnecessarily attempt at final solutions by means of moral deductions, from theories. Rather, they should show why diagnosis of value-loaded feature of a problem is so important before we jump to solution. Yet, Caplan himself raises a difficult question: How do we identify such problems? What steps are involved in? He says that it may not be easily answered though careful consideration is needed. The first point to note is that, *value identification* precedes value – resolution by any means. Hence, method of value resolution should give way to value identification to start with.

This primary work, I would later on in this Paper argue, presuppose an entry into pre-pragmatic *hermeneutic-phenomenological research* (HPR). Caplan makes two important observations that count most on what has been said about HPR just now. He asserts that once a value-loaded issue has been identified, we should be able to see the various point of views from which an issue may be seen for cogent resolution. This focuses our thoughtfulness and sensitivity in value resolution and in doing so we understand our competence to find out the relationship that determines our rights and duties. He further observes that in social relationship we all enjoy moral authority to value-resolution and for that empirical enrichment is required because moral abstraction (about what ought to be and what things are good), are of no use and does not succeed bereft of relation with what things matter-of-factly surround us. Factual information and value perceptions work in tandem in value resolution. Hence, “a fully developed applied ethics would afford the moral philosopher an opportunity to examine the delicate interplay that occurs among facts, social roles, and prescriptive principles in reaching moral decision.”⁴

Hume might be turning in the grave because the is-ought controversy is taken to be pointless. We are *not* deriving or *logically deducing* what ought to be from what things are. Let us remember that Hume’s wonder was eloquently expressed by G. E. Moore in the famous fallacy of naturalism, though the pathetic fallacy occurs only when we are either logically defining a value term by reducing it to natural terms or we are logically justifying a value theory by reducing it to a naturalistic theory. We are *not at* both these pathetic reductionist attempts. We are making a point in ethical application that bereft of empirical enrichment; value resolution is a futile attempt because we are considering value-loaded *practical problems* of urgency for

resolution. We assert much like J. L. Gorman that evaluation and descriptive features of dilemmas are epistemologically similarly grounded even if the former is action-guiding and the latter is not. In fact, both are at epistemological risk and both are amenable to moral arguments. For instance, when we evaluate fetal abortion after gender identification, we value (judge) it to be ethically repugnant and conclude that one ‘ought not’ conduct such an abortive act. If somebody conducts it, we judge: ‘he or she ought not to have done so’. Interestingly, such value judgments are possible (or a covering argument is sensible), when an intervening *factual assertion* has been made, that is, ‘fetus is a living entity enjoying certain rights’. Gorman concludes that value perception and factual information are in tandem in value resolution and that ethicists and non-ethicists all enjoy “moral authority”⁵ to value resolution.

Let us turn to the ‘anti-theory’ models of value-resolution. It is said to be a ‘bottom down’ or inductive model of value-resolution than the ‘top to down’ or deductive model discussed above. The reason is that the proponents start with the moral perceptions of concerned people along with ethicists than picking overreaching theories to draw moral conclusions, completely overlooking participation of the concerned parties. The model is known as ‘anti-theory’ for its clear opposition to application of one or more theory or theories of ethics and thus rejects ethical chauvinism and theoretical obsession. In an excellent critique of the top-down model, the anti theorists say that the model overlooks the particularities and uniqueness of situations in which a dilemma occurs and there is no absolute moral theory available to solve a wide range of such dilemmas.⁶ In view of these features, inductive model of ethical application is *contextualist* or particularist in nature.

Anti-theorists propose their model under the influence of particularism to argue that (a) actual cases and situations of moral conflict need to be considered for resolution in view of contexts, cultures, traditions, historical and local settings; (b) moral resolution awaits coming together of ethicists and concerned parties to apply these uncoded moral knowledge; (c) moral resolution needs enrichment of moral experience in socio-historic flux by virtue of our activities and participation in ecological community; (d) moral conflicts considered in their real contexts ought to be resolved by interpersonal moral dialogue among concerned parties (ethicist being one among others), and (e) moral resolution gives us sets of moral cues for decision-

making and policy formulation, which are relatively but not absolutely useful. Virtue of this model is that it is itself ethically desirable for being non-partisan in ethical resolution. It conceives of no division of labour and moral chauvinism of peer group. There is no divide like philosophers solving problems and non-philosophers supplying problems and thankful to their ethics masters. Callahan summarizes the enterprise as (a) resolution of value-loaded problems; (b) developing the moral imagination for resolution (c) having analytical skills for scrutiny of the problem to know about the concerned parties; (d) testing moral disagreements in discourses; (e) effecting decisions and behavior, and (f) implementation, closure and process.⁷

