

CHAPTER - II

THE CONCEPT OF SĀMĀNYALAKṢANA PRATYAKṢA

The Definition of Sāmānyalakṣaṇā :

In order to understand the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* we should know what *sāmānya* is. Generally, the *Naiyāyika* holds that *sāmānya* is a class - concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common characteristic of certain individuals which fall under the same class. A *padārtha* which is eternal, one and inhering in many things is called a *sāmānya* or a generic attribute. "*Nityatve sati anekasamavetatvaṁ.*¹ *Nityamekamanekānugataṁ Sāmānyam Tarkasamgraha, Karmādilakṣaṇa prakaraṇam.* Hoernle says, "The universal is a class character which is common to, or identical in, many objects whose membership of the class is thereby determined"^{1.1} The definition of *sāmānya* (*jāti*) or universal is stated in the *Nyāya-sūtra* by Gautama in the following way:

The universal is that entity which creates the concept of identity in our mind".² That is to say, it is the universal by the possession of which different individuals are referred to as belonging to one class. According to *Praśastapāda*, a famous *Vaiśeṣika* thinker, a *padārtha* which is eternal, one and inhering in many things is called a *sāmānya* or generic attribute.³ For example, 'manhood' (*manuṣyatva*) inheres in every individual of the class 'man'.

The word '*lakṣaṇa*' in the word *sāmānyalakṣaṇasannikarṣa* implies two meanings - *svarūpa* and *viṣaya* (object of knowledge). That whose nature is universal is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.⁴ And that which has got *sāmānya* (universal) as an object of knowledge is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. In this sense, it is the knowledge of *sāmānya* (*sāmānyajñāna*) which serves as *pratyāsatti* (contact). When we perceive, with normal contact, a pot present before us, we also perceive all the other pots of all times and spaces through super-normal contact. In such case, there is a relation technically called '*svasamba-ddhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūtadharmavatta*' between our eyes

and all the pots. This *sambandha* (relation) is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*.⁵ Here the word 'sva' means sense-organ i.e. our eyes and any object presented to our eyes, i.e. any 'jar' of this world becomes the qualificand (*viśeṣya*). And the universal 'jarness' (*ghatatva*) has become a qualifier (*prakāribhūta*) in the knowledge of which the object 'jar' which is connected with our sense organ i.e. our eye is a qualificand (*svasambandhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūta*). In this jar (*ghata*) the object 'jar' which is connected with our sense organ i.e. our eye is a qualificand. (*svasambandhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūta*) In this jar (*ghata*) the universal jarness inheres as a qualifier (*prakāribhūta*). In this way, a property of being qualifier (*prakāribhūtadharmā*) is produced in the jar presented to our eyes. Thus, the jar becomes the said *dharmavat* (substratum of a property). In this case *sāmānya* implies not only the universal (*jāti*) but also the qualificand feature of the type mentioned above. Hence, in the case of the perception of a pot, potness (*ghatatva*) is the *sāmānya* (universal) but when the perception of the ground (*bhūtala*) containing a pot occurs in our mind, it is *ghatavattā* (locusness of a pot) or *ghata* (pot) which is the *sāmānya*. If the first definition is accepted, everybody would have knowledge concerning all smoke individuals, through the contact of smokeness which is eternal and inheres in all smoke - individuals. But in practical life this does not happen.^{5.1} So, a different type of definition is being introduced : *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* means the universal which has become a qualifier in the knowledge of which the object connected with sense organ is a qualificand (*Indriyasamvandhaviśeṣyaka*).^{5.2} In the case of the knowledge of a particular manifestation of smoke, the smoke has become a qualificand which is connected with sense organ. In this smoke the universal 'smokeness' inheres as a qualifier (*Prakāribhūta*). All the individual manifestations of smoke existing in past, distant, present and future can be perceived with the help of supernormal connection through smokeness existing in a particular smoke.⁶

But if the characteristic feature of the object related to the organs is regarded as the connection, then after one has mistaken a mass of dust as

smoke, one cannot have the knowledge of all smoke, because here there is no relation between the organs and smokeness. But, according to some Naiyāyikas (e.g., Viśvanātha Nyāyapancānana), though the mass of dust is connected with the organs, there is the knowledge that it is smoke, which has the dust as its object. Smokehood which is a feature in that knowledge is the contact (*sannikarṣa*). So, there is no obstacle of being supernormal perception of all smoke.

At present we have to find that the reality of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as a type of perception depends on the direct knowledge of a class of things. Provided that there is any such knowledge, *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* will be a genuine type of perception. If we can perceive some individual object, then there is the presentation of a class of objects to which it belongs. So, the important question is : Is there any presentative or direct knowledge of a class of objects ? The *Naiyāyikas* demand that there is such a knowledge. We shall come to these later on. Now we can mention the following facts for the justification of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

The Justification of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

At first we know an individual as belonging to a certain class and at that time we know the universal underlying it. When we know the universal we can know the character or a group of characters which belongs to all the members of the class. Hence, to know the universal is to know all the individuals of that class, past, present and future as belonging to that universal. We know a cow as such means to know cowness which, again implies to know that it belongs, to all cows. For instance, we can state some particular cases, as,

X is mortal

Y is mortal

Z is mortal

..... and so on

And from these particular cases we can conclude that

All men are mortal.

Here, we somehow know that mortality is true of the class of men. In this case, a question arises: how do we know anything about the whole of a class of things from the observation of some of its members? Or, how do we get universal or general propositions from the observation of particular facts?

This is explicated by inductive inference in Western Logic.⁷ According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of the class or the universal proposition is obtained by supernormal perception.

