Hume's Theory of the Passions

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"Human Nature is the only science of man," said Hume. He described the Treatise of Human Nature as an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, and hoped to lay the foundation of moral science. Towards the close of the first book he alludes to "those immense depths of philosophy which lie before me" (Treatise, p. 263). Hume has used the term 'moral philosophy' to mean the science of human nature and intended the study of man as an active being. He wished to discover the fundamental or elementary principles which operate in man's ethical life. He emphasized the role of the emotional aspect of human nature in man's moral life, and that is why he devoted the second book of the Treatise to a discussion of the passions. Hume's task in the second book of the Treatise was concerned with analysing the emotional aspect of human nature, considered as a source of action. The word 'passion' is used by Hume to include emotions and affects in general, without confining it to unregulated bursts of emotion. Let us now turn to Hume's theory of the passions.

The passions are "secondary perceptions" or we may say, they form a class of their own consisting of impressions of reflexion. Hume divides the contents of the mind into impressions and ideas, the two being mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. He distinguishes the impressions from the ideas in terms of the degree of vivacity or liveliness. The "ideas are less vivacious or less lively copies

of difference. In the first book of the Treatise Hume sought to show that the impressions of reflexion are "derived in a great measure from our ideas" (ibid., p.7). But when Hume proceeds to show the manner in which impressions of reflexion arise "in a great measure" from ideas, he makes such statements which perhaps cannot be reconciled with the immediacy thesis I quote two such statements below :

> (a) The "idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of reflexion, because derived from it." Another similar remark reads: "the impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation".
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> (b) "the impressions of reflexion, viz., passions, desires, and emotion,...arise mostly from ideas". This statement is committed to the mediated arousal of the impressions of reflexion (ibid., p.8. Italics not in the text).

The ambiguity of the word 'immediately' prevails throughout the second book. After having called the passions 'secondary impressions', Hume goes on to say, "A passion is an original existence" in the sense that it "contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence". (ibid., p. 415) But at another time Hume finds it convenient to compare the reflective impressions (passions, for that matter) with such secondary qualities like "colours, tastes, smells" etc.,(ibid., p. 366). He tells us in the second book of the Treatise

that "all bodily pain and pleasures" are impressions of sensation, while "the passions and other emotions resembling them" are impressions of reflexions. If we take this categorization as authoritative, then we might say that impressions of reflexion can be said to proceed 'immediately' from impressions of sensation in the sense that they have a necessary reference to, of course, though the idea of, the original sensory data. Or, to put the matter in other words, passions are the basic data of moral psychology. We may start with saying that on the one hand we have sensorily felt pains and pleasures, and on the other, the corresponding reflectively had passions. But the idea[l]ed character of the secondary impressions cannot, perhaps, be explained away, because Hume's fork of impressions and idea is so devised that nothing can occur as a mental event unless it is a psychic atom or has either an ideal or impressionistic character.

Another remark can be made before we pass on to Hume's classification of the passions. Hume uses the words 'passion' 'emotion' and 'affection' in such a way as to suggest an equivocation. If the word 'passion' is taken in the sense a feeling, then it cannot be an emotion. He does seem to take 'passion' as 'feeling'. For example, approval is a special kind of passion for Hume, and we find him saying "To approve of a character is to <u>feel</u> an original delight upon its appearance"(<u>ibid</u>.,p.295). Now psychologists would like to distinguish between a feeling and an emotion. They regard emotion as the feeling-tone of a 'motor-set' or a tendency towards

towards activity. If 'passion' be called an emotion, then all of Hume's passions are conative, but not merely affective. We shall see it later. The non-synonymity of 'feeling' and 'emotion' is often brought about by saying that feeling is the affective state considered in abstraction from cognition and conation. We need not go into the question whether feeling can ever exist without any tendency to action. But so far there can be more feeling, there can be a state of mind which does not issue in external action of any kind. Emotion is said to be the 'moved' or 'stirred up' feeling associated with a tendency to act in a particular direction. The emotion of fear would illustrate the case. It remains somewhat uncertain throughout Hume's writing whether he regards 'passions' to signify the whole conative-affective state, or merely the stirred up feeling characteristics of a motor-set. A decision on this point is likely to affect Hume's theory of moral judgments, since if he is, as some do think, an emotionist, then attribution of goodness or badness to an appearance of passions will be to commend or condemn either a passive affective state of mind or a tendency towards changing or maintaining a state of affairs. Or, this decision is related also with the view that Hume's moral valuations are 'perceptive and not directive' (Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise, by D. Rydd, p. 179).

We may now come to Hume's classification of the passions. Hume makes two classifications of the passions, one in respect of their intensity or feeling-tone, the other in terms of their mode of origination. Of the first kind is the division called 'calm' and the

'violent' passions. Obviously, Hume is using the words 'calm' and 'violent' in a descriptive sense, without evaluating the passions in any way. As instances of calm passions he mentions "the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects" (op. cit., p. 276). Of the second kind, he mentions three pairs of passions, e.g., love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. The pairing is intentional and it will become evident from our later discussion. But Hume does not seem to be satisfied with this division, and he says that the "division is far from being exact". One reason of the inexactness of the division is clear. It is often the case that the so-called calm passions may acquire great emotional intensity. The cathartic function of aesthetic experience may be cited as a case. Listening to great music or witnessing a Greek tragedy being enacted is not a pacifying nor a passive encounter in the ordinary sense. Hume is well aware of this point, since he himself says, "The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height". But a few lines further, he seems to restrict the word 'passion' for violent reflective impressions as it were. Of impressions other than beauty etc., i.e., the violent ones, he says "properly called passions", and then declares that "in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity ..." (ibid., p. 276). In this passage, besides the restrictive use of the word 'passion' to violent reflective impressions, there is also the use of the word 'violent' as a differentia between passions and emotions in general. Our difficulty becomes no less when Hume uses the word 'emotion' for

a less active state of mind such as the contemplation of the aesthetic forms of objects. Shall we say, then, that 'calm' reflective impressions are passions improperly so-called because only the 'violent' ones are 'properly called passions'?

Hume looks back to the division of passions into calm and violent more than once in the second and the third books, and it must be admitted that the subsequent references to the division has only added to the ambiguity of the notion of calm passions. Sometimes it has been used to suggest reason or at least a reason-like disposition, at another time the notion has been so used as if to suggest an evaluating state of mind, disinterested and unbiased. We may give two examples of the varied use of the notion as put into by Hume:

> (a) "that reason which is able to oppose passion [is]...nothing but a general calm determination of our passions, founded on some distant view or reflexion". (ibid., p. 583)
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> (b) "The uneasiness and satisfaction are not only inseparable from vice and virtue, but constitute their very nature and essence. To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance".(ibid., p. 296)

Passages like these abound in the last two books of the Treatise, and have given rise to various interpretations. Hume himself writes that 'passion' be reserved for violent secondary impressions,while the term 'reason' for affections which operate calmly: "What we commonly understand by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the

former; but such as operate more calmly, and cause no disorder in the temper: Which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them." (ibid., p.437) What is significant in this passage is that Hume calls the affections which 'cause no disorder in the temper' by the name reason, and that the distinguishing mark of the calm passions is intended to be their low emotional intensity or 'tranquillity'. Though in other contexts Hume would like to reserve the term 'reason' for demonstrative operations of the mind alone, yet here, in this case, we find him using the term 'reason' in a generalised sense of reflexion, though not admitting its identity with 'intellectual faculties'. Besides the varying degrees of emotional intensity that characterise the calm and violent passions, Hume has another way of differentiating them, i.e., in terms of their effects. He says that "the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will" than the calm ones, which may, of course, control "the most furious movements" of the violent passions only if they are "corroborated by reflection, and seconded by resolution" (ibid., pp.437-8)

Hume never feels secure with his account of the dichotomy of passions. "What makes this whole affair more uncertain" he remarks, "is that a calm passion may easily be changed into a violent one", and vice versa, not only because of "the circumstances and situation of the object" of the passions and custom and imagination, but also due to the fact of their dependence on "principles too fine and minute". Considerations of like nature have led the commentators of

Hume to confess that the calm passions' doctrine is exceedingly difficult to understand and does not allow of any simple interpretation. It may be safely said that Hume says so many different things about the calm passions that one is likely to conclude either that he attributes several meanings to this term or that he thinks passions can be 'calm' in more ways than one. And yet more than one interpretations have been offered. We may note a few of them.

(i) D.Kydd in her book Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise holds that the term 'calm passion' is introduced by Hume in order to explain which we really mean by 'reasonable conduct'. The doctrine, she says, is an alternative to rationalism, and she interprets that a passion can be calm if it is "founded on a distant view or reflection".

(ii) Closely allied to Kydd's view is that of Mary Warnock's. She puts forth her interpretation in one of her papers to the Aristotelian Society (PAS, 1957, 44). She thinks that a calm passion is a feeling inspired by the rational and detached consideration of some object, and in support of her interpretation she alludes to Hume's example of a calm passion, i.e., 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action'.

(iii) Kemp Smith characterises the calm passions as modes of approval and disapproval.

All the three views about Hume's notion of the calm passions are related. If we take Kemp Smith's view as the leading one, then

we might find it to be source of the two other views as well. Mary Warnock's view seems to be a variant of Kemp Smith's view; since to a certain extent aesthetic evaluations for Hume, are on a par with moral judgments. Both the kinds of approvals, moral and aesthetic, are disinterested and unbiased and are said to arise from reflection. Only Rydd's view makes a further claim in characterizing calm passions as cognitive. P.S. Ardal has considered the calm passion doctrine extensively in his book Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise and criticized all the views mentioned above. We may now turn to Ardal's criticisms.

He has argued that Rydd makes two mistakes' in thinking (a) that a calm passion is always preferable to a violent one, and (b) that Hume's calm passion doctrine is "designed to replace the rationalist doctrine" and is "essentially based upon rationalist premises". As regards her first mistake Ardal points out that on occasions Hume has suggested that the mind should preserve its ardour, because security diminishes the passions. It is true that violent passions often lead to rash behaviour, yet if passions become "too calm" there might be no incentive to act left. So it is not true that a calm passions is always preferable to a violent one. Rydd thinks of the preference because a calm passion is dependent upon correct judgments, and to this Ardal points out that people may be misled even if they are not in the possession of a violent passion, e.g., by being given wrong information. Rydd has worked out her reasons for preferring a calm passion to a violent one as follows' passions are

calm in the sense that they are either conducive to or directed towards our greatest possible good. Ardal rightly thinks that this is a stipulation, because the word 'calm' in Hume's phrase 'calm passion' is not used evaluatively but descriptively.

Ardal is certainly right in pointing out, in connection with Kydd's second mistake, that Hume, in fact, uses his distinction between calm and violent passions to explain the rationalists' mistake. The rationalists claimed that reason could be a motive to the will, whereas Hume tried to show that even a calm passion associated with a firm disposition might be a stronger motive. Objective reflexion on a situation arouses in us a passion involving little emotional disturbance directed toward the object of desire or interest. Whether a calm or a violent passion will determine our conduct depends entirely upon our situation and the habits we have developed. We have already noticed Hume's remark in this respect. When Hume says that in distinguishing the calm and the violent passions he was using a "vulgar and specious" methodological device, he makes it quite clear that he had the rationalists in his mind, and his premises could not be rationalist either. The rationalists are the philosophic respectability.

But one feels that Ardal's criticism of Kydd's first mistake, i.e., that a calm passion is preferable to a violent one, is a little uncharitable. The possibility of one's being given wrong information while experiencing a calm passion is quite justified as Ardal has pointed out, yet Kydd's view is not altogether baseless though mis-

conceived. Hume does not speak to the effect that to be determined by a calm passion is to be determined according to the greatest possible good as Rydd thinks it is, but Hume does distinguish between good and the greatest possible good. The view of the greatest possible good may give rise to calm passion, but not necessarily. According to Hume, whether one will come to have a calm or a violent passion in view of his greatest possible good will ultimately depend on "the general character or present disposition of the person". (ibid., p. 418) Rydd overlooks this point. Hume says further that "strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (ibid.) but the implication is not mutual, because "there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue". Rydd may perhaps also have overlooked Hume's note that "The same good, when near will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one". (ibid., p. 419) Here we find no mention of any specific good which will be near or distant. There is no reason to suppose that the greatest possible good must always be at a distance in order that one may have a calm passion directed towards it. Rydd's preference thesis is an unfortunate formulation in rationalistic terms. We do find Hume speaking of choosing between calm and violent passions but not as Rydd thought. We are told : " 'tis certain, that when we would govern a man, & push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passion, and rather take him by his inclination that what is vulgarly called his reason". (ibid., p. 419) Hume is virtually looking back to Locke, who held that, the greater good does not determine the will in the

absence of uneasiness. Rydd appears to take Hume say what Thomas Reid would have said that what is good for us, upon the whole is an end of which we can only form a conception by the use of reason.

Ardal demures to Keep Smith's mistake in thinking that Hume was referring exclusively to approval and disapproval. Though Ardal does not minimise the importance of calm passions in evaluation yet he emphasises that calmness is not the defining characteristic of approval or disapproval. It is true that for Hume to evaluate is to experience a certain calmness of passions, yet the converse is not true. For instance, when the object of passion is distant and unrelated to us, we may have a calm passion towards it, but it does not imply that we are evaluating the object, we may be morally indifferent to it as well. Evaluative passions, Ardal points out, are distinguished by their qualitative character, i.e., disinterestedness and a general reflective perspective. Though Hume classifies approval and disapproval as calm passions, it does not follow that if there is a calm passion, it is either a feeling of approval or of disapproval. It is also true though that we cannot perhaps think of moral evaluation except as experiencing a calm passion.

Ardal seems to have altogether missed Kemp Smith's view that Hume's theory of the passions is more concerned with supporting the thesis that the laws of association play a similar role in the mental world like that of gravity in the physical world. He proposes to highlight "the closeness of the connexion between Hume's theory

of the passions and his ethical teaching". Hence he pays more attention to "those particular passions which call for special consideration under the title of 'sentiments' -- the moral and aesthetic sentiments, which determine our judgments of approval and disapproval, and to which there are no proper parallels in the animal sphere". (Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 159-160) If we keep in view the task Kemp Smith sets himself to do, then it would appear not to be mistaken to look upon the calm passions as those which are evaluative. On page 167 Kemp Smith draws our attention to the fact why is it that the calm passions as Hume says, are confounded with reason, "traced, like judgments and inference regarding matters of fact, to understanding or reason instead of to feeling"? Kemp Smith identifies the calm passions as those "which we experience on the mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action and external forms", and describes as "modes of approval and disapproval" (ibid., p. 167). The identification is made with a view to showing the ethical relevance of a class of passions.

Ardal's own observations about Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions are worth considering. One important comment that Ardal makes is that the distinction is "analogous to the concept of 'force and vivacity' in impressions and certain ideas". The analogy is partly true because, besides differing in 'force and vivacity' ideas and impressions can be said to differ in another

way. It is not only a difference in degree but may also be one of kind as well. Ideas are mostly available for recollection, though we may not have impressions in this way. In a sense, impressions are given, and ideas are not, they are not self-sufficient, but owe their existence to the occurence of impressions. Again, while explaining the word 'idea' Hume speaks as though he would have 'thought' for an equivalent expression. He writes, "By idea I mean the faint images of these (impressions) in thinking and reasoning;such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse..etc." (op.cit.,p.1) Can such a basic difference be discovered for the passions varying in the degree of emotional intensity alone? Hume's ideas and impressions are mutually exclusive, and this is not true about the passions, since a calm passion can become violent, and a violent one ~~becomes~~ calm. Such a possibility of transformation does not work for impressions and ideas. Ardal has been led to think that it does because he took the varying degree of emotional intensity as the decisive factor for the distinction between the calm and the violent passions. Impressions and ideas are related not only by their ~~degrees of~~ varying 'force and vivacity' but also by being original and its copy. Could we say that a calm passion is a copy of a violent one? And further, a calm passion can become violent, but an idea can never become an impression, at best we may have an impression of reflexion, and never one that of sensation.

The division between calm and violent passions, Ardal himself

admits, is not exact, but that between impressions and ideas is exact. He explains the sense in which the division is not exact: "Although, upon occasion, a calm passion can be violent, this does not entail that it belongs to the class of violent passions. A calm passion is thus a passion which on most occasions involves a low emotional intensity." (Passion and Value in Hume's Ethics, p.94). That a passion can be altered or acquire a greater or a lower emotional intensity without changing its identity. Now the statement is only apparently plausible. We may ask, is it true for all passions as such or for only a subclass of the passions? Can we think of the passion of approval altering into a violent passion? If it does, then it will certainly change its identity, because an evaluative passion is by definition calm, though any calm passion need not be necessarily evaluative.

Ardal suggests that 'calm passions' could be taken as a calm name, and the class would include more than the passions of approval and disapproval. But the consequences are not worked out by Ardal, and some of which might be contrary to his criticisms of both Kemp Smith and Hydd. For instance, if 'calm passions' is a class name, then it must be a class of such passions that "on most occasions involves low emotional intensity". Let us ignore the phrase "on most occasions". The class of passions involving low emotional intensity will have the class 'violent passions' as its complement. In that case no member of the class of calm passions can be a member of the class of violent passions, 'without changing its identity'.

We can think of a common membership between two classes only if they are non-identical classes. The passion of approval is a member of the class of calm passions, and as such it is not a member of the class of violent passions. Now the class of calm passions has other members besides evaluative passions. Ardal says that the non-evaluative members of the class of calm passions can 'on occasions' be members ad hoc of the class of violent passions without changing their identity. The notion of ad hoc membership is not enough clear. The class of chairs is a sub-class of the class of furniture, and it is not so 'on occasion', rather always. In formation dance, some members of one class can become ad hoc members of another class, but does not the new membership affect their identity? Can I think some of the trees of my garden as ad hoc members of the class of wild trees, even though I might have collected them from wilderness. The 'calm passions' as a class name is difficult to be worked out or formulated, yet what Ardal says about calm passions is that a passion which is usually calm, may on occasions be violent seems true only if we can afford to overlook his phrase 'without changing its identity'. Ad hoc membership and common membership are not identical notions. In the latter case the product class of the classes, say A and B, is a subclass of both the classes. Can we say that ad hoc membership presents a similar case? The product class formed by ad hoc membership can not be a subclass of both classes of calm passions and violent passions.

Hume says that the mind has always a propensity to pass from

one passion to any other related to it; and this propensity is forwarded when the object of the one passion is related to that of the other". (op. cit., p. 399) If this be so, then in order that a calm passion can alter itself into a violent one only if the object of a calm passion be related to that of the violent passions. Ardal obviously overlooks this condition.

Hume has made another division of passions into direct and indirect. "By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities' (ibid., p. 276) Some of the examples that Hume gives of direct and indirect passions are common to the examples of calm and violent passions. For example, the violent passions like love and hatred, pride and humility are classed under the indirect passions. But the violent passions such as joy and grief are said to be direct passions, together with desire, aversion, fear, despair and security. If the former distinction between calm and violent passions was based upon the degree of emotional intensity with which they 'strike upon the soul' or enter into consciousness, then the latter division of direct and indirect passions is made according to their mode of originating. So we can say that pride is a violent indirect passion or joy is a direct violent passion. It may be noted that Hume in the first section of the Book II of the Treatise does not give any example of any calm direct or calm indirect passion, though he treats the calm passion of beauty as an indirect passion in the later part of the book. Kemp Smith consi-

ders the evaluative passions, moral or aesthetic, as calm direct passions, while Ardal puts them under calm and indirect passion. It seems fair to treat the evaluative sentiments as a border-line case. An argument for their inclusion under the calm indirect passion may be formulated as follows: Hume's analysis of human nature is intended as the foundation of a study of the various kinds of judgments that we make and the various acts based on judgments. It is not concerned with original feelings, but with our reactions, i.e., the passions. In this sense, the passions are secondary impressions. The sensations are not indifferent, and are found either as painful or pleasant. This basic datum is the source of all our judgments, and acts. We approve of the pleasant sensations and disapprove of those that are painful. Secondary impressions or passions arise from these approvals or disapprovals. They constitute the basic human reaction to their situations. Some passions are aroused in us immediately by the original impressions, i.e., the direct passions, while others arise involving certain kinds of relations between the cause of the original impressions and our reactions. These are the indirect passions. When we evaluate ourselves or other persons, we have feelings, which imply a conscious mental state on our part and the person or persons or things having a certain set of attributes, and the owner of the feeling. This explanation shows what Hume could mean by his description of indirect feelings as proceeding from the same principles as the direct ones, 'but by conjunction of other qualities'. Passmore has observed that with the direct passions Hume did not much concern himself, but with constructing "the more compli-

cated indirect passions of the direct passions, with the aid of the associative principles" (Hume's Intentions, p. 124) Ardal takes exception to Passmore's use of the word 'construct', since it might suggest that Hume's indirect passions were complex physical entities. Hume himself remarks that no passion can be defined: " 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them (indirect passions like pride and humility), or indeed of any of the passions" (op. cit. p.277). In his words, the passions, whether direct or indirect, are 'simple impressions'. Kemp Smith comments that the indirect passions, "qua impressions, they are sui generis and unanalysable" (op. cit., p. 166). Ardal is then right in pointing out that Passmore's word conveys wrong suggestion. But Hume's discussion of the indirect passions is more elaborate than the direct ones, and we may presume that Passmore was led to use the word 'construct' keeping in view the fact that Hume found in his notion of the indirect passions an opportunity for testing the resources of the experimental method which he professes to follow. In particular, the indirect passion, we shall see later on, are specially susceptible to what Hume calls the 'double association of the impressions and ideas'.

