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Abstract

In this work an effort will be made to show how 'will-generated cognition' (*icchā-prayojya-jñāna*) acts in a philosophical activity. Human being has got autonomy to express something in his own manner. In epistemology, 'desire' has a significant role. An attempt has been in this work to this. The term 'will-generated cognition' means 'cognition generated through the desire of an individual which is not determined by any compulsion'. Our will may have some determinants which may act as promoters to do some activities. At the same time it may be admitted that there are certain philosophical activities which are prompted by the will of an individual having no determinants at all. In this case, an individual's will alone is honoured in getting certain cognition, but not other factors. Sometimes an individual has no alternatives than to desire something in a particular situation, which I would like to call as 'situational will', i.e. will having some determinants. In case of pure 'will-generated cognition' (*icchā-prayojya-jñāna*) philosophical activity starts with the 'pure desire' or 'sweet will'. The role of such will has been admitted in *Navya Nyāya* and other systems of Philosophy.

First, in introduction of my thesis I have stated that the role of desire is of twofold: creative and cognitive. In support of my statement references are given various scriptures like *Upaniṣad*, *Bhagavdgīta*, and writings of Rabindranath Tagore. In *Upaniṣad* it is stated that - "*svābhāvīkijñānavalakriyāca*" i.e. desire is free from any sort of artificial influences outside of it.. The 'creative aspect of desire' is beautifully shown in dance drama '*Tāśerdeśa*' written by Rabindranath Tagore. The 'Cognitive aspect of desire' is described especially in *NavyaNyāya* who admit desire (*icchā*) one of the qualities. The Navya Naiyayikas have developed a systematic language through which philosophical concepts can be analyzed systematically. They accepted after reforming Sanskrit language and this is widely accepted by Advaitins,

Grammarians etc. Doubt has got positive role in philosophical methodology. In *Kathopaniṣad* Naciketā possessed the strong will of knowing self to the great teacher Yama --- which is appreciated. Maitreyī in *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* has expressed her strong will to Yājñavalkya- ‘*yenāhamnāmṛtamsyāmtenāhamkimkuryāma*’ (What can do with that which cannot provide me Immortality?). Swami Vivekananda, in his pre monastic life, asks Ramkrishnadeva “have you seen God?” These questions are prompted by some doubt regarding a particular some object. This sort of curiosity or will to know about the true nature of an object has given a room in philosophical discussion.

Secondly, the second chapter of thesis deals with desire is through which one’s *pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti*, *upekṣa* can be explained. Will has a significant role in case of doubt. This uncertainty of mind can generate a tendency to search for the specific qualities, which can distinguish an object from the other. The search of ‘desire to know’ (*bubhutsā*) the specific feature of a thing is the essential character of philosophizing. In our traditional Indian culture, a desciple’s desire is taken as seed for any academic matter. According to *Bhagavadgītā*, if someone is desirous for knowing, he starts questioning, prostrating and nursing. Desire also has significance in the case of any scientific discovery. In Loss Elamas after seeing the first experimental explosion of an atomic bomb, scientist Oppenheimer was panicked and said: “Good, God, the long-haired boys have lost control” and then he said the verse of ‘*Gītā*’.

In the third chapter it has been discussed Metaphor as will- generated cognition I have shown that such intentional desire is found not only in Navya Nyāya but in addition to this in other traditional treatises like Grammar, *Alaṅkāśāstra*, *Bhaṭṭikāvya* also. The nature of metaphor has been discussed as a will-generated cognition. Just as in the metaphor ‘moon-like face’ (*mukhacandra*), it is known to an individual that face and moon can never be identified yet there is a strong will to identify them, which is called ‘deliberate identification’.

In chapter four some instances of ‘Will-generated Cognition’ in NavyaNyāya school of thought have shown with reasoning. These are the concepts of *Āhāryajñāna*, *Sambandha*, *Pakṣatā*, *Tarka*, *Tātparya* etc. The Navya Nyāya system, which is commonly known as realistic school, has prescribed some methods in order to arrive at certain truth, which is purely

‘deliberate’ (*icchājanya*). Among this *āhārya-jñāna* may serve as a means of knowing something indirectly. A problem may be raised how one can think of ‘knowledge produced through desire’ (*icchājanyajñāna*). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of *āhāryajñāna*. The knowledge, which is produced out of one’s own desire at the time when there is the contrary knowledge, is called *āhāryajñāna (birodha-jnāna-kālīnechhā-prayojya)*.

Apart from these there are a few cases where the knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in case of *pakṣatā* is found, though it is not absolutely necessary for logical point of view. If an individual bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi (siṣādhayiṣāsattve’numitirbhavatyeva)*. It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasaṃplaba* (i.e. capability of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain a single object.

In the conclusive portion of the thesis some evaluative critical remarks have been made regarding the will-generated cognition as mentioned above. The NavyaNaiyāyikas are called as *sambandhī* by the contemporary thinkers on account of the fact that they have put an adequate emphasis on the phenomenon of *sambandha* or relation particularly in the field of philosophical deliberation. Any philosophical analysis is linguistic and hence to establish something with the help of language is to adopt certain relation. Many contradictions involved in linguistic usage can be resolved if some relation is kept in view. It can be said that an individual exists in a room so far as the eastern side of the room is concerned (*pūrvadiśāvachhinna*) while he does not exist in the same room if the space is limited by the northern side of the room is concerned (*uttaradiśāvachhinna*). Our cognition needs such operator like relation to understand the proper meaning of certain expressions. To the Navya Naiyāyikas any standpoint of understanding can be taken as separate relation and hence the relation cannot be *seen* but *realized* through our independent intellect and desire. In order to bring clarity in thought the artificial languages like *pakṣatā*, *āhāryajñāna*, *tarka* etc. have been created by the NavyaNaiyāyikas. Moreover, some of relations admitted by the NavyaNaiyāyikas are related to the indicator dependent on the desire of an individual. In the case of *nirūpya-*

nirūpaka-bhāva relation it is the desire of an individual which indicates what would be determinant (*nirūpaka*) and determined (*nirūpya*) between two relata. A problem may be raised of the following type. Between son and father there is the above-mentioned relation but it is not understood by us what the determinant (*nirūpaka*) and the determined (*nirūpya*) is. It depends on the intention of the speaker leading to no fixed rule in this matter. If an individual thinks the son is the determinant (*nirūpaka*) of the father which is determined (*nirūpya*), it is taken for granted. If the case is otherwise, i.e., father and son are taken as determinant and determined respectively, it is equally acceptable. Such is the case between teacher (*śikṣaka*) and student (*chātra*), preceptor (*guru*) and disciple (*śiṣya*) etc. All these provide us the freedom of expression.