D.H.LAWRENCE
The Critic of Culture

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For my mother

PREFACE

AND

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D. H. Lawrence's 'identity' as a critic of culture itself is a cultural construct based on 'difference' that disrupts not only others but itself as well, foregrounding in the process an element of provinciality. This discursive disruption ingrained in Lawrence's thought finds ample support in the currently competing critical modes of our times. Lawrence destabilizes a whole tradition of thought as he finds it in a bid to open up new liberating horizons. This thesis seeks to highlight this radicalism in Lawrence by freeing him from such fixed idealized designations as 'priest of love' and 'pro-facist mythologizer of cultural politics'.

For Lawrence 'man is a thought adventurer.' The immense flexibility that such a view suggests helps him explore many of the major issues of contemporary critical discussions. This thesis traces the vital correspondence of Lawrence's thought with those of the contemporary thinkers. We claim that Lawrence the critic of culture has anticipated the key issues of postmodernism and feminism. Lawrence, however, remains a critic of culture but without any fixed 'identity.' All his pursuits of thought have the objective of learning how not to know. The provisionality and contingency of his thought, rather than ensuring 'certitude' to itself, invite us to a space beyond any fixity. "We are prisoners", says Lawrence in Phoenix, "inside our conception of life and being" (325). Thus thought, in the Lawrentian sense, seeks its own suspension by knowing its own limit in order to have a new beginning. This beginning is analogous to the eternal rebirth of the mythical bird, phoenix. In Fantasia of the Unconscious Lawrence has designated the proper place for knowledge and all its pursuits: "At last knowledge must be put into its true place in the living activity of man" (76).

The affinity of Lawrentian thought with those of the leading contemporary thinkers illustrates how much ahead of his times Lawrence has been. Lawrence

'insurrection of subjugated knowledges' and many other such issues as Bakhtin's celebration of 'heteroglossia' in the novel, Lyotard's incredulity towards 'metanarratives', Baudrillard's distrust of 'simulacra', Deleuze's emphasis on 'difference' and 'becoming' and Levinas's ethical concept of the other. Besides such close correspondences, Lawrence has significant affinity with such feminist thinkers as Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous and Julia Kristeva. Mine will be an attempt to establish as ascertained this community of concern between Lawrence and these postmodern thinkers.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Man is a thought-adventurer.
Man is a great venture in consciousness.
("Books". Phoenix, 731).

The prevalent view of D. H. Lawrence as a critic of culture needs to be reviewed and reassessed in the context of currently competing critical modes of our times. A glance at the history of Lawrence criticism shows the chequered appreciation Lawrence has received as a critic of culture over the decades since F. R. Leavis' seminal defence of Lawrence's stance. In Thought, Words and Creativity, Leavis says that the aim of Lawrence in his Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious is "to enforce his criticism of our civilization and culture by showing what the human individual in his wholeness, his living integrity as the actual presence of life, must be realized to be" (21). Leavis' partial and strategic reading of Lawrence has centrally seen Lawrence as the arch-proponent of 'Life' against the mechanization and dehumanization set off by Christian- democratic culture. Leavis' 'moral formalism'1 has paved the way for other such ideological interpretations. In her "Introduction" to D. H. Lawrence: A Collection of Critical Essays, Mark Spilka's observation about Lawrence's "fierce engagement with wasteland culture, his urgent sense of the modern death-drift and his creative attempts to transcend it" (12) corroborates Leavis's view. This "ideological chimera", as Peter Widdowson (2) terms it, has kept the Lawrence critics bewitched in the sixties for its rejection of collective political thought and action. But ironically this "ideological chimera" that challenges all cultural hegemonies, is looked upon by Marxists and early second-wave feminists as the "ideological veil of patriarchy and bourgeois cultural hegemony" (Widdowson: 6). After 1968, Lawrence the representative icon of humanist individualism has been transformed into "pro-fascist mythologiser of cultural politics" (Widdowson: 10). Mariana Trogovnik has rightly said that "Lawrence pushes his critics into starkly polarized positions: they either ritualistically rehearse his views or they reject him out of hand" (Fernihough: 1). The reification of Lawrence the critic of culture is closely followed by the demolition of the idol of the prophet of life as the focus

changes even within the broad area of ideology. Critics of Lawrence read him partially, selectively and eclectically to suit the need of the dominant critical mode of their own times. Our study of Lawrence the critic of culture in the context of the critical mode of our times draws its strength and inspiration from such diametrically opposite views about Lawrence's stance as a critic of culture.

Our study focuses specifically on the non-fictional writings of Lawrence in the belief that the dominant ideas of Lawrence the critic of culture are available more directly in his non-fiction than in his fictions. The entire area of Lawrence's non-fiction forms a huge bulk of his writings. Lawrence's Phoenix, Phoenix II, Fantasia of the Unconscious and Psychoanalysis of the Unconscious, Apocalypse, The Symbolic Meaning, Studies in Classic American Literature are the major works among them. In these volumes of non-fictional writings, Lawrence the critic of culture indulges in thought adventure. We have taken the idea of "thought adventure" from Lawrence's own writing. In his short essay titled "Books", collected in Phoenix, Lawrence says, "Man is a thought adventurer. He has thought his way down the ages" (Phoenix: 731). Lawrence is a thought adventurer and the sites of his adventure are variegated and diverse. This study treats Lawrence as a thought adventurer rather than as a cultural figure committed to the cause of 'Life', crusading against the cause of the cultural-spiritual collapse of his own times. It is a concern greater than a cause—a critical concern or concerns that align him with the leading contemporary thinkers. The aim of this study is to review the ideas of Lawrence the critic of culture in an attempt to liberate them from the "enclosed specialism"2 of Lawrence study both of Leavis tradition and that of the Marxists and early second wave feminists. This study will explore the "radical indeterminacy"3 in Lawrence's criticism of culture in the light of contemporary critical modes.

It is partly true that, Lawrence belongs to the anti-mechanistic tradition of Coleridge, Carlyle, Arnold and Ruskin. But this affiliation does not fully account for the provisional nature of Lawrence's criticism of culture. As a critic of culture Lawrence cannot be fully identified with the anti-mechanistic tradition: the dominant ideas of Lawrence sometimes have psychological as well as philosophical significance. This study seeks to free Lawrence from the idealistic readings on the

basis of Lawrence's own denunciation of idealism of any sort. It treats Lawrence as a critic of culture—a thinker, to whom thinking is an adventure. The dominant ideas of Lawrence the critic of culture do not contribute to the build-up of any prophetic voice in Lawrence. They do not carry any absolute value or truth or meaning. In Lawrentian schema, 'thought' or 'concept' in Deleuvian4 sense, does only have a functional value. The whole bulk of Lawrence's criticism of culture is interspersed with his comments denouncing form, stability and fixity. But even this strong disapproval is never absolute: "Man must wrap himself in a vision, make a house of apparent form and stability, and fixity. In his terror of chaos he begins by putting up an umbrella between himself and the everlasting whirl" (Phoenix, 255). This 'apparent' form, stability and fixity, and above all, the 'vision' Lawrence speaks of here have cast a spell on the critics of Leavis tradition. Again, this mistaking of the thought adventurer in Lawrence for a prophet with a 'vision' has elicited strong disapproval from the Marxists and the early second-wave feminists. Lawrentian thought, as he emphasizes on most occasions, is 'dynamic'5. We may define Lawrence's thought from what he says about it in his "Preface" to his Pansies, a collection of his poems. True thought, as he defines it, "comes from the heart and the genitals as from the head" (Phoenix: 279). Thought in Lawrence is liberated from any fixity as he says about thought in the same "Preface" that "it is an independent creature...with its small head and tail, trotting down its own little way, then curling to sleep."(Phoenix: 279).

Lawrence's criticism of culture is not grounded on idealism with a fixed set of emphases. His stance as a critic of culture does not mark a shift of loyalty from the mechanistic and spiritually collapsing Judeo-Christian culture to humanist individualism. His criticism of culture is an exploration of the various ways that disrupt the monolith of Judeo-Christian culture and celebrate indeterminacy, inconclusiveness and provisionality. In Lawrence's schema, all pursuits of knowledge are to be submitted to the unknown after pursuing them to their furthest limit6. The fixity he denounces is mistakenly tagged on to him by the generations of Lawrence critics. The concept of 'centre', 'identity', 'truth', and 'meaning'—the favourite haunts of contemporary critical modes—are always put into question by Lawrence by privileging the 'other' against the 'self', 'difference' against 'identity',

'fluidity' against 'fixity', 'body' against 'mind', 'becoming' against 'being', the 'unconscious' against the Cartesian ego and the 'in-human' against the 'human'. Even the apparently strong and stable individualism of Lawrence dissolves into an illusion in ultimate analysis. This destabilization of the critical figure of Lawrence occurs when Lawrence "is removed from behind the dominant image manufactured by Leavis" (Widdowson, 17). Our study seeks to liberate Lawrence the critic of culture from what the critical gaze up to 1990s have made of him and situate his cultural criticism within the context of currently competing critical ideas.

This study draws heavily on the new critical approaches to Lawrence that started in 1990s. Writings on Lawrence in our times produce a sense of disjunction and disorientation for the critics. The contesting views about Lawrence provide us a strong argument for the radical indeterminacy in Lawrence. Peter Widdowson puts forward an emphatic question: "Can there really be, simultaneously, the phallocrat/ misogynist and liberating writer of the phallic imagination?"(18). Lawrence's refusal of 'settlement' has already been pointed out by critics like Raymond Williams (Widdowson: 19-20). Widmer likewise has found "conflicted awareness"of Lawrence (Widmer: 163). Gamini Salgado finds Women in Love "not merely a novel that accommodates contradictory readings, it positively invites and even compels them" (1991: 20). This novel is, according to the same critic, shot through with a continuous "tension between the necessity of articulation of vision and a sense of its impossibility, and sometimes undesirability (1991. 20). This tension between the articulation of vision and a sense of its meaninglessness flows beneath the surface of Lawrence's non-fictional writings. Widdowson underlines ambivalence, contradiction and self-cancellation in Lawrence's discourse. He has rightly observed:

> the vast, and vastly differentiated, cultural reproduction of Lawrence's work means that we can make less and less sense of it in an absolute way—as its contradictory, heteroglossic, polyvocal discourse deconstructs beneath, and because of, our transfixed critical gaze. All we can do is to reconstruct it, temporarily and partially, in our own image and for our own ends (Widdowson. 24).

Moreover, the organicist imagery in Lawrence's literary and cultural criticism has misled the critics into taking it to be an organic form. In her Introduction to The Cambridge Companion to D.H.Lawrence, Anne Fernihaugh has pointed that out, "Lawrence's very hybridity, which has always made him difficult to pigeonhole, gave him a new found legitimacy as an object of study" (6). Lawrence is a cultural critic in the sense in which today's cultural critics are—eclectic in their approach to reading and writing. Lawrence criticism, she points out, gets a new fillip and direction on new lines with the opening up of feminism into a broad-based and more flexible concept of gender studies. All these contemporary studies open up new horizons of Lawrence criticism and for us, a new approach to Lawrence as a critic of culture.

Many of Lawrence's important pieces appear periodically after his death. This phoenix-like reappearance of his writings is accompanied by the publication of the hitherto unpublished versions of his already published text. Many and divergent versions of his texts underline the provisionality of Lawrence's writings. These texts, according to Eggert, suggest contingency, change and variation, and belie the idea of organic growth to some predestined goal of literary perfection (Fernihough: 7). According to Fernihough again, in his discursive writing, Lawrence is as insistent as he is inconsistent. While this 'insistence' of Lawrence has been taken literally by critics until the onset of "hopeless and horizonless"7 postmodern aesthetics, it is time we also reckon with his 'inconsistency' that suggests fluidity. John Worthen and Rick Rylance have emphasized Lawrence's use of "multiple consciousness" (Fernihough: 7). All such postmodern orientations of Lawrence criticism have inspired us to study the dominant ideas of Lawrence's criticism of culture in the light of postmodern productive indeterminacy.

In his Studies in Classic American Literature, Lawrence has said "Never trust the artist. Trust the tale."8. This has now become a classic dictum and resonates with the postmodern emphasis on the death of an author. Following him, we can say that we need not discover a visionary or a prophet in him. We need rather emphasize the creative and provisional nature of his ideas as a critic of culture. Lawrence's pursuit of knowledge by way of destabilizing it continuously also underlines the

provisionality of his discourse as a critic of culture. This provisionality is not a symptom of weakness but the strength of his discourse that always invites new readings of his ideas. It is a further proof of Lawrence's love of life's liveliness as against the abstractness of ideas about life. Reading such as the one we have taken up here is supported by the provisionality of Lawrentian thought that always leaves room for further new readings. We here offer to reread the dominant ideas in Lawrence's criticism of culture such as his concept of the body in the light of contemporary thought in the first chapter, explore their correspondence with contemporary feminism in the second, review his concept of gender in the critical context of our times in the third, reorient his ideas of ethics and aesthetics in the fourth and in the fifth chapter we shall make an overall exploration of Lawrentian thought adventure in the light of postmodern thought.

NOTES

1. The term is Mark Spilka's. In her Introduction to D. H. Lawrence: A Collection of Critical Essays, Spilka writes, "If, as [Eliseo] Vivas holds, that vision enables us to grasp 'the specific process of disintegration of which we are the victims', it may also help us, individually if not collectively, to reverse that process. The moral formalists, those who have rescued Lawrence from comparative oblivion, suggest that it will" (12).
2. Paul Eggert has used the term "enclosed specialism" to mean the predictability of methods and terminology of Lawrence studies in the essay "Opening up the Text: the case of Sons and Lovers" (Brown ed.: 38).
3. Gamini Salgado applies the term "radical indeterminacy" to the "principal effect" of Women in Love achieved through language. He says, "There seems to me to be the three aspects of Lawrence's language which point to the radical indeterminacy which is the novel's principal object" (Widdowson ed. 138). Widdowson similarly points to the "radically unstable discourse" of Lawrence (19-20).
4. Giles Deleuze, the French philosopher. We'll discuss the points of affinity between Deleuze and Lawrence in the chapters that follow.
5. Throughout his Fantasia of the Unconscious and Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, Lawrence contrasts "dynamic" thought with the "fixed" one. The emphasis on "dynamic" thought also figures prominently in his other major nonfictional writings.
6. The central arguments of our study draw heavily on Lawrence's emphasis on the paradoxical notion that man must know in order to learn how not to know.
7. Sandra Gilbert's term which she has used to deny Lawrence's ahistorical affiliation of postmodern thought (Fernihough: 236).
8. Page. 8.

LAWRENCE AND THE BODY

> For man, the vast marvel is to be alive. For man, as for flower, and beast and bird, the supreme triumph is to be most vividly, most profoundly alive. Whatever the unborn and the dead may know, they cannot know the beauty, the marvel of being alive in the flesh (Apocalypse, 149).

Our aim in this chapter is to review and reassess Lawrence's concept of the body in the light of contemporary theorists of the body. Central to Lawrence's criticism of culture is the thought that the status of the body in the dominant intellectual tradition, or the Judeo-Christian culture for that matter, has largely been one of absence or dismissal. Lawrence has strongly opposed the Judeo-Christian culture that regarded the body as the mundane path to a higher spirituality. He has equally denounced the post-Cartesian tendency of Western philosophy to reject the body as an obstacle to pure thought. This 'somatophobia'1 of Western philosophy, a product of Judeo-Christian culture, is a cause of serious concern for both Lawrence and the contemporary feminists.

The devalued status of the body in the Western philosophical tradition is strongly contested by Lawrence and the feminists. Rene Descartes, a seventeenth century French philosopher and scientist, is the most influential of all modern philosophers to have assigned a derogatory status to the body. In his formulation, the process of thinking precedes the process of being in the world. The Western philosophical tradition since Descartes has regarded the body as the site of unruly passions and appetites that might frustrate the pursuit of knowledge and truth. The mind/body binary of the Enlightenment and its emphasis on mind have been challenged by the feminists. Like them, Lawrence the critic of culture has expressed his disbelief in the truth-claims of the Cartesian subject. He is suspicious of the Cartesian idea of mind as a disembodied universal. He has also doubted the transcendence of corporeality of the thinking subject and its claim to be a neutral observer. Like Nietzsche, Lawrence views the Dionysian substratum of being as the source and support of spiritual

qualities in our nature. Nietzsche's Zarathustra says, "Once the soul looked contemptuously upon the body: and then the contempt was the supreme good- the soul wanted the body lean, monstrous, famished. So the soul thought to escape from the body and from the earth" (Nietzsche: 42). The antithetical attitude of Western philosophy to the body and the spirit in Judeo-Christian culture is therefore the main target of Lawrence's attack as a critic of culture. Lawrence has a strong distrust in the Cartesian ego and has decried its exaltation over the body. He looks upon this Cartesian exaltation of mind over the body as the epiphenomenon of Judeo-Christian culture. He has reversed the status of the body in the Cartesian binary by emphasizing the primacy of being over knowing: "In his adventure of self-consciousness a man must come to the limit of himself and become aware of something beyond him" (Phoenix, 185). In Lawrence's schema, the mind and its "adventure of self consciousness" are subordinated to the limitless "beyond", which is the unconscious. An individual is a unit of the unconscious—an individual not in his mental consciousness but in his/her body. The "beyond" is therefore represented by the body that continuously renews itself with the help of mind at its service. This subordination of mind to the body forms the central argument of Lawrence the critic of culture. In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence assigns a devalued status to knowledge attained through mind. He posits, "Knowledge is to consciousness what signpost is to a traveler: just an indication of the way which has been traveled before" (76). In the same book Lawrence elaborates on his point, emphasizing the need to subject mind to the body—the site and centre that enables man to live dynamically:

> This supreme lesson of human consciousness is to learn how not to know. That is, how not to interfere. That is, how to live dynamically, from the great source, and not statically, like machines driven by ideas or principles from the head, from one fixed desire. At last, knowledge must be put into its true place in the living activity of man (76).

The idea of living dynamically, denied by the Western philosophical thought, aligns Lawrence with Trinh T. Minh-ha, one of the leading contemporary feminists. We shall elaborate on this correspondence later in this chapter.

That the body is the most important site in Lawrence's thought adventure is proved by the fact that Lawrence has strongly decried the crucifixion of the body in Judeo-Christian culture. He traces the roots of this denunciation of the body in this culture and says that this denunciation is synonymous with the denial of woman. In Phoenix, Lawrence says, "Christ rose from the supposed male spirit in Judea, and uttered a new commandment. He repudiated woman: 'who is my mother?'" (452). This repudiation of woman, the body, Lawrence argues, had continued in Europe throughout the Middle Ages and even in his own times because of the all-pervading influence of Judeo-Christian culture. Lawrence expresses a Foucauldian concern for the crucifixion, destruction of the body. In Phoenix, he says,

> The history of our era is the nauseating and repulsive history of the crucifixion of the procreative body for the glorification of the spirit, the mental consciousness....The Renaissance put the spear to the side of the already crucified body, and syphilis put poison into the wound made by the imaginative spear. It took still three hundred years for the body to finish; but in the eighteenth century it became a corpse, a corpse with an abnormally active mind: and totally it stinketh (569).

The 'era' here is the era of Judeo-Christian culture in which Lawrence has detected the inordinate devaluation of the body. Lawrence has pointed out the inscription of Christian culture on the body. But unlike Foucault, Lawrence's analysis of the cultural inscription of the body is less systematic. Foucault's historically dynamic account of the manner in which the micro-political operations of power produce socially appropriate bodies, does not have any close resemblance with Lawrence as such. Yet, at the macro-level, Lawrence's concern for the crucifixion of the body largely corresponds with that of Foucault. Both Lawrence and Foucault focus on the destruction of the body by a historical process of inscription. In his essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History", Foucault writes: "Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is...situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body"(148). For Foucault, the body is a 'site' for the complex interplay of

knowledge and power. Lawrence is just aware of such an interplay which he has not developed. In her essay, "Lawrence, Foucault, and the Language of Sexuality", Lydia Blanchard has rightly pointed out: "Lawrence was certainly interested in the full conscious realization of sex, but that interest was, for him as for Foucault, part of a broader interest in the relation between language, sexuality, power and knowledge" (123). This comment on Lawrence's anticipation of the Foucauldian concept on the deployment of sexuality on the body is applicable to Lawrence's awareness of the modern forms of power which are exercised at the micro-level of the body, of course on a broad basis. Lawrence the critic of culture views the body, as Foucault does, as something that defies attempts at conceptualization—something fluid, inconclusive and contingent. For Foucault, it is only through discipline and confession that the discursive construction of the body is made possible. In Power/Knowledge Foucault says, "If it had been possible to constitute a knowledge of the body, this has been by way of an ensemble of military and educational disciplines. It was on the basis of power over the body that a psychological, organic knowledge of it became possible" (59). On the basis of his awareness of such discursive construction of the body, Lawrence emphasizes the need to renew our discourses continually by putting a limit to the pursuit of knowledge and by emphasizing at the same time the need to subject all knowledge to the unknown. We have already quoted to refer to this aspect of his thought. In The Symbolic Meaning, Lawrence insists on the same point: "When we know that the unique, incommutable, creative mystery of the self is within us and precedes us, then we shall be able to take our full being from this mystery. We shall at last learn the pure lesson of knowing not to know"(49). Foucault would certainly have agreed with Lawrence's emphasis on 'being', which is the Lawrentian term for the 'lived body' in its fluidity:

> When the great Christian will-to-knowledge is fulfilled; and when the great barbaric will-to-power is also satisfied; then, perhaps, man can recognize that neither power nor knowledge is the ultimate man's attainment, but only being; that the pure reality lies not in an infinitude, but in the mystery of the perfect unique self, incommutable; not in any eternity, but in the sheer Now (The Symbolic Meaning, 48-9).

Lawrence the critic of culture attaches great importance to the process of learning: "the pure lesson of knowing not to know" (The Symbolic: 49). This emphasis, Lydia Blanchard has rightly argued, aligns Lawrence fundamentally with Foucault.

Lawrence's concept of the body has affinity with that of the contemporary feminists in many respects. These feminists, like Lawrence, have exposed the somatophobia of Western thought. As Moira Gatens writes, "Recent feminist research suggests that the history of Western thought shows a deep hatred and fear of the body" (Price, 228). Right from the beginning the feminist project it is connected to the body. What has mattered to feminism is the insistence of the mind/body binary by the dominant culture and the enduring association of the devalued term with the feminine. The female body as it is viewed by the dominant culture, is intrinsically unpredictable, leaky and disruptive and is capable of generating ontological anxiety. As such, the early second wave feminists, especially Simon de Beauvoir, have regarded the body as something to be rejected in the pursuit of intellectual quality. Other feminist writers have developed theories which are explicitly embodied such as 'ecriture feminine'. Luce Irigaray , for example, has insisted on the centrality of the material body. Yet another group of the recent feminist writers have put into question the givenness of the natural body. Instead they have posited a textual corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings.

Lawrence does of course not share the theories of these three groups of feminists in their entirety. Yet he shares with them their major concerns. He associates the female with the body. But unlike Beauvoir, who has likened female genital sexuality to a 'carnivorous swamp'(Price, 4), Lawrence has celebrated the body in the female. In Phoenix, he says, "The true female will eternally hold herself superior to any idea, will hold full life in the body to be the real happiness" (481). Simon de Beauvoir's comment on the reproductive aspect of the female body also underlines her dismissive attitude towards it: "It is impossible simply to equate gestation with a task, a piece of work, or with a service, such as military service. Woman's life is more seriously broken in upon by a demand for children than by regulation of the citizen's employment" (Beauvoir, 90).

What Lawrence has said about the female body a few lines back—that women 'will hold full life in the body'—corresponds with the emphasis of Luce Irigaray on sexual difference. Similarly, Lawrence's concept of the body embraces embodied sexual difference. In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence posits, "A child is born sexed. A child is either male or female; every single living cell is either male or female and will remain either male or female as long as life lasts" (96). The biological determinism suggested here is not Lawrence's strong emphasis. Like Lawrence, Irigaray celebrates female embodiment. She emphasizes multiple forms of female embodiment, such as the self-touching two-lips that characterize female morphology: "Between our lips, yours and mine, several voices, several ways of speaking resound endlessly, back and forth. One is never separable from the other. You/I: we are always several at once" (Irigaray, 1985, 209). Irigaray's emphasis is on the fluidity, which marks the inherent excess of the feminine, resonates with the sense of fluidity contained in Lawrence's concept of the body. Her concern is, as pointed out by Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick, not with the female body as such but with the "feminine morphological imaginary"(Price, 6). In his concept of the body, Lawrence is also mainly concerned with the morphological imaginary, rather than with the lived body, at least in his non-fictional writings.

Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan, the two great psychoanalysts, have preferred to present a psychic body map, a morphological imaginary, to giving a concept of the flesh and blood body. For Freud, the biological body is overlaid with psychical and social significance. In the schema of Freud and Lacan, the infant does not have a unified, hierarchical relation to the body as it does not yet occupy a fixed and bounded space. Both of them link the genesis of the ego with the formation of the body. The ego is produced through a series of identifications and introjections of the image of the others. It is also produced by the rechanneling of the libidinal impulses in the subject's own body. In Lacan's terms, the child experiences its body as disunified and disorganized, a fragmented body. Lacan describes this body as a 'Lommelette', a subject-to-be. For Lacan, the ego is not a projection of the real body, the body of anatomy, but of an imaginary anatomy. The imaginary anatomy is not an internalized image of the meaning that the body has for its subject, for others

in the social world and for its culture as a whole. Lawrence's concept of the biological body is inseparably linked up with the concept of the psyche. In his Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence traces the development of the body through the development of the four primary centres of the psyche: "From these centres develop the great functions of the body" (Fantasia, 58). The coordination of these four primary centres in the grown-up individual, according to their respective primacy, gives primacy to the body. Immediately after its birth, the child, in its 'solar plexus', the primary centre of the psyche, is aware of himself and is conscious of—

> An awareness also that outside this quiet gate, this navel, lies a whole universe on which you can lay tribute. Aha—at birth you closed the central gate for ever. Too dangerous to leave it open. There are eyes and mouths and ears and nostrils, besides the two lower gates of the passionate body and the closed but not locked gates of the breasts (Fantasia, 28).

There is no 'introjection' and 'projection' in Lawrence's schema. The individual comes to terms with the outside world with the development of another important psychic centre in him—which Lawrence calls 'lumber ganglion': "At the lumber ganglion I know that I am I, in distinction from a whole universe, which is not I am this is the first tremendous flash of knowledge of singleness and separate identity" (Fantasia, 35). In Lawrence the Real and the Imaginary are closely linked up unlike what we find in Lacan:

> The actual evolution of the individual psyche is a result of the interaction between the individual and the outer universe. Which means that just as a child in the womb grows as a result of the parental blood stream which nourishes the vital quick of the foetus, so does every man and woman grow and develop as a result of a polarized flux between the spontaneous self and some other self or selves. It is the circuit of vital flux between itself and other being or beings which bring about the development and evolution of every individual psyche or physique (Fantasia, 246).

For Lawrence, the body is 'given', but it lacks fixity and stability. It is never separated from the maternal plenitude, as it renews itself continuously by surrendering itself to the unconscious, the unknown. This continuous renewal ensures its fluidity. Like Freud and Lacan, Lawrence emphasizes the role of psychic processes on the body, but does not accept Lacan's concept of the rupture from the mother (the 'Real') for the formation of the ego (the 'Imaginary') which, in Lacan's schema, is not a projection of the real biological body. In the Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says about the solar plexus, "From the first great centre of sympathy, the child is drawn to a lovely oneing with the mother" (71). Through this solar plexus, the child continues to have maternal plenitude even when he grows up.

Freud, Lacan and the feminists like Melanie and Nancy Chodorow—all have a degree of alienation from the maternal body. But for Lawrence the solar plexus, the primary centre of the psyche, where a child feels at one with the mother, is never separated and the grown-up individual continues to draw his vitality. Lawrence, however, posits that the central gate, the naval, of the gender-neutral body that opens on to the 'whole universe', is closed for ever at the time of birth. But the other gates such as eyes, mouths, ears, nostrils and two lower gates of the passionate body remain open. But as regards the central gate, Lawrence is categorical: "Too dangerous to leave it open" (Fantasia, 28). This 'central gate' in Lawrence's schema thus corresponds with the 'Real' in Lacan's.

This question of 'danger' here reminds us of Julia Kristeva's theory of the "abject'. "The abject is what the subject seeks to expel in order to achieve an independent identity but this is impossible since the body cannot cease both to take in and expel objects" (Brooker, 1). In Kristeva's schema, the abject is always ambiguous: desirable and terrifying, nourishing and murderous. "It is violent, clumsy breaking away with the constant risk of falling back under the sway of a power as securing as it is stifling" (Kristeva, 1982: 13). The abject threatens the corporeal and psychic boundaries of the embodied self. This intrinsic but unstable part of the self corresponds with the unease of the Judeo-Christian culture with the bodily, and especially female bodily, fluids. Women, associated with the abject are both dangerous and excluded others. At the same time, they are, as mothers, an

originary presence. For Kristeva, abjection is a process by which the child takes up its own body image through detaching itself from the improper and unclean connection with the body of the mother.(Price, 103) In Powers of Horror, Kristeva argues that the female body is quintessentially the "abject" body because of its procreative functions.

For Lawrence, the presence of the mother is often dangerous as it threatens to devour the child. But in such cases, the mother deviates from her 'originary presence' and is prompted instead by her 'will' from the upper centre of her consciousness, from her 'ego'. That is why Lawrence emphasizes that the mother-child "communication must be impersonal" (Phoenix, 625). The abject of Kristeva corresponds with Lawrence's concept of the unconscious in so far as the unconscious is posited in Lawrence's schema as the originary principle/site. But unlike Kristeva's abject, Lawrence's unconscious is "the spontaneous life-motive in every organism" (Fantasia, 212). "The true unconscious is the well-head, the fountain of real motivity" (Fantasia, 207). In Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, Lawrence affirms, "We must discover, if we can, the true unconscious, where our life bubbles up in us, prior to any mentality. The first bubbling life in us, which is innocent of any mental alteration, this is the unconscious. It is pristine, not in any way ideal" (Fantasia, 212). Kristeva's abject is certainly not 'ideal', but it is not 'pristine' either. The child, in Lawrence's conception, does not have to alienate itself gradually from its mother for the appropriation of its well-defined body. The abject always poses a threat to stability, identity and fixity of the materialized body. Lawrence's unconscious also ensures, because of its connection with the body throughout the lifetime, a renewal of the already formed subject and stands as a disruptive force for any kind of fixity. The ambiguity of desirability and horror that characterizes Kristeva's abject is alien to Lawrence's concept of the unconscious.

Lawrence's concept of the unconscious can be aligned with Judith Butler's theory of the 'constructive outside'. But Lawrence's unconscious, the source and support of all our being, is less concrete than either Butler's 'constructive outside' or Kristeva's 'abject'. In this respect, both the feminists are preoccupied with the quest for the process in which femininity is constructed by culture. In Butler's case, the

'constructive outside' is associated with the feminine body and Kristeva's 'abject' is related to the feminine body in the same way. But Lawrence's unconscious is gender-neutral. In Butler's view, the bodies that fail to materialize provide the necessary 'outside' for materialization of bodies that matter. ("Bodies That Matter", 243) Lawrence's emphasis on women's close association and almost identification with the body that the Judeo-Christian culture has devalued opens up new perspectives of his association with Kristeva and Butler. Lawrence would certainly have agreed with Kristeva's concept of the 'abject' on a broad basis and with Butler's theory of the 'constructive outside', since he has always exalted body over mind, being over knowing.

Butler's 'bodies that matter' and Kristeva's 'subject' that is formed by a process of constant exclusion of the 'abject' are not the real bodies that have been devalued by Judeo-Christian culture. Lawrence is, on the other hand, concerned with bodies that are always in the process of change, mutation and even transformation because of its inseparable link with the unconscious. It is the link that the Judeo-Christian culture has attempted to cut off. Lawrence the critic of culture has celebrated the fluid constituent of the body that disrupts and enables being to renew itself and be reborn like the mythological bird, phoenix.

Lawrence's concept of the ego as 'spurious self' that denies life contained in the body, his concept of theory and above all his concept of the solar plexus as the primal spontaneous centre of consciousness—have vital correspondence with those of T. Minh-ha, a leading contemporary feminist. We have referred to the feminist project of writing the body, 'ecriture feminine', of the French feminists like Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray in our chapter on Lawrence and feminism. Minh-ha's reading of Cixous's project reminds us of Lawrence's emphasis on body in writing, as she comments: "Woman, as Cixous defines her, is a whole—'whole composed of parts that are wholes'—through which language is born over and over again." (Minh-ha, 260).

Minh ha's concept of the ego is essentially Lawrentian. She argues: "Ego is an identification with the mind. When ego develops, the head takes over and exerts a

tyrannical control over the rest of the body" (Minh-ha, 261). Unlike Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler, Minh-ha emphasizes the tyrannical sway of mind over body, which is, like that of Lawrence, gender-neutral. In Lawrence's schema, cognition takes place in mind as a result of the perfect polarized circuit established between the first four poles of dynamic consciousness: "The moment there is a perfect polarized circuit between the first four poles of dynamic consciousness, at that moment does the mind, the terminal station, flash into cognition" (Fantasia, 74). The 'circuit' is established through 'the whole body' (75). But when the mind, the ego, takes over the rest of the body, it perversely provokes responses. Life loses its vitality and turns mechanistic by living from a fixed idea. The mind on its own can only give us a set of fixed ideas that have no dynamic value. In Phoenix, Lawrence argues that the mind subtly provokes and dictates our feelings and impulses (629). Lawrence the critic of culture warns against the fixity of ego that denies all spontaneous vitality of life: "But once we fall into the state of egoism, we cannot change. The ego, the self conscious ego, remains fixed, a final envelope around us" (Phoenix II, 396).

Lawrence's concept of the solar plexus as the first psychic centre in man of the profound and pristine consciousness quite significantly corresponds with Minh-ha's similar postulation. This centre (the solar plexus) is the closest one to the body in Lawrence's schema. In her essay "Write Your Body", Minh-ha draws on the procedures prevalent in Asia according to which there are three centres in our psyche: the intellectual, the emotional and the vital. She concentrates on the vital centre and writes,

> This centre, located below the navel, radiates life. It directs vital movement and allows one to relate to the world with instinctual immediacy. But instinctual here is not opposed to reason, for it lies outside the classical realm of duality assigned to the sensible and the intelligible (Minh-ha, 262).

Lawrence's concept of the solar plexus is also located below the navel. The 'vital movement' and 'instinctual immediacy' that this centre provides are very close to Lawrence's concept of the function of solar plexus. Lawrence's concept of the

whole consciousness begins from one sympathetic centre and is achieved through its polarization with its corresponding voluntary centre and finally through the correspondence of the complete dynamic flow in one plane with the other. Minh-ha's concept of 'body consciousness' corresponds with Lawrence's whole consciousness in which the mind/body binary is transcended. Minh-ha relates this vital centre with women's body-writing:

> So does certain women's womb writing, which neither separates the body from the mind nor sets the latter against the heart...but allows each part of the body to become infused with consciousness. Again, bring a new awareness of life into previously forgotten, silenced or deadened areas of the body (Minh-ha, 262).

To this centre of the body Minh-ha attributes the capacity to infuse the whole body with consciousness. Lawrence likewise emphasizes the qualitative difference of the knowledge provided by the solar plexus from mental knowledge:

> Primarily we know, each man, each living creature knows, profoundly and satisfactorily, and without question, that I am I. This root of all knowledge and being is established in the solar plexus; it is dynamic, pre-mental knowledge, such as cannot transferred into thought (Fantasia, 34).

Minh-ha would certainly agree with Lawrence that women's body-writing does not concern itself with mere 'thought' with all its fixity as is suggested by Lawrence here. Minh-ha's emphasis on the unknown in the writing of women is again Lawrentian: "the writing of women is really translated from the unknown, like a new way of communicating rather than an already formed language" (Minh-ha, 264).

In spite of his great concern for the body, Lawrence has not defined the body as such. The contemporary feminist Luce Irigaray has celebrated the multiple forms of female embodiment but has not defined normative body. The slipperiness of the body proves that it is fluid, dynamic and contingent—the point on which both

Lawrence and the feminists agree. Lawrence focuses on this elusiveness of the body in his Fantasia of the Unconscious metaphorically:

> It is no good looking at a tree to know it. The only thing is to sit among the roots and nestle against its strong trunk, and not bother. That's how I write all about these planes and plexuses—between the toes of a tree, forgetting myself against the great ankle of the trunk (43).

Spivak and Butler are of the same view, although their respective emphases are different. Butler says, with her characteristic insistence on performativity/discursive construction of the body: "There is no reference to a pure body which is not at the same time a further formation of that body" (Butler, 1993, 10). Spivak's emphasis is more general than that of Butler and therefore closer to that of Lawrence: "There are thinkings of the systematicity of the body, there are value codings of the body; the body as such cannot be thought" (Spivak, 149). This definition or the negation of it by stating its indefinability reminds us of what Lawrence has said about the 'dynamic pre-mental knowledge' to which one has access through the solar plexus. It is the knowledge which 'cannot be transferred into thought' (Fantasia, 34). Lawrence the critic of Judeo-Christian culture has focused on its deadening fixity because of its dismissal of the body. This culture, Lawrence argues, has rendered all thoughts of the post-Cartesian Western philosophy meaningless. He seeks to escape from this cul-de-sac by celebrating the fluid body as the contemporary feminists are doing, although sometimes for a different purpose.

Lawrence's celebration of fluidity of the body is shared by Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. In this book these two influential thinkers of the late twentieth century have used the term 'rhizome' to characterize the difference and multiplicity of the body. 'Rhizome' is the botanical form of growth seen, for example, in an iris and which, unlike a single root form, produces different points of equal growth across a lateral path. These governing principles of multiplicity and flow or 'lines of flight' are opposed to the tyranny of the One and the Same. For Deleuze and Guattari, "A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo" (1987, 25). In their schema, the

rhizomatic growth of the body underlines its 'in-human' character. Lawrence's similar emphasis on the 'unknown' in respect of the body to underline its difference and multiplicity opens up vistas of vital correspondence between him and these thinkers. Both Lawrence and these thinkers seek to 'deterritorialize' the static and fixed model of Western thought by celebrating the body in its multiplicity.

Lawrence's celebration of the fluid body once again aligns with the more recent form of feminism—cyberfeminism. Cyberfeminists like Donna Haraway have emphasized the radical fluidity of the body by arguing that the body of the late 20th century and beyond is determined neither by biological givens and boundaries nor by discursive regimes of power. For Haraway, the body constitutes a field of conflicting and unstable flows that ushers in revolution in informatics. As she has it, "Sociological stories depend on a high-tech view of the body as a biotic component or cybernetic communications system" (1991, 169). Lawrence certainly does not fully share this view of the body posited by Haraway. Lawrence was historically at a distance from the cybernetics communications system. Yet he can be said to have dimly anticipated Haraway's ironic configuration of the half-organic, half-mechanic cyborg: "The moment man learned to abstract, he began to make engines that would do the work of his body" (Phoenix, 29). With Haraway and her cyberfeminism the body has transcended the anatomical difference between the sexes—the difference that has been emphasized by Luce Irigaray. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick have rightly pointed out that "a large part of Haraway's own project has been to problematize the category not just of the female but of the human itself" (Price, 11). This concept of the gender-neutral body again aligns her with Lawrence. But the most important point that Lawrence shares with Haraway is the concept of the gender-neutral body marked by fluidity. Lynda Birke's reading of Haraway's vision emphasizes this point. She says, "Donna Haraway's vision of the cyborg also implies fluidity. She speaks of polymorphous, intuitive systems, emphasizing rates of flow across boundaries rather than bodily integrity" (Birke, 46).

In Lawrence's concept, the body is always marked by inconclusiveness, fluidity and contingency. In his Preface and Introduction to Books, an essay included in Phoenix, Lawrence has celebrated a sense of inconclusiveness, immediacy and "the

quality of life itself" in painting where "everything is left in its rapid, fluid relationship with the rest of things" (Phoenix, 220). The qualities of 'mutation', 'haste', 'inconclusiveness', 'immediacy' and 'fluidity' that Lawrence speaks of here2 are the qualities of life with which the body, a unit of life, is invested. Therefore, at a deeper level, Haraway's concept resonates with that of Lawrence.

Lawrence's concept of the body as an unknown site, a unit of the unconscious, that defies attempts at conceptualization. It is further illustrated by his comparison of the body with the 'darkest Africa'. This comparison again brings to the fore the elusive aspect of the body: "In the darkest continent of the body there is God. And from him issue the first dark rays of our feelings, wordless, and utterly impervious to words" (Phoenix, 759). His insistence is on the continuous renewal of the body from its source and therefore the conception of it is radically contingent. This point is touched upon by Elizabeth Grosz: "The stability of the unified body image, even in the so-called normal subject, is always precarious. It cannot be simply taken for granted as an accomplished fact, for it must be continually renewed" (Grosz, 1994, 43-44)

Long before the contemporary feminists have launched their attack against 'biological determinism' and 'biopolitics' on the ground that the truth claims of biological science is basically false, Lawrence has expressed his distrust of the truth-claims of science in matters relating to the human body. In Fantasia of the Unconscious., Lawrence says, "Science is wretched in its treatment of human body as a sort of complex mechanism made of numerous little machines working automatically in a rather unsatisfactory relation to one another" (55). This distrust of Lawrence is reflected in the destabilization of the biological body as a universal, stable entity in the writings of contemporary feminist theorists such as Emily Martin, Jane Sawicki, Donna Haraway and Susan Bordo who have offered new readings of the body. They have taken the concept of the body beyond Enlightenment claim to reveal the truth of bodies in their gross materiality.

Lawrence's concept of blood-consciousness, of 'dynamic consciousness' and of 'physical psyche' threaten the Cartesian mind/body split. He tries to overcome this

binary by putting the mind into its place and by insisting on an alternative awareness that incorporates the wholeness of the body. All these three concepts discussed above aim at overcoming the hierarchical relation in the Cartesian binary that is a product of the Judeo-Christian culture. In this respect Lawrence's theory of the body invites comparison with that of the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty posits a subject who knows because the body knows. His work rejects the Cartesian duality of mind and the body for a notion of subjectivity as the lived body. Merleau-Ponty argues, "You are your body and your body is the potential of a certain world" (1962, 106). His phenomenological approach sees the growing infant as embarking on the construction of its subjectivity through its relations with the world. In his schema, the gradual accrual of personal and largely unconscious habitual bodily attitudes towards the world, organize sense impressions, and structure the meaning of lived experience. In Merleau-Ponty's conception the body produces and enables social interaction. He says, "It is through the body that I understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive things" (1962, 186).

Lawrence's exaltation of dynamic consciousness over mental consciousness emphasizes his affinity with Ponty. This "dynamic consciousness", Lawrence writes, is "pre-cerebral consciousness"3 and is therefore associated with the body. Lawrence's concept of 'blood consciousness' reveals the extent of his affinity with Ponty's concept of the conscious body. Again in The Symbolic Meaning, Lawrence makes a very significant exposition of his concept of an alternative consciousness which is corporeal:

> The blood is awake: the whole blood-system—system of the body is a great field of primal consciousness. But in the nervous system the primary consciousness is localized and specialized. Each great nerve centre has its own peculiar consciousness, its own peculiar mind, its own primary precepts and concepts, its own spontaneous desires and ideas (135).

In Marleau-Ponty's schema, the body knows and through its knowledge can come to terms with the outside world and other bodies. Lawrence makes the same

point in the extract quoted above. Lawrence illustrates the process of' 'physical thought' formation by an analogy of the bees. He says,

> When a bee leaves its hive and circles round to sense the locality, it is attending with the primary mind to the surrounding objects establishing a primary rapport between its own very tissue and the tissue of the adjacent objects. A process of rapid physical thought takes place, an act of the primary, not the cerebral mind: the sensational, not the ideal consciousness (The Symbolic Meaning, 135).

Lawrence's concept of the "physical thought" here almost provides the rock on which Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account of the body is based. In Lawrence's view, "The foetus is... radically, individually conscious" (Fantasia, 218).

It is not surprising that some contemporary feminists have drawn on the ideas of Merleau-Ponty because he emphasizes the lived body. They are Iris Young, Catriona Mackenzie, and Ros Diprose (Cranny-Francis, 186). For Lynda Birke, "Living the body means experiencing it as transformable, not only as cultural meanings/reading but also within irself" (Birke, 45). After the disappearance of the fixed, biologically given, stable body, some of the feminists are attaching importance to this experience of the lived body. In doing so, they emphasize the fluidity, inconclusiveness and contingency of it. This emphasis, as we have already observed, is profoundly Lawrentian.

Lawrence the critic of culture has put great emphasis on the lived body. In his essay on Herman Melville, included in The Symbolic Meaning, Lawrence formulates his idea of the highest pitch of culture:

> Melville knows how to live and living he knows life. This is the highest pitch of culture. He has really no purpose in mind, no scheme of life for himself. In his actual living he is quite spontaneous, non-moral. All the time he is the living quick of the moment (228).

In Apocalypse, Lawrence regrets the loss of dynamic consciousness of the ancients: "We have lost almost entirely the great and intricately developed sensual awareness, and sense knowledge of the ancients. It was a great depth of knowledge arrived at direct by instinct and intuition" (91).

For Lawrence, the famous book of seven seals, the Apocalypse, is "the body of man" (Apocalypse, 101). The seven seals are the seven centres or gates of the dynamic consciousness. The opening of these seals symbolizes the conquering of the greater psychic centres of the human body. In his adventure of consciousness, Lawrence thus explores the possibility of revival of the body by a movement deep down the body to end the domination of the Logos, the Word, and the Mind over the body in Judeo-Christian culture. In Apocalypse Lawrence draws on Pryse's4 notion of a latent power within man that could be liberated through awakening of the seven principal nerve-centres or 'chakras' along the spine. In Yoga, this power, called 'kundalini', is symbolically represented as a serpent coiled at the base of the spine. When awakened, this serpent releases life-giving force by moving upward and gaining power with the conquest of each 'chakra' or 'plexus' in Lawrence's version. Lawrence's engagement as revealed in his Apocalypse with the project of liberation of the body shares a common agenda with the contemporary feminists. Their project of writing the body, "ecriture feminine", once again, is profoundly Lawrentian.

Lawrence's exploration of the great power of life lying in the lower body and the possibility of its release is one of his seminal attempts at disrupting the Judeo-Christian culture in which the mind enjoys supremacy over the body. It legitimizes in the process male supremacy over the female. By seeking to liberate the body from its devalued status Lawrence does the pioneering work to pave a radical way for the cultural agenda of the contemporary feminists. He seeks to liberate the body from its devalued status—a project similar to that of the contemporary feminists. In "Why the Novel Matters", Lawrence focuses on the centrality of the body, anticipating Merleau-Ponty and the feminists of our times:

"Oh, yes, my body, me alive knows, and knows intensely. As for the sum of all knowledge, it can't be anything more than an accumulation of all things I know in the body, and you, my dear, know in the body" (Phoenix, 534).

NOTES

1. Janet Price and Margrit Shildrick have used the term "somatophobia" to designate the masculinist fear and rejection of the body (Price, 4).
2. The original lines from which we have taken the phrases in quote are: "There must be mutation, swifter than iridescence, haste, not rest, come-and-go, not fixity,inconclusiveness, immediacy, the quality of life itself, without denoument or close (Phoenix, 220).
3. Page. 75 (The Symbolic Meaning).
4. James Pryse is a Dublin theosophist whose book on Apocalypse, The Apocalypse Unsealed had influenced Lawrence. (Apocalypse, 5).

LAWRENCE AND FEMINISM

The close correspondence between Lawrence's concept of the body and that of the contemporary feminists opens up the scope for a fresh reckoning of Lawrence as a critic of culture in relation to feminism. Lawrentian emphasis on man-woman relationship and his 'priest of love' image built on the primacy of this relationship by Mark Spilka have made Lawrence the grist to the mills of the second-wave feminists in the late sixties and the early seventies. But with the onset of the third wave feminism that almost coincides with postmodernism, Lawrentian assumptions were put to fresh scrutiny in terms of contemporary issues like sexual difference, gender, the body, 'ecriture feminine' and sexuality. In this chapter, we shall briefly review the second wave feminists' reading of Lawrence and proceed to assess the worth of the key ideas of Lawrence the critic of culture in relation to the major concerns of the third wave feminism. Since a full-length study of all the areas of feminism is beyond the scope of this single chapter, the issue of gender will be taken up in the next one. Here in this chapter, our main focus is, besides the review of Lawrence-Beauvoir-Millet interaction, on the leading issues of third wave feminism like sexual difference, sexuality, 'ecriture feminine', performativity, essentialism in feminist perspective and 'semiotic'.