Another issue may be considered for a while, i.e., the classification of the evaluative passions as direct or indirect passions. We have earlier noted that Kemp Smith puts them under calm direct passions, while Ardal classifies them as calm but indirect passions.

How which of these classifications could be justified. Let us remember that Hume holds that direct passions "arise immediately from good and evil, from pain or pleasure" (op.cit., p. 276). And Kemp Smith explicitly remarks that the evaluative passions are experienced "on the mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action etc.," (op. cit.,p.167). How arising immediately from pain and pleasure and from mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in actions and forms can hardly be said to have similar import. Kemp Smith while arguing for the calmness of evaluative passions insisted on their contemplative nature: "as arising when [some abiding quality].. is viewed disinterestedly". On these terms approval or disapproval of the 'moral type' can not be direct, but indirect. Ardal's view that the evaluative passions are calm and indirect seems to fair better than Kemp Smith's. But there remains another difficulty. An indirect passion is distinguished from a direct one by its necessary relation to the self. Neither pride nor humility could be explained without reference to the self of the proud or the humble person. And when evaluative passions are characteristically disinterested, how could they be said to be 'indirect' in the sense defined? Disinterestedness seems to be the crucial point involved. If a calm passion is disinterested, i.e., bears no reference to self of the person experiencing the passion, then it is direct. On the other hand, a passion can arise immediately from experienced pain or pleasure, or from a contemplation of things. If it does arise in the former manner it will be a direct passion; and if it arises in the latter way, then it is indirect. If contem-

plativeness or disinterestedness is compatible with the necessary reference to the self, then the evaluative passions are calm and indirect as Ardal has argued. If not, then Kemp Smith's view seems to be cogent. But Hume himself is not very helpful on this point, and one will have to offer interpretative explanations. Recent writers on Hume think that the calm/violent division and the direct/indirect division of passions are such that the former 'cuts straight across' the latter. This seems to be a plausible view, and is held in unison by both Ardal (p. 97) and Philip Mercer (in his Sympathy and Ethics, p.22). Though Ardal calls the calm/violent division "the fundamentum divisionis"; Kemp Smith, on the other hand, favours another basic classification of passions, i.e., into the primary and the secondary ones. He says that the natural appetites which are 'sheerly instinctive' are primary passions. In their being instinctive they differ from all passions whatsoever. Then there are the secondary passions comprising the affections, emotions and sentiments. "The differentia distinguishing them from a [primary] passion like hunger is that the immediate occasion of their being experienced is some antecedent perception of pleasure of pain." (op. cit., p. 166). Under the secondary passions comes the direct/indirect division, with a calm and a violent variety each kind. But no classification fully works because of Hume's ambivalent attitude in testing the passions and not following his own divisions strictly. A passion like benovelence for example is classed with love of life, which is certainly instinctive. Mercer has remarked that Kemp Smith has lumped together passions of diverse nature, though Hume

himself is responsible for that sort of stipulations, and this fact has been taken note of by Ardal (p.10).

We may now turn to consider the nature of the indirect passions. Since the passions are simple and unalysable, only a description of them is possible to be given. By 'description' of the passions, Hume means "an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them". He distinguishes between an object and a cause of the indirect passions. Both of these are 'conditioning' circumstances of indirect passions. Kemp Smith takes 'object' to signify "the relation in which the passions stand to the self", and Ardal thinks that the object of a passion is the "direction of thought or attention". Kemp Smith uses the phrase 'the view of the mind'.

In the case of the indirect passions like pride and humility. Hume says that the "object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (op.cit., p.277). Whether Hume here abdicates his controversial 'bundle of perceptions' or is incorporating some form of Cartesian notion of mental substance, we need not go into that question. Mercer has dealt with this issue. We may instead sample out a few ways in which Hume does speak about the object of the indirect passions. In experiencing an indirect passion the mind comprehends everthing "with a view to ourselves" (ibid.) and what "we call self" is a "connected succession of perceptions" (ibid.). The self is spoken of as an "individual person" (ibid., p.286), which is said to comprehend "the qualities of our mind and body" (ibid.p.303).

The "impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us, and ... our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our our person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that anything can in this particular go beyond it" (ibid., p.317). Again, "we are at all times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions" (ibid.,p.339). And the "idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we are related"(ibid.,p.354).

The domain of the indirect passions is interwoven with a system of sentional association, of which the self is the most important factor. The self as the object of indirect passions has a specific role to play. It is evident from Hume's manner of speaking about the self that it is an important condition of all our self-regarding passions like pride and humility. Pride, for Hume is a self-regarding passion, which is characterised by "self-esteem or self-approval or self-value" as John Laird has put it (Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p. 194). Kemp Smith has explained Hume's notion of the 'object' of the indirect passions like pride and humility in the following way: "Either passion, on being aroused, at once turns our view to the idea of the self. Though neither pride nor humility, qua impression, contains the idea of the self, each none the less fixes the view of the mind upon it." (op.cit.,p. 179). It means the self cannot be regarded as a necessary condition of having the passions of pride or humility. Since neither pride nor humility, qua passion contain the idea of the self, it

is not analytic to say that to experience a passion like pride or humility is to entertain an idea of the self. This point has been elaborated by Ardal in the context of his view that Hume "misrepresents the relation between the indirect passions and their objects" (op. cit., p. 18). The contingent relation between pride and its object is such that one might be proud and yet not think of oneself (ibid.,p.23). But is this true? If, as Hume has more than once put it, the 'impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us', could we say, as Ardal argues, X is proud and the 'object' of his pride is not X himself, but Y? If Hume would allow the logical connexion between X's feeling proud and thinking of himself be overlooked, then even though we might grant that X, while feeling proud, is thinking of another person, Y (think of the statement "I am proud of you"), as the object of his pride, it will run counter to Hume's own statement in this context: " 'tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look beyond, 'tis still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon us." (op.cit.,p.280) Both Kemp Smith and Ardal quote this passage in order to bring out the contingent relation between the self as object of passion and the passion itself. It is true that Hume speaks of the relation as 'natural', but both of them have overlooked Hume's use of the words 'always' and 'original' in the passage they quote. Later on in the paragraph following the passage Hume distinguishes 'original' from 'natural' and speaks of inseparability of the self as the object of the passions as their "distinguishing characteristic". This confusion

could not have arisen if it could be recalled that an indirect passion was marked off as arising when previously experienced pleasure and pain were accompanied by certain ideas involving some kind of reference to a self (see Kemp Smith, p.169). And pride is an indirect passion. Hence it would follow that pride has the self as its object. It has been held that the relation between the passion of pride and the self as its object is contingent. This view is an instantiation of the more general opinion that, for Hume, the relation between the passions and their objects is contingent. The view is widely held and has almost passed into a dogma, and is related to a logical thesis which entertains no other dimensions of language than that of entailment and contradiction, and no use of language than the statement-making one. Without entering into the logical debate, we can ask whether deductive relationships are the only ones that we should consider. Again, should we not consider the nature of the world or the circumstances we care to name. Could we not significantly suggest that by virtue of the nature of the passions one's feeling pride necessarily implies one's having one's self as the object of the passion. Pride is a self-sentiment, and one can not be said to be *proud* unless one's direction of thought is addressed to one's self. Pride may also be a character trait, and in that case the proud man need not be conscious of his self all the time, but from this fact it does not perhaps follow that the proud man has no self-esteem. It appears difficult to conceive a situation such that there is a man who is proud and who does not have his self as the object of his passion. Such locutions as

"I am proud of you" are possible and legitimate. The possibility of such expressions depends on the fact that the speaker shares some of pride worthy qualities of the other person. That is to say, the qualities of the other person and the person himself stand in a unique relationship to the speaker. A father may be proud of his son or a teacher of his pupil and not without reasons. If there are proud mothers who pride in <u>their</u> babies, it is because the babies make it possible for such mothers to enjoy the state of motherhood, which is valued for various reasons, and hence desired. In short, in the domain of the passions Hume intends his propositions to have the contents of factual truths, and to be guranteed in the context of human nature, since he wants to be able to use his propositions as truths about man or human nature with a factual content.

Two points may briefly be noted in connexion with Ardal's interpretation of Hume's view of pride as an indirect passion. (a) He takes pride as 'a form of self-valuing', and points out that in this sense it has an object. But, he remarks that "the object is not something separate from the pride". This point is not explicit in Hume. Ardal further distinguishes between the object of a passion and the object of a desire. "Desires are aimed at bringing something about, a change in, or the continuation of, a certain state of affairs" (<u>op. cit.</u>,p.19). On the other hand, the object of pride or love is always some person, either oneself or another, it is something real, "not something to be realized" or brought about. (b) He makes another important distinction between <u>being</u>

proud and feeling proud. Ardal thinks that Hume's causal account of the indirect passion of pride is concerned with the latter. One may be proud by having pride as his character trait, and in that case he may not experience a certain sort of feeling. It is not unreasonable to suggest, Ardal says, that "a proud man's pride is in general more conspicuous to others than it is to the person himself" (op. cit.,p.20). According to him being proud is not equivalent to feeling proud or feeling an impression of pride.

Now this distinction has or may have its own merits, but what is not clear about it whether the judgment 'X is proud' is to be taken an introspective assertion or as a perceptual statement. It seems to me that, so far Hume is concerned, the judgment 'X is proud' can never have any self-validating force, at best an inductive inference at a par with such locutions like 'the peacock is proud' which is based upon noticing a set of conventional 'marks' of pride. Our chief source of knowing judgments like 'X is proud' is only through the mechanism of sympathy, since we do not enjoy any privileged access to anybody's feelings. Granted the privacy of experience as a basic empiricist premise, it remains only to say that the degree of corrigibility of one's own feeling-reports is certainly lesser, because, to have Hume's words once again, "our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person". In that case, Ardal's doubt that a "man is not at all the best judge himself as to whether he is a proud man" (op. cit.,p.22) seems to be much beside the point. Ardal himself admits that there may be an element

of self-valuing even in the case of pride as a character trait. Though on the basis of Hume's account of pride it is certainly possible to distinguish, as Ardal does, between being proud and feeling proud, yet, so far Hume's preoccupation is concerned, they are equivalent. At best, we can say that when we experience an emotion through an imaginative or sympathetic assumption of the expression and situation of another person we need not and commonly do not experience it as we would if the situation were unequivocally our own. In the Lysis Plato distinguishes between the ignorance which is both present in and predicable of a man and that which though it is present in him is not predicable of him. Emotion is subject to a similar distinction: the emotion or passion that I feel as another person's may be present in me without being predicable of me. It is present in me, when I say 'X is proud', because I do not merely recognise that X is displaying certain signs or expressing pride, but actually feel the passion; yet the passion I feel is not predicable of me, i.e., it would be false to say that I am proud or even, unqualifiedly, that I feel proud. In the case of the statement 'X is proud', the passion is there for me in X.

We have thus far followed Hume saying that the 'object' of indirect passions like pride and humility is the self. But the self in itself does not generate these passions. The passion of pride or humility in ourselves is excited only when something not ourselves "turns our view" to ourselves. The stimulus to pride or humility must lie in some distinctive 'quality' of the 'cause' that excites these passions. Let us see why the self, the 'object' of the

passions of pride and humility cannot be their 'cause' as well. We have already pointed out that Hume makes a logical point in saying that the thought of self and the passions of pride and humility are 'naturally' connected. Hume's word 'natural' must be taken in a stronger sense than contingent since it is inconceivable in the context of human nature to feel proud and not have a thought of one's self. The word 'natural' in Hume's writings means "an ultimate characteristic of our human nature" (Kemp Smith, op.cit.,p.183). Hence, for Hume's purposes, to say that the thought of self and the feeling of pride are 'naturally' connected would be equivalent to asserting a unique implication between the passion and its 'object'. Or, we might say that the self as the object of the passions of pride and humility is the necessary condition of the passions. Now, the necessary condition is not also the sufficient condition [redacted]. Hume says, "But tho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self, be always the object of these two (pride and humility) passions, 'tis impossible it can be their cause, or be sufficient alone to excite them. For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause, it cou'd never produce any degree of the one, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both." (op.cit., p.277-8). Hume argues that if the self were the cause of both pride and humility, then we could not distinguish between the passions. Since the passions in question are not similar in nature, the self cannot be the cause of either. This consideration leads him to make a valid point: "As

must, therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them,and that to which they direct their view, when excited...The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produced by it. The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, and the second the object of the passions." (Ibid.,p.278) In short, the passions of pride and humility have an identity of 'object', i.e., the self, but a diversity of their causes, for nothing can excite both the passions of pride and humility, nor can they have their 'sufficient cause' what is common to both. Hence a distinction between the cause and the object of the indirect passions of pride and humility is legitimately called for.

Now granted the distinction between the 'cause' and the 'object' of the passions of pride and humility, Hume further subdivides the cause into the 'quality' and the 'subject' of passions. The 'subject' is the locus of the 'quality' which operates in generating the passion. When, for example, we say that X is proud of y, here y constitutes the subject part of the 'cause' of X's feeling of pride. The domain of y is constituted by a "vast variety" of things, the qualities of mind and body and "whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to" X. We might further say, P. In this case a fuller expression of 'X is proud' would be equivalent to

asserting 'X is proud of Py'. For Hume, whenever X is proud of y, there is always an y such that it is P. Hume's own example would make the point clearer. "A man, for insoance, is vain of a buitiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contriv'd. Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house; which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider'd as his property or contrivance. Both these parts are essential ..." (ibid., p.279) Kemp Smith has rightly said that the 'subject' of an indirect passion is 'complexly conceived'.

The quality 'P' exists in a something y, the subject, which stands related to the self. The relation between Py and X may be two fold. Kemp Smith says "either as in some manner constituting it or as causally related to it as a possession or dependent" (op. cit., p. 181). If Py is constitutive of X's, pride then y would stand for X's dispositions or bodily endowments; and if y is causally related to X, the y would stand for "whatever is in the least allied or related" to X. But the overall picture seems to be of the second sort, i.e., casual explanation of the phenomenon of pride and humility. Kemp Smith has distinguished two ways in which the self enters into the passions of pride and humility: "(1) as integral to the 'subject' which excites, i.e., produces, the passion; and (2) as being the 'object' to which the passion, when excited, at once leads the mind." (ibid.) In the first case the self in a factor

in the complex 'subject'. The second case is easy to understand, and we can dispose of it without any comment. As regards the first case, i.e., wherein the self is 'integral' 'factor' in the 'subject' of passion, one may doubt whether the relation between Py and the self-reference[1] of pride would be identical with that of in the second case. Where the self is a factor in the 'subject' of passion, the relation between the 'subject' and the 'object' would be closer than that in which it is not, and consequently the nature of the causal relation in the two cases will have to be diverse. Hume seems to overlook this point and assort all sorts of instances under one heading.

Ardal has raised the point of justifying one's pride. For example, if X is challenged as to whether he had anything to be proud of in a X could justify his pride with more congency only if he were personally responsible for the quality P in y, i.e., if Py were constituted by X's self. A man could be proud of his academic attainments. But if Py were a beautiful house which X had inherited, it may be doubted whether X could be as proud of it as he could be if it were of his own making. Hume mentions the case of one's return to health as a cause of one's pride. We can think of a person so addicated to drugs that he became ill, and could return to health

1. The self is the 'object' of pride. When X says 'I am proud', X is self-conscious and self-consciousness is a reflexive relation, just as much self-love is, such that for both pride and self-love a formula like '(x)Rxx' is true. I do not suggest that for Hume self-love is reflexive, but, for Hobbes, it could be so. That of course, is another issue. '(x)Rxx' is especially true in the case of pride as self-exteem. In the cases of such locutions as 'I am proud of you', the formulation of the relation between the object and the subject of the passion may be rendered by distinguishing between total reflexivity and reflexivity.

only by dint of his will power in overcoming his addiction. In this case the example is alright. But with an ordinary patient when he comes to health as a result of good medical treatment, it is the doctor who could be proud rather than the patient, who could of course be joyful. Ardal makes two comments which confuse the issue which he very rightly raises. He remarks, on the one hand, that "the challenge 'You have nothing to be proud of' cannot be met unless there is something special in the relation between the cause of pride and its object", and on the other, he says that such a special relation "should be thought to exist" (op. cit., pp. 29-30, emphasis added). How 'thought' by whom? The man who puts up the challenge or the person who is proud? If it is the thought of the person who feels proud, then the demand for a 'justification' makes no sense, because his mere thinking of there being a special relation would suffice. If it is the other person who challenges the proud man, then of course the question becomes relevant. Whether a man is justified in feeling proud could be ascertained by invoking the principle of sympathy. And if pride is said to be a kind of self-valuation, then the evaluation could also be tested by assuming a general point of view. My mere thinking that there is a special relation between myself and the 'cause' of my pride would cannot justify my feelings. I can say whether I could have been in some sense responsible for the realization of what is taken by me to be the 'cause' for my pride. A plagiarist might show off 'marks' of pride, yet he cannot be proud, because he can take no credit for the cause of his pride.

It must not be assumed that the cause 'Py' of itself alone would give rise to passion. The 'cause' would arouse a passion in X only if it is either agreeable or disagreeable to him. This point follows from Hume's description of indirect passions. X could experience a passion only if the quality P is capable of producing pain or pleasure, and y is related to x. "I observe, that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or poorer makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: And by humility I mean the opposite impression." (op.cit., p. 297) Another more terse statement runs as follows: "Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object." (ibid., p.283) In the case of humility "the relation to self continues the same" only "the sensation, arising from the causes" is reversed, i.e., the causes of humility produce disagreeable sensations. The passions of pride and humility, thus explained go to yield a "general system" to which Hume provides as many as five 'limitations'. Some of the limitations we have already taken note of, viz. the cause of a passion must be an independent source of pleasure or pain and it must stand in a special relation to the self. We might now turn to a consideration of what Hume calls the "double association of impressions and ideas."

Hume's 'general system' of indirect passions depends on the associative mechanism of man's emotional life. The passions of pride and humility are "determined to have self for their object,

not only by a natural but also by an original property." (ibid.,p. 280) The words 'natural' and 'original' are significant notions so far as Hume's theory of passions is concerned. By 'natural' he seems to mean the constancy and steadiness of the determination of the passions, and by 'original' that it is primary in the sense that it cannot be further resolved into other elements. This explanation stands in need of being modified when we come to the causes of passions. The causes of pride and humility are natural in the sense that the same sorts of objects tend to give rise to the passions. The earlier explanation fits in here. But when we turn to the other property, i.e., 'natural', a modification seems necessary. Material possessions and physical qualities tend to give rise to pride and vanity, though these cannot be said to be 'original' in the same sense as indicated in the case of the 'object' of passions. Firstly, there is a vast number of causes, from psycho-physical dispositions to the effects of art and industry. Hume says that " 'tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was foreseen and provided for by nature" to become causes of pride and humility. Again, "we find upon examination, that they are not original, and that 'tis utterly impossible they shou'd each of them be adapted to these passions by a particular provision, and primary constitution of nature." (ibid., p. 281) Although, it might be said, it is from natural principles that a great variety of causes excites pride and humility, it is not true that each different cause is adapted to its passion by a different principle. Only an "unskilful naturalist" (the phrase is Hume's) would say that. Hence, the problem

is to discover among the various causes a common element on which their influence depends. Instead of admitting "a monstrous heap of principles" in moral philosophy Hume seeks to reduce the number of the principles. He compares this task to a Copernican revolution in morals.

