

**IMMANUEL KANT
ON PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL**

TRANSLATED, WITH FOUR INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS


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To
MY FATHER
AND
MY MOTHER

IMMANUEL KANT
ON PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL



PREFACE

Of recent years, it has become one of the prevailing fashions to speak disparagingly of Kant and Hegel and their philosophies. Thus, we come across statements that Kant is a mistake and Hegel a misfortune, and other brilliant judgments to the same effect, but very often it turns out that the disparagers themselves are only disguised and unconscious Kantians and Hegelians, and bad ones too, precisely because they are unaware of the extent and nature of their debts. Particularly of Kant it may be said, in words that Professor Whitehead rightly applies to Plato, that the whole of modern European philosophy is only "a series of brilliant footnotes" to the speculative achievements of Kant. In short, a modern philosopher may be a Kantian or an anti-Kantian, but whether he wants to deny the fundamental assumptions or the final conclusions of Kant, he must use, not only the method, but also the problems which Kant has bequeathed to philosophy.

This makes it all the more important to study Kant, and study him in his own words so far as practicable, for very often they are the loudest in detraction who have read the least of him. There has been growing recognition of this in recent years, and philosophers, amidst the perplexities

and controversies of to-day, are harkening "back to Kant" to discover anew the orientation of their philosophies. In England, this has been marked by the emergence of a number of brilliant writers on Kant and his philosophy, of whom the most remarkable are Professors R. Adamson, N. K. Smith and H. J. Paton, Mr. A. D. Lindsay, Mr. Justice A. J. Meredith, Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, Doctors A. C. Ewing and W. D. Ross and Professor H. A. Prichard. Those who have been privileged to hear Mr. H. H. Price lecture on the Critique of Pure Reason can only record their regret at his refusal to publish them, for not only would they stamp him as one of the most stimulating of the interpreters of Kant, but would also instruct and inspire a far wider circle of Kantian students. To all of them I am grateful for what they have taught me of Kant, and my occasional disagreement with some or all of them does not make me the less conscious of what I owe to them.

The present translation, undertaken at the suggestion of the Master of Balliol, is offered as an humble contribution towards the same general purpose of a better understanding of Kant through the study of his *ipsissima verba*. That the present tract was not translated earlier seems somewhat surprising, for here we have, within a short compass, one of the fullest statements of Kant's general position and an indication of the lines along which his mind was working during those glorious years

when he wrote the three Critiques. The undue and, as pointed out by the Master of Balliol in his magnificent monograph, unfortunate neglect of the third Critique may be partly responsible for this; the history of the publication of the text may, as suggested by Herr Lehmann, be one of the other reasons; but though these may explain, they cannot justify the neglect which has so far attended this text. It is only because of this that I have, in spite of a keen consciousness of my deficiencies, yet ventured to bring out the present translation for the use of students of Kant. I have not spared any pains to make the translation as accurate as possible and yet try to capture the rhythm and movement of normal English prose,—a task which all translators of Kant know is far more difficult than at first sight appears. In some of the more difficult passages, I have consulted Dr. Adam von Trott zu Solz, sometime Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford, and Dr. Batakrishna Ghosh, a Greater India Society Scholar at the University of Munich. I should like also to thank Dr. Saileswara Sen, Reader in Philosophy, Andhra University, Waltair, for a suggestion with regard to the translation of one particularly difficult sentence. In every case, however, I am alone responsible for the translations as presented here and they must not be charged with any mistakes that might have remained in spite of all possible precautions. I shall be deeply thankful to all

readers who point out any mistakes that might be noticed by them.

I should like to record here my sense of obligation to Herr Gerhard Lehmann for the text he has prepared for *Der Philosophischen Bibliothek* published by Herr Felix Meiner of Leipzig. This is the text which has been followed throughout in the present translation. I have always translated *Urteilkraft* by Judgment, using a capital 'J' to distinguish it from *urteil* which has been translated by judgment. Generally speaking, I have used the capital to indicate the faculty as distinguished from the activity in which it expresses itself.

The four introductory essays seek to bring out the essential unity of the three Critiques and suggest that, whatever be the history of the publication of the third Critique, it is a mistake to regard it as a mere afterthought. The first two essays summarise the conclusions of the first two Critiques and show that they necessarily imply the activity of Judgment which is analysed in the third Critique. The third essay studies the function of Judgment in the first Critique, while the fourth is a comparative study of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment as it now stands and the tract which is presented here.

The passages from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment quoted in the introductory essays are based upon the translations of Professor N. K. Smith and

Mr. Justice A. J. Meredith, respectively, who have laid all students of Kant under a deep obligation by their magnificent translations of and illuminating studies in the philosophy of Kant.

In the writing of this book, my deepest obligations are to Dr. R. R. Marett, Rector of Exeter College, Oxford, and Mr. A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. It was Dr. Marett who first encouraged me in the study of philosophy, and helped with sympathy and assistance at every stage of my student-life at Oxford. It is enough to say that but for his most generous intercession on my behalf, and the assistance of Mr. H. E. Stapleton, then Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, it would not have been possible for me to stay a fourth year at Oxford, and perhaps this book, far from being written, would not have been even contemplated. My obligation to Mr. Lindsay is equally great. As already noticed, the present translation was undertaken at his suggestion, while the introductory essays bear the mark of his inspiration on every page. I attended his lectures and read his published work, and he also very generously lent me the use of his unpublished writings and lecture notes. My general position, as well as many of the points discussed in these essays, are the direct outcome of what I have learnt from him. If I have yet ventured to differ from him on one or two points, it is with a full consciousness of my

deep obligation for what his teaching has meant to me.

I must thank very deeply Mr. H. H. Cox of Lincoln College, my tutor during the whole of my undergraduate days at Oxford, whose un-failing sympathy and courtesy, and the obvious interest he took in my work was a source of constant inspiration to me. I am also grateful to all my other teachers there, but feel that I must make special mention of Mr. H. W. B. Joseph of New College, Mr. R. G. Collingwood of Pembroke, Mr. C. R. Morris of Balliol, Mr. R. M. Foster of Christchurch and Mr. O. S. Franks of the Queen's College as some of those from whose lectures I derived the greatest benefit. I have to thank Professors J. A. Smith and H. H. Joachim for permission to attend and participate in their discussion classes, which were a source of instruction and inspiration to all who were fortunate enough to attend. I must here mention Mr. Ian Gallie, a fellow Exonian, and now Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford, for the many interesting discussions we had during our common student days.

Among those who were not directly my teachers, I must mention Sir S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-Chancellor of Andhra University, Waltair, and Mr. S. P. Mookerjee, Vice-Chancellor, Calcutta University, as those to whom I owe most. Sir Sarvapalli is widely known as a scholar of

rare learning and deep insight, but it is not so widely known that he is equally great as a patron of learning and a helper of aspiring students. Of Mr. Mookerjee, it is enough to say that he is young in years but has already proved that he is not only the son, but also the successor of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, greatest of the Vice-Chancellors of Calcutta University.

Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya, then Director of Indian Institute of Philosophical Research, Amalnar, did me the honour of reading the whole of this book in type-script. I have tried to strengthen the argument in several places to meet some of his criticisms, but unfortunately for me, I came to know him at a time when the book had already been made ready for the press, and any radical alterations were impossible. I am, however, deeply obliged to him for the care and interest with which he looked into the work, and to Dr. S. K. Maitra of Calcutta University for suggesting an alteration with regard to the form of the opening paragraph of the introductory essays.

I have to thank Mr. J. Chakravorti, Registrar, Calcutta University, for the interest he has taken in the production of this work. Without his interest and the magnificent co-operation of Mr. A. C. Ghatak, Superintendent of Calcutta University Press, the book could not have been published before the end of this year. I am also indebted to Mr. B. L. Banerjee, Printer, and other

members of Calcutta University Press for the energy and interest with which they have helped in the completion of the work.

Mr. Sudhindranath Dutt, Editor of the *Parichaya* and one of the collaborators of the proposed *Oxford Book of Bengali Verse*, read through all the proofs in spite of the many calls upon his time. I must also thank my nephews, Messrs. A. Zaman and A. T. Jemal of Presidency College, Calcutta, for helping me in reading some of the proofs.

Finally, I have to thank Calcutta University and the Government of Bengal for the award of a foreign scholarship which enabled me to study Philosophy at Oxford, and the Executors of the Mohsin Trust Funds for the provision of a special grant for the continuation of my studies at Oxford for a fourth and final year.

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HUMAYUN KABIR

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INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS

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• I

Human knowledge is a process in time, coming about in a finite individual mind, and yet it claims to hold true for all minds at all times. The problem is further complicated by the fact that what claims to be true does not always turn out to be true. A *prima facie* examination of the contents of knowledge cannot therefore decide the question of their truth or falsity. If what is true were always self-evidently true, and the certainty and infallibility of knowledge were manifest in its object, it would become impossible to account for the fact of error. Truth is not a property of the subject knowing or of the object known, and we cannot solve the problem of knowledge by an examination into the ontological status of the constituents of the knowledge situation.

It is only in comparatively recent times that this has been fully recognised, and with this recognition, the problem of knowledge has become the fundamental problem of philosophy. Anticipations of the problem may be discerned in the writings of some of the earlier philosophers, but it is Locke who first raises the question in the specific form which modern philosophy has made

familiar to us. Even Locke, however, was a pioneer rather than a denizen in the realms of modern philosophy. He no doubt started with an enquiry into the nature of the human understanding, but, with him, the enquiry was merely preliminary to an examination of the objects of our knowledge in order to determine their ontological nature and status. It was really Kant who changed the character of philosophical enquiry by asking, not what things ultimately are, but what are the conditions implied by the fact of knowledge.

For Kant, therefore, "truth is," in the words of Dr. Lindsay, "concerned not with the relation of what we apprehend and something on the other side of the apprehensible, nor with the quality of that which is apprehended, but with the relation of what we apprehend at one time to what we apprehend at another—or, as he puts it, the relation between present and possible experience."¹ The distinction between association and judgment is therefore of the utmost importance to his problem and he soon came to realise that knowledge and judgment are, and must be, co-extensive.

Kant thought that formal logic had completed the analysis of judgment as pure form in abstraction from all content of knowledge. All that was therefore left for him to do was merely to analyse

¹ Lindsay, p. 55.

thinking in its relation to knowledge of objects, and this he proposed to do in his transcendental logic. We need not discuss here how far his account of the nature of formal logic is correct, nor raise the objection that formal logic does not actually abstract from all content, for "we must, if we wish to study the principles that pervade our thinking, consider to some extent the differences in our thought arising from differences in that about which we think."¹ It is enough to point out that this professed respect for formal logic did not prevent Kant from altering its scheme wherever in conflict with that suggested by his own analysis. In the end, he revolutionised the problem and procedure of logic in spite of his protestations of loyalty.

An objection may be, and is sometimes, raised about this supposed effect of Kant's investigations upon the problem and procedure of logic. It is argued that what Kant was doing was merely to undertake an examination of the presuppositions of logic and this examination has no influence whatever upon the programme which logic sets itself to carry out. Thus, Kant's analysis may have changed our attitude towards the problem of knowledge and involved a reformulation of the theory of truth, but logic deals with the implications of the forms of thought and these implications are not necessarily affected by changes in

¹ Josseph, *Logic*, 5.

our theory of truth. In other words, Kant's transcendental logic deals with the question of the *validity of knowledge*, while formal logic is content to test the *consistency or otherwise of logical forms of thought*. The two problems may be related to one another, but they are distinct problems. Since the problems are distinct, changes in the theory of the one need not necessarily involve changes in the theory of the other.

This, it is said, is what Kant means to express by his insistence upon the absolute certainty of logical knowledge. He no doubt feels compelled to make certain additions and alterations in his account of the forms of judgment, but this is due merely to the fact that the problem he sets himself is a problem wider than that of formal logic. So long as the question is one of formal consistency and the implications of different forms of statements, the account given by formal logic is adequate, and in recent times, symbolic logic has been only extending the scope, without modifying the principle, of old formal logic. What Kant is doing is something different, for his problem is that of the possibility of knowledge itself, and it is therefore inevitable that he should introduce distinctions and principles not recognised in the account of formal logic. In short, the account of formal logic may not be a complete account, but then, formal logic never claims that its account is final and complete. Incompleteness of the account

does not, however, necessarily involve its falsity, for partial knowledge, provided we remember that it is partial, may be, and is, true and valid knowledge. "Whenever we judge at all, we not only predicate a partial feature, but we predicate it as partial. What we assert is its connectedness within the whole nature of the subject, in accordance with the characteristic form of unity distinctive of that subject."¹

This objection raises one of the most fundamental problems of all philosophy, *viz.*, the problem of the nature of relations. This problem we propose to discuss at some length at a later stage, and for the present we are prepared to concede that, at least *prima facie*, relations do not seem to constitute the nature of a term.² Let us take the case of similarity. If A and B are both blue, the relation of similarity between them depends on the fact of similarity, *i.e.*, on the presence of some identical quality, *viz.* blue, in both of them. The relation is therefore based on a fact which is intrinsic to the nature of A and B. We cannot, however, say that the relation is on that account internal and constitutes the nature of A and B, for the simple reason that the relation between A and B would hold even if both of them were black, or not-blue. Blueness which is part of the

¹ Stout, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, 217.

² See below, pp. xlvi ff.

content of A and B cannot therefore be constituted by the relation of similarity which holds between A and B. Expressing it in another form, we may say that, what is the condition of a fact need not (and perhaps cannot) be a part of its content. Applying it to the case of knowledge, we must therefore say that a condition or presupposition of knowledge cannot be its object, and therefore, whatever may be the findings of transcendental logic, it cannot, as an examination of the *presuppositions* of knowledge, affect formal logic which deals with the logical forms exhibited by the *contents* of our knowledge.

The position suggested above rests on the assumption that formal logic is correct so far as it goes, even though it may not go very far. But this is an assumption which is hardly tenable. We shall see later that the account of judgment given in formal logic is not a valid account, and further, that Kant himself recognises this fact. Since the business of formal logic is the examination of the implications of the forms of judgment, it is essential that it must give a correct account of the nature of judgment, for any inaccuracy there is bound to vitiate its whole discussion. Modern symbolic logic has made it quite clear that the old formal logic did not give an adequate account even of the implications of the forms of judgment. It confined its attention to the problem of the relation of the class to its members, and as

Professor Kemp Smith points out, the only type of judgment with which it concerned itself was the attributive judgment. The result of Kant's analysis is to show that even the attributive judgment expresses, "not the inclusion of an attribute within a given group of attributes, but the organisation of a complex manifold in terms of the dual category of substance and attribute."¹ Therefore, apart from any question of the relation of transcendental to traditional logic, and consequently, that of the conditions to the contents of knowledge, Kant's analysis results in a revolution in both "the problem and the procedure of logic."

This epistemological interest explains why the *Critical Philosophy* begins with the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant started with the position that the empirical judgment of perception—what Bradley calls the analytic judgment of sense²—offers no difficulty, for in it the question of validity beyond the moment of experience does not arise. It expresses the particular perception of a particular finite mind at a definite point in the space-time order and guarantees its own validity. He did not at first see that even this judgment involves a reference beyond the individual mind. As an objective unity of given representations, it claims acceptance from every one, and must therefore be distinguished from a relation of the same

¹ Kemp Smith, 37.

² Bradley, *Logic*, I, 2, 15-16.

representations that has merely subjective validity. Nor did he here ask what is meant by a point in the space-time order and how we come to apprehend it.

Similarly, he thought that the analytical judgment offers no difficulty, for the concept analysed in the judgment guarantees its validity. If the analysis of the concept means a development of its meaning, then we must in some way account for this increase in our knowledge and the concept cannot guarantee the validity of the judgment. If, on the other hand, there is no development of meaning but only a statement of what we mean by a term, then it is not a judgment at all, but a definition of a word. Nor is the problem simplified when we remember that we must account for the concept itself, and no account of this in terms of the rationalist's distinction between Reason and Intuition is possible to Kant.

What really started Kant on his critical investigations was therefore the problem of the scientific judgment, for judgments of science claim universal validity like the analytical judgments, and yet like the judgments of perception, apply to objects of experience which are given to us as particular and finite. These judgments are therefore at the same time synthetic and a priori, and demand a new account of knowledge to explain their possibility. The answer of the first Critique is that the unique nature of space and time explains

this paradox, for all objects of experience exhibit spatio-temporal characteristics, and must therefore conform to the uniform, self-external and intuitive character of space and time.

This may be regarded as the position of common-sense, analysed and made self-conscious. It has been shown time and again that the common-sense idea of 'things' must inevitably lead to ideas in Plato's sense. If we attempt to give any account of the platonic ideas, we are forced to say that they are general laws or universal elements which explain the uniformity of experience, for, the attempt to regard them as noumenal entities, distinct in being from the particulars in which they are exemplified, leads to the denial of even their comprehensibility. These universal elements cannot be given in experience, and must, therefore, be regarded as pure forms of abstraction lying ready in the mind, and called to activity by the occasions of experience. Hence, it is the manifold of disorganised sense-data which supplies the material for these forms. But these ideas are universal while the data of sense are particular, and it is therefore impossible to give any account of their mutual connections in terms of idea and sense alone. The ideas therefore have to be schematised, *i.e.*, brought into relation with space-time organisation in order to explain their applicability to the particulars of sense.

This account does not, however, seem to distinguish between the positions of Hume and Kant. Hume had said that only the particulars were given in experience, while their organisation into objects was the result of the associative power of the mind. Even the principle of causality was, for Hume, a subjective necessity of the human mind, and there was therefore no guarantee of its application to the objects of experience. The advance of Kant on this position is that the categories are seen to be involved in the structure of experience as such, so that even the distinction between the subjective and the objective is possible only through the operation of the categories.

This is a case of turning Hume's position against Hume himself, but the full extent of Kant's advance is not always realised on account of his undue neglect of the individual element in all knowledge. Kant's own analysis shows that the categories are not by themselves adequate to the constitution of experience and require a further intuitive element. In the first Critique, he does not, however, examine the nature of this intuitive element. The result is that he does not even canvass the possibility that, if the manifold of sensations be really disorganised, it might refuse to submit to the forms which the categories seek to impose on it.¹

¹ cf. Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetic*, 257-9.

The logical implication of this is that even the particular is not bare content without form. This is the conclusion towards which the revolution in the theory of judgment also points. The result of Kant's analysis of judgment was to show that the problem of synthetic a priori judgment is not confined to any special province of knowledge, but is co-extensive with its whole field. If Kant had realised what his own position involved, *viz.*, that even the empirical judgment is synthetic and yet has its own universality—he would have seen that universal and necessary principles inform even the data of our observation.

This can be expressed in another way by saying that for Kant, the given is never the bare particular supposed to be found in atomic sensation. In fact, he denies that sensation can ever be atomic, for he insists that the perception of space and time is itself the perception of a manifold.¹ Even in the *Aesthetic*, he always speaks of space and time as manifolds of intuition, but as if to leave no doubt in the matter, he quite explicitly states in the *Analytic* that space and time themselves, as unities underlying all experience, must involve the synthetic activity of the Understanding. "In the *Aesthetic*, I have treated this unity as belonging merely to Sensibility. This I have done simply in order to note that it precedes any concept, though as a matter of fact, it presupposes

¹ *cf.* Lindsay, Kant, 64-5, 98.

a synthesis which does not belong to the senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. It is by means of it (in that the Understanding determines Sensibility) that space and time are first given as intuitions. The unity of this a priori intuition therefore belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the Understanding." ¹ Hence, an element of structure or synthesis is involved even in the perception of the particular, but Kant does not stop here and goes on to add that this perception also presupposes an idea of the system of reality. In the section on the Regulative Employment of the Ideas, Kant lays down that "the hypothetical employment of Reason has, therefore, as its aim the systematic unity of the knowledge of the Understanding, and this unity is the criterion of the truth of its rules." ²

Stated in simpler terms, this can only mean that coherence is our test of truth, and therefore, objects can be objects of our knowledge only so far as they conform to the unity of the system of reality. Now, if we regard reality as a thoroughly interconnected system, it follows that every part of such a system must be organically related to the other parts as well as to the whole. In that case, the way seems clear to the Hegelian Absolute in which the parts are nothing but the partial manifestations of the whole itself. In other words, Reality becomes a vast

¹ B 160-1, note.

² A 647=B 675.

organic system in which the parts are the microscopic reproductions of the macroscopic whole.

This, however, is a position that is repugnant to the deepest metaphysical insight of Kant, and the passage quoted above is therefore immediately followed by the caution that "the systematic unity (as a mere idea) is, on the other hand, only a projected unity, and must be regarded, not as given in itself, but only as a problem (for the Understanding). It helps us, however, in the discovery of a principle for the manifold and special modes of employment of the Understanding, directs its attention to cases which are not given, and thus renders it more coherent."¹ Kant is never tired of insisting on the fact that the ideas of Reason, though conditions of knowledge, are not its constituents. In other words, the systematic unity of experience may be one of the presuppositions of even a particular experience, but precisely for that reason, the systematic character of experience cannot constitute the content of the particular experiences. Translating it into logical terms, we may therefore say that Kant is quite definite in his mind that a judgment, though its truth may be tested by its coherence with a system of judgments, cannot yet be identical with such a system. The individual of experience is not therefore for Kant an individual of the Hegelian type. It is

¹ A 647=B 675.

the meeting point of many concepts (or characteristics), but this unification of concepts in a particular is for us *a fact*; it cannot, for us, be a construction from the premises, though with the progress of knowledge, we come to see more and more clearly that such construction is actually exhibited in it. The necessity of the particular is also, for Kant, for that very reason, not self-justifying as it is for Hegel and his followers,—it is merely the recognition of the infinite connectedness which enters into the very nature of the thing.

If we distinguish between the aspects of the nature and the existence of a thing,—between the *thisness*, and the *this*,—we may say that, for Kant, the categories refer to the *thisness*, but cannot account for the *this*. Further, if we abstract the *thisness* from the *this*, no significant statement can be made about the *this*, for it refers to the bare fact of existence, and the existence apart from the characteristics of a thing is hardly an object of logical thought. It may, therefore, be argued that Kant is quite justified in neglecting to give an account of the particularity of the particular, and the supposed inadequacy of the first Critique is after all illusory. In the account of the categories, and the categories explain the *thisness* of the objects of experience, Kant has said all that is necessary or possible to say with regard to the individual as given in experience. As for the *this*, or the bare fact of existence, Kant has

himself pointed out in his criticism of the ontological argument that *being* cannot be an attribute of a thing, and hence, it has no place in the logical analysis of its nature.

Admitting all this, we might yet argue that there is still an element in the *thisness* itself of which Kant has given no account in the first Critique. The *this* may fall outside the scope of the analysis of logic, but the *thisness*, or the unity of the categories in a particular, is a problem of which logic must give some account. Any and every category is not, and cannot be, applied to any and every experience,—the variety and manifoldness of experience prove that at different centres, the categories are organised or unified in different ways. This organisation or unification of the categories is not, however, identical with merely the *this* of the particular, for the *this* as bare existence is unintelligible and merely given, while the unification of the categories (or the *thisness*) is what determines the nature of a thing, and therefore supplies us with whatever insight we have into the intelligibility of the object. Further, Kant himself suggests the importance of this unification of the categories when he points out that “this unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity. All categories are grounded in the logical functions of Judgment, and in these functions combination, and therefore the unity of given concepts, is already

thought. Thus the category already presupposes combination. We must therefore look still higher for this unity, namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in Judgment, and therefore of the possibility of the Understanding, even as regards its logical employment."¹ In other words, the idea of the unity of the self and of its counterpart, *viz.*, Reality as a system, is operative in the judgment of the particular as well, and accounts for the unification of the categories in the *thisness* of the given, but as already pointed out, Kant spares no pains to prove that this idea is only a regulative idea of Reason and does not in any way contribute to the nature of the contents of experience.

Hence, we might say that, on the one hand, as against Hume, Kant is insisting on the universal and necessary elements involved even in the concept of the bare particular, and on the other, as against Hegel, he is warning us that the given may be concrete as including in itself various aspects in combination, but it is not, and cannot be, concrete in the sense of an individual which justifies its own existence by containing in itself, though only potentially, the infinite manifoldness of the whole of reality.

The neglect of the perceptual element in the first Critique is not however surprising, for Kant's

¹ B 131.

main interest here was in the sciences, more especially in the mathematical sciences. "Every particular natural discipline contains in it only so much of genuine science as it contains of mathematics."¹ Science does not consider the individual instance or case as individual, because for science, it is the similarity of the class rather than the peculiarity of the members of the class which is important. Even the class concept, however, implies some recognition of the idiosyncrasies of the individual members of the class, at least in noticing their significant resemblances to one another in contrast with their important differences from members of other classes. This is so even in mathematics, in which we find the exaltation of this scientific tendency. In mathematics, even the relations of the classes are generalised, so that in the symbolic interpretations of algebra, the class characteristics themselves are hardly in evidence. But however far mathematics might go in thus de-individualising its terms, it can never succeed in fully doing so, for the distinction between term and term must remain if mathematics is to be a possible discipline. Kant did not at this stage pay sufficient attention to this aspect of the problem, for he was taking over without criticism the traditional rationalist conception of mathematics,

¹ Kant, *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science*, Preface. Quoted by Lindsay, 274.)

according to which it gives absolute knowledge of the absolute reality.

The conclusion then seems to be that the Understanding gives knowledge, but the knowledge it gives is general and abstract. Strictly speaking, it gives only the form of knowledge rather than actual knowledge, for the general divorced from the particular is a mere abstraction. Its a priori constitutive principles have universal validity, but when we come to examine the territory where the Understanding rules, we find that it gives the barest skeleton or framework, which can be filled up only by what actual experience gives. The point to notice is that even the knowledge of the phenomenal world is the result of the co-operation of Sense and Understanding, of the given and the categories, for the categories are mere form, and form without matter is unintelligible. Further, we cannot have even the knowledge of relations without some knowledge of the terms which are so related. The categories by themselves can therefore give no knowledge, and at every step, they require the co-operation of the senses.

“It is a very remarkable fact that we cannot determine the possibility of any thing through the category alone, and must, in order to exhibit the objective reality of the pure concept of the Understanding, always have an intuition..... So long as there is no intuition, we do not therefore

know whether we are thinking an object through the categories (or not). Indeed, we do not know whether there can anywhere be an object conforming to them. In all these ways, it is therefore proved that the categories are not by themselves knowledge : they are merely forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions."¹

At this stage, Kant did not however realise the implications of this discovery and the result is that he tends to identify knowledge with scientific knowledge. He had begun by pointing out that there are some judgments which are both synthetic and a priori, but now he sees that all judgments must have these characteristics. Unfortunately, however, he confined his analysis of synthetic a priori judgment to the judgments of science, so that the realization that all judgments are synthetic and a priori tended to suggest that scientific knowledge is the pattern of all knowing. In the end, Kant came to recognise the validity of knowledge which is not scientific, but the neglect of the perceptual element in the first Critique may be largely attributed to this identification.