"Some of the most developed and influential political critiques of Lawrence are the product of feminist literary criticism", says Fiona Becket (143). Kate Millett's Sexual Politics is the most influential of the 'political critiques of Lawrence' that Fiona has in mind. Kate Millett's blanket condemnation of Lawrence partly derives its sting from Simon de Beauvoir's The Second Sex. Beauvoir has pointed out the tendency in Lawrence, among other such, to offer woman who accepts being defined as the 'Other'—the categorization that is unacceptable to her but which gives a firm ground to the third wave French feminists like Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous. "Lawrence," says Beauvoir, "believes passionately in the supremacy of the male."(1972, 248). Beauvoir's eclecticism is a politically determined one as it is that of Kate Millett. Millett's attack on Lawrence is more stringent as she goes further to expose the phallocentric and misogynistic tendencies in Lawrence. In her highly

influential book, she calls Lawrence "the most talented and fervid of sexual politicians" and comments that Lawrence "is the most subtle as well, for it is through a feminine consciousness that his masculine message is conveyed" (Millett, 71). The question of gender involved in the comment quoted here has escaped the critical gaze of Millett herself. Millett is aware of the "feminine consciousness" in Lawrence but instead of trying sincerely to understand the question of gender contained in it, she unfortunately views it as the subtle tool of a sexual politician. We shall explore a possible correspondence between this "feminine consciousness" and 'ecriture feminine' of the French feminists later on in this chapter.

In Millett's attack on Lawrence, the focus is mainly on those aspects of Lawrence's thought that serve the purpose of exposing the oppressive operations of patriarchy in Lawrence. Her approach is typically one of second wave feminism.— she has excluded the question of gender from her discourse and the point of radical indeterminacy and provisionality in Lawrence. Yet she is not totally unaware of them. Millett's offhand comment is: "One is always struck by the sexual ambiguity in Lawrence" (Millett, 82).

But this issue of ambiguity is sidetracked for the attainment of a predetermined objective. So much preoccupied is Millett with sexual politics that she has diluted even Lawrence's attack on egocentrism. In the same book she says,

> Critics are often misled to fancy that he recommends both sexes cease to be hard struggling little wills and egoists. Such is not the case. Mellors and other Lawrentian heroes incessantly exert their wills over women and the lesser men in their mission to rule (Millett, 76).

She draws her arguments from her identification of Lawrence with Mellors and other heroes. Lawrence by the same token may also be identified with the heroines like Connie, Alvina, Ursula and others. Lawrence's critical corpus contains 'sexual ambiguity'1 but no ambiguity is there in his denunciation of the ego-ideal. Throughout his non-fiction Lawrence has denounced in unequivocal terms the ideal

ego. In Phoenix, he says, "Nothing in the world is more pernicious than the ego or spurious self, the conscious entity with which every individual is saddled." (710).

Lawrence's non-fiction focuses on his quarrel with the Cartesian ego. This firm stance of Lawrence the critic of culture in respect of 'ego' and the projection of anti-feminist ego through Mellors the game keeper in Lady Chatterley's Lover, as Millett views it, are two incompatible things. Millett has sidetracked this incompatibility. Otherwise she would have found in Lawrence a radical uncertainty and provinciality even in respect of male superiority over the female in man-woman relationship. As regards the question of identification of Lawrence with Mellors, Millett's mistake is pointed out by Alison Light who argues that "novels, as constructs of the imagination, might be attempts at 'ungendering' and however unsuccessful at dispersing or even transgressing the gendered experience of an author and its unusual restraints" (Light, 176).

Alison Light is one of the many feminists who have defended Lawrence against the blanket condemnation of him by Kate Millett. Others include Sheila Macleod, Carol Dix, Hilary Simpson, Lydia Blanchard—all of whom share a pro-Lawrence stance opposing that of Millet. Sheila Macleod in her Lawrence's Men and Women (1985) takes a stand countering that of Millet and makes a plea for a balanced view of Lawrence's treatment of man-woman relationship. Carol Dix argues that Lawrence offers as many positive views of woman as negative (Becket, 147). Hilary Simpson in her D.H. Lawrence and Feminism has set Lawrence's changing attitudes to women in the perspective of the contemporary women's movement. Simpson historicizes Lawrence and in so doing does not only show the limitations of Millett's approach but also opens up areas for us to develop new assimilations of Lawrence's conflicting concerns in respect of man-woman relationship. She gives an account of Lawrence's shift "from a liberal, pro-feminist position before the first world war to the rabid post-war vision of women as a destructively dominant sex, and of programmes for masculinist revolution" (Simpson, 90). Although the trajectory of Lawrence's attitude to women culminates in, in Hilary's account, 'programmes for masculinist revolution', we cannot identify her stance with Millett's because the latter lacks the detached standpoint of a historian. What makes her study profitable

for us is that it points to the provisional character of Lawrence's disillusionments with women after the war and it reveals her penetrating insight into Lawrentian concern: "he must have felt that women in whom he had much of his hope for the future had merely become more like men"(Simpson, 94). The provisionality, perhaps inadvertently suggested here, lies in the fact that Lawrence sincerely believed that the men are incapable of any becoming because of their wholesale adoption of Judeo-Christian culture and the only hope of reconstruction lies with women. The fixity of the male culture can only be disrupted by the female, this concern is corroborated by the 'abstract' male and female principles in the exploratory prose of Lawrence. Lawrence's view of the female as the 'unknown' is the source of his provisionality. The principle of the female, the source of creativity, renders all 'fixity' of the male provisional, indeterminate and inconclusive. This association of the female with the 'unknown'—the 'difference' that facilitates 'becoming', is shared by the contemporary French philosopher, Giles Deleuze. The affinity of Lawrence with Deleuze and Guattari is one of the major concerns of our study in the last chapter. Here we limit our discussion to their consensual attitudes towards women.

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari argue that becoming woman is a privileged position (Colebrook, 139). The very concept of man, according to them, stands in the way of our thinking the difference of life—the difference that ensures becoming. Both Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari agree that man, the subject, functions as a stable being or identity. In Deleuze's view, the status of becoming woman is privileged because woman is the opening away from the closed image of man (Colebrook, 140). Lawrence's view of woman is similar to that of Deleuze. Lawrence has denounced the 'stable ego' and its 'One-and-Allness' in the post-Cartesian Western thought. In his "Study of Thomas Hardy", Lawrence has said that the tragedy of Jude

> (I)s the result of over-development of one principle of human life at the expense of the other; an over-balancing; a laving of all the stress on the Male, the Love, the Spirit, the Mind, the Consciousness; a denying, a

> blaspheming against the Female, the Law, the Soul, the Senses, the Feeling (Phoenix: 509).

This 'laving of all the stress on the Male' and a 'blaspheming against the Female' have constituted the concept of 'man'. This male principle is the principal target of Lawrence's attack in his discursive writings. Deleuze and Guattari argue that Western thought is built on the idea of the prohibition of incest, on the idea that we must renounce our desire for our mother in order to become social and human. In their view,

> Woman, therefore is reduced as an impossible, lost and prohibited origin—as what must be repressed and excluded in order for human history to begin. Therefore, they regard becoming- woman as the opening for a new understanding of desire that does not begin with the loss or repression of an original object (Colebrook, 140).

The second reason for the importance of becoming-woman has to do with the impersonal and unbounded nature of sexual desire. In Difference and Repitition, Deleuze insists on the inhuman character of sexsuality. The 'inhuman' here suggests something 'human'. Lawrence's way of looking at the sexual act is similar to that of Deleuze: "But the act, called the sexual act, is not for the depositing the seed. It is for the leaping-off into the unknown, as from a cliff's edge like Sappho into the sea" (Phoenix, 441).

According to Deleuze, desire is pre-personal and pre-human -it is free flow, creative difference and becoming (Colebrook, 142). In his view, thinking a desire beyond the prohibition of woman, thinking a desire that traverses the human body, means thinking of the becoming of woman, not as a sex but as the opening to 'a thousand sexes'(143). In the same vein and with the same emphasis, Lawrence has said in Apocalypse, not in one of his pre-war writings and therefore contrary to Hilary Simpson's observation: "The woman is one of 'wonders'" (123). Lawrence is aware of the pre-personal and pre-human character of desire. In The Symbolic Meaning, Lawrence says, "we must wake and sharpen in ourselves the subtle faculty

for perceiving the greater inhuman forces that control us" (19). Deleuze's association of woman with 'a thousand tiny sexes' finds a correspondence in Lawrence, who, in the "Crown", says: "It is thus seeking consummation in the utter darkness, that I come to the woman in desire: she is the discovery, she is the gate to the dark eternity of power, the creative power" (Phoenix II, 377).

It is true that Lawrence does not share Deleuze's concept of the dissolution of sexual difference into an inhuman flux. Lawrence's identification of woman with the 'creative power', the 'unknown' parallels Deleuze's identification woman with literature (Colebrook, 145). In Phoenix, Lawrence says, "A woman is a living fountain whose spray falls delicately around her....A woman is a strange soft vibration of the air, going forth unknown and unconscious and seeking a vibration of response" (191). Deleuze is aware of such correspondence or perhaps he is just an admirer of Lawrence. "In his (Deleuze's) Essays: Critical and Clinical(1997)", says Colebrook, "we can also look at Deleuze's use of Lawrence, Melville and other writers who make language 'stutter' in order to produce new actualizations from the power of literature" (Colebrook:151).

The parallelism of Lawrence's conception of woman and that of Deleuze and Guattari points to Lawrence's creative options. Lawrence's pre-war hope with women has been recorded by Hilary Simpson. She has cited excerpts from letters Lawrence wrote to his male and female friends. In such letters quoted by Simpson, Lawrence speaks about the need of getting the souls 'fertilized by the female' for 'getting of a vision' (Simpson: 93), "I still have the hope of the woman" (93), and about the crucial role for women in the reconstruction of the state which he envisaged with Bertrand Russell (93). Simpson points out Lawrence's change of attitude towards woman again by quoting a letter by Lawrence to Katherine Mansfield in November, 1918: "I do think women must yield some sort of precedence to a man, and he must take the precedence" (93). This shift of ground in Lawrence is not only because of his ailing health and the consequent desperate bid to grab male grandeur, as Millett has pointed out. Simpson's explanation is more balanced, although it is limited by her assumed role of a historian. The war has certainly shaken Lawrence's hope for women but the larger issues like

identity/difference, being/becoming are also involved here. Mark Spilka's division of Lawrence's career into three sections—early sympathy for women, strengthening of the male to match the female and ultimately the desperate need to insist on male superiority2—is identical with Simpson's study. Sheila Macleod's emphasis on Norman Mailer's comment on Lawrence's slightly uncertain masculinity and the consequent insecurity is again biographical like that of Millett. Mailer's comment on the tyranny of the male over the female in some of Lawrence's later fictions dwells on this biographical aspect. In Mailer's view, domination over women was not tyranny to Lawrence but equality (Brown, 19). Lawrence's criticism of the stranglehold of Judeo-Christian culture, the culture that thrives on the principle of the male, shows his concern for women. To criticize Lawrence for this shifting attitude towards women is to mistake the thought-adventurer in him for a misogynist. The metadiscourse of patriarchy in Lawrence, if any, is deliberately constructed for the love of construction and this illustrates an adventure of Lawrence's thought.

The mixed response of the second wave feminism to Lawrence's view of women and their cause points to its underlying uncertainty. It is the element of ambiguity pointed out by the third wave feminism. Fiona Becket calls it Lawrence's "idiosyncratic approach to the relations between men and women" (Becket, 144). This issue of sexual ambiguity in Lawrence's narratives together with the other central questions with which the third wave feminism is engaged such as radical alterity, sexual difference, 'ecriture feminine', 'semiotic', female sexuality are also the major concerns of Lawrence the critic of culture.

Lawrence has not lived to interact directly with the third wave feminism but his ideas about man-woman relationship, his radical evaluation of sexual values, shares many of the major concerns of this contemporary criticism. Lawrence's adventure of thought in this regard corresponds with that of the contemporary French feminists like Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous and Julia Kristeva whom Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan consider as 'essentialists' (Rivkin, 528). Contemporary feminism has come a long way from its slogan 'the personal is the political' and the political agenda of the emancipation of woman. Feminism has diversified its interest so much

that it has now become a 'chameleon-like organization', as Imelda Whelehan calls it (Brooker, 100). Feminism now concerns itself with questions of women's role in consumer societies, its political debt to the Enlightenment project, as much as its tensions between the contradictory agendas of white middle class Western women on the one hand and those of the third world women of colour on the other. It is further exacerbated by the new agendas within Lesbian studies and Queer Theory. This sense of fragmentation is intensified by post-feminists like Wolf, Paglia, Roiphe who celebrate fragmentation as a new phase that feminism must enter (Brooker, 100). Lawrence has no point of affinity to speak of with questions of difference of the white intellectual feminists from the third world ones. However, Lawrence's awareness of the ambivalence of sexual identities, as revealed and represented in fictional narrative of his tale 'Fox', aligns him with the proponents of Queer Theory, although remotely. As regards the question of the constructedness of gender emphasized by the Queer Theory, we find meaningful awareness of it in Lawrence's criticism of culture. We shall explore this awareness in a subsequent chapter on gender.

The most important correspondence between Lawrence the critic of culture and the third world feminism is the attitude to sexual difference. The French feminist theory, of Helene Cixous, Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, emphasizes sexual difference. The difference is defined differently by each of these three feminists. Cixious locates sexual difference in sexual pleasure and speaks for the liberation of sexuality. She emphasizes the need of a transformation of our relationship to our body which is a distinctly Lawrentian emphasis. In Lawrence's scheme of things "the body is not an instrument, but a living organism" (Phoenix, 618). Cixous seems to associate femininity with the body and seeks to liberate it from its marginalized status in patriarchal ideology. For Cixous, the conception of and the difference between man and woman are not definable in feministic terms as the conception itself is derived from phallocentric conceptualization. She says,

> We can no more talk about 'woman' than about 'man' without getting caught up in an ideological theatre where the multiplication of representations, images, reflections, myths, identifications constantly transforms, deforms,

alters each person's imaginary order in advance, renders all conceptualizations null and void (Cixous, 268).

For Cixous, the difference between man and woman lies in sexual pleasure. Like Deleuze, she almost dissolves sexual difference into an inhuman flux: "Men or women, complex, mobile, open beings" (Cixous, 269) echoing almost Lawrence who says, "Man or woman, each is a flow, a flowing of life" (Phoenix, 192). In regard to sexual difference Cixous says that "it is at the level of sexual pleasure in my opinion that the difference makes itself most clearly apparent in as far as woman's libidinal economy is neither identifiable by a man not referable to masculine economy" (Cixous, 268). Lawrence expresses his awareness of "woman's libidinal economy" as identifiable by a man only with adjectives of indefiniteness like 'deep' and 'exquisite': "A woman reaches her fulfillment through love, deep sensual love, and exquisite sensitive communion" (Fantasia, 124). Again in Fantasia., Lawrence says, "In love it is the woman naturally who loves, the man who is loved. In love, woman is positive, man is negative" (98). Helene Cixous looks upon woman's libidinal economy as distinguished from masculine economy. This difference, in her view, is the source of all creativity: "The difference would be a crowning display of new differences" (Cixous, 269). For Cixous, the emancipatory aspect of feminism is concerned only with repressed libidinal economy of women. With the distinction between man and woman almost destroyed, she finds some exceptional poetic beings in whom "the component of the other sex makes them at once much richer, plural, strong, and to the extent of this mobility, very fragile" (Cixous, 269). This 'homosexual component', in her view, is to be found in the "philosophers of the Nietzschean sort, inventors and destroyers of concepts, of forms, the changers of life." (Cixous, 269). Her quarrel is not with man but with the phallocentric Western metaphysics that identifies woman with the body and dismisses her. She has emphasized the 'feminisation' of experience, an emphasis which, as Simpson observes, forms the very basis of Lawrentian thought: "he (Lawrence) had urged for the feminization of experience, the necessity for men to take women, and the feminine side of their own natures, seriously" (Simpson, 94). Cixious' version of the Lawrentian concept of the 'feminization of experience' runs thus: "there is no invention possible whether it be philosophical or poetic, without

the presence in the inventing subject of an abundance of the other, of the diverse: persons detached, persons thought, peoples born of the unconscious." (Cixous, 269,).

I have underlined the last part of the last sentence quoted above to show the close correspondence of ideas between Lawrence and Cixous. Lawrence has always spoken of the consignment of knowledge to the unknown—the 'unknown' that he identifies with woman. In The Symbolic Meaning, Lawrence says, "The goal is to know how not to know" (196). In Lawrence's schema, like that of Cixous, a balance of the male and the female is necessary for creation. In the draft of Le Gai Savairi, Lawrence writes, "We start from one side or the other, from the female side or the male, but what we want is always a perfect union of the two (quoted in Brown, 90). In his "Study of Thomas Hardy", Lawrence also speaks for a balance between the male and the female principles.

Lawrence shares with Cixous her emphasis on creativity that can be achieved through incorporation of the other represented by woman without destroying the difference. Lawrence the critic of culture is disillusioned with the Western metaphysics and seeks to oppose it by opening up other horizons of thought than those of the Judeo-Christian culture. Cixous, too, associates it with the phallogocentric drive from which she seeks liberation by championing the body—"the immense material organic sensual universe that we are" (Cixous, 269).

Both Lawrence and Cixous view women as 'minoritarian'3 in the sense of Giles Deleuze. For all of three, women, by virtue of their position outside 'majoritarian'4 oneness, ensure difference and becoming. These commonality of thought as evinced in Lawrence and Cixous can be located in the major ideas of the feminist French philosopher, Luce Irigaray.

Luce Irigaray's emphasis on difference as against identity and her covert biologism form the basis of the charge of essentialism brought against her. With Lawrence she shares her acceptance of difference and her rejection of equality. She writes, "Woman exploitation is based upon sexual difference; its solution would

come only through difference" (1993, 12, 13). Like Lawrence, she has also validated human nature. In her je, tu, nous, she praises pre-existent, 'natural' virtue: "(woman's) choices tend more toward maintaining peace, a clean environment, goods we really need in life, humanitarian options" (1993: 12). Lawrence likewise sees man and woman as belonging to two different principles forming an eternal duality which is pre-personal. This duality is sometimes metaphorical: "The love between man and woman is the perfect heart-beat of life, systole, diastole" (Phoenix, 153). In the same essay, Lawrence speaks for total difference as the goal of man-woman relationship: "I am in the beloved also, and she is in me. Which should not be, for this is confusion and chaos. Therefore I will gather myself complete and free from the beloved, she shall single herself out in utter contradistinction to me" (Phoenix, 153). Lawrence's denunciation of equality or sameness corresponds well with Irigaray's: "Now-a-days, alas, we start off self-conscious, with sex in the head. We find woman who is the same" (Fantasia, 126). Other emphases of Irigaray such as biologism and validation of human nature are also to be found in Lawrence. Lawrence is an essentialist as Irigaray is. In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says, "A child is born sexed. A child is male or female; in the whole of its psyche and physique is either male or female and will remain either male or female as long as life lasts" (96). The difference emphasizing essentialism here is further intensified by Lawrence's insistence on irreducible difference at the level of communication:

> Woman will never understand the depth of the spirit of purpose in man, his deeper spirit. And man will never understand the sacredness of feelings to woman....the whole mode, the whole everything is really different in man and woman....for the magic and dynamism rests on otherness (Fantasia, 103, my emphasis).

It is this difference, the affirmation of which is insisted by Luce Irigaray. Like Cixous, Irigaray attempts to theorize the feminine outside the phallic economy (Jackson: 172). We have pointed out similar emphasis in Lawrence. Patricia Waugh in her essay "Postmodernism and Feminism" has pointed out the tendency in Luce Irigaray to regard "alterity as the sublime space outside the law recoverable through madness, hysteria, or some metamorphosed return to the body" (184). This tendency

in Irigaray identifies femininity with a mysterious, irrational and unpresentable otherness in an affirmative sense as in Lawrence. In a letter written to Cynthia Asquith in the autumn of 1915, Lawrence writes: "If only the women would get up and speak with authority" (quoted in Widdowson, 93). This utopian space outside rationality, consciousness or language is what Lawrence has identified woman with and has explored in his great body of non-fictional writings. His identification of femininity with the unknown and Irigaray's with the 'sublime space' are illustrative of their similar line of thinking, which they together share with Giles Deleuze.

For Irigaray, "feminine pleasure has to remain inarticulate in language, in its own language" (Rivkin, 571). Lawrence is also for keeping the feminine and its pleasure beyond definition. In The Symbolic Meaning, Lawrence says, "She (woman) can never give expression to the profound movements of her own being" (145). Irigaray has also affirmed that femininity has the power to disrupt the patriarchal univocity. This attitude is profoundly Deleuvian as well as Lawrentian. In "The Power of Discourse and Subordination of the Feminine", Irigaray writes, "the feminine finds itself defined as lack, deficiency or as imitation or negative image of the subject, they should signify that with respect to this logic a disruptive excess is possible on female side" (Rivkin, 571). Irigaray's idea of the "disruptive excess" of the feminine is not very far from Lawrence's attitude towards woman. Lawrence looks upon woman as "the sacred mystery of otherness" (The Symbolic Meaning, 128). He says, "When the self is broken, the mystery of the recognition of otherness fails, the longing for otherness becomes a lust" (The Symbolic Meaning, 125). Lawrence's emphasis on otherness and becoming in regard to man-woman relationship, like that of Irigaray's, involves a strong opposition to 'oneness' and identification. We have already quoted lines from Lawrence in support of our view. The reduction of all things to terms of oneness, in Lawrence's view, results in the impoverishment of life (The Symolic Meaning, 65). For Lawrence the critic of culture, the body enjoys primacy over the spirit. He has consciously privileged the body in order to disrupt the metadiscourse of Judeo-Christian culture that exalts the spirit and its oneness.

Lawrence's thought adventure can also be evinced in Julia Kriteva's apolitical discourse. Kristeva's originality as a feminist thinker rests mainly on her concept of

the 'semiotic' and its power to disrupt. Kristeva has employed the term "semiotic' "to name the pre-linguistic drives and impulses associated with the pre-oedipal experience of the infant" (Brooker, 228). Kristeva has associated the maternal symbolic realm with creativity. She suggests that this realm appears to be superseded by the realm of law and language, but continues to exert pressure on it from within (Jackson: 167). Lawrence's concept of the primal consciousness has many aspects in common with Kristeva's 'semiotic'. The primal consciousness in Lawrence is "pre-mental and nothing to do with cognition...the primal consciousness is always dynamic and never like mental consciousness, static" (Fantasia, 34). For Lawrence, this realm of primal consciousness is not so much associated with creativity and the realm of the mother, although it is as disruptive as the 'semiotic' of Kristeva. Kristeva sees femininity as the non-essential, non-biological attribute, a social rather than a natural construct. The feminine, Kristeva argues, is marginal to the symbolic order. The feminine, like other marginal groups, have greater access to the semiotic, which is also marginal to the symbolic. These groups, including woman, exert pressure on the symbolic order and as such they have a revolutionary potential 5. She argues that "women's struggle cannot be divorced from revolutionary struggle, class struggle and anti-imperialism" (Jackson: 170). Lawrence's pre-war view of women, as pointed out by Hilary Simpson, suggests Lawrence's faith in woman's capacity to disrupt the established order. The Bakhtinian concept of carnival as a disruptive event and its application to women is, however, opposed by some feminists. Juliet Mitchell says, "this type of disruption is contained within the patriarchal symbolic. To me this is the problem" (Mitchell, 390).

Kristeva, Irigaray, and Cixous are generally put in one group—the group of the French feminist psychoanalysts. Despite their differences, these feminists have many points in common like the emphatic assertion of the feminine. All of them are concerned mainly with theorizing the feminine rather than the feminist political movement. Lawrence emphasizes the same: as a critic of culture, Lawrence is more interested in the concept of the feminine than the real life problems of women. This brings us to the concept of 'ecriture feminine' of the school of French feminism.