The Vedānta Philosophers advocate that a generalisation is the statement of an invariable relation between universals. And we can know it through the observation of their concomitance. So, the Universal or general proposition "All men are mortal" or 'whatever is smoky is fiery' is the expression of an invariable relation between manhood and mortality or smokeness and fireness". When in any particular instance it is known that manhood to be related to mortality or smokeness to fireness we have a knowledge of such universal propositions. Hence, the notion of generalisation as pointed out by the Vedāntins corresponds to "intuitive induction" in Western Logic.⁸ It is a process by means of which we understand a particular instance as exemplifying an abstract generalisation.

While the abstract principles of mathematics may be taken as statement of necessary relations between certain universal concepts, all our empirical generalisations are truths about classes of things. These are truths about any universal that has a denotative reference to a class of things. Such principles are supposed to be better called the necessary laws of thought. Provided that

the above cases are abstract generalisations exemplified in particular instances, it is beyond our realisation how they can be called "intuitive induction". Some Western logicians have called them so. If this induction means, - the immediate apprehension of an axiom by means of its exemplification in a particular instance, it must be admitted that there is no need for any induction or inference or reasoning in it. If there is an immediate knowledge of anything, there is no room for any inference or reasoning for it. A description of such knowledge as "intuitive induction" seems to be no less objectionable than a description of it as "perceptual inference". Provided that it is meant by "intuitive induction", the intuitive knowledge of a general principle through a particular instance, it should be clear that such instance is not the basis of an inference regarding the general principle. Here according to Dr. Stebbing, we should characterise our knowledge of the general principles of logic and mathematics as intuition than to call it an "intuitive induction", in order to avoid a possible misunderstanding.⁹

The abstract principles of logic and mathematics are different from the ordinary generalisations. Here, the former are truths about certain universal concepts, the latter are classes of objects. The propositions, 'all men are mortal' or 'all smoky objects are fiery' do not mean that there is a necessary relation between manhood and mortality, or between smokeness and fireness but they mean that mortality is true of the class of men or that all smokes are connected with fire. These propositions are empirical generalisations meaning thereby these are assertions about whole classes of things and these are arrived at from observation of particular instances. But now the question is : what is the true nature of the process of knowledge which is involved when we generalise from 'some' to all, in a reasonably proper way? Is it an induction ? It must be "Induction by simple Enumeration" or "perfect induction". A perfect induction is that in which from the consideration of each of the members of a limited class we pass to a generalisation concerning all the members of that class. When on examining every boy of a class one says, "all the boys of this class are intelligent", it is an instance of perfect induction. Here, Dr. Stabling says, 'Mr. Johnson has suggested the convenient name summary induction for this mode of inference, and that it is certainly a more appropriate name than "perfect induction". Both

the names are equally inappropriate, and that for the same reason. A summary of a number of observed facts is not an induction at all. To say this an induction is to misunderstand its epistemic character as inferential. When on examining every patient in a sick room a doctor says, "all the patients in this room have got headache" his judgement is not to be regarded as an inference or induction in any sense. This is a memory synthesis. It is same as the one we have when we understand the meaning of a sentence by a synthesis of its constituent words and their meanings. These meanings are determined by memory. So, our knowledge of a universal proposition like, 'all men are mortal' cannot be called a 'perfect induction' even if it were possible for us to verify all human beings. But this is not possible as a matter of fact. The class of men is an unlimited one and it has an infinite number of members. So to examine all men is not possible as a matter of fact.

Now let us consider whether "Induction by simple Enumeration" can supply us an empirical generalisation like 'all men are mortal'. Generalisation from a number of examined instances which do not constitute all the members of the given class is known as 'Induction by simple Enumeration'. This type of induction may be shown as under :

X, Y, Z are mortal

therefore, all men are mortal.

But it is not a valid form of inference. It does not follow the general rule of inference. We should not go beyond the evidence. For, in this inference the conclusion makes a statement about all men on the ground of what is observed in some men. If it would be a form of valid inference, it will make other argument of this form valid. In like manner, the forms of deductions guarantee the validity of a reasoning that may be put in any of those forms.

Here, we agree to the argument "All men are mortal" because X, Y, Z are mortal but we do not accept the argument, 'all men are black' because X, Y, Z are black. The examination of these two arguments will show the following distinction between them.

In the first case, mortality which is seen in some men is predicated of all men. In the second, blackness which is found in some men is predicated of all men. We notice 'X, Y, Z are mortal' not because they are X, Y, Z but because they are men. On the other hand, we find that X, Y, Z are black because they are X, Y, Z, not because they are men. Here mortality is related to the essential nature of X, Y, Z but the relation between blackness and X, Y, Z are not like that. The particular men like X, Y, Z possess a certain essential common nature (manhood) which is found in all men. We can put together all men into one class and exclude all other animals from that class with the help of that common nature.

So when we observe that mortality is related to the essential nature of some men, like we can say that all men must be mortal. But the second knowledge does not follow from the first. Just when we know that mortality is related to the essential nature of some men, we know that it is related to all men. It is a truth which is known directly or immediately, and for which we require no inference or reasoning. So our knowledge to the whole class is an intuitive knowledge of the class essence or the universal is not attained by inductive inference. The knowledge of the inductive inference depends on that of the class essence of the universal and so the former cannot be the ground of the latter. The universal, belonging to all members of a class, is either directly known or never known. We can find or discover the universal which is in things through observation and experiment on things. Universal is not a thing to be made or constructed out of them but it is already in them. If by observation and experiment we know that a universal is related to something, we know at once that all members of the class are related to that thing. The Naiyayika argue that it is the perception of the whole class as related to an attribute, and we can perceive the class essence simultaneously as related in the same way. The

Naiyāyikas call it *Alauḥka* or supernormal perception in order to distinguish it from normal perception. So, inductive inference as accepted in Western Philosophy may be similar to the Naiyāyikas' *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception in the sense of intuition of a universal or general proposition with the help of the knowledge of class essence or the universal.

