

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Gottlob Frege (1845-1925) was a German mathematician and philosopher. He was also the founder of modern mathematical logic. His philosophical work was primarily restricted to logic and the philosophy of mathematics. His introduction of the quantifier-variable notation for expressing generality cause the sharp break between modern logic and the older logical tradition that George Boole and his contemporaries developed. In the first quarter of the 20th century, Frege began to develop mathematical logic which made him a major figure in the history of mathematics and philosophy. His famous publication *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Notation) published in 1879 brings his inclination towards mathematics and logic. Besides mathematics and logic, Frege was equally interested in the philosophy of mathematics, which greatly influenced philosophers like Edmund Husserl, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. They studied Frege's philosophy of mathematics and were highly influenced by him even though it remained unknown to the then general philosophical circle.

According to Frege, the foundation of a mathematical theory comprises the elucidation and justification of its axioms. We think Frege's ideas on this subject appear as fresh as any contemporary writing and contemporary questions that now seem relevant. As a semantic philosopher, Frege takes the realist position and in turn, revolted against Hegelian idealism. In this regard, he enabled to seize the most sophisticated realist position than Meinong, Moore, or Russell. Some would say that this philosophical position of Frege is somehow misleading. What is vivid and clear is that through his realism Frege launched a strong attack on what he called *psychologism* – a view that asserts that the meaning of words must be given in terms of the mental process. This

psychologistic outlook was deeply embedded in British empiricism as in post-Kantian idealism. Frege perhaps was the first philosopher after Descartes who asserted that logic was the beginning of philosophy. In this regard, Michael Dummett says, “For Frege, if we do not get logic right, we shall get nothing else right.”¹ Thus for Frege, Dummett claims, that logic is before philosophy and logic properly guides philosophy. Epistemology is not prior to any branch of philosophy. It was Frege who first claimed that one can deal with the philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of science and philosophy of metaphysics without first having undertaken any epistemological inquiry. This position of Frege is exclusively Fregean for which he has been treated as the first modern philosopher. Thus, we have a change of philosophical perspective in Frege which has further been extended by Frege’s juniors Russell and Wittgenstein in their philosophical writings.

Fregean Foundations and Development of Philosophy:

It has already been mentioned that Frege started his philosophical career with the publication of *Begriffsschrift* which appeared as the presentation of the modern logical system comprising logical concepts, such as, negation, implication, the universal quantifier and identity as primitive. It is a formulation of classical second-order predicate calculus whose first-order fragment constitutes a complete formalization of first-order logic. The second stage of Frege’s career ended with the publication of his masterpiece *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* (published in 1884) where the most fundamental mathematical theories and the theory of numbers were developed. In *Die*

¹ Dummett, Michael, *Truth and Other Enigmas*, Duckworth, 1978, p. 89.

Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Frege gives a preliminary account of his view of arithmetic. The arithmetical insight of Frege that appeared in this book contradicted the earlier theories on arithmetic. Frege's attack was brilliantly successful and the views Frege criticized in his *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* are totally annihilated.

The third period of Frege's career extended with the publication that appeared in 1903, the second unpublished volume of *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* in which Frege became aware of certain deficiencies in his philosophical logic. In his subsequent writings, Frege gradually developed a highly articulated system of the philosophy of logic that is absent in *Grundlagen*.

Was Frege a Linguistic philosopher?

It thus seems from the above that Frege started his philosophical career with a background in logic and mathematics. He candidly confessed that without logic and mathematics, serious philosophy cannot be practiced. If it would be the case then naturally the question arises: Was Frege a linguistic philosopher? We think that Frege even started with logic and mathematics, his very intention was to develop a kind of distinct and precise language that would adequately reveal the world or reality. Even though he developed number theory but he at the same time seeks questions about: What do number words mean? What is the analysis of statements of number? What is the logical status of the arithmetical theorem? What is the function of the negation sign? Thus by way of doing logic, mathematics and arithmetic, Frege in turn has sought the proper analysis of such concepts very similar to the criterion adopted by a linguistic philosopher. While giving the intended interpretation – the semantics, the whole apparatus of Frege's philosophical logic comprising sense and reference, thoughts,

truth-values, judgments, assertions and objects as opposed to the concept, relations, and functions of one or two arguments, classes, the extension of relations, discusses these notions from his *philosophy of language*.² It should be mentioned here that linguistic philosophy is all about the clarification and analysis of linguistic terms. Linguistic philosophy deals with clearing the slums of language by way of clarifying and analysing the logic of language. Thus linguistic philosophy offers us a *philosophical method* through which the relationship between language and reality can be established. In this regard, we need precise and distinct language. This type of language cannot be obtained, Frege opines, without a background in logic and mathematics. Thus, our observation is that even though Frege started his philosophical career in general and semantic approach in particular with his *Begriffsschrift* and *Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik*, his very intention was to develop a kind of language under the realm of semantics.