'Ecriture feminine' is a type of feminine writing advocated by Helene Cixous and Luce Irigaray. Ecriture feminine "challenges the discourse of the SYMBOLIC order in a counter language appropriate to feminine DESIRE and DIFFERENCE" (Brooker, 85). "The concept of ecriture feminine, the inscription of the female body and female difference in language and text, is a significant rhetorical formulation in French feminist criticism, although it describes a utopian possibility rather than a literary practice," says Showalter (Showalter, 312). Although Lawrence's conscious concern as a critic of culture has not much to do with ecriture feminine, his awareness of such a possibility is very significant. Many critics of Lawrence have pointed out that Lawrence has assumed female consciousness in many of his fictions. Even in his non-fictional writings we find Lawrence the critic of culture speaking of female consciousness and its role in creative writing. The fiercest of all the critics of Lawrence, Kate Millett, has spoken of Lawrence's conscious act of assuming 'female consciousness' in The Lady Chatterley's Lover. She says, "He (Lawrence) is the most subtle as well, for it is through a female consciousness that his masculine message is conveyed (Millett, 71). Likewise, Hilary Simpson finds in Lawrence the urgings for the feminization of experience. We have already referred to it.

In Irigaray's view, the source of ecriture feminine lies in the "biological female BODY and, second of 'feminist', since it is evidently antagonistic to the operations of patriarchy inscribed in conventional writing" (Brooker, 85). Lawrence's optimistic outlook on women has found woman as "becoming individual, self-responsible, taking her own initiative" 6 and he would approve obviously of Irigaray's view. The search of speaking corporeal in Irigaray's theory is a new one: "We have to discover a language(langage) which does not replace the bodily encounter, as paternal language(langue) wants to do, but which can go along with it, words which do not bear the corporeal, but which speaks the corporeal" (Lodge, 421). Lawrence is aware of the limitations of 'paternal language' and its capacity to speak adequately of what a woman is. Without a language of her own, woman cannot speak of herself. Lawrence writes in The Symbolic Meaning,

> What woman knows, she knows because man has taught it to her. What she is that is another matter. She can never give expression to the profound movements of her own being. Man is the utterer, woman is the first cause. (145).

Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous have taken up the challenge and have attempted the apparently impossible task of speaking corporeal. The awareness of the difficulty of the speaking corporeal has not stopped Lawrence from making explorations in the Fantasia of the Unconscious where Lawrence offers a very sensitive and informal approach towards speaking corporeal.

. The 'utopian possibility' of ecriture feminine, as Showalter calls it, is envisaged by Cixous in her famous essay, "Sorties". Such a possibility, if translated into reality, would transform the whole society. Cixous posits,

"Then all the stories would have to be told differently, the future would be incalculable, the historical forces would, will, change hands, bodies; another thinking as yet not thinkable will transform the functioning of all society"(Cixous, 266).

Lawrence would have as much exulted over the possibility.

Irigaray has referred to the relationship with the mother as the "dark continent" (Rivkin, 415). Lawrence has referred to the body as the 'dark continent' and to certain extent shares the agenda of Luce Irigaray. Lawrence says,

> In the very darkest continent of my body there is god. And from him issue the first dark rays of our feeling, wordless, and utterly previous to words: the innermost rays, the first messengers, the primeval, honorable beast of our being, whose voice echoes wordless down the darkest avenues of the soul, but full of potent speech. Our own inner meaning (Phoenix, 759).

Lawrence here underlines the limitation of language, the language of a culture that has rejected or dismissed the body and its capability of speaking corporeal.

Contemporary feminism has come a long way from the emancipatory project of Kate Millet and recognizes that there is no universal woman for whom feminism can speak. It is skeptical about universal truth claims, doubtful about the idea of a stable, pre-social self and questions the pretensions of disembodied rationality. Lawrence's radical uncertainty and provisionality about universal truth claims and his overt destabilization of the Cartesian ego—all these align him in a community of concern with contemporary feminism. The recent emphases of feminism—the radical alterity, the feminine space outside of rationality and a fondness for images suggestive of fluidity or hybridity such as the cyborg or the nomad—all these are also found in Lawrence. Feminist theory hates the tantalization of patriarchal theory. It is now "a process of theorizing rather than as a privileged body of knowledge." (Jackson, 8-9). The term 'theorizing' implies that the thinking is fluid and provisional, and continually being modified, whereas 'theory' implies something static—a fixed point of reference (Jackson, 8-9). In the same way Lawrence has also regarded theory as something fixed and therefore inadequate to fulfil the demands of life which is in constant flux: "Theory as theory is all right. But the moment you apply it to life, especially to the subjective life, the theory becomes mechanistic" (Phoenix, 318). Lawrence has exalted theorizing over theory by subjecting knowledge to the unknown. We have quoted earlier to show the Lawrentian emphasis on knowing how not to know. The fluidity and provisionality of Lawrence's theory is his central point of argument against the Judeo-Christian culture. Lawrence the critic of culture has privileged flux over form, being over knowing and fluidity over fixity which are the core issues of contemporary feminism. In the light of fluidity of the contemporary feminist thought, Lawrence is to be viewed not as a sexual politician, but as a thought adventurer deeply interested in the question of gender. "So it is that gender remains key issue for Lawrence critics", says Fiona Becket (149). We, therefore, move on to our study of Lawrence's way of viewing gender.

NOTES

1. "One is always struck", says Millett, "by the sexual ambiguity in Lawrence"(Widdowson: 82)
2. Quoted in Keith Brown ed. Rethinking Lawrence (16).
3. The term 'minoritarian' is used by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus as opposed to 'majoritarian'. "A minoritarian mode of difference, says Colebrook, "does not ground the distinction on a privileged term, and does not see the distinction as an already-given order" (Coloebrook, 104). Deleuze and Guattari describe 'woman' as minoritarian (Colebrook, 108).
4. The term 'majoritarian' in Deleuze suggests a mode that presents the opposition as already given and based on a privileged and original term. So, 'man' is a majoritarian term and the opposition between man and woman is majoritarian in Deleuze and Guattari's schema.
5. Kristeva has said this in her 1974 interview published later on in 1985 in Marks and de Courtivron. Ours is the secondary source, quoted in Stevi Jackson and Jackie Jones ed. Contemporary Feminist Theory. P. 170.
6. Quoted earlier from Hilary Simpson.

LAWRENCE AND GENDER

> There is not and cannot be any actual norm of human conduct. All depends, first on the unknown inward need within the very nuclear centres of the individual himself, and secondly on his circumstance. Some men must be too spiritual, some must be too sensual. Some must be too sympathetic, some must be too proud. We have no desire to say what men ought to be. We only wish to say there are kinds of ways of being, and there is no such thing as human perfection (Fantasia: 47).

Lawrence's awareness of the contemporary feminist issues such as difference, ecriture feminine and so on has been the focal point of our study in the preceding chapter. These issues are intimately connected with the contemporary gender study. Contrary to Kate Millett's assumption that for Lawrence the relation of sex and gender is fixed and irrevocable, we have shown how he is a champion of just the opposite. Fluidity rather than fixity is basic to all his thoughts including gender. Millett herself has, perhaps inadvertently but truthfully, recognized it in Lawrence's scheme of things as she observes, "One is always struck by the sexual ambiguity in Lawrence" (82). In Millett's conception, sex and gender are all of a piece and she finds, mistakenly of course, the same in Lawrence. That it is not the case is evinced in her own statement that "it is through a feminist consciousness that his masculine message is conveyed" (Millett, 71). It may be due to her overwhelming preoccupation with the cause of women that Millett fails to see Lawrence's difference despite her occasional awareness of it.

But this sense of Lawrence's radicalism about gender has not escaped the critical gaze of contemporary Lawrence criticism. Lawrence's gradually changed view of women- changing from a positive view as expressed in his letter to Edward Garnett "Women becoming individual, self-responsible, taking her own initiative"1 to a later disillusioned one- has been historicized by Hilary Simpson. But Fiona Becket in the "Lawrence and the Feminists" segment of her book, has rightly argued that

Lawrence's positive views about women does not express his support for the feminist politics of his time, as Hilary Simpson has taken it to be. On the other hand, this positive view of Lawrence and his later changed view are indicative of Lawrence's "idiosyncratic approach to the relations between men and women" (Becket, 144). This 'idiosyncratic approach,' supposed to be characteristic of Lawrence, is loaded with suggestions for a vital correspondence between Lawrence and the contemporary feminists who question gender identity and view gender as fluid as against given fixity and hence domination of the 'heterosexual matrix'2, to use Judith Butler's term.

Lawrence's ambivalence about gender has also been pointed out by Mark Spilka. In her "On Lawrence's Hostility to Wilful Women: The Chatterley Solution", Spilka argues that Lawrence's accommodation of 'tenderness' and 'vulnerability' as aspects of Mellor's 'maleness' is an antidote to old ideas of aggressive masculine dominance in his writing (Becket, 148). Spilka is right. This provisional and contingent approach to gender is significant and more so because it is in a later novel that such an uncertainty and tenuousness of gender is fictionally posited. This aspect of Lawrence's conception of gender has also been pointed out by Janet Barron: "In Alison Light's phrase, this is an attempt at 'ungendering' and Lawrence did consistently try to develop the female point of view, however provocative the results at times" (Brown, 19). This deliberate attempt to unsettle and disrupt the established notions of gender not only justifies our study, but also calls for a full-length study which is beyond the scope of this one. We agree with Fiona Becket's observation that "gender remains the key issue for Lawrence critics" (Becket, 149) and as such we will read and review Lawrence's 'idiosyncratic' and 'ambiguous' attitude towards gender in the light of gender theory of the contemporary feminists like Judith Butler, Donna Haraway, Elizabeth Grosz, Gayle Robin, Marjorie Garber, Susan Bordo, Stevi Jackson and Sheila Benhabib. The mention of all these feminists together without mentioning the specificity of their respective approaches to gender does not mean that all of them subscribe to unanimous view of the main issues in gender study. We do not want to say that Lawrence shares all their concerns in regard to gender. Lawrence would certainly have agreed with them on most of the central issues raised by contemporary feminists. We have already pointed out that

Lawrence critics in recent times have concentrated mostly on gender studies. But they have restricted their discussions to Lawrence's fictions. We here shall explore the relation, if any, of Lawrence's attitude to gender with that of the contemporary feminists in Lawrence's non-fictional writings. We shall also explore how much Lawrence the critic of culture has anticipated and approximated to the central ideas in contemporary gender study.

Gender, as defined by Peter Brooker in his A Glossary of Cultural Theory, "is a term for the social, cultural and historical construction of sexual difference" (110). Feminists from the sixties and the seventies of the preceding century had stressed the distinction between biological 'sex' and socially constructed 'gender'. According to them, gender operates as a set of hierarchically arranged roles in society for men and women. Men are associated with the spheres of labour, sport and physical combat and the public sphere in general whereas women are associated with the sphere of home where they are to play the twin roles of mother and the object of male desire. This set of hierarchically arranged roles of men and women are constituted by the 'heterosexual matrix' which is at work within the patriarchal culture. The feminists of the seventies and later had challenged and rejected this practice of mythologizing women's 'nature' and they had formulated their own theories of gender. Lawrence had died in 1930, much before the emergence of these new theories of gender. Yet from such a historical distance, Lawrence has shown his awareness of the central issues of contemporary gender study.

Lawrence's concept of gender is less identifiable with that of Freud or Lacan than with the feminist object relations theory of Milanie Klein and Nancy Chordrow and those of Butler and others who have emphasized the constructedness of gender. Lawrence's concept of gender is something contingent, provisional and performative. The 'fluidity' of gender in Lawrence's schema, opens up immense scope of study. For Freud, the 'polymorphously perverse' child of both sexes with its unstructured libido is one with the mother. The child enters the gendered space when it separates itself from its mother and its sexual desire is formed. In Freud's view, the male child forms a strict and strong super-ego by repressing his desire for the mother and this super-ego gives him greater access to culture. But the girl takes a

different route. She first identifies herself with the mother and her drives are focused on the 'clitoris,' the penis substitute. Subsequently she develops self-hate and resentment towards the mother when she discovers that she has no penis. She develops penis envy and replaces the erotic zone of the clitoris with the female vagina—from sexual pleasure to reproduction. Women, for Freud, do not have castration anxiety that develops the super-ego and therefore have limited participation in culture.

The biological determinism of Freud is challenged by the feminists and Lawrence. Although Lawrence has viewed man and woman in their inescapable duality in matters of sex, his conception of gender defies Freudian determinism. For Freud, gender is constructed once and for all, but for Lawrence, it is more a role rather than an inescapable 'given'. Freud has viewed gender as a fixed identity which Lawrence opposes by constantly shifting his emphasis from one gender to another. Lawrence has not emphasized separation of the child from its mother in order to become a gendered male/female in a patriarchal society. Rather he points to the leakiness of the watertight compartments of the male and the female. For Lawrence a child is born sexed, acquires maleness or femaleness after puberty and receives the standard of gender from the culture in which he lives. In his schema, gender is more performative than an identity. Lawrence the critic of culture is against all kinds of fixed norms, and the norms of gender are no exception. In Fantasia of the Unconscious., he says while speaking about the standard body of man: "There is no such thing as an actual norm, a living norm. A norm is merely an abstraction, not a reality" (47). This contention is also applicable to Lawrence's concept of gender as his argument on the same page confirms:

> Some men must be too spiritual, some must be too sensual. Some must be too sympathetic, some must be too proud. We have no desire to say what men ought to be. We only wish to say there are all kinds of ways of being, and there is no such thing as human perfection (47, my emphasis).

Lawrence's ambiguity about maleness is pronounced here. Elsewhere, in "Cocksure Women and Hensure Men", Lawrence deplores the fact that men, against the grain

of their 'nature', have become 'sympathetic', leaving their 'role' to be performed by women who have become 'cocksure'. In the extract quoted above from Fantasia, Lawrence speaks about the possibility of men's becoming 'sympathetic' sometimes in some individual males. But what is more important for us is the contention that "there are all kinds of ways of being". This polymorphous concept of gender is the central proposition common to almost all the feminist theorists of gender.

Lawrence does not share the Lacanian concept of gender either. For Lacan gender is a part of linguistic network that precedes and structures the formation of the linguistic subject. He insists that the subject itself is formed through a subjection to sexual difference. Sex and gender are therefore fixed identities. In Lacan's version of Oedipus, both men and women are deprived of the Phallus, both have lost the sense of plenitude experienced in the early symbiosis with the mother. The child enters the Symbolic order with its specific gender distinction. Lacanian concept of gender lacks fluidity and therefore leaves almost no scope for any change or modification of gender. Sexual difference, which is synonymous with gender difference in Lacan, appears to constitute the very matrix which gives rise to the subject itself. For Lawrence, the formation of the subject is never complete and sexual difference does not influence subject formation in any significant way. In Lacan's scheme of things, gender comes first as it is associated with 'culture' and the Symbolic order, whereas 'nature' or the Real remains always elusive. Both men and women mistake the other for the Other. For Lawrence, the maternal plenitude is not lost for ever but men and women have an access to it through the sympathetic centre of consciousness, the solar plexus.

Lawrence's concept of gender has more affinity with the feminist 'object relations theory' that emphasizes socialization and the internalization of norms. For theorists of 'object relations' such as Klein and Chodrow, children consolidate their gender identity in the first two years of life, before the time the Freudian Oedipus complex sets in (Cranny-Francis, 54). Maternal identification is the initial orientation for children of both sexes. The girls sustain the primary identification with the mother, while the boy repudiates it (Cranny-Francis, 54). For these theorists,

> gender is a set of roles and cultural meanings acquired in the course of ego formation within family structures, and the significant changes in child-rearing practices and kinship organization can alter the meaning of gender and close the hierarchical gap between the genders of man and woman (Cranny-Francis, 3-4).

Lawrence agrees with them in respect of the sexed-but-not–gendered child's identification with the mother and about the cultural construction of sex as gender. But he also differs from them in his view that a child identifies itself as much with the mother as with the father that helps the balanced growth of the child. Unlike them, Lawrence has not envisaged a social reconstruction of gender. Lawrence is interested in destabilizing the 'heterosexual matrix' that dictates some fixed roles to men and women in the name of gender and therefore he is not very far from the agenda of Klein and Chodrow.

Lawrence's concept of gender as fluid and provisional aligns him with Judith Butler who argues that gender is a process of repeated performance of the acts of gendering. In this respect Lawrence has further correspondence with Elizabeth Grosz. Grosz suggests a Lawrentian fluidity in her notion of gender as she says, "Women's corporeality is inscribed as a mode of seepage" (1994: 203). Lawrence of course has not associated women's fluid corporeality with gender, but he posits that gender is nothing more than a 'role' to be played by men and women—a notion that underlines the fluidity of gender. In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says, "the man is male, the woman is female. Only they are playing one another's parts, as they must in certain periods" (97). In the preceding chapter we have discussed the same emphasis of Lawrence on the feminization of experience. Freud's later definition of the lesbian as the one suffering from penis-envy (Price, 115) shows an attitude to gender which is totally different from that of Lawrence. For Lawrence, it is as much natural for a woman to desire a woman as it is for a man to desire a woman. But for Freud, it is a negative desire.

The closest parallelism that Lawrence's concept of gender has is with Butler's theory of the performativity of gender. This theory of Butler is based on Foucault's conception of the discursive construction of the body. Foucault makes clear that sexuality in the post-Enlightenment thought is the overloaded focus of the discursive strategies of power and knowledge, and women's bodies, he asserts, are saturated with sex (Price, 79). In her "Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions", Butler explains how the deployments of the body through reiterated acts and gestures of gendered sexuality, are productive of discursive identity. For Butler, neither gender nor sex is inherent biological feature and that heterosexuality is a term that constructs rather than simply classifies human sexuality and gendering of individual subjects. She says that "gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender and without these acts, there would be no gender at all" (Price, 420). For Lawrence, gender is discursive, though not sex. In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says, "A child is born with one sex only, and remains always single in his sex. There is no intermingling, only a great change of roles is possible. But man in the female role is still male" (102, my emphasis). Lawrence destabilizes his apparent biological determinism by speaking of the possibility of "a great change of roles", of men and women as the bearers of two cosmic principles which he sees as the cause of creation. His concept of duality in man-woman relationship is to be understood as 'morphological imaginary': "Man and woman, each is a flow, a flowing of life" (Phoenix, 192). It is the notion that compels the feminist psychologist Luce Irigaray to dwell on difference. For the same reason, Lawrence has to keep the purity of sex (not gender) intact:

> The great thing is to keep the sexes pure. And by pure we don't mean an ideal, sterile innocence of similarity between boy and girl. We mean pure maleness in a man, pure femaleness in a woman.... Women and men are dynamically different in everything (Fantasia, 188).

But this notion of 'purity' of sex is not emphasized in the case of gender. Like Butler, Lawrence suggests that gender is not a fact but inherently performative.

For Butler, the performativity of 'sex' and 'gender' is not a singular or deliberate 'act', but is "the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names" (Price., 236). In her view, sex is "an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time" (Price, 236) and the construction of sex itself a 'temporal process' which operates through the reiterations of norms (Price, 239). Performativity, in Butler's view,"conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition" (Price, 241). This act like status of gender performativity is anticipated by Lawrence. In his essay "We Need One Another" (Phoenix), Lawrence explains how through the reiterative act of various models women are forced to play their gender roles by 'compulsory heterosexuality'.3

> There are many popular dodges for killing every possibility of true contact: like sticking a woman on a pedestal, or the reverse, sticking her beneath notice; or making a 'model' house-wife of her, or a 'model' mother, or a model help-meet. All mere devices for avoiding any contact with her. A woman is not a model of anything (191).

The Deleuvian concept of woman that Lawrence formulates here conforms to Elizabeth Grosz's emphasis on the corporeal fluidity of women which we have pointed out earlier. The compulsory heterosexual imperative has it that women are to act up to models to which Lawrence is opposed. Lawrence's argument here shows his awareness of the 'reiteration' and 'citational practice' through which individuals must have acted up to the discourse or model given to them. In the same essay, Lawrence elaborates on this act of playing roles and denounces the 'fixity' that it imposes on women. He says,

> We only know a few crude forms—mistress, wife, mother, sweet-heart. The woman is like an idol, or a marionette, always forced to play one role or the other: sweet-heart, mistress, wife, mother. If only we could break up this fixity, and release the unsizable reality of real woman: the woman is a flow, a river of life, quite different from man's river of life (Phoenix, 194).

Lawrence here seeks to disrupt the fixity of gender, as Butler does, but not sex. Sex is, in Lawrence's schema, given, but in Butler's schema, constructed.

Butler's notion of performativity implies that there is no preexisting self who performs. Such a notion is a reflection of the fundamental lack of any grounds of truth. For Butler, performing the body fabricates identity in all sorts of ways, of which gender is one important component. She says, "That the gender is performative suggests that it has no ontological status" (Price, 417). She also denies the existence of any 'gendered core'. She elaborates on her concept of gender,

> acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create illusion of an interior or organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purpose of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality (Price, 417).

Lawrence, as we have pointed out in our first chapter, is opposed to the concept of fixed self or identity. He also distrusts "the interior and organizing gender core", (Price, 417) as Butler does. This distrust is implied in his argument against the various roles assigned to women by the 'heterosexual matrix'. Lawrence's disbelief in any fixed identity is reiterated in his Apocalypse where he says, "We become, alas, what we think we are" (71). The idea of the constructedness of self is deeply related to Lawrence's concept of the constructedness of gender. His concept of the unconscious as the ground of all our identity also focuses on the constructedness of identity. In his view, the unconscious is

> beyond all law of cause and effect in its totality, yet in its processes of self-realization it follows the laws of cause and effect. The processes of cause and effect are indeed part of the working out of this incomprehensible self-realization of the individual unconscious (Fantasia, 216).

The processes of 'cause and effect' that partly work out the self-realization of the unconscious, imply the famous Lacanian proposition that the unconscious is structured like a language.4 For Lawrence, the individual is a unit of the

unconscious and as such this cause and effect process has a vital role in identity formation including that of gender. This process of 'cause and effect' is central to Foucault's and Butler's concept of 'sex' and 'gender' as constructs. As Butler says,

> The category of 'sex' is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault has called a 'regulatory ideal'. In this sense, then, sex not only functions as a norm, but as part of regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, that is whose regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce—demarcate, circulate, differentiate—the bodies it controls (Price, 235).

The unconscious of Lawrence may be seen as a site for the 'regulatory ideal' where deployments may take place. The self-realization of the unconscious depends on the process of cause and effect, whereas the materialization of sex, in Butler's view, depends on deployments. In both cases the materialization of sex and of the self-realization of the unconscious, the process is never complete. In Lawrence's case, the unconscious is never fully accessible to the consciousness, and in Butler's case, as she argues, "That this reiteration is necessary is a sign that materialization is *never complete*" (*Price, 236*)

The sense of fluidity in Butler's concept of identity—a fabricated identity lacking in 'ontological status'--is similar to Lawrence's. In the "Crown", Lawrence posits his concept of fluid identity: "If I say I am, this is false and evil. I am not...Our readymade individuality, our identity is no more than an accidental cohesion in the flux of time" (Phoenix II, 384).

Again, in his Forward to the Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says, "Man live and see according to some gradually developing and gradually withering vision" (15-16). The influence of the pre-Socratic philosophy on Lawrence especially that of Heraclitus' concept of flux is well known and seems to be active here. In fact his philosophy of love and existence is built on it. This profound influence of Heraclitus points to and emphasizes the provisionality and contingency of human identity in Lawrence's scheme of things. Lawrence's destabilization of gender identity is thus

basic to his philosophy. In "Cocksure Women and Hensure Men", Lawrence's focus is again on the confusion of gender roles. The natural (heterosexual) mode of gender is described by Lawrence in his own terms in the Fantasia, "in what we call the natural mode, man has his positivity in the volitional centres, a woman in the sympathetic" (Fantasia, 97). Lawrence focuses on the confusion of the 'natural mode' and says that in 'the vast human farmyard'—

> nowadays all the cocks are cackling and pretending to lay eggs, and all the hens are crowing and pretending to call the sun of bed....Men are timid, tremulous, rather soft and submissive....The tragedy about cocksure women is that they are more cocky, in their assurance, than the cock himself (Selected Essays, 33-34).

Lawrence the critic of culture has argued for the disruption of the fixed parameters of gender. Although he sometimes deplores the assumption of male roles by female as in the lines quoted above, his emphasis on the reorientation of male-female roles is insistent in his criticism of culture. He denounces the emphasis on the male principle in Judeo-Christian culture. We have explored in the preceding two chapters Lawrence's project of making revaluation of the values of man-woman relationship. Like him, Luce Irigaray also is occupied with the project of exploring a positive model of feminniity that may help "establish the condition necessary for the production of new kinds of discourse, new forms of knowledge and the new modes of practice" (Price, 225).