Despite enjoying merits of a method with a human face, the model has several gaps. First, the method of *identification* of value loaded problems and parties concerned with the problems to be invited for broad based discourses, has not been well elaborated. Second, the dynamics of moral debates that goes along with theoretical discovery of normative dynamics is missing. Third and the most serious aspect is that moral disagreements and closure by virtue of moral corroboration point towards the problems of ‘structuralism’ and ‘limit to application’. Let us elaborate, on these serious problems. Let us accept that the moral entrepreneur involved in the task of value resolution is faced with the problem of proper method to frame searching questions for moral debates/dialogues that bring out moral perceptions of concerned parties; most likely the trained and conscious entrepreneurs are directed to achieve the outcome of her exercise, and for that she frames or *structures* some such fine tuned questions to churn out moral views of people and their normative leaning. To churn out normative leaning of the parties, in the name of deciphering value perceptions, is an engineering caveat. Hence, a structured question of expert is equally chauvinistic and theoretically schizophrenic. The moot issue is how can a corroborator arrange and organize social dialogues for value resolution without structuring questions for dialogue for ulterior end? Furthermore, a number of people seriously concerned about value resolution may be left out of social dialogue because they have ideological differences with the so-called mainstream entrepreneur and her esoteric coterie. How do we resolve this serious ‘limit’ put to the process at our own will? Finally, anti-theoreticism may be equally at mistake to avoid normative analysis because normative analyses are part and parcel of value-resolution though no one

advocates picking a theory and applying it. We still have to inquire carefully into the dynamic involvement of normative theories in real life moral discourses enabling corroboration. The point has been nicely presented by Musschenga, Mckeever and Ridge. Mckeever and Ridge argues that though moral valuation does not beg moral principles, their use theoretically and practically are not undesirable.⁸ Musschenga argues that “we need them (principles) in moral discussions. Without principles, it would be difficult to regulate cooperation with other. If empirical ethicists want to take their claim to prescriptively seriously, should formulate principles”⁹. Hence, reductive model of value-resolution demand chauvinism of all shades jigsawing with theories, structuring questions and avoiding limits of application all of which are undesirable. Therefore, an entry into pragmatic/ experimental/ empirical model of value-resolution that presupposes a pre-pragmatic research work laid down in HPR is necessary. HPR assumes an important role in value-resolution not merely in cases of human science but across fields filled with value-loaded problems, such as, medicine, nursing, law, education and environmentalism. (We hope to instantiate some of them in the section to follow).

II

Nature and significance of Hermeneutic-Phenomenological Research (HPR) in value-resolution

Inductive approaches to value resolution have contributed immensely in shaping, re-shaping and sharpening applied ethics, so much so that we have well accepted the importance of social-scientific vocation in value-resolution across public and professional domains. It has been successful in showing the importance of understanding the value perceptions of people who are directly and indirectly concerned with resolution of value dilemmas. Quite often than not people having occupations and professions who are responsible for decision making, policy formulation and implementation care for resolving moral crises that incessantly and unstopably emerge. However, these concerned and careful people tend to overlook a stage that precedes pragmatic/ practical/ experimental stage in value-resolution, which may be termed as the, ‘pre-pragmatic stage’. At this stage it is important to enter into what may be simply called a social-scientific vocation by the one who is an applied ethical entrepreneur to enrich her moral vocabulary, that is, strive for moral

enrichment. Interestingly, moral enrichment is supported by empirical enrichment (let us forget the hackneyed is-ought dichotomy because there is none). This is to envision a practical possibility of understanding the moral experiences, moral knowledge or moral vocabulary concerning value loaded practical problems. This is something like deciphering *meaning* of moral perceptions of parties in association, that is, *in-and-with-parties* by means of talking, questioning, debating, discussing, listening to stories and narratives- precisely, by means of understanding the *lived experiences* of parties. Hence, moral enrichment through empirical sensitivity is enabled by an art of interpreting moral perceptions, which is, hermeneutical understanding of moral perception and phenomenological understanding of the *essence* of lived experiences of people. Hermeneutic-phenomenological research (HPR) is thus primitive to value discourses in communion for decision-making, policy formulation and enactment of these policies. HPR enables us to solve the problem of structured questions to divulge the normative leaning of parties, and the limit to public participation in ethical application. But before that we need to find out a few important arguments that support HPR in value-resolution and to understand that applied ethics transmutes to pragmatic or practical ethics.