Our main concern in this research work is to explicate and examine the problem of the meaning of Frege. The problem of the meaning of Frege is reflected through his celebrated distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). The distinction between sense and reference for determining the meaning of language is philosophically important because at the very outset it overshadowed the distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and ‘coloring’ (*Färbung*). According to Frege, “*the sense is that part of the meaning of an expression which is relevant to the determination of the truth-value of a sentence in which the expression may occur*”³. On the contrary, the coloring is that part

² Dummett, Michael, *The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy*, Duckworth, 1981, p. 13.

³ Dummett, Michael, 1978, op. cit., p. 93.

of its meaning which is not relevant to the determination of the truth-value of a sentence in which the expression occurs. Thus for Frege, while determining the meaning of a sentence or solving the problem of meaning proper, one has to distinguish precisely and distinctly between sense and coloring (tone). Frege holds that the truth-value of a sentence is eventually determined just by way of knowing the sense of the sentence but not by way of knowing the tone or the coloring of the sentence. Philosophical ambiguities arise when philosophers fail to distinguish between sense and tone clearly and vividly. If we have a sound logical and mathematical background while dealing with language, we can overcome the distinction between sense and tone. We come to know that the problem of meaning can be sorted out just by way of knowing the sense of the sentence under consideration. This is where, Frege says, the significance of the clarification of language actually hinges on.

Within the sphere of philosophy of mathematics, Frege concentrated more on the analysis of particular mathematical notions, but elsewhere he was more concerned with giving a general account of *the structure of language*,⁴ and hence with *a general theory of meaning*. In each of these cases, he gives importance to the senses of particular words or language. We think that his development of the quantifier-variable notation determined his orientation toward the philosophy of language. This philosophical tendency of Frege deviated himself from natural language because Frege found some incongruity in natural language for developing a new philosophical method. The discovery of his new philosophical method is based on a *permanent distrust* of natural language. He conceived natural language as merely incoherent. Distrust of natural

⁴ Ibid, p. 94.

language is not only Fregean taste, in fact, but the whole host of semanticists have also adopted the revisionist position of the proposition of natural language for its ambiguity and vagueness. According to Frege, no coherent account what he called *semantic account* could be given of a language containing well-formed sentences which were neither true nor false. Therefore, in constructing a philosophy of language, Frege opines, we need not be shackled by the inadequate instrument with which we are forced to make in everyday discourse. Accordingly, we have to construct a more perfect and precise effective instrumental language on the foothold of which the proper philosophical journey be started. Elsewhere Frege was also concerned to apply the technical notions of his theory of meaning to sentences of natural language, or demonstrate that his logical formulas were apt for representing the logical structure of the thoughts expressed by such sentences. However, it should be kept in mind that Frege in his *Grundgesetze* was not concerned with the representation of sentences of natural languages or the thoughts expressed by them, rather he was setting up a *formal language* as an integral program of his semantics, the senses of whose formulas were to depend solely on his stipulations of mathematical and philosophical logic.

Indeed, throughout his life, Frege attempted to write a comprehensive treatise setting out his views on that (semantic) branch of philosophy which he called 'logic'. Thus, there is no fundamental distinction between semantics and logic in Frege's philosophy of logic. Frege's logic or semantics is much wider than formal logic or the theory of deductive reasoning that we employ in first-order predicate logic. According to Michael Dummett, Frege's formal logic of *Grundgesetze* is not an ancillary to or extension of

natural language, but as an independent language in its own right or simplistically, *'the beginning of one'*⁵.

Thus it seems to me that Frege's semantics hinges on his very conception of logic. Logic, for Frege, is required for the analysis of deductive reasoning in general. Logic must incorporate all principles of inference that may need to be invoked independently of the *subject matter*. Logic is not concerned merely to state the laws governing correct inference, but with whatever is required for the explanation of the terms in which they are stated and for their formal or informal justification. Since the test for the validity of a form of inference is that it be *truth-preserving*, logic is concerned with how a sentence or thought is expressed. That is why Frege intends to say that logic has to be understood in the broad sense where the word 'true' indicates its *subject matter*. In summing up, Michael Dummett, after Frege, says that 'logic must be a theory applying to any language capable of expressing thought.'⁶

According to Frege, a large part of the work of the philosopher 'consists in a battle with language'. In this regard, language may be thought to be an enemy. Language bewitches us according to Wittgenstein. Even though language is the only medium of communication, considering the bewitchment capacity of language, one must be very careful about the functional aspect of language. For Frege, language is an enemy because language is merely a means of obscuring the true structure (logical structure) of the thoughts expressed. Therefore, human beings must associate thought with a

⁵ Dummett, Michael, 1981, op., cit., p. 15.