We have already seen that even the abstractest science cannot fully de-individualise its terms, for the neglect of the perceptual or individual carries with it its own nemesis. The principle of causality

¹ B. 288.

has been rightly regarded as the fundamental scientific category, since the categories of substantiality and reciprocity are merely types of the causal category. The first Critique exalts the principle of mechanical causation as the governing principle of the phenomenal world, but this exaltation of the principle leads in the end to its own negation.¹ The nature of space and time is uniform and cannot therefore explain why a particular thing has a particular spatio-temporal position. In causation, we accordingly start by premising that we must not regard the nature of things as due to their spatio-temporal positions. We must, on the contrary, regard their space and time relations as determined by their nature. This nature must, on the other hand, be their nature as determined by their antecedents, *i.e.* their nature as terms in a series. The more we extend the causal chain, the more do things lose their independent individuality and tend to become merely determined points in a space-time order. The perceptual elements seem to become less and less important, till at last the whole of reality is sought to be represented as the quantitative function of some element whose quality is neutral or indifferent. This is what has actually happened whenever men have tried to express reality in terms of the synthesis of the homogeneous. Whether it be the physicist's atom

¹ *cf.* below, § IX, pp. 60 ff. •

or the philosopher's notion, whether we regard it as physical or spiritual, the attempt to express the world as the complications of some common basic stuff must result in the denial of the possibility of change. There are no qualitative differences among the elements of reality to allow for change from one quality to another, and quantitatively, its magnitude remains constant, so that the process of explaining change comes in the end to denying change and even its possibility. This is seen in another way, if we remember that the nature of a thing cannot be its nature merely as part of a series, for it cannot be even a term in a series unless it is something more than a mere term. A system of relations without relata is a contradiction in terms. ✓

In the distinction between the dynamical and the constitutive categories, Kant begins to sense the importance of the individual character of things. The mathematical principles are constitutive, for they are concerned with the "mere intuition of an appearance in general"¹ and have nothing to do with their existence. In other words, they apply equally to objects and images, and in fact cannot explain the distinction which we make between the two. The distinction between subjective and objective is therefore expressed by the dynamical categories, which are, however, for

¹ A 160=B 199.

that very reason, regulative and not constitutive of our perception. In the words of Professor Kemp Smith, "the mathematical principles lay down the conditions for the generation or construction of appearances. The dynamical only specify rules whereby we can define the relation in which existences contingently given are connected."¹ Hence, the causal category, as dynamical, is only regulative of perception and must presuppose the specific character of the elements which are thus brought into relation with one another.

But on the other hand, this specific character is itself constituted, at least partially, by the dynamical categories, since by existence we mean, not bare abstract existence, but existence of a specific type. As we shall soon find, even images have existence of a sort, and must therefore in a sense imply the dynamical categories, but that is not what we seek to express when we talk of the existence of the object. If object is taken in the most general sense, *viz.*, as the *-ed* of any *-ing*, there can be no question of its truth or falsity, and we can at best be aware only of some of the most rudimentary characters of such objects. As soon, however, as we raise the question of their reality and unreality, the dynamical categories come into operation, and they not only seek to determine the relations among these apprehensions,

¹ Kemp Smith, 346.

but also bring out in the process the universal elements implicit in such objects. In other words, if we remain on the merely perceptual level, objects are just given to us, and the problem of their real nature and existence cannot arise. The emergence of these problems marks the transcendence of the merely perceptual level, but then, the merely perceptual level is for us human beings only the concept of a logical possibility. In our experience, Perception and Understanding must always work in co-operation, and that is why, for our experience, the dynamical categories are not only regulative but also constitutive. This is what Kant means when he says, "In the *Transcendental Analytic*, we have distinguished the dynamical principles of the Understanding, as merely regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which as regards intuition are constitutive. None the less, these dynamical categories are constitutive in respect of experience, since they render the concepts, without which there can be no experience, possible a priori."¹

This indissoluble unity of perceptual and intellectual elements in all human experience also explains why the dynamical categories are operative even in our imagination. Kant, as soon as he faces the question, is therefore forced to admit that even the dynamical categories by themselves

¹ A 664=B 692.

are not adequate to express the distinction between the subjective or the imaginary and the objective or the real in the sense indicated.¹ This distinction can be expressed only in terms of the unity of experience, for, "the postulate of the possibility of things requires that the concept of the things should agree with the formal conditions of an experience in general. But this, the objective form of experience in general, contains all synthesis that is required for knowledge of objects."²

This distinction between constitutive and regulative principles is important for Kant, for it is the beginning of the recognition that scientific knowledge in terms of the causal category is not the only type of human knowledge. In fact, even scientific knowledge depends on data and principles of which no account can be given in purely scientific terms. In other words, mere mechanism is not adequate as an account even of the method of science.

This distinction is also important for Kant in another way. As pointed out by Dr. Lindsay, it distinguishes his position from that of both the dogmatist and the sceptic.³ For the dogmatist, all a priori principles are constitutive, while the sceptic recognises no constitutive principles at all. The dogmatist's objective laws guarantee the universality

¹ See below, pp. xlv ff.

² A 220=B 267.

³ cf. Lindsay, 59 ff.

of knowledge but cannot explain its empirical validity. The sceptic's postulates account for the empirical validity of knowledge, but only at the cost of its necessity and universality. Kant, by recognising the two types, tries to make room for both the regularity and the novelty of the world, and at the same time develop the distinction between Reason and Understanding. This distinction does not seem to be explicitly recognised in the *Analytic*, where Kant tends to identify Reason with the Understanding. Nor is this surprising, for at this stage, Kant is still concerned with the universal laws of science. It is as a result of the analysis of judgment in the *Deduction* that Kant comes to see that even empirical judgments claim universality.

The problem of empirical universality made Kant realise that every judgment claims to be necessarily true, and yet bases that claim on conditions which can never be completely known.¹ Reason seeks to realise this totality of conditions, and thus prescribes the aim and sets the limit to the work of the Understanding, but the Understanding is left to do the actual work of collecting data and systematising our experience. Difficulties in the form of antinomies arise because the demand of Reason for the unconditioned totality is confused with the

¹ cf. Bradley, *Logic*, chap. 2.

realisation of that demand. In the distinction between the Ideas of Reason which are regulative, and the concepts of the Understanding which are constitutive of experience, Kant therefore seeks to express the contingency and the necessity which at once seem to characterise all our experience. Kant does not here follow the clue offered by the dynamical categories, which suggest that the distinction between Reason and Understanding is not absolute.

Let us briefly sum up the results so far attained. From the point of view of our apprehension alone, there is no way of distinguishing between images and objects. Both have existence of a type and both are presented to our consciousness. But by existence we do not mean the type of existence which images have, *i.e.*, we in some way distinguish between images which we regard as subjective and objects which we regard as existent. Now, even images must have certain spatio-temporal as well as qualitative characteristics which cannot be denied without also denying their being. These are determined by the mathematical categories which, as constitutive of all perception, cannot therefore distinguish between the subjective and the objective. Yet this distinction is fundamental to experience. Hence, we distinguish between images and objects by the employment of the dynamical categories. In other words, we distinguish between the real and the unreal, not through

any intrinsic differences in their character, but through their relations to one another.¹ Where different apprehensions cohere with one another, we regard our experience as objective. Where such coherence is lacking, the experience is regarded as subjective or unreal. Expressing it in still another way, it may be said that imagination is involved in all knowledge, but this does not make all imagination knowledge.

From this account, it follows that the dynamical categories are not, and cannot be, constitutive of perceptions. They determine the relations of the apprehensions to one another and must therefore presuppose the apprehensions themselves.² This is recognised by Kant himself, but he does not draw the conclusion which follows from it. If the dynamical categories, *viz.*, the categories of science, are themselves regulative from one point of view, the regulative principles require more detailed examination than he has accorded to them in the first Critique.

This becomes still clearer as soon as the distinction between Reason and the Understanding is realised. For it is then seen that even the application of the dynamical category is not enough. We no doubt make a distinction between the subjective and the objective, and do so on the basis of the dynamical categories, but now we learn

¹ cf. Lindsay, pp. 54 ff.

² cf. below, pp. xlviiii ff.

that this employment presupposes the completed system of reality which can yet be never given to us. Relations determine for us the distinction between the real and the unreal: whatever is coherent is assumed to be real and the incoherent is stigmatised as the unreal. But can the test of coherence be applied before the completion of the process of our experience? A work of imagination has its own internal consistency, and yet we regard it as unreal, because it is contradicted by the wider experience of our common humanity. How do we know that a wider experience will not contradict what we have taken to be the reality with our limited and circumscribed views? In Bradley's words, "The series of phenomena is so infected with relativity, that, while it is itself, it can never be made absolute. Its existence refers itself to what is beyond, and did it not do so, it would cease to exist. A last fact, a final link, is not merely a thing which we cannot know, but a thing which could not possibly be real. Our chain by its nature cannot have a support. Its essence excludes a fastening at the end. We do not merely fear that it hangs in the air, but we know it must do so. And when the end is unsupported, all the rest is unsupported."¹

This is therefore a remarkable anticipation of the findings of modern logic. It is never the image

¹ Bradley, *Logic*, I. 2. 71.

or the object that we perceive in itself, we also judge of its reality or unreality. But this is not all, for such judgment is based on an assumption of Reason. This is the assumption that reality is a systematic whole. In the language of modern logic, there is no floating idea but always a judgment and this judgment always involves an implicit inference.¹

On the other hand, Kant is never tired of pointing out that this inference is no part of the content of the judgment which we make. He always insists that Reason and its Ideas, however necessary they might be for the purposes of our knowledge, do not yet contribute anything to the actual contents of knowledge. Speaking of the Ideas of Reason, he says, "We, however, misapprehend the meaning of this Idea, if we regard it as the assertion or even as the mere assumption of a real thing, and proceed to ascribe to it the ground of the systematic order of the world. On the contrary, what this ground, which eludes our concepts, may be in its own inherent constitution is left entirely undetermined. The Idea is posited only as being the point of view from which alone that unity, which is so essential to Reason and so beneficial to the Understanding, can be further extended."²

•Let us examine the implications of this position. Reason and its Idea of a system, as the

¹ cf. Bradley, *Logic*; also cf. Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, 95

² A 681 = B 709.

presuppositions of knowledge, cannot constitute its content. Our judgments claim to express truth. The truth they seek to express can be tested only by their agreement with a system of judgments which together constitute our knowledge of the world. In other words, the truth of a judgment can be tested only by its consistency, but precisely for that reason, this agreement or consistency cannot constitute its truth. In short, if coherence is the test of truth, it cannot also be the nature of truth.

It would seem to follow that, for Kant, relations are not necessarily internal. This is implied by his insistence that the Ideas of Reason, though the presuppositions of knowledge, do not yet constitute its content. The contention that the individual, though the meeting point of many universals, is yet not fully explained or explicable in terms of them, expresses the same attitude of the mind. Similarly, his rejection of the Subjective Deduction in the second edition of the first Critique becomes intelligible as soon as we remember that the transcendental psychological activities of the mind, however necessary they might be for the very possibility of experience, do not yet constitute its content, and are therefore irrelevant to the purposes of a logical analysis of knowledge and its nature.

According to the Hegelian, all judgments are both synthetic and analytic, for the object of the judgment is an embryonic system in which the unity and the variety of Reality are already

contained in essence. 'How can we say that "the book is blue," unless the percept *book* already contains in it the element *blue*? The judgment is at the same time an analysis of the undifferentiated whole presented before us into its constituent elements, and also a synthesis of these elements to form a unity which is recognised as necessary. Hence, the ultimate subject of the judgment is the conceptualised percept which always contains the predicate. Judgment is only an explication of this percept and nothing new is, or can be, added in the process of judging. In other words, the subject of the judgment is always a concrete individual, and in the ultimate analysis, this is identical with the system of reality.

If this theory of judgment be correct, it would seem to follow that all relations are internal, for there could not be any relation (or what perhaps comes to the same thing, we could not know of any relation) which is not grounded in the nature of the related terms. "It will follow that every such property is grounded in the term, in the sense that, in the case of every such property, it follows from the mere proposition that that term is that term that it has the property in question. And it will also follow that any such property is grounded in the qualities which the term has, in the sense, that if you take all the qualities which the term has, it will again follow in the case of each relational property, from the proposition that the term has all

those qualities, that it has the relational property in question ; since this is implied by the proposition that in the case of any such property, any term which has not had it would necessarily have been different in quality from the term in question." ¹

Now, we need not repeat here all the controversies which have ranged over the question of the nature of relations. The idealists, generally speaking, have succumbed to the charm of internal relations, while the realists have with equal enthusiasm flaunted the dogma of the externality of relations. Internal relations imply the theory of the concrete universal, which is identity in, and in spite of differences, for it dominates the differences and makes them express its own character in different media. External relations postulate an abstract universal which is only a mark or characteristic loosely attached to the object, and hence in no way determines its being or nature. The abstract universal makes the problem of the relation of the universal to its particulars unintelligible and inevitably leads to the myth of the substance as a mysterious something in which attributes mysteriously inhere : the concrete universal leads equally necessarily to the absolutist metaphysics in which the whole of reality is identified with the concept, and indeed, is the concept.

Without in any way claiming or even trying to

¹ Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, 308.

decide among these controversial questions, one or two points in connection with the Hegelian account deserve notice. First, in spite of all its professed declarations to the contrary, the Hegelian position places a greater emphasis upon the aspect of identity than upon that of difference, just as the realist emphasises the aspect of difference rather than that of identity. Thus, the Hegelian categories end, not in Absolute Distinction, but in Absolute Identity. It is true that the distinctions are sought to be retained within it as Ideality, but how can such ideality be reconciled to the Reality which is the goal of synthesis? Expressing this criticism in other words, we may therefore say that the Hegelian account no doubt provides for the certainty of our knowledge, since every judgment, however slight or trivial, is in the end backed up by the massive weight of the whole of reality. The certainty of knowledge is, however, achieved only at the cost of its novelty, for according to this account, the judgment merely expresses distinctions which are already implicit in the nature of the Absolute. Nor can the novelty be explained in terms of the subject's acquisition of knowledge, for in that case, the novelty becomes subjective, so that, from the point of view of the Absolute, all progress in knowledge must be illusory. On the other hand, it is not possible to dismiss even the subjective as merely illusory, for even the subjective, just because it is subjective, must at the same time possess

objectivity of a type.¹ In the Hegelian Absolute, there can therefore be no change, but this denial of change is at the same time the denial of the adequacy of the Absolute.

Further, if we try to determine what exactly is meant by saying that relations modify their terms, we are forced to admit that modification in such contexts must mean the causation of a change. In other words, if all relations are internal, we seem forced to say that all relations are types of the causal relation, and not only that, these relations are themselves causally related to the terms between which they hold. In that case, the way to Bradley's vicious regress seems clear and straight. If there is a causal relation, *x*, between the term, A, and the relation, R, this causal relation must itself require relations at either end to connect it to A and R, and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor do we seem to have any justification for saying that every case of relation is a case of causal relation, for we have already seen that the exaltation of the scientific category to be the sole category of reality necessarily leads to a suicidal denial of knowledge.*

¹ See below, § XI, p. 77.

* *cf.* Moore, *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 280-90. Professor Moore's otherwise admirable analysis is, however, vitiated by one fundamental assumption which must be, but is not examined by him. He points out, and rightly, the distinction between the two propositions, *viz.* (1) "If A has P, then any term which has not, *must* be other than A," and (2) "If A has P, then any term which had not, *would necessarily be* other than A," and sums up his own position by saying that (2) does not follow from (1), although (1) is implied by (2). From

Kant, we have already seen, considered but rejected this position. For him, the individual is not of the Hegelian type and does not contain within itself its own justification. We no doubt come to determine its reality or otherwise in terms of its inherence in a system of reality presupposed by Reason, but the system is for us an ideal and cannot therefore serve as the basis of the inference of the particular. "If Reason is a faculty of deducing the particular from the universal (two alternatives are possible). Either, the universal is already certain in itself and given, so that Judgment alone is required to perform the act of subsumption, and the particular is thereby determined in a necessary manner..... Or otherwise, the universal is admitted as problematic only, and is a mere idea. The particular is certain, but the universality of the rule of which it is a consequence still remains a problem."¹ "Principles of pure Reason, on the other hand, can never be constitutive in respect of

this he concludes that "the dogma of internal relations" is false, but his conclusion really begs the question at issue, for it rests on the *assumption* that the implication between (1) and (2) is not mutual. He is himself forced to admit that though distinct, (1) and (2) are related, and further (2) entails (1). Distinction does not, therefore, by itself prove the impossibility of implication, in fact there can be a relation of implication only among distincts. It cannot therefore be assumed without further examination that (1), though distinct from (2), does not necessarily entail (2). It *may* really be so, but it cannot be *assumed* and must be proved, for this is the point at issue, and Professor Moore does not seem justified in assuming what is really the problem.

¹ A 646=B 674.

empirical concepts. For no schema of sensibility corresponding to them can ever be given. Hence, they can never have an object in concreto.”¹

“The unity of Reason is the unity of system. This systematic unity does not serve objectively as a principle that extends the application of Reason to objects, but subjectively as a maxim that extends its application to all possible empirical knowledge of objects. Nevertheless, the systematic connection which Reason can give to the empirical employment of the Understanding not only furthers its extension, but also guarantees its correctness. The principle of such systematic unity is therefore also objective, but in an indeterminate manner. It is not a constitutive principle that enables us to determine anything in respect of its direct object, but merely a regulative principle and maxim, which furthers and strengthens *in infinitum* (i. e., indeterminately) the empirical employment of Reason. In this, it does not in any way proceed against the laws of its empirical employment, and yet at the same time opens out new paths which are not within the cognisance of the Understanding.”

Thus, for Kant, we can know the system of reality only so far as we have been successful in organising the particulars into a system of experience. Nowhere is this more clearly expressed than in the magnificent passage where he says that “we ought

¹ A 664=B 692.

² A 680=B 708.

not to derive the inner appearances of the soul from a simple thinking substance but from one another, in accordance with the idea of a simple being ; we ought not to derive the order and systematic unity of the world from a Supreme Intelligence, but to obtain from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule according to which Reason in connecting the empirical causes and effects in the world may be employed to best advantage, and in such manner as to secure satisfaction of its own demands.”¹

This is also an admission that all relations are not and cannot be of the causal type. At one time, Kant perhaps tended to characterise all relations as causal, but as we have already seen, he soon came to realise that causality, if regarded as a category constitutive of reality, is self-contradictory, and must be supplemented by a category of spontaneity or freedom, not only for the interpretation of reality as a system, but also for the apprehension of the bare particular. If Reason's Ideas are not constitutive of experience, and they never are for Kant, and yet they are its presuppositions, there is no way of denying that causality or mechanism is not the only type of relations exhibited in reality. In his suggestion of degrees of freedom, we shall find that he is only working out the implications of this idea.²

¹ A 673=B 701.

² cf. below, pp. lxiv ff.

Reason is therefore operative in experience from the very beginning and does not have to wait till the Understanding has completed its work. But Kant, in the first Critique, confines his attention to the operations of Reason in the system which Understanding builds up by the application of the categories. Hence, the individual element in experience is left unexplained and the totality which Reason seeks to realise remains an unintelligible ideal. Understanding with its categories deals only with the relations among the constituents of reality and cannot therefore describe its nature. Nor can Reason do so, since it depends on the Understanding to complete the picture.

Nor can Judgment, as described in the first Critique, give any better account of the individual. For Kant, Judgment is essentially empirical. It is the power of applying the rule to particular cases or of finding the rule for particular given instances. It is thus concerned with the concrete exemplified in the individual act of apprehension. It is therefore natural to expect that in discussing Judgment, Kant should give some account of the alive elusive element in perception which we call feeling. But in the first Critique, he considers the faculty from only one of these two possible points of view. He discusses it as the faculty of applying a given rule to particular cases, or in other words, subsuming a particular instance under a given law. This is analogous to the work of the Understanding and

II

In the second Critique, Kant attempts to go beyond the abstract universal of the Understanding by the realisation of the individual from the realm of conduct. Moral principles in the abstract may, like other general laws, be taught, but whether the present is an occasion for the principle or the law can only be intuitively grasped. We may take any principle we like, and most probably we shall agree that such principles should generally govern our activity. But placed in any concrete situation, we are faced with the double difficulty of first recognising the principle which can apply to the case, and secondly, of determining the form in which that principle is applicable. Principles may be best described as the generalisations of the past experience of the community, and as such there is no guarantee that they can be applied to present and future occasions without modification. If, on the other hand, we abstract from them all reference to concrete situations, whether past or present, they may or may not exhibit the form of a general ethical truth, but in that attenuated form they have no application whatsoever to the concrete situation in which human beings are placed. Before they can serve as principles governing human activity, we must make them concrete by

re-introducing the element of particularity in the situation before us.

The importance of the individual in conduct is thus recognised, but the confusion between Reason and Understanding still persists in the insistence upon the rule or law. This confusion is at the root of most of the difficulties of Kantian ethics. Only the Understanding can give us knowledge, and it always deals with the general. Reason, as practical, is concerned with conduct and it must therefore deal with the individual. Precisely for that reason, it cannot give us knowledge, for knowledge is confined to the empirical which is governed through and through by the causal law.¹ We therefore know, and can know things, not as individuals exhibiting freedom or spontaneity, but only as determined links in a chain of mechanical necessity. On the other hand, we have already seen that they cannot be even the links of a causal chain unless they have an individual nature which determines their spatio-temporal positions and is not determined by them. Hence, even from the standpoint of the Understanding, reality must be regarded as a system which exhibits causality and freedom simultaneously.

Kant did not, however, develop this necessary implication of his own position. He, therefore, held that we cannot know this freedom, for freedom

¹ cf. Bosanquet, *History of Aesthetics*, 259-60.

belongs to things only in their character as individuals in the noumenal realm, while we know them only in their relations to one another as parts of the phenomenal world. If, however, there be any sphere where we deal with things as individuals, we shall be dealing with them as free in their causality and this is what occurs in conduct. But this does not solve the difficulty, for conduct is realised in the phenomenal world, and as such must obey its causal laws. This explains the possibility of the scientific observation of human character from an external point of view. The more we know about a man's character, the more we seem to be able to predict his conduct, and yet we regard that man as most free who has the most reliable character. In moral conduct, "a man must act himself, be now the same man who acted, have been himself at the time of the act, have had sense enough to know what he was doing, and to know good from bad. In addition, where ignorance is wrong, not to have known does not remove accountability, though the degree of it may be doubtful. And everything said of commission applies equally well to omission or negligence."¹ Hence, from the standpoint of Reason as well, the individual must, in moral conduct, exhibit not only spontaneity but also character, not only freedom but also causality.

¹ Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, 9.

Kant attempted to express this by his distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. Causality and freedom both apply to reality, though in its different spheres, for causality is the rule of the phenomenal world while freedom belongs to things-in-themselves. It is, however, no real solution, for it makes the relation between the two principles even more difficult to understand. Besides, the restriction of the two categories to two different and mutually exclusive spheres re-opens the very question which the recognition of the dual categories seeks to solve. For we have seen that mechanical causation is itself inconceivable without an element of freedom or spontaneity in the terms between which the relation holds; on the other hand, the individual's freedom becomes unintelligible if it does not exhibit an element of uniformity or character. Kant himself admits that the noumenal object, characterised by freedom, remains outside our knowledge, and can appear to our consciousness only as a part of the phenomenal world governed by the law of causal necessity. The argument for spontaneity, based on the fact that the individual nature of a thing must determine its time and space relations, applies to all things that are individual, and therefore to nature as well as to man. Similarly, the fact that individual things can appear only as parts in a system demands some sort of a causal connection among them.

The solution which naturally suggests itself is that reality must be regarded as a system in which the parts are determined by their relation to the whole and also determine the whole in virtue of their individual character. "It may be said that the parts finally depend on the whole to which they belong and not on each other. The obvious answer is that the whole must be, inclusive of all its parts ; hence in affirming that any one part is dependent on the whole, we affirm that it is dependent not only on the other parts but on itself ; in other words, we affirm that it is relatively independent."¹ Similarly, it can be shown that the whole has a character which is not the mere result of the summation of its parts.

It is no explanation to refer the necessity to the phenomenal and the freedom to the noumenal character of things, for we have already seen that even the phenomenal is just as unintelligible without freedom* as the noumenal is without necessity. The only way out is to recognise the difference between them as one of degree. *That is phenomenal in which the aspect of freedom is negligible while the noumenal is that in which causality is not the most important element.* This is the logical conclusion of Kant's account of the categories, for according to him the categories determine only the general form of our experience

¹ Stout, *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, 326,

while the details are filled up empirically. Thus, the category of causality tells us that events must be connected according to the causal law, but it does not and cannot tell us what event has what cause. Specific causal laws cannot therefore be deduced from the general principle of causality. Still less can the general principle explain why this is a case of this specific causal law, or indeed of any causal law. Therefore, even in knowledge of causality, which, as the type of scientific knowledge, may be regarded as the stronghold of the principle of necessity, we find that causality by itself is not able to give a complete account. An element remains which is contingent from the point of view of the causal law and may therefore to that extent be regarded as due to the agency of freedom. Hence, we might say that in reality, the adherence of the different members to the system need not be uniform, so that the whole may determine and be determined by different parts in differing degrees.

This position, though the logical outcome of his own analysis, was not accepted by Kant at this stage. His sharp distinction between freedom and necessity made any explicit recognition of degrees of freedom impossible for him. His position involved that the individual was, and must be regarded as purely individual. It could not be a member in any causal series and hence was entirely free.

In fact, it could not have any character, for whatever has a determinate nature must to that extent have limitations imposed upon its freedom of manifestations. This also explains why we can never know this individual, for a cognitive object must have a specific nature which distinguishes it from other cognitive objects. Kant admits this in saying that we know *that* though we do not know *what* the individual self is, but this knowledge of the indeterminate self in effect means the indeterminateness of the knowledge of the self.¹

Further, the sharp distinction between the phenomenal and the moral world requires that the principle of moral actions must, even in details, be deduced from the pure form of the moral law. "Any possible object of desire, any wished-for event, any end in the shape of a result to be attained in the particular existence of myself or another, all are this or that something; they have a content, they are 'material.' Only that will is good which wills itself as not-particular, as without content or matter, in a word, which wills itself as form. The good will then is the will which is determined by the form only, which realises itself as the bare form of the will..... I am autonomous only because I am free, free only because I am universal, universal only because not particular and not particular only when formal."²

¹ cf. Lindsay, ¶19.

² Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, 144-45.

It would follow that the law of morality furnishes its own particulars, so that there is and can be no conflict of duties. The difficulty in morals would therefore be to decide to act according to the law of freedom rather than by the law of necessity. Once this conflict is resolved, there would be no difficulty in knowing the dictate of the moral law in any given case. This is obviously a mechanistic interpretation of human action, for in it the motive of duty is opposed to the phenomenal motives and they are compared to two opposing forces acting on the will. The attempt at complete divorce of freedom from mechanism thus results in the application of the category of causality to the sphere which is peculiarly that of freedom.

Nor is this the only difficulty. There is the logical difficulty that the universal divorced from the particular is not a true universal. "To will in general is impossible and to will in particular is never to will nothing but a form."¹ A formal will is therefore a self-contradictory will, for the essence of will is that it must realise a specific content in a specific situation. To accept the principle of morality as the principle of our action is therefore to negate the formality of that principle.

Besides, this does not give us a satisfactory account of the problem of conflict of duties. In

¹ Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, 153.

a conflict of duties, we are not aware of a conflict between the law of freedom and that of necessity. It could not be a case of conflict of *duties* if the conflict were between *duty* and what is ex-hypothese *not-duty*. What seems to be a true analysis of the situation is that we are aware of different claims upon us and cannot decide which claim is obligatory under the circumstances. Any one of the claims, given the necessary conditions, might become a duty; the difficulty is that we are not able to dissociate all the factors involved in the case and cannot therefore prefer any one of the claims to the others. The different claims we can apprehend, but about duty we can only judge as we judge of a beautiful object.¹ It is therefore simply not true to say that there is no difficulty in knowing the dictate of the moral law in any given case. On the contrary, this is precisely what is difficult. There is little difference of opinion so long as we talk of duty in the abstract: the difficulties begin when we come to apply the principle to a concrete situation, for the world is a vast and complex conglomeration in which the uniformities observed are at best only partial, and in strictness, no two things are exactly alike. That there is beauty in the world has only to be asserted in order to be accepted: but that

¹ cf. Joseph, *Some Problems in Ethics*, 67 ff.; also, Ross, *The Right and the Good*, Chap. II.

this object before us is beautiful will be debated till the very end of time.