Any statement of Hume's theory of the association of ideas is beset with difficulties. The materials of experience, i.e., impressions and ideas, are 'clear and distinct' (at least in the Enquiry, section 48) and fall within the domain of matters of fact. Any relation between them cannot be analytically true, since their atomic status precludes any such possibility. According to Hume only mathematical ideas can be analytically related in the technical sense of the word 'relation'. Hume himself has distinguished two kinds of relations: philosophical and natural. The philosophical relations are usually said to be relations holding between mathematical ideas. And this is the kind of relation that I propose to say is a relation in the technical sense, e.g., any true statement of the form Rab . To say that a is like or unlike b is to assert a philosophical relation between a and b. Obviously this conception of relation does not concern us here. The second sort of relation is of the kind which Hume calls 'natural' relations, and causal relation is a paradigm case of such relations. A natural relation between x and y would mean that x and y are 'related', 'connected' or even 'associated'. Hume's equivocation of 'relation' and 'association' is worthnoting in this context. In fact he speaks of the "double relation of ideas and impressions"(ibid.,p. 206; and

he also uses the word 'connected' in the Treatise p.285 in the same context). Natural relations are based on the three properties of resemblance, continguity and cause and effect. One might legitimately expect that Hume's theory of association of impressions and ideas would be a casual one, or at least Hume gives us an account of man's passionate life in casual terms.

The fact that impressions (both primary and secondary ones) and ideas get associated is a characteristic of human nature, and this has "a mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions" (ibid., p.283). Now having granted that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas," Hume notes a "remarkable difference" in the manner in which impressions are associated from that of the ideas: "ideas are associated by resemblance, continguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance" (ibid., p.283). By 'impressions' here would be meant impressions of reflexion or indirect passions. Let us now see how does Hume account for the genesis of pride and humility by making an appeal to the association of impressions and ideas. He would extend the applicability of the mechanism of association to two other indirect passions, viz., love and hatred as well.[1]

Given an indirect passion, say pride, we have two sets of properties, i.e., I(a) properties of the passion, namely, the self or the person having or experiencing the passion, its 'object', and (b) the sensation of passion, which is either painful or pleasant. In

1. "What I discover to be true in some instances, I suppose to be so in all." (Treatise, p. 285).

the other hand, "the two supposed properties of the causes": II (a) "their relation to self, (b) their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion" (ibid., p. 286). Hume goes on to explain the mechanism thus: "That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd. The one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it." (ibid., pp.286-7)

The relation is said to be 'double' in the sense that we have two sets of ideas and two sets of impressions. The two sets of impressions are the impression of sensation, i.e., the pleasant or painful sensation and "the sensation of passion" which is an impression of reflexion. The two impressions resemble each other, and are therefore related. On the other hand, we have the 'idea of ourselves' and the idea of the causal subject with its qualities, which is related to the self. Thus we have two associations, one that of the ideas, and the other, that of the impressions. This 'double impulse', as Hume calls it, gives rise to an indirect passion. Neither of these associations is sufficient to give rise to passions, and hence the necessity of the 'double relation'.

In short, Hume's intention has been that of explaining the

complex emotional life of mankind with the aid of as few principles as possible. In treating of the indirect passions and of the transition from one passion to another he makes use of the double relation of impressions and ideas. In fact, he does two things: one, he speaks of indirect passions as arising from the 'double impulse', and secondly, he explains the transition from one such passion to another as the effect of the concurrent operation of associated ideas and impressions. But it may be doubted whether he consistently adheres to the principle of association. For instance, he says, "Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be completed. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections." (ibid., p.283) Doesn't this explanation make a single association of resembling passions do the work of transition, which on Hume's theory requires a double association of impressions and ideas? Again, the alleged association of ideas becomes suspect, since Hume compares ideas to "the extension and solidity of matter" and says, "Ideas never admit of a total union, but are endowed with a kind of impenetrability, by which they exclude each other.." (ibid., p.366) And for that reason how could there be any association between sorrow, disappointment and anger, since 'impenetrable' ideas are involved. There is a general epistemological thesis which underlies Hume's discussion of the passions. This is the thesis that all the passions are simple impressions. A simple impression is one that cannot be analysed into parts. If it is not

implied that a simple impression can only be inspected, or in other words, all that we can do is to point to it and name it; in that case it is possible to observe similarities between simple impressions. This similarity of impressions is essential for the principle of association which Hume uses. What is after all meant by holding that an impression is simple? ~~How does~~ Why should Hume note simplicity of an impression compatible with its being similar to something else, since the notion of being similar conceptually excludes the notion of being simple? If X is similar to Y, in that case X can not be simple, for X must consist of what is similar Y, and what is different from Y, otherwise it would be identical with Y. From the claim that simples resemble each other in being simple it follows that there are no simples. Hence the epistemological basis for the similarity of simple impressions essential for the principle of association appears untenable. But the argument is not altogether decisive. It could be argued contrarily, whether in saying 'X is similar to Y' Hume would mean to say anything about X. Because the ideas or the impressions are simple, can there be anything over and above what they intrinsically are? Given two simple ideas X and Y, to say that X and Y are resembling, is not to say anything about X and Y anymore than saying that X is X and Y is Y, since the ideas are self-sufficient, and, resemblance is not a name of predicate or connexion of any sort, distinguishable from the ideas themselves. Association is also a relation, and a natural relation. In that case, it might not be unfair to suggest, X and Y are connected in the <u>imagination</u>, there is between them a <u>natural</u> relation, or it is

natural to the mind. When love and benevolence are associated by similarity of sensation of the passions the relation derives its credibility from the linguistic usage that governs the meaning of the terms. I do not propose to settle the disputed issue of Hume's theory of relations, and would rather leave it pointing out some of the difficulties involved in the epistemological basis presupposed in Hume's theory of passions. According to Hume the individuality of the passions is determined by the ideas, i.e., their 'objects'. There appears no reason to suppose why the ideas which are less vivid copies of impressions should fare better than their originals in so far as associative dispositions are concerned. That the ideas are not "entirely loose and unconnected" is a fact of experience only. The vulnerability of Hume's epistemological position is due to his assumption that it is possible to analyse items of awareness in consciousness into elements derived exclusively from sense experience. We need not examine Hume's epistemological theses in detail here.

Another disquieting feature of Hume's principles of association is that he seems to drop the element of the separate sensations of pleasure and pain by redefining the passions of pride and humility. On p. 286 of the Treatise he makes two statements that are hard to reconcile. We have already found him making a distinction between "two supposed properties of the causes [of passions], viz. their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion." This factor of "pain or pleasure, in-

dependent of the passion" is part of the cause of a passion, and identical with the passion itself. On the same page, a little above the passage quoted Hume makes a categorical statement, i.e., "pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful". Pride is a feeling or we are told that it is an impression of reflexion, and no sensation could be admitted to this category. If pride and humility are sensations in the ordinary sense of the words, the whole division of the primary and secondary passions become redundant. One might feel uneasy because Hume insists on the identity of pride and humility with pleasant and painful sensations in such terms as to make the sensations not only the necessary but also the sufficient condition of the said passions: "upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility".(ibid.) We might suggest levels in the language of our talking about emotions, corresponding to the emotive entities talked about. The language of sensation may be regarded as belonging to the first-order level, while that of the feelings (Hume's indirect passions) to second-order level. Granted that such language strata is admitted it may now be remarked that Hume's redefining the indirect passions of pride and humility in terms of sensations confounds the two levels besides upsetting the causal scheme of the passions which he had so elaborately worked out.

How do the sensations by which Hume defines pride and humility (I am aware of the fact that according to Hume's conditions indirect passions are indefinable psychic elements in our emotive life. I am

speaking about the extension of the notions of pride and humility) differ from what he calls 'sensation of passion'? I should like to withhold my answer for a little while. Ardal has undertaken to clarify the meaning of the phrase 'sensation of a passion'. He explains the terminology as follows: "When, ... two emotions are said to have a similar sensation, this indicates that, independently of knowledge of the circumstances, a person who has experienced both could detect a similarity - a medicine can taste like a certain fruit" (op. cit.,p.39). Ardal's interpretation is based upon the entailment between the fact that passions are simple impressions and the fact that to experience a passion is to have a special sensation. There is no apriori reason for rejecting Ardal's view, though it must be admitted he does not clarify the notion to make it sufficiently perspicacious. The 'special sensation' that one might have while experiencing an indirect passion must be of a different sort from that of the 'primary' passion, as Kemp Smith puts it. The sensation of passion is an emergent experience, while a sensation which which is just painful or pleasant, unless one cares to qualify the expression as Hume does not, would belong to the 'cause' of the passion experienced. The 'sensation of passion' is relative to the 'object' of the passion, and cannot be a part of the complexly conceived 'cause' with its 'subject' and 'qualities'. Pride and humility can be said to be sensations only if by 'sensation' we here mean the 'sensation of passion' and not that which makes us aware of things either agreeably or disagreeably in the case of experiencing 'primary' passions of Kemp Smith's classification.

Kemp Smith admits the two different types of sensations while commenting upon the mechanism of association. He writes, "The 'subject', which excites the passion, is related, causally, to the 'object' (i.e. the self) to which the passion qua passion turns the view of the mind; and the sensation of pleasure or pain which the 'subject' separately produces is related by way of resemblance to the sensation of the passion."(op.cit.,p.189-6) Now, besides the question of the two sensations, the passage contains an important point regarding the causal association between the 'subject' and the 'object' of the indirect passion. Ardal has taken up this point and has made some remarks worth considering. The relation between the self and the 'subject' of pride is a 'natural' one as Hume would have had it. The 'natural' relation could only be noticed but not explained, because it only so happens that there is an association between the idea of the self and the idea of the 'subject', which here would mean anything that has the quality of being the cause of the passion. Now, apart from the difficulty in conceiving an association of ideas, which are 'impenetrable' as Hume himself has admitted, there seems to be the difficulty, which Ardal emphasises, of expressing a logical relation in causal terms.[1] We have already

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1. It can also be suggested that generally Hume's explanation of pride and humility in terms of association is presented as a hypothesis. And so is his claim for the ego-centric and hedonistic basis of other passions. See Treatise, pp.289-90,324,325,326. The word 'hypothesis' in these contexts is not used pejoratively as synonymous with 'conjectures'; for example, as in §.xxii of Treatise or in the first Enquiry on page 145. Rather, he uses the term as a synonym for 'principle' or 'general principle' or 'doctrine', and a group of them with 'system'. Hence such uses of the terms have a potential verifiability. I have in mind Hume's set of 'Experiments' to confirm his system of the passions. While considering what emotions will be felt by a man who is shown a close friend or a relative in either a flattering or an unflattering light, Hume

Continued.....

considered that it is analytic to say that 'X is proud' entails that 'X is self-conscious', and it would be then self-contradictory to assert that 'X is proud' and the 'object' of his pride is some other person than himself. This is a strong sense of the 'natural' relation between the self and the passion of pride. But could we not think of some weaker senses of the relation? By a 'weaker' relation between the self and the passion of pride I mean some remote or indirect reference to the self of the proud person being involved. For example, when a father says to his son 'I am proud of you', it is this image of his son that draws his attention more than the idea that he is proud of his son. Again I would like to point to cases where we do sometimes are taken away by indirectly related 'subjects' and their 'qualities' and feel proud or humiliated, even if neither of these emotional states could be justified or we are not in any way responsible for the 'subject' of pride or humility in existence. In all such cases the 'natural' relation between pride and humility and their 'object' would seem to hold and appear to be in order.

Ardal seems to doubt whether resemblance is potent enough for the association of impressions. Hume holds that all resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Now 'follow' here is not a logical word, because impressions (of reflexion) are 'matters of fact' and no

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(Continuation of footnote 1 from previous page)

proposes to consult experience in order to verify his hypothesis that either pride or humility should result. These considerations are of course of primarily methodological interest, and we need not enter into the detail of the issues involved.

so-called logical or 'philosophical' relation[1] can hold between them. We can at best notice the associated impressions. Impressions follow one another in our experience and we can only reflectively notice it, though, Ardal points out, "noticing a resemblance is no part of the operation of the association" (op.cit., p. 25). But since the act of noticing does not associate the impressions, so it is one thing to compare reflectively the resembling impressions, and it is quite another thing that the resembling impressions are associated as a matter of fact. The association does not depend upon a prior reflective comparison. The impressions, given the quality of resemblance, 'follow' independently of our noticing the fact that they resemble one another. Hence Ardal remarks, "Hume is...in real difficulty, for if the association of impressions operates by resemblance only, it becomes hard to explain why any of a number of resembling impressions should be aroused in a given case." (op.cit.,p.26)

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1. Hume appears to be in two minds as regards his distinction between 'philosophical' and 'natural' relations. All knowledge on Hume's view, as on Locke's, is knowledge of relations, and 'proportions in quantity or number' (Treatise, p.70) are the objects of mathematical knowledge. These belong to the class of relations which cannot change while the relata remain constant, in contrast to spatial relations, which may alter without any change in the objects or ideas related. The sharp distinction between mathematical knowledge and empirical knowledge is satisfactory to the logical analyst. But doesn't Hume prefer to restrict the term 'relation' to what he entitles 'natural'? His justification for the restriction is by an appeal to ordinary usage. That he should ever have wished to limit the term 'relation' to 'natural' relation is explained also by his interchangeable use of 'relation' with 'association', 'connexion' and his speaking of custom or habit as "producing a relation". He describes a "perfect" relation as being one in which each of the two associated objects carries the mind to the other. See Treatise, p.355.

In the case of the passion of pride the resembling impressions are the sensation of pleasure which the 'quality' of the 'subject' produces in us and the pleasant sensation (of passion) of pride itself. Ardal seems to take the association of impressions in isolation from the association of ideas, and it may very well be surmised that the reason "why any of a number of resembling impressions should be aroused in a given case" is to be sought in the association of ideas. For we find Hume putting it in clear terms that "'tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object." (op.cit., p.283-4) Hume appeals to the principles of association only in order to give a genetic account of indirect passions in general, and pride and humility in particular, together with love and hatred. Of the double relation of impressions and ideas, he seems to, at least some times, give more importance to the association of ideas than that of the impressions. We might juxtapose two of his statements and find the relative value of the two principles of associations. First, let us have the statement concerning the association of impressions: "...the relation of resemblance operates upon the mind in the same manner as contiguity and causation, in conveying us from one idea to another, yet 'tis seldom a foundation either of pride or of humility" (ibid.,p.304). And secondly the statement about the value of the association of ideas: "The relation...of contiguity, or that of causation betwixt the cause and object of pride and humility, is alone requisite to give rise to the passions.."(ibid.,p.305) The value of the asso-

ciation of impressions seems to lie for Hume in "forwarding the transition betwixt some related impressions", i.e., from the impression of reflexion to the sensation (since every passion is an impression) of passion. Much depends on what Hume means by 'resemblance' and 'relation'. By 'relation' he means "nothing but a propensity to pass from one idea to another" (ibid.,p.309) and his equivocation of 'association' and 'relation' is a terminological characteristic. In Book I of the Treatise Hume mentions two senses of the word 'relation', "a quality by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination" or "that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them" (ibid.,p.13). In the case of the association of impressions by the relation of resemblance, Ardal's question is answered by the second alternative mentioned by Hume. Resemblance for Hume is "a principle of union" which is assumed in the cases of association, but it does not guarantee that the things associated are really resembling, and that is why Hume calls this relation "the most fertile source of error" (ibid.,p.61) Now if grief gives rise to anger, or anger to envy, we cannot ask why 'anger' or 'envy' alone 'follow' in Hume's sense of the term, and any other impression, because there is something inherent in the impression of grief by way of a disposition (Hume's term is 'propensity') to give rise to anger, or anger to envy. Hume seems to have been perfectly aware of this difficulty mentioned by Ardal, for we find Hume qualifying his 'system' of associative mechanism by 'limitations', particularly of 'causes' and 'general rules'. The dispositional interpretation of

the association of impressions may be given a textual support. Hume seems to be quite clear and emphatic on this issue. He writes, "that we may understand the full force of this double relation, we must consider, that 'tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end. One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling,...but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent."(ibid., pp.384-2) So Ardal's question might be answered as follows: In the case of the impressions (i.e. passions) changeableness is essential to our human nature (see Treatise, p.283) and when it changes, it does so from any one passion to which most resembles it. Why at all this should happen cannot be asked because Hume's analysis is empirical, and any trans-empirical pretension would be a philosophical perversity. The validity of his analysis can well be verified by 'consulting experience' as Hume puts it. From his own position, Hume would say in connexion with Ardal's question that "nature has bestow'd a kind of attraction on certain impressions...by which one of them, upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative." (ibid.,p.289) The argument hang on the word 'naturally', and it is such an important word that its implications cannot be profaned by relegating it to the domain of the contingent.

But one could always doubt whether Hume is a consistent associationist. Two reasons go to support this doubt. First, Hume seems to disbelieve the efficacy of the principles of association

and proliferates a number of limitations and the 'supplementary agency' of sympathy. Secondly, his advocacy of association comes to be confined to mixed passions. On this issue he seems to even contradict himself. On pages 381-2 of the Treatise he exempts pride and humility from the rule of the double relation of impressions and ideas since "these are pure sensations without any direction or tendency to action", and hence "the full force of this double relation" cannot be realized in their case. Is this inconsistency of a formal or a real nature? What does he mean by the term 'pure'? Does he mean by it 'simple'? If such be the case, then all indirect passions are simple, and it makes no sense to say that only pride and humility are 'pure sensations'. If, on the contrary, Hume is proposing to redefine his notion of indirect passions in terms of conative dispositions as he does seem to suggest by his phrase "tendency to action", then his original intention of giving a causal account of the rise of indirect passions irrespective of their 'pure' or mixed nature, comes to be abandoned. All emotions are not equally conative, but this fact does not seem to affect the explanation as to how do they arise. And Hume unfortunately, perhaps unaware of it, comes to hold some such view. It has been suggested by John Laird that in fact Hume distinguished three types of association; besides those of impressions and ideas, Laird mentions association of dispositions. The third type of association, he hoped, might explain the disquieting feature of the passions with or without "a tendency to action". But it is far from the case. Laird took notice of another kind of

association which Hume calls a 'real' relation and gives it the name of the "principle of a parallel direction" of desires. Kemp Smith calls it "the principle of concurrent direction" (op.cit.,p.184). Laird's association of dispositions (Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, p.201) does not really remove the difficulty mentioned above. It only goes to show that Hume did not believe his "double relation of impressions and ideas" sufficient to explain the transition of emotions, and his idea of a Copernican revolution remained unfulfilled.

But could we not find another line of defence that Hume might offer for the various limitations and types of associations that he said he needed? He might say that by careful examination he could show how extremely difficult it was to define and categorize precisely the internal phenomena of passions. Analysis, however subtle and ingenuous, remains still too coarse to grasp the delicate shades and far too inadequate to assimilate the rich and varied manifestations of our emotional life. The task of the psychologist is much more difficult than that of the natural scientist. A proof of this can be given as follows. Hume begins with saying that pride is a sensation of pleasure produced by the idea of something agreeable associated with our own self. But he soon finds it too wide a conception and puts various limitations, e.g., that pride is an indirect, combined and generally constant sensation of pleasure produced by the idea of something unusual; something frequently determined to be valuable by the opinion of our fellow begins, and consciously associated with the individual itself. Yet the words 'often' and

'generally' point to a failure in determining by scientific method (Hume calls 'experimental') the richly varied conception of pride. And the same argument would apply to no less complex phenomena of humility, love, and hatred. Whether or not their defence be granted, it may not be inconsistent with Hume's avowed intention for producing a 'statics and dynamics' of our mental life, though it remains veritably questionable whether this was his avowed intention. Hume suffers from a tension between professing his ability to give a naturalistic, mechanistic account of the human constitution and the Hutchesonian notion that our emotional life is divinely prearranged. Kemp Smith is right in his remark that in Hume the Hutchesonian and Newtonian influences are in conflict with one another.

We may now turn to consider certain general characteristics of Hume's theory of the passions.

Hume did not seek to derive or explain all passions through emotions. The 'direct' passions are not the products of the associationist mechanism. Hunger, lust, benevolence towards friends and resentment towards enemies are of such type and are considered by him to arise from "a natural impulse or instinct which is perfectly unaccountable". But the passion of benevolence is a test case. As an instinctive 'direct' passion, benevolence seems to be a passive passion. Is it quite that? For we do find Hume having benevolence among 'indirect' passions as well, though it is no longer passive. Hume's distinction between "pure emotions" or "pure sensations" and those passions that are attended with a "direction or tendency

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to action" makes him readjust his previous classification. Many of the direct passions reappear as non-pure, i.e., conative indirect emotions. In a sense, Hume is justified in his move, since he must have realized that besides the natural association of impressions and ideas, there is the association of dispositions, and this must have led him to formulate the principle of association of passions in order to account for the "transition of passions". A transition of passions is effected by the conjoined operation of the double associations of impressions and ideas. After a passion has been given rise to by the so-called "double relation of impressions and ideas" the passion, if it is conative, would glide into another passion of allied nature. Hume speaks of the "character" of passions. A passion stands related in two directions; one, causally with its 'subject' and 'quality' and 'object', and secondly, with other passions of resembling character. Hume writes, "One impression may be related to another not only when their sensations are resembling, ...but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent".(Op.cit.,p.381) The word "impression" here obviously stands for passions. Hume finds "this peculiar relation of impressions only in such affections, as are attended with a certain appetite or desire; such as those of love and hatred." (ibid.,p.382) So we might say that the dispositional association of passions holds, in addition to those of impressions and ideas, only in the case of indirect passions, but "with a certain appetite". This association of passions on the basis of disposition or "character" of passions is an after-thought, and does not seem to belong to the original scheme of

theory of passions. There is a tension in Hume regarding a dispositional account of the passions. On the one hand, he avows that the passions are simple impressions, and on the other he resorts to a dispositional account of specific passions such as love and hatred. The self-referring passions like pride and humility are non-dispositional inasmuch as they are 'closed' states of mind. Since pride and humility presuppose man's social point of view in respect of the standards of worthiness prevalent in society, it could very well be doubted whether pride and humility are as 'closed' as Hume depicts them to be. It is possible for a man to be proud as a character-trait. In that case he may not be aware of it. But in the case feeling proud, it is natural to expect the proud man to display such behaviour patterns as we are accustomed to associable with the passion. Hume's thesis of simplicity of the passions has more often vitiated his intention of giving a dispositional account of the passions. Yet the various shifts he makes in his position lays it bare that underneath the so-called atomism there lies another design. There is the suggestion in Hume's writings that pride is a virtue, and if it be so, how could it be that intransitive an emotion? It is a question worth asking, how a virtue could remain unfulfilled in virtuous behaviour.