⁶ Ibid, p. 16.

sentence expressing it. We grasp thoughts as expressed by sentences. Frege does not admit any account of the structure of thoughts. Frege inclines to say that although the analysis of thought must be given in terms of an analysis of some means of expressing it, the relevant means of expression must be a *purified logical notation*. This is indeed the symbolic expression of a thought that displays its true structure. However, its verbal expression distorts it. Thus for Frege, thoughts in the desired sense cannot be comprehended concerning the verbal expression of natural language. In a letter to Husserl in November 1906, Frege says that '*someone who wishes to learn logic from language is like an adult who wishes to learn thinking from a child*', and that 'the principal task of the logician consists in a liberation from language and a simplification: logic ought to be a judge over language'.

If we try to understand the content of the letter of Frege written to Husserl, we come to know the whole proposal of Fregean semantics. It clearly indicates that Frege emphasizes more on logic than natural language. His constructed language is backed up by logical canons and principles. Thus he tries to grasp thoughts through the construction and analysis of logical or formal language. Of course, we do not deny the fact that thought in a broad sense can be expressed using language. In this sense, the concept of thought may be very closer to the concept of ideas. But when the concept of thought is to be taken with regard to the concept of ideas then such thought cannot ensure the concept of truth under the orbit of semantics in the Fregean line. Frege invokes a kind of semantics as distinguished from the concept of an idea through which the concept of truth as the program of the problem of meaning can be resolved and sorted out. We will discuss this issue in great detail later on. Our point of contention at

this point in time is that Fregean thought is functioning not under the womb of verbal or natural expression but under the womb of logic.

As a semanticist, Frege with the help of logic attempts to give a general account of *the structure of language*. The logical basis of language is in no way related to the language we use in our everyday life. The question then arises: Does Frege comprehend logic as *universal logic*? If it does then it has two consequences. First, the formulas of the logical symbolism must express *thoughts* that we are capable of expressing in natural language or in ordinary mathematical notation as well as the technical notations of sense, reference, object and concept. But if logical symbolism can serve to express the very same thoughts as those we express using natural language, then the structure of a symbolic formula must correspond at least to the *hidden structure* of the appropriate sentence. If it did not, it could not be said to express the same thought. Accordingly, Frege said that the structure of thoughts corresponds not at all to the structure of a sentence of natural language expressing it. Now, if the structure of thought were in no way reduced to the structure of a sentence, then it could not be *that thought* which was expressed by the sentence, that is, which was the sense of that sentence. It then follows that natural language cannot be quite useless for the analysis of thought. Natural language perhaps is useless for the analysis of thought when an attempt has been made to ensure the concept of truth along with the line of semantics with the help of natural language.

The Philosophical Logic of *Grundlagen*:

While dealing with the problem of meaning, we have to spell out the philosophical logic of *Grundlagen*. Frege based his investigation of the theory of numbers on three

fundamental theses, which are enunciated in *Grundlagen*. The first is the rejection of psychologism; the second is connected with the context of sentences and the third basic principle is the distinction between *concept and object*. Let us explain each of these in turn in brief.

According to Frege, mental images that may arise in the mind of the speaker or hearer are irrelevant to its meaning, which consists in the part played by the word in determining the *truth-condition* of sentences in which it occurs. This is the first clear statement in the history of philosophy of a basic principle that may underlie any *adequate theory of meaning*. This clearly suggests that in Frege's philosophy in general and semantics in particular, mental images as the content of psychologism do not have any significant role in determining truth conditions. The vague conception, common to both the British empiricists and Aristotle, whereby a word represents an 'idea' and a phrase or sentence accordingly represents a complex of ideas, is simply too crude to serve even as a starting point. This again reflects that the concept of idea as developed by the British empiricists and Aristotle does not have any significant role in determining the concept of truth. We know that Frege's problem of meaning can be solved by way of determining the truth-condition of the sentence under consideration. Ideas are associated with a mental image and hence are an integral part of psychology. It virtually forces us to adopt the conception whereby the meaning of a word is embodied in a mental image. In this regard, Frege says, so long we cannot overcome mental images, we cannot overcome ideas. Frege, of course, admits that no progress can be made until we take up the step of seeing a word connected with our actual practice in the employment of language. Thus, Frege's severance of mental images from meaning is