We have seen that the doctrine of degrees of freedom is implicit in Kant's distinction between the mathematical and the dynamical categories in the *Analytic*, and still more so in that between the categories of the *Understanding* and the *Ideas of Reason*. In his moral theory also, there is some suggestion of the need of such a doctrine. His analysis of the concept of freedom seems a progressive realisation of this fact. In the *Antinomy*, freedom means merely the spontaneity of all things-in-themselves, but this is at best a negative description of freedom. When we attempt to find out the positive content in the definition, we find that it only brings out the contrast between things in their phenomenal and their noumenal character. Besides, we have already seen that even phenomenal objects must exhibit spontaneity, since otherwise, the concept of causality itself becomes unintelligible. Freedom gets a more specific meaning when it is regarded as the peculiar attribute of moral beings,—the differentia which distinguishes man from physical objects. Freedom here refers to the fact of man's dual allegiance: he is at the same time a denizen of both the realm of moral ends and the world of mechanical law. Though subject to the law of necessity in the phenomenal world, he is also free as an individual in the realm of things-in-themselves.

Man is not, however, always conscious of his noumenal character,—it may be doubted if he is at all conscious of it,—and hence by a still stricter interpretation, freedom is attributed to man only when he acts in a very peculiar and exceptional way, *viz.*, out of reverence for the law which is the product of Reason as such. Freedom gets its specific meaning in the context of moral action, which is seen to be the expression of the nature of Reason itself. In this development of the meaning of freedom,—from the freedom of indifference to that of autonomy or self-legislation, we seem to find a clear indication of the doctrine of degrees of freedom, but this was not the conclusion which Kant himself derived.

Thus, both his theory of knowledge and his ethical theory require for their proper understanding a recognition of the dual character of all experience. This recognition was not, however, open to Kant himself, since his sharp separation of the theoretical from the practical resulted in the reference of freedom and necessity to mutually exclusive spheres. Thus knowledge was doomed to be confined to the phenomenal, while conduct wandered blindly among the wilds of the unknown world of unintelligible realities.

III

We have seen that the difficulty for Kant was that his sharp division of the theoretical and the practical rendered it impossible to give any satisfactory account of knowledge or of practice. Understanding gives us knowledge of laws, but these laws are merely general and without any specification. The general without the particular is not, however, even a real abstraction, for an abstraction, at any rate, is an object of thought, and a general which is merely general cannot be conceived at all. On the other hand, it was suggested that in conduct or practice we are concerned with the individual, but since it is Reason which expresses itself in conduct, the individual, as an idea of Reason, can never be known. If, in other words, the individual is merely individual, we can never know it, for our knowledge must always develop in terms of universal meanings. Yet practice is not possible except on the basis of knowledge, and the upshot is that if we insist on the separation of Reason and Understanding, we can neither know nor act.

The realisation of this impasse made Kant examine anew the distinction of Reason and Understanding. It is not that Kant had not faced this difficulty before, and the Critique of Judgment is

cannot account for the character of the instance which is sought to be thus described. But there is the other type of empirical judgment, corresponding to induction as the determining judgment corresponds to deduction, in which the particular instance is given and we have to find out the law under which it can be subsumed. Kant's analysis of the judgment has made it clear that the division into deductive and inductive judgments is not mutually exclusive. Every judgment, whether empirical or a priori, has and must have deductive and inductive elements. It must transcend the immediately given, and on the other hand, it must be based on some specific element in the datum of our experience. The neglect of this other type of judgment makes it impossible for Kant to give any account of the individual element in knowledge, and is itself due to his failure to draw the necessary implications of his limitation of the categories to the empirical.

The first Critique therefore ends with the problem of the relation of the general to the particular unsolved. The function of Reason in defining the end is not sufficiently recognised, while Judgment is treated only from the point of view of the determining Judgment which is hardly distinguishable from the Understanding. The result is that the Understanding guarantees the validity of the a priori constitutive principles of knowledge, but it cannot explain their application to the details of experience. The attempt to do so through the categories

alone leads to self-contradiction, for we have seen that the categories are unthinkable except in relation to the given in experience. The distinction between them is not merely that between form and matter; for the given is not mere matter without form. It obviously has laws and connections of its own, and explains the possibility of starting with the individual, and from an examination of its own specific character, describing and classifying it in its relations to other individuals. This however is not recognised in the first Critique, whose final conclusion is that the Understanding gives us knowledge but not of the individual.

an afterthought to gloss over the glaring defects in the construction of the Critical Philosophy. Dr. Lindsay has brought forward evidence to show that the idea of a Critique of Judgment was entertained by Kant even as early as 1771, though his attitude towards it underwent at least two variations between that time and the date of publication of the work.¹

Let us examine briefly the function attributed to Judgment in the first Critique. In the opening section of the Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories, Kant does not seem to recognise any distinction between Judgment and Understanding, for in his words, "we can reduce all acts of the Understanding to judgments, and the Understanding in general may therefore be represented as a faculty of judgment."² This is perhaps not surprising, because at this stage Kant is thinking of judgment in terms of formal logic, and for it, the most important, if not the only type of judgment is that which deals with classification, *i.e.*, with the bringing of a particular instance under a class concept which is given. Kant does not as yet raise the question as to how we get the class concept itself, or how we get from the mere possession of the class concept to the recognition of a given particular as an

¹ Lindsay, p. 215 ff.

² A 69=B 94.

As soon as it is seen that subsumption in itself is something of a problem, the distinction between Judgment and Understanding begins to emerge. In a note on the modality of judgments, Kant recognises that the Understanding, as dealing with the general, is from the nature of the case contingent in respect of the particular. Neither is Reason able to give us any better account of the individual. As practical, it deals with the individual but gives no knowledge, while as theoretical, it deals with the totality of conditions and presupposes that the work of the Understanding has been completed. On this presupposition, it then proceeds to give an account of the particular as necessitated by its universal. But Reason's presupposition can never be satisfied, for the work of the Understanding in explaining and systematising the world of experience can never end. Thus neither Reason nor Understanding can explain our knowledge of the particular and the individual,—that is the function of Judgment and Judgment alone. "Just as if thought were in the problematic a function of the Understanding; in the assertoric, of Judgment; in the apodeictic, of Reason."¹

Now our experience is always an individual experience of individual things. We generalise these experiences and formu

¹ A 75 n=B 100 n.

laws, but however far we may travel towards universality, we can never wholly discard the particularity of the experience with which we started.¹ This is the meaning of Kant's insistence that the categories apply only to the empirical, for in confining our knowledge to the phenomenal world, Kant is suggesting that the Understanding's attempts to establish universal truth do not result in the discovery of a world of ideas which is different in kind from the world of sense. Universal truth is therefore only the generalisation of the datum of sense, not its abandonment.

Though the sensible individual element is thus, on Kant's own showing, essential to knowledge, the Critique of Pure Reason does not give any account of how we come to be aware of it. In the Introduction to Transcendental Judgment in general, he further develops the distinction between Understanding and Judgment suggested in the note on A75 (B100); for he now defines Judgment as "the faculty of subsuming under rules,"² in contrast to Understanding which is defined as "the faculty of rules."² Subsumption is essentially an individual operation, for it is concerned with the recognition of a particular as the particular of a given universal. Logic, as the science of the Understanding, deals with

¹ cf. above, p. xxxv.

² A 132=B 171.

the general and cannot therefore give any account nor contain any rules for Judgment, but this confession of failure on the part of general logic is at the same time a condemnation of its very being. However much Kant might have professed to accept and admire formal logic as true and immutable, his insistence that transcendental logic, in sharp contrast with the failure of formal logic, must advise Judgment in the use of Understanding shows that he recognised this to be the crucial test for any theory of knowledge.

Knowledge is always at the same time universal and individual, and therefore, any account which emphasises either of the aspects at the cost of the other, ends by denying the possibility of knowledge itself. Both rationalism and empiricism had foundered on this self-same rock, though they approached the problem from opposite sides, and both owed their birth to the same misconception about the nature of knowledge. Transcendental logic is concerned with the criticism of thought and examines the extent and possibility of knowledge. It must therefore take Judgment as its own special problem. "Transcendental philosophy, however, has this peculiarity. Besides the rule (or rather, the universal condition of rules) which is given in the pure concept of Understanding, it can also specify a priori the instance to which the rule is to be applied...It must formulate by means of universal but sufficient marks the

conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with these concepts."¹

But if this means anything, it means that "transcendental logic is not, as Kant would profess, supplementary to general logic; it is its tacit recantation."² For according to him, general logic abstracts from *all* differences in the objects known, while transcendental logic abstracts only from empirical content. General logic does not, therefore, deal even with the a priori elements in the object, but the question is that if all characteristics, a priori as well as empirical, are abstracted from the object, can we regard it as object at all? Further, if there be no object, can we speak of knowledge or consciousness and what becomes of the Understanding? Kant may say that the problem of general logic is the Understanding's knowledge of itself, while that of transcendental logic is the Understanding's a priori knowledge of objects, but in either case there must at least be the idea of reference to objects. In the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*, and again and more explicitly still, in the *Refutation of Idealism*, Kant quite definitely says that there can be self-consciousness only so far as there is consciousness of objects. The proof of the *Paralogisms* also depends on this very principle.³

¹ A 135-6=B 174-5.

² Kemp Smith, 181.

³ cf. Joseph, *Logic*, 4-7.

For Kant, then, knowledge is concerned essentially with the act of judgment by which an individual element is recognised in its general character. Logic which deals with the problem of knowledge must therefore take as its especial topic the investigation of judgment in its dual aspect. From one point of view, we for the first time know the individual as individual in judging about it, and from the other point of view, the same judgment reveals to us its generic or universal character.

This is perhaps more readily understood if we remember that the human understanding is not creative of its object, but merely arranges and organises data given to it. Our experience is an experience in time, and as such, all our apprehensions come to us successively. Yet we not only do but must distinguish between these successive apprehensions. The succession is attributed sometimes to the successiveness of our apprehensions and sometimes to that which is thus apprehended. In other words, we are not only able to, but must also make the distinction between the order of that which we perceive and the order in which we perceive it. If the *order of what* we perceive could not be distinguished from the *order in which* we perceive it, nor could we distinguish what we perceive from our perception of it. If the distinction between perceiving and perceived is lost, we also lose the meaning of

the term perceive, and experience itself becomes impossible.

This distinction is therefore the basis of objectivity and alone makes it possible to give an intelligible account of experience. But if it is this distinction which renders experience intelligible, it must, on the other hand, itself conform to the nature of intelligence. The function of the Understanding in experience is therefore to introduce this distinction into the data given to us, and the categories are, in the words of Dr. Lindsay, "a priori conceptual principles of objectivity."¹

Two facts seem to emerge from this account. On the one hand, when we speak of the categories as constitutive or originative, we refer only to our knowledge of objects, not to the character of the objects known. In fact, since the principles of objectivity depend on the distinction between the order of the perceived and that of perception, it would seem to follow that the categories only make explicit for our knowledge the independence of the structure of that which we know. The categories do not therefore create or originate the objects of our experience, they only render our experience intelligible by distinguishing the factors in it which are due to our own activity from those which are not so dependent.

The second point which seems clear is that the distinction between the discursive and the

¹ Lindsay, 81.

originative functions of thought is not therefore absolute, for the synthetic activity through which we first become conscious of the objective is at the same time also a discernment of its character. The categories are no doubt concerned with the possibility of knowledge itself, but this possibility issues only in the concepts with which discursive thought deals. This is seen even in empirical judgment, for every judgment, whether empirical or a priori, both makes and uses concepts. If it does not express new knowledge but only repeats what is already known, it is not a judgment at all; and if it does add to our knowledge, it must in the process add to the meaning of the concept.¹ On the other hand, while adding to our knowledge, it must bring this new knowledge into relation with what is already known. If some entirely novel feature was even revealed to us, we could not yet be aware of it, for our awareness is by way of explanation and classification which proceed on the basis of what is already known. Hence, the empirical judgment, while adding to our knowledge and thus enriching the meaning of the concept, must at the same time use concepts acquired from past experience.

This can be more generally seen in the concept of objectivity itself. Whatever is present to consciousness is its object, but in such usage, the very

¹ cf. above, p. xxvi.

generality of the meaning renders the term meaningless. Object in this sense cannot be distinguished even from not-object, because so far as we can think of not-object, that is itself an object of thought. Hegel's classical example of being and not-being is a case in point. Hence, whenever we think of objectivity, we think of specific objectivity, and the principle of objectivity therefore involves, not merely the general distinction between the subjective and the objective, but a specific distinction based on the specific character of the object concerned. In other words, the origination of the object according to the categories is at the same time its determination according to concepts.

Kant therefore seems justified in saying that "the same Understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it has produced the logical form of a judgment, introduces, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general a transcendental content into its representations."¹ Both creative and discursive thinking would in that case be based on the spontaneity of thought; on the spontaneity of synthetic interpretation through the categories on the one hand, and of discrimination and comparison in concepts on the other. The distinction between the concept and the category would also in that case be one of degree

¹ A 79=B 105.

of abstraction, for the same act of thought would be at once both conceptual and categorial. When we are concerned with the making of the concept, we are taking Understanding in its transcendental use and regard the unifying of the diverse apprehensions as the application of the category. When we are more concerned with the using of the concept, we regard the activity as the logical use of the Understanding and describe the judgment as the subsumption of a particular under a given concept.

The argument here, though largely based on the account given by Professor Kemp Smith, differs from his interpretation in certain respects. Kantian interpretation and criticism are intrinsically so very difficult that it would be hardihood for any one to state a position dogmatically even when he is supported by the consensus of expert opinion. When such support is not forthcoming, his position is still more precarious, and it is almost the limit when he has the temerity to differ from Professor Kemp Smith. It is therefore with the greatest diffidence that the present argument is advanced as a plausible explanation of the question at issue.

Professor Kemp Smith seems to hold that Kant is mistaken in thinking that the same activity of the Understanding is involved in both transcendental and general logic. According to him, "in the one employment, the Understanding, by creative synthetic activities, generates from the

given manifold the complex objects of sense-experience. In so doing it interprets and organises the manifold through concepts which originate from within itself. By the other it discriminates and compares, and thereby derives from the content of sense-experience the generic concepts of traditional logic.....Each is based on the spontaneity of thought—on the spontaneity of synthetic interpretation on the one hand, of discrimination and comparison on the other. This feature common to the two types of activity can be further defined as being the unity of the act whereby a multiplicity is comprehended under a single representation.”¹ And he goes on to add, “We shall have occasion to observe that Kant is unable to prove, and does not ultimately profess to prove, that it is ‘the same understanding’ and still less that it is ‘the same operations,’ which are exercised in discursive and in creative thinking.”² Neglecting for the moment the question of Kant’s success or failure in proving the point at issue, *viz.*, the identity of the Understanding in discursive and in creative thinking, let us examine the arguments that Professor Kemp Smith advances in support of his contention. His contention is that discursive and creative thinking are distinct, for “the former presupposes and is conditioned by the latter.”³

¹ Kemp Smith, 176-77.

² *Ibid.*, 177.

³ *Ibid.*, 178.

Professor Kemp Smith argues, "Both, it is true, are functions of unity, but otherwise there is, according to Kant's own teaching, not the least resemblance between them. A generic or abstract concept expresses common qualities found in each of a number of complex contents. It is itself a content. A category, on the other hand, is always a function of unity whereby contents are interpreted. It is not a content, but a form for the organisation of content..... Through study of the Understanding in its more accessible discursive procedure, we may hope to discover the synthetic forms according to which it has proceeded in its pre-logical activities. When we determine the various forms of analytic judgment, the categories which are involved in synthetic thinking reveal themselves to consciousness."¹ To conclude, "There is no real identity—there is not even analogy—between the processes of comparison and abstraction on the one hand and those of synthetic interpretation on the other. The former are merely reflective: the latter are genuinely creative. Discursive activities are conscious processes, and are under our control: the synthetic processes are non-conscious; only their finished products appear within the conscious field... The synthetic activities, as he himself finally came to hold, are due to a faculty of imagination."²

¹ Kemp Smith, 177-8.

² *Ibid*, 179.

Professor Kemp Smith's position, then, may be briefly summarised as follows: The categories are the concern of transcendental logic and are functions of unity which make experience possible. As conditions of experience, they must therefore be regarded as pre-logical and cannot be held to be the content of experience. Concepts, on the other hand, are the result of experience, for they involve comparison and discrimination. They are therefore the content of the logical use of the Understanding. Finally, the synthesis of the categories is due, not to the Understanding, but to the faculty of imagination. "Synthesis in general, is the mere result of Imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious."¹ "With this admission," comments Professor Kemp Smith, "Kant also gives up his sole remaining ground for the contention that there must be a complete parallelism between discursive and creative thinking. If they arise from such different sources, we have no right to assume, without specific proof, that they must coincide in the forms of their activity."²

One thing may be conceded at the very outset. There are many passages in Kant, and Professor Kemp Smith brings forward many of

¹ A 78=B 103.

² Kemp Smith, 180.

them, which support such an interpretation. As one interpretation of Kant among *others*, Professor Kemp Smith's position need not therefore be questioned, but it might be argued that such an interpretation fails to do adequate justice to some of the most important elements in Kant's thought.

The first point to note in this connection is that Professor Kemp Smith's interpretation does not seem to recognise the implications of the change which Kant effected in the theory of judgment. In pre-Kantian logic, and also at times in Kant himself, the unity of judgment is no doubt attributed to the conceptual predicate, but as soon as Kant faces the problem of judgment, he recognises that the unity is due, not to the character of the predicate, but to the possibility of experience as such. It is the unity of experience which every judgment, empirical or a priori, seeks to express, for "a judgment is nothing but the manner in which given modes of knowledge are brought to the objective unity of apperception."¹ But if that be so, there are no floating ideas, and the concept exists only as a factor in the total act of judgment,—in effect, it is the unifying element which we recognise in all judgment. But this unification cannot be unification in the abstract, it must be unification in some specific way, and the concept supplies the principle of specific unity. Thus,

¹ B 141.

concepts are not mere contents, the result of experience, but also principles of unity making specific experience possible.

To this it is possible to reply that granting all this, the absolute distinction between concept and category would still obtain. Concepts might be the principles of specific unity, but the categories are pervasive features of all reality. When we think of particular experiences, we no doubt unify them in terms of specific concepts, but how do we at all think of them as particular *experiences*? It is admitted on all hands that all concepts do not have the same applicability, *e.g.*, the concept of matter or organism cannot be regarded as predicable of every item of the world of experience; a concept like that of *being* must, on the other hand, be so applicable. The very existence of the special sciences proves that concepts are partial descriptions of the nature of the universe from some special point of view. As opposed to these, philosophy discusses the pervasive characters of reality, *viz.*, the categories which are principles of the possibility of knowledge itself. As Kant expresses it, "The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience."¹ This has led some of the extremer idealists to deny that concepts of science

¹ A 158=B 197.

are true concepts ; in their opinion, these are pseudo-concepts which should be strictly distinguished from the true concepts of philosophy, *viz.*, the categories.¹

Further, it is argued that when we think of particular experiences, we no doubt unify them in terms of specific concepts, but how do we think of these specific concepts themselves? Thought is primarily concerned with the objects of experience, and it is only by a reflexive movement that it turns back upon itself and examines the nature of its operations in dealing with these objects. The more we insist upon the fact that concepts are principles of unifying the manifold of experience, the more important does it become to examine the principles which guarantee the validity of such procedure. Concepts may be involved in the consciousness of objects, but categories are required for the possibility of the concepts themselves. In short, the very existence of logical thought requires that there should be transcendental thought to explain its possibility.

These two distinct but related objections seem to be derived from one identical fallacy, *viz.*, the unreal divorce of the universal from the particular. It is argued that, because scientific concepts do not as such apply to the whole range of experience, they are not true concepts at all but pseudo-concepts. To this it might be replied that any

¹ *cf.* Croce, *Logic*.

concept which seeks to express the nature of the universe with its infinite variety and multiplicity in terms of itself alone, would be equally a pseudo-concept, for it would be a concept without any content whatsoever. As, already argued, objectivity is always specific objectivity in which the specific character cannot be isolated from the character of objectivity.

The category is not therefore in addition to the concept, just as the universal is not in addition to the particular, even though we may, and perhaps must, in both cases distinguish them in thought. We may, *e.g.*, speak of Relation, but relation in the abstract includes within it even the absence of relations. When, therefore, we talk of relation, we mean, not Relation, but some particular relation, and all cases of relation are cases of such particular relations. In interpreting experience, it is not that we apply the general category to experience in general, for then the particularity of experience would for ever remain unintelligible. Nor is it that the general category is particularised by the particularity in the nature of the given, for if the category were really general, then its applicability to particular experiences would itself defy explanation. The only way, then, of explaining our particular specific experiences is to admit that the category itself is never merely general, but always a specific modification which fits in with the nature of the given

in every specific case. In other words, it is never the category as such, but the concepts which are the specifications of the categories that make our specific experiences intelligible. Concepts can, therefore, never be the results of mere experience, for the very possibility of experience is grounded on them.

This may be seen in another way. If it is argued that concepts may be the principles of logical thought but require distinct categories for reflection upon them,—if in other words, it is insisted that logical thinking and transcendental thinking are distinct in nature, the inevitable retort would be to ask, how can we reflect on the categories themselves? Does such thinking require a still higher category or categories, as some thinkers have suggested? Once we are started on this way, is there any stopping anywhere? To be consistent, we would have to say that empirical concepts are required for empirical thinking, logical concepts for reflection on these empirical concepts, categories for thinking about these logical concepts, and so on *ad infinitum*. Nor can it be denied that we do think about the categories, for the insistence on the necessity of the categories, as principles of unity underlying experience, itself involves statements about their nature. We are therefore compelled to admit that reflection on the categories does not require any higher categories, but if that be so, why should we need higher

categories to think about the logical concepts of the Understanding ?

The upshot of this discussion then seems to be that the distinction between category and concept is not absolute, but that the category always expresses and must express itself in the form of some concept or other in order to make experience intelligible. Hence, the unity of the judgment in terms of the category is never abstract unity, but some specific unity expressed in terms of some specific concept. It is in the realisation of this functional character of the concept in judgment that the essence of Kant's revolution in logic lies.

From what has been said, it would follow that the distinction between concept and category as post-, and pre-logical is no more tenable than that between them as content and function. Concepts are regarded as post-logical because they form the content of our logical thought, but on the same showing, the categories also must be regarded as equally post-logical, since they too are discussed in the examination of our thought. Further, we have seen reason to believe that concepts are not the mere results of discriminating thought, but also supply the conditions which make discrimination possible. They are, therefore, from this point of view just as pre-logical as the categories. Presumably, the distinction between them as pre-, and post-logical depends on some such argument

as follows: 'To think at all implies certain general conditions of thinking and these general conditions are the categories. The results of thinking are, however, always specific and these are the concepts which thought yields. Hence, the categories as preceding all thought are pre-logical, while concepts as the result of particular thoughts are post-logical.'

This argument does not and cannot explain how specific results are obtained from general thinking, nor does it seem to realise that all thinking is specific thinking, and therefore the conditions of thinking also must always be specific. By denying the distinction of category and concept as pre-, and post-logical, we not only avoid these difficulties, but also escape the charge of inconsistency in discussing categories and yet regarding them as pre-logical and outside consciousness. If these categorial activities are really pre-logical, and as conditions of consciousness fall outside its range, then it is surely paradoxical, if not wholly meaningless, to speak of them as functions of unity, or indeed in any other way. The position does not in principle seem to be different from that of the mystic who with the same breath insists on the ineffability of his experience and yet describes it in such fervid and glowing terms.

This denial of the pre-logical character of the category brings us to the discussion of the part

played by Imagination in all our knowledge. Professor Kemp Smith holds that the categories are pre-logical functions of unity which make experience possible by synthesising the manifold of sensations, but at the same time he asserts that they are due to the activity of the Imagination. He quotes with approval the passage in which Kant asserts that "synthesis in general...is the mere result of Imagination, a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious."¹

At first sight, it may seem that this contains a glaring inconsistency, for on the one hand, the categories are regarded as the a priori conceptual principles of objectivity, and yet on the other hand, they are attributed to the Imagination which seems to be the one faculty free from the compulsion of the objective. Even in ordinary speech, the distinction is between the real and the imaginary, and however much metaphysics might refine upon that distinction, it has to admit in the end that the distinction between revelation and construction, between immediacy and mediacy is ultimate. In this insistence upon the Imagination as the source of the categories, Kant therefore seems to give up all that he has said about the indispensable contributions of passivity and spontaneity in the organisation of our knowledge.

¹ A 78=B 103; cf. Kemp Smith, p. 179 ff.

Professor Kemp Smith accepts this interpretation of Kant, and explains that the categories had to be attributed to the productive Imagination just because they are pre-logical. "The activities generative of consciousness have to be recognised as themselves falling outside it. Not even in its penumbra, through some vague form of apprehension, can they be detected. Only the finished products of such activities, not the activities themselves, can be presented to consciousness; and only by general reasoning, inferential of agencies that lie outside the conscious field, can we hope to determine them."¹

"Now Kant appears to have been unwilling to regard the Understanding as ever unconscious of its activities....In order to develop the distinction demanded by the new Critical attitude, he had therefore to introduce a new faculty, capable of taking over the activities which have to be recognised as non-conscious. For this purpose he selected the imagination, giving to it the special title, productive imagination."²

Again, "mental processes, in so far as they are generative of experience, must fall outside the field of consciousness, and as activities dynamically creative cannot be of the nature of ideas or contents. They are not subconscious ideas, but non-conscious processes. They are not the

¹ Kemp Smith, 263-64.

² *Ibid.*, 264.

submerged content of experience, but its conditioning grounds.”¹ But so far, there is nothing to distinguish such a position from the wildest type of subjective idealism, for, if it is asserted that “the productive imagination acts in the manner required to yield experiences which are capable of relation to the unity of self-consciousness, *i.e.*, of being found to conform to the unity of the categories,”² it really means that the world of our experience is a gigantic product of our own Imagination. Professor Kemp Smith therefore goes on to add that “they must no longer be interpreted in subjectivist terms, as originating in the separate existence of an individual self. In conditioning experience, they generate the only self for which experience can vouch, and consequently, in the absence of full and independent proof, must not be conceived as individually circumscribed.”³ But if this is so, and they are not the mental processes of any individual self, it may well be asked, whose mental processes are they? and what is the point of calling them mental processes?

Professor Kemp Smith may no doubt argue that “from the subjectivist point of view the synthetic activities consist of the various cognitive processes of the individual mind, and the given manifold consists of the sensations aroused

¹ Kemp Smith, 273.

² *Ibid.*, 264.

³ *Ibid.*, 273-74.

by material bodies acting upon the special senses. From the objective or phenomenalist standpoint the synthetic processes are of a noumenal character, and the given manifold is similarly viewed as being due to noumenal agencies acting, not upon the sense-organs, which as appearances are themselves noumenally conditioned, but upon what may be called 'outer sense.'"¹ But he is himself forced to admit that "the synthetic processes must take place and complete themselves before any consciousness can exist at all. And as they thus precondition consciousness, they cannot themselves be known to consciousness; and not being known to be conscious, it is not even certain that they may legitimately be described as mental. Further, we have no right to conceive them as the activities of a noumenal self. We know the self only as conscious, and the synthetic processes, being the generating conditions of consciousness, are also the generating conditions of the only self for which our experience can vouch."² In that case, there is no longer any ground for attributing these synthetic activities to the Imagination, since there is, and can be, no evidence whatever to suggest that the Imagination is a noumenal entity whose processes create for us the world we know.

This emphasis on the activity of the productive

¹ Kemp Smith, 274-75.

² *Ibid.*, 277.

Imagination vitiates in two related ways our understanding of the problem of knowledge. On the one hand, it slurs the distinction between knowing and imagining, and on the other hand, through this confusion it prevents a proper appraisal of the contribution of Imagination to all knowledge, transcendental as well as empirical.

Taking the first point first, the distinction between imagining and knowing is absolutely fundamental to our experience. Professor Prichard insists that "knowing and making are not the same,"¹ and therefore, "ideal construction is a contradiction in terms, unless it refers solely to mental imagining."² Hence, if the categories are attributed to the Imagination, we in effect deny the distinction between knowing and making, and this means the denial of the possibility of knowledge itself. Now, we know since the days of Descartes, if not always, that the possibility of knowledge cannot be intelligibly denied. The denial of the possibility of knowledge must itself be based on knowledge.