In view of the above considerations Hume's use of the word 'association' may be evaluated, together with his insistence on regarding indirect passions as simple impressions. John Laird distinguished between two senses of Hume's use of the word association: "(i) the clustering of unmodified entities, and (ii) a fusion where

the constituents lost their former identities and became indistinguishable in the new total fact." (op. cit., p.201) Laird thinks it "misleading to call such different processes by the same name". The association of ideas may be taken to illustrate the former case, since, ideas, as Hume tells us, are "impenetrable". Impressions, on the contrary, are "susceptible of an entire union" and "may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself". (op.cit.,p.366) This case may be taken to instantiate Laird's second kind of association. Now, one might legitimately ask that if association of impressions are "susceptible of an entire union" then how could one insist on the simplicity of the passions. Some passions are indeed simple, viz. those without any "direction", i.e., the non-conative ones, like pride and humility. But what about those with "direction"? Conative passions are born out of association of resembling impressions and could, in fairness to Hume's own admission, be said to be complex and compound. Much of the force of the view that passions are simple impressions, derives from the fact that Hume treats passions in such a manner as though they could be picked up from among various mental states (he says that the passions are "internal" impressions, and hence they could be taken as phenomena associated with introspection or "reflexion", rather than perception) and identified in isolation from others. Much of it is true of pride and humility, since they are self-referring or intransitive or closed mental states; or we might even say that they bear a relation of reflexivity to the person who experiences them. But there are passions that are not "completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion

which they produce, but carry the mind to something further".(ibid., p.367) Love and hatred are such passions which are non-reflexive and hence, transitive. Perhaps, it is in this very sense Hume speaks of an "end" of the passions of love and hatred, besides their "object" and "cause", and says that "all which views, mixing together, make only one passion". (ibid.,p.367) It might be argued that conceptually the passions of love and hatred do not entail their respective ends -- "not absolutely essential" as Hume says -- yet it is only a counter-factual assertion. It may be noted in this connexion that to the passions of love and hate there corresponds explicit performative formulae, e.g., 'I love you' or 'I hate you'. In some cases the second person pronoun may be replaced by third person ones. If the formulae are not vacuous (or 'unhappy' as J.L. Austin would have it), they must be designed towards loving or hateful behaviour. Don't we in some manner commit ourselves by such speech-acts as saying 'I love you' and the like to treating the person addressed in a particular way? And if this case be granted the emotions of love and hatred could equally be looked upon as setting us in specific and appropriate dispositions. Similarly, the hearer would, in all propriety, have the guarantee of my intention from my utterances. The fact that lends force to the notion of complex or compound passions is "that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoined with them, by the original constitution of the mind" (ibid.,p.368). And so far Hume is concerned there is no greater court of appeal than that.

There is again the difficulty about the 'object' of pride. The self as the 'object' of the passion of pride is spoken of sometimes as an 'idea' and sometimes as an 'impression'.[1] Does Hume use the words interchangeably? Perhaps Hume cannot so use the terms since 'impressions' and 'ideas' are for him, mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the constituents of our mental life. Whatever sense the word 'self' may stand for, it is at least clear that it is a non-Cartesian conception and does not allow, as Laird puts it, "the introspective visibility of any ... inner mental zone". (op.cit.,p.190) Passmore is a little too much worried over Hume's use of the concept of the Self in the context of passions. It is difficult to understand why Passmore would say that "Hume is certainly not entitled ... to talk of an 'idea of ourselves'". (op.cit., p.126, emphasis added) I think, Mercer has rightly pointed out that Hume's scepticism is directed against the "the self as a unique, unchanging impression" within ourselves and not at the ordinary, everyday belief in personal identity we all share. (op.cit., p.30) And it is the everyday belief in personal identity which Hume speaks of as the object of indirect passions. But the difficulty is not so much in Hume's concept of the self, in its relation with the passion of pride. About this relation Hume speaks in an inconsistent language. For example, he says that pride "actuates us" (op.cit.,p.277), "produces" the idea of the self (ibid.,p.287). In one case the self is the effect, and in the other, it is the 'object' of the passion. To be an effect and to be the 'object' of pride are not an identical

1. See Treatise, pp.364 and 317. Hume has such phrases as "idea of ourselves" or "impression of ourselves."

stateSof affair, for the case of the self as the 'object' of pride the relation involved is a logically stronger one, than the case of its being an effect.

Another difficulty concerns the relation of the passion of pride and its causes. Though Hume makes it clear that "everything related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility" provided the relation required is a "close one" (ibid.,p.291), this limitation seems to be waived when he comes to speak about general rules. Hume's example of the influence of general rules upon pride and humility turns out to imply that a man may feel proud of something which might bear no special relation to himself. This is an "enlargement" of Hume's original account of pride. It is significant that Hume speaks of two objects of pride; besides the self, there is "the cause or that object which produces pleasure" (ibid.,p.292). What is productive of pleasure is variable, and presupposes socio-cultural coordinates. The second object of pride, i.e., that which produces pleasure should have some relation to self. Since the self grows in a society, the notions of esteem and worthiness are derived from the social context and in this regard the general rules or "custom and practice" as Hume says, come to play contributory role for the production of pride and humility. What one ought to be proud of, that is, the standard of pride-worthiness is normally something which is public and commonly accepted. Pride is a social passion, and hence, open to the influence of general rules or custom prevalent in society. It may be that the

states of mind elude tidy classification, yet no passion could be considered apart from the circumstances in which they arise. Human nature being what it is, no passion could be complete within itself. P.L.Gardiner takes Hume's interpretation of passions as "mere impressions...describable without reference to the objects towards which they are directed and in distinction from any of the forms of outward expression in which they typically manifest themselves" ('Hume's Theory of Passions' in David Hume, A Symposium ed. D.F. Pears, p. 39). Gardiner has generalised the point beyond warrant, and his generalisation gives a one-sided and somewhat distorted view of Hume's over-all position in his theory of passions. Hume might be said to have held an intentional theory of passions, and Gardiner seems to overlook this important point.

Let us consider Gardiner's view. He says "Hume in effect follows Descartes in sharply dividing the mind from the body; the relation between inwardly felt passions and emotions and their manifestations in overt behaviour is a purely contingent one, discovered by experience." (ibid., p.41) Now, two points can be made about this judgment. First, it is difficult to say with any amount of certainty whether Hume did sharply divide the mind from the body, at least in the Book II of the Treatise. For he often speaks of bodily states as belonging to the Self. Speaking about the subjects of the passion of pride, he says that the indirect passions of pride and humility are not confined to the mind, "but extend their view to the body like wise" (op.cit.,p.279). "A man could be proud of his beauty", as well as of every "valuable quality of the mind".

Hume's concept of a person is not that of a disembodied conscious existence like the Cartesian cogito. When Hume says that the passions cannot "look beyond self or that individual person"(ibid, p.286) he includes body also within the concept of the self and speaks of the mind and the body conjointly as we do in our everyday experience. The intimate presence of the "impression of ourselves" is the liveliest one that we could have, and it is so because it is concerned with, as in the case of pride and humility, "our thoughts, actions and sensations".(ibid.,p.329) If the Humean self were a disembodied ego, then, it would not have been intelligible to speak about "actions and sensations" of an "identical person". Secondly, about the so-called contingent relation between passions and "their manifestations in overt behaviour" Gardiner's statement needs to be qualified. Except for pride and humility, Hume does not speak about the non-conative nature of passions. As "pure emotion" pride and humility are complete within themselves, "without any direction or tendency to action". But we must bear in our mind that even about pride Hume speaks of "evident marks". "The very port and gait of a swan, or turkey or peacock show the high idea he has entertain'd of himself, and his contempt of all others" and he holds that this phenomenon is not confined to "merely human passions, but extend themselves over the whole animal creation".(ibid.,p.326) Though Hume always that holds a non-transitive relation holds between the affective and the conative states of mind, this is merely conceptual, and not natural. What matters for him is the natural transition of states of mind of one sort to another. The "original constitution of the

mind" is for him a greater authority than the logical relations. And lastly, the non-intentional nature of emotions as Gardiner ascribes to Hume's theory is also unfounded, because the impropriety of the concept of self-love as Hume has cared to show does not support Gardiner's view. "Self-love", says Hume, cannot be talked of "in a proper sense", since "Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us".(ibid.,p.329) Not only this is so in the case of the passions of love and hatred, but it is a general point that Hume intends to make that "Our self, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects..." (ibid., p.340) Even in the case of pride, which he conceives as a form of self-valuation, he quite explicitly says that the sensation of such passions must not be "closely related" but also be "peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons". (ibid.,p.291) Elsewhere, he says, "not only to ourselves but to others also".(ibid.,p.292) All these are sufficient to show that Hume did not propound a solipsistic theory of passions as Gardiner's over-generalization makes it seem to be.

Gardiner is not the only scholar in recent years, to have drawn our attention to the point that 'in his theory of the passions Hume retained many of the assumptions that underlie Descartes' own book on the subject, Les Passions de l'ame. Mercer also has dwelt upon the Cartesian inheritance of Hume. But the matter, in view of its ambiguous nature, cannot be taken at its face value and calls forth a little detailed examination, which neither of the two have

actually done. Ardal simply has noted that Hume's theory of passions is not Cartesian, his explanation is "psychological and not physical or physiological." It has become fashionable in recent years, amongst writers on philosophical psychology, to say that Hume's theory of the passions is Cartesian. Besides Gardiner, Ardal and Mercer, G. Anscombe and Anthony Kenny also have held that Hume did hold a Cartesian notion of the passions and have expressed their views in one context or another. But most of these writers seem to have confused two issues. It is one thing to say that Hume retains many of the assumptions that underlie Descartes' The Passions of the Soul[1], and it is quite another thing to assert that Hume's theory is Cartesian. I do not waive the first statement, though by no means feel inclined to endorse it, but certainly am sceptical about the truth of the second.

Descartes' The Passions of the Soul is argued on physician and has very scanty material for a theory of ethics. Properly speaking, The Passions of the Soul is not a treatise on moral psychology, far less a work on ethics, with of course the exception of the concluding part. The main bulk of The Passions of the Soul is concerned with that sort of physiological discussion, which Hume begged to be excused of in the beginning of the second book of his Treatise. On the contrary, what Hume calls "the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy" (ibid., p.276) form the corpus of Descartes' The Passions of the Soul. A brief outline of Descartes' views on the passions may be given before we argue why a Cartesian

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1. Translated by Lowell Clair in Essential Works of Descartes, Bantam Books, 1966, New York and London.

reading of Hume's theory of the passions would be illegitimate or misconceived. Let us begin with Descartes' notion of passion.

In Article 1 Descartes says that "everyone feels the passions within himself and therefore has no need to borrow observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature" and goes on to observe that "whatever takes place or happens anew is generally called by philosophers a passion with regard to the subject to which it happens, and an action with regard to what causes it to happen". This passage is by no means clear and needs a little explanation. Descartes is ambivalent in allowing reciprocal action of mind and body and in denying it. But nonetheless, he seems to affirm some form of correspondence between the mental and the corporeal "occasion" when changes occur in the one and in the other. Since Descartes remarks in Articles 2, 3 and 4, "we cannot conceive of the body as thinking in any way" and "everything that is in us, and which we cannot in any way consider as capable of appertaining to a body, must be attributed to our soul"; hence "in order to understand the passions of the soul we must distinguish its functions from those of the body". In Article 17, he takes up the distinction between passions, volitions and actions. He writes, "there remains nothing in us that we must attribute to our soul except our thoughts, which are of two kinds: those which are the actions of the soul, and those which are its passions. I name all our volitions its actions, because we experience them as coming directly from our soul and seeming to depend on it alone; on the

other hand, we can generally give the name of passions to all the different forms of perception or awareness that are in us, because often it is not our soul which makes them what they are, and because it always receives them from the things they represent". Actions of the soul are thoughts, and mental occurrences ensuing on bodily changes are passions of the self and actions of its body. If the occurrence be a movement, it is one of some body, otherwise it must belong to the self. Volitions or desires are actions of the soul inasmuch as they derive and proceed from the soul. In a volitional situation, the self is active only if the object of desire is due solely at itself, and passive if it belongs to its body or to something external to it or both. In Article 10, Descartes mentions "will to love God" as a volitional action of the self since it is of that sort "which terminate in the soul itself". Mathematical truths may be of this kind as well, because in such cases we "apply our thought to some non-material object". The self is passive when, for example, we desire health, it is an action which terminates in our body. Perceptions are also another kind of action of the self, they differ from volitions as implying the awareness of the presence of the sensible. In Articles 23,24 and 25, Descartes discusses the perceptions which we refer to external objects, to our body and to our soul. When we hear the sound of a bell, or feel the cold of our hand or feel elated in joy — (all the examples are Descartes') all these are perceptions, but of different kinds according to the references made. In all these cases the self is passive. The passive states of the self's

history like sensations, unclear perceptions and emotions go, for Descartes, to constitute the domain of the passions of the soul. And in Article 27, he defines the passions of the soul "as those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer specifically to it, and which are caused, maintained and fortified by some movement of the animal spirits." Clearly, this 'definition' is a psycho-physical one. Passions are, for Descartes, unclear or confused perceptions, and for this reason alone, they are indefinable. They can be objects of indirect knowledge[1], or known only descriptively. The Cartesian notion of the passions of the soul are then the confused, unanalysable epiphenomena of certain analysable physical changes collaterally occurrent in the experients' body. It is a statement of a thorough physiological psychology.

Another task that Descartes sets himself to in The Passions of the Soul is of eliciting the irreducible kinds of emotion discoverable on introspection in terms of their functional characters. According to Descartes there are only six kinds of emotion (in a wider denotation the Cartesian passions include feelings, emotions, and in some cases, volitions) that are really primitive and irreducible, namely, the states of unmixed wonder, love, hatred, joy, sadness and desire. Seldom do we experience emotions in their purity but usually a secondary and complex one. They are derivative in being either a species of some primary emotion, for example, esteem

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1. I am not sure whether the word 'knowledge' is appropriate in this context. But Kemp Smith has sanctioned the usage in his New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes.

(Article 149) or a combination of one primary emotion with some other just as pity (Article 189) is. Pride (Article 157) is a kind of self-valuation for Descartes, but it differs from magnanimity (an Aristotelean echo indeed, see his Nichomachean Ethics Bk.IV.2) in being "without any reason". (Hume's notion of pride "well-regulated" and "well-founded" as distinguished from what he calls "over-weening conceit". See Treatise, pages 598 and 600) Besides the irreducibly primitive and derivative passions, Descartes recognises innumerable possible combinations of passions or mixed emotions, which can be descriptively indicated without being given a name.

Now despite Descartes' physiological reductionist theory of passions, emotional life involves an intellectual factor. All passions relate to our body and in fact occur only because our mind is so intimately united with it. Article 30 states: "the soul is truly joined to the entire body". And yet the relation between the external data of passions and the person who experiences it exists in and through the person's valuation of the object. Love and hatred are passions which involve an intellectual as well as an affective state. Love and hate are felt only if a judgment of good and evil has been passed on the object perceived: "when something is presented to us as being good with regard to us, that is, as being beneficial to us, this makes us have love for it, and when it is represented as bad or harmful, this arouses hatred in us." (Article 56) There is on one side a dependence on the body, a passivity of the soul, and on the other, a valuation, a belief affectively qualified one that something is really good or bad for

it by the self. This is the active factor. Descartes' definition of joy (article 91) makes the physiological and the intellectual aspect of the passions clearer: "Joy is an agreeable emotion of the soul in which consists the enjoyment it has of the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as being its own... it is in this emotion that the enjoyment of the good consists, for the soul receives no other fruit from all the goods it possesses." This "intellectual" joy constitutes the hedonic quality of the objects experienced in passions. According to the Cartesian hypothesis it is of course possible to feel joy or sadness without fixing on any particular thing as its object, and it would only mean that, in that case, the intellectual act of evaluation is not performed, that is to say, the self is passive in its experience. For instance, our gaiety when we are in good health is an agreeable feeling of the self following upon some proper functioning of the organism, though by no means due to any operation of our intellect. But those feelings that may be called the passions of the soul have both the physiological actions and their corresponding pleasant or unpleasant kinaesthetic sensations on the one hand, and the self's assertive attitude of evaluation on the other. Descartes is quite emphatic on the intellectual factor involved in the experience of the passions of the soul, and this emphasis is highlighted when he speaks of definite judgments concerning good and evil, in accordance with which the self resolves "to conduct the actions of its life"(Article 48) as he says that "those who are most agitated by their passions (at the physiological and the corresponding kinaesthetic levels)

are not those who know them best" (Article 28). To 'know' a passion is to have 'clear cognitions' or as he says pensee claire, --- an active state of the soul, otherwise a passion is "to be counted among the perceptions made confused (pensee confuse) and obscure by the close alliance between the soul and the body." He cares them "sensations" (Article 28). It may be worthnoting that an idea of a passion is an idea of something obscure. But it is not the case that the idea of an obscure thing is itself obscure. In this sense there can be a "clear" idea of a passion, though not "distinct", i.e., what it is an idea of.

Descartes speaks of a natural order among emotions; one emotion tends to introduce another, but he does not offer any explicit principle for their evocation and connexion. All that he says is the following: "the principle effect of all the passions in man is to incite and dispose the soul to will the things for which they are preparing the body" (Article 40), and this statement may be taken to imply that the primary emotions, generally speaking, are founded on their objects' helpfulness or otherwise to our body. A desire for conserving or realising some state of affairs will be 'good' if it is really beneficial, and 'bad' if it is erroneously so judged. Hence the importance of the knowledge of truth for conduct. In Article 74, we read that "the usefulness of all the passions consists in their strengthening and prolonging in the soul thoughts which are good for it to conserve, and which might otherwise be effaced from it". For example, love, he says, is a passion "which incites it to will to join itself to objects which appear to be

beneficial to it" (Article 79).

What is significant in Descartes' theory of the passions is his almost unambiguous assertion about his rejection of the Platonic division of the soul into its rational and sensuous parts, all the same it evinces a very disquieting feeling about body. One can almost feel a tension in Descartes' thought. Though he says that "there is in us but one soul, and that soul has no diversity of parts: it is both sensuous and rational, and all its appetites are volitions", and yet almost in the same breath he argues that it is to the functions of the body "alone we must attribute every thing that can be observed in us as repugnant to our reason"(Article 47). Do we not have in the passage an anticipation of Kant's celebrated dichotomy of the ethical self as the rational will and the anthropological self of inclinations? It is risky to hazard any opinion in that matter, but this much is certain that Descartes believes that no conflict of passions is irresolvable[1], since "there is no soul so weak that it cannot, if well directed, acquire absolute power over its passions" (Article 50). Descartes emerges as a firm believer in the freedom of the will, which consists in the self's (in its active, rational dimension) capacity to assent to or reject the incitation of the passions. The Cartesian self is free almost in the Kantian sense of the term, i.e., as a noumenal cause it can set in motion a new series of causes. Descartes speaks of the moral sovereignty of the self, or its self-determination

1. Is it not the same in Kant? The realm of inclination is so alien to our rational nature that it becomes pretty difficult to envisage the possibility of any war between the two, and the ought implies can.

(Article 152). The will, he says, 'is by nature so free that it can never be constrained' (Article 41) except by 'the control we have over our volitions' (Article 152), and 'it makes us like God to some extent'. How far is Kant's 'holy will' from this? The whole motive of Descartes' The Passions of the Soul has been oriented towards the self and its freedom. It is a metaphysics of morals, a concern which Descartes would happily share with Kant.