If we go through the NavyaNyāya texts before Gaṅgeśa we find that the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* comes in connection with the concept of *vyāpti* (universal concomitance). The main argument for the acceptance of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* before the period of Gaṅgeśa was such that inductive generalisation is possible by it. Again we find that there is a relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between all cases of relata, for instance, fire and smoke. But we cannot perceive all cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence by our ordinary sense organ. When we perceive a particular smoke, particular fire and their co-existence, we perceive simultaneously their corresponding essential common nature, i.e. smokeness, fireness etc. We can have the knowledge of all individuals containing the class-essence through these perceptions or perceived universals at the next moment. Here, the universal or the knowledge of it acts as the contact or relation (*Pratyāsatti*) which unites the sense organ and the objects or all individuals and this is called supernormal perception. This argument was put before Śriharṣa and it was not favourable to him. He does not investigate this elaborately. But Śriharṣa and Maṇikanṭha argue that the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* would involve omniscience. It is argued that one may know a thing as knowable and there may be a universal concomitance between knowability and objectivity. And this would in its turn imply omniscience. So, we suppose that the problem of *vyāpti* encourage the NavyaNaiyāyikas to postulate *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

Maṇikanṭha rejects this concept because to him it is an inference and he asserts that the services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not necessary for the knowledge of all individuals but he opines that it can be considered as a case of inference.¹⁰

When we come to Gaṅgeśa we find a more concrete picture of the problem of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. In the *Vyāptivāda* section of *Tattvacintāmani*, Gaṅgeśa records different traditional definitions of *Vyāpti* and gives his own definition of it and then he discusses the problem of certainty of *Vyāpti*. He gives a passing reference to this concept (*Tattvacintāmani*, p. 187, 2-5). It formulates the basis of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* section. If we go deep into Gaṅgeśa's text we find that many new problems have been evolved as a result of giving arguments and counter - arguments and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* has been very useful for the satisfactory solution of the problems. Gaṅgeśa has elaborately presented the arguments of the opponents. He gives the opinions of both the parties admitting and rejecting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* in the *pūrvapakṣa* section. At first he states the argument of the follower of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. And this argument coincides with the opponent argument given by Sriharṣa and Manikaṅṭha. Besides, Gaṅgeśa mentions another argument and this argument is supposed to have originated from some Navya - Naiyāyikas of the period before Gaṅgeśa. These arguments are as follows. We know that every synthetic knowledge (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) presupposes the previous knowledge of the determinant (*viśeṣaṇa*). The proposition 'there is fire on the hill' is synthetic in character and 'fire or fire-on-the-hill' acts as the determinant. So, it must be previously known. If the hill is not perceived at first, fire-on-the-hill cannot be known. Likewise when universal concomitance (*Vyāpti*) is established by the perception of probans and probandum, all members of the classes of probans and probandum are perceived through the medium of their respective class - essences or universals. And this shows the justification of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. But all these arguments were not sufficient to Gaṅgeśa. So he wants to justify *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* on the grounds as under : Such types of doubt about "whether all smoky objects are fiery" always occur at the time of assertion of *vyāpti*. No difficulty arises in the observed cases of instances but doubt arises regarding all other unobserved cases of smoke and fire which remains beyond the range of ordinary observation. Doubt implies that the object of it must be previously perceived. Here, the perception of all smokes is possible without any doubt because all cases of smoke are concomittant with all cases of fire. This is the

function of *samanyalakṣaṇa* as sought by Gangesa.^{10.1}

***Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* and its different types :**

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is of two kinds - *sāmānyasvarūpa* (that which is in the nature of *sāmānya*) and *sāmānyajñāna* (that in the form of knowledge of *sāmānya*). Some Naiyāyikas point out that it is the *sāmānyasvarūpa* which is the contact (*sannikarṣa*) and the others maintain that *sāmānyajñāna* (knowledge of *samanya*) is the contact. The *Naiyāyikas* who demand *sāmānyajñāna* as the contact have differences of opinion among themselves. One section of the *Naiyāyikas* (the old *Naiyāyikas*) advocates that it is the *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna* (a knowledge in which universal has become a qualifier) is the contact. And the others are of the opinion that *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* (i.e., a knowledge revealing universal as a content) is the contact. Those who support *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* as the contact admit also the *sāmānyaprakāraṇajñāna* as the contact (*sannikarṣa*) because *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna* is also called *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna*. Objectivity is of three types : *Prakāratā* (objectivity), *saṁsargatā* (character or attribute of relation) and *viśeṣyatā* (substantiality). So, *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna*, is included in the *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna*, as a content of knowledge can be known as being a qualifier. If it is stated that *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, then the three types of knowledge i.e., *sāmānyaprakāraṇa* (knowledge in which universal is a qualifier) *sāmānyasaṁsargaka* (knowledge in which universal acts as a relation) and *sāmānyaviśeṣyaka jñāna* (knowledge in which universal is a qualificand) are inevitably called the contacts. It may be stated truly that *sāmānyaviśayakanirvikalpaka jñāna* also is regarded as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* because the *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* is regarded as the contact (*sannikarṣa*). The *prācīna* (old) *Naiyāyikas* admit that it is the *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna* which is the contact (*sannikarṣa*). And according to the *Neo-Naiyāyika* it is the *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* which is the contact. When we examine the meaning of the word '*lakṣaṇa*' in the term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* we are acquainted with such kind of differences of opinion.