We also reach the same conclusion if we remember that the distinction between knowing and imagining is that between truth and error in another form. This latter distinction is basic to logical thought, and any attempt to slur or deny it is self-contradictory. Now, truth must be

¹ Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, 236.

² *Ibid.*, 244.

necessary and universal. As objective, it is therefore compulsive for the individual mind, which must accept and not create its own truth. The mind's individuality is therefore of no importance to the meaning of truth, but in error, it is its particularity that is most relevant, for error consists in the confusion of its own demands with the demand of truth. Imagination is constructive and spontaneous, but to claim to construct spontaneously is to repudiate the compulsion of the truth.

This does not mean that the Imagination is entirely arbitrary in its operations. It never is, for the human Imagination does not range in vacuo. It is conditioned by past knowledge and is anticipatory of future experience. This is clearly recognised by Kant, who following Hume, insists that Imagination, productive or reproductive, is involved in the very possibility of experience. Every experience is what it is against the background of a larger experience. Since human experience is conditioned by space and time, this larger whole is, however, never given to us as an object of experience. Hence, even the experience of the particular is comprehensible only by imaginatively filling up the details of this totality. And yet, in spite of the dependence of knowledge on Imagination and of Imagination on knowledge, knowing and imagining remain distinct.¹

¹ cf. Bosanquet, *Knowledge and Reality*, Chap. I; also, Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis*, 83.

If, then, Imagination is involved in all knowledge, but Imagination controlled by the demand of truth, there is no point in insisting that only synthetic thinking is due to its activity, while analytic thinking, must be attributed to the agency of the Understanding. Besides, even transcendental logic claims to be true, and is therefore capable of yielding knowledge, a claim which can never be satisfied if its sole concern is with the Imagination. We are, therefore, forced to the conclusion that there is no absolute distinction between concept and category, and any attempt to exaggerate that distinction must, from the very nature of the case, result in the denial of the objectivity of the categories. Further, once we separate the concepts from the categories, there would be no way of explaining their conformity to one another, and hence the categories would become, not transcendental conditions of experience, but transcendent entities falling outside its range. It would then be of no use to insist that analytic thinking is based on synthetic thinking, the concept on the category, for, if they are as diverse in nature as the separation of the concept from the category suggests, this dependence of analytic on synthetic thinking would itself be a problem that would defy all analysis. Finally, we have already noticed the formidable list of pre-conscious faculties with their

mythical activities which such an account demands.

The denial of the absolute distinction between the categories and the concepts would save us from all these difficulties, and there are at any rate indications in Kant (not to put the claim any higher), that he did not regard any such distinction as absolute. In Transcendental Deduction B, which may be taken to embody his final conclusions on the question at issue, he definitely says that "the Understanding, under the title of a transcendental synthesis of Imagination, performs this act upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is."¹ This is evidence that he did not regard the Understanding and the Imagination as separate faculties, exhibiting themselves in activities which are distinct from one another. As if to leave no doubt about his opinion on the matter, he goes on to add that "it is thus proved that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily be in conformity with the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and is contained in the category completely a priori. It is one and the same spontaneity, which in the one case, under the title of Imagination, and in the other, under that of Understanding, brings combination into the manifold of intuitions."²

¹ B 153.

² B 162 n.

Further evidence in favour of this position is to be found in Kant's reiterated insistence that the categories, as opposed to the ideas of Reason, are constitutive of our experience. We have already seen that the ideas of Reason, while pre-suppositions of experience, do not enter into it as its contents. Hence, the distinction between the ideas and the categories is significant if and if alone the categories express real features exhibited by the objects of our knowledge. We have also seen that objectivity must always mean specific objectivity, so that the objective features of experience which the categories seek to express must be features which have a specific character. Hence, the fact that the categories are presented in experience only in the form of concepts suggests that the relation between them can be expressed as that between the universal and its particular. In a passage in the section on the Regulative Employment of Ideas, Kant seems to offer an explicit suggestion along these lines. "Every concept may be regarded as a point, which as the station for an observer, has its own horizon, *i.e.*, a variety of things which can be represented, and as it were, surveyed from that standpoint. The horizon must be capable of containing an infinite number of points, each of which has its own narrower horizon...But for different horizons... each of which is determined by its own concept, there can be a common horizon, in reference to which, as from a common centre, they can all be

surveyed. From this higher genus we can proceed until we arrive at the highest of all genera, and so at the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept, and which comprehends under itself all manifoldness,—genera, species and sub-species.”¹

One cannot do better at this stage than to quote at some length Dr. Lindsay’s illuminating remarks on these controversial topics.

“There are,” writes Dr. Lindsay, “two main views possible of the Deduction, based on different interpretations of Kant’s conception of the work done by what he calls ‘the blind faculty of imagination’ and of his account of intuition. Both have in common the doctrine that in perceiving anything as an object, the assumptions on which the categories are based have already been operative in the work of the imagination. But the first view.....holds that this is not inconsistent with the retention of the distinction between the given and the connected, between intuition and thinking ; the second holds that it is.”²

“According to the first view the intuition of the given, strictly given, is always the intuition of a manifold in space and time, with, therefore, individual spatial and temporal relations intuited in that manifold. That is very far from being a chaos. What it lacks is the distinction between

¹ A 658=B 686.

² Lindsay, 108.

subjective and objective...Kant's view is that the distinction between subject and object cannot be arrived at without the activity of the mind. If the mind had only one single representation given to it, it could not make out whether that representation was mental or physical, subjective or objective; it could not indeed split that single representation into an *ing* and an *ed*, an apprehending mind and an apprehended content. We realise the self in its activity. The activity of the self as contrasted with the activity of what is apprehended is in its turn the object of apprehension, inasmuch as we are aware that the order and unity of the acts of our apprehending—from each of which the apprehended content is inseparable—is other than the order and unity which belongs to the apprehended. The same apprehended content forms two series, the one being the history of the apprehending mind, and the other the apprehended object.”¹

“According to the second view, the given is the isolated impression or sense datum; all apprehension of the manifold is successive, and therefore all apprehension of the manifold as we consciously experience it is already ordered synthesis. The given is then never experienced as such. We cannot be aware of a manifold as a manifold except in virtue of the mind's synthesis of those

¹ Lindsay, 109.

isolated elements. Therefore, this synthesis must be operative before consciousness." ¹

"The essence of idealism which Kant is concerned to refute is its assumption that the knowledge of the self is prior to the knowledge of objects. But the Deduction of the second edition has shown that knowledge of self and knowledge of objects are correlative: that we come to be aware of the unity and order in our knowing over against the unity and order of what is known. These two centres of unity arise in consequence of the work of the transcendental faculty of imagination on an undifferentiated vague chaos: the one is the phenomenal self, the other phenomenal nature. And because the reality of each of these lies in its connectedness, the merely given, being in itself not connected, shrinks almost to nothing. The phenomenal self is not anything sensed, but 'enjoyed' action. Phenomenal nature is its correlate the unity made." ²

The difficulty of this view is to keep the two phenomenals apart. That, to do justice to this interpretation of Kant as an interpretation, is clearly a difficulty of Kant's. Each world has indeed its own transcendental ground—the noumenal self on the one hand, things in themselves on the other. And so far as the subject is concerned, Kant insists that though we know

¹ Lindsey, 110.

² *Ibid*, 119.

the self as phenomenal, we know *that* though not *what* the transcendental self is: and the reality of that transcendental self, left open as a possibility but not revealed by knowledge, is experienced in action and its freedom realized in moral obligation. But Kant assumes that the self as known, the phenomenal self, is, as phenomenal, determined,—and as determined it is part of phenomenal nature. For clearly our actions affect nature and are affected by it. When we think then of this phenomenal self, we must think of it as part of one phenomenal world, not of two phenomenal worlds. This is, in fact, Kant's settled attitude to the problem of free-will and determinism, that the self is noumenally free but phenomenally determined; and it is phenomenally determined, not as a world by itself but as part of nature, by external stimulus acting on a given bodily disposition. Yet if that is really the upshot of the first Critique, and we really are committed by it to one phenomenal world, ~~the~~ reality of the noumenal self becomes as shadowy as that of the thing itself, and we are in principle committed to behaviourism, or at least to epiphenomenalism." ¹

“The fundamental difficulty of this view is that it makes nonsense of Kant's distinction of Understanding and intuition,” ² while the first view “of

¹ Lindsay, 119-20.

² *Ibid*, 120.

the Deduction does more justice than the other to the main points Kant is concerned to maintain in the second edition Deduction—the contrast between thinking and an intuitive Understanding, between thinking and perceiving; between thinking and association, between the inner and the outer sense.”¹

In short, if we accept the interpretation of the Deduction as offered by Professor Kemp Smith, there is hardly any way of distinguishing the position of Kant from that of neo-idealists like Croce and Gentile, who hold that the world of reality is the unfolding of mental events by a creative imagination or some noumenal aesthetic activity. But this goes against Kant's reiterated dictum that the co-operation of sense and Understanding is indispensable for our knowledge, that if the senses cannot think nor can the Understanding intuit.

Why then does Kant sometimes speak of Imagination as the source of the categories? We have seen that sometimes he tends to identify Imagination with the Understanding working unconsciously, and sometimes to assert that it mediates between Understanding and the senses. It seems that here we find the secret of Kant's insistence on the importance of the Imagination, for in his theory of imagination, Kant is trying to

¹ Lindsay, 117.

face the most crucial problem of knowledge, *viz.*, how is it that we recognise a particular as the particular of a universal? According to him this is peculiarly the function of Judgment, and since knowledge is always knowledge of individual things to an individual, the nature of Judgment becomes the most important problem of the Critical philosophy. Hence, in the theory of imagination in the first Critique, we find an anticipation of the problem of the Critique of Judgment. The analysis of the third Critique is directed to show that the particular is not as such lacking in character or universality, and yet that universality need not be derived from any thing outside itself. Conversely, that analysis is also concerned to show that the universal is never an abstract universal with its being divorced from that of the particular in which it is exemplified; on the contrary, its only being is in that of the particular which is its instance.

The third Critique is therefore an attempt to soften the distinctions which the first two Critiques had made too rigid, by showing that both Understanding and Reason require, though in different ways, a living individual element in thought. To say, as Kant often did in the first Critique, that the Understanding gives knowledge but not of the individual, is really to deny the possibility of knowledge. To say, as Kant so often says in the second Critique, that Reason is concerned with

the individual but gives no knowledge, is equally to deny the intelligibility of moral conduct. Hence, the entire burden of the proof of the possibility of knowledge as well as conduct is thrown upon Judgment, for Judgment is concerned with the individual and yet gives knowledge.¹

The result is that the rigid distinction between Understanding, Judgment and Reason breaks down, for we now see that each faculty must in its own way deal with the relation of the universal to the particular. Kant thought that this is peculiarly the function of Judgment, which must somehow be able to account for the operations of both Reason and Understanding. Understanding is therefore assimilated to the determining Judgment, while it is almost impossible to distinguish some of the activities of Reason from those of the regulative Judgment. The advance in the third Critique lies in this, for Kant now recognises that the spontaneous creative activity of the mind is necessary, not only for thinking of the unconditioned totality which Reason seeks to know, but also for the awareness of the barest particular which Understanding grasps by the application of the categories. The principles of Judgment are involved in all knowledge and come into play as soon as we begin to consider the particular, not after we

¹ cf. A 643=B 671, where there seems to be an anticipation of this in recognising that it is Judgment, rather than Understanding or Reason, that is responsible for error.

have already determined and described it. In the words of Mr. Justice Meredith, "It is with the reflective Judgment, therefore, rather than with Reason, that Kant's critical philosophy is most intimately connected. This is not alone true of the Critique,¹ but of the transcendental philosophy as a whole. Its point of view (as opposed to its subject-matter) is as obviously that of Judgment and the conception of teleological unity (which looks out towards Reason) as Hegel's is that of Reason and the unity of the syllogism."²

¹ *i.e.*, K.U.

² Meredith, Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, xix.

IV

Kant wrote two introductions for the Critique of Judgment. The one he wrote originally was replaced by the Introduction as we find it now. The former was not, however, entirely lost. It was preserved among Kant's lesser writings under the title of "On Philosophy in General," but as pointed out by Herr Lehmann, it was only a fragment of the original that was made available to the student of Kant. Buek restored the text and published the first unabridged edition of the work.

The neglect of the Critique of Judgment itself is no doubt partially responsible for the neglect which has so far attended the present tract. But this was not the only reason. Herr Lehmann suggests that this was also largely due to the history of the publication of the text. Those who are interested in this aspect of the question cannot do better than refer to the short but informative introduction he contributes to his edition of the "Erste Einleitung."¹

The question with which we are concerned here is, however, different. We have seen the importance of the third Critique for understanding

¹ Lehmann, pp. iii-v.

the Critical philosophy, for it is the keystone to Kant's philosophical constructions. Any writing bearing upon its problems is therefore of paramount interest; in the Introduction as it now stands, we get, so to say, the finished product of Kant's thought, in the present tract we almost see the workings of his mind as he slowly struggles to the positions which he finally came to occupy.

It has been suggested that "On Philosophy in General" was discarded only on account of its difficulty. Following Beck, this is the explanation which Dr. Lindsay has accepted.¹ On the other hand, it has also been suggested that it was discarded, not on account of its difficulty, but of its irrelevance and long-windedness. Herr Lehmann adopts this view and argues that "On Philosophy in General" is not only more discursive and un-systematic than the present Introduction, but it also fails to establish as clearly the fundamental thought of the third Critique, *viz.*, the principle that Judgment gives determination to the transcendental substratum in and outside us through the intellectual faculty.² This principle is of the greatest significance to post-Kantian idealism and is recognised far more explicitly in the Introduction as it now stands, which is itself constructed on the dialectical principle. The first three sections state the argument and demonstrate that the Critique of

¹ Lindsay, 219.

² Lehmann, vii.

Judgment is the necessary mediator between the first and the second Critiques. The next three sections deal with Judgment itself and exhibit it as a faculty of a priori legislation presupposing the finality of nature and connected a priori with pleasure. The last three sections deal with the idea of aesthetic, real and absolute finality of nature, and thus seem to lead to the thought of the unity of the supersensible. Hence, according to Herr Lehmann, "On Philosophy in General" is discarded, not only on account of its long-windedness, but because it represents only a transitional stage in the development of Kant's thought.¹ This of course enhances its interest and importance for the student of Kant, but at the same time explains why it was discarded.

This is obviously criticism from a Hegelian point of view and its validity therefore depends on our attitude towards the third Critique. If we think that in this Critique, Kant was slowly feeling his way towards a position like that of Hegel, we might agree that, as he gradually realised the implications of his thought, he became conscious that "On Philosophy in General" did not give an adequate account of the systematic unity of the mind and felt the need of a new and more unified Introduction. This would imply that the Critique of Teleological Judgment is the most

¹ Lehmann, vii.

important part of the third Critique, and the supersensible unity which is the substratum of all our faculties is not a mere idea but an idea which is realised in the operations of Reason.¹

This is the interpretation which Caird adopts, for he believed that the Critical philosophy points beyond itself to a unity which it never completely attains. He did not, however, suggest that Kant himself actually held such a position. For him, therefore, the Critical philosophy as a whole remains merely a transitional stage in the development of idealistic thought, and the Critique of Teleological Judgment marks only the nearest approach to Absolute Idealism. "The Critique of Judgment thus comes with Kant to be equivalent to a discussion of the Teleological Idea; because design is the a priori principle which underlies the activity of Judgment, as the intermediary between Reason and Understanding. Thus, the pure activity of Reason shows itself in the unity of self-consciousness: the activity of the Understanding shows itself in the determination of objects in the context of experience; and the activity of Judgment shows itself in relating the former to the latter, in establishing the unity of the consciousness of objects with the consciousness of self."² Again, "It is strange to see how Kant names and explains the Idea of an organic unity,

¹ But *cf.* above, pp. xxxi ff.

² Caird, II, 515.

and also of an intelligence which should apprehend the world as an organic unity, while yet he absolutely refuses to recognise that our own intelligence can attain to more than an external union of elements which, though not logically contradictory, yet are essentially irreconcilable. He supposes, in fact, that our consciousness of our own limitations enables us to think of such an intelligence and its object as a possibility, or, perhaps we should rather say, to recognise that our own inability to conceive it does not necessarily involve the denial of its existence. But here he stops. We can conceive an external connection of things as acting upon each other; we can conceive a determination of that external connection by an intelligent being which uses it to realise some purpose or end; but we cannot, according to Kant, form any definite conception of that, which yet seems to be set before us as a fact in organic beings, *viz.*, of a unity which produces the differences of its parts and reveals itself in their determination by each other. In short, we cannot think of a unity that reveals itself in difference except as an intelligence; and if we think of it as an intelligence, we cannot think of it as itself the source of the differences which it apprehends and on which it superinduces its unity, but only as an artist working with a given material.”¹ And Caird

¹ Caird, II. 528.

concludes by saying, "The important point for us here, however, is to observe how the successors of Kant, and especially Hegel, detected the dialectical movement by which in all his alternations of thought Kant was guided. In fact, it would not be too much to say that Hegel's great achievement was that he brought the unconscious dialectic of Kant to light. Thus, he pointed out that the negative relation of the consciousness of self to the consciousness of the object, being a necessary relation, must conceal a positive relation. Both must be regarded ultimately as forms or expressions of one principle; nay, their difference and opposition must itself be regarded as a necessary phase in the realisation of that principle; for it is necessary that they should stand opposed and indifferent to each other, as separate existences, in order that their unity may be realised. But, just because they are one in the ultimate principle of their being, the apparent determination of the one by the other to which their division gives rise, will ultimately show itself to result neither in the annihilation of the one by the other, nor even in the subordination of the one to the other; but in the full manifestation of the principle, which is present in both, and which has given rise to their difference. Hence, the process of knowledge, in which at first the subject seems merely to submit itself to be determined by the object, will be really the process by which the subject becomes conscious of itself in

and through the object ; and the process of moral activity,—in which at first the subject seems to determine the object to an end, which is not given in the object itself, but in the nature of the self to which it is made subservient,—will really be the process by which the objective world first reveals the spirituality of the principle which works in it, the end to which it is determined by its own nature.”¹

According to Caird, then, the system of Kant points to such an idea, but “because of his original separation of positive and negative, and his refusal to treat a negative relation as involving any objective connection, he is unable to bring together the end and the beginning of his speculation.”² Even from the Hegelian’s point of view, “On Philosophy in General” does not therefore seem to be a transitional stage in the development of the Critical philosophy, for Kant always maintained that the idea of a supersensible unity as the substratum of all experience is for us merely an idea, an horizon of thought which continually recedes before the advance of human knowledge.³

Nor is there any evidence that Kant regarded the Critique of Teleological Judgment as the most important section of the third Critique. Even in the final Introduction, Kant quite explicitly says, “In a Critique of Judgment, the part dealing with

¹ Caird, II. 560.

² Caird, II. 561.

³ cf. Lindsay, 268-9.

Aesthetic Judgment is essentially relevant. This alone contains a principle which Judgment lays down completely a priori as the basis of its reflection upon nature. This is the principle of nature's formal finality for our cognitive faculties in its particular (empirical) laws,—a principle without which Understanding could not feel itself at home in nature: No reason is, however, assignable a priori, nor is so much as the possibility of one apparent from the concept of nature as an object of experience, whether in its universal or in its particular aspects, why there should be objective ends of nature, *i. e.*, things only possible as natural ends.Aesthetic Judgment is, therefore, a special faculty of estimating things according to a rule, but not according to concepts. Teleological Judgment is not a special faculty, but only general reflective Judgment proceeding, as it always does in theoretical cognition, according to concepts but in respect of certain objects of nature, following special principles,—namely, those of a Judgment that is merely reflective and does not determine objects. Hence, as regards its application, it belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy. Its special principles are not, however, determinant, as principles belonging to doctrine have to be. Hence, on account of its special principles, it must also form a special part of the Critique.”¹

¹ K.U., pp. I-111.

The two problems with which the third Critique deals are those of the relation of causality to freedom,¹ and of the categories to the details of experience.² Both the problems are concerned with the application of law to individual cases and rest on the difficulty of understanding how an individual can at the same time exhibit law or universal character. We have seen that this difficulty is felt in Kant's account of knowledge as well as of practice, and the third Critique is an attempt to solve the problem by examining a region of experience in which the paradox is most clearly seen.

The regulative judgment starts with the individual and tries to relate it to the whole of our knowledge by describing it in its true character. This character cannot, however, be determined by merely looking at the thing, for out of the indefinite number of resemblances to and differences from other things which result from the infinite aspects of any individual thing, only some are vital for our knowledge. To distinguish between the essential and the non-essential aspects, we must therefore have a principle to guide us in our selection, and yet *ex hypothesi*, we start with the individual and the principle is not given to us. We can therefore do only one of two things,—select out of our stock of concepts the one which seems to fit the experience

¹ K.U., pp. xviii-xx.

² K.U., pp. xxx-xxxiii.

in question, or invent a new concept to describe a novel experience. The two operations are not of course entirely distinct, for even in selecting an old concept, we add to its meaning, while on the other hand, invention is impossible unless previous experience affords us with a clue.¹ This aspect of invention is most clearly marked in the aesthetic judgment, which, in giving up the claim to objective truth, is also liberated from the compulsion of the objective. In art, we are concerned with the individual, and yet the individual of art exhibits law or form, though law or form of a kind that cannot be divorced from its individual manifestations. An artistic representation of an object answers no question as to whether the object is this or that, and yet draws attention to resemblances and characteristics which are recognised by all as significant of its truest character. The aesthetic judgment is, therefore, the most typical of regulative judgments and exhibits most clearly the aspect of invention (or creation) which is involved in all experience. Hence, the problem of the application of law to individual cases can be best understood by an examination of the nature of art.

The evidence for regarding "On Philosophy in General" as a transitional stage in the development of Kant's thought is not, therefore, to put it very mildly, conclusive. Nor is it true to say that

¹ See above, pp. xxvi and lxxviii.

in the Introduction as it now stands, Kant regards Judgment as transcendently determinant of experience. On the contrary, he quite explicitly says that Judgment's conception of finality, even when we regard it as teleological, is never determinant but always regulative. "Judgment's concept of a finality of nature belongs to the class of natural concepts, but only as a regulative principle of the cognitive faculties, although the aesthetic judgment on certain objects (of nature or of art) which occasions that concept, is a constitutive principle in respect of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure."¹

In fact the argument in both the Introductions runs on very similar lines. In both, we have a magnificently systematic outline of the problem, though the body of the work centres round the particular problems of aesthetic and teleology. "Both introductions contain a systematic account of the whole Critical philosophy, a statement of the relations of the two worlds of nature and of freedom, the two capabilities of knowledge and desire, the two faculties of understanding and reason, and they suggest that a bridge is to be made between nature and freedom by art, between knowledge and desire by feeling, between understanding and reason by the faculty of judgment, between law and obligation by the concept of purposiveness or finality. Now Kant puts forward

¹ K.U., Ivii.

the faculty of judgment as concerned with feeling, with art, and with purposiveness or finality, and he promises to show how an analysis of aesthetic judgment will solve the difficulties involved in the contrast just stated. He adds that the application of the general a priori principles of Judgment to our knowledge of nature has an interest of its own, and will be treated in what should be regarded as an appendix, the Critique of Teleological Judgment."¹

It may be conceded at the outset that the Introduction has certain great advantages over "On-Philosophy in General." For one thing, it is far more concise, and yet states the essential problem of Judgment more clearly than the other. This is, as we have already seen, the problem of the relation of the particular to its universal. Of the two forms which the problem assumes, the first, and in a sense the more fundamental, is that of the relation between freedom and necessity.² Both freedom and necessity apply to the same territory of experience and yet their jurisdiction over it is independent of one another. To say that they do not clash on account of their restriction to independent spheres is no longer possible to Kant as soon as he admits that freedom must be actualised in the material world. Their harmonious cooperation in experience must, however,

¹ Lindsay, 219.

² K. U., pp. xviii-xx.

be explained, and this can be done only on the assumption that there is no absolute incompatibility between them.¹ Art, which is free and yet exhibits law, thus becomes the type of all experience and the interpretation of reality becomes the task of Judgment which in its reflective operation is concerned with art. In this work of interpretation, Judgment proceeds on the assumption that nature is an intelligible system, but there is no way of knowing beforehand that the system is intelligible. This is known only through and in the details which thought has rendered intelligible.

The account given above is taken from the Introduction as it now stands. "On Philosophy in General" does not at all raise the problem in this form. The result is that in the Introduction, Judgment's mediation between Reason and Understanding is seen to be necessary, and the Critique of Judgment becomes an essential constituent of the Critical philosophy. If freedom and necessity both apply to the same world of experience, it follows that they are both regulative of, but do not constitute experience. In other words, the distinction between freedom and necessity becomes one of degree, and Judgment which deals with the individual in experience, becomes the meeting ground of Reason and Understanding. The Introduction therefore reveals far more clearly than "On

¹ cf. above, pp. lxiii ff.

Philosophy in General" the inter-relation and fundamental unity of the cognitive faculties.¹

The second great merit of the Introduction lies in its exposition of the relation of finality and pleasure. "On Philosophy in General" suggests this connection, but the evidence adduced is mainly of a negative character. Judgment's principle of finality is wholly subjective and determines nothing in respect of the forms of natural products. Aesthetic judgment, in which this finality is expressed, can therefore never be a cognitive judgment. On the other hand, feeling also is never cognitive, our pleasure in an object does not in any way add to our knowledge of it. In other words, the aesthetic judgment though based on sensations is non-cognitive, and the only non-cognitive sensation is that of pleasure. This, it is argued, establishes the connection of finality and pleasure.²

The lacuna in this argument is obvious. From the mere fact that the aesthetic judgment and feeling are both non-cognitive, it does not necessarily follow that finality and pleasure imply one another. Besides, the argument as stated by Kant sounds plausible only on account of the ambiguity in the meaning of the term 'feeling,' which means sometimes the faculty and sometimes the state of the mind. When it is argued that the aesthetic judgment is based on sensation, and the only

¹ K.U., pp. lv ff.

cf. below, § VIII, pp. 42-43.

noncognitive sensation is that of pleasure, pleasure obviously refers to an affection of the mind, but the conclusion which is drawn is that aesthetic Judgment gives the law to feeling, just as Reason gives it to the will and Understanding to the cognitive faculties. Here, feeling equally obviously refers to the faculty, and the transition in meaning can be explained only through the ambiguity of the term.

A more satisfactory argument is suggested when Kant says that pleasure is due to the subjective character of the finality. Because the finality is subjective, the agreement of the representation with the faculties of knowledge cannot be presupposed, and because the agreement is not presupposed, its occurrence gives rise to pleasure.¹ In this, there seems to be a faint, but only a very faint, recognition of the connection of pleasure with desire. The occurrence of the unexpected does not necessarily give rise to pleasure, for an unforeseen experience may be pleasurable or the reverse. Hence it is not mere unexpectedness, but uncertainty combined with desire or longing, that explains the pleasure associated with particular experiences.

The argument in the Introduction avoids the ambiguity as well as the indefiniteness. Finality is connected with pleasure through an analysis of their respective natures. Finality is a subjective necessity

¹ *cf.* below, § VIII, pp. 44-45.

for us, since without using this principle, we cannot explain the details of our experience. On the other hand, we have no assurance beforehand that experience must conform to our intelligence. Hence, whenever we find the principle of finality realised, we are pleased, for the attainment of an end is always attended with pleasure.¹ Thus, wherever there is consciousness of finality, there is pleasure, and wherever there is pleasure, there is a realisation of finality. This also gives us a new understanding of the nature of pleasure. If pleasure in some cases follows the determination of the will and does not always determine it, it cannot be regarded on the analogy of a cause operating mechanically on the phenomenal self. This is therefore a tacit admission by Kant that the account he has given of the motives of action in his moral theory demands modification.