The foregoing, an almost truncated account of Descartes' theory of passions would now give us a better perspective, for, judging whether and how far Hume's theory of passions may be said to have a Cartesian intention and methodology. However tempting the resemblance might seem to be between Descartes' and Hume's theories of the passions, we must be clear about a set of very basic differences between them. Hume does not have any explicit concern for "natural and physical causes" of the passions or those "impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul"(op.cit., p.275). Hume's is a psychological concern, far less physiological. Even where he proposes to give a causal account of the passions, his primary interest lies in the indirect ones. The concept of the indirect passions in Hume's theory is something unique, and may not, without overlooking the obvious differences, be put on a par with the Cartesian account of the passions of the soul. No less peculiar is Hume's notion of the self, which is employed in the everyday sense of the term. The Humean self is not defined as the subject of predicates that are inapplicable to the body, (in the terminology of the Meditations the distinction between mind and body is "absolute".

The mind and the body are "reciprocally different"), as it is in the case of the Cartesian self. The former is ideational, while the latter is essentially cognitive. Descartes speaks about a functional difference between the self and the body. He says in Article 2 that "there is no better way of gaining knowledge of the passions than by examining the differences between the soul and the body, in order to know to which of the two we must attribute each one of the functions that are in us". If we turn to Hume, we come across an altogether different picture. Hume's notion of the self is not only a succession of related ideas and impressions, but also used indifferently with the body. He does not deny that some passions may originate in the body, but he would have a physiological reduction of all passions to the body. Hume writes, "Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceeding thought or perception". (ibid., p.276, emphasis added[1]) It is strange that despite such explicit statements Gardiner could say that Hume in effect followed Descartes in sharply dividing the mind from the body.

It is doubtful whether Gardiner presents Descartes' case with fairness when he remarks, "we cannot be mistaken in our judgements" about our passions and they "refer to nothing beyond themselves". Now, the first remark seems a little hasty, because we have already

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1. See Treatise, p. 303. Hume uses "the self" for both "mind and body".

seen that Descartes makes the actions of the soul, the assertive attitude of evaluation so important in his theory. His very definition that passions are confused perceptions makes room for possible mistakes about our 'knowledge' of the passions. We have earlier quoted Descartes saying that "those who are most agitated by their passions are not those who know them best". It is true that Descartes holds that we have an immediate awareness of our passions, that "everyone feels the passions within himself", and yet in Article 2 he does not leave it ambiguous that a passion of the soul may be mistaken for an action of the body or vice versa; and hence a knowledge of the passions by examining the differences between the soul and the body is invoked. The discovery and identification of the passions for Descartes is a matter not only of introspective psychology but also of "clear cognition" as well. As we have already remarked that if our 'knowledge' of the passions consist in having 'clear' ideas, namely the idea that I have a passion. My having a 'clear' idea does in no way guarantee the distinctness of the idea. The content of the idea may very well remain obscure. In that case, Gardiner might argue that, for Descartes, it is possible to mistake one passion for another. Gardiner of course, does not take into account the fact that our idea of a passion may be clear yet not distinct. The paradox with Descartes' theory of the passions is that to have a "distinct" idea of a passion is not to experience the agitation of passion any longer. And the second remark of Gardiner's that the Cartesian passions are opaque or non-representative is difficult to be endorsed. Descartes

classifies passions as they are referred to the external objects, to our body and to our soul. Even with regard to the last mentioned class of passions he does not explicitly say that they are completely non-representative. Let us consider the Article 25, which is especially relevant to Gardiner's remarks. Descartes distinguishes between a "general" and restricted meaning of the word "passion". In the restricted sense of the term, the word "passion" means "the passions of the soul", i.e., "only those which are related to the soul itself". What does this phrase really imply? It implies that in experiencing such feelings as joy, anger, etc., we are more concerned with the effects of the feelings, and "to which we are usually unable to assign any proximate cause". The said inability does not imply the non-representative character of the passions themselves. For Descartes himself remarks that the feelings of joy, anger, etc., "are sometimes aroused in us by objects that move our nerves, and sometimes also by other causes". Since no passion is sui generis, it cannot ever be non-representative in Gardiner's sense of the term. Not only does he misjudge Hume, but also misrepresents Descartes.

Further Descartes is ambivalent in his dualism. Sometimes he defines the mind in exclusion of the other and vice versa, so that mind and body are mutually exclusive by definition, but there are ambivalent passages in The Passions of the Soul that make us hesitant in taking a definite stand. For example, speaking about the correspondance of emotions and their behavioural occurrents Descartes says, in Article 1, "the action and the passion are always one

and the same", though "the agent and the recipient are often quite different", or in Article 51 that the passions are "solely" caused "by the temperament of the body". It is not untrue to say that Descartes could never made up his mind with regard to the mind-body problem. In a letter to Princess Elizabeth he speaks of three kinds of primitive notions: the notion of mind, the notion of body, and the notion of mind and body together. Passions concern the latter notion, and hence can be said to be known only obscurely. Kemp Smith refers to Descartes' "strange and difficult theses" and makes the following remarks: "That the notion of union of mind and body is for us no less primitive and ultimate than the notion of either taken separately! That it is a notion certified by sense, not by thought, and yet in respect of certainty no less reliable! That it is a notion opaque to the understanding, and even to the understanding aided by the imagination, and yet 'known very clearly by the senses' !" (New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes, London, 1952.)

Apart from these difficulties of the Cartesian analogy for Hume's theory of the passions, we must bear in our minds that Hume's notion of the indirect passions is from the very outset invested with a social dimension, and no such similar facet could be discovered for Descartes' passions of the soul. The passion of self-love may be cited as a crucial case. Hume dismisses the notion of the passion as an improper use of terms, while Descartes makes it highly significant. Though Descartes has pride as a passion of self-valuation[1], yet this similarity is superficial, because in the Cartesian

1. In Enquiry II, p. 314, Hume explains that he does not use the word

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content, it means unreasonable self-esteem, a deviation from magnanimity. Nor does Descartes' passion of humility bear any resemblance to that of Hume's. Humility is a 'virtuous' passion in Descartes (Article 155), while for Hume it is a secular passion. Hume does not have any notion of the "usefulness" of the passions as Descartes has, for the Humean self is a passionate self, while that of Descartes' is a rational judge. Descartes' The Passions of the Soul is directed towards achieving freedom for the self from the confusion of the passions, in the purity of the non-corporeal ego, but Hume's intentions have been different; his psychology is only preparatory to his ethical theory of sympathetic and benevolent social commitment. And again the passions are indefinable, for Descartes, on account of their confused nature, while for Hume, because they are simple impressions. The Cartesian analysis is functional, i.e., the passions are descriptively known in terms of their function of inciting the self; in the case of Hume, the analysis of the passions is phenomenological, i.e., as they are found to occur in ordinary human experience.

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'pride' with its common meaning. By 'pride' he designates 'the <u>sentiment</u> of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character'. In a footnote he expatiates: 'The term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad sense; but this sentiment seems indifferent, and may be either good or bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to the other circumstances which accompany it'. In the <u>Treatise</u>, p.297 Hume explicitly refers to those who moralize in 'the style of the schools and pulpit' and says that they might be surprised to hear him 'talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice'.

Descartes' notion of pride is Aristotelean in conception. Aristotle's 'magnanimity' is a virtue concerned with honor. Descartes seems to have Aristotle's 'pride' in his mind though he uses the term 'magnanimity'.

It is often said that, for Hume, the relation between passions and their manifestations in overt behaviour is a purely contingent one. Gardiner has ascribed this characteristic to Hume's Cartesian inheritance. I cannot make much sense of this objection. How Descartes would allow the contingent relation within his deterministic physiologically based theory of the passions is by no means clear. According to Descartes, something is contingent only if it is neither physically determined, i.e., it is not a state of a natural body explicable by the principles of mechanics, nor logically determined, i.e., it is a proposition that follows of necessity from a set of constituent propositions forming a deductive system. Passions seem to be contingent in this sense. Should this manner of stating the Cartesian position is regarded as philosophically harmless, Gardiner's ascription would become pointless. It can be argued whether Descartes ever entertained the idea of a deductive system. Without any pretension to Cartesian scholarship I would like to submit that despite the fact that Descartes speaks of his philosophical method as reason founded on immediate intuition, he no doubt aimed at deduction. One can even notice an obvious tendency, especially in the Principles, to supersede his original or intuitive method by the demonstrative or deductive. His account of the passions as given in the Part IV of the Principles appears quite decisive in that the emotions are given a neural explanation. Of the passions, says Descartes, "as far as they are confused thoughts which the mind has not from itself alone, but from its being closely joined to the body". If that be the case why should there be a

one-way traffic only, i.e., from the body to mind, and not vice versa? Then, as regards Hume's case, it might be rash to assert that between experiencing an emotion and its overt expression the relation is contingent. The notion is a logical sophistication, and it is difficult to say if and whether Hume did use the term "natural relation" in exactly the modern usage "contingent". Does Hume's notion of "matters of fact" answer to the idea of a proposition that is not tautologous? I do not aspire to settle the issue. Rather, I should like to avert that Hume's notion of the "natural" relation cannot be interpreted as a propositional case of mixed truth-values without doing injustice to the uniqueness of the notion itself. Besides, in Hume's case what we have is psychological determinism of the association of ideas, whereas Descartes takes mental states collaterally occurrent with associated physiological actions in the case of the former there is no suggestion of dualism, explicit or implicit; in that of the latter, it is a basic presupposition. Again, the status of the passions is even different in the two philosophers. For Descartes, the separation between the corporeal and the mental domains cannot explain the obscure and confused ideas and the passions connected with them. They are disturbances of the mind, perturbationes animi. The passions as perturbations present an indubitable fact, metaphysically incomprehensible, and recognized as an exceptional relation between two heterogeneous substances. With Hume, the passions are a sub-class of matters of fact, and are naturally related to their overt behavioural coordinates. In view of the fact

that the Cartesian passions of the soul are "contingent" in a specialised sense, and since the modern logical notion of "contingent" cannot be read into Hume's doctrine either of matters of fact or natural relation, Gardiner's opinion misses relevance. It would be interesting to see what could Hume say on the relation of the passions to their overt behaviour. It may be objected, as Hume himself comments, that while necessity is regular and certain, human conduct is irregular and uncertain. But we must bear in mind, he says, that although many of our beliefs are weak, we do not therefore abandon the idea of natural necessity. Arguing in connexion with liberty versus necessity he remarks, "No union can be more constant and certain, than that of some actions with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the operations of body, nor can we conclude any thing from the one irregularity, which will not follow equally from the other." (op.cit.,p.403) That the passions as motives determine our conduct is a point Hume pressed home and fashionable thought it has become in modern philosophical discourse to say that something is contingent. Even if it be so, for the sake of argument, 'contingent' need not imply 'defective', just because it is not analytic.

John Laird's discussion of this topic is much balanced and there would be sense in endorsing his considered view that Descartes' psycho-physical theory does not "seem to have played a very effective part in Hume's theory of the passions" (op. cit.,p.207) although there are many striking similarities of assumptions and views

between the two thinkers. On these particular points of course I have differences with Laird's way of looking at the similarities, though I might agree with his remark that there was "the closest historical continuity between Descartes and Malebranche; and Hume, like Hutcheson, has studied Malebranche very carefully".

We have so far considered Hume's causal account of the indirect passions, and found that since indirect passions are simple impressions, the criterion for deciding whether a man is proud or not would be the presence or absence of a unique simple impression. The criterion can be questioned, because a person may not himself be the best judge of his mental states. Hume would not allow this, on the contrary, he holds that 'every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them [passions], without any danger of mistake'. (op.cit.,p.277, emphasis added) But verbal mistakes are possible, a man might not know what a particular impression is called. In that case Hume would be admitting the view that words like 'pride', 'love', 'hate' etc., are names of feelings or experiences that involve feelings. It can also be asked whether he has given us the causal conditions for <u>being</u> proud, or he has simply given that for <u>feeling</u> proud. The two are not identical, because a proud man need not necessarily <u>feel</u> proud. Does Hume draw this distinction, or is it, for him, so that to be proud is to feel proud? It has been argued against Hume that he thinks of being proud as equivalent to feeling an impression of pride. What this argument questions is Hume's concept of emotion and his solution of the problems that the concept gives rise to. The most important of them concern the

function of statements about emotion and the criteria for their validity. How are we to justify the statements of the form 'X is proud'?

What are the assumptions of Hume's concept of emotion? Generally speaking, Hume seems to take the stand that an emotion is a feeling or at least an experience of a special type which involves a feeling. We have noted above that his view seems to imply that words like 'pride', 'love' etc., are names of feelings. Let us call those words 'emotion words'. The view that emotion words are names of feelings, is usually called, the traditional theory of the emotions. The theory is said to make two assumptions: (a) that to every emotion word corresponds a qualitatively distinct experience and (b) that the experience need not find expression in overt behaviour. If the relation between feelings and its behavioural expression is a contingent one, it would make shamming or pretending, i.e., feeling in one way and behaving in another way, possible. It is conceivable and often the case that a person behaves as if he were angry without feeling or having the experience of anger. What follows from the so-called traditional theory of the emotions is a picture which presents one mental life as being essentially a sequence of passive impressions and ideas following one another or combining in recurrent patterns. In case the emotional experience finds expression in overt behaviour, it then entitles us to infer the existence of the inner feeling and therefore to assert, with some degree of probability, statements of the form 'X is angry'. The theory has had a long career, and down to

Russell's The Analysis of Mind emotions have been looked upon as a process, interspersed with claims of cognitivity, conativity and involvement of bodily movement. But in recent times the so-called traditional theory has come to be systematically challanged both from the sides of philosophical analysis and the direction of observational enquiry and research.

I do not propose to defend the so-called traditional theory. What I intend to do is clarifying the issues involved and see how far the criticisms made against are just. This is something worth doing, since Hume is held as subscribing to the so-called traditional theory of emotions. In that case, how far the view is correct? To speak first about the issues. There seems to be a case between subjective experience and behaviour. The former is radically and essentially private in a sense in which no behaviour could ever be. The problem has assumed the form that how, if at all, it can be possible to draw valid conclusions about the subjective experience, the private consciousness, of other people from what seem to be the only premises which are, or ever could be available. The somewhat clumsy statement of the position is taken to imply that these premises, at best, consist in the sum total of the behaviour of these other people. The problem of other minds, as it is called in its epistemological formulation, is supposed to be based upon the traditional theory of the emotions. The critics of the theory, the logical analysts or analytical behaviourists maintain that words and expressions which have been taken to refer to mental events in fact refer only to actual and possible behaviour.

Thus, for instance, a claim to have understood emotion words would be construed as referring not to the occurrence of a moment of private illumination but to the acquisition of capacities to manifest understanding. The undisputed example of an attempt to logical behaviourism as far as it will go is Ryle's The Concept of Mind. Perhaps another version of it is to be found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. The main point of criticism of the logical analysts against the traditional theory of the emotions is that it rests on a logical mistake, i.e., of taking emotion words as names of feelings.

The logical analysts in the moments of their high enthusiasm look like underlabourers of behaviourist psychology. A behaviourist point of view makes it imperative to explain behaviour without recourse to conscious experience, and emotion becomes emotional behaviour. A consistent behaviourist might also propose that the concept 'emotion' should be abandoned and think that an explanation of 'emotional' phenomena could be given without the use of the concept, simply for the reason that 'emotion' as a scientific concept "is worse than useless" (B. Duffy in The Nature of Emotion, ed. M. B. Arnold, p. 129).

Now behaviourism can be either methodological or dogmatic. The methodological behaviourism may propose to take only the overt behaviour of people into account and to construct theories in which mental concepts are not employed at all. But from the fact that for the purposes of methodological behaviourism mental concepts are not

needed it scarcely follows that such concepts are empty, which often seems to be the contention of the dogmatic behaviourists' criticism of the traditional theory of emotions. The dogmatist, instead of carrying out a methodological programme, is primarily concerned with what may be called a "dissolution of the realm of minds" (the phrase is Findlay's in his The Discipline of the Cave, lecture X). They might be said to show that the so-called mental phenomena are, properly speaking, physical phenomena. According to many of them, statements about mental phenomena are synonymous with statements about overt behaviour, almost, perhaps, in the same sense in which propositions about brothers are synonymous with propositions about male siblings. But a logical difficulty seems to be over-looked. The statements about physical phenomena are truth-functional and existentially quantifiable, while those about mental ones are not. This reason seems to a great extent sufficient to rule out the possibility of reducing statements about one class of phenomena into another set of statements about a logically diverse sort of phenomena. The very idea that such a reduction is possible, as the dogmatists often seem to entertain, may well be said to rest upon a logical mistake.

Ryle in his The Concept of Mind has dealt with the problem of the emotions, and holds that since the term 'mental' does not denote a status, hence no special footing could be provided for sensations, feelings and images. He appeals to the findings of observational research and says that "our impressions and ideas" do not find a mention there (The Concept of Mind, p. 199). Again, the

"mood words" like 'happy' or 'depressed' are not names of feelings, because feelings "are things that come or go" (ibid, p.97). He rejects also the view that "motive words" the names of feelings. By a "motive word" Ryle means such words as 'vanity' etc., which stand for inclinations, which can be "relatively strong or relatively weak" (ibid.,p. 91). Incidentally, Ryle mentions Hume's use of the word 'passion' and says that Hume's distinction between 'calm' and 'violent' passions is applicable to states of mind or moods only[1], because inclinations cannot be either calm or violent. But Hume's use of the word 'passions' covers both inclinations and moods. This interpretation has nothing objectionable, and Hume's own words may also be cited to lend support to it. He includes both impulses and propensities besides affections and emotions, and his search for some abiding quality in the "personal character" of the agent, and the view that a calm passion is one "which has become a settled principle of action"(op.cit.,p.419) as contrasted with "any sensible agitation" -- all these go to make a strong case for a view that Hume was in a sense a precursor of the dispositional analysis of mental concepts. The emotion words are either "motive words" or "mood words", and none of these, according to Ryle, is a name of feeling, hence 'emotion words' are not names of feelings. It may be doubted whether Hume would be taken to have held such a suggestion.

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1. Ryle has taken the words 'calm' and 'violent' in a sense that overlooks Hume's intentions. By 'calm' passions Hume means settled principles of actions and hence dispositional in nature. Even the violent passions act as motives. Ryle appears to have chiefly the Section IV of Part III of the Book II of the Treatise in his mind when he mentions Hume.

His doctrine that passions are simple impressions does not generally encourage any such conjectures, yet it is quite clear that for Hume, 'X is proud' might mean that X could be expected to behave in a certain manner; though it may not be so always. The overt expression of a passion may be postponed by the agent on reasonable grounds, or delayed as a normal phenomenon. This possibility should be considered in respect of the alleged 'contingent' relation between a passion and its expression in overt behaviour. 'X is proud' may be a valuation as well, i.e., X is conscious of an 'excellency' in himself. Again, Hume makes feelings the sine qua non of the passions. Speaking about an "original quality" of the passions, he says that "their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul ... constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful ... Of this our very feeling convinces; and beyond our feeling, 'tis have in vain to reason or dispute" (op.cit., p.286). From this follows the importance of 'avowals' as Ryle calls them, in Hume's philosophical psychology. The statement 'X is proud' is ultimately verifiable by X's avowal to the effect that he has a particular pleasant feeling. This of course does not rule out that X can make a false avowal, but there is a limit to that as it is in the case of Y's being in pain. Y might well chew but cannot go on doing it in all the cases. The epistemologist's disquiet concerning privacy of experience and scepticism concerning the first person reports of mental states has some sort of a triviality.

The benefit of rejecting the thesis that emotion words are names of feelings seems to be the possibility of giving a logically adequate criterion for inter-subjective ascription of mental states, and a dispositional or behavioural analysis of emotion words or psychological verbs is often held to yield an interpersonal criterion of truth. As regards the statements about emotions are concerned, whether first person avowals or ascriptions to others, Hume's causal account of the emotions does not explicitly rule out the case of having a criterion. We have already seen that, for him, there is a sense in which one can say that he has a feeling, though he may miscall it. There is no sense in asking some one for grounds for his avowals. To say that one is one's own authority for the truth of first-person avowals of feelings is not necessarily to deny that his description of the experience is not corrigible by him and in some circumstances by others too. I may come to know that what I took for my love for A was only a case of infatuation. My friends, again, before it is clear to me, know that I was really not in love with A, and I might find it so later only. For my part, my avowals imply that descriptions of my experience of love are subsumed under concepts and it is possible to misapply concepts. There may be another reason for the corrigibility of my avowals. I can ask myself whether I am really in love with A, and it is quite a common experience. For Hume, the passions being impressions of reflexion, this possibility remains open. I can always correct a genuine mistake of fact about myself. For example,

Hume says that men "often act against their interest" but it is also possible to "counter-act a violent passion", and thereby one may come to know in what does his "greatest possible good consist".