The word *sāmānya* has been used by Visvanātha in the non-technical sense in the following way : the common characteristics of all the individuals of similar type is called *sāmānya* (*samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam*)¹¹. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *sāmānya* means a category (*padārtha*) which is eternal and inheres in many things. But here the word *sāmānya* does not mean this kind of *padārtha* or category only. Here the technical meaning of the word *sāmānya* is not implied, but non-technical meaning of it also is indicated. Hence, the meaning of the word *sāmānya* is the knowable (*jñāyamāna*) generic attribute inhering in many similar loci. There is no guarantee that this attribute must be a *sāmānya* (*jāti*) Some substances and some qualities also may be referred to as *sāmānya*. That attribute may not be eternal and may not inhere in many things. The actual locus of an attribute may be one or many in number. If that attribute is known by many loci, then that attribute should be known as *sāmānya*. A colour (*rūpa*) is located in a substance (*dravya*). If that colour which actually resides in a particular locus is erroneously known by another substance (*dravya*). A pot (*ghaṭa*) is a substance (*dravya*). Here if that pot is known through many loci, it will also be called *sāmānya*. As the word *sāmānya* is applied here in a non-technical sense, we should not think that *sāmānya* will not indicate *jāti* (universal) e.g., 'potness', 'smokeness' etc. The eternal attribute, 'potness', 'smokeness' etc. may be implied by the word *sāmānya* and the things like pot etc. and the qualities like colour etc. which are non eternal attributes are also referred to as *sāmānya* ; In this way the meaning of the word *sāmānya* has been used here.

When a pot is known to be existing on the ground through conjunction or in its two halves through inherence, there arises the knowledge of all grounds or all halves having that pot. With the help of this example we can realise that the transitory common feature also is the connection. In the supernormal perception the common feature (*sāmānya*) is the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the substrata pot (e.g. smoke etc) through the relation of conjunction or inherence by which it is known. After the destruction of the pot one recollects the substratum having that pot but there would be no knowledge of all such substrata of pots

through the contact (*sannikarṣa*) based on a common feature because the common feature (potness) is absent at that time. On the other hand, if one has got the knowledge of a pot (the object of knowledge) which is connected with the organ, such knowledge may arise on the next day. Further, there is the common feature (potness) which is a feature (*prakāra*) in such knowledge, although there is no connection with the organ. So, it is the knowledge of the *sāmānya* (the common feature) which is the contact and not the *sāmānya* itself. Hence, in the word *sāmānyalakṣaṇa lakṣaṇa* implies an object of knowledge. Therefore, we can say, the knowledge of the *sāmānya* is the contact.

If, even without the conjunction of eye etc., there is the knowledge of the common feature (*sāmānya*), there might be ocular or any other perception of all pot etc. If we want to have perception through an external organ with the help of the contact of a *sāmānya* (common feature), there must be present the sum total of causes of the perception of that common feature (*sāmānya*) by the respective organ, in some object having that feature. The said sum total quoted above is the conjunction of the eye, the existence of light and so on. So, there is no such perception by the eye etc. in darkness etc.¹²

Here *sāmānya* which comes under the purview of our knowledge (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) is the *sannikarṣa* (contact) because *sāmānya* itself has been stated as the contact. When knowledge is attained by the ordinary contact of sense organs with the locus of *sāmānya*, knowable universal (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) or the knowledge of *sāmānya* will be the contact of our sense organs. Provided the knowledge of *sāmānya* is acquired by a means except *laukika sannikarṣa*, it will not be a contact of sense organs.

If our eyes are conjoined with a pot, we can attain the normal perceptual knowledge of that pot (*ghaṭa*) which is in the relation of inherence with potness (*ghaṭatva*). Here we can perceive all the other pots because to perceive one pot is to perceive potness in it and this 'potness' belongs to every member of the class of all pots. For, potness is inherently related to every pot (*sāmānya*

sambandha or the relation of inherence) and here we find the relation of *svaviṣayabhūtaghaṭatvasamavāya sambandha* (i.e. a relation of inherence through jariness remaining in the content of knowledge). That is to say, provided our visual organ is connected with a particular pot, the visual perception of all the other pots existing in past, distant, present and future is also possible in the way mentioned above. Here the distinction between the two kinds of perception is as follows : The perception of the pot connected with our eyes is called *laukika* (normal or ordinary) as it is produced by the normal contact. And the perception of all the other pots is called *alaukika* (supernormal) because it is produced by the *alaukika sannikarsa* (super-normal connection). This type of supernormal contact (*alaukika sannikarsa*) is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. And the perception (*pratyakṣa*) caused by this *sannikarṣa* is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. That potness (*ghaṭatva*) becomes a connection (*sannikarṣa*) because it inheres in all pots through the relation of inherence (*samavāya sambandha*) and the knowledge of potness exists in all pots through the relation of *svaviṣayabhūtaghaṭatvasamavāyasambandha* i.e. the relation of inherence of jariness existing in the individuals which becomes an object of knowledge. Again *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* may be illustrated in the following way:

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is the perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property (*sāmānya*) perceived in any individual member of that class. Jayanta clearly describes the *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* kind of super normal perception explaining that it is accomplished through the internal organ.^{12.1} Thus, when we perceive something, e.g. a man, we take it as belonging to the class of men. To know that an individual belongs to the class of men is also to know all other members of the same class. But initially there should be a linkage between our senses and the external objects for normal (*laukika*) perception. When we perceive a man, we perceive the universal 'manhood' as its defining property. When we perceive the universal 'manhood' in the present 'man' there obtains a link between our sense organs and all the other men. Thus, the perception of one thing implies the perception of the generic attribute of that thing which exists in all other things of its class. Here, the man existing in

past, present, distant and future can be perceived by the extraordinary linkage through 'manhood' existing in a particular man.