It may, therefore, be admitted that the exposition of the Introduction is in certain respects superior, but on the other hand, "On Philosophy in General" brings out more clearly the movement of Kant's thought. He recognised the independence of the sphere of art, but approached it from a metaphysical standpoint and from an examination of nature. In discussing the concept of technique, he points out that technique may be conceived mechanically, in which case the

¹ K. U., pp. xxxix-xl.

technical judgment is merely the corollary to the cognitive judgments of the Understanding. On the other hand, technique may also be conceived as an application of regulative Judgment, where we regard nature *as if* it had been constructed for our Understanding, but do not *know* that this is the case.¹ We regard nature as adapted to our Understanding and this helps us in our investigation of nature, but we can know this adaptation only so far as we have succeeded in explaining the phenomena of nature. Thus, technique of nature is analogous to the technique of art, for the specific quality of art is that it manifests rules or laws in its results, but cannot itself be constructed by means of a rule.

These judgments on the technique of nature reveal to us a new type of judgment, a judgment which is neither theoretical nor practical.² It cannot, therefore, be referred to either Reason or to Understanding, and as such has no objective reference at all. This connects such a judgment with the judgment of art, for in an aesthetic judgment we do not determine anything objectively. An aesthetic judgment is, as such, neither true nor false, it just *is*. On the other hand, an aesthetic judgment, while it claims neither truth nor falsity, claims universal acceptance.

We need not here examine whether this claim

¹ *cf.* below, § IX, pp. 55-56.

² *cf.* below, § I, pp. 8-9.

is justified or not, for Kant himself admits that mistakes and differences of opinion with regard to particular aesthetic judgments are not only possible, but common enough in experience. On the other hand, it is undeniable that the claim is made. The very fact of artistic production proves that the artist claims, with whatever success it may be, universal acceptance for his work. This is equally true of the judgment on the technique of nature. The possibility of judgments, which, without claiming objective validity, yet claim universal acceptance, can therefore depend only on the relation of such judgments to the faculties of our mind. Now, we know of our faculties only through their operation in experience, and experience is possible only under the form of a unity. The finality of experience for our intelligence is therefore the presupposition of all knowledge, whether objective or subjective.¹ Finality is therefore equally the presupposition of the judgments in question, and since finality is the principle of reflective judgment, it is reflective judgment which alone explains the possibility of judgments that are neither theoretical nor practical in the sense previously defined.

The bearing of this analysis on the problem of empirical judgments is obvious. An empirical

¹ cf. below, § IX, pp. 56 ff.

judgment is based on an individual act of perception and yet it claims acceptance from every one. The universality of the laws of thought may depend on their necessary character, for we must use these laws if we are to think at all. That is not, however, the case with empirical judgments. Empirical judgments, or for the matter of that, even the judgments of science, are not in the least involved in all thinking. From the point of view of the Understanding and its categories, we cannot therefore give any account of even the judgments of science, beyond the most general and abstract, of statements like, e. g., that every event has a cause. The true scientific judgment, however, seeks to express specific causal (or other) relations among determinate elements of our experience, and we cannot find any justification of such judgments in Understanding and its general law. The position of empirical judgments which express the particular perceptions of an individual subject is still worse, for they lack even the limited generality which scientific judgments exhibit.

The individual empirical and the scientific judgments are cases of knowing the details of experience, the second great problem which the Critique of Judgment seeks to solve. In the Introduction, the problem is no doubt suggested and it is argued that Judgment is entitled to use the principle of finality of nature to account for the

particularity of experience.¹ It is, however, merely *assumed* that the principle of finality can explain the complex individuality of the details of experience, and no attempt whatever is made to show that this must be so. "On Philosophy in General" does not merely assume, but seeks to explain how the principle of finality justifies the empirical judgments of perception and of science.

The argument may be briefly indicated as follows: 'All empirical judgments, whether individual or scientific, depend on one or more particular perceptions, and claim universal acceptance even though they are not involved in the laws of thought. Their claim to universality therefore depends on the fact that they seek to express knowledge of the one real world, but on the other hand, the world as a unified object of experience is never given to us. We are, in fact, in our perceptual and scientific judgments seeking to determine the unity of the world, and we know this unity only so far as we have succeeded in validating the claims of the judgments that we make. We cannot know the world to be, so to speak, a finished product of which the different aspects are revealed to us in succession, but on the contrary, we can think of the unified world only so far as we have succeeded in organising the successive revelations into a unity. Expressing

¹ K. U., pp. xxx-xxxiii.

this in another form, we may say that our knowledge is not a passive process, in which the unified world gradually imprints itself upon our minds. On the contrary, knowledge is essentially selective, and assumes that out of the infinite details of experience, some are relevant and important, some are not. But the distinction between relevant and irrelevant can be made only on the basis of a principle, and this principle can be no other than the assumption that the world is a unity. Hence, the advance of Judgment on, the Understanding lies in its assumption of harmony among the empirical concepts, *i.e.*, the assumption of the finality of nature. This is, however, a principle of regulative Judgment, which therefore lies at the basis of all empirical judgments.

The corollary to this is the recognition that regulative Judgment is implied, not only in judgments of art and the technique of nature, but also in judgments of science and empirical perception. There is, therefore, *no difference in principle* between the universality claimed by empirical judgments and that claimed by the judgment of art. The aesthetic judgment bases its claim on the assumption of a harmony among our cognitive faculties, the empirical judgment rests its claim on the harmony of the world of experience. The harmony of the cognitive faculties is included in the harmony of the world, and the universality claimed by the empirical judgment is therefore of

a wider application than that claimed by the judgment of art. There is only one other difference between the aesthetic and the empirical judgment. In the aesthetic judgment, we do not have any definite concept before us, while in the empirical judgment, the presence of such a concept implies that the resemblances and differences denoted by the term have been noticed already, and noticed as important for the purpose of knowledge. "Imagination does not exist in the free state, and itself requires a basis of fact. This basis of fact in turn requires a basis of imagination, for no fact can be known until it has been sought by the imaginative act of questioning, and this question itself requires a further basis of fact and so *ad infinitum*. This is not an infinite regress only because the two moments, question and answer, are not actually separate. Their distinction is an ideal distinction only, and the presupposition of each by the other is only a way of stating their inseparability." ¹

• Judgment with its principle of finality is therefore implied even in the simplest of empirical judgments, and this is what we should naturally expect. For, if the principle of finality be the presupposition of our knowledge of the world, this finality must be exhibited not only by nature as a whole, but also in every part of it. If the

¹ Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis*, p. 80.

parts, taken individually and in isolation, resist the application of this principle, it would follow that the whole, which is a whole of the parts and therefore at least partially determined by the nature of the parts, would also resist the application of the principle. Hence, the finality of reflective Judgment explains, not only the interconnections of the empirical laws, but also the finality we seem to find in particular objects of nature. Yet, at the same time, we must never forget that Judgment's principle of finality is only a subjective principle and cannot be known to have any objective validity.¹

Another important problem which is discussed at length in "On Philosophy in General," but hardly mentioned in the Introduction, is that of the relation of pleasure to perfection. In the Introduction, there is an implied reference to this problem in the discussion of the relation of finality to pleasure, but the reference is not worked out. "On Philosophy in General" examines the relation of finality to perfection, especially in connection with Leibnitz's theory of art. Leibnitz, in conformity with the general intellectualist tendency of his philosophy, tended to represent art as the confused conception of the perfection of an object. Kant, on the other hand, carefully points out that a concept, whether confused or clear, is always referred to

¹ cf. below, § II, pp. 21-22 ; also § V, p. 30.

cognition, whereas art gives no knowledge of the object, though it may supply the conditions which make knowledge of the Understanding possible. Besides, perfection always requires a definite concept of purpose and art has nothing to do with objective purposiveness. Perfection, as implying teleological finality, must therefore be distinguished from subjective finality which has no meaning apart from pleasure. Pleasure or subjective finality does not require even an abstract concept of purposive connection and it is impossible to identify pleasure with perfection. Kant concludes his argument by pointing out that if pleasure could be regarded as a 'confused conception of the perfection of an object,' pleasure as conceptual would become a cognition through Understanding and the distinction between Understanding and Intuition would be lost. This distinction is, however, one of Kant's most fundamental assumptions, for time and again he points out that both are equally indispensable for our knowledge or its possibility.¹

- The distinction between the aesthetic judgment of sense and of reflection is also not worked out in the Introduction, and consequently that between the agreeable and the beautiful is assumed without any attempt to exhibit the ground of that distinction. The distinction may be one of the given facts of experience and therefore require no proof,

¹ cf. below, § VIII, pp. 48 ff.

but it can become intelligible if and if alone we see that it is grounded in the nature of our cognitive faculties. "On Philosophy in General" points out that we may distinguish between two types of judgment arising out of the experience of pleasure, *viz.*, the aesthetic judgment of sense about the agreeable and the aesthetic judgment of reflection on beauty. In the one case, the relation to the feeling of pleasure is direct while in the other, the reference is to the balance of the cognitive faculties.¹ Both the types of judgment are, however, subjective, for, in them, we are concerned with the relation of the object to ourselves; and we may therefore be tempted to regard them as both aesthetic and noncognitive. But Kant goes on to add that the so called aesthetic judgment of sense refers to only one of the human faculties and that directly. There is therefore no question of subjective finality or harmony among the faculties here, and it is a misnomer to call it an aesthetic judgment at all. Hence, it is only the judgment on beauty that is truly aesthetic, since it bases itself on the principle of subjective finality. In other words, the distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful depends on the fact that the agreeable as such does not refer to the cognitive faculties at all, while the beautiful, though it does not produce objective

¹ *cf.* below, § VIII, p. 44.

cognition, brings the cognitive faculties into harmonious interplay.

It must be admitted that this gives a better account of the distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable than the one often found in the body of the Critique. He often says that the pleasure in the beautiful is disinterested and that in the agreeable is not. This may seem to explain the universality of the judgment on beauty, for Kant believed that objects have a causal influence on the phenomenal self through its feelings of pleasure and pain. The beautiful does not refer to any inclination of the subject, and this is enough to show that the judgment on beauty is universal. But Kant himself admits that this does not explain the distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful in every case, for there does not seem to be any reason why one person prefers wind instruments to stringed ones and another does not. Disinterestedness cannot therefore be the essence of the distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable, this must be sought in their reference to the different faculties of the mind.

In concluding, we may therefore say that, while the Introduction has the great advantage of being more concentrated and definite than "On Philosophy in General," it does not, on the other hand, reveal so clearly the workings of Kant's mind. Nor does the Introduction work out in such detail the implications of the principle of finality in the

ABSTRACT OF "ON PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL."

§ 1. The first section starts with the familiar distinction between philosophy and criticism, and points out that philosophy as doctrine can have only two parts, *viz.*, a theoretical and a practical part. The concept of the practical is, however, very often misunderstood, for the technically practical is regarded as belonging to practical philosophy. This is not justified, since the technically practical is only a corollary from the theoretical. It is distinguished from pure theoretical knowledge only formally, but not according to content and should therefore be sharply distinguished from morality which alone is truly practical.

The technical judgment has two forms. In one form it belongs to art, for it is concerned with the bringing into being of what we desire. In the other form, it refers to nature in those of its spheres in which its objects are conceived *as if* their possibility depended upon art.

Such judgments on the technique of nature reveal to us a new type of judgment, for they are neither theoretical nor practical, and cannot be referred to either Understanding or Reason. To account for them, we must therefore regard Judgment itself as technical, for its law supplies the principle for such judgments. Since our knowledge of nature depends on them, we shall regard nature

itself as technical, but we cannot regard its technique as objective. Hence a discussion of this technique belongs to the Critique and not to the doctrine of philosophy.

§ 2. The analysis of the faculty of human knowledge through *concepts* (not *intuitions*) results in the distinction of Understanding, Judgment and Reason. Understanding gives knowledge of the general rule or law. Judgment subsumes the particular under the general, *i.e.*, gives knowledge of the particular as such. Reason determines the particular through the general, *i.e.*, tries to exhibit the particular as derived from general principles. Hence, Understanding which deals with the general aspects of experience, supplies the a priori laws of nature, while Reason is concerned with the totality of the system, which as totality is unconditioned and therefore free.

Judgment which mediates between Understanding and Reason may also be expected to have its own a priori principles. Judgment is not, however, self-dependent like the other two faculties and cannot therefore have any constitutive principles. Its a priori principle is thus that of the concept of the adaptation of nature to human knowledge, since this concept is required if experience is to be possible as a system according to empirical laws.

The pure-transcendental laws of the Understanding or the categories no doubt contain the possibility

of a system, but this is merely general and cannot account for the systematic character of the empirical laws. These laws afford such variety that system according to them is always contingent for the Understanding. In other words, categories explain only the spatio-temporal unity of experience. Events must have spatio-temporal relations if they are to be events for us, but this does not and cannot explain why one event should be related to another event as its cause or effect. Hence, the conformity of the empirical laws with one another and their inherence in a system is not guaranteed by the Understanding.

This principle of finality of the empirical laws is therefore contingent according to all concepts, but nevertheless Judgment must assume it in order to make its operation in nature intelligible. It is therefore only a presupposition of Judgment and yet it supplies the principle of investigation of nature. Hence, this concept of Judgment is that of Technique and does not add to our knowledge.

§ 3. If, on the other hand, we analyse the general faculties of the mind, we find that we can distinguish between the faculties of knowledge, of feeling and of desire. These cannot be reduced any further and the only question we can ask about them is as to whether they constitute a system or an aggregate. The a priori principle of connection among them may be sought in the concept of freedom which determines the faculty

of desire and yields pleasure, but if pleasure is assumed to precede the determination of the will, this attempt to unite the faculties fails. Yet the feeling of pleasure is given as one of the faculties of the mind. Hence, if we are to explain the unity of the mind, we must assume that this feeling has its own a priori principle. Empirically, feeling of pleasure determines the will, but transcendently, pleasure cannot be a determinant of the will. Now Reason gives the law to Will and Understanding to knowledge. We can therefore provisionally connect Judgment with feeling as giving the law to it. Like feeling, Judgment also refers solely to the subject as opposed to Reason and Understanding with their territories which must have an objective reference.

§ 4. General laws are no doubt given to nature by Understanding, but experience requires particular laws in addition to the categories. Understanding cannot guarantee that nature must be a system and still less that we can know it to be one. Yet the unity of space and time thought through the categories requires the unity of experience as a system according to empirical laws. This is, however, not knowledge but only a presupposition of Judgment. Hence, Understanding does not examine the affinity of particular laws, this is the task of Judgment, which deals with the particular and its relation to the universal. It must therefore postulate an a priori principle of affinity, even

though it may regard the agreement of the forms of nature as contingent.

§ 5. Judgment has two forms, the determinant and the reflective. In determinant Judgment, there is a concept lying at the basis of a given representation. In reflective Judgment, the concept is discovered through the representation. The principle of reflective Judgment must therefore be synthetic, for it assumes that empirically determined concepts can be found for all objects of nature. In this, reflective Judgment goes beyond the categories, for it makes the further assumption of harmony among the empirical concepts. This connects Judgment with technique, for we have no knowledge of reality as a whole and cannot therefore say that this is a system. Our imperfect but growing knowledge must, however, proceed on the assumption that it is so. Nor is this assumption of harmony among the empirical laws based on practical considerations, for our duty is independent of the order of nature. This technique of nature is the presupposition and cannot therefore be the result of experience. It cannot thus be derived from a consideration of the comparison of genus and species, for all such comparison would presuppose the principle. It may be called the principle of affinity of nature which is intuitively grasped and nature regarded on the analogy of a work of art. This principle refers, not to the

forms of objects of nature, but to their interconnectedness in a system.

§ 6. We cannot, however, derive from this a real finality of the things of nature. Real things may form an aggregate, not a system and yet be adapted to classification. Real finality would involve the production of the object through its concept and would require the co-operation of Reason for the completion of the system of experience. The distinction between the two types of finality is possible to the reflective, but not to the determinant Judgment, for the latter refers everything to the mechanical principle. The finality assumed by reflective Judgment explains not only the interconnections of empirical laws, but also the finality we seem to find in particular objects of nature, e.g., in organisms.

§ 7. The results so far reached are thus as follows: Judgment makes it possible to think of finality of nature and thus explains the conformity of empirical laws. This finality is, however, subjective and determines nothing in respect of the forms of natural products. It is not a category and is not constitutive of experience and yet it applies to nature. This application depends on the distinction between the technique and the mechanism of nature. In all awareness, however, there are involved three operations of the cognitive faculty, *viz.*, the apprehension of the manifold of intuitions through Imagination, the comprehension

in concept through the Understanding and recognition of this concept in an intuition through Judgment. Thus, Judgment and its finality are required for even empirical perception.

The relation of Understanding and Imagination differ in different types of judgment. In the aesthetic judgment of reflection, the relation of Imagination to Understanding is one of balance or harmony. It is not a cognitive judgment and the finality expressed is subjective. Where the finality seems to be objective, Understanding stands in relation to Reason and its principle of the possibility of a system. This judgment, though cognitive, belongs to reflective and not to determinant Judgment, since it is in Judgment that we find the idea of a finality of nature.

§ 8. If 'aesthetic' refers to an element in cognition, then a transcendental aesthetic is possible. If, however, 'aesthetic' refers to feeling, there can be no transcendental aesthetic of feeling. This confusion is due to the ambiguity of the term 'feeling' which sometimes means the faculty and sometimes the state of the mind. This ambiguity can be avoided by reserving the term 'aesthetic' for the operations of Judgment. An aesthetic judgment would then always refer to the subjective relation of Understanding and Imagination, since from the point of view of cognition, an aesthetic judgment would be a contradiction in terms. Since the aesthetic judgment could never

refer to objects or to cognition, its connection with feeling which also is never cognitive is clearly seen.

The aesthetic judgment, though always subjective, has two forms, *viz.*, that of sense and of reflection. In the aesthetic judgment of sense, the finality depends on the relation to feeling and thus gives rise to the judgment of the agreeable which is always empirical and contingent. The aesthetic judgment of reflection, though equally subjective, expresses the relation to the faculties of cognition and gives rise to the judgment of beauty which always claims universality. (In other words, the aesthetic judgment of sense refers directly to the feeling of pleasure, while that of reflection refers to the balance of the cognitive faculties. The peculiarity of both types lies in their non-cognitive character. Yet both types are based on sensations and the only sensation which does not constitute knowledge is the sensation of pleasure.

In the case of the aesthetic judgment of sense, the relation to pleasure through sense is direct and does not need any special principle of Judgment. In the aesthetic judgment of reflection, on the other hand, the pleasure follows the agreement of the representation with the faculties of knowledge. This involves the principle of the finality of Judgment. Hence these judgments alone can be regarded as truly aesthetic. Their claim to universal validity follows from this and at the same time indicates that they are based on a principle a priori. } The

validity claimed is not however objective. It is only subjective validity.

The pleasure thus implied in reflective judgments is not, however, the sensible representation of the perfection of an object. A judgment of perfection is always a logical judgment though the concept of perfection may be an unclear concept. If pleasure were a cognition through Understanding, it would be conceptual, but in that case the distinction between Understanding and Sense would be lost. Intuition and Understanding must therefore be kept distinct, for both are equally necessary for knowledge.

If pleasure in general could be identified with sensible intuition of perfection, the concept of finality of nature would become identical with the concept of perfection. But perfection as completeness is an ontological concept and totally unconnected with pleasure or pain. Perfection is in that case merely formal. Perfection as teleological would imply something more, though it would be based on perfection as ontological: it would have to posit an end. This judgment of teleological, like that of causal connection would have no connection with pleasure. Perfection as objective finality and the feeling of pleasure are therefore unconnected, but subjective finality has no meaning apart from pleasure. Subjective finality does not require that even an abstract concept of purposive connection should belong

to it. Hence, it is impossible to identify subjective finality with perfection.

We may ask whether Reason judges of subjective finality by means of pleasure or pain, or judges of pleasure and pain through subjective finality. If the finality claims to be universal and necessary, it requires an a priori ground but at the same time determines through feeling. This would explain the paradox of the relation of Understanding and Sense. If, on the other hand, it is determined through feeling, it would be like the aesthetic judgment of sense, and therefore merely empirical. In the Critique of Practical Reason, the representation of universality (*i.e.*, of freedom) controls the will, but not through concepts. In Reflection, the representation of subjective finality is identical with the feeling of pleasure but again not through concepts. The conclusion therefore is that pleasure and pain cannot be explained, they can be only felt. •

• § 9. Formal technique presupposes harmony of Imagination and Understanding but real technique is teleological. This requires the concept of the end as the basis of the possibility of objects of nature. We cannot know this end a priori, for the objects of nature differ from one another. The possibility of experience as a system seems to give an a priori principle to Judgment, not only to Understanding as tended to be suggested in the first

Critique. Nature in its causality cannot, however, be comprehended by Judgment, for it requires Reason to do so. Judgment can contain a priori principles for the form of intuitions but not for the concept of the production of things. This is confined to Reason as the faculty of the unconditioned. Natural beauty therefore requires no concept; natural ends do, but they still belong to Judgment, not to Understanding or Reason, for experience gives us cases which seem to be ends but can never prove intention in such cases. We can therefore interpret them only on the analogy of ends, but cannot determine them as ends. We can talk of ends only in art, never in nature.

§ 10. Judgments of beauty claim universality and cannot therefore be explained by psychology, which is always empirical and contingent. Yet such judgments are not logical and must belong to Judgment. Similarly, teleological judgments deal with an *ought*, though it is not the *ought* of morality, and cannot therefore belong to Understanding or Reason. As based on a principle a priori, it must also belong to Judgment.

§ 11. The transcendental principle of Judgment proves that a reflective judgment can be a priori. The aesthetic judgment is the pure type of reflective judgment, for the teleological judgment implies Reason and hence requires no special justification. Aesthetic judgment, however, requires a Critique.

§ 12. Critique of Judgment can thus have only two parts, *viz.*, those of Aesthetic and of Teleological Judgment. Critique of Aesthetic Judgment will have two parts dealing with beauty and with sublimity. Critique of Teleological Judgment will deal with inner and relative conformity.

ABSTRACT OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT.

§ 1. Philosophy may be divided into theoretical and practical. The division depends on the distinction of theoretical and practical concepts. The technically practical is not therefore truly practical, for it is a corollary to the theoretical and does not require any special principle.

§ 2. Understanding is the faculty of the theoretical and Reason of the practical. They have jurisdiction over the same territory of experience, but do not interfere with one another. This apparent paradox is solved through the distinction of phenomena and things-in-themselves. The paradox is not, however, fully solved, for freedom is meant to actualise in the sensible world the end proposed by its laws. There must therefore be a ground of the unity of the supersensible, which explains the idea of correspondence between nature and freedom.

§ 3. Judgment serves to mediate between Understanding and Reason. It may give the

principle to the feeling of pleasure which stands between the faculties of knowledge and of desire.

§ 4. Judgment is determinant or reflective, but in either case, it is concerned with the relation of the particular to the universal. Determinant Judgment is subsumptive and hence it might seem to require no principle of its own; but the variety of nature demands that here also there must be laws. These laws may be contingent from the point of view of Understanding, *i.e.*, the general rules of Understanding may give no reason why a particular is exemplified in any case, and yet we have to assume that there must be some reason why this, and not some other particular is exemplified. Even if we accept this reason itself to be contingent, the contingent requires for its possibility some principle which is not contingent, though we may not know what this principle is. Reflective Judgment which seeks the universal of a given particular must therefore have a principle of its own. This principle it cannot borrow from any other source, but must give to itself. This is the principle of the finality of nature.

§ 5. This principle is a transcendental principle and therefore requires a Deduction. The argument runs thus: Categories give universal laws of nature, but these refer only to the general characteristics of experience. Particularisation is the work of Judgment which subsumes under these laws but subsumption involves specification and

specification requires a principle of specification. Thus, Understanding prescribes that every event must have a cause if we are to know it as an event, for objective time-relations require causality, but Understanding cannot determine what the cause will be in any given case. Hence, from the point of view of the Understanding, the unity of experience is contingent, and yet we must assume such unity in order to explain the possibility of experience. This transcendental law is therefore a subjective principle that is regulative of experience, not constitutive of it. Our experience is always experience of the particular. These particulars must, as objective, share in general characteristics deducible from the laws of the Understanding, but these general characteristics cannot express the complexity and individuality of objects. Hence, we must have an a priori principle to account for the regularity of the manifold, but the principle will be only regulative.

- § 6. Since the principle of finality of nature is a subjective necessity for us, realisation of this principle yields pleasure, since the attainment of an end is always attended with pleasure. Where this attainment is connected with an a priori representation, the pleasure is also a priori and thus valid for all men.

§ 7. This principle of finality does not contribute to knowledge, and the only element in a representation incapable of becoming an element of

cognition is the pleasure connected with it. The representation of finality is therefore always an aesthetic quality. This representation of finality occurs when Imagination and Understanding accord. This representation and its attendant pleasure are valid for all men, but at the same time, they are contingent. In other words, we cannot claim a priori validity for the representation and the pleasure. The two aspects of this feeling of finality give rise to two types of the aesthetic judgment, *viz.*, those of beauty and of sublimity.

§ 8. We have considered so far the representation of finality as subjective, but we may also think of it as objective or teleological. Here we deal, not only with finality but also with ends, whether these be ends of nature or of art. Thus, we get a teleological judgment which is, however, only regulative and as such belongs to Judgment, but otherwise it does not require any special faculty. It is only the reflective employment of Judgment.

§ 9. This regulative character of Judgment with its concept of finality of nature, which is neither cognition of the object nor practice by the subject, mediates between nature and freedom, for Judgment shows us the possibility of the final end which can be actualised only in nature.

ON PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL

OF PHILOSOPHY AS A SYSTEM

If philosophy be the system of rational knowledge through concepts, it is thereby already sufficiently distinguished from a Critique of Pure Reason. The latter no doubt contains a philosophical investigation into the possibility of such knowledge, but it does not belong as part to such a system. On the contrary, it for the first time suggests and tests even the idea of such a system.

The division of the system can at first be only into its formal and its material parts, of which the first (the logical) shapes into a system of rules the mere forms of thought. The second (the real) part brings systematically into consideration the objects conceived according to these forms, so far as rational knowledge of objects is possible from concepts.

This real system of philosophy can itself be divided into theoretical and practical philosophy in only one way. It can be divided according to the fundamental distinctions of its objects and the essential differences on this account in the

principles of the sciences which it includes. One division must therefore be the philosophy of nature, the other of morals. Of these, the first can contain empirical principles as well, but the second, none but pure principles a priori, since freedom can never be an object of experience.

But a grave misunderstanding, and one disadvantageous even to the methodology of science, exists with respect to the concept of the practical. What is it that can be regarded as practical in such a sense that it deserves to be included in a practical philosophy? Statesmanship and political philosophy, rules of domestic management and intercourse, prescriptions of health and dietetics, of the body as well as of the soul, together make up an aggregate of practical propositions. It has therefore been believed that they (and why not all arts and trades?) could be regarded as practical philosophy. Practical propositions are indeed forms of representation. They are not, however, on that account distinguished according to content from theoretical propositions which contain the possibility of things and their determinations. Only those are practical propositions which deal with freedom under law. All the rest are nothing but the theory of what belongs to the nature of things. They apply to the way in which these can be generated from us according to a principle, *i. e.*, to the possibility of what is posited through an arbitrary action, and this action itself belongs

to the class of natural causes. Thus, to find the ratio of the respective arms of a lever in order that a given force may be in equilibrium with a given weight is a problem of mechanics. The solution of the problem is indeed expressed as a practical formula though it contains nothing but a theoretical proposition. The proposition is that the length of the latter varies inversely to the ratio of the former when they are in equilibrium. This ratio, in respect of its origin, is conceived as possible through a cause, of which the ground of determination is the representation of that relation, *i.e.*, it is due to our arbitrary will. The case is the same with all practical propositions which deal with the production of objects. Thus, precepts are given to further one's own happiness, and the question is, *e.g.*, as to what one has to do in one's own person in order to be receptive of happiness. The inner conditions alone of the possibility of happiness are then represented as belonging to the nature of the subject, *viz.*, those of contentment, of moderation of appetites so as not to be passionate and so on. At the same time, the manner of production of this equipoise is represented as a causality possible through us ourselves, and therefore as the immediate consequence of the theory of objects in relation to the theory of our own nature. Here, the practical precept is indeed formally distinguished from the theoretical, but only formally and not with respect

to content. It therefore requires no special kind of philosophy to understand this connection of grounds with consequences. In a word, all practical propositions, which derive from the arbitrary will as cause all that can be contained in nature, belong, as knowledge of nature, altogether to theoretical philosophy. Only those practical propositions which give law to freedom are specifically distinct from the former with regard to content. Of the former, it can be said that they constitute the practical part of a philosophy of nature, but it is only the latter which form the basis of a distinct practical philosophy.