Contemporary feminists of gender study have focused on 'constructedness of gender' and have invaded the eternally unchanging, asocial and trans-historical nature of sex. Theorists like Donna Haraway have argued that the body of the late twentieth century and beyond is determined neither by biological givens, nor by discursive regimes of power on a Foucauldian model, but constitutes a field of conflicting and unstable flows that partake of the revolution in informatics (Price, 11). Haraway contributes to a non-hierarchical and non-binary construction of gendered subjectivity. In the field of cyberfeminism, the dispersal of the normative body is taken for granted, and the distinctions between human and machine, between

male and female, actual and virtual, lose currency. This specified project of queering what counts as natural and the more recent Queer theory are deliberately transgressive and unsettling for the stability of gender norms.

Lawrence cannot be said to share this deliberately transgressive aspect of gender theory. Yet Lawrence's awareness of the possibility of going against the 'nature' of sex through the intense upper excitement of the body—back to its polymorphous state- is very much an awareness of the cyborg: "Introduce any trick, any idea, any mental element you can into sex, but make it an affair of the upper consciousness, the mind and eyes and mouth and fingers" (Fantasia, 123). The sense of fluidity in gender, emphasized in the radical and Queer Theory is also implied in Lawrence. The primacy of fluidity over fixity is a Lawrentian priority. Lawrence the thinker and the critic of culture is committed to a certain inconclusiveness that gives priority to fluidity as against fixity. In Phoenix, Lawrence says,

"There must be the rapid momentous association of things which meet and pass on the forever incalculable journey of creation: rapid, everything left in its own fluid relationship with the rest of things" (220, emphasis mine).

Lawrence the critic of culture has also criticized the Judeo-Christian ethics which claimed that sex was meant for procreation. The sexual act, in Lawrence's view, is not for the "depositing of the seed", but for "leaping off into the unknown" (Phoenix, 441). In Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence has exalted pleasure over procreation: "after all our experience and all our poetry and novels, we know that the procreative purpose of sex is, to the individual man and woman, just a side show" (106). This primacy of pleasure over procreation is a strong point that Lawrence shares with the contemporary feminists: "It is no primary need of the begetting of children" (Phoenix, 442).

Lawrence also destabilizes the strict heterosexual parameters of gender role by advocating the coexistence of heterosexuality and homosexuality. The Birkin-Gerald relationship in Women in Love apart, Lawrence speaks in favour of a space for homosexuality within heterosexual matrix in his non-fictional writings. Foucault has

the same emphasis on homosexuality. In "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations: an Interview with Michael Foucault", Foucault says, "The problem is not to discover in oneself the truth of one's sex, but rather, to use one's sexuality henceforth to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships. And no doubt, that's the real reason why homosexuality is not a form of desire but something desirable" (Ethics, 135-6). In Phoenix, Lawrence reiterates:

> Marriage and deathless friendship, both should be inviolable and sacred, two great creative passions, separate, apart, but complementary: the one pivotal, the other adventurous; the one marriage, the centre of human life; the other, the leap ahead (665).

The 'deathless friendship' spoken of here is undoubtedly between man and man, as Lawrence himself says a few lines back in the same essay, "Let there be again the old passion of deathless friendship between man and man" (665). This issue of bi-sexuality is taken up by contemporary feminist Marjorie Garber. In her book Vice-Versa: Bisexuality and the Eroticism of Everyday Life, she says that bisexuality is "a sexuality that undoes sexual orientation as a category, a sexuality that threatens and challenges the easy binaries of straight and gay, queer and 'het', and even through its biological and physiological meanings the gender categories of male and female" (1995, 65).

Bisexuals, who have sex with both the same sex and opposite sex partners, found themselves excluded by both homosexual and heterosexual society. Long before the formulation of the theory of bisexuality, Lawrence has expressed his distrust for the heterosexual rigid parameters because of their inadequacy.

Contemporary gender theorists have extended their study to the analysis of emotions and feelings in historical perspective. Stevi Jackson, for example, stresses the need to analyze 'love' as a culturally constructed emotion. She says, "Love is not a fixed, unchanging emotion, and that its stifling meanings are the outcome of gendered struggles" (1995, 52). She has shown how the notion of romance is implicated in maintaining a cultural definition of love, which is detrimental to

women (Cranny-Francies, 231). Lawrence's strong dislike of love as fixed emotion aligns him with Stevi Jackson:

> The bond of love! What worst bondage can we conceive than the bond of love? It is an attempt to wall in the tide; it is a will to arrest the spring, never to let May dissolve into June, never to let the hawthorn petal fall for the berrying (Phoenix, 151-152).

Lawrence's view of love is free from all notions of fixity, such as 'romance'. This is how he defines love: "The love between man and woman is the perfect heart-beat of life, systole, diastole" (Phoenix, 153). Lawrence the critic of culture is critical of the Christian doctrine of universal love, encapsulated in 'Love thy neighbour as thyself'. He insists that such an insistence of Judeo-Christian love is inherently faulty: "if you insist on loving humanity, then you insist that it shall be lovable: which half the time it is not....If you insist that they shall be, this imposes a tyranny over them, and they become less lovable" (Phoenix, 206). For Lawrence, Christianity's concept of brotherly love is thus a culturally constructed emotion. He would agree with Jackson's contention that the various notions of love have proved detrimental to women.

Contemporary theory and practice of gender is extraordinarily diverse. Issues like transexuality, transvetism, bisexuality have added new dimension to the feminists' attempt at destabilizing the norms of gender. The Queer Theory in its objective of destroying the homo-hetero binary has an essential point of affinity with Lawrence's concept of gender. Annamarie Jagose notes, "queer marks a suspension of identity as something fixed, coherent and natural" (1996, 98). Jagose in her book quotes Rosemary Hennessy's argument that the queer project is

> an effort to speak from and to the differences and silences that have been suppressed by the homo-hetero binary, an effort to unpack the monolithic identities 'lesbian' and 'gay' including the intricate ways lesbian and gay sexualities are inflected by heterosexuality, race, gender and ethnicity (Cranny-Francis., 76).

Such a project is implied in Lawrence's view of gender. Lawrence's adventures of thought also show awareness of 'transvetism', the practice of dressing in the clothes of the opposite sex. Marjorie Garber notes in her Vested Interests: Cross Dressing and Cultural Anxiety, "Transvetism is a space of possibility, structuring and confounding culture".

Lawrence has explored this 'space' of the possibility of confounding culture in the tale, Fox. In this tale Benford and Marsh are women living together in a friendship and enjoying wartime independence. The independence of Marsh's 'transvetism' is cut short by the appearance of her lover into the scene and she is brought back from her role as an androgynous farmhand to 'proper' appearance in skirt and blouse. The gender ambiguities, alternating between male and female perspectives including 'transvetism', reveals Lawrence's adventurous, playful attitude towards gender. This exploration of the possible space where the fixed notions of gender can be confounded, is an attempt at 'ungendering' to use Alison Light's words5. Lawrence has not treated 'transvetism' separately as a conscious project to confound gender binaries and therefore his awareness of the disruptive power of transvetism can only be partly identified with the actual cultural practice.

One more point about Lawrence's view of gender is that for Lawrence, gender is constructed by culture. The duality of gender is destabilized in Lawrence's schema but the duality of sex is kept inviolable and pure. Sexual difference, involved as it is in gender study, remains embedded and necessarily untranscended in Lawrence's concept of gender. The latter-day feminists like Luce Irigiray and Cixous share this perception in clear terms. For them, as for Lawrence, the destruction of sexual difference would amount to the undesirable destruction of desire.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Hilary Simpson's "Lawrence, Feminism and the War" (P. 94).
2. Judith Butler uses the phrase "heterosexual matrix" to "designate that grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, genders and desires are naturalized"(Butler, 1990: 151).
3. Adrienne Rich's term. See her "Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence" in Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi and Albert Gelpi (eds.) Adrienne Rich's Poetry and Prose. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993. pp. 203-23.
4. Lacan's proposition is, "The unconscious is constituted by the efforts of speech on the subject, it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently the unconsciousness is structured like a language" (1977, 147).
5. We have noted Alison Light's comment on playful treatment of things relating to gender and her calling it an act of "ungendering" earlier in this very chapter.

LAWRENCE AND THE QUESTION OF ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

We have explored Lawrence's awareness of many of the major issues in contemporary critical theories in the preceding chapters. In the first, second and third chapters our main concern was to revaluate Lawrence's schema mainly with the different emphases of contemporary feminist theory. Our focus in this chapter is on the ethical dimension of Lawrentian thought adventure and its relation to his aesthetics. In Lawrence's schema, ethics and aesthetics are inseparably linked up as both of them are committed to life. As such, Lawrence's ethics and aesthetics are associated with issues that we have explored in the preceding chapters. Ethics is concerned with the investigation of the nature of right and wrong thought and action in order to judge them in personal, social and political life. Aesthetics is a term by which we at once mean the compositional aspect of a work of art, a coherent philosophy of art and the artistic dimension of culture as a whole. In this chapter we shall explore first the affinity between Lawrence's ethical and aesthetic concerns and those of our contemporary ethical critics and then move on to exploring Levinas, Bakhtin and Foucault for the purpose.

For Lawrence, the essential function of art is moral. His insistence on the impact of art on our sincere and vital emotions resonates with the 'neo-humanist' theories of contemporary criticism. In the context of the textual nihilism of postmodernism that has declared the demise of modern humanism and the absence of any serious moral content in art, the 'neo-humanism', as Daniel R. Schwarz calls it, seeks to reinstate ethical considerations in the evaluation and appreciation of literature. As Schwarz, an ethical critic, puts it, "We are in the midst of a humanistic revival or at least a neohumanist burst of energy" (Schwarz, 3). The leading names of such ethical critics are Martha C. Nussbaum, Staley Cavell, Richard Rorty and Wayne C. Booth. The premise common to all of them is that there is a strong connection between art and life—which is essentially a Lawrentian concern. In his essay "Why the Novel Matters" Lawrence focuses on this relation between life and literature: "The novel is

the bright book of life. Books are not life. They are only tremulations on the ether. But novel as a tremulation can make the whole man alive tremble" (Phoenix, 535).

This idea of the great impact of literature on life is implicit in the Anglo-American humanist tradition of which Matthew Arnold, F. R. Leavis, Henry James and Raymond Williams are the prominent representatives. Wayne C. Booth, partly drawing on this tradition and partly on Aristotelian theory of ethics and aesthetics1, emphasizes this transaction of life and literature. In his essay "Why Ethical Thinking can Never be Simple", Booth explores the undeniable power of narrative to change our lives: "The powers of narrative change our lives" (18). He insists on "the value of ethical criticism as a means for understanding narrative's capacity for registering an ethical and aesthetic impact upon the human condition" (Davies, xi). Lawrence's idea of the novel as a 'tremulation' that can 'make the whole man alive tremble' is echoed in the premise of Danies R. Schwarz: "Literature calls upon us to respond fully, viscerally, with every dimension of our psychological and moral being" (Schwarz, 6). In his insistence on the link between ethics and aesthetics, Schwarz is an Aristotelian. As he himself declares, "Following Aristotle, I believe that the aesthetic, ethical and political are inextricably linked" (9). We, however, cannot altogether link Lawrence's views of ethics and aesthetics with those of Aristotle. The reason is Lawrence's insistence on flux in life to which both ethics and aesthetics are committed.

Lawrence's dictum that the essential function of art is moral has not escaped critical attention. Gamini Salgado in his book A Preface to Lawrence (1986), has said about Lawrence, the literary critic, that "He was also passionately interested, though in an informal way, in questions of literary theory and in problems connected with the relation between art and morality" (151). Intimately connected with this view of the moral functions of art is his view of the cognitive role of the emotions in making vital contact with and among ourselves. Lawrence's emphasis on the same point is available in his essay on "Galsworthy" where he says that "we judge a work of art by its effect on our sincere and vital emotion, and nothing else" (Phoenix, 539).

The implied ethical dimension of this view of the cognitive role of imagination in art is rooted in the tradition and has always been carried further. Martha C. Nussbaum in her essay "Exactly and Responsibly" affirms that her two books, Love's Knowledge and Poetic Justice stress "the cognitive role of the imagination and the emotions in bringing us into contact with the complexity of our own lives and the lives of others" (63).

Martha Nussbaum argues that our emotions involve "evaluative judgements" ("Exactly.", 66) and that the works of literature "promote compassion" (68) which are implicit in Lawrence's understanding of literature. Both she and Wayne C. Booth claim that the activities of imagination and emotion are examples of moral conduct "in the sense that they are examples of the type of emotional and imaginative activity that good ethical conduct involves" ("Exactly.", 70). Lawrence privileged emotion over reason because the former has the power to disrupt the fixity of thought. Emotions, in Lawrence's schema, are more conducive to morality in his sense of the term. Morality, he says "is that delicate, for ever trembling and changing balance between me and my circumambient universe which precedes and accompanies a true relatedness" (Phoenix, 528).

Morality, as the "delicate, for ever trembling and changing balance" is closely associated with emotion and the sense of flux communicated by the word "trembling"; while "changing" in Lawrence suggests an affinity with the idea of the primacy of "Saying" over "Said" in Levinas's ethical philosophy. We shall discuss this Lawrence-Levinas correspondence later in this chapter.

Lawrence would certainly have agreed with Nussbaum's emphasis on the ethical aspect of narrative literature. She claims that narrative literature "nourishes the ascription of humanity, and the prospect of humanity" (Poetic Justice, 39). Her insistence that there is a very general connection between our aesthetic and our moral evaluations ("Exactly", 72) once again reaffirms Lawrence's views. Nussbaum's concept of the enlivening impact of the novel on the "emotional deadness" of its readers has a distinct Lawrentian import. In her essay "Exactly and Responsibly", Nussbaum observes to the effect that: "it is precisely in virtue of the

mastery of the craft that enables the novelist to deploy 'perceptual and expressional'2 terms with skill that he can make a contribution to a public victory over obtuseness and emotional deadness" (60). This public victory over emotional deadness is also a strong point of Lawrence's argument for the novel. In "Why the Novel Matters" Lawrence touches on the same point: "But in the novel you can see, plainly, when the man goes dead, the woman goes inert. You can develop an instinct for life, if you will, instead of a theory of right and wrong, good or bad" (Phoenix, 538). In "Surgery of the Novel or a Bomb", Lawrence reasserts the same idea: "It's got to present us with new, really new feelings, a whole line of new emotion, which will get us out of the emotional rut" (Phoenix, 520)

Lawrence's great emphasis on the intersubjective relations within texts points to the significant correspondence between him and Mikhail Bakhtin. This correspondence has already been pointed out by David Lodge in his essay, "Lawrence, Dostoevsky, Bakhtin. Lawrence and Diologic Fiction". But Lodge's focus in this essay is on the fiction, on Lawrence's Women in Love to be particular. However, Lawrence's idea of fiction as revealed in his non-fiction, especially in the essays like-- "The Surgery of the Novel or a Bomb", "Art and Morality", "Why the Novel Matters" and "Morality and the Novel"—have more than superficial correspondence with that of Bakhtin. In "Morality and the Novel", Lawrence celebrates the novel's capacity to represent the polyvocality of life, insisting at the same time on the ethical significance of such an act: "The novel is a perfect medium for revealing to us the changing rainbow of our living relationships. The novel helps us to live, as nothing else can" (Phoenix, 532). This is echoed in Wayne C. Booth's comment in his "Introduction" to the latest translation of Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, "The one grand literary form that is for Bakhtin capable of a kind of justice to the inherent polyphonies of life is 'the novel'" (xxiii). For Bakhtin, as for Lawrence, meaning exists in the process of intersubjective communication, because no utterance is truly isolated. An utterance can only be understood in context, a context that is partly non-verbal and involves the status of and relations between speaker, addressee and the object of reference. Lawrence thus contextualizes truth/meaning:

> The novel is the highest example of subtle interrelatedness that man has discovered. Everything is true in its own time, place, circumstance and untrue outside of its own place, time, circumstance. If you try to nail things down, in the novel, either it kills the novel, or the novel gets up and walks away with the nail (Phoenix, 528).

For both of them, prose fiction provides illuminating representation of this "subtle interrelatedness" in practice. In Bakhtin's terms prose literature is 'dialogic' or 'polyphonic', an orchestration of diverse discourses. Bakhtin emphasizes the points of Lawrence such as diversity of discourses and their interrelationship in the novel:

> Authorial speech, the speeches of narrators, inserted genres, the speech of characters are merely those foundational compositional unities with which help heteroglossia can enter the novel; each of them permits a multiplicity of social voices and a wide variety of their links and interrelationships (2000: 263).

In Bakhtin's view "the novel orchestrates all its themes, the totality of all the world of objects and ideas depicted and expressed in it" (2000: 263). Lawrence is also aware of the diversity of 'themes' or discourses in the novel. In "Why the Novel Matters" Lawrence says, "And only in the novel are all things given full play, or at least, they may be given full play, when we realize that life itself, and not inert safety, is the reason" (Phoenix, 538).

The resemblance of Lawrence and Bakhtin here is very close and corroborative. Bakhtin's concept of 'orchestration' of all the themes in the novel is synonymous with Lawrence's idea of the 'full play' of all things in the novel as both 'orchestration' and 'full play' suggest dramatization. Moreover, both Bakhtin and Lawrence attach great importance to orchestration of diverse discourses because it ensures the ethical significance of the aesthetics of narrative literature. Bakhtin spells out the fundamental characteristic features of novel in his Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics:

> The possibility of employing on the plane of a single work discourse of various types, with all their expressive capacities intact, without reducing them to a common denominator—this is one of the fundamental characteristic features of prose (1984: 200).

The warning against the possible reduction of this "orchestration of all themes" to "a common denominator" is also issued by Lawrence. In the last chapter of his long essay on Thoman Hardy, Lawrence says,

> Because a novel is a microcosm, and because man viewing the universe must view it in the light of a theory, therefore every novel must have background or the structural skeleton of some theory of being, some metaphysic. But the metaphysic must always subserve the artistic purpose beyond the artist's conscious aim (Phoenix, 479).

The specified form of Bakhtin's "common denominator" is the "metaphysics" of the novelist in Lawrence's version that, in Lawrence's view, always threatens to totalize the other discourses. Elsewhere, Lawrence has also spoken about "nailing things down", as against the unethical reduction of discourses to a single one. The well known Lawrentian dictum "Never trust the artist. Trust the tale"3 also underlines the need to fight off such reductive tendency on the part of the author. The devouring presence of the novelist's metaphysics is the source of immorality in a novel. The true morality in the novel is characterized by instability: "Morality in the novel is the trembling instability of the balance. Which the novelist puts in his thumb in the scale, to pull down the balance to his own predilection that is immorality" (Phoenix, 528).

It is because of the interrelatedness of the diverse discourses, the representation of polyphonic life that Lawrence prizes most in the genre of the novel. This fundamental feature of novel, according to Lawrence, can be traced in 'Plato's dialogues': "Plato's dialogues are queer little novels" (Phoenix, 520). The superiority of the novel over philosophy, religion and science rests on its capacity to present things in their ever-changing interrelatedness. In philosophy, religion and

science, things are nailed down in order to get a stable equilibrium (Phoenix, 528). That is why Lawrence triumphantly justifies his being a novelist: "For this reason I am a novelist. And being a novelist, I consider myself superior to a saint, the scientist, the philosopher, and the poet, who are the great masters of different bits of men alive, but never get the whole hog" (Phoenix, 535).

Lawrence's insistence on the intersubjectivity within the novel does not only align him with Bakhtin, but also pushes his sense of morality beyond its conventional sense. In other words, Lawrence subjects conventional sense of fixed morality, the modern humanist ideal, to the morality which is forever new. In his essay on Thomas Hardy, Lawrence posits that a really good work art "must contain the essential criticism on the morality to which it adheres" (Phoenix, 476). Lawrence points out a sense of fluidity and contingency contained in the morality that art is committed to. In "Morality of the Novel" he says, "The business of art is to reveal the relation between man and the circumambient universe, at the living moment" (Phoenix, 527). The words "circumambient" and "living" connote a sense of flux and fluidity. Lawrentian idea of morality therefore is not the limiting frame of the Enlightenment project of humanism, but a liberating one from this form that constantly renews itself according to its time, place and circumstance. It is subject to change as is everything in life: "The relation between all things changes from day to day, in a subtle stealth of change. Hence art, which reveals or attains to another perfect relationship, will be forever new" (Phoenix, 527).

This great concern for interrelatedness in Lawrence's schema points to his affinity with the ethical philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas's critique of the Western philosophy in Totality and Infinity is grounded in his argument that in its search for the truth, Western philosophy has mostly been 'ontology'—the ontology that privileges thematization and knowledge at the expense of neglecting the absolute priority of ethics. Western philosophy, according to Levinas, has tried to comprehend the nature of reality by subordinating particular beings to an all-encompassing rational structure or 'totality'4. Confined within this 'totality', the individual beings have lost their individuality and become conceptually the same.

For Levinas, the human other resists all philosophical attempts at knowing in terms of totalization and calls into question the violence and injustice of ontology.

Lawrence shares Levinas's etical stance against totalization, against the encompassing rational structure of the post-Cartesian Western philosophy. Lawrence the critic of culture strongly denounces the idea of the average that denies human beings their individuality. In Phoenix, he says that the average "is a pure abstraction. It is the reduction of the human being to a mathematical unit" (699). For him, the ideal of equality is only a particular form of 'totality' that once again reduces a living human being to a standard unit. His repudiation of such a standard is unequivocal: "Men are not equal, and never were, and never will be, save by the arbitrary determination of some ridiculous human ideal" (Phoenix, 701). The emphasis on oneness in Western philosophy is what Lawrence the critic of culture tirelessly attacks in his non-fictional writings. The privileging of oneness of Western philosophy for Lawrence, as for Levinas, impoverishes life and deprives it of all its ethical values. Lawrence expresses his reservation against such a drastic reduction of life very clearly in The Symbolic Meaning: "if we reduce all things to terms of spirit and oneness, we impoverish life at last beyond bearing" (65). Levinas calls it "imperialism of the same" (1986: 347) what Lawrence here means by "spirit and oneness". For Levinas the "imperialism of the same" results when the other is rendered intelligible through representation and is constructed by and in the terms of the agent of observation. Both for Levinas and Lawrence, epistemology, the product of digestive ontology, thrives on the "digestion of alterity" (Critchley, 6). Levinas's ethical philosophy therefore foregrounds the presence of the other that resists and calls into question the rational ego—the 'I'. This emphasis resonates in Lawrence too. The ethics of Levinas begins with the face of the other that emphasizes responsibility for the other. In Simon Critchley's version, ethics, in the terms of Levinas, occurs as, "the putting into question of the ego, the knowing subject, self consciousness" (Critchley, 5). In Levinas's own words, "We name this calling into question of the spontaneity by the presence of the other, ethics" (1969: 43).

Ethics is an on-going process of putting the knowing ego into question through the process of the exposure to and recognition of alterity. It is therefore not reducible

to any fixed standard of morality. Lawrence is not so systematic in his formulation of his idea of the other and its role in the genesis of ethics. Yet his emphasis on the other is no less important than that of Levinas. For him, the other resists all attempts of the knowing ego at reducing it to the order of the same. In The Symbolic Meaning, he characterizes otherness as "untranslatable" (17). In the same book, he refers to otherness as "a term of the vivid, imminent unknown" (60). After quoting a passage from the work of an American author, Crevecoeur, Lawrence appreciates the author's "deep tender recognition of the life reality of the other, the other creature which exists not in union with the immediate self, but in dark juxtaposition" (The Symbolic Meaning, 64). For Levinas, ethics begins with putting into question of the rational, knowing self by the other who is incomprehensible in real terms. Lawrence's idea of ethics also starts with the recognition of the surrounding incomprehensible others by the knowing self. Lawrence says in the "Study of Thomas Hardy", "The vast unexplored morality of life surrounds us in its eternal incomprehensibility" (Phoenix, 419).

For Levinas, this calling into question of the knowing ego occurs in the face to face encounter with the other which "precedes ontology" (1969: 96). This encounter is totally devoid of any intention of reducing the other to the order of the same. As he maintains,

> meeting the face is not of the order of the pure and simple perception, of the intentionality which goes toward adequation. Positively, we will say that since the other looks at me, I am responsible for him, without having even taken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incumbent on me (1985: 96).

Lawrence also traces the root of ethics in the recognition of the untranslatable otherness embodied in the presence of the other. In his essay on "Democracy", Lawrence says,

> Our life, our being depends upon the incalculable issue from the central Mystery into undefinable presence....And presence is nothing mystic or

> ghostly. On the contrary. It is the actual man present before us. The fact that an actual man present before us is an inscrutable and incarnate Mystery, untranslatable, this is the fact upon which any great scheme of social life must be based. It is the fact of otherness (Phoenix, 714).