III

Justification of HPR in value-resolution

(i) Arguments from the lived experiences of people

Lindseth and Norberg take note of nursing care work and value dilemmas in particular to propose HPR or PHR as a model of value-resolution.¹⁰ Unique feature of HPR is that people facing moral dilemmas express their moral perceptions though for practical and psychological reasons, they fail to do so more often than not. Hence, value-resolution should start with enabling people to actively participate by bringing out freely their moral views on contentious matters. For the researcher it is extremely important “to analyse the material and the morals and the ethical thinking visible”¹¹. This is exactly the problem of ‘understanding’ value perceptions of people and for which “we could especially draw on the tradition of hermeneutics”¹². Equally important is “the tradition of phenomenology as it was developed by its founder Edmund Husserl and his successors”¹³. In the former case we understand “text” as it is given to us and in the latter we try to understand the “essence” of value perceptions

of people as it is lived in human experience. Notably, in this context “text” is not a body of written document but those moral vocabularies obtained from one to one, and one and many interviews, discussions, storytelling and by simply talking to people and taking note of them in various forms available to a researcher. In these ways one have entered into social- scientific vocation. Interpretation of text for meaning is then an integral part of hermeneutical research at the pre-pragmatic stage. However, hermeneutical interpretation of text (in its contextual import) does not aim at describing the morals and social facts. Yet, interpretation of text is not beyond socio-historicity and contextual sensitivity. Another important point is that hermeneutic understanding of ‘text’ is a movement from what has been said and what has been talked about, and what it talks about (the moral values), which is the essential meaning of text. Hence, for the researcher, phenomenological understanding of the essential meaning of lived experience is basic to understand what the moral opinions are of good and right of decision, actions and policies and so on. These enrichments are required before the researcher moves to the next level of pragmatics of value resolution with the aid of unstructured questions. This is basic to resolve the problem of limit to value-resolution because enrichment is *in- and- with* parties and not with theories and coterie of experts. A familiar misconception is that essential meaning is subjective construction and therefore structuralism is built in it. However, the truth is that meaning is drawn from shared familiarity with the world in which parties express their moral opinions, and therefore, essential meaning of good and right are *original experience* of the world or a foundation of all lived experiences. This is exactly what is for Husserl life-world or for Heidegger, ‘world’. The above explained research is then neither pure phenomenology nor pure hermeneutics but interpretation of ‘text’ and revealed ‘essential’ meaning of value of decisions and actions underlined in hermeneutic phenomenology (HP). It is also important to note that moral valuation occur in life-world which is not a case of bracketing the natural or factual world. In phenomenological attitude bracketing statement of facts, and through shared lived experiences, we gather essential meaning in a natural way. We do not bracket the world altogether rather, bracket pre-understanding of morals (or theories).

From this we come to know that before wide ranging public discourses and debates (more often other than not culminating in moral consensus), that happens at

the pragmatic or practical levels of decision-making and policy formulations, access to a body of expressions or *narratives* from lived experiences of concerned parties enable us to conduct, the said discourses in unstructured ways and transgress the limit to public/ participation. Improvement in understanding value of decisions and actions enable us to get access to next level broad based pragmatic mechanism of resolution and subsequent policy making. Paul Ricoeur says that in this way we enter into the ‘hermeneutical circle’ starting with naïve depiction of text, its structural analysis or theme interpretation and summarization or comprehensive understanding. The point is *pragmatic mechanism* at the *post-understanding stage* is required because text might have several interpretations. For internal consistency and shared value of experiences, phenomenological hermeneutics require *argumentation* and resolution, says Ricoeur.

(ii) Argument from Heidegger Hermeneutic-Phenomenology (HHP)

HPR is also backed by Heidegger Hermeneutic Phenomenology (HHP) and it has an impact in resolving several moral dilemmas pertaining to the case of children with physical intellectual and social disabilities, Work of Laforest, Knol and Leblanc is important to note.¹⁴ For Heidegger, a deeper understanding of the meaning of being a person and what it amounts to be in the world are of great importance because understanding the meaning of Being *as ethics* is more crucial than knowing the being as pure ontology. Knowing existence and explaining it is superseded by understanding the meaning of existence as ethics. This is made clear by Heidegger’s use of being- in and being- in- the- world. On the one hand a person exists in this objective world contextually as well as in his own subjective world, wherein he is separated from him. Being- in- the- world *cares for* person’s experience, that is, to interpret the different ways in which the person exists in the world. ‘Care-for’ is the most fundamental attitude of a person though care for self and for others may be different because the latter may be authentic and inauthentic as well. In order to have existential experiences the researcher ought to care-for the ethical perception of others. For Heidegger, being is basic for an understanding of relations or to care for what surrounds us (the relationship is ‘in the world’). It is here that person’s daily experience takes place, which is not the unique unshared experience but shared with

other persons. In this sense, understanding moral experience never happens in unique isolation and therefore never be to 'bracketed'.