OBSERVATION

A great deal depends upon the proper determination of philosophy according to its parts. For this end, it is important to avoid setting up as one among the members of the divisions of a system anything which is only a consequence, or an application of it on a given occasion without requiring any special principles.

Practical propositions are distinguished from theoretical ones in respect of either principles or consequences. In the latter case, they do not constitute a special division of a science, but belong to the theoretical part as a special kind of consequences following from it. The possibility of things according to the laws of nature is in

principle essentially distinct from that of those according to the law of freedom. The difference does not however lie in the fact that, in the latter case, the cause is to be found in a will, while in the former, it lies outside the will in the thing itself. For, let us suppose that the will follows no other principles but those according to which, as pure laws of nature, the Understanding perceives that objects are possible. The proposition which contains the possibility of objects through the causality of the arbitrary will may no doubt still be called a practical proposition, but it would nevertheless be, in principle, in no way distinct from the theoretical propositions which deal with the nature of things. Moreover, it must derive its principle from that of theoretical propositions in order to explain the representation of an actual object.

There are practical propositions which, according to their content, deal only with the possibility of an object represented through arbitrary operation. They are therefore mere applications of an entirely theoretical knowledge and can constitute no special division of a science. A practical geometry, as a specialised science, is a nonentity, whatever be the number of practical propositions contained in this pure science. Of these, the majority, as problems, require special methods for their solution. The problem of constructing a quadrilateral with a given line and a given right angle

may be a practical proposition, but it is a mere corollary to the theory. Similarly, surveying can hardly usurp the name of practical geometry and call itself a special division of general geometry. It really belongs to an appendix of the latter, *viz.*, to the application of this science to trades.*

Physics proper is a natural science so far as it rests upon empirical principles. The practical operations to discover the hidden laws of nature cannot, however, on that account lay any claim to the title of practical physics, under the name of experimental physics as a division of natural philosophy. Practical physics also is a nonentity. The principles, according to which we direct our attempts, must themselves be always derived from the knowledge of nature, and therefore from theory. This is valid even of the practical precepts which concern the arbitrary production of a determinate mental state in us, *viz.*, the movement or restriction of the imagination, or the satisfaction

* This pure and therefore lofty science appears to detract somewhat from her dignity, if she owns that even as elementary geometry she requires instruments (although only two) for the construction of her concepts, *viz.*, the circle and the line. These constructions alone she calls geometrical, as opposed to those of higher geometry which she calls mechanical, because complicated machinery is required for the construction of the concepts of the latter. In fact, however, actual instruments are not meant even in the first case; for they can never produce those figures with mathematical precision. They must (really) mean only the simplest kinds of representations *a priori* of the imagination, which no instrument can ever equal.

or weakening of desires. There is no practical psychology as a special part of the philosophy of human nature. The principles of the possibility of influencing it through art must be derived from those of the possibility of our determining the existing constitution of our nature. Although these are expressed (in the form of) practical propositions, they do not constitute a practical part of empirical psychology. They have no special principles of their own and belong to the appendix of the theoretical ones.

- There are practical propositions, they may be pure a priori or empirical, which assert the immediate possibility of an object through our arbitrary will. These invariably belong to the knowledge of nature and to the theoretical part of philosophy. There are also propositions which directly represent the determination of an action as necessary, through the mere representation of its form according to universal law and without any consideration of the means that contribute towards it.
- These alone can and must have their own special principles in the idea of freedom. Although the concept of an object of the will (the highest good) is based on these principles, this object belongs only indirectly, as a consequence, to the practical precept. This precept is then called moral. Hence these principles alone belong to a special division of a system of rational knowledge, under the title of practical philosophy.

To avoid ambiguity, all other propositions of practice, to whatever science they may be annexed, may be named technical instead of practical. For they belong to art, to bringing into being that which we desire should be. This is always a mere consequence from completed theory and is no autonomous part of any province of science. Thus, all precepts of skill belong to the technique and therefore to the theoretical knowledge of nature as consequences from it.* In future, however, we will make use of the expression, Technique, also in cases where objects of nature are sometimes only so regarded as if their possibility itself depended on art. In such cases, the judgments are neither theoretical nor practical in the

* This is the place to correct an error I committed in the *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*. I said of the imperatives of skill that they commanded only contingently, and indeed, under the condition of a merely possible, *i.e.*, a problematic end. I therefore gave to such practical formulae the name of problematic imperatives, but this expression contains a patent contradiction. I should rather have called them technical imperatives, *i.e.*, imperatives of art. The pragmatic imperatives or rules of cleverness command under the condition of an actual, and subjectively even necessary end. They also therefore fall under the imperatives of technique. (For what is cleverness but the capacity to use to one's own purposes free men, the disposition of nature and even one's own propensities?) Now the end which we attribute to ourselves and to others, *viz.*, personal happiness, does not belong to the class of merely agreeable ends. This justifies a special term for the imperatives of technique. Unlike other cases of technical imperatives, the task here demands, not merely the finding of means to the realisation of a given end, but also the determination of that which constitutes the end itself, *viz.*, happiness. In the case of the general technical imperatives, we must presuppose that this end is already known.

previously defined sense, for they determine nothing in the constitution of the objects, nor in the manner of their production. On the contrary, nature itself is discerned through them, though only in analogy with art, and in respect of its subjective relation to the faculty of our knowledge, not of objective relation to things. We shall not regard the judgments themselves as technical in such cases, but rather Judgment itself, on whose law the judgments are based. As related to Judgment, nature also should here be regarded as technical. This Technique contains no objective determining propositions. It does not therefore constitute any part of the doctrine of philosophy, but only of the critique of our faculties of knowledge.

II

OF THE SYSTEM OF THE SUPERIOR COGNITIVE FACULTIES WHICH LIES AT THE BASIS OF PHILOSOPHY

If the discussion is, not about the divisions of philosophy, but only of our faculties of knowledge a priori through higher concepts, we find that the systematic representation of the faculty of thought results in a three-fold division. (This refers to a Critique of Pure Reason, but considered only in respect of Reason's capacity to think, so that the types of pure intuition are not taken into consideration.) The divisions are, firstly, Understanding or the capacity of the knowledge of the general (*i.e.*, of rules); secondly, Judgment or the capacity of subsuming the particular under the general; and thirdly, Reason or the faculty of determining the particular through the general, *i.e.*, of derivation from principles.

The Critique of Pure Theoretical Reason was devoted to the study of the origin of all cognitions a priori, and therefore also to what in them belongs to intuition. It supplied us with the laws of nature and the Critique of Practical Reason with the laws of freedom. The principles a priori for the whole of philosophy seem therefore to have been already completely discussed.

Understanding supplies a priori the laws of nature while Reason supplies those of freedom. Now Judgment, the third faculty, mediates the connection of the other two faculties. By analogy, it is therefore to be expected that, like them, it will also yield its characteristic principles a priori, and perhaps form the basis of a special department of philosophy. Like the others, this also as a system can have only two parts.

Judgment is, however, a special and by no means self-dependent faculty of cognition. It does not, like Understanding, give concepts, nor like Reason, ideas of any object. It is merely a faculty of subsumption under concepts which are given in some other way. Hence, if there is to be a concept or rule which has its origin in Judgment, it must be a concept of the things of nature so far as nature conforms to our Judgment. It is therefore the concept of such a constitution of nature, that we cannot conceive of it in any other way except as agreeing in its disposition to our faculty of subsuming particular given laws under more general ones which are not yet given. In other words, it must be the concept of an adaptation of nature for the purposes of our faculty of knowing it, in so far as it is required for this that we should be able to judge the particular as contained in the general and to subsume it under the concept of nature.

The concept of experience as a system according to empirical laws is such a concept. It

is true that this is constituted as a system according to the transcendental laws which contain the possibility of experience in general. Such unending variety and heterogeneity of the forms of nature belonging to particular experiences are, however, possible according to the empirical laws that the concept of a system according to them must be quite alien to the Understanding. We cannot conceive the possibility and still less the necessity of such a whole merely according to these empirical laws. Yet particular experiences, connected throughout according to these permanent principles, require also the systematic connection of empirical laws. It thus becomes possible for Judgment to subsume the particular under the general, though this still remains empirical, and go on in this fashion till we reach the highest empirical laws. Judgment refers these to their respective forms of nature, and is consequently able to regard the aggregate of particular experiences as the system thereof. For without this presupposition, there can be no thorough-going connection according to law, *i.e.*, their empirical unity is not possible.*

* The possibility of experience in general is the possibility of empirical knowledge as synthetic judgment. It cannot therefore be derived analytically from mere comparison of perceptions as is generally supposed. The combination of two different perceptions in the concept of an object in order to know them is a synthesis which makes empirical cognition, *i.e.* experience, possible. This it does in no other way except in accordance with the principles of the synthetic unity of appearances, *i.e.*, according to the fundamental laws through which

Judgment presumes and presupposes this conformity of nature to law only on its own behalf. According to all concepts of Understanding, it is contingent in itself: It is a formal conformity of nature but we attribute it to her absolutely. Neither a theoretical knowledge of nature nor a practical principle of freedom is however established through it, although it supplies a principle for the estimation and investigation of nature in order to seek general laws for particular experiences. We have to arrange them according to such laws, in order to bring out that systematic connection which is necessary for coherent experience and which we have reason to assume a priori.

The concept originating in and characteristic of Judgment itself is therefore that of nature as art, in other words, that of the technique of nature in respect of its particular laws. This concept establishes no theory, and like Logic, contains no

appearances are brought under the categories. Now these empirical cognitions constitute an analytic unity of all experience in accordance with that which they necessarily have in common, *viz.*, the transcendental laws of nature. They do not however constitute the synthetic unity of experience as a system. This unity combines the empirical laws under a principle in respect of what is different in them, differences which in their variety can reach up to infinity. The conformity or adaptation of nature, in respect of its particular laws, is with regard to Judgment what the category is in respect of each particular experience. It is therefore represented as not merely mechanical but also as technical. Though it does not determine the synthetic unity objectively like the categories, it is yet a concept which gives subjective principles that serve as clues to the investigation of nature.

knowledge of the object and its constitution. What it does is to give only a principle of progress according to empirical laws through which the investigation of nature is made possible. This does not, however, enrich our knowledge of nature by any particular objective laws. There is only established a maxim according to which Judgment is to observe nature and hold together its forms.

Philosophy as the doctrinal system of the knowledge of nature as well as of freedom does not thereby acquire any new territory. The representation of nature as art is a mere idea, which serves as the principle of our investigation of nature and is therefore a principle for the subject alone. Its purpose is to evolve, wherever possible, connection in a system out of the aggregate of our empirical laws as such. This it does because we attribute to nature a coherence according to this our need. Our concept of a technique of nature, on the other hand, will belong, as an heuristic principle for its estimation, to the Critique of our faculties of cognition. This Critique indicates what motives we have in making such a representation of it for ourselves, what origin this idea has, if it is to be found in an a priori source, as well as the range and limits of its use. In a word, such an enquiry would belong as part to the system of the Critique of Pure Reason, not to that of doctrinal philosophy.

III

OF THE SYSTEM OF ALL THE FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN MIND

We can reduce all faculties of the human mind without exception to three: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire. Some philosophers, who deserve all praise for the fundamental character of their thought, have indeed sought to explain away these differences as merely apparent and derive all the faculties from that of knowledge alone. It is however easy to prove, and has indeed been already seen, that this attempt to introduce unity into the manifoldness of the faculties, though undertaken in the best philosophical spirit, is bound to fail. Representations, so far as they are derived from objects and the unity of consciousness in them, belong to knowledge. In their objective relations, considered as cause of the actuality of the objects at the same time, they are accounted to the faculty of desire. In their relation merely to the subject, so far as they are their own ground and contain (the conditions of) their existence in themselves alone, they are treated in connection with the feeling of pleasure. There is always a great difference between these three kinds of representations. The last type neither

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is, nor produces, any knowledge, though it may indeed presuppose cognition as its determining condition.

The connection between the knowledge of an object and the feeling of pleasure and pain at its existence or the determination of the faculty of desire to bring it into being, is indeed empirically easy to recognise. But if this cohesion is not based on a principle a priori, the faculties of the mind constitute only an aggregate and not a system. Now, it is indeed possible to establish an a priori relation between the feeling of pleasure and the other two faculties. If we connect a cognition a priori, *viz.*, Reason's concept of freedom, with the faculty of desire as the ground of its determination, it is possible to find in this objective determination also a subjective feeling of pleasure contained in the determination of the will. The faculties of knowledge and of desire are not, however, connected in this way by means of pleasure or pain. For this pleasure or pain does not precede the determination of the latter (*i.e.*, the faculty of desire). It either follows immediately on its determination or is perhaps nothing but the perception of the determinability of the will through Reason itself. It is therefore no special feeling or characteristic sensibility which requires a special division among the attributes of the mind. A feeling of pleasure, which is independent of the faculty of determination and can, on the contrary,

give it a motive, is, however, incontestably given in the analysis of the general faculties of the mind. For the combination of this faculty with the other two into a system, it is thus necessary that the feeling of pleasure, like the other two faculties, should rest, not merely on empirical grounds, but also on principles a priori. Thus for the idea of philosophy as a system is required also a critique, if not a doctrine as well, of the feeling of pleasure and pain, so far as it is not grounded empirically.

The faculty of knowledge through concepts has its principles a priori in pure Understanding (its concepts of nature), and the faculty of desire in pure Reason (its concepts of freedom). There still remains among the general attributes of the mind an intermediate faculty or sensibility, *viz.*, the feeling of pleasure and pain, while among the superior faculties of knowledge, there remains unemploy'd an intermediate one, *viz.*, Judgment. What is more natural than to suppose that the latter will contain principles a priori for the former ?

Without yet deciding about the possibility of this connection, we nevertheless find that a certain conformity of Judgment to the feeling of pleasure, (to serve as its determining ground or to find it therein), is, however, unmistakable. In the division of the faculties of knowledge through concepts, Understanding and Reason refer their

representations to objects to obtain concepts of these, but Judgment relates itself solely to the subject and it alone (of all the faculties) produces for itself no concept of objects. * Similarly, in the general division of all the powers of the mind, the faculty of knowledge like that of desire contains an objective relation of representations. The feeling of pleasure and pain is, on the contrary, merely the subject's susceptibility to determination. Hence, if Judgment should ever determine something for itself alone, this can be nothing but the feeling of pleasure (and pain). Conversely, if the feeling of pleasure should ever have a principle a priori, this can only be found in Judgment.

IV

OF EXPERIENCE AS A SYSTEM FOR JUDGMENT

We have seen in the Critique of Pure Reason that entire nature, as the sumtotal of all objects of experience, constitutes a system according to transcendental laws. These are laws that the Understanding itself gives a priori for appearances, so far as, connected in one consciousness, they are to constitute experience. Precisely for that reason, however, experience must constitute a system of possible empirical knowledge according to general as well as particular laws. Thus alone is it ideally possible to regard it as objective in general. For, this is demanded by the unity of nature according to the principle of thorough-going connection of all that is included within the compass of the totality of appearances. Experience in general should, to this extent, be regarded, not as a mere aggregate, but as a system according to the transcendental laws of the Understanding.

It does not, however, follow from this that nature also is for the human faculties of knowledge an intelligible system according to empirical laws. Nor does it follow that it is possible for men to grasp the thorough-going and systematic connection of its appearances in an experience

and consequently to know experience itself as a system. For it might be partially possible for us to combine sensations into an experience according to opportunely discovered particular laws, and yet it might be beyond our powers to bring these empirical laws themselves to the unity of relation under a common principle. Such would be the case if the manifoldness and heterogeneity of these laws, alike with the forms of nature conforming to them, were endlessly great, and represented them (as belonging to) a crude and chaotic aggregate, without affording the slightest clue to a system. (This is indeed possible, or at least, the Understanding can think a priori of such a possibility, although we are compelled to presuppose experience as a system according to transcendental laws.)

The unity of nature in space and time is identical with the unity of the experience possible to us. The former is a totality of mere appearances (kinds of presentation) and can have its objective reality wholly in experience. If the former is to be thought of as a system (as it must then happen), experience must itself be possible as a system according to empirical laws. It is therefore a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition that there do not occur in nature a perplexing and unlimited multiplicity of empirical laws and heterogeneity of the forms of nature. On the contrary, it is necessary to suppose that nature itself, as an

empirical system, qualifies to become (an object of) experience through the affinity of particular under more general laws.

This presupposition is the transcendental principle of Judgment. This faculty serves, not merely for the subsumption of the particular under the general of which the concept is given, but it also serves to discover the general for a given particular. Understanding abstracts from all the manifoldness of possible empirical laws in its transcendental legislation for nature. It takes into consideration only the conditions of the possibility of an experience in general according to its form. The principle of the affinity of particular laws of nature is therefore not to be found in the Understanding. But Judgment, which is obliged to bring particular laws under higher though still always empirical laws, must lay down a transcendental principle as the ground of its procedure. This it must do even in respect of their differences under the general laws of nature. Judgment views the social agreement of the forms of nature under common empirical but higher laws as totally accidental. But it would be still more contingent if particular perceptions qualified themselves successfully as empirical principles through fumbling with these forms. Even more accidental would it, however, be if the manifold empirical laws should fit themselves, in their complete coherence, into a systematic unity of the knowledge of nature

in a possible experience, except through the presupposition of a principle a priori of such a form of nature.

Nature takes the shortest way, she does nothing gratuitously, she makes no leaps in the manifoldness of forms (*continuum formarum*), she is rich in species but consequently sparing in genera: all these familiar formulae are nothing but this very transcendental expression of Judgment and establish a principle for its own special use in order to regard experience as a system. Neither Understanding nor Reason can found a priori such a law of nature. It is readily seen that in its merely formal laws, through which it is object to experience in general, nature adjusts itself according to our Understanding. In respect of particular laws, however, with their manifoldness and heterogeneity, nature is free from all limitations by our law-giving faculty of knowledge. Such a principle (of uniformity) is therefore merely a presupposition of Judgment, which posits it to help it in its work of always ascending to the general though still empirical in order to effect the unity of particular laws. This is Judgment's characteristic use of the empirical-particular. Such a principle can never be derived from the consideration of experience, for it is only under the presupposition of such a principle that experience can be presented in a systematic way.

V

ON REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT

Judgment can be regarded in one of two ways : either as a mere capacity of reflection upon a given representation according to a certain principle, on behalf of a concept possible through it, or else, as a capacity to determine through a given empirical representation a concept lying at its basis. In the first case, it is the faculty of reflective, and in the second, of determinant judgment. To reflect (*i.e.*, to turn over in one's mind) is, however, to compare and combine a given representation with either other representations or with the faculty of knowledge in relation to a concept possible through it. Reflective Judgment is the faculty which is also called the capacity of discernment (*facultas dijudicandi*).

Reflection is seen even in animals although only instinctively, *viz.* not in connection with a concept obtained through it, but rather in connection with an inclination somewhat determined by it. In Determination, the basic concept of the object prescribes the rule to Judgment and thus serves as the principle. For Reflection also, we need a similar principle.

The principle of reflection over given objects of nature is that empirically determined concepts

can be found for all things of nature.* It will go so far as to say that a form can always be presupposed for its products and this form is possible according to general laws knowable by us. If we could not presuppose this principle and place it at the basis of our dealings with empirical representations, all Reflection would depend upon a blind and capricious, and therefore ungrounded expectation of its conformity with nature.

With regard to general concepts of nature,

* At first sight, this principle does not have the slightest appearance of a synthetic transcendental proposition. It seems to be a mere tautology belonging to pure logic. For it teaches us how to compare a given representation with others, derive as a mark for general use what it has in common with them and thus frame a concept. But logic says nothing as to whether there are in nature many (or any) other instances, sharing a common form, to which any particular object can be compared. This condition of the possibility of the application of logic to nature is rather a principle for the representation of nature as a system to our Judgment. This is a system in which the manifold, divided into species and genera, makes it possible to bring through comparison all existent forms of nature to concepts of greater or less generality. Now, pure Understanding, though it also does so through synthetic principles, has indeed taught us to think of all things of nature as contained in a transcendental system according to concepts a priori, *i.e.*, categories. But (reflective) Judgment, which seeks concepts even for empirical representations as such, must make a further assumption. It must for this purpose assume that nature in its boundless multiplicity yet exhibits a systematic division into species and genera. This is such that it is possible for our Judgment to find harmony in its comparison of the forms of nature and arrive at empirical concepts and an arrangement of these under one another through ascent to more general, though still empirical concepts. In other words, Judgment presupposes a system of nature according to empirical laws as well, and this it does a priori, and consequently through a transcendental principle.

under which alone a concept of experience (without particular empirical determinations) is for the first time possible, Reflection already has its mandate in the concept of nature in general, *i.e.*, in the Understanding. Judgment requires here no special principle of reflection. It schematises these concepts a priori and employs these schemata to each empirical synthesis. Without this, no empirical judgment would be possible. Here, Judgment in its reflection is at the same time determinant, and the transcendental schematism of the latter serves it also as the rule under which given empirical intuitions are subsumed.

But take the case of concepts which must first be discovered out of given empirical intuitions. They presuppose a special law of nature according to which alone particular experiences are possible. Here Judgment requires a characteristic and at the same time transcendental principle of reflection. This cannot be referred back to empirical laws already known, thus transforming reflection to a mere comparison of empirical forms of which there are already concepts. For the question is, how can we hope, through the comparison of perceptions, to arrive at empirical concepts of what is common to the different forms of nature? The great variety of empirical laws makes it possible for us to think that nature has placed in them so great a heterogeneity that all or most of such comparisons are powerless to

articulate a uniformity and gradation of genera and species under these forms. In order to know empirical laws and their respective specific forms in natural phenomena, together with their generic agreement with other forms as well, all comparisons of empirical representations make a presupposition. This presupposition is that nature itself, in conformity to our Judgment, has, in respect of its empiricallaws, observed a uniformity and economy conceivable by us. This presupposition must, as the principle of Judgment a priori, precede all comparison.

Thus, reflective Judgment deals with given appearances in order to bring them under empirical concepts of determinate things of nature. This it does, not schematically, but rather technically, not merely mechanically as an instrument under the direction of the Understanding and the senses, but rather artfully, according to general but at the same time undetermined principles of a purposive disposition of nature in a system. Understanding says nothing about the adaptation of the particular laws of nature to the possibility of a systematic experience. It is Judgment which makes this presupposition, since without it, we cannot hope to ascertain correctly the possible particular laws in a labyrinth of manifoldness. Hence, Judgment adopts a priori as the principle of its reflection the technique of nature, without yet being able to

explain it or determine it any further. Nor does Judgment have for that purpose a knowledge of the Thing-in-itself, which serves as an objective ground of determination of the general concept of nature. This it does only in order to be able to reflect according to its needs through its own subjective laws, but nevertheless also in conformity with the general laws of nature.

Nature is thought of as a system according to empirical laws through the principle of reflective Judgment. This is however a principle for the logical employment of Judgment alone. It is indeed transcendental in origin, but only in order to regard nature a priori as qualified to be a logical system of manifoldness under empirical laws.

The logical form of a system exists only in the division of a given general concept, which is here that of nature in general. The particular, here the empirical, with its differences is thereby thought of as contained under the general according to a fixed principle. If one proceeds empirically and ascends from the particular to the general, a classification of the manifold is proper here, *i.e.*, a comparison with one another of several classes, of which each stands under a determinate concept. If these classes are completed according to common characteristics, here also belongs their subsumption under higher and higher classes (species), till the concept which

contains the principle of the entire classification in itself and constitutes the highest genus is reached. If, on the contrary, one starts from the general concept and arrives at the particular through an elaborate division, the operation is in that case called the specification of the manifold under a given concept, which proceeds from the highest genus to lower species or classes and from species to sub-species. In common use of speech, it is said that the particular which stands under a general concept must be specified, but it is a more correct expression to say that the general concept is specified through bringing the manifold under it. For logically considered, the genus is likewise the material or raw substance which nature works up into particular species and sub-species through increasing determinations. It can therefore be said that nature specifies itself according to a fixed principle (*i.e.* the idea of a system), in analogy with the use of this word by teachers of law when they speak of the specification of a given raw material.*

It is clear that reflective Judgment in its own character cannot undertake to classify the whole of nature in her empirical differences, if it does not presuppose that nature herself specifies her transcendental laws according to a fixed

* The Aristotelian school also called the genus *matter*, but gave the name *form* to the specific difference.

principle. This principle can, however, be no other than that of conformity to the power of Judgment itself. It is the power to find, in the unlimited variety of things according to empirical laws, an affinity which is adequate (for the purpose) of bringing them under empirical concepts (classes), and these under more general laws (higher genera), and so on. In other words, it is the power to arrive at an empirical system of nature. Such a classification requires a detailed,¹ not a general,² knowledge of experience. Similarly nature also, so far as she is thus thought to specify herself according to such a principle, is regarded as a work of art. Judgment therefore contains as necessary a priori a principle of the technique of nature, which is distinguished from its nomothetic according to the transcendental laws of the Understanding. The distinction consists in this that the nomothetic can validate its principles as law, while the technique can do so only as a necessary presupposition.*

1 intuitive ?

2 discursive ? There is here a play on the word 'kunst' in speaking of 'detailed knowledge,' and nature 'as a work of art.'

* Could Linnaeus have hoped to construct a system of nature if he had to fear that when he found a stone and named it granite, this could, in its inner constitution, differ from all the others which appeared exactly like it ? That he could therefore expect to meet only the unique, only things which appeared isolated to the Understanding, but never a class which could be brought under the concept of genus and species ?

The characteristic principle of Judgment is therefore as follows: Nature, to serve the purposes of Judgment, specifies her general laws into empirical ones according to the form of a logical system.

Here arises the concept of purposiveness of nature, and indeed as a characteristic concept of reflective Judgment, not of Reason. For the end is not posited in the object at all, but only in the subject and that in its mere capacity to reflect. We call that thing purposive whose being seems to presuppose its own representation. The laws of nature are so conditioned and derived from one another (that it seems) as if Judgment had devised them for its own particular use. They have, however, an affinity with the possibility of things which presupposes a representation of these things as their ground. It is therefore through its own principle that Judgment thinks of a purposiveness of nature in the specification of her forms through empirical laws.

These forms themselves are not, however, thought of as purposive on that account. It is only their relation to one another and their conformity to a logical system of empirical concepts in spite of their great variety which is so thought. If nature exhibited nothing beyond this logical conformity, we would indeed already have cause to wonder over it. For according to the general laws of the Understanding, we know of no ground

to account for it. Hardly anybody but a transcendental philosopher would, however, be capable of this admiration and he would have to think of it generally. Even he would be unable to name a single determinate case where this purposiveness displays itself in the concrete.

VI

OF THE UNIFORMITY OF THE FORMS OF NATURE AS OF SO MANY PARTICULAR SYSTEMS

To make experience possible as a system of empirical knowledge, nature would have to specify itself in its empirical laws. The form of nature exhibits for this purpose a logical conformity, *viz.*, its agreement with the subjective conditions of Judgment in respect of the possible coherence of empirical concepts in the totality of an experience. This conformity does not, however, from its utility lead to the inference of a real conformity in its products, *i.e.*, it does not allow the bringing forward of individual things in the form of systems. For these things could always, as in perception, be mere aggregates and yet be possible according to empirical laws which agreed with others in a system of logical division. A characteristic concept based on them and consequently an underlying purposiveness of nature need not therefore be assumed as a condition of their particular possibilities. In like manner, we regard the earth, stones, minerals, and similar things as mere aggregates without any purposive form. We nevertheless regard their inner character and grounds of cognition so related to their possibility, that they are useful for the classification of things

in a system of nature according to empirical laws, without however indicating in themselves a systematic form.