The possibility of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* through other senses :

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa i.e. the super normal perception through universal is possible through other senses also. This is shown by the following illustration.¹³

When we touch a table, we perceive its individual characteristic and its universal characteristic (tableness). We can perceive all the other tables because we have already perceived class essence 'tableness' which inheres in every member of the class of tables. Here the individual characteristic is only the characteristic of the table present before us. But the universal characteristic is not only that of the table before us but it belongs to all other tables of the past, present, future and the distant. It is possible because the perception of the universal characteristic present in a particular table causes a supernormal contact between the sense of touch and all the tables. So we can perceive all the tables.

In like manner, when we taste a bitter medicine we perceive its particular characteristics and universal characteristics as well. Its particular characteristics are the characteristics of the bitter medicine that we taste. Its universal characteristics (i.e. bitterness) perceived in the present bitter medicine not only belong to it but also it belongs to all bitter medicines. By perceiving *sāmānya* (bitterness) in the present bitter medicine we can know all the other bitter medicines because every bitter medicine belongs to the *sāmānya* (universal) 'bitterness'. This is so because perception of universal characteristic occurs a supernormal contact between our sense of taste and all bitter medicines and we perceive all bitter medicines.

Again on hearing some sound we perceive its individual characteristic as well as its universal characteristics, i.e. soundness. Its individual

characteristics are that which we hear. But its universal characteristics, i.e. soundness perceived in the present sound not only belongs to it but it also belongs to all sounds. By perceiving universal feature in the present sound we can know all sound because every sound has soundness as its universal characteristic. The universal characteristic, 'soundness' brings about the extraordinary contact between our auditory sense organ and all sounds and we perceive all sounds.

Similarly, when we smell some odour we perceive the individual characteristic and the universal characteristic (*sāmānya*). Its individual characteristic is only the characteristic that we smell. Its universal characteristic i.e. odourness (*gandhatva*) not only belongs to it but it belongs to all odours. By perceiving the generic essence, i.e. odourness in the present odour, we can perceive all odours because every odour has a generic attribute (*sāmānya*) i.e. odourness. The universal characteristic i.e. odourness present before us brings about a supernormal contact between our sense of smell and all odours and we perceive all odours.

Nature of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

It has been said earlier that the old Naiyāyikas calls *sānmānyajñāna prakāra* (*prakārajñāna*) (i.e. knowledge having universal as a qualifier) as the connection and according to the *Neo-Naiyāyikas*, *Sāmānyaviśayakajñāna* (knowledge having universal as a content) is the connection. Here *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is admitted by both of the Naiyāyikas in a different way. So, the consequences of these views also differ. The old view says that at first we perceive the jar present before us normally and then extraordinary perception of all the other jars is occurred. For as per this view *sāmānyaprakāra jñāna* i.e., visual perceptual knowledge qualified by jariness becomes the supernormal connection between our eyes and other jars. If there is no visual perception characterised by jariness at first, how is supernormal perception possible? Hence, at first there is visual perception characterised by jariness (*ghatātva*) out of normal contact (*laukikasannikarṣajanya*) and then

extraordinary perception of other jars is possible because of extraordinary contact or visual perception (*cākṣuṣapratyakṣarūpa*).

According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas (Neo-logicians) at the time of ordinary perception of a jar, extraordinary perception of other jars also is possible because, according to this view, *sāmānyaviśayakajñāna* i.e., *ghaṭatvaviśayakajñāna* (knowledge characterised by the object - jarness) is admitted as the connection (*sannikarṣa*). *Ghaṭatvaviśayakajñāna* becomes the supernormal connection in case of the perception of other jars. For this reason, supernormal perception occurs at the very moment of normal perception. Just after the contact between our eyes and a jar, there is an indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) of a jar, jarness and the relation called inherence (*samavāya*), existing between them. As the jarness (*ghaṭatva*) becomes the object of that indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as it is called *ghaṭatvaviśayaka jñāna*. When after the indeterminate perception, there is determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) of a jar connected with our eyes, extraordinary perception of other jars is there at that very moment since that indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) *ghaṭatvaviśayakajñāna* (knowledge characterised by the object jarness) becomes the connection (*sannikarṣa*). Thus, the ordinary perception of a jar connected with our eyes and the extraordinary perception of other jars are produced at the same time.

After having the indeterminate knowledge we have the perceptual knowledge of a jar caused by ordinary contact with our eyes and that of all other jars is caused by extraordinary contact in the form of the knowledge of jarness (*ghaṭajñānarūpa*). Though all the jars become the object of that perceptual knowledge, the perceptual knowledge of that jar is not of the same form. That knowledge is determinate in case of the jar before our eyes and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) in case of all the other jars. Just before the perception of a jar, present to our eyes the jar, jarness and their inherence becomes the three objects of the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) which must be admitted. So, here we can familiar with jarness and

the relation of inherence between jar and jarness. Nevertheless, the indeterminate perception of all the jars except the one connected with our eyes must be admitted because the perception of a relation depends on the relata. So long as the relata i.e. the knowledge of the nature of all the other jars is not attained, the perception of the relation of the inherence of jarness and all the other jars except that present to our eyes is not possible. If we have no knowledge of the nature of all the other jars, the perception of the above relation is not possible. No knowledge can be called *savikalpaka* if it is not in a relation. Therefore, it is to be admitted that this perceptual cognition is known as *savikalpaka* in respect of the jar present to our visual organ and this cognition is attained by the ordinary contact. And the above cognition is *nirvikalpaka* in the context of all the other jars revealed to us through the *sāmānyajñāna* which is acquired by supernormal connection. However, the Modern Indian logicians are of the opinion that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* and ordinary contact simultaneously produce a perceptual cognition of all the jars.