Lawrence shows his awareness of this relational radicalism long before Levinas has problematized it. This awareness underlines the deep affinity between Lawrence and Levinas in ethical matters. Lawrence's insistence that "any great scheme of social life must be based" on the recognition of the inscrutable 'other' is also implied in Levinas's proposition. The knowing ego, thus exposed to the defenceless nudity of the face, realizes the need for self-amendment.

For Levinas, "Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another" (1985: 96). Lawrence also privileges 'being', as a unit of the unknown, to 'knowing'. Thus both of them have reversed the Cartesian order of 'knowing' and 'being' enunciated in "cogito ergo sum". Lawrence's being is also responsible for the other as its calling into question of its own identity as the knowing ego is an on-going process. Levinas's concept of responsibility is fundamentally identical with that of Lawrence:

> My responsibility is untransferable, no one could replace me. In fact, it is a matter of saying the very identity of the human I starting from the responsibility, that is, starting from his position or deposition of the sovereign I in self-responsibility for the other (1985: 101).

The deposition of the human ego from its sovereign position is reiterated by Lawrence in his criticism of culture. Like the subject of Levinas, Lawrence's subject does not have the freedom from its responsibility for the other, because the other in Lawrence's scheme of things eludes the comprehension of the conscious ego and therefore the exposure to the face remains an endless process. The intersubjective relation in Lawrence is therefore 'non-symmetrical' and non-reciprocal as in Levinas (1985: 98).

For Levinas alterity is to be understood as an experience rather than a realizable quality. This experience of alterity is, in Levinas's terms, nothing more than a subjective experience of the limits of the percipient's knowing. In his later work, Otherwise than Being, Levinas characterizes the experience of alterity in his formulation of the "Saying" which he contrasts with the "Said". "Saying", in Simon Critchley's explication of the idea, is,

> The performative stating, proposing or expressive position of myself facing the other. It is a verbal or non-verbal ethical performance, whose essence cannot be caught on constative propositions. It is performative doing that cannot be reduced to constative description. By contrast, the "Said" is a statement, assertion, or proposition...concerning which the truth or falsity can be ascertained (Critchley, 7).

Lawrence's emphasis on the dynamic relation between individuals also resonates with idea of "Saying" as performative that cannot be reduced to constative description. In Fantasia of the Unconscious Lawrence anachronistically echoes Levinas as he proposes that "Life is to be lived from the deep, self-responsible spontaneous centres of every individual, in a vital, non-ideal circuit of dynamic relation between individuals" (85). Lawrence's distrust of fixity in any presentation of truth is also ingrained in Levinas's idea of the "Said". The "Said" in Levinas, "the constative proposition", conforms to Lawrence's idea of an "idea" or "theory". The dynamic life in Lawrence's schema is in perpetual conflict with the fixity of an idea or theory as something not applicable to life (Phoenix, 78).

The "alterity" in Levinas, again in the words of Critchley, is "the non-thematizable ethical residue...of language that escapes comprehension, interrupts philosophy, and is the very enactment of the ethical movement of the same to the other" (7). "Saying" is thus a relational process, rather than a fixed relationship, a movement, not stasis. Lawrence has put emphasis on this "relational process" as does Bakhtin. Lawrence attributes ethical values to "the relation between man and his circumambient universe":

"morality is that delicate, for ever trembling and changing balance between me and my circumambient universe, which precedes and accompanies a true relatedness" (Phoenix, 528). The "for ever trembling and changing balance" corresponds with Levinas.'s "Saying". Likewise, Bakhtin celebrates the novel for the orchestration of all its themes. The orchestration here is a relational process that assures truth, however contingent it may be: "Everything is true in its own time, place, circumstance and untrue outside of its own place, time and circumstance" (Phoenix, 528). This once again reminds us of Levinas for whom "alterity" is an experience that is entirely subject and context specific.

The most fascinating parallelism between the ethical ideas of Lawrence and those of Levinas appears in the solution they offer to the problem of how to "say" the other without reducing it to the intelligible—the "Said". The solution, for Levinas, lies in exploring "the ways in which the Said can be unsaid or reduced, thereby letting the Saying reside as a residue, or interruption, within the "Said"" (Critchley, 8). For Lawrence, the solution lies through an on-going periodic process of suspension and disruption of the process of knowing. Levinas's exploration of the process of unsaying the "Said" corresponds with Lawrence's idea of learning how not to know—an unlearning process. In Fantasia, Lawrence says in a paradoxical language:

> We must know, if only in order to learn not to know. This supreme lesson of human consciousness is to learn how not to know. That is not to interfere. That is, how to live dynamically, from the great source, and not statically, like machines driven by ideas or principles (76).

The knowing ego of Lawrence is analogous to the "Said" of Levinas. Like Levinas who speaks for reducing the "Said", Lawrence subjects the knowing ego to the unknown that constantly disrupts and interrupts. For Levinas also, the disruption of the "Said" is never complete (Critchley, 165).

The ethical in Levinas signifies the oscillation between the orders of the "Saying" and the "Said". In Lawrence the ethical lies in "the changing rainbow of our living

relationships" (Phoenix, 530). In the same essay Lawrence defines morality as the "trembling instability of the balance" (538). Lawrence the critic of culture attaches great importance to "new relationship": "A new relationship between ourselves and the universe means a new morality" (Phoenix, 523).

In Lawrence as in Levinas, ethics and aesthetics are thus one. By emphasizing the irreducibility of the other for whom the knowing ego is responsible, Levinas, like Lawrence, has celebrated the "intertwining flux" of life. For both of them, the knowing has its existence from the recognition of responsibility for the other. Therein lies the essence of ethics. For Lawrence, "Each thing, living or unliving, streams in its odd, intertwining flux" (Phoenix, 525), and the essence of the ethical lies in "living relatedness" (525).

In Levinas's schema, the "Said" is constantly put into question by the "Saying". Levinas's idea of responsibility is at the very core of Lawrence's ethical considerations: "There is nothing man can do but maintain a true relationship with the contiguous universe" (Phoenix, 525).

In matters relating to ethics and aesthetics Lawrence has significant correspondence with another leading thinker of our times, Michael Foucault. Foucault's concept of ethics and aesthetics and their inseparable link is mainly analytical as it focuses on the shift in the interrelation of ethics and aesthetics in historical perspective—from antiquity to modern times. Foucault defines ethics as "the kind of relationship you ought to have with yourself, rapport a' soi, which I call ethics and which determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his actions" (2000: 263). Again as he adds, "the part of ourselves which is most relevant for morality is our feelings" (2000: 263).

This definition further confirms the dictum that ethics and aesthetics are one. This dictum is avowed by Wittgenstein apart from Lawrence and Levinas (Davies, 33). Foucault's insistence that "we have to create ourselves as work of art" aligns him with Nietzsche and Satre (2000: 262). Lawrence's emphasis on the creation of an individual as a work of art is also a dominant aspect of his thought. In a letter

written to Morrel on 1 March,1915, Lawrence says that "to create oneself, in fact, be the artist creating a man in living fact...(to) create that work of art, the living man, achieve that piece of supreme art, a man's life."5

Lawrence has further affinity with Foucault in matters relating to ways of creating the individual as work of art. "The novel," says Lawrence, "is a bright book of life" (Phoenix, 535). Both Lawrence and Foucault insist that the creation of multiplicity of relationships, the developing of a new way of life, the developing of the aesthetic appreciation of sexual act and the creation of pleasure are the ways through which the individual can create his life as a work of art. Foucault, like Lawrence, is aware of the relational world we inhabit which is characterized by "multiplicity of relationships" (2000: 135-6) currently endangered by institutions: "We live in a relational world that institutions have considerably impoverished....We should fight against the relational fabric" (2000: 158).

Lawrence the critic of culture has a great concern for the impoverishment of the "relational world" perpetuated by Judeo-Christian culture, the culture that works through the "institutions". Again like Foucault, Lawrence suggests that the solution lies in discovering a new mode of human relationship. In Phoenix, Lawrence proposes that "We have got to discover a new mode of human relationship. Which means...we have got to get a new conception of man and of ourselves. And we have then to establish a new morality" (615).

In "Why he Novel Matters" Lawrence reposes his trust in the instinct for life based on the right man-woman relationship and not a theory of right and wrong: "in the novel you can see, plainly, when the man goes dead, the woman goes inert. You can develop an instinct for life, if you will instead of a theory of right and wrong" (Phoenix, 538). Foucault's way of escape is very much like Lawrence's: "Let's escape as much as possible from the type of relations that society proposes for us and try to create in the empty space where we are new relational possibilities" (2000: 160).

Foucault also suggests the use of one's sexuality to arrive at a multiplicity of relationships and views 'homosexuality' as one form of friendship. Homosexuality, in his view, has the potential of offering us a new way of life: "It seems to me that a way of life can yield a culture and an ethics. To be 'gay'...(is) to try to define and develop a new of life" (2000: 138). Lawrence anticipates Foucault in his recommendation of "deathless friendship" outside the matrix of heterosexuality. He refers to such a friendship as "sacred', as a "great active passion and characterizes it as "adventurous" and "a leap ahead" (Phoenix, 665). The cultivation of such a friendship, for Lawrence, contributes to the creation of new way of life. Both Lawrence and Foucault view sex as a possibility of creative life. For Lawrence, "sex is a very powerful, beneficial and necessary stimulus in human life (Phoenix, 174), and for Foucault, "sex is not a fatality, it is a possibility of creative life" (2000: 163). For both of them, Christianity has eradicated pleasure by its denunciation of the body. Foucault observes, "The Christian formula puts an accent on desire and tries to eradicate it.....And pleasure is both practically and theoretically excluded" (2000: 269). In his view Christianity has eradicated pleasure by insisting on the passivity of the sexual act. He further observes that "in the fourth century B.C., the sexual act was an activity, and for Christians it is a passivity" (2000: 258-9).

Foucault's project of creating oneself as a work of art involves the reinstatement of pleasure: "We have to create pleasure" (2000: 166). Lawrence also privileges pleasure over Christianity's insistence on reproduction. The sexual act, Lawrence insists, is not for the "deposition of the seed" (Phoenix, 441). Lawrence agrees with Foucault that the Christian renunciation of the body and all its pleasures has impoverished the creative life of individuals. Therefore, Foucault emphasizes the "aesthetic appreciation of the sexual act"6 and Lawrence appreciates the sexual act as a vitalistic necessity. Lawrence's description of the sexual act in Fantasia underlines both the creative and aesthetic aspect of the act:

> It is the bringing together of the surcharged electric blood of the male with the polarized electric blood of the female with the result of a tremendous flashing interchange, which alters the constitution of the blood, the very quality of being in both (107).

It is, nonetheless, a description of the creative process which Christianity has denied. Immediately after the act, Lawrence observes, "the new song rises, the brain tingles to new thought, the heart craves for new activity" (Fantasia, 108).

For Foucault, Christianity has given a fixed pattern of behaviour for everybody, jeopardizing the creative life of individuals. In Christianity, Foucault observes,, sexual rules for behaviour were justified through religion (2000: 266). After the 18th century, "a medical or scientific approach and a juridical framework" take over the place of religion. On the other hand, in the Greco-Roman times, the codes of sexual conduct concentrated on a kind of ethics which was an aesthetic one. Their ethics was a matter of personal choice, it was reserved for a few people in the population and their theme was aesthetics of existence (2000: 254-55). Foucault recommends this classical model of the blend of ethics and aesthetics to confront modern thought (2000: 294). Lawrence recommends his model of "true relatedness": "Men must get back into touch, their own absoluteness...and fall into their true relatedness" (Phoenix, 382). Implicit in Foucault's project of the ethical and aesthetic creation of one's life is the assertion of individual freedom and choice. Lawrence the critic of culture embarks on a same project and urges that "Everyman shall be himself, shall have every opportunity to come to his own intrinsic fullness of being" (Phoenix, 603).

Central to Foucault's project of creating individual life as art is the relationship between individuals—that constitute the "relational world". He attaches great importance to the relation of the individual to the other. He says, "I insist on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the morality that concerns the search for the truth and the relation to the other" (2000: 111). He emphasizes, like Lawrence, the difference between the lover and his beloved and refers to "lovers' fusion of identities" as a "readymade formula" from which the lovers must escape (2000: 137). We have already pointed our Lawrence's emphasis on difference in this chapter. Love, in Lawrence's view, "does not lie in merging, mingling, in absolute identification of the lover with the beloved. It lies in the

communion of beings, who, in the perfection of communion, recognize and allow the mutual otherness" (The Symbolic Meaning, 130).

For Lawrence, as for Foucault, Epistemology has destroyed the ethical framework of life. The ethical can be reinstated by breaking, destabilizing and reducing the 'One-and-Allness', the totalization of the know-all ego promoted by the post-Cartesian Western philosophy in Judeo-Christian culture. Greek philosophy, in Foucault's view, held that only an ethical subject can have access to truth7: "After Descartes, we have a non-aesthetic subject of knowledge" (2000: 279). Foucault strongly objects to this. All these three thinkers—Levinas, Foucault, and Lawrence—respond to the segregation of ethics from aesthetics by offering their alternative discourses to confront it.

NOTES

1. "As Aristotelian", says Schwarz, "Booth regards ethics, rhetorics and poetics as inextricably related".(Schwarz, 8).
2. Nussbaum has taken the term "perceptional and expressional" from Henry James' Art of the Novel: Critical Prefaces. 1934. New York: Scribners, 1970. p. 339.
3. On page 8 of his Studies in Classic American Literature (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971. Reprinted 1981), Lawrence has said this.
4. In Levinas's schema, "totality" denies and absorbs the other. The totalizing discourse of Western philosophy seeks to occupy all the available ground and thus deny any oppositional site to those whom it excludes.
5. This part of the letter is quoted in Apocalypse. P. 19.
6. See Foucault's Ethics. P. 149.
7. Foucault's Ethics. P. 278-79.

LAWRENCE AND THE POSTMODERN THINKERS

The frontiers of Lawrence criticism are opening up in our times onto postmodernism and post-structuralism. The dynamically contradictory nature of Lawrence's text has given, in the words of Widdowson, "a wholly new dimension in the context of postmodernity"(20). Daniel Schneider sees in Lawrence, in his attacks on idealism and logocentrism, a project allied to decostruction's frontal assault on traditional views of knowledge and logic. David Lodge in his "Lawrence, Dostoevsky, Bakhtin: Lawrence and Dialogic Fiction" attempts at bringing Mikhail Bakhtin's theory and practice to bear on the fiction of D. H. Lawrence, especially Women in Love. Daniel O' Hara finds in the "repetitive self-cancellation" in Lawrence's Women in Love a radically more deconstructive approach than even the rhetorical postures of the deconstructive critics themselves. (Widdowson. 146) John Worthen finds, while analyzing a passage from Sons and Lovers, that rhetorical presence is by no means easy to pin down in Lawrence's fictions. But the most revealing postmodern disclaimer of meaning, truth, identity, self and being comes from Lawrence himself. In a letter written in 1913, Lawrence has said, "Don't ever mind what I say. I am a great bosher and full of fancies that interest me" (Cambridge. Vol. I. page. 503). This love of fancy is related to his love of thought adventure, a fact that we have already pointed out. Biographical writings also support Lawrence's love of adventure. Paul Eggert in his "The Biological Issue: the Lives of D. H. Lawrence" points out Lawrence's love of role-play from an early age that can be linked to the provisionality of his writing, and to his "risk-taking polarizations and extremes" which typify much of his work (Fernihough. 9). This love of adventure is also inherent in Michael Foucault's approach. In answer to a query of the interviewer J. A. Miller whether sexuality and criminality were the same, Foucault has said, "I would say, let's try and see if it isn't the same. That's the stake in the game, and if I am thinking of writing six volumes, it's precisely because it's a game!"(Power/Knowledge, 209). The sense of 'game' here chimes with Lawrence's sense of adventure he pursued so nonchalantly.

In Lawrence's criticism of culture, the word 'culture' suggests a whole that in the postmodernist fashion can be seen as a number of parts connected by ideological point of view. The assumed consistency has earlier been overlooked. The assumption of consistency derives from the idea of a writer with a stable identity speaking from a fixed centre. The destabilization of the cult figure behind Lawrence's criticism of culture is contained within the non-fictional texts. Our eclectic approach supported by Lawrence's own, is only to view and review it in the context of postmodernism.

The definition of the term 'postmodern' with all its controversial shades of meaning is beyond the scope of our study. Our concern is with the dominant ideas that are generally associated with postmodernism and post-structuralism and to see how much Lawrence the 'destabilizing' critic of culture anticipates the tropes of contemporary radicalism. Following the failure of Lawrence critics to pigeonhole Lawrence's stance within modernism of such figures as Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, Wyndham Lewis and Virginia Woolf, it would surely be a worthwhile endeavour. One can agree with Bell that Lawrence was neither straightforwardly modernist nor anti-modernist, but "engaged in a parallel project" (Bell, 179). In his essay "Lawrence and Modernism", Bell proceeds to establish the set of cultural and artistic concerns of Lawrence at the centre of modernism while pushing those of Pound's, Eliot's and Joyce's to the periphery, especially in such matters as personal identity, artistic impersonality, gender, myth and truth of feeling. We argue that Lawrence's concerns have much to share rather with the leading thinkers of our times. His sense of the human personality as a process to be understood in 'inhuman' as well as in 'human' terms anticipates Levinas's idea of the 'inhuman'. "The question of impersonality is," says Bell, "perhaps the most crucial point of contrast between Lawrence and the typical proponents of modernism." (Bell, 185) T. S. Eliot's 'impersonal theory of poetry' formulated in his 1919 essay, "Tradition and Individual Talent", has a highly personal note as he insists that poetry "is not a turning loose of emotion", it is "an escape from emotion" (Eliot, 21). But Lawrence's theory of impersonality, not formulated formally but expressed in a letter to Edward Garnett, is, again according to Bell, " the non-moral awareness of a 'beyond self' which provides the ultimate imperative for all life decisions, the non-

teleological purpose of existence." (Bell, 186). This 'non-self' – the repudiation of conscious self (ego)-- and the situating of the unit of life beyond the 'totalizing' rationality in Levinas's sense, have taken Lawrence beyond modernism and nearer to the postmodernist philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. Lawrence is also opposed to the modernist view that feeling requires discipline. The gendered assumptions about feeling are a modernist sub-text which the feminists have opened up. The following observation of Bell is loaded with implications that not only align him with feminists but also with the Deleuvian idea of 'becoming woman'1:

> His obvious male insecurity, the reactive misogyny, clearly comes from a man with a strong female identification which has creative as well as personal dimensions. Early reviews assumed him to be female, and Lisa Appingnanesi has noted the cooption of femininity, by several male modernist writers, as a vital element in their creativity (Bell, 187)

We have already discussed the question of 'the strong female identification' in Lawrence in our chapter on Lawrence and feminism. Back to the modernists' concern with 'myths', Eliot's reification of myths is manifest in his approving remarks on Joyce's use of the 'mythic method' as a technique. It reflects the modernists' attitude to myths in general. But for Lawrence, myth is a mode of being, not a technique—the emergence of which is possible only when the characters, passing beyond their everyday consciousness, are at one with the impersonal.

Lawrence shares with the modernists their suspicion about ideas. Ezra Pound in his Literary Essays (341) says that "an idea has little value apart from the modality of the mind which receives it" and T. S Eliot in his obituary compliment to Henry James that he "had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it" (Egoist.5. 1. 1918).2 But the affinity between Lawrence and these two modernists in this respect is only superficial. Lawrence hates ideas because they are detrimental to the life of feeling. He says, "My field is to know the feelings inside a man and to make new feelings conscious." (Phoenix II. 567) The importance of emotional response Lawrence attaches to literary criticism pushes him beyond the limit of modernism to 'ecriture feminine' and other such feminist aesthetics currently held by many feminist critics.

Lawrence's capacity to assume roles as pointed out by Eggert only confirms our earlier contention that Lawrence is a thought adventurer. This love of adventure in thought has perhaps prompted him to feel the spirit of places like Mexico, Australia and the Etruscan. We do not attribute this love to any psychological or pathological tendency nor to any particular philosophical predilection does Lawrence hold dear to him, but to his inordinate love of playing the game of thought from a belief in the eternal flux of life and an endless becoming like his fond symbol 'phoenix'.

Lawrence the critic of culture shows his concern with things that corroborate with those of the leading contemporary thinkers such as Jacques Lacan, Jean Baudrillard, Jean- Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin and Giles Deleuze. Lawrence shares with them the central issues like the rejection of realist epistemology and the Enlightenment project that is built upon that epistemology, the denial of the Cartesian autonomous subject, of the transparency of language, of the accessibility of the real, of the possibility of universal foundation, and so on. With them he stresses the other, contingency, change, difference and absence of self and meaning. Like them, Lawrence has called into question the totalitarian reason and the tendency of increasing homogenization in Western Culture. Here we propose to reread the key ideas of Lawrence against the plural and provisional perspectives of postmodern condition.

Lawrence is aware and shows his concern for the increasing dominance of simulacra in Western Culture. On this point he comes very close to Jean Baudrillard, the French cultural theorist whose dominant concern is the postmodern turn to simulacra or 'hyper-reality'. For Baudrillard, we have lost all sense of authenticity and live in a world of simulation that we take to be reality: the signifier or image "bears no relation to any reality whatever" (1988, 170). Lawrence is not only aware of the simulacra but also raises many other deep issues associated with this:

> Man fixes some wonderful erection of his own between himself and the wild chaos, and gradually goes bleached and stifled under the parasol. Then comes a poet, enemy of convention, and makes a slit in the umbrella: and lo!

> The glimpse of chaos is a vision, a window to the sun. But after a while, getting used to the vision, and not liking the genuine draught from the chaos, commonplace man daubs a simulacrum of the window that opens on to chaos, and patches the umbrella with the painted patch of simulacrum...so that the umbrella at last looks like a glowing open firmament, of many aspects. But alas! It is all simulacrums, in innumerable patches (Phoenix. 255-256).

Lawrence's view of the world as a "wild chaos" connotes a sense that is shared by another leading French philosopher, Giles Deleuze. We shall discuss further affinity between Lawrence and Deleuze later on in this chapter. Unlike Baudrillard, who stresses the essential unreality of the culture in which we live, Lawrence attributes the unreal images to "commonplace men" counter-pointed by the "vision" of the poet. Yet the very awareness of a "glowing open firmament" suggests that Lawrence is not very far away from Baudrillard in this respect.

For Baudrillard, the dominance of simulacra in our times is symptomatic of a loss of the real. Lawrence expresses a similar view in his "Apropos of Lady Chatterley's Lover":

> Never was an age more sentimental, more devoid of real feeling, than our own. Sentimentality and counterfeit feeling have become a sort of game, everybody trying to outdo his neighbour. The radio and the film are mere counterfeit emotion all the time, the current press and literature the same. People wallow in emotion: counterfeit emotion (Lady Chatterley's lover, 336).

For Baudrillard, advertising today sells us images rather than things and for Lawrence, multimedia like radio, film, press and literature are selling us emotions which are simulacra, 'counterfeit' in his version. Standing at a historical distance from Baudrillard, Lawrence has voiced the same concerns. Shortly before his death, Lawrence has voiced a deep Baudrillardian concern: "We don't to look at flesh and blood people—we want to watch their shadows on the screen. We don't want to hear

their actual voices: only transmitted through a machine" ("Men Must Work and Women as Well", Phoenix-II, 590). In the "Study of Thomas Hardy", although in a different context, Lawrence has said, "map appears to be more real than the land" (Phoenix, 420). Further, Lawrence has shown his awareness of man's love of simulacra in his essay "Art and Morality" where he says that man in general sees what 'Kodak' has taught him to see:

> whatever the image on the retina may be, it is rarely even now, the photographic image of the object which is actually taken in by the man who sees the object. He does not, even now, see himself. He sees what Kodak has taught him to see. And man, try as he may, is not a Kodak (Phoenix. 522).