thus the first move in the direction of Wittgenstein's dictum that 'the meaning is the use'. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, 'Don't ask for the meaning, ask for its use'⁷. But Wittgenstein's dictum is suffering from weaknesses as it lies in its extreme generality. Frege is distinct from Wittgenstein as unlike Wittgenstein, Frege's conception of linguistic practice appeared in *Grundlagen* is excessively schematic. For Frege, everything was a matter of the utterance of sentences with determinate truth conditions. Thus our prime objective is to find out the meaning of truth conditions by way of linguistic practice – a sort of linguistic practice which is completely detached from mental image and which is functioning under the paradigm of semantics.

The second thesis of *Grundlagen* has a close connection only in the context of a sentence that a word has meaning. This dictum appeared in *Grundlagen* and was endorsed by Wittgenstein both in the *Tractatus* and in the *Philosophical Investigations*. However, it never occurs in Frege's subsequent works. Frege elsewhere suggested the absurd idea that a language is conceivable in which the thoughts expressed by sentences like 'The Earth is round', '5+17=22'. He then said that the *sense* of a sentence is built up out of the senses of its constituent words. That means, that not only do we attain an understanding of the sentence by our understanding of the words which make it up, but this sense is intrinsically complex. Rather Frege was aiming at what Wittgenstein expressed by saying that only by the utterance of a sentence, and not of any smallest linguistic unit, do we succeed in 'making a move in the language game'. This is how we do perform a linguistic act. Frege's dictum conveys that the 'meaning of a word consists wholly in the contribution it makes to a precise determination of the specific

⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, tr. by G. E. M. Anscombe, Pearson Publication, 1953.

linguistic act that may be affected by the utterance of each sentence in which the word may occur'⁸.

Frege thus said if we do not follow this principle of meaning, we shall commit the fallacy of 'asking after the meaning of a word in isolation'⁹. Any attempt to concentrate on the meaning of a word without adverting to the kind of sentence which contains it will lead us to fix on some *mental images* as its meaning. To overcome such immanent fallacy, what we ought to be doing instead is characterizing the truth-condition of the most general form of sentence in which the word occurs. The advantage of such characterization is that it relates to a complete sentence and in such a case there is no reason as such why it needs to proceed via an explicit definition of the word in question. In *Grundlagen*, Frege regarded his principle that words have meaning only in the context of sentences as justifying contextual definition and thereby took this to be one of its most important consequences.

Frege's third basic principle is the distinction between *concept and object* and between concepts of the second and first order. This distinction cannot be appreciated until Frege's definite conception of an object is grasped. This notion is correlative with that of what Frege called a proper name. By a proper name, he meant what is more generally called a *singular term*. However, for Frege, there is no implication that a proper name should be logically simple. More importantly, what Russell distinguished as a definite description, Frege included in the general category of proper names. Russell categorically classified proper names as logical and ordinary and then claimed that only

⁸ Dummett, Michael, 1978, op. cit., p. 95.

⁹ Ibid, p. 95.

logical proper names are genuine proper names because in such a case the denotation of a logically proper name is known by acquaintance all without exception. Frege, unlike Russell, was not interested to distinguish between logical proper names and ordinary proper names; instead, he was interested to accept anything like a proper name having adequate sense. We will discuss this issue later on. Our point is that this category of expression assumed peculiar importance for Frege because of the analysis of the structure of sentences which for him underplayed the quantifier-variable notation for expressing generality. As a founder of modern elementary logic, Frege attempts to develop semantic language with the background of mathematics and logic.

Thus in the **First Chapter** of this thesis, I propose to analyse and examine the nature of proper names after Frege and also make an attempt to outline a comparative study of Frege, Mill, and Russell of the same. It is important to be noted here that like all other semanticists Frege advocates linguistic revisionism toward developing semantic language. In this regard, he metaphorically compares logical language with a microscope and ordinary language with an eye. He then said that just like an eye cannot detect the default of language which a microscope can do similarly, there are so many loopholes in ordinary language that cannot be reflected on the surface level or grammatical level but which can be reflected in the logical structure. Therefore, to do or practice philosophy properly one has to emphasize more on the logical structure of language. Interestingly, Frege did not face this phase because knowingly or unknowingly he started his philosophical career with mathematics and logic. It has already been mentioned that Frege began his philosophical career with *Begriffsschrift* (Concept-Notation) which is based on elementary logic and mathematics.