Here we shall have to concentrate our attention on another object. In case of ordinary contact or visual contact we admit counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) and subjunct or co-positive (*anuyogī*) of relation. In like manner, we should admit counterpositive (*pratīyogī*) and co-positive (*anuyogī*) in case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, the extraordinary contact. Organs are the counterpositive of those relations in respect of visual contact etc. and the jar etc, the co-positive (*anuyogī*) become the object here. If *sāmānya* (universal) or knowledge of *sāmānya* (*sāmānyajñāna*) be referred to as a relation, the counterpositive of that relation will be the sense-organs and the substratum of the *sāmānya* will be the subjunct (*anuyogī*).

If *sāmānya* (universal) is called the contact then relation controlling counterpositiveness (*pratīyogitā*) existing in organs is *svaviṣayakajñānaviṣayaka-samyoga* (i.e. a contact having some knowledge of an object which becomes an object of jarness). Here, the word 'sva' implies 'jarness', the universal (*ghaṭatvasāmānya*) *Svaviṣayakajñāna* implies

knowledge of jarness in a jar present to organs. The object of that knowledge is a jar. The connection (*saṃyoga*) of that jar exists in sense organs. Hence, the counterpositive of the relation of *ghaṭatvasāmānya* i.e. universal in the form of jarness becomes the sense organs. If the universals, jarness etc. are admitted as relation, the regulator (*niyāmaka*) or *anuyogitā* i.e. subjunctness will be inherence (*samavāya*). The substratum of the universals like jarness etc (*ghaṭatvādisāmānya*) is *anuyogī* or subjunct and the universal (*sāmānya*) exists in that *anuyogī* in the relation of inherence.

If *sāmānyajñāna* (the cognition of universal) is admitted to be a contact, then the regulator of *pratiyogitā* (counterpositiveness) will be *svaviṣayavatsaṃyoga*. The meaning of the word 'sva' is the cognition of jarness (*ghaṭatvajñāna*), the object of it is jarness, *svaviṣayavat* means the locus of the object of the cognition of jarness, i.e., the jar and the connection (*saṃyoga*) of the jar (*ghaṭa*) qualified with jarness exist in sense organs and thus the sense organs become the counterpositive. When the knowledge of universal (*sāmānyajñāna*) is said to be the contact, *svaviṣayasāmānyāśrayatā* would be the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *anuyogitā* (subjunctness). The word 'sva' means the knowledge of jarness (*ghaṭatvajñāna*), its object (*viṣaya*) or *sāmānya* is jarness (*ghaṭatva*) and the character of its substratum (*āśrayatā*) exists in the jar.

Thus, if *sāmānya* is regarded as contact and the cloud of dust (*dhūlipāṭala*) is known as smoke, then *svaviṣayajñānaviṣayasamāyoga* and inherence become the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *Pratiyogitā* and *anuyogitā* respectively. The word 'sva' means the universal (*sāmānya*) 'smokeness' (*dhūmatvasāmānya*). *Svaviṣayakajñāna* implies the cognition of smokeness in the cloud of dust present to our sense organs. The object of that knowledge is the cloud of dust. It has a connection with our sense organs.

The universal (*sāmānya*) smokeness inheres in smoke. So, the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *anuyogitā* or subjunctness is inherence.

The same case happens when we consider *sāmānyajñāna* (the cognition of universal) to be the connection (*sannikarṣa*). If *sāmānyajñāna* becomes the connection (*sannikarṣa*), the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *pratiyogitā* i.e. counterpositiveness is *Svaviṣayavatsamyoga* i.e. contact having object in the form of jarness. But if *sāmānyajñāna* becomes the connection (*sannikarṣa*) of mind i.e. internal sense, *svaviṣayavatsamyoga* cannot be the criterion (*niyāmaka*) of the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*). The relation which determines the counterpositiveness existing in mind is *svāśrayasamyoga* i.e. the contact existing in the locus of jarness. Pleasure, pain etc. are the objects of mental perception. The knowledge of happiness and pain is the *sannikarṣa* of the supernormal perception of pleasure and pain. The counterpositive of that *sannikarṣa* is mind. The criterion (*niyāmaka*) of this counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*) is *svāśrayasamyoga* (i.e. the contact existing in the locus of jarness). The word 'sva' implies the knowledge of happiness and pain. The substratum of that knowledge is self which has the contact with our mind. Thus, mind becomes the counter-positive in the relation of *svāśrayasamyoga*.

It should be noted here that the follower of the first view calls the universal under the perview of our knowledge (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) to be the contact (*sannikarṣa*). According to the second view, the qualificative cognition of *sāmānya* (*sāmānyaprakāraka jñāna*) is the contact and the third view says that the objective cognition of *sāmānya* is the contact. Among the three views the third view or the view of the Navya Naiyāyika is correct. To admit *sāmānya* as a contact causes a defect. When a non-eternal universal (*sāmānya*) is not present before us and we are mistaken for it (*sāmānya*), the supernormal perception of the substratum of the non-eternal universal is not possible, since the cause of that perception - *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* in the form of non-eternal *sāmānya* is not perceived at that moment. *Sāmānya* being non-eternal cannot exist for ever. The extra-ordinary perception of the real substratum of it will not be possible in the event of its absence due to false cognition. For this reason the acceptance of the knowable (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) as a contact cannot be accepted.