Lawrence's point here is that 'the photographic image of the object' falls much short of the actual 'image on the retina' and that the former is a drastic reduction of the latter. This lack of correspondence between the 'actual' and the 'virtual', as Baudrillard sees it, is one of the major concerns of Lawrence the critic of culture. This question assumes wider significance in the Lacanian discourse of the three-dimensional space—the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic which we shall discuss while exploring later in this chapter the affinity between Lawrence and Lacan. Back to our context, Lawrence's focus on the problem is less on the autonomy of simulacra than on the individual human being's love of simulacra: "We have learned to see and every one of us has a complete Kodak idea of himself."(522)

The parallelism between some Lawrentian ideas with that of the French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard is all the more close. Lyotard's central argument in The Postmodern Condition is that we now live in an era in which legitimizing metanarratives are in crisis and in decline. These narratives are contained in or implied by Kantianism, Hegelianism and Marxism and are set in motion since the period of the Enlightenment. These narratives argue that history is progressive, that knowledge can liberate us, and that all knowledge has a secret unity. The two of the main narratives Lyotard has attacked are those of the progressive emancipation of humanity, the Christian and the Marxist utopia on the one hand and the triumph of science on the other. Lyotard considers that such doctrine of modernity has lost the

credibility after the Second World War. "Simplifying to the extreme," says Lyotard, "I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives" (1984. XIV).

Lawrence's "incredulity towards the metanarratives" is seen in his sustained denunciation of Kantian unifying ego, in his refusal to accept scientific enquiry as disinterested pursuits of truths about reality and its universal applicability, and in his rejection of any grand theory that attempts at governing life. In his cultural criticism, Lawrence has attacked Christianity for its exaltation of the spirit over the body and the gift of redemption it offers. In Phoenix, Lawrence says, "Christianity, then, is the ideal, but it is impossible. It is impossible because it makes demands greater than the man can bear" (284). In his essay on "Democracy", Lawrence has exposed the ideal of humanism. He argues, "Men are not equal, and never were, and never will be, save by the arbitrary determination of some ridiculous human ideal" (Phoenix, 701). In his view, the idea of the average is pure abstraction and a reduction of the human being to a mathematical unit. The metadiscourse of humanism is essentially faulty as its measuring unit assumes the role of a human being it is supposed to measure, Lawrence argues in the same essay. Lawrence's strong denunciation of ideals or metanarratives shows his keen awareness of the inadequacy of them. In his Defining the Postmodern, Lyotard says, "Neither economic nor political liberalism, nor the various Marxisms emerge from the sanguinary last two centuries free from the suspicion of crimes against mankind" (1986: 6). Lawrence's observation, although from a different angle, has touched upon the inefficacy of many such ideals: "The state is dead ideal. Nation is a dead ideal. Democracy and socialisms are dead ideals. They are one and all just contrivances for the supplying of the lowest material needs of a people" (Phoenix, 702).

All such ideals, in Lawrence's view, are bound to fail because they are static abstractions abstracted from life, negating all its multiplicity. The failure of such metanarratives, in Lawrence's view, is because of their 'absolute' character. He therefore prefers contingency to the absolute character of the grand narratives. The progressive emancipation of mankind is jeopardized by this very contingency. As Lawrence says, "There is no absolute good, there is nothing absolutely right. All things flow and change, and even the change is not absolute" (Phoenix. 536). The

'metanarratives' of Lyotard are the "great ideas" of Lawrence that claim but do not have any legitimacy. Lawrence has regretted that "we have limited our consciousness, tethered it to a few great ideas, like a goat to a post" (Phoenix. 629, my emphasis). For Lawrence, individuals are "Not a mass of homogeneity, like sunlight, but a fathomless multiplicity, like the stars at night, each one isolate in darkly singing space"(Phoenix. 634). This figurative description is characteristically Lawrentian that Lyotard does not share, but the "fathomless multiplicity" is distinctly Lyotardian.

The Lyotardian incredulity towards the metanarrative of science does also correspond to Lawrentian skepticism about the same. The claim of science to objective truth is repeatedly called into question by Lawrence. In his introduction to Fantasia of the Unconscious. Lawrence expresses his incredulity towards science in as clear terms as those of Lyotard.

> Our objective science of modern knowledge concerns itself only with phenomena, and with phenomena as regarded in their cause-and-effect relationship....Our science is a science of the dead world. Even biology never considers life, but only mechanistic functioning and apparatus of life (Fantasia. 12).

Lawrence proposes to have instead "a science in terms of life," the "the subjective science of the great pagan world," the science that "proceeds in terms of life and is established on data of living experience and of sure intuition" (Fantasia,12). Lawrence also regrets the reductive tendency in the science of medicine in The Symbolic Meaning, the earlier version of his Studies in Classic American Literature. In the opening essay titled "The Spirit of Place" Lawrence, while commenting on the didactic element in art, has said that "we reduce a man to his mere physico-functional capacity in the science of medicine" (The Symbolic Meaning, 19). Elsewhere such as in Apocalypse, Lawrence again questions the universality of science and its application, and limits them to mere "thought-forms":

> All that science has taught about fire does not make fire any different. The processes of combustion are not fire, they are thought-forms. H2O is not

water, it is a thought-form derived from experiments with water. Thought-forms are thought-forms, they do not make our life. Our life is still made of elemental fire and water, earth and air: by these we live and have our being (135).

For Lawrence, these thought-forms are incapable of delivering goods for mankind for they are cut off from life in its eternal flux. They represent absolutes that do not apply to life. In his essay, "Crown", Lawrence again comments on the failure of science to live up to the demands of life:

> All absolutes are prison- walls. These laws which science has invented, like conservation of energy, indestructibility of matter, gravitation, the will- to-live, survival of the fittest: and even the absolute facts like—the earth goes round the sun, or the doubtful atoms, electrons, or ether—they are all prison walls, unless we realize that we don't know what they mean (Phoenix II, 397).

In Lawrentian terms, knowledge is always subsidiary to life and always has just a functional value. The status of scientific knowledge is no better.

In Lyotard's view, the transition from modernity to postmodernity is a transition from metanarratives to 'petits recits' or mini narratives. These modest narratives "have a limited validity in place and time and that are sometimes identical with what Lyotard, borrowing from the later Wittgenstein, calls "language games" (Bertens, 247). Lawrence's love of pagan polytheism, expressed in his Apocalypse in the following lines—"To the ancient consciousness, Matter, Materia, or Substantial things are God. A great rock is God. A pool of water is God" (Apocalypse. 95), is vindicated by Lyotard in Economic Libidinale. In this book Lyotard argues that "a polytheistic religious system like that of ancient Rome has a number of advantages over monotheistic religions"(Bertens, 246). Paganism privileges heterogeneity and difference, and stands for the postmodern incommensurability—the issues that Lawrence raises in his cultural criticism. Lawrence is also aware of the 'petits recits' of which Lyotard was so articulate. In "Morality and the Novel", Lawrence

emphasizes the need for petits recits: "Everything is true in its own time, place and circumstance, and untrue outside of its own place, time and circumstance" (Phoenix, 528). This finds support from Lyotard as much as from a later commentator like Sheila Benhabib:

> Transcendental guarantees of truth are dead; in the agonal struggle of language games there is no commensurability; there are no criteria of truth transcending local discourses, but only the endless struggle of local narratives vying with one another for legitimation (Situating the Self, 1992, quoted in Christopher Butler, 29).

Lyotard's emphasis on 'heterogeneity' and 'difference' has further correspondence with Lawrence's views. A differend, Lyotard writes in The Differend, "would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments" (XI). This conflict beyond equitable resolution is the central point of Lawrence's argument in his "Crown". In this essay Lawrence argues that the existence of the unicorn depends upon the very existence of the lion and each of them is kept in a 'stable equilibrium' by the opposition of the other. The never-ending conflict between them, Lawrence argues, is the essential prime condition for their existence:

> The lion and the unicorn are not fighting for the crown. They are fighting beneath it. And the crown is upon the fight. If they made friends and lay down side by side, the crown would fall on them both and kill them (Phoenix II, 371).

The crown is the Lawrentian symbol of the Absolute. It is not the fruit of either victory, but is the "the raison d'etre of both" (Phoenix II, 373). In Lawrence's view, Christianity speaks of unforgivable blasphemy by trying to make the lion lie down with the lamb and, as a consequence, destroys the opposition or conflict. Victory on either side gives only a false crown: "This is the sham crown, which the victorious lion and the victorious unicorn alike puts on its head: the crown of the sterile egoism" (Phoenix II, 380).

Lawrence's keen awareness of the necessity of otherness and difference allies him with Lyotard. In The Symbolic Meaning, he says that the classic American literature is to be understood in terms of 'otherness' and 'difference'(17), because, as he argues, "the present reality is the reality of untranslatable otherness"(17). Again like Lyotard, Lawrence sees oneness as standing in the way of real deliverance: "We must get clear of the old oneness that imprisons our real deliverance"(17). For Lyotard, as it is for Lawrence, both the structuralists and phenomenologists have left no room for desire by eliminating difference altogether: "The fundamental realm of desire is the realm of difference, of true heterogeneity," says Lyotard (Bertens, 245). Both Lawrence and Lyotard have celebrated 'difference' and 'heterogeneity' against homogeneity and oneness, local narratives against 'metanarrative'. Lawrence's concept of desire is based not on identification but on otherness. In his view lovers will meet but never merge and it is the pure maleness in man and pure femaleness in woman that constitutes the realm of desire. Lawrence argues that "the longing for identification with the beloved, without recognizing her otherness, becomes a lust" (Phoenix, 125).

Lawrence the critic of culture has laid bare the spuriousness and falsity of the humanist ideal. The humanist ideas of self are defined by the operations of consciousness, including rationality, free-will and self-reflection. Freud has destabilized the humanist ideal of the self. For him actions, thought, beliefs and the concepts of self are all determined by the unconscious, its drives and desires. But Freud has emphasized the conscious self or rational identity, the ego, and seeks to make it more powerful than the unconscious in order to ensure the onward march of civilization. Lawrence has expressed his doubt towards the Freudian metanarrative regarding the ego. This incredulity towards the authenticity of the ego is later on shared by Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst of the mid-twentieth century.

For Lawrence, as for Lacan, the ego or 'I' self is an illusion. Lacan has described the process of how the infant forms an illusion of the self in his essay on the "Mirror Stage". Lawrence's enunciation of the same is less systematic but no less firm in its insistence of the spuriousness of the ego. Lawrence attributes the formation of the

ego to the unhealthy development of the mind that overpowers all the spontaneous dynamic activity that feeds on faulty idealism. He also attributes this, like Lacan, to man's inordinate love of his own image on the mirror-his own picture.

In Lacan's schema, there are only 'signifiers' and no 'signified', (the terms he borrows from Saussure) to which the signifiers ultimately refer and therefore there is no guarantee of some kind of meaning. There is no anchor that ultimately gives stability to the whole system. He says that the process of becoming an adult or 'self' is the process of trying to fix, to stabilize the chain of signifiers so that the meaning of 'I' is possible.

Like Freud, Lacan's infant starts out as something inseparable from its mother. This is the state of 'nature', which has to broken up in order for 'culture' to be formed. The baby in the Mirror Stage, at the age between 6 to 8 months, will see itself in a mirror. The baby will look at its image, then look back at its mother or some other person—then again look at the mirror image. Lacan says,

> The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from the insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopedic—and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development ("The Mirror Stage", Ecrits: 5).

The child is thus moved from a 'fragmented body' to an 'orthopedic vision of its totality'. What really happens is an identification that is misrecognition. Lacan says, "Our experience shows that we should start...from the function of meconnaissance3 that characterizes the ego in all its structures" (Ecrits, 7) This process of misrecognising one's self in the mirror image creates the ego. The ego is thus at the best a fantasy, an illusion, and not an internal sense of separate whole identity.

For Lawrence, the cognition or the first glimmerings of the mind in a child do not coincide with the formation of the ideal ego. In Lawrence's schema, direct cognition takes place when dynamic connection begins from one sympathetic centre of the two—'solar plexus' and 'lumber ganglion'. It is then polarized from the corresponding voluntary centre, either 'thoracic ganglion' or 'cardiac plexus' and the complete dynamic flow in one plane corresponds to the other to establish a whole field of consciousness. Lawrence says, "The moment there is a perfect polarized circuit between the first four poles of dynamic consciousness, at that moment does the mind, the terminal station, flash into cognition" (Fantasia, 74).

Lawrence's concept of the ego, like that of Lacan, is formed by a misrecognition. But it is not formed in childhood, as Lacan insists. Man, according to Lawrence, may fall into egoism at any stage of his life and mistake the ideal ego for a true self. In the "Crown", Lawrence says, "Once we fall into the state of egoism, we cannot change. The ego, the self-conscious ego remains fixed, a final envelop around us" (Phoenix II, 396). The ego is "man's second self" (Phoenix, 710), is the "false absolute" (Phoenix II, 381) and the "vicious circle"(Phoenix, 180). For both Lawrence and Lacan, the ego is a prison. Lawrence says,

> We are all pot bound in our consciousness. We are like fish in a glass bowl, swimming round and round and gaping at our own image reflected in the walls of the infinite: the infinite being the glass bowl of our conception of life and the universe. We are prisoners inside our own conception of life and being (Phoenix, 325).

Speaking about the conception of 'freedom' of the existentialists, Lacan says, "a freedom that is never more authentic than when it is within the walls of a prison" (Ecrits, 7). Lawrence also attributes the formation of the ego to man's tendency to form a picture of himself and substituting the Real for the Imaginary. Lacan says that the child's self-concept, its ego, will never match up to its own being. Its 'imago' in the mirror is both smaller and more stable than the child, and is always 'other' than the child. Lawrence detects the tendency of forming a picture of the self, the ego, not in the baby but in a grown-up man. He says, "As soon as man became

aware of himself, he made a picture of himself. Then he began to live according to the picture. Mankind at large made a picture of itself and everyman had to conform to the picture" (Phoenix, 379). Lawrence traces the emergence of the ego to man's habit of identifying with the visual image of himself. In "Art and Morality", Lawrence says, "This is the habit we have formed: of visualizing everything. Each man to him is a picture. That is, he is a complete little objective reality, complete in himself, absolutely, in the middle of the picture" (Phoenix, 523). In the same essay he says that this habit has contributed to the development of conscious ego in man (Phoenix, 523).

In Phoenix Lawrence says that in true psychoanalysis, the psychoanalyst's task is to break "the ego-centric absolute of the individual" (379). The escape from the impasse of the ideal ego, for Lawrence, lies through getting ourselves back into touch:

> Men must get back into touch. And to do so they must forfeit the vanity and the noli me tangere of their own absoluteness: also they must utterly break the present great picture of normal humanity: shatter that mirror in which we all live grimacing: and fall again into true relatedness (Phoenix, 382)

Lacan's way of bringing about a correspondence between nature (the Real) and culture (the Imaginary) lies through love: "At this juncture of nature and culture, so persistently examined by modern anthropology, psychoanalysis alone recognizes this knot of imaginary servitude, that love must always undo again, or sever" (Ecrits, 8).

Lacan's conception of the mirror stage, as a phase in which reification of the ideal ego takes place, repudiates all the philosophies relying on cogito. Lacan says, "It (the mirror stage) is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the cogito" (Ecrits, 1). Lawrence's outright rejection of the cogito is ubiquitous in his writings. In "Pornography and Obscenity" Lawrence says, "I am what I am, not merely what I think I am" (173). He iterates the same in his poem, "Climb down, O Lordly Mind":

"Man is an altering consciousness.
Man is an altering consciousness
Only that exists which exists in my consciousness.
Cogito, ergo sum
Only that exists dynamically and unmentalised, in my blood,
Non cogito, ergo sum.
I am. I do not think I am." (The Complete Poems, Vol. 1: 474)

Again in "Ego-bound", a poem in the same volume, Lawrence compares the pot-bound plant with the ego-bound man and urges man to "shell off his ego" (475).

Lawrence the critic of culture has also shown his awareness of the Bakhtinian theory of carnival. We here make a very sketchy study of such an awareness in Lawrence in order to map out the extent of Lawrence's thought adventures. Bakhtin has formulated the concept of the carnival in his study of the seventeenth century prose satirist, Francois Rabelais. The concept of the carnival "is derived from the practice of medieval carnival when, in an episode of permitted licence, the people would enjoy a holiday from their labours and in the process lampoon the authorities of church and state" (Peter Brooker, 24). It is a subversive act of the lower orders. On such occasion the lower order indulged themselves in the pleasures of the BODY in eating, drinking and sexual activity. This social order, Bakhtin argues, was "adopted as a form of literary satire by Rabelais and employed what he identifies as the key features of 'decrowning activity', eccentricity, laughter, PARODY, profanation and 'doubling'"(Brooker, 25)

In Apocalypse, where Lawrence rereads this Biblical episode in the title, Lawrence explains symbolical language of the supposed Apocalyptist:

> The language of the text, "rejoice and make merry and send gifts to one another" suggests a pagan saturnalia....If this is what the Apocalyptist meant, it shows how intimately he follows pagan practice, for the ancient saturnalian feasts all represented the breaking, or at least the interruption of an old order of rule or law (Apocalypse,117).

The 'breaking' or the 'interruption of an old order of rule or law' is Lawrence's version of Bakhtinian 'decrowning activity'. Lawrence is not a theoretician, but his adventuring thoughts, like the globe-trotting man in him, have ventured into many hinterlands of critical consciousness postulated and elaborated as theory later by many of our contemporaries.

Lawrence's strong opposition against the trust reposed on knowledge by the Western philosophical tradition aligns him with the contemporary French philosopher, Michel Foucault. Lawrence's concept of knowledge has interesting parallels with that of Foucault. Both of them are opposed to the status of fundamental principle given to knowledge by modern philosophy. For Lawrence, knowledge, mental knowledge to be specific, at best has only functional value, and for Foucault, "Knowledge is more likely to be 'rooted in the errors of life' than to provide an 'opening to the truth of the world'" (Bertens,138). In Lawrence's schema, knowing is subsidiary to being as knowledge has its basis in the already lived experience and therefore is incapable of coping with the demands of new experience. Foucault has also spoken of the primacy of life over theory, of reality over knowledge in the contemporary 'thematic':

> we have repeatedly encountered, at least at the superficial level, in the course of most recent times, an entire thematic to the effect that it is not theory but life that matters, not knowledge but reality...and arising out of this thematic...we might describe as an insurrection of subjugated knowledges (Power/Knowledge, 81).

This "insurrection of subjugated knowledges", a project in Foucault's genealogy of knowledge, has its analogy in Lawrence which we shall discuss later.

Foucault in his Ethics has explored the origin of knowledge as a fundamental principle in modern philosophy and has found that "in theoretical philosophy from Descartes to Husserl, knowledge of the self takes on ever-increasing importance as the first step in the theory of knowledge" (2000: 228). Foucault comments that

Descartes' emphasis on the direct evidence of non-ethical subject that gives him access to truth (2000: 279) and Kant's reintroduction of "ethics as an applied form of procedural rationality" (2000: 279/280) are basically faulty. For Foucault, the emphasis on the knowing subject in modern philosophical tradition and its attempt to found knowledge in truth are inherently deluded projects. Foucault brings Kant's analytic of truth into interrogation by drawing on the arguments of the French philosopher Georges Canguilhem who argues that "this historian of rationalities himself so 'rational', is a philosopher of error"(Quoted in Bertens, 137). Since the possibility of error is intrinsic to life, rationalism has reduced the importance of coping with chance and error. Lawrence's repudiation of knowledge as 'opening to the truth of the world' is less systematic but no less categorical than that of Foucault. He is also critical of the modern philosophical tradition for its emphasis on the knowledge of the self as leading to truth. We have already pointed out Lawrence's dismissal of Cartesian subject as knower of truth. Like Foucault, Lawrence is also aware of the limitations of conceptual schemas: "Theory as theory is all right. But the moment you apply it to life, especially to the subjective life, the theory becomes mechanistic" (Phoenix, 378).

For Lawrence, knowledge is inherently contingent in its scope to open up any possibility of access to truth and therefore it has a reduced applicability to life: "human consciousness contains, as we know, not a tithe of what is, and therefore it is hopeless to proceed by a method of elimination" (Phoenix, 434).

For Lawrence, life revolves around a condition that is marked fundamentally by chance and unpredictability—a condition that reduces the importance of knowledge as foundation of truth. But it is not true that Lawrence has dismissed the importance of knowledge altogether. He says, "We don't find fault with mental consciousness....We only find fault with the One-and-Allness which is attributed to it" (Phoenix, 636). In Apocalypse Lawrence iterates this stance: "it is not Reason itself whom we have to defy, it is her myrmidons, our accepted ideas and thought-forms. Reason can adjust itself to anything"(50). Lawrence is aware of the tenuous nature of truth that the rational self has access to. Like Foucault, Lawrence argues that knowledge is necessary for the protection of individual existence: "And ever, as

his knowledge of what is past becomes greater, he wants more and more liberty to be himself. There is the necessity of self-preservation, the necessity to submerge himself in the utter mechanical movement" (Phoenix. 425).

Lawrence considers knowledge as a 'force' (Phoenix.431). Foucault likewise designates knowledge the important role of helping individual existence to protect itself and deal with the external world. Significantly, Foucault also gives a functional value to knowledge. His concept of knowledge is inherently Lawrentian: "Knowledge is for me that which must function as a protection of individual existence and as a comprehension of the external world. I think that's it. Knowledge as a means of surviving by understanding" (2000: 125).

The affinity between Lawrence and Foucault is further focused by Lawrence's argument that man's consciousness is a manifestation of his individuality. Man's extension of consciousness helps him understand his world better (Phoenix, 431-2). But on validation of knowledge and attempts at establishing it as a foundation of truth, both Lawrence and Foucault have expressed their reservation. They agree upon the proposition that knowledge is to be viewed in terms of limitations inherent in our ways of thinking. In Dits et. Ecrits 3., Foucault has said, "Each certitude can only remain secure of a supporting ground that remains unexplored" (1994: 787).

The proposition of subjecting knowledge to the unknown as suggested by the quoted line in order that any knowledge may attain 'certitude' is a demand that Foucault's own designation of knowledge fulfils. First, Foucault has not conceived knowledge in terms of 'totality'. Second, in his genealogy of knowledge he has entertained the

> claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects (Power/Knowledge, 83).

Lawrence's denunciation of the 'One-and-Allness'of knowledge is Foucault's "unitary body of a theory" from which Foucault seeks to resurrect knowledges of the 'local', 'discontinuous', 'disqualified' and 'illegitimate' character. Foucault attempts at emancipating historical knowledges from their subjection, to render them, that is capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse (Power/Knowledge, 85). Lawrence the critic of culture has a similar project. His exploration of the Mexican God in The Plumed Serpent, of the spirit of the Etruscan places in the travelogue, of the long lost subjective science in the Fantasia of the Unconscious and of the pagan way of life and of various esoteric knowledge in Apocalypse are glaring examples. The adventures of Lawrence's thought bring within its fold these subjugated knowledges of human history to counter the hegemony of unitary body of theory and to show its inadequacy. Lawrence regrets that "We always want a conclusion, an end, we always want to come, in our mental processes, to a decision, a finality, a full-stop" (Apocalypse, 93). This tendency is endemic to "the tyranny of globalizing discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde" (Power/Knowledge, 83) which Foucault seeks to eliminate. Coming back to the question of Foucauldian 'certitude' that needs an unexplored supporting ground, we find an illustration of it in Lawrence's grounding of knowledge on the unknown:

> He(an individual) takes knowledge of all this past experience upon which the new tip rides quivering , he becomes again the old life, which has built itself out in the fixed tissue, he lies in line with the old movement, unconscious, of where it breaks, at the growing plasm, into something new, unknown (Phoenix, 424)

For Foucault, the anthropological sleep of the modern philosophical tradition has cost us dear. Lawrence is aware of such a gap and this awareness is manifest in his interest in anthropology. This anthropological interest serves to disrupt the unitary thought in his criticism of culture. In his Forward to the Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says, "I am not a proper archeologist nor an anthropologist nor an ethnologist. I am not scholar of any sort. But I am very grateful to scholars

for their sound work" (10). This disclaimer only emphasizes Lawrence's interest in anthropology.

Foucault has exalted "life over theory", as we have quoted above. Lawrence has also celebrated life, exalting 'to be' over 'to know' in Apocalypse, "for man the vast marvel is to be alive" (149). This celebration of life and its becoming in the individual associates him with yet another French philosopher, Giles Deleuze. Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, with their insistence on 'difference' and 'becoming' have emphasized that the value of art and philosophy lies in their power to disrupt the existing mode of life and become new. Lawrence holds a similar view. The primacy of life over everything that attempts to fix it—is one of the cardinal points of Deleuze and Guattari's argument. They, like Lawrence, argue that consciousness and spirit cannot overcome 'difference' and 'becoming' as Hegel argues. Against the tendency in Western thought to suppress and reduce difference to some grounding identity, they have posited that "Life is difference, the power to think differently, to become difference and create differences" (Colebrook, 13). Both structuralists and phenomenologists placed difference and becoming within some ground or foundation. Against them, Deleuze posits a becoming for the sake of change itself. In Deleuze's view, capitalism has emerged from "the tendency to sameness, uniform quantification, the fixing of all becoming through one measure or territory (Colebrook, 65). His 'untimely' philosophy, by creating whole new lines of time, offers to disrupt the impasse of capitalism. Although Lawrence has not treated capitalism in isolation, his reading of it as one more way of totalization that invites comparison with Deleuze's stance.