To say that I experience a special feeling and it is pride does not preclude the possibility of having a different emotion word in the place of the second conjunct. Since the avowal 'I am proud' is analysable into a conjunction of a report and a name of the reported feeling, and remains corrigible either by myself or by others. There does not appear any need to exile the first conjunct from our discourse in order to make room for corrigibility. With regard to the statement 'X is proud', it might be suggested that it is verifiable in principle by X himself. The emotion word 'proud' being a name answers to a certain description, e.g., as Hume would say, the "evident marks" of pride and its cause, which is public. So secondarily, the statement is verifiable by others also. But what is more important is that behavioural expressions, for Hume, have criteriological significance for the ascription of states of mind to others, though he does not count them as logically adequate criteria. Granting the possibilities of pretending and shamming, the manifestation of the so-called appropriate behaviour cannot be taken to entail the presence of the relevant state of mind. There is no logical relation between behaviour and states of mind. Hume does not deny that the passions have appropriate behavioural expressions, though he doubts any logical or conceptual connexion between the existence of a certain form of behaviour and the existence of a certain mental state. But he does not deplore the non-logical states of affair

because it is likely to be so from the nature of things as they are, i.e., demonstrative certainty should not be looked for in the domain of the matters of fact. In the domain of passional experience the actual is the necessary. It is the necessity of nature, and evidence is human nature. Reason is a blind guide in respect of matters of fact, and it exhausts its legislative functions in adjusting the general character of the passions. What, then, is Hume's solution for our knowledge of ascriptions of emotion words to others? For this we must look to his assumptions. We have earlier noted that his concept of the indirect passions has a social dimension. We cannot think of a person who lives in a solipsistic world and could be said to be proud, hating, loving, jealous, envious or angry. An indirect passion involves three factors, a perceiver who feels it, good or evil things or attributes and the other self or selves who could be said to have those good or evil things and attributes. Indirect passions as evaluation cannot come about without some form of society, because evaluation implies comparison. The indirect passions are our feelings about ourselves or others, and can only be based on comparisons with the standard of worthiness prevailing in a given social domain where we may happen to belong to. Hume says that "the pleasant or painful object [has to] be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also. We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others..." (ibid., p. 292) or "Men always consider the sentiments of others in their judgment of themselves" (ibid., p. 303). And that famous statement that men "has the most ardent desire of society...We can form no wish, which has not a

reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer" (ibid., p. 363). Hence it can be said that, for Hume, the existence of other minds is not problematic. Ascribing particular states of mind to particular persons, such as in the statement 'X is proud', is possible on the basis of which is normally expected of a person, because he is typical of people generally, or of some class of people. We act on the belief that "Every human creature resembles ourselves" (ibid.,p.359). So far Hume is concerned, and taking his picture of human existence as one of emotional life, knowledge of oneself is impossible without an awareness of one's relationship to other people. Similarly, the notion of knowledge of other people cannot be understood in independence of the notion of personal relationships. A man who cannot feel sympathy toward others, or cannot establish relationships with them with all the dimensions of feeling, can never be said to know people in full sense. Hume distinguishes peoples from things largely in terms of the kind of relationships that we can have with them. For example, his example of parricide as given in the Book III of the Treatise is case at hand (Of course my use of the word 'relationship' is different from Hume's). Sympathy, he holds is "more conspicuous in man" (ibid., p. 363) by virtue of which there can be "communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another". Hence against the background of an understanding of human relationships and a conception of what is to be expected of such relationships we cannot have any knowledge either of ourselves or of others.

The considerations made above are in no way to be regarded as

an answer to the question of what it is to know oneself and what it is to know other people. The question is a very difficult and complex one. But a few issues are involved in Hume's treatment of the passions and in his general position in philosophical psychology, and it is in connection with these we have ventured to make certain observations. Moreover, the problem of the status of the statements about emotions, both in the case of first-person avowals and ascription of mental states to others is involved in Hume's concept of sympathy. The concept is crucial for Hume's ethical views, and it could not be introduced without making clear the epistemological issues involved in the concept. For such reasons as these we have ventured above a very brief and inadequate excursion into one of the most vexed problems of epistemology. Hume seems to invest his concept of sympathy with a sort of cognitive import. And in order to round off the observations a few comments may be made.

Our knowledge of other selves has an important bearing on our ethical attitude, and this truth seems to have been implied by Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. 'Respect for persons', as a modern phrasing has it, is basic to an ethical view of life. Hence, the context and the hinterland of any ethical discussion must be supplied with an existential perspective, i.e., a general background of our ideas about the world, society and the concept of man that we happen to entertain. Again, the concept of a person or the ethical subjects or selves cannot be conceived in abstraction from their social roles that they play. The concept of a person is a multi-level concept, as far as ethics is concerned,

but the fact need not necessarily act as a barrier to knowledge. Again, the plurality of roles which an individual may play is a common-place in psychology. Its significance for selfhood has not been so generally recognised. The self whom I 'know' in knowing X is not the self which his younger brother or his son or his mother knows, or is there a common 'core' to all these many selves which may be said to be his 'real' self? This would not be admitted either by his wife or his mother, each of whom claims to know him best. There seems to be an inherent perspective about our knowledge of others. In shifting from one group to another we become 'different' persons, and this fact has been noted both by anthropologists and psychologists (See G.H.Mead in his Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of Social Behaviourism, p. 49). Is there anything analogous to the 'standard object' in the concept of the 'other self'? - a fact which often profaned by philosophers with a bare epistemological concern. A behavioural expression cannot always be a surer guide to other's mental state. The understanding of an expression hinges on understanding something of a context. For instance, the lie is an example of a verbal expression, the smile is a facial expression; and silence is at first sight the absence of any overt expression at all, but it can be a powerful instrument of expression. In view of the last example, the charge that, for Hume, the relation between having or feeling a passion and its expression in overt behaviour is 'contingent' need not create much worry. For it is quite likely that a proud man may not 'speak out' his feelings. To demand that our knowledge of each other, should

be objective is to demand the impossible. To doubt, however, that there is anything to be known is to be 'unreasonable'. Hume seems to steer clear between the two extremes.

In the preceding paragraphs we have been considering whether the emotions can be explained solely in terms of a behaving body. The desire to avoid Cartesian dualism has perhaps been the main thing that has led philosophers to adopt behaviourism in recent times. But the denial of dualism is not equivalent to behaviourism, at least in the crude form. I have also been concerned with examining the thesis whether Hume could be taken to advocate a theory of the passions that could be taken as an instance of, what Errol Bedford (Aristotelean Society Proceedings, LVIII, 1956-57) calls, the traditional theory of the emotions. It has not been my intention to deny traditional elements in Hume's account of the passions. But it remains nonetheless true that for Hume emotions words are not purely psychological, rather they presuppose concepts pertaining to the domain of society. Hume's passions are social passions; and the causal account offered for their explanation places the individual experiencing the passions against a background of social relationships. It would be an understatement to say that Hume takes the function of emotion words as one of explaining behaviour by specifying an inner experience, without any reference to relevant external circumstances. As we shall see later, he holds that human actions are accountable, and as such he does take into account, besides the agent's motives, desires and dispositions, his relationship to other people as well.

It is possible to take a non-behaviourist view of Hume's account of the passions. One might argue that since the passions are naturally related to a behaving body, the passions do not explain behaviour. In fact, Hume's argument against any "local conjunction" of the passions with the body may be taken to confront the behaviourist. A body, says Hume, is something extended, and extension implies divisibility. The passions are simple, and hence indivisible. A passion, therefore, cannot be identified with a body, and for that matter, any bodily behaviour either. The crux of Hume's argument is that no predicate of quantifiable nature can be said to be true of the passions. He asks, "can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length, a foot in breadth and an inch in thickness?" (ibid., p. 234). It appears that Hume intends to distinguish between predicates or class of predicates that can be applied to the passions though not to a body; and those that can be applied to a body though not to the passions. One might say that Hume was anticipating what Strawson christened as P-predicates. But does not the taste of a fig permeates its body? Hume himself admits that the taste of a fig permeates its body. Ryle says that the feeling of pride pervades the whole body as do the glows of warmth. Can we not say that the taste of a fig permeates its body in much the same way as does pride for Ryle. At least the two cases are analogous. Whether be it the taste of a fig or the feeling of pride, a la Ryle, what matters, Hume would remark, is an impression of reflexion, and to suppose the impression figured and extended is "absurd and incomprehensible". To suppose so would be to entertain a confused notion, which arises, according to

Hume, as a result of the operation of two contrary principles of fancy and reason. To say that the taste of a fig is extended, since it is felt as permeating its body, or the feeling of pride pervades the body of the proud person would tantamount to materialism. Hume calls one a 'materialist', i.e., one who conjoins "all thought with extension". Whether the Humean materialist is a behaviourist may be questioned. But if he holds that our statements about emotions are equivalent, without remainder, to statements about states of the body, then he certainly is a behaviourist of a sort, and Hume would part company with him.

But the behaviourists are not a monolithic folk. Some of them deny the existence of mind, and some hold that the mind is just the body in action. Again, behaviourism need not entail the view that only purely physicalist accounts of the nature of mind are worth considering. It is also conceivable that a behaviourist should give an account of the mind solely in terms of behaviour and dispositions to behave, yet think that behaviour betokens mind, and hence does not have a purely material cause. Hume can be not reasonably taken to espouse some variety of this view. He does not deny the existence of inner mental states that are potentially conative. In this way, dispositional behaviour is involved in the concept of mind. That is to say, for Hume, our emotional life does not merely consist in the having of experiences, it also involves acting in certain ways, or being disposed to act in certain ways. In Hume's usual manner of speaking, the passions place the mind in particular dispositions. The passions are the catalytic agents of behaviour. A statement about

a person's emotion normally carries implications about the person's behaviour and his situations.

As regards behaviourism, the notion of a behaving body is centrally important. Certainly, a behaviourist cannot allow the logical possibility of the disembodied existence of a mind. As a theory of mind, behaviourism, in the least, must take the embodied existence of mind for granted. A behaving body, in the words of Wittgenstein, the outer criterion of the so-called "inner processes". In Hume's case, we can ask, what sort of person the passions occur to? The passions qua impressions of reflexion presuppose ideas and their sensible originals. Ideas and impressions, Hume tells us, can make their appearance in the mind only if there are pain and pleasure; and it is inconceivable to experience pain and pleasure unless one were an embodied being. We are told that impressions of sensation "arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, ...or from the application of objects to the external organs" (ibid., p. 275, italics not in the text). The phrase, the "mind, as well as the body" occurs on p. 186. This is Hume in his dualist mood. It might appear that he is distinguishing between the mind and the body, besides the existence of sensible objects. It may not be the whole story of his philosophical intentions. I have argued earlier that Hume is not a dualist, and in the present context, I will want to insist that, for Hume, the relationship between having passions and their expressions in overt behaviour would not be that "contingent" as as it is often alleged, only if it could be shown to be the case that mind and body of a man, for Hume, are not two different entities.

The following observations may be considered.

Hume uses the term "man" to persons embodied in human form, and the class of predicates typically applied to men is called "actions". Again, other persons are accesible to us through their bodies. For a person, to have a body, then, means that a host of complex correlations exist between him and other persons. A man is not something over and above a person embodied in human form. Hence, there does not arise any need to discriminate the passional and behavioural phenomena. It is convenient to speak of the system formed by the two as a single individual, since the correlations between them is extensive, enough to permit it.

Hume's theory of the mind is well-known. C.D.Broad has termed it the "bundle theory" of the self, a theory that takes its name from Hume's famous remark that a person is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions". The implication of the statement is that the existence of a "perception" does not involve the existence of anything that perceives or has the perception. But can it be very strongly asserted that the bundle of perceptions are somehow linked with a material body? D.M.Armstrong attributes to Hume the theory of bundle dualism, but is himself quite hesitant on that score. He writes, "Although 'Bundle' Dualism is closely linked with Hume's name, it is not absolutely clear whether or not Hume himself was a 'Bundle' dualist. His view of the mind certainly fits our definition, but it is legitimate to doubt whether he holds a Materialist theory of the mind" (A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968, p.7). Armstrong's doubts rest

on Hume's ambivalence with regard to the notion of the body. But it would be very much unenlightening to take Hume as a dualist, ignoring thereby definite passages in the Treatise, which point to a view that the mind and the body are only indifferently so-called.

The notion of "our own body" as Hume puts it, is pretty difficult and cannot be easily explained. That it is an inalienable companion of the idea of the self is evident even from Descartes' struggles with the notion. Hume never exercises any doubt with regard to the existence of bodies in general; "'tis in vain to ask, whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings" (op.cit., p.187, italics in the text), says Hume. But "our own body" is different from other bodies in the sense that "our own body evidently belongs to us" (ibid., p.190, italics not in the text). The property of belonging evidently to us is so unique that any impression that appears exterior to our body is also supposed to be "exterior to ourselves". And if it be asked what the external objects are external to? - the answer would be indifferently ourselves or our own body. The indifference is also brought out on page 298 of the Treatise. Hume, referring to the causes of the impressions of pride and humility, says that it does not matter whether their causes are "plac'd on the mind or body". Further below the passage, he says, "Whether we consider the body as a part of ourselves, or assent to those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be allow'd to be near enough connected with us...". On page 303, again, Hume says that pride and humility have for their causes

"the qualities of our mind and body, that is self" (italics in the text).

There is a sense in which "our own body" is not a body like other bodies, such as tables and chairs. We become aware of other bodies with reference to "our own body", i.e., their impressions appear exterior to our body. But why do the impressions appear exterior rather than internal is a question Hume neither raises nor explains. He takes it for granted "Our own body" seem to have a special status, it provides, us with a perspective. "Our own body" is our point of view upon the world, to borrow the phrase from Merleau Ponty. The uniqueness of "our own body" consists also in the fact that we have impressions of other bodies except of our own. Hume says, " 'tis not our body we perceive" (ibid. p. 191), and he would have agreed with Kant's celebrated observation that our embodied existence becomes possible only mediated by and through outer experience. Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, A 358) did not find any good reason to regard the soul as quite different from its body. We are led to believe that souls are different from their bodies only because we place our own body on a par with other bodies. Hume as well would shared this opinion with Kant. "Our own body" is not the non-descript one among external bodies.

I have no intention of suggesting that Hume advocates an identity theory of the mental and the physical. All that I want is to press home the point that ascription of dualism to Hume in an unqualified manner overlooks interchangeability of the mind and the body, which constitutes a feature of our world. Often our intention

and behaviour overlap, the relationship between our emotions and our overt behaviour is not customarily fortuitous. How are we to explain such cases? I do not pretend to any solution of the "World-knot" -- Schopenhauer's striking designation for the mind-body problem. But it remains worth noticing that Hume was driving at some common referent of the mind and the body, which, for common sense and also for the philosophically sophisticate, widely differ in sense. Ordinary language serves many purposes quite adequately, and it unhesitatingly combines mental and bodily states in many descriptions and explanations of human behaviour. One trembles with anxiety, eagerness is written all over one's face, an attack of flu leaves one in a depressed mood, and so on. These few illustrations indicate that ordinary language reflects an interactionistic view of the relations of the mind and the body.

But does it not presuppose some sort of dualism? Hume was no less aware of it. In a passage of the Treatise, he speaks of "the union of soul and body" and remarks that "everyone may perceive, that dispositions of his body change his thoughts and sentiments" (p.248). This is plain common-sense, but does the converse hold? It might be pointed out that shame and embarrassment involve blushing. This is not denied in a theory of the passions that takes the passions as such conative mental states which would be identified by certain causal patterns of mental and bodily behaviour. There need be situations in order to satisfy the claims of emotion words. But the difficulty lies in the fact that situations should have corresponding beliefs, and it is well-known that perceptions

may fail to correspond to reality. All these may be granted in cases of human intervention in social environment. But we must distinguish such cases from those of mind-body relationship. It is doubtful whether Hume relegates human body to the external world.

I do not wish to deny that Hume does have a trouble with dualism. In a letter to Arnauld Descartes retorted that how an incorporeal mind could move the body was a matter incomprehensible to man. Locke's inheritance was grateful, and he held the inability of matter to think. In the earlier parts of the Treatise, for example on pages 7 and 8, we find Hume holding the view that sensations arise from "unknown causes". This may, or in fact does amount to saying that the mental realm differs totally from the physical, and consequently, a philosophy of mind remains to be worked out independently of the physical conditions which make perceptual experiences possible. Even in the Book II of the Treatise we are given to understand that the physiological phenomena is a subset of the physical phenomena. All this is true, but this sort of dualism is, in a sense, different from that of between "ourselves" and "our own body", which is not easily ascribable to Hume. When he says that "our own body" is a part ourselves or that is "near enough connected with us", he emphasizes a sense of ownership that would not be available were human body a member of the class of physical things without any difference.

Hume's dualist manner of speaking notwithstanding, it would not be unwarranted to say that his distinction between objects

(i.e. bodies) and perceptions (i.e. impressions and ideas) implies neither a dualism of the mind and the body, now that the distinction is in any sense specific; "we may suppose, but never can conceive a specific difference betwixt an object and impressions"(ibid.,p.241), says Hume. The reason for the disavowal of dualism can be so stated. Spatial properties like extension and being composed of parts etc. are experienced in our perception of objects, but ultimately, are characteristic of our impressions and ideas of them. The qualities perceived as qualities of our perceptions. Objects and perceptions are not then two types of existents. We are thus landed into a tension of natural belief and perceptual evidence. The notion of objects having independent existence is a result of natural belief, while perceptions are yielded by immediate consciousness.

If I am right in this account of the matter, it follows that such a tension, with regard to "our own body", is scarcely encountered by Hume. Granted that he tacitly admits a dualism of a *non-Cartesian* sort in respect of bodies in general, even including the bodies of other persons, he would still have held what G.F.Stout called 'the unity of the embodied self'. Hume does not contest the experience of having feelings which we locate in our bodies, and he would also have agreed with the observation that we can move our own bodies in a manner in which we cannot move anything other than our own bodies. This, may be taken as a distinctive feature which differentiates volition from other types of causal experience. There is a sense of resistance which we meet with when we move bodies other than our own. It is true, it may be alleged that in the first *Enquiry*

Hume has cast doubts whether we can will to move all our organs. "Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers, not over the heart or liver?" (ed. Selby-Bigge, Second edition, Oxford, 52). I should like to point out that in the Enquiry Hume is, in fact, arguing against a dualistic hypothesis, and the argument is directed at showing the "connexion, which binds them [mind and body] together and renders them inseparable" (ibid., italics not in the text). Should one like to insist on the physiological conceptions mentioned by Hume, it could be said that there is a sense in which "our own body" is not an equivalent expression of 'physiology' or 'anatomy', because we hardly ever mean by "our own body" an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. We possess our bodies in an undivided fashion. Physiology or a physiological account of my body is not what I feel about my body, rather it is what my body would like to others if studied as a matter of science.

To put the matter in brief. The question whether the relationship between having a passion and its overt expression in bodily behaviour is 'contingent' can be understood in a two-fold manner. From the point of view of the agent mind and body are not apprehended as distinct phenomena, nor are mental processes taken apart from bodily in such wise as to raise questions concerning the way in which they are related with each other. It is this which is signified by our use of personal pronouns. As an agent one can vouch for a continuous history of one's having a passion and its behavioural satisfaction. The agent's volitional experience (which, for Hume, is like any other passional experience) need not

be necessarily construed as a conjunction of two separate occurrents, namely, his being aware of volition and his subsequently becoming conscious of its fulfilment. This would be the spectator's view of the matter, and for whom the gap between one's having a passion and its expression in overt behaviour can only come to be connected in their being given in experience as constant conjuncts. But does it follow from the spectator's view that the connexion between a passion and its expression in bodily behaviour is less strong, simply because it is yielded by constant conjunction? That the relationship between the two is "contingent" only methodological, i.e., it is simply an affair of analysis. Or could it not be said that the connexion between a passion and its bodily manifestation, or for that matter, mental phenomena and the bodily, is such that they are distinguishable only by an effort of analysis. As it actually takes place mental phenomena are also bodily, and the converse is no less true. If we could conceive dualism in hard and soft varieties, the former would be Cartesian; and the latter would be Hume's. The relationship between emotion and behaviour, or having a passion and its bodily behavioural expression will be strongly contingent in the hard variety dualism; whereas in the soft variety of Hume's sort the relationship would be different. For Hume, the connexion would be a strong one, for less "contingent" to provide a basis for a deterministic explanation of human conduct. "As long as actions have a constant conjunction with the situation and temper of the agent, however we may in words refuse to acknowledge the necessity, we really allow the thing" (op.cit. p.403). The "necessity" that Hume speaks of is a subspecies of

necessity as exhibited in natural happenings. If at all the factor of inference is what is denied in such cases, that does not render the notion of agency null. A null or empty notion of agent is essentially one of an impotent performer. An agent without performance is no agent at all. If an agent is a behaving agent, in that case, his having or undergoing a certain passional experience does in a sense point to his appropriate behaviour. The passions are "active principles" as Hume calls it, and become "settled principle/s/ of action". There should then be nothing mysterious about the fact that the passions are correlated with bodily actions; and that given the appropriate conditions they accompany one another. This somewhat long digression may not have been without any purpose; which I hope, besides settling the question whether Hume could be called a 'Bundle' dualist, helps us decide that Hume's philosophical psychology stands intermediate between extreme behaviourism and some form of Cartesianism.