Furthermore, Heidegger mentions that by understanding moral experience of others, the researcher or interpreter is complete with interpretation, not of realities as they appear to a person but the one that happens when facts are allowed to *speak* for themselves. Hermeneutics thus explains some of our daily existence as a human being by interpreting *revealed* facts. Nevertheless, Heidegger has laid stress on the researcher's enterprise to interpret and understand morals intersubjectively in a given context because moral understanding comes from subjectively shared meanings. We are all unable to bracket the interpreter, the interpreted and context of such understanding. Interestingly, lived experienced of Being- in- the- world need never be bracketed. Kerdeman observes that following Heidegger, Gadamer holds that understanding is not an end that we deliberately strive to achieve. Rather, "In our everyday world... meaning is intersubjective, publicly available, linguistically constituted, and deeply familiar... understanding is a mode of ordinary practical experiences. We understand in and through the experience of being involved with concerned people and events."¹⁵

(iii) Argument from unstructured meaning and subsequent dialogue:

In early anti-theoretical models of value-resolution a serious problem was the one of structured questions for dialogues. HPR is further justified by the need of broad-based moral dialogues among those responsible for decision-making and policy formulation only after existential understanding in unstructured ways. The question is, if pre-pragmatic research enables understanding of value-oriented features of problems, their various aspects and parties to be cared for value-resolution, why is it followed by further social dialogue? The main reason is that though HPR is built in practical ethics, moral understanding of researcher is never absolute or final. Thus, unstructured questionnaires for moral debates, able moderation of debates and theory non-coopted value enrichment by the researchers are all needed. For unstructured questions, HPR at the pre-stage calls for caring for people's moral perception in several social scientific methods of moral enrichment not structured at intellectual whims for attaining an intellectual goal. Gadamer clarifies that our life's experience is based on understanding not the other way around. Existential hermeneutics cannot be

detached from our experience and meaning cannot be detached from experiences in our “distinctive situatedness”.¹⁶ However, meaning is never definite in such a method of interpretation available to the interpreter. Our value interpretation and understanding are not definitive; they grow and fizzle out in the climate of lived experiences. Empirical enrichment is also not absolute and so is the case with structuring questions for moral dialogues, they are essentially in a flux, so to say. Further, in social settings our understanding of value perceptions of other people is never complete because we cannot freely comprehend value perception of the other person in her situation. Hence, a position of ambiguity at the pragmatic stage can be solved by broad-based dialogues. It is here that our prejudices are brought at a place for understanding wherein “a real fusion of horizons occur which means that as the historical horizon is projected it is simultaneously superseded. To bring about this fusion in a regulated way is the task of what we call historically affected value”¹⁷.

During pre-pragmatic research therefore, researchers’, non-structured questioning, answering, interpreting and understanding has been rolled in HPR. In Gadamer’s analysis, conversation in understanding moral point of view is both questioning and answering. Where “answering’ is hermeneutical interpretation of sense-making which enables conversations to continue. This thrust has to be further carried to the pragmatic level of discourses for transversal of opinions to converge for problem solving and decision making. Value-resolution is therefore, not endless cacophony, it is an act of listening for deeper meaning in collaboration- a state of divergent life-world belonging to different human existence converge.

This takes us seamlessly to another important feature of HPR, that is, pre-pragmatic dialogue for *self-discovery* and *discovery of other-selves*. Phenomenological understanding according to Paul Francis Colaizzi and Stein Halling is enabled by *narratives* and dialogues which are again unstructured. Colaizzi underlines phenomenological understanding under descriptive phenomenological method¹⁸. That aims at unfolding the ‘essence’ of any phenomenon under investigation, such as, value of decision and actions. Essence is underlined by those characteristics that make something what it is and ‘descriptive’ amounts to unfolding adequately something such as phenomenon under consideration. Colaizzi uses this method in adequately unfolding the ‘given’ in health sciences. The method banks on

first person account of moral experiences of people through written narratives or one-to-one unstructured interviews. Colaizzi mentions seven steps in that regard. We may avoid details of these steps except the last one, which Colaizzi calls, ‘verification’. He is of the opinion that after the penultimate stage of understanding essence of the phenomenon, the researcher ought to return her findings to the participants for verification so that honest modifications in their moral perception are possible. ‘Verification’ of moral perception expressed in dialogues/ narratives may not be needed at all if essence has been understood. However, we believe that in HPR, phenomenological essence finding, as also in case of hermeneutical interpretation be put to further grinding at broad- based discourses. However, at the second stage, dialogues lead to verification of essence in *association* and this is of great value.