Deleuze's concepts of 'becoming' and 'difference', of 'immanence' and 'unovocity', of the Nietzschean 'lines of flight', 'pre-personal singularities' and 'eternal return' and above all of the preponderance of flux in the actual, the virtual and the real are the areas in which Lawrence has correspondence with Deleuze. Lawrence's idea of history is that of 'untimely' in the Deleuvian sense of the term. The idea of dynamic thought in Lawrence, as posited in the Fantasia of the Unconscious, is also emphasized by Deleuze who "wanted to express the dynamism and instability of thought"(Colebrook, 4). Lawrence's thought adventure gets a new

dimension in the light of Deleuze's emphasis on doing philosophy adventurously (Colebrook, 14).

Both Lawrence and Deleuze agree that 'difference' is the essential condition of life. The process of creation starts, for Deleuze, when certain organisms are differentiated from the chaos or flows of difference which are life. This happens prior to any organized matter or system of relations. These organisms are not closed forms but 'starta' that creates a distinction between 'inside' and 'outside'. Each organism opens out in two directions: towards the chaos and to its own limited forms (Colebrook, 77). In his "Study of Thomas Hardy", Lawrence emphasizes these two directions:

> Facing both ways, like Janus, face forward in the quivering glimmering image of the unresolved, facing the unknown, and looking backward over the vast rolling tract which follows and represents the initial movement, man is given up to his dual business of being, in blindness and wonder and pure godliness, the living stuff of life itself, unresolved: and knowing with unwearying labour and unceasing success, the manner of that which has been, which is unrevealed (Phoenix, 430).

This passage shows Lawrence's close affinity with Deleuze: 'the vast tract of life which follows and represents the initial movement' resonates with Deleuze's concept of chaos while Deleuze' concept of the little form of organism is reflected in Lawrence's sense of 'quivering, glimmering image of the unresolved'. These are the two directions in which, for both Lawrence and Deleuze, each organism opens out. Lawrence's emphasis on 'difference' is again like that of Deleuze:

> It seems as though one of the conditions of life is, that life shall continually and progressively differentiate itself, almost as though the differentiation were a purpose. Life stars crude and unspecified, a great Mass. And it proceeds to evolve out of that mass ever more distinct and definite particular forms, an ever multiplying number of separate species and orders (Phoenix, 431).

This process of continuous and progressive differentiation is the cardinal condition of life as Deleuze views it. For him, life proceeds by creatively maximizing its potential (Colebrook, 14). For Lawrence, as for Deleuze, perpetual flux is a necessary condition for existence, for all life is a continuous process of becoming. Lawrence says, "The final aim of everything is the achievement of itself" (Phoenix, 403). The creative maximization of life is a dominant concern of Lawrence the critic of culture. In the same essay he says,

> The excess is the thing itself at its maximum of being. If it had stopped short of this excess, it would not have been at all. In this excess the plant is transfigured into flower, it achieves at least itself. The aim, the culmination of all is the red of the poppy, the flame of the phoenix (Phoenix, 402).

Like Lawrence, Deleuze has observed this power of life in smaller organisms and in their tendency to evolve, mutate and become (Colebrook.1).

Deleuze's proposition against Platonism, which is formulated in his Logic of Sense (1990), is similar to that of Lawrence. Lawrence prefers Heraclitus's idea of flux to Plato's idea of form as a convincing mode of explaining the complexities of life. Deleuze likewise overturns Platonism with the affirmation of becoming. He destabilizes the foundation of being by acknowledging "the immanence of becoming" (Colebrook, 126). Lawrence's privileging of becoming over being forms one of the ground of his criticism of the Judeo-Christian culture. In Phoenix again we come across the following passage which gives priority to becoming: "life is unfathomable and inscrutable in its motives, not to be described, having no ascribable goal save the bringing forth of the ever-changing, ever-unfolding creation" (608).

Deleuze has attacked the modern concept of the subject in philosophy. Modern philosophers from Rene Descartes to the 20th century phenemenologists argue that experience is always given to a subject. Descartes has established subjectivity by arguing that the experienced world, wherefrom we know that truth or being is open

to doubt or question except the experiencing subject. For Deleuze, the subject is one form of transcendence (Deleuze, 1990: 106) against which Deleuze posits 'univocity'. The subject in Western thought is, for Deleuze, an "image of thought" (Deleuze, 1994: 131) that is mistaken for ultimate foundation. Deleuge argues that there just 'is' experience—a pure flow of life and perception which he has called the plane of immanence—and there is no distinct perceivers (Colebrook, 74). Experience precedes the subject and the image of ourselves as distinct subjects are formed from experience. The self is formed from "larval subjects", a multiplicity of perceptions and contemplations (Colebrook, 74). Lawrence in his "Education of the People" says that the individual is not a 'mass of homogeneity', but a 'fathomless multiplicity' (Phoenix, 634). His incredulity towards the Cartesian subject we have already discussed in this chapter. On this point, the view of Lawrence enjoys the support of Deleuze. In order to counter the concept of subjectivity in modern philosophy Deleuze insists on the all-pervading sense of multiplicity and flux in life. Lawrence's priority too emphasizes the same thing: "Each thing, living or unloving, streams in its odd, intertwining flux" (Phoenix, 525). Lawrence exposes the Cartesian subject's claim of access to truth through knowledge by arguing that human consciousness contains "not a tithe of what is, and therefore it is hopeless to proceed by a method of elimination" (Phoenix, 434).

In our discussion of Lawrence-Foucault correspondence in this very chapter, we have shown that in Lawrence knowledge and knowing subjects are assigned a secondary role to play in the business of living. Life is governed by multiplicity which is all suppressed by the "One-and-Allness" of Western metaphysics. Lawrence seeks to disrupt this by subjecting knowledge and the knowing subject, formed by faulty philosophers, to the unknown, "a well-head built over a strong, perennial spring" (Phoenix, 422). The 'spring' here is the spring of the vitality of life. Both Lawrence and Deleuze propose a life in harmony with the chaotic flux from which organisms are formed by the relative reduction of difference. They also agree about the condition of becoming or maximizing the potential of life: the at-oneness with the "circumambient universe" in Lawrence's case, and with the chaos of life in Deleuze. Lawrence's supreme commitment to life is shared by Deleuze. Lawrence says, "Nothing is important but life. And for myself, I can absolutely see

life nowhere but in the living" (Phoenix, 534). For Deleuze, acts of thought, such as philosophy and literature, are active responses to life (Colebrook, 4). Philosophy responds to life by creating 'concepts' and art by creating 'affects' and 'percept'. The philosophical project of Deleuze is to liberate the scope of philosophy from formation of general opinion. For Deleuze, opinion moves from a particular experience and uses it to form some whole that reduces difference and complexity. Opinion thus homogenizes desire by producing a general 'subject'. A philosophical concept works against this generalizing tendency by expanding difference and by creating new ways of thinking (Colebrook, 16-17). Lawrence embarks on a similar project in Lady Chatterley's Lover. In the "Apropos" he speaks against homogenization of desire and sets out to create new ways of thinking. Both Lawrence and Deleuze believe in the positivity of desire. In What is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari say, "The philosophy of communication is exhausted in the search for a universal liberal opinion as consensus" (1994: 146). Lawrence has expressed his strong disliking for the bland notion of 'average man' in his essay on Democracy. Against such 'philosophy of communication' Deleuze posits Nietzsche's concept of the world in terms of "pre-personal singularities", (Deleuze. 1990: 102) that is, in terms of chaotic and free-roaming fluxes. For Deleuze, "The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings, always to give them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the possible as events" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 167). The idea of destabilization and disruption of space, time, matter and thought is central to the philosophical project of Deleuze and Guattari. For them, philosophy is thinking the plane of immanence4. This place of immanence is never absolute deterritorialisation5 (Colebrook, 77). Thinking the plane of immanence is "thinking the power of difference and distribution which allows activities, such as art and philosophy, to think the very difference from which any world emerges" (Colebrook, 77). Philosophy deterritorialises or becomes other than itself in the hands of Deleuze and Guattari. For Deleuze, philosophy is not a philosophy of communication, but "heterogenesis" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 199). It is not just a becoming but a becoming other (hetero), and it does so in response to the other (chaos) (Colebrook, 70).

Lawrence has not directly related active thinking to becoming. But his pursuit of knowledge to its furthest limit is a precondition for taking a leap into the unknown. This deliberate act of thinking is certainly 'active' thinking in the sense of Deleuze. Lawrence says in The Symbolic Meaning: "We shall at last learn the pure lesson of knowing not to know" (49). In the same book he says, "The goal is to know how not to know" (196). Lawrence's paradoxical dictum of knowing not to know, like Deleuze's 'heterogenesis', emphasizes becoming other (other than the stable ego) in response to the other (the unknown, the 'creative mystery of life'). Lawrence's creative thinking is reflected in the naming of his own philosophy as 'pollyanalytics'6 which reminds us of Deleuze's 'heterogenesis'.

In A thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to life's production of 'lines of flight', where mutation and difference produce not just a progression of history but disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and monstrous births (Colebrook, 57). Lawrence is aware of such 'lines of flight' that life produces. In Apocalypse he says, "Our idea of time as a continuity, as an eternal straight line has crippled our consciousness cruelly" (97). Like Deleuze and Guattari's concept of history, Lawrence's own is marked by difference and becoming. In Movements in European History, Lawrence focuses on this aspect, although in a different language:

> Inside the hearts, or souls, of men in Europe there has happened at times some strange surging, some welling-up of unknown powers. These powers that well up inside the hearts of men, these are the fountains and origins of human history. And the welling-up has no ascribable cause. It is the naked cause itself (XXVII).

The primacy of 'strange surging', of becoming, over the causes ascribed to them later, reminds us of Deleuze's contention that there just 'is' experience from which the self is organized—the point that we have mentioned earlier. For Deleuze, history attends to disruptions and therefore it is 'untimely' (Colebrook, 61-62).

For Deleuze, art and philosophy are 'untimely' by virtue of the power to create whole new lines of time or 'lines of flight' (Colebrook, 62). Art creates 'affects' and

'percept'. Pure 'affect' is 'deterritorialisation' (Colebrook, 59). It is the affect of impersonal becoming as it is not grounded in any agent (Colebrook, 60). Deleuge says,

> The affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individual state of things: it is nonetheless singular, and can enter into singular combinations and conjunctions with other affects....The affect is independent of all determinate space-time; but it is none the less created in a history which produces it as the expressed and expression of a space or a time or a milieu (Deleuze, 1986, 98-99).

Affect opens the line of time to disruption, giving an 'untimely time' (Colebrook, 61)

Lawrence's use of 'affect' qualifies his literature as 'minor literature'—the literature that, in Deleuze's view, disrupts and dislocates tradition and creates 'lines of flight'. Though Lawrence's awareness of his production of 'affect' in his novels as 'affect' in Deleuze's sense of the term is uncertain, it is not difficult for us to recognize this awareness in an oft-quoted letter written on June 5, 1914 to Edward Garnett. In that letter Lawrence has written as an explanatory note on his novel The Rainbow—

> You must not look in my novel for the old stable ego—of the character. There is another ego, according to whose action the individual is unrecognizable, and passes through, as it were, allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than any we have been used to exercise, to discover, are states of the same pure single element of carbon. The ordinary novel would trace the history of the diamond—but I say, 'Diamond, what! This is carbon'. And my diamond may be coal or soot, and my theme is carbon (quoted in Gamini Salgado's A Preface to Lawrence, 114).

The 'unrecognizable individual characters', passing through 'allotropic states', are 'affects' that disrupts and dislocates our territorialized world and open on to a

'virtual' world and in the process facilitates our becoming other than what we are. The ordinary novel is 'major' literature in Deleuvian sense as it becomes 'expressive' and not 'creative' of identity (Colebrook, 104). In the same letter Lawrence says, "Somehow that which is physic—the non-human, in humanity, is more interesting to me than the old-fashioned human element" (Salgado, 1986: 114). The 'non-human' here is what Deleuze refers to as 'impersonal' in the extract we have quoted few lines back.

For Deleuze, the power of difference in literature is the power of life that helps to think of the plane of immanence. Art opens the door to becoming by taking us for a flight from perceptions to 'percept' and affections to 'affect' wherefrom we have our rebirth. As Deleuze and Guattari have it,

> By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the percept from perceptions of objects and that states of perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract the block of sensations, a pure being of sensations (Deleuze And Guattari, 1996: 167).

Lawrence has shown such awareness in him in the letter quoted above.

Deleuze's concept of the 'eternal return', which he has derived from Nietzsche, posits that "time is eternal only in its power to always produce new, over and over again—with no origin and no end"(Colebrook, 60). Lawrence's concept of 'eternal return' is dominant in his non-fictional wittings. His favourite symbol of the mythical bird, phoenix, illustrates his concept of 'eternal return' of difference and newness:

> The phoenix grows up to maturity and fullness of wisdom, it attains to fatness and wealth—and all things desirable, only to burst into flame and expire is ash and the flame and the ash are the be-all and the end-all, and the fatness and wisdom and wealth are but the fuel spent (Phoenix, 401).

This bursting into flame and expiring in ash are the inherent nature of life as Lawrence and Deleuze see it. The idea of eternal return is suggested by the 'leap' that, Lawrence insists, the individual must take periodically in order to facilitate his rebirth like the mythical bird: "Life is traveling to the edge of knowledge, then a leap taken" (Phoenix II, 374). This insistence on becoming is seen in his conscious subordination of individuality to 'flux' of life: "Our ready-made individuality, our identity is no more than and accidental cohesion in the flux of time" (Phoenix II, 384).

Deleuze emphasizes the importance, among other things, of literature in facilitating becoming—becoming other. Such 'others' include becoming woman, becoming animal etc.. We have discussed Deleuze's concept of becoming woman in our chapter on Lawrence and feminism. Here we briefly discuss Deleuze's idea of becoming animal. "Becoming animal is a feel for the animal movements, perceptions and becomings: imagine seeing the world as dog, a beetle or a mole" (Colebrook, 136). Our perception is drawn to the animal, Deleuze argues, not because we feel empathy for it, but because it represents difference, it is anomaly. Lawrence's attitude towards the world is also free from empathy. In a piece of writing on a pet dog, included in Phoenix, Lawrence writes, "He (the dog) should have stayed outside human limits, we should have stayed outside canine limits. Nothing is more fatal than the disaster of too much love" (Phoenix, 21).

We have spent so much space for Deleuze in this chapter because Lawrence the thought adventurer has a vital correspondence with Deleuze who has done his philosophy adventurously. Lawrence is adventurous in the sense that his adventures are grounded only on becoming. The adventures of his thought emphasize the inherent difference and becoming in life. For him time is not a linear but circular movement which he continually disrupts by surrendering the fixity and stability of his tools to the unknown in order to make a different start in different directions. In Phoenix, Lawrence says,

> In his adventure of self-consciousness a man must come to the limits of himself and become aware of something beyond him. He must be self-

conscious enough to know his own limits, and to be aware of that which surpasses him (Phoenix, 185).

The awareness of what surpasses Lawrence—the chaos, or the 'fathomless multiplicity'—is the area of the unknown on which his thought adventures are based. This basis gives at least a tentative 'certitude'—'certitude' of which Foucault has spoken—to his thought. Even if there is no meaning of what he says, he does not care. The playfulness of Lawrentian approach to meaning aligns him again with Deleuze: "It is fantastic to deny meaning when meaning is there, as it is to invent meaning when there is none. And it is much duller. For the invented meaning may still have a life of its own" (Apocalypse, 56).

The quest for life in anything and validation and maximization of life in everything—life in its perennial difference and preternatural becoming—have associated Lawrence with Giles Deleuze in a profound sense of the term.

NOTES

1 In Deleuze's schema, 'becoming woman' is a privileged status. "The privileged status of becoming-woman is that woman is the turning away from the closed image of man; if there is another mode of becoming then becoming lacks any single ground or subject. The second reason for the importance of becoming-woman has to do with the impersonal and unbounded nature of sexual desire" (Colebrook, 140).

2. The lines quoted from Ezra pound's Literary Essays and from "Egoist" are quoted in "Notes" by Bell (Bell, 195).

3. The sense of 'meconnaissance' is of a 'failure to recognize' or 'misreconstruction', as Alan Sheridan, the translator of Lacan's Ecrits says in his note (Lacan, 2001: XIII)

4. The plane of 'immanence'is, in the schema of Deleuze and Guattari, the outside or 'pre-philosophical' element in any philosophy. Thinking the plane of immanence is not just to perceive a world but to think the very difference from which any world emerges (Colebrook, 77).

5. 'Deterritorialization' frees a possibility or event from its actual origins. It occurs when an event of becoming escapes or detaches from its original territory.

6. Lawrence has called his philosophy as pseudo-philosophy or 'pollyanalytics' on page 15 of his "Forward" to Fantasia of the Unconscious.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters of our study we have explored the adventures of Lawrence's thought and reviewed them in the light of contemporary critical modes. Our main concern has been more with the thought adventures of Lawrence than with the chronological order in which they appear in the many and various non-fictional writings of Lawrence. Adventure is certain only of its uncertain destination and Lawrentian thought adventure, as we have explored it in our study, is characterized by a radical uncertainty. In Lawrence's schema, the relation between knowledge and the thinker parallels the relation between signpost and a traveler (Phoenix, 76). The signposts of knowledge in the preceding chapters are therefore nothing more than indications of the way which Lawrence the critic of culture has traveled before. This uncertainty, contingency and inconclusiveness of Lawerntian thought come from Lawrence's emphasis on the unknown and his subordination of knowledge to the unknown. In the preceding chapter on the correspondence of Lawrence's thought adventure with that of the postmodern thinkers, we have quoted extensively from Lawrence to focus on this aspect of Lawrentian thought. The paradoxical approach to knowledge encapsulated in Lawrence's dictum that the "supreme lesson of human consciousness is to learn how not to know" (Fantasia, 76) points to Lawrence's concern for certain uncertainty of his thought adventure. We have also quoted in the preceding chapter the seminal proposition of Foucault that only an "unexplored" supporting ground can give any "certitude" (Dits et ecrits,). This proposition ensures a firm and secure ground for Lawrence's thought adventure because it is based on the unexplored unknown. Levinas's view of reason also supports our argument as he says, "Reason is never so versatile as when it puts itself into question" (1984: 69).

Lawrence the thinker knows that the only way to attain the supreme knowledge is to learn how not to know. For him, only intellectual awareness of the necessity to free the self from mental consciousness can lead to such a freedom. Therefore, the thought adventures of Lawrence are the essential means for the end of living in close contact with the unknown. For Levinas, reason is to be put constantly into question and for Lawrence knowledge, after pushing it to its farthest limit, is to be

surrendered to the unknown. Further points of similarity is that Levinas has not spoken for renunciation of reason and Lawrence, in spite of his strong denunciation of knowledge, has not spoken of giving up the pursuit of knowledge. In Levinas's case, reason attains its versatility by calling itself into question and in Lawrence's case, knowledge shows its own limitation when pursued to its furthest limit. In this respect Lawrence the critic of culture invites comparison with Giles Deleuze. Deleuze insisted that we are to push thoughts to each of its limits by understanding their distinctions (Colebrook, 12). According to him philosophical concepts create the possibilities of thinking beyond what is already known or assumed (Colebrook, 19). Lawrence also suggests this "beyond" by insisting on the need to live from the unknown.

In this concluding part of our study we, after a hectic adventure with the thoughts of Lawrence, take a breather to explore the space that, in Lawrence's schema, lies beyond his thought adventure.

Lawrence envisages beyond his adventure of consciousness or adventure of thought a space, a state of receptivity, a positive preparedness, an awakening of the non-mental centres of consciousness. Lawrence makes an exposition of such a state in many of his writings. In his poem "Song of a Man Who Has Come Through", Lawrence speaks of the need for active, full-bodied assent in letting oneself be borne on the wind of time's new direction:

> Not I, not I, but the wind that blows through me!
> A fine wind is blowing the new direction of time.
> If only I let it bear me, carry me, if only it carry me!
> If only I am sensitive, subtle, oh, delicate, a winged gift! ("Song of the Man Who has Come Through" (Collected Poems, Vol. I, 250).

This state of being borne on the wind of time's new direction is the state of insouciance in Lawrentian thought. It is located at the utmost limit of human thought. It is a state of carelessness in the positive sense that offers a direct sensuous contact with one's surroundings by suspending mental consciousness

("Insoucience", Selected Essays, 105-6). In such a state of peace "it is intuition which makes me feel the uncanny glassiness of the lake, the sulkiness of the mountains" (Selected Essays, 106).

Lawrence the critic of culture, like Deleuze, is seriously concerned with maximization of life and underlines the need to be in contact with life by subordinating all the cares of mental consciousness: "There is much more life in a deep insouciance, which really is due to faith than in this frenzied, keyed-up care, which is characteristic of our civilization" (Phoenix, 118).

This state of insouciance is the state of peace, the state of fulfillment of the deepst desire of the soul (Phoenix, 669). "It is the condition of flying within the greatest impulse that enters us from the unknown" (Phoenix, 669). The state of insouciance is the destination of Lawrence's thought adventure because it puts his thought into contact with the unknown, the unexplored foundation that gives 'certitude' to the contingent thoughts of Lawrence. This state requires faith, a faith in the unknown: "I wait upon the unknown and from the unknown comes my new beginning. Not of myself, but of my insuperable faith, my waiting" (Phoenix, 689).

The state of insouciance is located at the edge of the unknown, away from the civilization with all its "keyed-up care". It is the site of plenitude parallel to that of Lacan's the Real, Kristeva's 'semiotic' and Freud's unconscious upon which Judeo-Christian culture and its epiphenomenon Western thought have shut the gate. In Foucault's version, it is the site of silence. In an interview taken by Stephen Riggins on June 22, 1982, Foucault says, "I think silence is one of those things that has unfortunately been dropped from our culture. We don't have a culture of silence" (Ethics, 122).

Lawrence the critic of culture has likewise repented the absence of insouciance in the culture. Lawrence's insouciance is synonymous with Foucault's silence. Commenting on the superficial chattering of ladies on everything that comes their way, Lawrence expresses his exasperation: "They care! They simply are eaten up with caring. They are so busy caring about fascism or League of Nations or whether

France is right or whether marriage is threatened, that they never know where they are" (Selected Essays, 105).

The adventure of his thought leads Lawrence the critic of culture to the space of thoughtless silence, a state of insouciance where, like a house built on the edge of a forest, he experiences 'thinking' giving way to 'being' or 'becoming' and he awaits the prompts from the unknown:

> I am like a small house on the edge of the forest, in the eternal night of the beginning comes the spirit of creation towards me. But I must keep the light shining in the window or how will the spirit see my house? If my house is in darkness of sleep or fear, the angel will pass it by (Phoenix, 698).

In such a state of insouciance the faculty of thinking is totally suspended. But in Foucault's version, the actual self or being "follows a more profound, coherent and seasoned trajectory" than the self we are familiar with. Foucault says in an interview,

> It has struck me that I might have seemed a bit like a whale that leaps to the surface of the water disturbing it momentarily with a tiny jet of spray and lets it be believed, or pretends to believe, or himself does in fact believe, that down in the depths where no one sees him any more, where he is no longer witnessed or controlled by anyone, he follows a more profound, coherent and seasoned trajectory (Power/Knowledge, 79).

Foucault, like Lawrence is aware of "depths" that remains inaccessible to thinking at the level of communication. This unexplored area is the source and support of our being, and thinking is only a momentary excursion, in other words, travel or adventure to the plane/surface where communication can take place. The "more profound, coherent and seasoned trajectory of the whale" represents the Lawrentian unknown to which the adventures of Lawrence's thought is committed and this gives, "certitude" to Lawrence's thought adventure.

The thought adventure of Lawrence the critic of culture thus, in our ultimate analysis, paradoxically explores how to suspend all the activities of rutted and restricted mental consciousness, how to disrupt the monolith of Judeo-Christian culture and how to liberate life and release all its creative potential from the 'lordly Mind'.

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