By an absolute finality of the forms of nature, I therefore understand those external configurations, or also their inner structures, which are so constituted that an idea of them must be laid down in our Judgment as the basis of their possibility. For purposiveness is a conformity to law of the accidental as such. In respect of its products as aggregates, nature behaves mechanically, as mere nature. But in respect of them as systems, e.g., in the formation of crystals, of all kinds of forms of flowers, or in the inner structure of plants and animals, nature proceeds technically, *i.e.*, as in art. The distinction between these two ways of estimating natural objects is made solely through reflective Judgment. In respect of the possibility of the object itself, determinant Judgment (under the principles of Reason) does not permit this distinction, and perhaps tries to know everything as referred back to the mechanical type of explanation. Reflective Judgment is however fully able to, and perhaps also must, do so. For the explanation of an appearance according to objective principles is the work of Reason and it is quite compatible that this should be mechanical, while the rule for the estimation of the selfsame object, according to the subjective principles of Reflection should be technical

Now, Judgment's principle of the finality of nature in the specification of its general laws never stretches so far as to involve in itself the production of the purposive forms of nature. The system of nature according to empirical laws, which alone Judgment is entitled to postulate, is possible also without such forms, which must be given solely through experience. Since, however, we have once found reason to lay down a principle of finality for nature in its particular laws, it always remains possible and permissible to attribute the purposive forms exhibited by experience in its products to the same ground as that on which the former rests.

This ground itself might lie even in the transcendental and extend beyond the limit of our possible insight into nature. Yet, we have already acquired something through it. We have acquired a transcendental principle of the finality of nature lying in readiness in Judgment to explain the conformity of the forms of nature found in experience. This principle may not be adequate to the explanation of the possibility of such forms, but at any rate, it makes it permissible to apply to nature and its conformity to law so peculiar a concept as that of purposiveness. This cannot of course be an objective concept of nature, but is derived from the subjective relation of nature to a faculty of the mind.

VII

ON THE TECHNIQUE OF JUDGMENT AS THE BASIS OF THE IDEA OF A TECHNIQUE OF NATURE

As shown above, it is Judgment that makes it for the first time possible, in fact necessary, to think also of a finality of its own besides the mechanical necessity of nature. This is a presupposition without which it would not be possible to find systematic unity in the exhaustive classification of particular forms according to empirical laws. It has then been shown that this principle of finality is merely a subjective principle for the division and specification of nature, and hence determines nothing in respect of the forms of natural products. There may therefore be many ways in which this purposiveness remains a mere concept. It may even underlie the logical use of Judgment in experience, as a maxim of the unity of nature in its empirical laws, on behalf of the application of Reason to its object. In nature, however, no objects of this special type of systematic unity, *viz.*, that according to the representation of an end, are ever given as products corresponding to it in their form. I give the name 'technique of nature' to its (*i.e.* nature's) causality in respect of the

form of its products as ends. This is opposed to the mechanism of nature which subsists in its causality through the connection of the manifold without any concept lying at the basis of its unity. Thus, certain weight-lifting tools, like a lever or an inclined plane, can contribute towards a desired end without an idea of the end lying at its basis. They are, however, called machines, not works of art, for though they can be used towards an end, they are not possible solely in relation to ends.

The first question here is as follows : How is the technique of nature in its products perceived ? The concept of finality is not a constitutive concept of experience, nor the determination of an appearance belonging to the empirical concept of the object, for it is not a category. Judgment may reflect over the empirical intuition of a given object, in order to bring it under some still undetermined concept, or on the concept of experience itself in order to bring to common principles the laws contained in it. So far as Judgment merely reflects on a given object in either of these ways, we perceive finality in it (*i.e.*, in Judgment). Judgment is therefore characteristically technical. Nature also is represented as solely technical, so far as it conforms to the procedure of the former and makes such procedure necessary. We will presently show the manner in which the concept of reflective Judgment, which makes the inner perception of a conformity of representations

possible, can be applied also to the representation of the object as contained under it.*

To each empirical concept belong three operations of the spontaneous cognitive faculty: (1) the apprehension of the manifold of intuitions, (2) the comprehension, *i.e.*, the synthetic unity of the consciousness of the manifold in the concept of an object, and (3) the representation in intuition of the object corresponding to this concept. Imagination is required for the first operation, Understanding for the second and Judgment for the third. In the case of an empirical concept, this has to be determining Judgment.

In mere reflection over a perception, we do not, however, have to think of a determinate concept. The task here is always to think, on behalf of the Understanding as a faculty of concepts, only of the rule governing a perception. If we compare the relation, in which Imagination and Understanding must always stand against one another in Judgment, with the relation in which they actually stand in a given perception, it is clearly seen that in pure reflective judgment these two relations are regarded as identical.

If the form of a given object is so constituted in empirical intuition that the apprehension of the manifold of it in Imagination agrees with the representation of an undetermined concept of the

* We confuse it is said, enduring objects with things and do not distinguish them, as it were, from their perception.

Understanding, then Understanding and Imagination harmonise in pure reflection for the furtherance of their task. The object is then perceived as purposive for Judgment alone, and consequently, the conformity itself is regarded as merely subjective. A determinate concept of an object is neither required for it nor produced through it. The judgment itself is not cognitive and is called an aesthetic judgment of reflection.

On the other hand, ready-made empirical concepts and even laws agreeing with the mechanism of nature may be given, and Judgment may compare such a concept of the Understanding with Reason and its principle of the possibility of a system. In that case, this finality is judged to be objective when the form is met with in the object. The thing is then called an *end* of nature, whereas formerly, things were estimated only as indeterminate purposive *forms* of nature. The judgment on the objective conformity of nature is called teleological. It is a judgment of cognition and yet belongs to the reflective, not to the determinant Judgment. The technique of nature, whether merely formal or also real, is always a relation of things to our Judgment. The idea of a finality of nature is to be found in Judgment alone and is ascribed to nature only in relation to it.

VIII

ON THE AESTHETIC OF THE FACULTY OF DISCERNMENT

The expression, an aesthetic representation, is quite unequivocal, if by it is understood the relation of the representation to an object as appearance in order to know it. For the expression, aesthetic, then means that such a representation is necessarily attached to the form of sensibility (*i.e.*, how the subject is affected), and is thence transferred unavoidably to the object, though only as a phenomenon. A transcendental aesthetic, as a science belonging to the faculty of knowledge, is therefore possible. It has, however, long been customary to call a representation aesthetic, *i.e.*, sensible in another sense. By it has been meant the relation of a representation, not to the faculty of cognition, but to the feeling of pleasure and pain. Because we lack any other expression, we may according to this nomenclature call this feeling also a sensation, *i.e.*, a modification of our state. It would not even then be an objective sensation, whose determination is required for the knowledge of an object, and in fact, it would contribute nothing to its knowledge. For to intuit, or rather to know something with pleasure, is not a relation of the

representation to the object, but to a sensibility of the subject. It is precisely for this reason that an aesthetic of feeling cannot be given as a science, in a way similar to that of an aesthetic of the faculty of cognition, for all determinations of feeling are merely of subjective significance. Hence there always remains an unavoidable ambiguity in the expression, an aesthetic representation, if by it is understood, sometimes that which excites the feeling of pleasure and pain, and sometimes that which applies only to the faculty of cognition, so far as sensible intuitions which permit us to know objects only as appearances are found therein.

This ambiguity can, however, be removed, if the expression aesthetic is used, not for intuitions and still less for representations of the Understanding, but only for the operations of Judgment. An aesthetic judgment, if it is sought to be used for objective determination, would then be so manifestly self-contradictory, that this terminology would itself be sufficient security against misrepresentation. For intuitions can indeed be sensible, but judgments belong only to the Understanding taken in the wider sense. An aesthetic or sensible judgment, so far as it is to give knowledge of an object, is a contradiction in terms. It is a case where sensibility interferes with the work of the Understanding and gives a false direction to it through a *vitium subreptionis*. The objective judgment is passed

only by the Understanding and cannot therefore be called aesthetic. Hence, in our transcendental aesthetic of the faculty of knowledge, we have been able to speak of sensible intuitions but never of aesthetic judgments. This is because its judgments must be altogether logical, since it has to deal only with cognitive judgments which determine the object. The expression, an aesthetic judgment on an object, therefore directly indicates this: A given representation is indeed understood to be related to an object, but in the judgment itself is understood, not the determination of the object, but rather of the subject and his feelings. For Understanding and Imagination are treated in relation to one another in Judgment. This relation, as belonging to knowledge, can indeed be considered as primarily objective, as was the case in the transcendental schematism of Judgment. Even this relation of the two cognitive faculties can, however, be considered as merely subjective, so far as the one assists or hinders the other in respect of the same representation and thus modifies the state of the mind. In other words, this relation may be regarded as one which is sensible, a possibility that does not arise in the distinctive use of any other cognitive faculty. Although this sensation is not the sensible representation of an object, it can yet be designated as the sensible representation of the state of the subject which is affected through an act of the

former faculty, (including in it sensibility as well). We do so because this sensation is subjectively connected with the making sensible of the concept of the Understanding through Judgment. It can also be called an aesthetic, *i. e.*, sensible judgment according to its subjective effect, but not according to the ground of its determination. This can be done although judgments (*viz.* objective ones) are the work, not of sensibility, but of the Understanding as the superior faculty of knowledge in general.

A determinant judgment is logical, because its predicate is a given objective concept. A pure reflective judgment on a given unique object can however be aesthetic. Before its agreement with others is yet seen, Judgment, which has no concept ready for the given intuition, has to connect in such cases Imagination (merely in its perception) with Understanding (in the representation of a concept in general). It has also to observe a relation of the two cognitive faculties. This relation, *viz.* the agreement of the two faculties with one another, constitutes the subjective and merely sensible condition of the objective employment of Judgment. An aesthetic judgment of sense also is, however, possible. The predicate of such a judgment can never be the concept of an object, since it does not belong to the faculty of knowledge at all. Thus, in 'The wine is pleasant,' the predicate expresses the relation of a representation

directly to the feeling of pleasure and not to the faculty of knowledge.

An aesthetic judgment may therefore, in general terms, be explained as that judgment of which the predicate can never be knowledge, *i.e.*, the concept of an object. It may however contain the subjective conditions of cognition in general. Sensation is the ground of determination in such a judgment. Now, there is only *one* so-called sensation that can never be the concept of an object and this is the feeling of pleasure and pain. This is merely subjective, while all remaining sensations can be used for knowledge. An aesthetic judgment is therefore such that its ground of determination lies in a sensation which is in immediate relation to the feeling of pleasure and pain. In the aesthetic judgment of sense, it is the sensation which is produced directly by the empirical intuition of the object. In the aesthetic judgment of reflection, however, it is that sensation which is caused in the subject by the harmonious play of Imagination and Understanding, the two cognitive powers of Judgment. Here, the power of apprehension of the one and that of production of the other are reciprocally necessary to one another in the given representation. In such cases, this relation, through its mere form, causes a sensation which is the ground of determination of a judgment. This judgment is hence called an aesthetic judgment, and as subjective finality without

concept, it is bound up with the feeling of pleasure.

The aesthetic judgment of sense contains material finality, but the aesthetic judgment of reflection contains only formal finality. The former is not related to the faculty of knowledge, its relation being to the faculty of pleasure immediately through sense. Hence, it is only the latter that is conceived as based upon the characteristic principles of Judgment. Subjective finality is *thought of* before it is *sensed* in its effects, if reflection on a given representation precedes the feeling of pleasure as the determining ground of the judgment. So far, *viz.* according to its principle, the aesthetic judgment belongs to the higher faculties of knowledge and indeed to Judgment itself, under whose subjective but nevertheless general conditions the representation of the object is subsumed. A merely subjective condition of a judgment does not, however, yield any determinate concept of the ground of its determination. This can therefore be given only in the feeling of pleasure, so that the aesthetic judgment is always a judgment of reflection and presupposes no agreement of the representation with the faculties of knowledge which work in unity in Judgment. As against such a judgment, an aesthetic judgment of sense is that in which a given representation is related also to the feeling of pleasure, though not through Judgment and its principle. The criterion for

deciding among these differences can, however, be given for the first time in the discourse itself, and depends upon the claim of the judgment to universal validity and necessity. For, if the aesthetic judgment exhibits these characteristics, it thereby also makes the claim that the ground of its determination must lie, not merely in the feeling of pleasure and pain for itself, but simultaneously in a rule of the superior faculty of knowledge. Here in particular, the rule must be that of Judgment, which, therefore, in respect of the conditions of reflection a priori, is legislative and displays autonomy. Unlike the autonomy of the Understanding in respect of the theoretical laws of nature, or of Reason in respect of the practical laws of freedom, this autonomy is not however objective. In other words, it is valid, not through the concept of things or possible actions, but merely subjectively for the judgment of feeling. If this judgment can claim universal validity, it thereby indicates its origin as based on a priori principles. This legislation must be correctly described as Heautonomy, since Judgment legislates neither for nature nor for freedom, but entirely for itself. Nor is it the faculty for the production of concepts of objects. It merely compares present cases with concepts which are given to it in some other way and supplies a priori the subjective conditions of the possibility of this relation.

Hence, it can also be understood why pure reflective Judgment, in an operation which it executes for itself without basing it on the concept of objects, relates the reflection directly to mere sensation which, like all sensation, is always accompanied by pleasure or pain. This it does, instead of establishing, according to its proper rule, a relation of the given representation to its consciousness. This does not happen to any other superior faculty of knowledge. The rule itself is merely subjective, and agreement with it can be known as the characteristic and motive of the judgment only in the case of sensation, which expresses mere relation to the subject. Hence this judgment also is called aesthetic. All our judgments can therefore be divided into theoretic, aesthetical and practical judgments in accordance with the order of the superior faculties of knowledge. Under aesthetic judgments are understood only the judgments of reflection, which alone are related to a principle of Judgment as a superior faculty of knowledge. Aesthetic judgments of sense, on the contrary, deal immediately with only the relation of representations to inner sense so far as the latter is feeling.

OBSERVATION

Here, it is particularly necessary to examine the account of pleasure as the sensible representation of the perfection of an object. According to that

explanation, an aesthetic judgment of sense or of reflection would always be a cognitive judgment on the object, for perfection is a determination which presupposes a concept of the object. Through it, therefore, the judgment which attributes perfection to an object is in no way distinguished from other logical judgments, as it is sometimes assumed to be through the confusion which attaches to the concept. This concept (of perfection), sought to be regarded as sensible, can never constitute any specific difference among the judgments. If this were not so, an endless series of judgments, not only of the Understanding but of Reason as well, would also have to be called aesthetic. In them also, an object is determined through a concept that is unclear, e.g. in judgments of right and wrong. Few people indeed, including philosophers, have a clear conception of what is right.* A sensible representation

It may be generally said that things, which change into one another through the mere increase or decrease in the degree of a quality (common to them), can never be regarded as specifically different on that account. The difference between clearness and confusion of concepts is realised only at the level of consciousness of distinctions according to the degree of attention directed towards them. Till then, one kind of representation is not specifically distinguished from the other. Intuitions and concepts are, however, distinguished from one another specifically. They do not pass into one another, whether we become more or less clearly aware of them and their characteristics. Even the greatest unclarity of a representation through concepts (e.g. that of right) leaves untouched its specific difference in respect of origin

of perfection is a contradiction in terms. If the coherence of the manifold is to be called perfection, it must be presented through a concept, as it cannot otherwise claim that title. • Let us assume that pleasure and pain are nothing but pure cognitions of things through the Understanding, though they appear to be mere sensations to us. (Only, the Understanding is not conscious of its own concepts here.) The discernment of things through these must then be called, not aesthetic (*i.e.* sensible), but always intellectual. Sense would not, then, be fundamentally anything but a judging Understanding, even if without any adequate consciousness of its own activities. The aesthetic representation would not be specifically different from the logical, and the difference of nomenclature would be quite useless, since it would be impossible to draw the line of demarcation between the two at any determinate place. (Nothing is here said of this kind of mystical representation of the things of the world, for it admits of no sensible intuitions distinct from concepts in general, and nothing but an intuitive Understanding could be recognised by it.)

in the Understanding. Similarly, the greatest clarity of an intuition does not in any way bring it nearer to the first, because of its origin in the sensible faculty. Besides, logical clarity is entirely different from aesthetic clarity. The latter is possible even though we do not cognise the object through concepts at all, *i.e.* although the representation as an intuition is sensible.

It may still be asked : Does not our concept of the finality of nature mean exactly the same thing as the concept of perfection ? Some have sought to explain pleasure in general as the sensible intuition of perfection ; is not therefore the empirical consciousness of subjective finality, or the feeling of pleasure with certain objects, identical with this ?

I would reply : Perfection as the mere completeness of the many, so far as they together constitute a unity, is an ontological concept and has nothing to do with the feeling of pleasure and pain. This concept is identical with that of the totality (allness) of a complex, through the co-ordination of the manifold in an aggregate, or through their lineal subordination to one another as ground and consequent. The perfection of a thing, in the reference of its manifold to its own concept, is merely formal. When I, however, speak of perfection (of which many instances may be attributed to a thing under that very concept), there always lies at the basis the concept of something as an end. To this is applied the ontological concept of the combination of the manifold into a unity. This end need not always be a practical end which presupposes or contains pleasure at the existence of the object : it may also belong to the technique. It therefore concerns merely the possibility of things and is the conformity to law of a combination of the manifold which is in

itself accidental. The uniformity which is thought of as necessary to the possibility of a regular hexagon may serve as an example. It is entirely contingent that six equal lines on a plane should meet in obviously equal angles. It is therefore thought that this connection according to law presupposes a concept which is the principle of its possibility. Similarly, the objective finality observed in things of nature, specially in organic beings, is regarded as material and objective, and necessarily leads to the concept of a goal of nature, whether actual or falsely ascribed. It is in relation to this that we attribute perfection to things as well. The judgment on it is called teleological and, like the judgment of mere causal connection, carries no feeling of pleasure with it.

The concept of perfection as objective finality and the feeling of pleasure are therefore not connected in any way. A concept of the object necessarily belongs to a judgment of the former, but is not necessary at all to a judgment through the feeling of pleasure. This is possible through mere empirical intuition. The representation of the subjective finality of an object is, on the contrary, wholly identical with the feeling of pleasure and does not require that even an abstract concept of purposive connection should belong to it. The difference between these two kinds (of judgment) is very great. To decide whether the subjectively purposive is also purposive

objectively requires a many-sided and extensive investigation, not only of practical philosophy, but also of technique, of nature as well as of art. In other words, Reason is required to see perfection in a thing, and pure Sense to find acceptability. To find beauty in it, nothing is required but mere reflection without concepts on a given representation.

The faculty of aesthetic reflection therefore judges only about the subjective finality of the object, not about its perfection. The question is, whether it does so only by means of the pleasure or pain engendered thus, or directly through the finality itself, so that the judgment at the same time determines that pleasure or pain must be connected with the representation of the object.

This question, as already indicated, does not yet allow of a satisfactory solution. The exposition of this kind of judgments in the body of the discourse must for the first time decide whether they possess a universality and necessity qualifying them for derivation from an a-priori ground of determination. In that case, the judgment would indeed determine through the sensation of pleasure or pain, but it would also at the same time determine a priori, through the cognitive faculty, in particular through Judgment, the universality of the rule of its connection with a given representation. On the contrary, this judgment may, like the aesthetic judgment of sense, which

is a judgment neither of knowledge nor of reflection, contain nothing but the relation of the representation to feeling without the mediation of a principle of cognition. In that case, all aesthetic judgments would belong to the purely empirical sphere.

Provisionally, it can then be said that there is no passage from cognitions to the feeling of pleasure and pain through the concept of objects, so far as these concepts must stand in relation to the former. There can therefore be no hope of determining a priori, as we did in the Critique of Practical Reason, the influence which a given representation produces on the mind. There we observed, as a law contained and contained a priori in our moral judgments, that the representation of the universal law-abidingness of the will must at the same time determine the will and also evoke thereby the feeling of reverence. We could not, however, derive this feeling from concepts. The aesthetic judgment of reflection will, in a similar manner, display to us on analysis the concept of a formal but subjective finality of the object, a concept contained in the judgment itself and resting upon a principle a priori. Fundamentally, this is identical with the feeling of pleasure, but cannot be derived from any concept. The faculty of representation nevertheless refers to this possibility when it affects the mind in reflection on an object.

A general account of this feeling, without marking the distinction as to whether it accompanies sensible perception, or reflection, or the determination of the will, must be transcendental.* It

* If there is reason to suppose that concepts, which are used as empirical principles, are related to the faculty of pure cognition a priori, it is useful to seek for them a transcendental definition. In that case, one proceeds like the mathematician, who keeps the empirical data of his problem undetermined and brings only their pure synthesis under the formulae of pure arithmetic. In this way, he greatly facilitates the solution of his problem. The following objection has, however, been raised against me for a similar explanation of the faculty of desire (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Foreword, page 16). The argument runs thus: It is admitted that mere wishes cannot bring their objects into being, but they also are desires. The faculty of desire cannot therefore be defined as the faculty which through its representations is the cause of the actuality of the objects of these representations. This objection, however, does nothing more than indicate that there may also be determinations of the faculty of desire where it stands in contradiction to itself. For empirical psychology, this is indeed a phenomenon worth noticing, as it is for logic to notice the influence which prejudices have upon the Understanding. This must not, however, have any influence on the definition of the faculty of desire treated objectively, *viz.*, what it is in itself, before it is diverted from its determination in any way. In fact, a man can desire something intensely and continuously, even though he is convinced that he cannot attain it or that it is almost impossible of attainment. He can, *e.g.*, unwish the fact or desire wistfully for the quicker passage of time unpleasant to him. It is also an important task of morality to warn emphatically against such empty and phantastic desires, which are nourished, often through romances, and sometimes also through similar mystical representations of superhuman perfection and fanatical bliss. Take, however, the effects which such empty appetites and longings have upon the mind. They dilate the heart and wither it up, and cause the mind to languish through the exhaustion of its powers. These effects themselves prove sufficiently that such desires, to make objects actual through their representation, are in fact exerted contradictorily, and frequently, the

can run thus : Pleasure is a state of the mind in which a representation agrees with itself. This serves as the ground of, either, merely maintaining itself, since the state in which the powers of the mind necessarily imply one another in a representation maintains itself, or alternatively, as the ground of producing its object. If it be the first, then the judgment upon the given representation is an aesthetic judgment of reflection. If, however, it be the latter, it is a pathological or practical aesthetic judgment. It is now readily seen that pleasure and pain, since they are not cognitions, cannot as such be explained in any way : they demand to be felt, not conceived. They can therefore at best be inadequately explained only through the influence which a representation has upon the activity of the powers of the mind by means of this feeling.

mind, in the consciousness of its incapacity lets them sink back. These empty wishes and longings play a very great part in human lives, and for anthropology, it is an important task to enquire why nature has put in us the disposition to such fruitless expenditure of power. To me it appears that, here as everywhere else, nature has ordered its arrangements wisely. For, if the representation of the object never determined us to the expenditure of energy till we had first assured ourselves of the adequacy of our power to produce it, the greater portion of our energy would have remained unutilised. For we generally learn to know our powers only so far as we try them. Nature has therefore related the determination of energy to the representation of the object prior to the knowledge of our capacity. Indeed, the capacity is itself often first called into being through this very striving, though at the outset it might have appeared as an empty wish even to the mind. Wisdom lies in setting limits to this instinct, but it will never succeed in extirpating it, nor even desire to do so.

IX

ON JUDGING TELEOLOGICALLY

By a formal technique of nature, I understand its finality in intuition. By a real technique, however, I understand its uniformity according to concepts. The former gives to Judgment uniform configurations, *i.e.*, forms. In such presentations Imagination and Understanding agree with one another mutually and spontaneously for the possibility of a concept. The second implies the concept of things as ends of nature, *i.e.* as such that their inner possibility presupposes an end, and consequently a concept, which lies at the basis as the condition of the causality of their production.

If Judgment finds for comprehension such intuitions as present themselves for the representation of a concept, it can itself yield and construct a priori purposive forms of intuition. But ends are representations which are themselves regarded as conditions of the causality of their objects as effects. They must always be given from some other source, before Judgment, in order to conform to them, concerns itself with the conditions of the manifold. Should these ends be ends of nature, it must be possible to regard certain natural things *as if* they are the products of a cause, whose causality can be determined only through the

representation of the object. We cannot, however, determine a priori how and in what different manner things are possible through their causes. Empirical laws are required for this.

Where uniformity of natural things is treated as the ground of their possibility as ends of nature, the judgment on this uniformity is called a teleological judgment. Even if aesthetic judgments are not themselves possible a priori, principles a priori are given in the necessary idea of experience as a system. These principles contain the concept of a formal finality of nature for our Judgment. From them is derived a priori the possibility of aesthetic judgments of reflection as grounded on principles a priori. Nature conforms in a necessary manner, not only to our Understanding in respect of its transcendental laws, but also in its empirical laws with our Judgment and its capacity of representing them in an empirical comprehension of their forms through Imagination. This nature does solely on behalf of experience, where the formal conformity of these laws in respect of the latter agreement, *i.e.*, that with Judgment, is demonstrated as necessary. Nature in its causality, as object of teleological estimation, should, however, be regarded as agreeing with Reason as well, according to the concept of an end which it makes for itself. This is more than Judgment by itself can ever be disposed to do. Judgment can indeed contain characteristic principles a priori for

the form of intuitions, but not for the concept of the production of things. Thus, the concept of a real end of nature lies completely beyond the scope of Judgment; when it is taken by itself alone. As a distinct power of cognition, Judgment considers only two faculties in relation, *viz.* Imagination and Understanding, in a presentation given before all concepts. It thereby observes, in its comprehension of the object through Imagination, its (*i.e.* the object's) subjective finality for the cognitive faculties. The teleological finality of things as ends of nature can, however, be represented only through concepts. In this case, therefore, Judgment, in order to explain things as ends of nature, would have to place Understanding in relation with Reason, which is not generally required for experience.

The aesthetic estimation of the forms of nature was able to find finality in certain phenomenal objects of nature in the merely empirical apprehension of the intuition without any underlying concept of the object, *viz.* merely in relation with the subjective conditions of Judgment. Aesthetic estimation did not therefore require a concept of the object, nor did it bring any forward. It therefore explained their finality as purposive only in subjective relation to the faculty of presentation, not as ends of nature in an objective judgment. This finality of forms may be called figurative, and in respect of it, the technique

of nature may also be named in the same way.

The teleological judgment, on the other hand, presupposes a concept of the object and asserts its possibility according to a law of the connection of causes and effects. This technique of nature could therefore be called plastic, if the word had not been already brought into vogue in a more general sense, *viz.* for natural beauty as well as for views of nature. If desired, it may therefore be called the organic technique of nature, an expression which also denotes the concept of finality, not merely for the faculty of representation, but for the possibility of the object itself.

The most important and essential of proofs for this number is however this: The concept of enduring objects in nature is a concept belonging to Judgment, and not to Understanding or Reason. This concept is abstracted from nature according to general mechanical laws by the teleological estimation of the objects. In other words, though the concept of an end of nature could also be used with objective meaning as the intention of nature, such a use, as already argued, could never be grounded on experience. Experience lays down ends no doubt, but it can never prove that the ends are at the same time intentions. Consequently, what is found here as belonging to teleology is contained entirely in the relation of its objects to Judgment, and indeed to a fundamental

principle of Judgment, through which it legislates for itself, but not for nature, namely as reflective Judgment.