If *sāmānyaprakāra jñāna* i.e. a cognition of universal as a qualifier is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* then there arises another defect. The extraordinary perception evolved from the *sāmānyaviśeṣyakajñāna* (i.e. the cognition of universal as a qualifier) will not have any ground (*upapatti*). The supernormal perception of the substratum of *sāmānya* which comes after the *sāmānyaviśeṣyaka jñāna* (the knowledge of that universal which is produced by a qualificand) is based on experience (*anubhavasiddha*). If qualificative knowledge of *sāmānya* as a qualifier is accepted as a contact, then that type of supernormal perception is not possible. Hence, according to *Navya Naiyāyika*, *sāmānyaviśeṣyaka jñāna* is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

It has been stated by Visvanātha that the knowledge having the universal as content is called *Pratyāsatti*. The knowledgeness (property of being knowledge) having universal as content (*sāmānyaviśayakajñānatvam*) becomes the limiter of the *pratyāsatti*. It entails that the knowledge which comes through *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is of an object remaining immediately after indeterminate perception and recollective knowledge.¹⁴

In this context, the phrase '*Sāmānyaviśayakajñānam* (i.e. knowledge having *sāmānya* as its content) means knowledge of the universal which has become a qualificand by virtue of being connected with sense organ.¹⁵ According to a section of *Naiyāyikas*, mere knowledge of the universal which is common in the indeterminate perception and recollective knowledge becomes the *pratyāsatti*.¹⁶

The above mentioned view is not at all tenable. Because the knowledge of the universal cannot be apprehended at the stage of indeterminate perception. Moreover, in the case of memory the *sāmānya* cannot also be perceived because, the content of memory is very much difficult to ascertain whether it is true or not. The verifiability principle being not applicable to it fails to reveal the real nature of an object. That is why, it has been mentioned in the *Prabhā* that the knowledge of universal has to be ascertained in an object remaining

just after indeterminate stage i.e. *savikalpaka* stage and after the memory stage i.e. at the level of knowledge (*pramā*). Smṛti being not verifiable, cannot provide us the true knowledge of an object as per a section of philosophers.

Now, a question may be raised, if, on seeing a pot, or at the time of perceiving it we can know all the pots, then on perceiving a thing or at the time of perceiving it, we can know all the things. Or, in other words, the perception of all knowable objects are implied by the perception of anything of the world belonging to the class of knowables. So, we shall be omniscient. If *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is admitted, how the problem of being omniscience of all things will be solved? In reply to this question it can be said that we cannot be omniscient with the help of the cognition attained by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (a contact in which universal becomes the nature) The particular knowledge of all things or *padārthas* is required for being omniscient. That kind of particular knowledge is not acquired by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. We may have the particular knowledge of the pot present before our eyes with the aid of normal contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*). But this type of knowledge of all the other pots is not possible by supernormal contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. We can know the pot present before us in particular by normal perception. But such knowledge of other pots is not possible by supernormal perception in the form of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Knowledge of specific feature of a thing is called particular knowledge. The knowledge of relation and relata are the requisite things for being full of specific feature (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhī*). Here in case of the extraordinary perception of other pots although the relata, potness and the relation are known previously, the another type of relata being unknown will not be characterised by particular feature. Therefore, if that type of knowledge of all knowable objects (*prameya*) is not attained by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* in the form of *prameyatva*, then how the objection of being omniscient will be raised? ¹⁷

The Necessity of Admitting of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

Now, the question is : we find that the pot in front of our eyes is known particularly but in case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* other pots are not known like the former. Here the knowledge of the former pot is called particular knowledge and that of the latter is called universal knowledge (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā*). If the objectivity of knowledge is not admitted in the same way in the same kind of knowledge, then why do we say that all the pots are the objects of knowledge ? That is to say, what is the necessity of admitting of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* ? That all the pots of all times and space are perceived at the time of seeing one pot is not accepted by experience (*anubhava*). With a view to justifying this imagination which is contradictory to experience and showing a connection between our sense-organ and the pots of the distant, the present, the past and the future, it seems non-sense to call knowable *sāmānya* (universal or *sāmānya* which comes under the purview of our knowledge) or knowledge of *sāmānya* to be a contact.

In response to the above question, the Naiyāyikas point out that some defects may occur if *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not admitted. First, if someone finds the co-existence of smoke and fire in some places, he may have doubt that all the manifestations of smoke of the world are not universally related to fire. This doubt cannot be overcome if *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not admitted. For, it is established that there are universal concomitance (*Vyāpti*) of fire in the perceived smoke. Here, there is no doubt of *vyāpti* between smoke and fire. Now we shall have to admit that there is a doubt of universal concomitance between the unknown smoke and fire. This doubt will be dispelled through the means of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* has been justified by the Naiyāyika in the following manner :

In respect of a visual perception of a number of cases, e.g. smoke is found to co-exist with fire. All cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence can never be covered through our sensuous perception. In our ordinary life we notice a number of cases, and on the basis of that we form the judgement that

wherever there is smoke, there is fire. It is considered as a type of perception which is pure and simple. Whatever it may be, the question arises : how can a universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) of smoke and fire be established on the datum of perception ? A sense-organ can never be related to all instances of smoke, fire and their co-existence. The difficulty is steered clear of by saying that when we perceive a particular instance of smoke and a particular case of fire and their co-existence, we also perceive their generic attributes i.e. 'smokeness', 'fireness', and the property of co-existence at that very moment. And it is only at the next moment that we perceive through the data of smokeness, fireness and the property of their co-existence all the individual instances respectively related to the above universals. Thus, the perceptual knowledge of the universal serves as the supernormal link through which all the unobserved instances of smoke, fire and their co-existence become amenable to the visual sense organ.¹⁸ Such is the way of justifying *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* which assists in ascertaining *vyāpti*.