The value of phenomenological research in HPR has also been underlined by Stein Halling in what he calls, *dialogical phenomenology*¹⁹, which gives great importance to dialogical participation with the community people to understand their moral views on contentious issues. Halling is of the opinion that phenomenology is important with regard to value resolutions because it is a tradition which values data obtained from everyday life through descriptions and stories which become basic to an understanding of human existence. However, phenomenology does not encourage a linear relationship between lived experience and reflection, that is, it does not allow a transition from experience to abstract theory construction. Halling explains that phenomenologist engage in three levels of analysis, namely, looking at particular experiences; search for themes that are common to variety of experiences and to inquire about the nature of human beings and their relationship. It is clear that in the phenomenological and the hermeneutic parlance, HPR lay stress on subjectivity or better said *intersubjectivity* between researchers and researched in a participating manner. Halling along with Finlay (2012) and Gadamer (1975) brings out the point that in value resolution, researchers should at the first place be open to dialogue, that is, open to speaking- critiquing- understanding situation. There is an importance of using researcher’s own experience and understanding- “it involves an active evaluation of the researcher’s own experience in order to understand something of the fusion of horizons between subject and object”²⁰.

Covering the arguments in favor of HPR at the pre-pragmatic stage of value-resolution, crucial point is that ethics experts are important in so far as they undertake a socially valuable enterprise of value resolution and they have their own understanding of values. Yet, we have to remember that ethical expertise that pampers moral principles separated from their ultimate narrative frameworks become so abstract that they are aid to intellectual gimmick. Proponents of narrative ethics argue that (if are go by HPR), we need to put moral theorizing to “practices, codes, metaphor, symbols and narratives that shape the society where they feel anchored and in which they have confidence”²¹. Nevertheless, narrative tradition does not overlook rational inquiry. The problem is how this would be possible in association across traditions? Can we transverse moral views, incorporate moral traditions and their insights in association? This is the typical problem of “limit” to ethical application. We think that we *ought* to transcend our moral narrative tradition through open communication about shared values in the respective traditions in the way of finding out generality. Sharing value in narrative tradition is not to lose identity. Identity restoration in communal sharing value is writ large in HPR. Narrative tradition helps in understanding the functionality of moral principle in real life “in the light of the contexts, narrative contexts where they appear and from which listeners are summoned to apply these principles in their own narrative context”²². It is in this way that in pragmatic model of ethical application, which is precisely, *practical ethics* that pre-level research, post-research dialogue for decision-making and policy-making and post-pragmatic analysis of functionality of moral principles seated in narratives are all closely knit. Applied ethics therefore after a number of transformations, come to what is practical ethics for value-resolution.

Conclusion

Pragmatic or practical ethics envisions value-based decision-making and policy-making by careful consideration of moral perceptions of concerned parties and find ways to come out of moral impasses to enable better living. In doing so, real life value-resolution and decision-making need not avoid the most needed and important step of moral enrichment in and with the concerned parties through unstructured dialogic-narrative course of action, correlative interpretation and understanding the moral perceptions of people on contentious value loaded issues. The model is

empirical at its root, tied to policy making process that is value based and to scientific advancements. The process engages stakeholders in joint inquiry leading to cooperative solution then relishing theoretical debates over metaphysics of values. Policy-making is then enabled by experience, using knowledge to bring out change in the world and strive for moral dynamics to resolve crises and live a decent life as humans need to live. Pragmatic ethics that has moved farther from the theory-anti-theory squabble has taken cue from vastly rich traditions of hermeneutical and phenomenological research, a more politically and ethically correct dynamics of policy making and theoretical analysis. Democratic discourse, ethical punctuation and immensely valuable contributions from narrative tradition all make practical ethics a success. I would thus like to conclude that HPR is basic in enabling a movement from classical application of ethics to practical ethics, empirically seated and ethically dynamic.

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