We may now turn to considering some further problems connected with some of the indirect passions. The simplicity of the passions make them indefinable, so that only a description of them possible. In this sense, Hume's account of the passions is partly phenomenological, i.e., to see and describe what happens when we come to experience a particular passion. The term 'phenomenological' is to be taken in a restricted sense and only in order to emphasise the descriptive methodology involved in Hume's theory of the passions. In the middle of the nineteenth century the definition of 'phenomenon' was extended until it became synonymous with 'fact' or 'whatever is

observed to be the case'. As a consequence, 'phenomenology' acquired the meaning that it possesses most frequently in contemporary uses -- a purely descriptive study of any given subject matter. In this sense, Sir William Hamilton, in his Lectures on Metaphysics, spoke of phenomenology as a purely descriptive study of mind. Similar was Edward von Hartmann's use of the word in the title of his book: Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness, which had as its task a complete description of moral consciousness. Of course the term 'phenomenology' as applied to Hume's case cannot have the meaning which Husserl invested the term with, namely, that it is a non-empirical science devoted to intuiting essences. But 'phenomenology' as a method has an applicability in characterizing Hume's treatment of the passions, the ultimate data of our emotional life, in a descriptive way[1], since the propositions of psychology, for Hume, are empirical.

It has often been said that Hume's preoccupation with the description of the conditions that give rise to the passions is the

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1. A phenomenological interpretation of the Book I of Hume's Treatise has already been done by C.V.Salmon in his The Central Problem of David Hume's Philosophy, Halle, 1929. Salmon writes, "The Phenomenological conception of Consciousness as the matter of philosophy ... resembles Hume's conception of Human Nature. Historians will see Hume's lineal successors, not in Kant or Mill, but in Brentano and Husserl. For the essential of Hume's philosophy is its subjective attitude, the notion that the ultimate explanation of truth and all ontologies awaits the practice of an introspection." (see, p.3) Even if one is not ready to go as far as Salmon, there does not seem to be any reason to object to his remark that Hume's method, like that of the phenomenologists', "aim at description and not at definition".

reason why he does not provide us with an analysis of the nature of the passions or the meaning of terms standing for passions. I do not quite understand the contention of the charge. Much depends on what one means by 'nature'. If one accepts that the passions are feelings of a special kind, i.e., simple, and hence indefinable impressions of reflexion, then, perhaps, nothing remains to be done except for describing the causal conditions that give rise to the passions, and as for the analysis of the meaning of the term standing for passions, one has to look for it elsewhere; I suppose, in the general theory of which Hume's is a special and important variation. The most important task of a philosopher of psychology is to answer two such questions which may be formulated roughly as follows: What kind of an entity is an emotion? Is it a feeling, sensation, cognition, physiological condition, behaviour pattern, tendency or some combination of these? and, How does one distinguish one emotion from another, in oneself and in another?

What does and does not belong in the category of emotion is one of the subjects of controversy between different schools of thought. E.Claparede writes, "The psychology of affective processes is the most confused chapter in all psychology. Here it is that the greater differences appear from one psychologist to another. They are in agreement neither on the facts nor on the words." (The Nature of Emotion, ed. M.B.Arnold, p. 197). In the circumstance we might venture to suggest that by emotion, passion or affection we shall understand that what is designated by such words like 'anger', 'joy', 'disgust', 'grief', 'remorse' etc., and the common name of the class

of such words, as we adopted earlier, be emotion words. In spite of certain amount of circularity, the statement may be found to be workable. One might then distinguish between a kind of temporary state of a person, what Hume calls 'violent passions' and Ryle calls 'moods', from more or less long-term dispositions to various states, for which Hume's epithet 'calm' is very suggestive, together with his emphasis on 'durable' dispositional characteristics of certain passions such as love and what Ryle would prefer to call 'inclinations'. Dispositions may be said to include attitudes (admiration, contempt, jealousy etc.), dispositions to act and feel in certain ways (friendliness, benevolence, etc). How psychological factors of such sorts have often been lumped together with what we would call 'emotion' or Hume calls 'passion'. But it must be admitted that many emotion words can be used to designate dispositions as well as a temporary mental state. Hume's insufficient emphasis on the dispositional analysis of emotion words may be viewed in another light. It is noteworthy of the typical uses of the general term 'emotion' that these have to do with emotional states under them than attitudes or other general dispositions. For instance, one is not termed an 'emotional person' because of one's having a lot of admiration, pride, humility or gratitude — all of these are dispositions or "character traits", but rather because of frequently getting into states of anger, grief, joy and expressing them freely. When some one is said to give way to one's emotion or control one's emotions, it is emotional states which are in question. The same is free of getting emotional over something and being emotionally upset.

A set of factors, i.e., feelings of certain kinds, a cognition of something as in some ways desirable or undesirable, marked bodily sensations of certain kinds, tendencies to act in certain ways, an upset condition of mind and body -- have been considered to be essential to emotions. But theories differ as to which of these items they take to constitute the emotion itself and which they take to be causes, effects or concomitants of the emotion. Now Hume takes conscious feeling to be the emotion. Passions, for him, are unique kinds of experiences which arise as a result of sense perceptions, including sensations of pleasure and pain and thoughts. Other subscribers to this general notion of emotion as conscious feeling would be Descartes, Kant and Hamilton. Believers as they were in what is called faculty psychology, for both Kant and Hamilton, emotions would be modes of feeling. Feeling is taken by them to be one of the ultimate faculties of the mind, along with cognition and will. So conceived, feeling is the faculty of being affected positively or negatively by objects cognised. Kant's famous distinction between sensation and feeling is worth quoting: "the word sensation is used to denote an objective representation of sense; and,....we shall call that which must always remain purely subjective, and is absolutely incapable of forming a representation of an object, by the familiar name of feeling. The green colour of the meadows belongs to objective sensation, as the perception of an object of sense; but its agreeableness to subjective sensation, by which no object is represented: i.e., to feeling." (Critique of Judgment, p. 45, tr. Meredith)

What is common to all these views is the conviction that what

makes a condition an emotion, and what makes it the particular emotion it is, is the presence in the consciousness of a certain felt quality which is completely accessible to introspection. The one and only way to know what anger is, for instance, is to actually experience the feeling that *is* anger. This is the most disquieting feature of the theory, i.e., the emotion is only 'contingently' related with other factors, and this is what is bemoaned by its critics. It is true that Hume considers it an inexplicable fact that the passion of pride should regularly be induced by the awareness of things which belong to us rather than by consideration of objects which have no connexion with us. That means that Hume's designation of the object, in such an expression as "the object of pride" as "that towards which the emotion is directed" seems arbitrary, for it is possible to refer to the father as the object of pride in the expression 'he is proud of his father'. This would be a quite acceptable use of the term "object", though whether the father is the proper object of pride would not be easy to settle. But it would be convenient to distinguish an object properly so-called of pride from those which are only so-called. In the first case the passion of pride is directed towards the person who possesses the passion. If X is proud (not as a character trait, but in the sense of being proud, not merely feeling it) then we can say that (a) the being proud is predicated of X, and (b) the pride of X is directed towards himself. Similarly in the case of humility. As regards the objects so-called of pride (and humility) they are Hume says, "always consider'd with a view to ourselves". The self

self must bear a specially intimate relation to objects that one can be proud of. Moreover one's being proud of one's father, or a father's being proud of his children are states of feeling born of natural affection and far less evaluations proceeding from considerations of the qualities either bestowed upon or genuinely possessed by the objects. Since Hume's account of pride is a causal one, and the passion being self-valuating in character, it cannot be likened to such expressions as 'X is proud of his father' unless in a derivative sense. However, the distinction proposed above might be expected to remote much of arbitrariness from Hume's notion of object of a passion, of course without disregarding the difficulties of it. When the self is the object of a passion as in the case of pride the relationship is a reflexive one, and hence, stronger than the non-reflexive instances. 'X is proud' will be always true as having his self as the object of his passion. 'X is proud of his father' is not guaranteed in that fashion. In a matriarchal society the chances of the expression's being true would be scarce, unless it is asserted as an instance of natural affection.

The foregoing observations are not intended to validate any theory of the emotions which holds that emotion is a conscious feeling. There are difficulties in the theory, and it is worth one's while to admit that. But what I have been driving at is that unless one makes reservations, Hume's view of the passions cannot be said to be an instance of such a theory. A few of the cases may be noted. The claim that an emotion can occur without its typical overt expressions can be challenged. As for the fact that one can be angry or annoyed

without any one else realising it, it may be argued that although one can inhibit an overt manifestations of an emotional state, if one needs to or has sufficient self-control, there would be limit to it. There will still be tendencies to these manifestations. It is true that the premises of the theory that emotion is a conscious feeling, imply also the fact emotion is an inner mental rather than a bodily state, since it is the sort of thing of which one can have the same kind of immediate infallible knowledge one has of one's sensations and thoughts, a kind of knowledge open to no one else. The critic might draw our attention to psychoanalysis, a theory that has very promisingly shown us cases in which one misinterprets or misidentifies one's emotional state. Indirect expression of emotion that are inhibited may be in dreams. It is a legitimate point, but it is also to go over to another set of premises about the nature of the mind and its operations than what Hume or Kant would have espoused. And since, for Hume, emotion words are names of feelings, it is quite possible to miscall one's state of mind, and one wonders whether Hume ever denied it seriously.[1] Now assuming that I cannot be mistaken about whether I am angry, then being angry cannot be just feeling angry. To be sure, the critic would further add, some claims that an emotion does not necessarily involve the usual state of feeling depend on using an emotion word in the

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1. In the Enquiry, Hume writes, 'Our predominant motive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed from ourselves, when it is mingled and confounded with other motives which the mind, from vanity or self-conceit, is desirous of supposing more prevalent'. p. 299.

attitudinal rather than the emotional state sense. But we have earlier mentioned that typical uses of general emotion words had to do with emotional states rather than general dispositions. But evidential grounds against any theory cannot settle the issue as a matter of logic. Let me explain. Suppose a theory of dispositional analysis sort claims to offer some evidential grounds, such that the theory T implies the evidential grounds in support of it E, i.e., $T \rightarrow E$. Now, in the circumstance, all that we can say that the theory is false, i.e., T is not the case or $\sim T$, because the claims of evidence are not observed, i.e., $\sim E$. This argument is validated by the logical rule of modus tollens. But simply because E holds, we cannot infer that T is the case. Here often than not these critics of Hume's theory of the passions forget this fact.

So rather than on evidential grounds, the criticisms are provoked by a generalized suspecision of states of consciousness, and data of introspection. Philosophers under Wittgenstein's influence have maintained that no term can have an inter subjectively shared meaning if it simply functions as a name for objects that are necessarily private, hence emotion words, as terms in a public language, cannot be so functioning. There is a demand for some sort of behavioural criterion for identifying or speaking about emotions. But the dogmatic behaviourists' insistence on the behavioural criterion does not seem to fare well all the time, because if feeling is 'supervenient' upon behaviour, there cannot be any relation of entailment between the two either way, since a feeling can sometimes be produced by drugs also. A doctor may expect his patient to report his mental

state as a result of administering certain drugs or having done a surgical operation on the patient. Such correlation, more than proving the identity, implies rather the distinctness of the two types of phenomena, physical and mental, or else the doctor would not expect his patient to report. In this connexion Hume's account of moral virtues and character may be alluded to. He distinguishes moral virtues from "the actions that proceed from them", and a man's character from those of his actions which are "sign(s)" or "indications" of it. In morality, he claims, we should consider "only the quality or character from which the action proceeded", because "these alone are durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person". These "durable principles of the mind" are described as causes, and they may exist without having their usual effects, if the other necessary conditions are lacking. An agent may have a certain "character even tho' particular accidents prevent its operation". Hume criticizes the libertarian for not recognising that actions cannot be blamed if "they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person, who perform'd them" (ibid., p.411). A man is not responsible for an action if it "proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant". Even when a spectator fails to grasp the connexion between our character and our actions, he judges rightly that there is such a connexion, and that it would be discoverable, "were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition" (ibid., pp. 408-409). Thus, even if no explanation of a

man's actions in terms of his character is now available, it is to be looked for, the lack is in our knowledge, not in the world. This is Hume in his non-reductionist mood, on the question of dispositions, i.e., mental (dispositional) terms are not exhaustively analysable into overt hypotheticals.[1]

Now to turn to Hume's treatment of individual passions. His thinking about the relation between passions in mechanical terms sometimes makes us feel uneasy. Let us take an example. He says, "To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent." (ibid., p. 278) Pride and humility are 'contrary' passions, and it is "impossible" that "a man can at the same time be proud and humble". If the passions are simple impressions, how could it be so conceived? Passions are non-extended, and as such they do exist but no where, in such a case the sense of "contrariety" can only be conceptual or by definition of the passions, which is impossible on Hume's own terms. And to say that the mind is in a complete equilibrium is to admit non-arousal of either passion. And can Hume admit any such state of mind without any agitation of passions of any kind? If it is so that he can, then his arguments against Spinozistic concept of mind

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1. I have no intention of suggesting that Hume's view of dispositional terms is non-reductionist in an unqualified manner, since he can legitimately be cited to have very strongly asserted an explicit reductionist thesis by declaring the distinction between "power and the exercise of it" as one of "without foundations" (see Treatise, p.171). This only shows the unresolved tension in his thought between the two views, and that the non-reductionist view fits in well with his brand of dualism. I shall not defend either of his views about dispositional terms and have, in the present context, restricted myself to only a bare mention of them. That would have been a task beyond the scope of the present work.

makes no sense. We can perfectly conceive of a mental substance without its modes. The reasons for Hume's speaking opposition of passions leaving the mind in equilibrium may be sought in the science of mechanics, in particular, the law of the opposition of forces. In the Buddhist psychology the notion of contrary passions plays a therapeutic part. Emptying the mind of the passion has been looked upon as a desirable achievement, and as a means to that end contrary passions are enjoined to be evoked with the intention of cancelling or getting ride of any original given passion. The monks in order to get rid of amorous passion were admonished to think of decaying human corpses with a view to arousing the passion of disgust for human body in their minds. This procedure of course assumes that the passions do not simple 'happen' to someone, but can be so cultivated as to be able to aroused at will. What is important for our purpose here the practical application of the notion of "contrary" passions. It remains doubtful whether Hume would over have cherished such a passionless state of mind as the Buddhists aspired for. Or how far the Stoic ideal of ataraxia would have ever allured Hume.

Hume writes, "the passion [pride] always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances." (ibid., p.287). What does he mean by the verbs 'makes' and 'turns'? Is it a causal statement? If it is taken as a causal statement, then what does it state, the sufficient condition or the necessary condition or both? Is it not absurd to suggest that we think of ourselves when we are already proud? It is an essential part of the meaning of

pride that it is a form of self-valuing. Could we think of such a case that we are proud, and through a change of human nature, we have another as its object? To be proud is a form of self-valuing, and it is a statement of conceptual clarification, and in that sense analytic. But Hume writes as if pride causes us to think of ourselves. 'Pride has the self as its object' is not a synthetic assertion, but it spells out the meaning of 'pride'. And since in no other case we think of ourselves than being in pride, Hume could be taken to laying down the necessary conditions of being proud.

Hume has dismissed the case of self-love as an improper use of words, and this follows from his analysis of 'love' as a word for other-regarding affective valuation. And so is 'hatred'. Pride and humility are self-regarding valuations. The question whether the self or the other is the object of passion makes the dichotomy sharp and clear. Now, love, for Hume, is a simple impression of reflexion, distinguished from what he calls 'the amorous passion', which is "compound" in the sense that it is derived from "the conjunction of three different impressions or passions" (ibid.,p.394). Three passions having three 'distinct' objects, aided by the double relation of ideas and impressions together with "the parallel direction of the desires" go to constitute the amorous passion. But if this analysis is granted, why could we not conceive of self-love or self-hatred, as genuine experiences that we all sometimes do have, on the conjunction of two passions and two objects? If we care to have a look to his second Enquiry we shall come across his implicit admission of self-love as a complex passion. In the second Enquiry Hume takes up the case of

self-love chiefly in connexion of his critique of what he calls "the Hobbish" doctrine of the total selfishness of man, whether presented as pure psychology or the result of a "philosophical chemistry". On page 218 of the Enquiry he refers to self-love as "a principle in human nature of.....extensive energy". What he means by the term 'principle' is left unexplained, and is a little ambiguous, for it may mean a law (in the sense of an interrelation of causal conditions, as he speaks of the double relation of ideas and impressions as "internal principles" on p. 327 of the Treatise) or a disposition or 'propensity' or 'quality' (e.g., Hume uses the words 'quality' and 'propensity' in connexion with sympathy and says on p. 316 that sympathy is a principle). If the expression of the Enquiry is taken in the second sense, i.e., in the sense of a disposition, then self-love amounts to a passion. Hume, in the Enquiry, distinguishes "the language of self-love"(p. 272) through which one expresses "sentiments, peculiar to himself" or "sentiments of self-love" (p.274) whereas the language of morals, which, according to him embodies "notions" implies "some sentiment common to all mankind". Hume's version of universalizability of the moral language is based upon a "general system of blame or praise", or as he puts it, "the humanity of one man is the humanity of everyone" (Enquiry, p. 275), the passion of self-love loses its moral relevance as the Hobbists would like to establish. Without entering into the debate any further, it may be inoffensively asserted that in the Enquiry, Hume does admit self-love as a passion, which he had dismissed as a contradiction in terms in the Treatise. The whole of the Appendix II of the second Enquiry is

concerned with self-love as a thesis put forward by "Hobbes and Locke, who maintained the selfish system of morals" (ibid.,p.292). On p. 297 again we find a mention self-love as a passion where Hume proceeds to argue by the rule of reductio ad absurdum. According to his "natural and unforced interpretation of the phenomena of human life"(ibid., p.244) self-love as a passion is based upon benevolence: "from the original frame our temper, we may feel a desire of another's happiness or good, which, by means of that affection, becomes our own good, and is afterwards pursued, from the combined motives of benevolence and self-enjoyment" (ibid., p.302). In the Treatise, by 'love' Hume means a kind of valuing, a simple, and "tender emotion", the logical compliment of the passion of pride, which he describes in the Enquiry as "self-value" (p. 253). In the sense of a 'tender emotion' self-love does not qualify, this is what Hume says quite explicitly: The sensation (i.e., feeling) selflove produces does not have "any thing common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend or mistress"(op.cit.,p.329). And it is by the criterion of tenderness that the various "appearances" (see Treatise, p. 448) of love are identified. But this point of view does not entitle Hume to refuse self-love as "a compound passion". And if self-love is a possible passion, then self-hatred can also be construed in a similar way.

Hume's account of pride and love as names of two indirect passions seems to make stipulations for the ordinary meaning of these words. Hume himself says that by 'pride' he means 'self-value' and similarly his phrase "love and esteem" is a conjunction of univocal words. For

Hume, pride and love are two basic forms of felt evaluations arising as our emotive response to a definite set of "causes", and their difference seems to lie the respective "objects" of the passions. He says, "As the immediate object of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious" (ibid., p.329 , italics not in the text). Granted that the logical relations between the "objects" of pride and love, and the person possessing the passions are different and that Hume is mainly concerned with such relations as are entailed by such statements as 'X is proud' or 'X loves Y' (where obviously X and Y are variables for persons), yet we do not necessarily have these logical relations in mind when we make such statements. It is not improbable that a person may be proud of another or loves himself. Self-love or narcissism is a psychological possibility as much as self-pride.