Secondly, darkness (*tamaḥ*) is a perceptible thing . *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is necessary for perceiving this thing (*padārtha*). According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, absence in general (*sāmānyābhāva*) of all manifestations of fire is called *tamaḥ* (darkness). The perception of that thing called *tamaḥ* depends on the knowledge of all kinds of lights because of the cognition of counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) becomes a cause of the cognition of absence or non-existence (*abhāva*). Hence, at first the knowledge of all kinds of light or that of counter-positive (*pratiyogī*) is required for the perception of *tamaḥ*. But, how is the knowledge of all kinds of fire possible ? It is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* which can make this possible. We can know all the manifestations of fire after the perception of a particular fire by the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the knowable (*jñāyamana*) lightness (*tejastva*) or the cognition of *sāmānya* and thus the perception of darkness which depends on the knowledge of the counterpositive of all the manifestations of light will occur immediately, provided we admit the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.¹⁹

Thirdly, it has been contended by some that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is a necessary condition for the perception of previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*).²⁰ The ordinary perception of the counter-positive is not possible owing to the absence of a sense object contact. The counter positive (*pratiyogī*) may be known by another supernormal means of knowing called *jñānalakṣaṇa* : which is also not possible here. So *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* has to be admitted. Hence, when we perceive a pot we can perceive all other pots including the non-produced or even the damaged ones through the universal potness present in the perceived pot.

Fourthly, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is a requisite for forming any negative judgement of perception.²¹ For instance, "This (horse) is not a cow", is a negative judgement of perception as there is an absence of cowness in the horse. But "absence of cowness in a horse" can be known by perceiving all cows. And all cows cannot be perceived ordinarily. We can perceive cow-universal (cowness) in an individual cow and the cowness is linked with all other cows. And through this link we can perceive all the cows. Thus, any negative judgement can be perceived through *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.²²

Fifthly, we cannot explain the voluntary effort to attain pleasure without the help of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. To desire for pleasure is somehow to know it as something to be, but not yet experienced. When we perceive one pleasure, we perceive all pleasures including the future pleasure through the generic property, 'pleasurability' present in the perceived pleasure.²³

Notes and References :

1. "Nityatve satyanekasamavetatvam" *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse No.8.
 - 1.1. Hoernle : "Concerning Universals", *Mind*, 1927, p.180.
2. "Samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ" - *Nyāyasūtra*, 2.2.69.
3. *Padārthadharmasamgraha* - Prasastapāda (Chowkhamba), p.311.
4. "Sāmānyam lakṣaṇam yasya ityarthah" - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse 63.
5. Srimohan Bhattacharya and Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya : *Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa*, Vol. I, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1978, p.180.
 - 5.1 Dr. Raghunath Ghosh - *The Justification of Inference* (A Navya Nyāya Approach), Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, Varanasi, 1990, p.93.
 - 5.2 "Indriyasamvaddhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūtam vodhyam".
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 63.
6. "Tatra dhūmatvena sannikarṣeṇa dhūmā ityevaṁ rūpaṁ sakaldhūmaviṣayakam jñānam jāyate" - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse 63.
7. J.S.Mill : *A System of Logic*, Ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Great Britain, 1973.
Stebbing : *Logic in Practice*, pp. 19-20.
8. Stebbing : *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p.243.
9. Dr. Stebbing : *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, pp. 90-97, 244.

10. Manikanṭha : *Nyāyaratna* with Dyutimalika commentary, of Nṛsīṃhayajvan, ed. V.S.Sastri and V.Krishnamacharya, Madras Govt. Oriental Series, Madras, 1953, p.64.
- 10.1 Gopikamohan Bhattacharya : *Navya-Nyāya - some Logical Problems in Historical Perspective*, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, 1978, pp. 58-59.
11. Parantu samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 63.
12. Sā ca sāmāgrī cakṣuḥ-sāmyogāloka-sāmyogādikam.
Tenāndhakārādau cakṣurādinā tādrśam jñānam na jāyate -
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse no. 64.
- 12.1, Karl H. Potter - *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Volume II, p.168.
13. L.P. N.Sinha : *Nyāya Theory of Perception*, Classical Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1983, p.108.
14. Sāmānyaviṣayakajñānatvaṁ pratyāsattitāvachhedakam ityarthah. Tathā ca nirvikalpakottaram sāmānyalakṣaṇajanyajñānameva tonmate iṣṭamiti bhāvaḥ." Prabhā commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 64, *Kārikāvalī*, ed. Sri C. Shankarram Shastri, Choukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1988, p.464.
15. Indriyasambaddha viśeṣyakam sāmānyajñānamityarthah yadvā sāmānyaviṣayakam jñānam ityarthah. *Dinakari commentary* on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 64, Ibid, p.464.

16. Etanmate ca nirvikalpakasādhāraṇaṁ smaraṇasādhāraṇaṁ ca sāmānyajñānaṁ pratyāsattiḥ. Dinakari commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 64, Ibid, p.465.
17. N.C.Goswami : *Tarkasaṁgraha*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, p.276.
18. Gaṅgeśa : *Tattvacintāmani*, Anumāṅkhaṇḍa, Bibliotheca Indica Edition, 1910, p.251.
19. *Tarkasaṁgraha*, by Narayan Chandra Goswami, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, p.277.
20. Ibid.
21. Sunil Kumar Das : *The Nyāya Theory of Supernormal Perception*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1988, p.29.
22. Vide my article "*Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*", NORTH BENGAL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Ed. Pabitra Kumar Roy, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, 1995, pp. 128-129.
23. *Tattacintāmani*, II, pp. 283-90, Anumāna Khaṇḍa, Bibliotheca Indica Edition, 1910.