The concept of end and finality is a concept of Reason, in so far as it is laid at the basis of the possibility of an object. But finality of nature, or the concept of things as ends of nature, establishes a causal relation between these things and Reason. The knowledge of this relation is not obtained through experience as the ground of its possibility. It is only in the case of products of art that we can be conscious of the causality of Reason for objects. These are therefore called purposive or ends. To call Reason technical in respect of these is appropriate to the experience of the causality of our own characteristic powers. But to conceive of nature itself as technical like Reason, and thus to ascribe to nature finality and even ends, is a strange concept which we cannot come across in experience. It is laid down by Judgment in its reflection over objects in order to arrange experience according to particular laws, viz. those of the possibility of a system.

All conformity of nature may therefore be regarded either as natural (*forma finalis naturae spontanea*), or as intentional (*intentionalis*). Mere experience entitles us only to the first kind of representation. The second is a hypothetical explanation which is attained through the concept of things as ends of nature. The former concept

of things, *viz.* as ends of nature, belongs by origin to reflective Judgment, though it is not the aesthetic, but the logical reflective Judgment. The second belongs to determinant Judgment. Reason also is required for the first, but only on behalf of an experience arranged according to principles. Consequently, it is Reason in its immanent use. For the second, we require Reason in its transcendental use, losing itself in the supernatural.

We can and ought to strive, so far as it lies in our power, to investigate nature in its causal relations according to the mere mechanical laws found in experience. The real basis of physical explanation lies in them, and their coherence constitutes the scientific knowledge of nature through Reason. Among the products of nature, however, we find distinct and very extended species. They contain in themselves such a connection of efficient causes that we must lay the concept of an end at the basis, if we want merely to arrange experience, *i.e.* observations according to a principle appropriate to its inner possibility. If we wanted to estimate the form and its possibility merely according to mechanical laws,—laws in which the idea of the effect must be taken to be, not the ground of the possibility of its cause, but rather the contrary,—it would then be impossible to acquire any concept of experience from the specific forms of these natural things ; we mean a concept which would enable us to derive the effects from the inner

constitution of these forms as causes. For the parts of these mechanisms cause the effects visible in them only so far as they have a common ground of their possibility, not so far as each has its own distinct ground. It is quite contrary to the nature of physical mechanical causes that the whole should be the ground of the possibility of the causality of the parts. Rather must the parts be given first in order to understand the possibility of a whole built out of them. Further, the distinctive representation of a whole, which precedes the possibility of the parts, is a mere idea. When regarded as the ground of the causality, it is called the end. It is therefore clear that if there be similar products of nature, it would be impossible to investigate their constitution and their causes in mere experience, without representing them as determined in their form and causality according to a principle of ends. Much less possible would it be to explain them through Reason.

It is now clear that in such cases the concept of an objective finality of nature serves only for reflection over the object, but not for its determination through the concept of an end. It is also clear that the teleological judgment on the inner possibility of a product of nature is a mere reflective, not a determinant, judgment. It is, e.g., said that the crystal lens in the eye, through a second refraction of the rays of light, serves the

end of effecting the re-union of light-rays scattering from a single point back again in a point on the retina of the eye. This only means that in the production of the eye, we must think of the representation of an end in the causality of nature. This is done because the idea serves as a principle to lead through it to the investigation of the eye, so far as concerns the said fragment. At the same time, it also serves as a means which could be imagined for promoting that effect. Through this, we do not, however, attribute to nature an intentional and efficient causality acting according to the representation of an end. This would have been a determinant teleological judgment, and as such, transcendent, as it would introduce a causality which lies beyond the boundaries of nature.

The concept of the end of nature is therefore solely a concept of reflective Judgment for its own characteristic work, *viz.* to trace the causal relations of objects of experience. A teleological principle of explanation of the inner possibility of certain forms of nature leaves it undetermined as to whether the finality is intentional or not. The judgment which affirmed one of the two alternatives would be determinant and not merely reflective. The concept of the end of nature would also then no longer be a mere concept of Judgment for immanent empirical use. It would be connected with Reason's concept of a purposively working cause set over nature. Whether we affirmed or denied such a concept, its use would be transcendent.

X

OF THE SEARCH FOR A PRINCIPLE OF TECHNICAL JUDGMENT

If what is sought is only the ground of explanation of what happens, this may be, either, an empirical principle, or a principle a priori, or a combination of the two. This can be seen in the physico-mechanical explanation of events in the material world, which have their principles partly in the general (rational) science of nature and partly in that which contains the laws of empirical movement. The same thing holds if psychological grounds of explanation are sought for what happens in our minds. The only distinction is that, so far as is known to me, its principles are altogether empirical, excepting the one single principle of the continuity of all change. This principle lies a priori at the basis of these perceptions, because time, which has only one dimension, is the formal condition of all inner intuitions. From the point of view of explanation, however, this principle is hardly of any use, because the general doctrine of time does not, like that of pure space (Geometry), yield sufficient material for a complete science.

If it therefore comes to explaining how, what we call taste first emerged among men, why it

applies more to some objects than to others, why the judgment of beauty has been wanting in development under some conditions of place and society, through what causes it has been able to develop into luxury and so on, the principles of such explanation must for the major part be sought in psychology, which always means empirical psychology in such cases. Thus, the teachers of morality demand that the psychologist should explain to them the strange phenomenon of avarice, which sets an absolute value to the mere possession of the means of comfort (or of any other end), though it is never intended to make any use of the means; or of ambition, which hopes to find this value in mere fame without any further purpose. They want this information so that they can adjust their instructions accordingly. This does not refer to their instruction of the law of morality itself, but to that for the removal of hindrances which are opposed to its influence. It must, however, be admitted that, in comparison with physical, we are but scantily furnished with psychological explanations, which, moreover, are hypothetical to the very end. Besides, to three different grounds of explanation, an equally plausible fourth can be readily invented. Thus, there are hundreds of sham psychologists of this kind, who profess to know how to specify the cause of each affection or movement of the mind occasioned by plays, poetic representations and

natural objects. They give the name philosophy to this play of their wit. They nevertheless appear to lack, not merely the knowledge to explain scientifically the commonest natural events in the material world, but also perhaps the capacity itself for such knowledge. Empirical psychology will hardly ever be able to claim the rank of a philosophical science. It has, perhaps, only one real obligation, *viz.* to observe psychologically, like Burke in his *Essay on the Beautiful and the Sublime*, and thus collect material, without pretending to apprehend it as yet, for the future systematic connection of the rules of experience.

Take, however, a judgment that sets itself up as universally valid, and consequently claims necessity for its assertion. This alleged necessity may rest on the concept of the object a priori, or on the subjective conditions which lie a priori at the basis of the concept. It would then be absurd, if the claim of the judgment be conceded, to vindicate it through a psychological explanation of its origin. For this would be to act against one's own purpose, and the successful completion of the required explanation would prove that the judgment can make absolutely no claim to necessity, and precisely because its empirical origin can be pointed out.

Aesthetic judgments of reflection, which we will presently analyse under the name of judgments of taste, are of the above kind. They claim

necessity, for they do not say, this is how men *do* judge, but rather this is how men *should* judge. The former would have made them a problem for empirical psychology to explain, but the latter indicates that they have for themselves a principle a priori. Suppose that the relation to such a principle is not contained in these judgments. Since they claim necessity, it would therefore have to be admitted that universal validity in a judgment can be logically deduced from the fact of general validity as proved by empirical observation. Conversely, from the fact that every man *judges* in a certain manner, it would follow that he *ought* so to judge, which is an obvious absurdity.

Aesthetic judgments of reflection are thus faced with the difficulty that, they can on no account be based on concepts nor derived from any determinate principles; for in that case they would become logical. The subjective representation of conformity need not, however, be the concept of an end. The relation to a principle a priori can, and must, however, obtain wherever the judgment claims necessity. We are discussing here such judgments and the possibility of such a claim, for it is just through this claim that a Critique of Reason to enquire after the basic though undefined principles themselves is suggested. The Critique may also succeed in discovering and recognising it as the principle which lies at the basis of the

judgment subjectively and a priori, though it can never supply a determinate concept of objects.

* . * * *

Similarly, it must be admitted that the teleological judgment is based upon a principle a priori and is impossible without such a principle. Yet, it is solely through experience that we discover the ends of nature expressed through such judgments, and without it, could not have known that such things are even possible. The teleological judgment places a determinate concept of an end at the basis of the possibility of certain products of nature and connects this concept with the representation of the object, but it is nevertheless, like the former, merely a judgment of reflection. It does not at all claim to assert that, in this objective conformity, nature (or through it, some other being) proceeds purposively in fact, *i.e.*, the concept of an end determines the causality of it itself or its causes. Rather does it assert that we must employ the mechanical laws of nature only according to this analogy, *viz.*, the relation of cause and effect, in order to recognise the possibility of such objects and acquire a concept which can account for their cohesion in a systematically proceeding experience.

A teleological judgment compares the concept of a product of nature in respect of what it is with

what it *ought to be*. A concept of the end, which precedes it a priori, is placed at the basis of the judgment of its possibility. There is no difficulty in representing the possibility of works of art in this way. But to think of a product of nature that it *ought* to be something and to judge of it accordingly, as if it were also *actually* so, is a different matter. This contains the presupposition of a principle which cannot be derived from experience, for experience only teaches us what things actually *are*.

That our eyes enable us to see is a fact of immediate experience. We also know by direct experience their external and internal structure. This structure contains the conditions of their possible use and therefore their causality according to mechanical laws. I can also use a stone, either to break something to pieces against it, or to build something upon it and so on. These effects may be referred to their causes as ends, but I cannot therefore say that the stone ought to have been used for construction. It is only of the eye that I judge that it ought to have been suitable for vision. The figure and constitution of all its parts, discerned according to merely empirical laws, is no doubt wholly contingent for my Judgment. I nevertheless think of the necessity to be organised in a certain way as inherent in its form and construction, *viz.* according to a concept which precedes the efficient causes of this organ. Without

this concept, the possibility of this product of nature is not intelligible to me through any mechanical laws of nature, which is not the case with regard to the stone. This *ought* includes a necessity which clearly distinguishes itself from the physico-mechanical necessity, according to which a thing is possible through mere laws of efficient causes without a precedent idea of the thing. This necessity can be as little determined through merely physical (empirical) laws as the necessity of the aesthetic judgment can be through psychological laws. Rather does it require a special principle a priori in judgment in so far as this faculty is reflective. The teleological judgment stands under this principle and must also be determined by it in respect of its validity and its limitation.

All judgments of the finality of nature, be they aesthetic or teleological, therefore stand under principles a priori. Since they are merely reflective and not determinant judgments, these principles belong essentially and exclusively to Judgment. Precisely because of this, they also belong to the Critique of Pure Reason, taken in the most general sense. The determinant judgments are indeed more in need of the critique than the reflective, because they (*i.e.* the determinant), if left to themselves, tempt Reason to conclusions which can get lost in extravagant enthusiasm. In place of

that, the reflective judgments demand a laborious investigation in order to guard against their being wholly limited to the empirical in respect of their principles, and thus destroying their claim to universal validity.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC INTRODUCTION TO THE CRITIQUE
OF JUDGMENT IN THE SYSTEM OF THE CRITIQUE
OF PURE REASON

An introduction to a discourse is either that to a proposed doctrine, or to the doctrine itself as part of the system to which it belongs. The former precedes the doctrine, while the latter should properly constitute only its conclusions and determine according to principles its position among the contents of the teaching to which it is united through common laws. The former is a propaedeutic, while the latter may be called an encyclopaedic introduction.

The propaedeutic introductions are the usual ones. As preparatory to a proposed doctrine, they derive the necessary preliminary knowledge from some other already known doctrine or science in order to make the transition possible. If used for distinguishing carefully the special principles (*domestica*) of the newly developed doctrine from those which belong to others (*peregrinis*), they serve to determine the boundaries of the sciences. This is a precaution which cannot be praised too highly, because without it, there is no hope of thoroughness; and especially in philosophic knowledge.

An encyclopaedic introduction, however, does not presuppose some related and preparatory teaching leading up to its new doctrine; it presupposes the idea of a system which is for the first time realised through it. Such a system is not possible through the haphazard collection and combination of the manifold acquired in the process of (empirical) investigation. If, through the formal concept of a whole, which likewise contains a priori the principle of a complete division within itself, one is in a position to specify completely the subjective and the objective sources of a given kind of cognitions, then and then alone is such a system possible. It can now be easily understood why encyclopaedic introductions, however useful they might be, are so rare.

Judgment, of which the characteristic principle is to be sought out and examined here, is a strange faculty, for it does not yield any knowledge, whether practical or theoretical. Notwithstanding its principle a priori, it contributes no special section to transcendental philosophy as objective doctrine. It rather constitutes only the connection between the other two superior cognitive faculties, *viz.*, Understanding and Reason. In the determination of the principles of such a faculty, yielding only a critique and no doctrine, I may therefore be allowed to deviate from the order necessary everywhere else, and present beforehand a short encyclopaedic introduction to it. This would

belong, not indeed to the system of the sciences of pure Reason, but merely to the critique of all the faculties of the mind determinable a priori, so far as they constitute a system. In this way, the propaedeutic introduction would be united with the encyclopaedic.

The introduction of Judgment into the system of the pure faculties of knowledge through concepts depends entirely on the transcendental principle characteristic of it. It is the principle that in the specification of the transcendental laws of the Understanding (principles of the possibility of nature), *i.e.*, in the manifoldness of its empirical laws, nature proceeds according to the idea of a system of its divisions, in order to make experience as an empirical system possible. This yields for the first time the concept of an objectively contingent, but for our faculty of knowledge subjectively necessary conformity to law, *i.e.*, a finality of nature and indeed a priori. Though the conformity of particular forms of nature must always be given empirically, and this principle determines nothing with regard to them, yet the judgment upon these forms acquires a claim to universal validity and necessity. As mere reflective judgment, it does this through the relation of the subjective conformity of the given representations for Judgment to the principle a priori of Judgment, *viz.*, the principle of the finality of nature in its general conformity to empirical laws.

Thus, an aesthetic judgment of reflection, although it is not determinant, can be seen to rest upon a principle a priori. Judgment also is thus entitled to a place in the critique of the superior faculties of pure knowledge.

The concept of a finality of nature, as a technical conformity which is essentially distinct from practical conformity, is a concept distinguished from all dogmatic philosophies, whether theoretical or practical. This it must be, if it is not to be a merely surreptitious assumption of what we make of it for what it actually is. It is based on that principle of Judgment which precedes the empirical laws and makes their cohesion in the unity of a system first possible. It is therefore seen that, of the two kinds of employment of the faculty of reflective judgment, *viz.*, aesthetic and teleological, only the former has its ground of determination in Judgment unmixed with any other faculty of knowledge. This is the aesthetic judgment of reflection which precedes all concepts of objects. The teleological judgment, on the contrary, is not possible except through the union of Reason with empirical concepts, though it is true that in the judgment itself, the concept of a goal of nature is used as the principle of reflective, not of determinant Judgment. The possibility of a teleological judgment of nature, since it follows only the principles of Reason, is therefore easily seen and

demands no special principle of Judgment. The possibility, on the other hand, of an aesthetic judgment of pure reflection, which is nevertheless based on a principle a priori, *i.e.*, of a judgment of taste, demands a Critique of Judgment as a faculty with characteristic transcendental principles like Understanding and Reason. For this, it is, however, necessary to prove that such a judgment is really entitled to claim universal validity, but this is enough to qualify it for inclusion in the system of the faculties of pure knowledge. The ground for this is that the aesthetic judgment does not presuppose a concept of its object, and yet attributes to it finality and that universally. The principle for doing so must therefore lie in Judgment itself. The teleological judgment, on the contrary, presupposes a concept of the object which is brought under the principle of purposive relation by Reason. This concept of an end of nature is, however, used by Judgment in reflective judgments alone, not in determinant ones.

It is therefore in taste alone, (and that, even in respect of objects of nature), that Judgment manifests itself as a faculty with its own characteristic principles. It thus makes a well-grounded, though perhaps unexpected, claim to a place in the general critique of the superior cognitive faculties. If, however, Judgment's competence to give itself

principles a priori be once admitted, it becomes necessary to determine also its extent. For this completion of the critique, it is necessary that its aesthetic and its teleological powers should be recognised as contained in one faculty and based upon the same principle. For the teleological judgment on things of nature, equally with the aesthetic judgment, belongs to Judgment in its reflective, not in its determinant aspect.

The Critique of Taste is generally used only for the improvement or establishment of taste itself. If, however, it is treated with a transcendental purpose, it reveals, through the fact that it fills up a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties, an astonishing, and it seems to me, an extremely promising prospect of a complete system of all the faculties of the mind. This it does so far as these are related in their determination, not only to the sensible but also to the transcendental, without however removing the limitation set for itself by a rigorous critique of the latter employment. It may, perhaps, be of use to the reader, and enable him to survey the more easily the cohesion of the following investigations, if I sketch out here an abstract of their systematic connection. It is, however, true that as the actual whole number, this should have its proper place only at the conclusion of the treatment.

The faculties of the mind can all be traced back to the following three :

- The faculty of knowledge
- The feeling of pleasure and pain
- The faculty of desire

The faculty of knowledge makes possible the exercise of the others. This need not, however, always be knowledge, for a representation belonging to the faculty of knowledge may also be an intuition, pure or empirical, without any concept. So far as the discourse is of the faculty of knowledge according to principles, the following functions are therefore found to be related to the general faculties of the mind :

The faculty of knowledge	...	Understanding
The feeling of pleasure and pain	...	Judgment
The faculty of desire	...	Reason

It is seen that Understanding contains characteristic principles a priori only for the faculty of knowledge, Judgment only for the feeling of pleasure and pain, and Reason only for the faculty of desire. These formal principles establish a necessity which is partly subjective and partly objective, and partly, because it is subjective, at the same time also of objective validity. Accordingly, they determine, through their respective superior

functions, the corresponding faculties of the mind :

The faculty of knowledge.	Understanding	...	Conformity to law.
The feeling of pleasure and pain.	Judgment	...	Purposiveness.
The faculty of desire.	Reason	...	Purposiveness, which is also Law : Obligation.

Finally, the following associate themselves as products to the already specified grounds a priori of the possibility of forms :

Power of the mind.	Superior faculty of knowledge.	Principle a priori.	Product.
The faculty of knowledge.	Understanding	Conformity to Law.	Nature.
The feeling of pleasure and pain.	Judgment	Purposiveness.	Art.
The faculty of desire.	Reason	Obligation	Morality.

Nature therefore bases its conformity to law on the principles a priori of Understanding as a cognitive faculty. Art is guided in its finality a priori by Judgment in relation to the feeling of pleasure and pain. Finally, as the product of freedom, morality stands under the idea of such a form of purposiveness as qualifies itself to be a universal law, as a ground of determination of

Reason in respect of the faculty of desire. The judgments which thus originate out of the principles a priori, characteristic of each of the fundamental powers of the mind, are the theoretical, the aesthetic and the practical judgments.

Thus is revealed a system of the faculties of the mind in their relation to nature and freedom, each of which has its characteristic determining principles a priori. The two parts, theoretical and practical, of philosophy as a system of doctrines are thus constituted. There is also revealed at the same time a passage by means of Judgment which connects the two parts through a characteristic principle, namely the passage from the sensible substratum of the first to the intelligible substratum of the second philosophy through the Critique of Judgment. This faculty serves merely to connect these two spheres. It cannot therefore contribute any knowledge by itself, nor supply any part of the doctrine of philosophy. The principles of its judgments are merely subjective, because these judgments are distinguished from all those judgments, theoretical or practical, which, as logical, must have objective principles. Its judgments are therefore called aesthetic, and are of such a peculiar kind that they relate sensible intuitions to an idea of nature, and yet nature's conformity to law cannot be understood without a relation of these to a transcendental substratum. The demonstration of this will be given in the book itself.

In respect of the first kind of judgments, we shall call the critique of this faculty, not Aesthetic, (*i.e.*, the science of sensibility), but the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. The first expression is of too wide a significance, for it could also mean the sensible character of intuition, which belongs to theoretical cognition and supplies the stuff to logical objective judgments. We have therefore already determined the term, Aesthetic, exclusively for the predicate, which in judgments of cognition belongs to intuition. No ground of misunderstanding is, however, left, if Judgment is named aesthetic for the reason that it does not relate the representation of an object to concepts nor therefore the judgment to cognition; in other words, if Judgment is not determinant but merely reflective. For Judgment in its logical aspect, intuitions, though they may be sensible (aesthetic), must first be raised to concepts, in order to serve for the cognition of objects. This is not so with aesthetic Judgment.

XII

DIVISIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT

The demarcation of the sphere of cognitions of a certain kind, in order to demonstrate it as a system, has in it an importance not sufficiently recognised, but is also of a difficulty not often appreciated. If the parts of such a possible whole are found to be given in their completeness, the division appears mechanical and in virtue of mere comparison, while the whole is seen to be a mere aggregate. Towns, for example, tend to become such aggregates, if, without the supervision of the police, a plot of land is divided among a number of builders, each working for himself according to his own opinions. If, however, the idea of a whole according to a certain principle can and ought to be presupposed before the determination of the parts, the division must then take place in a scientific manner. Only in such a case can the whole be a system. The latter requirement is satisfied in all cases where the discourse is about a sphere of cognitions a priori which, with its principles, rests upon a (particular) specific legislative faculty of the subject. In these cases, the sphere of the use of these principles is determined a priori through the specific constitution of the faculty itself. The number and the relations

of the parts to a totality of cognitions are also simultaneously determined. No well-grounded division can, however, be made without at the same time constituting the whole itself, and conceiving it beforehand in all its parts, although this may be done only according to the rules of the Critique. To bring this then into the systematic form of a doctrine requires nothing but minuteness of attention to the particulars and elegance of precision in combining them. This holds only so far as such doctrines are generally possible in respect of the nature of this cognitive faculty.

Now, Judgment is a faculty which can never supply the material for a doctrine, although it is based on principles a priori. To divide a Critique of Judgment into its parts, the basis of distinction must therefore be the fact that reflective Judgment alone, and not the determinant, has proper principles a priori ; that the latter (determinant Judgment) proceeds only schematically under the laws of a different faculty, *viz.* Understanding while the former proceeds technically according to its own laws alone ; and further, that a principle of the technique of nature, and consequently the concept of a finality which must be presupposed for it a priori, lie at the basis of the former procedure. This finality is, indeed, according to the principles of reflective Judgment, presupposed only as subjective, *i.e.*, relative to the faculty

itself as necessary for it. However, it also leads by itself to the concept of a possible objective finality, *i.e.*, the conformity to law of natural objects as ends of nature.

The relation to the feeling of pleasure and pain is a finality which is judged to be merely subjective. This finality does not therefore base itself on a concept, nor can it do so as far as it is judged merely subjectively. The judgment over this is aesthetic and is indeed the only instance where it is possible to judge aesthetically. If this feeling accompanies only the sensible representation of the object, *i.e.*, its sensation, the aesthetic judgment is empirical and requires a special receptivity indeed, but no special Judgment. Further, if this feeling is taken to be determinant, a concept of the end must lie at its basis, and consequently, the conformity would have to be judged as objective, not aesthetically but logically. The feeling of pleasure, which is identical with the representation of subjective finality, must therefore be regarded as dependent on, and connected by, a principle a priori with aesthetic Judgment in its special capacity as reflective Judgment. This is not the feeling of pleasure as dependent on sensations in an empirical representation, or on the concept of the object. Consequently, it is feeling as dependent on, and connected by a principle a priori only with Reflection and its form, *i.e.*, with the characteristic action of Judgment through

which it rises from empirical intuitions to general concepts. One part of the Critique of this faculty will therefore be employed with the aesthetic or reflective Judgment, while the other part, under the title of Teleology, will be constituted by the Logic of the same faculty. Both, however, regard nature as technical, *i.e.*, as uniform in its products. In the one case, this is done subjectively, in respect of the mere faculty of representation of the subject. In the other case, nature is regarded as objectively final in relation to the possibility of the thing itself. In the sequel, we shall see that the finality of form in the appearance is beauty and the faculty for its estimation is Taste. It would therefore seem to follow that the division of the Critique of Judgment into the aesthetic and the teleological must include in itself only the theory of Taste and the science of physical ends (*i.e.*, the estimation of the things of the world as ends of nature).

All conformity, whether subjective or objective, can however be divided into two types, *viz.*, intrinsic and relative conformity. Of these, the former is grounded in the representation of the object itself, but the latter only in the accidental use of this representation. The form of an object can in itself, *i.e.*, in pure intuition without concept, be first perceived as purposive for reflective Judgment. The subjective conformity is then ascribed to the things and to nature itself. In the

second case, however, the object of Reflection may not be at all suited to the determination of its form by perception. Its representation can, however, base an aesthetic judgment on a conformity, lying a priori in the subject, applied to the stimulation of a feeling of it, (perhaps of the supersensible determination of the mental faculties of the subject). Like the former, this aesthetic judgment relates itself to an a-priori, although only subjective principle. Unlike the former, it depends only on a possible purposive use of certain sensible intuitions according to their form by means of pure reflective Judgment, and not on a finality of nature in respect of the subject. The former judgment ascribes beauty to the objects of nature and the latter sublimity. Both, however, do so through pure aesthetic reflective Judgment, merely in respect of subjective finality without concept of the object. No special technique of nature would therefore be presupposed even for the latter judgment. This judgment exhibits a merely accidental use of the representation, not with a view to the cognition of the object, but on behalf of a different feeling, viz. that of inner finality in the constitution of the faculties of the mind. The judgment over the sublime in nature expresses a similar subjective finality which does not depend on a concept of the object. It also would not therefore be excluded from

the divisions of the Aesthetic of the reflective Judgment.

The position is the same with regard to the objective finality of nature, *i.e.*, the possibility of things as ends of nature. Judgment is passed over them only according to their concepts, *i.e.*, not aesthetically in relation to the feeling of pleasure and pain, but logically. Such judgments are called teleological. The objective finality is laid at the basis of, either the intrinsic possibility of the object, or the relative possibility of its external consequences. In the former case, the teleological judgment deals with the perfection of a thing according to an end which lies in the thing itself. Here, the elements of the object are related to one another as reciprocal means and ends. In the second case, the teleological judgment views an object of nature only in respect of its utility, *viz.* the conformity to an end which lies in another thing.

Accordingly, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment includes, firstly, the Critique of Taste, *i.e.*, the faculty of estimating the beautiful, and secondly, the Critique of Spiritual Feeling (*Geistes-gefuehles*), for this is the name I provisionally give to the faculty of representing sublimity in objects. The teleological Judgment refers its representation of finality to the object, not by means of feeling but through the concept. It therefore needs no special nomenclature for

distinguishing the faculties included in it. These are intrinsic as well as relative, but both are of objective conformity. It refers its reflection entirely to Reason and not to Feeling.

It remains to be noticed that finality is here regarded as a regulative concept of Judgment in respect of the technique of nature, and not that of the causality of the faculty of representation in man. Art (or skill) in the characteristic meaning of the term is the name given to this faculty. Nature itself may be considered as technical or plastic for the sake of an analogy according to which its causality must be represented with that of art. In that case, its procedure may be named technical, *i.e.*, almost artificial. The principle of artistic beauty or of artistic perfection is not, however, sought here. We are concerned here with the principle of pure reflective, not of the determinant Judgment, which lies at the basis of all works of human skill. The finality must therefore be treated by the aesthetic Judgment as unintentional and to be met by it only in nature. The estimation of artistic beauty must then be regarded as mere consequence from the same principles, which lie at the basis of judgment over the beauties of nature.

The Critique of Reflective Judgment in respect of nature is thus constituted out of two parts, *viz.*, the Critique of the aesthetic and that of the

teleological faculty of estimation of the things of nature.

The first part will consist of two books, *viz.*, the Critique of Taste or of the estimation of the beautiful, and the Critique of Spiritual Feeling in pure reflection over an object or of the estimation of the sublime.

Similarly, the second part also contains two books, of which the first will bring under principles the estimation of things as ends of nature in respect of their inner possibility, and the other, the judgments over their relative conformity.

Each of the two books will contain in two divisions an analytic and a dialectic of the faculty of estimation.

The analytic will seek to justify in as many sections, firstly, the exposition, and then, the deduction of the concept of a finality of nature.

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