Hume has three different notions of love as a passion. Ordinarily, what he means by love is a simple impression of which the 'object' is always some other person. In having "some sensible being external to us" (ibid., p.329) as its object the simple impression or passion of love is distinguished from pride. Apart from this schematic statement of love as a passion, Hume puts two specific meanings on the word. As an other-regarding evaluative feeling love means "thinking highly of", and in this sense love is a correlate of pride. 'To be proud' means 'to entertain high self-esteem', and similarly, 'to love' means 'to think highly of'. In

a footnote on page 608 of the Treatise Hume says "Love and esteem are at bottom the same passions, and arise from like causes". As a social passion, love differs from pride inasmuch as unlike the latter it is conative. Pride and humility having the self as their immediate object, Hume observes, "are pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action" (ibid., p. 367). On the contrary, he continues, "love and hatred are not completed within themselves, nor rest in that emotion, which they produce, but carry the mind to something further. Love is always follow'd by a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery"(ibid.). Much has been made about the contingent relation between the passion of love and that of benevolence in its two-fold sense, i.e., "desire of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery". Hume himself is in a sense responsible for the confusion about the relation of love and benevolence. He notes that though it "evidently contrary to experience" that "we never love any person without desiring his happiness" (Ibid, p.367), yet the relationship between the two states of mind is "not absolutely essential". Mercer attributes this contingent relation between love and benevolence to Hume's so-called Cartesianism, a phrase I cannot make much sense of. It is true that Hume writes in such a vein that might lend support to Mercer's thesis of Hume's Cartesianism. Hume says, "I see no contradiction in supposing a desire of producing misery annex'd to love and of happiness to hatred" (ibid., p.368). Here Hume equivocates between the sense of love as esteem or of thinking highly of someone and

another sense which he puts forward as the "tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress". Love in the sense of an evaluation of the qualities of some person need not be accompanied by a desire of his happiness, at least explicitly. But it is certainly self-contradictory to say that I entertains tender emotions for Y and does not desire his happiness. To say so and to hold that it is not self-contradictory is to violate ordinary usage of the word 'love'. Hume's notion of love as esteem or evaluation is a stipulation; on the other hand, his notion of love as "tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress" is the everyday meaning of the word. These two senses of the word must needs be separated. Hume's sense of love as esteem has a definite set of "causes", i.e., qualities found in the person loved or thought highly of. He writes, "The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem" (ibid., p.330) as from "beauty force, swiftness, dexterity" (ibid.). But surely we do not expect a friend or our mistress to have these qualities. In some cases the qualities may be sufficient but not necessary conditions for the arousal of the passion of love in the sense of tender emotions. And this fact establishes that love as esteem and love as tender emotion are non-identical in their import, and Hume more often equivocates them. Love in the sense of esteem, like the passion of pride or self-esteem requires the double relation of impressions and ideas. An exception is made by Hume to this general requirement in the case of non-evaluative sense of love.

Our love of relations is an example. "Whoever is united to us by

any connexion is always sure of a share of our love, proportion'd to the connexion, without enquiring into his other qualities" (ibid., p. 352). If this is true, as Hume says, then his example of tender emotion excited by a friend or mistress would also not require the double relation of impressions and ideas. In an ambiguous passage he writes that "the passion of love may be excited by only one relation of a different kind, viz. betwixt ourselves and the object; or more properly speaking, that this relation is always attended with both the others" (ibid.). What different kind of relation he means is not made clear, whether it is a relation of impressions or only of ideas. A few lines below, he says that "acquaintance, without any kind of relation, gives rise to love and kindness". He seems to take "acquaintance" in the sense "intimacy with any person", and in that case friendship and one's love for one's mistress are examples of acquaintance and do not need any relation for producing the passion characterised by Hume as "tender emotion". These difficulties issue from Hume's confusing the two distinct senses of the word love -- love as esteem and love as any intimate relationship between persons.

Hume's distinguishing between love of relations as requiring only one relation, and love arising out of acquaintance needing no relation is difficult to comprehend. Acquaintance itself is a kind of relation, may be of ideas. Whatever that be, acquaintance as such need not give rise to love in the sense of tender emotion. 'X is acquainted with Y' is not equivalent to saying 'X loves Y', though 'X is intimate with Y' may at times be taken to mean that "X has tender emotions for Y'. Acquaintance in some cases may cause love.

This may be Hume's intention, but acquaintance need not necessarily give rise to love, it may, as the saying goes, breed contempt as well.

The third sense of love that Hume speaks of what he calls "the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes". According to him, amorous passion is not a simple impression but a compound one and necessarily hetero-sexual. Hetero-sexuality is the characteristic feature of amorous passion. He says, "Sex is not only the object, but also the cause of the appetite" (ibid., p. 396). But in order to fit it in the scheme of his principle of double relation of impressions and ideas Hume adds the passions of beauty and good-will and thus the compound nature of the passion of love between the sexes is secured. Amorous passion does not seem to be compound on a logical ground but it is made compound on a psychological necessity. Hume admits that "reflecting on it [sex] suffices to excite the appetite" but as "this cause loses its force by too great frequency" (ibid., p.396) the idea of "the beauty of the person" is needed. But is it so really? In the case of the infatuated lover the idea of the beauty or deformity of the beloved seems to play no part at all, although he very much experiences amorous passion. This improvisation of the idea of the beauty of the person loved seemed to Hume to give "a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas" (ibid.). Now, amorous passion has sex for both its "object" and "cause". Hume remarks that the "double relation is necessary where an affection has both a distinct cause, and object, how much more so, where it has only a distinct object, without any determinate cause?"(ibid.). But is it true? In the case of acquaintance

there is a determinate object, though no determinate cause, and yet no double relation is required. Either, so far amorous passion is concerned, sex is both the object and the determinate cause of the passion and the double relation is needed, or, it is only the object with no determinate cause and the double relation is not needed. Hume cannot have it both ways.

Again love as tender emotion excited by one's mistress is surely as hetero-sexual as amorous passion. The "beauty of the person" as Hume puts it may be a source of tender emotion as well. He himself says that "the most common species of love is that which arises from beauty" (ibid., p.395). A lot depends on what Hume means by "beauty". It may be real or imaginary. Can we say that love arising out of intimacy has anything to do with the beauty of the person? We fancy somebody as beautiful because we love her, and not that we love her because she is beautiful. The notion of beauty is brought in to a dubious role in Hume's account of amorous passion. It is devised to ensure kindness towards the person for whom one might feel bodily appetite. "Kindness or esteem, and the appetite to generation, are too remote to unite easily together. The one is, perhaps, the most refin'd passion of the soul; the other the most gross and vulgar. The love of beauty is plac'd in a just medium betwixt them, and partakes of both their natures: From whence it proceeds, that 'tis so singularly fitted to produce both" (ibid.,p.395). One simply wonders how it does.

Hume appears to be indecisive as regards the object of the amorous passion. At one place he says that sex is the object of the

passion, at another he remarks that amorous passion has no specific object. He further conceives beauty as the catalytic agent of the passion. But all this has something unsatisfactory about it. Amorous passion is an achievement, partly biological partly conventional. Hume nowhere mentions the role played by pleasure, almost of the paradigmatic sensual type, in amorous passion. Does he mean "the sense of beauty, the bodily appetite" is the same as sexual pleasure? But sexual desire is a part of the sexual pleasure, and cannot be conceived of existing outside it. Sexual desire transforms itself gradually into the pleasure that appears, misleadingly, to be an aim extrinsic to it. Again, when Hume speaks of "the beauty of the person" he comes very near the truth of erotic perception as analysed in recent times by Merleau-Ponty. There is both an embodiment as well as a transcendence. "What we try to possess" says Merleau-Ponty "is not just a body, but a body brought to life by consciousness" (Phenomenology of Perception, p.167). Sexually relevant aesthetic features may be perceived and recognised, but it is not these but their possessor who is the proper object of amorous passion. This recognition is mutual, and the factor of mutuality is important in considering judgments of sexual worth. In rape, for instance, no mutual recognition of desire by desire is involved. There is an element of respect for persons in amorous passion, which Hume does not sufficiently bring about. It is very important that the object of sexual attraction is a particular individual, who transcends the properties that make him or her attractive. Different persons may be attracted to a single individual for different reasons, eyes, hair or figure —

though the object of their desire is nevertheless the same -- the person. Lastly, Hume seems to smuggle "beauty" into "the appetite to generation", since both are variants of "bodily appetites". But this is obviously a false bias, and confuses that what is psychological with the physiological.

Hume's account of the passion of love has an important bearing. He says that "the object of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious"(ibid., p. 329). The other person, "of whose thoughts, actions and sensations we are not conscious" is a member of the social set, which is the domain of morality. The passion of love is thus essentially social, and since it is said to have a "tendency" or "end", the passion is intentional. Or we may say that Hume's account of love has possibilities of being developed into a mode of knowing other selves. Love and hatred constitute a universal component in the relation of persons, and may be found in the personal situation in all its forms. Philosophers who have written on love as a mode of personal relationship have emphasised on the element of mutuality. It is said that love is fulfilled only when it is reciprocated. An early recognition of it is found in Aristotle's Ethics (Book IX). He speaks of a friend being in fact another self. Aristotle says that a man is "related to his friend as to himself (for his friend is another self).. the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love for oneself" (The Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle, translated by Ross, The World's Classics, p. 228). This passage is often quoted in favour of the view that Aristotle's theory of friendship

is based on self-love. But it can equally well be regarded as the first philosophical treatment of "mutuality". He speaks of "man being a social animal and formed by nature for living with others". To readers of the Politics, this sounds familiar. Aristotle has a good deal to contribute about the relations between selves. Most of all in the line: "Friendship is acted out in intimacy," he offers the most 'practical' wisdom of all. Philia presupposes a certain equality of the two taking part and a mutual recognition of the worth of each. Hume's position is not far from Aristotle's, because though we are not intimately conscious of the thoughts and feelings of the person we may love, yet it is hoped to be overcome by the principle of sympathy, which Hume invokes for this exclusive purpose. The element of mutuality is not explicit in Hume's account of love, but not without it. The element of intimacy is secured by my having a special relation to the person I love, just as in the case of pride, something that I am be proud of needs shared in a special relation to me. Hume says that the relation has got to be "a close one, and a closer than is requir'd to joy" (ibid.,p. 291). Similarly, in the case of love, "myself am related to the person" (ibid.,p. 339). The faculty of imagination assists the passions, and this is more so in the case of the other-regarding passions like love and hatred. On epistemic grounds the passions of pride and humility are easier to have than those of love and hatred because, "when the affections are once directed to myself, the fancy passes not with the same facility from that object to any other person, how closely so ever connected with us" (ibid., p. 340). The difficulty

besetting the transition of passions with objects other than ourselves, can be removed by invoking the principle of sympathy. Hume's notion of the moral self, one can say, is not a windowless monad, and hence it cannot rest with itself as the object of its passions. He makes this point quite clearly. The moral self becomes real only in the context of personal relationship. He writes, "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing: For which reason we must turn our view to external objects; and 'tis natural for us to consider with most attention such as lie contiguous to us, or resemble us"(ibid). The principle of sympathy operates of itself, it is not artificially introduced, it is a 'natural' working of the mind. We shall later undertake a fuller consideration of Hume's notion of sympathy. It will suffice here to say that sympathy as Hume puts it, is a mechanism by which "the mind passes easily from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us"(ibid). We find, then, that passions, when the object is some other person than myself are assisted by the imagination and sympathy. In this way Hume liberates us from the confines of the isolated self by way feelings. The self, whether of mine or of others, that can become the "object" of passions is no mere cognitive subject but a living and changing centre of experience in all its richness of affective and conative aspects as well. If the self were a mere cognitive subject then to speak of one self knowing another self would indeed be contradictory, for on such a view the 'subject' is that which, by reason of being the condition of knowing, cannot be regarded as an 'object'. But since the self is a living

self, it is not like the inhabitants of T.S.Eliot's The Waste Land -- "in a prison, waiting for a key". In fact, it already finds itself in a world where people are communicating with each other.

In connexion with love as an other-regarding passion the talk of self-love would come up once again. It is assumed that to the degree to which I love myself I do not love others, that self-love is the same as selfishness. John Calvin spoke of self-love as "a pest". In the Book III of the Treatise Hume speaks of self-love as "the source of all injustice and violence", though it is a natural appetite, his value judgment is the same as that of Calvin. He says that "each person loves himself better than any other single person" (ibid., p. 487). It appears that Hume takes the term 'self-love' to mean selfishness. His position, then, with regard to self-love, stands as follows. Either self-love is terminologically a defective notion, i.e., the passion of love cannot have the self as its object, or self-love is selfishness. I have tried earlier to show that self-love is a conceivable passion. In the present context, I should like to argue that selfishness need not necessarily be the only meaning of 'self-love'.

"A propensity to the tender passions" (ibid., p. 603-4) such as love and benevolence or friendship is for Hume the criterion for moral appraisal or commendation. "We praise", he says, "all the passions that partake of" the tender passions. The operation of the tender dispositions, i.e., the generosity of men, as Hume calls it, is a limited one, and "it seldom extends beyond their friends and

family, or at most, beyond their native country." Yet, we are told that "in our calm judgments" the limitations are transcended. How love, then, becomes an attitude which is the same toward all objects including myself. The commandment "love thy neighbour as thyself" as speaking of love in the sense suggested above. If you love yourself, you love everybody else as you do yourself -- so goes a Buddhist saying. Self-love in this specific sense has a history. The notion that love for others and love for oneself are mutually exclusive is unsound. If it is a virtue to love my neighbour as a human being, it must be a virtue -- and not a vice -- to love myself, since I am a human being too. Since there is no concept of man in which I myself am not included. The love for my own self is inseparably connected with the love for any other being. Love of others and love of ourselves are not alternatives. On the contrary, an attitude of love toward themselves will be found in all those who are capable of loving others. The arguments stand on the truth of the premise that not only others, but we ourselves are also the 'object' of our feelings and attitudes. And there is no foreseeable reason that Hume would disdain it. Love should then properly be contrasted with selfishness, which is a case of self-alienation. The over solicitous mother is said to be selfish. Psychiatrists say that such mothers actually have a deeply repressed hostility toward her child -- the object of her concern, while she consciously believes that she is particularly fond of her child. She is over concerned not because she loves the child too much, but because she has to compensate for her lack of capacity to love him at all. The

selfish person seems to care too much for himself, while there is a lack of fondness and care for himself in any productive sense. Hume's notion of love as a tender emotive feeling is also productive, i.e., it implies care, concern and responsibility. If an individual is able to love productively, he loves himself too. The following should be taken as about the behaviour of the self-loving man: " 'tis remarkable, that nothing touches a man of humanity more than any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship, where a person is attentive to the smallest concern of his friend, and is willing to sacrifice to them the most considerable interest of his own" (ibid., pp. 604-5). Such behaviour is taken by Hume as "a proof of the highest merit in any one". It is not for the love of a wife that a wife is dear, said Yajnavalkya to his wife, but for the love of the self that a wife is dear. This could not have been the utterance of a selfish person.

It has been argued that love is unreliable because it is a biased judgment. Love is a biased emotion and biased emotions may lead to unfair evaluation. Ardal has raised the point that either love can lead to a wrong evaluation or it may be aroused even when the object possesses no very obvious pleasing qualities. But as we have already attempted to distinguish between three senses of the word, love as esteem or thinking highly of is something different from, say, our love of relations or feeling of tender emotion for our friends. Ardal is right in pointing out that one may be called upon to justify one's pride in something, and such a justification consists in giving an account of the valuable characteristics of

the object of pride. But such a process of justification is not possible in the case of love. Ardal seems to argue, because, he says, "when referring to people, /love/ usually stands for tender emotion .... and does not mean 'thinking highly of'. Thus we claim to love our children without having to meet the challenge that there is nothing lovable or valuable about them; but we cannot claim to be proud of our children unless we are prepared to say that they have some valuable qualities." (op.cit.,p.37) The argument is valid, but not sound, since Hume does implicitly distinguish between love as esteem as a correlative of pride, and love as tender emotion. The correlation between pride as self-esteem and love as esteem or thinking highly of others makes possible the transition from pride to love. Almost in the manner of Aristotle, Hume says that "the original passion is pride or humility, whose object is self; and .... this passion is transfus'd into love or hatred, whose object is some other person". (op.cit.,p.346. italics not in the text) The evaluative character of the passion of love remains unchanged, for our love for the other person is caused by his valuable qualities: "The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem." (ibid.,p.330) Hume explicitly says that the object of love and hatred is always some other person, but "the object is not, properly speaking, the cause of those passions, or alone sufficient to excite them."(ibid.) And for precisely this reason he was led to distinguish between "the quality that operates, and the subject on which it is placed" (ibid.) Ardal misses this point altogether. What is more important to remember is that Hume himself treats "love of relations" as an

exception to the rule of double association of impressions and ideas which is required for the passion of love as esteem. Love differs from pride, not as Ardal thinks, "without in any sense implying the existence of any valuable quality at all"(op.cit.,p.37) but in requiring the assistance of imagination and sympathy. There is in Hume an use of the word 'love' which does satisfy Ardal's description, and that is love as tender emotion, or a variant of it, i.e., love of relations.

And, finally, the misgiving that love can lead to a wrong evaluation may be disposed of by the following consideration. Hume's moral psychology is worked out with a view to showing that all our activities, at least the practical ones, have their motives and intentions, and are sustained by an emotional attitude. This is not to say that all our thinking is prejudiced or coloured by emotional bias. Whether we can escape completely from prejudice may be questioned. An element of emotion is present in most of our thought and it is also doubtful that to get rid of emotions is to escape from prejudice altogether. May be that we shall lose the capacity to think. Loose thinking or uncontrolled feelings do lead us into error. I do not mean to deny this. But strong emotions, which Hume calls "violent passions" such as love and hatred may sharpen the focus of our attention and quicken our apprehension of the object and lead to the recognition of truths, and even of facts, which otherwise could have escaped our notice. Personal relations have the merit that it minimises the possibility of shamming. Who knows a man better than his wife? Feelings arising out of personal

relationship constitute the hinterland of our approach to others. A certain modicum pro-feelings seems to be the presupposition of the whole enterprise of getting to know others. If I am not interested in X, and rather dislike him in fact, I will not embark on the project of getting to know him further. Our pro-feelings (and love is one such), moreover, seem to act as a kind of bridge spanning the gap between the various times when we are in actual contact. The stimulus to continue our knowing then appears to come not only from the will but from our affective life (Of course, this makes no sense in other knowings, e.g., mathematical knowing, though very relevant to our knowledge of others).

The general statements made above need substantiation. The problem of knowing other selves is riddled with grave epistemological difficulties, and any opinion expressed cannot go without hazarding opposition. In ethics the epistemological bearing of the problem has not much been probed, though the very notion of morality seems to presuppose a non-solipsistic universe. In his moral psychology, it appears to me, Hume has hinted at some probable solution which is worth considering. His investing the passions with a social dimension and intentionality prepares from the start for a non-solipsistic world of morality. The close relation that he shows between the two 'faculties' of the imagination and passions (op.cit., p. 339) and the 'principle' of sympathy (ibid., p. 316), which he invokes for knowing the feelings of others go to lay the foundations of what may be called the epistemology of ethics. To put in general terms, Hume is, in fact, attempting to reinstate the primacy

of feeling in our practical concerns. Or, he is trying the efficacy of feeling in our having a knowledge of other selves whom we must take into account before any moral action is possible.

The efficacy of reason as an instrument of discovery was by and large taken for granted by philosophers from the time of ancient Greece onwards. However, there have been periods in the history of philosophical thought when due recognition was given to a way of thinking not purely intellective. We may note some of these. The mediaeval distinction between cognitio per modum amoris and cognitio per modum rationis provides a case in point. Pascal perhaps came nearest to this notion with his conception of an order of the heart. Among later philosophers Lotze was alive to the intentional character of emotion and to its revelatory function, and it may be said to have been implied in the most thorough fashion of all in the writings of the romantics. In this theory of value Meinong maintained that emotions have what he called a 'presentative' function and that they therefore, had a part to play in cognition. Among recent philosophical writings one of the most challenging claims in favour of the cognitive role of feeling was made by W.E.Hocking. In his chapter on the 'Destiny of Feeling' he writes: 'All positive feeling .... reaches its terminus in knowledge. All feeling seems to imitate some experience which is essentially cognitive' (The Meaning of God in Human Experience, p. 67).

Feeling in the context of ethics are mostly regarded as a bar to the proper functioning of reason and the performance of duty. Plato's analogy of the unruly horses which seek to run away with

the chariot, or Kant's dislike of the category of the 'pathological' are what is typical of the philosophers' treatment of feelings in ethics. Whatever may be the shortcomings of feelings, neither Plato nor Kant provides us with a clue for knowing the other selves. Sartre's charge against Kant that from the transcendental apperception of the self or the barely logical 'I think' the existence of the other selves cannot be derived seems to hold truth. Though Kant was in a greater need of a non-solipsistic universe, otherwise his universalizability thesis or the kingdom of ends lose its meaningfulness, yet appears to take the existence of other selves as granted in both of his Second and Third Critiques. There could have been a possible line of approach through the intentional character of feelings, but Kant's deep distrust of the pathological prevented it from being done. In Hume we find a promising attempt at laying the foundations of moral epistemology. To say this is not to commit oneself to the soundness of his arguments, but to recognize what has long been unheeded: Feelings from the hinterland of our knowing other persons.