Thus, we can say that Fregean semantic language has adequately been backed up by logic and mathematical precepts. We are talking about the proper name. Proper names are supposed to be the vocabulary of Fregean semantic language. This is not new to Frege because very similarly there is a whole host of semanticists, reductionists, and atomists who developed their semantic language with the help of proper names. Therefore, the problem of the meaning of the Fregean language is associated with the functional aspect of proper names.

It is further noted that based on the proper name there develops various theories which directly or indirectly address the problem of meaning under the realm of semantics. In this regard, there develops two important theories, such as the sense theory and the no-sense theory. This clearly suggests that the sense of a proper name plays an important role in determining the problem of meaning in Fregean semantics. It is further stated that within semantics there develop two important attributes of a proper name. It is said that a proper name either denotes or connotes an object. That means every proper name has its denotational (*de re*) and connotational (*de dicto*) implications. These two implications are associated with the referential function of language. Thus, the paradigm of semantics centred around proper names is based on two functional aspects of names of which one is directed to sense and the other is directed to reference. Thus, sense and reference are the two functional aspects of a name based on which the development of semantics is made possible. Therefore, in the **Second Chapter** of this thesis, we propose to analyse and examine sense and reference as the criteria of meaning after Frege.

There is no question of doubt that the whole host of semanticists envisaged and enquired about the problem of meaning with regard to the referential function of language. It has been generally accepted that language does refer but disagreement arises among the semanticists regarding the footholds of reality. Language does refer but where does language refer? What does language refer to? Does language refer to objects? Does language refer to concepts? Does language refer to what lies within the world or does it refer to what lies outside the world? Thus, we can say that as far as the referential aspect is concerned there is no problem among the semanticists but where language refers is a problematic area for the semanticists. It is to be noted here that semantics as a philosophical school works or functions under the womb of referential theory. The important aspect of the referential theory is that it sets up the foundation of *linguistic realism*. The very contention of linguistic realism is that it asserts that without the reference of language, the object of the world as an integral part of reality must be there in the world. That means linguistic realism asserts that language and the referent of language are two independent entities where one is used to locate the other. In this regard, there developed two different types of referential theories, such as *the naïve version of the referential theory* and the *sophisticated version of the referential theory*.

According to the naïve version of the referential theory, the meaning of the sentence is determined by what the sentence refers to. That means the sentence and its reference are two independent and separate entities. However, the naïve version of referential theory immediately faces serious objection because if this theory is taken into account as a paradigm of semantics, then there is a possibility of incorporating metaphysical entities. Because the reference of language may be some metaphysical objects or

pseudo-objects. Because language refers but it is not clear where language refers to, what language refers. Therefore, the foothold of reference must be specified. In order to overcome this apparent default of the naïve version of the referential theory, there developed a sophisticated version of the referential theory. According to this version of the referential theory, a sentence is meaningful if it refers to something other than the sentence itself and there must be a *referential connection* or referential adjunction between the sentence (language) and what it refers to (reality). This is how the problem of meaning can be solved with regard to the referential theory of meaning. If we carefully go through the sophisticated version of the referential theory, it seems to me that the referential connection plays an all-important role to ensure the relationship between language and reality.

It should further be kept in mind that referential theory is a general perception of semantic school. However, various linguistic philosophers under the same school have developed various theories on their own the foundation of which is somehow or other linked with or directly associated with referential theory as stated above. The referential connection, of course, is the hallmark of semantics. There is no question of doubt. It has been reflected in Mill, Russell, early Wittgenstein, Saul Kripke, and many others. While distinguishing between the logically proper name and ordinary proper name, Russell goes on to say that logical proper names are the real proper names based on which genuine language under the womb of semantics can be constructed. A logical proper name, according to Russell, is known by acquaintance where there is no scope for description¹⁰. We think that Russell's theory of acquaintance is reflected in the naïve

¹⁰ Russell, Bertrand, *The Problems of Philosophy*, Henry Holt and Company: New York, 1912.

version of referential theory where the emphasis has been laid on *referential connection*. Acquaintance is a sort of fulfilment of referential connection. In modern terms, it is known as denotation or *de re*. It is said that every proper name has two different types of referential contents, such as denotation (*de re*) and connotation (*de dicto*). Keeping this background in mind, Frege perhaps distinguishes between object and concept. This perception actually influences other semanticists as well. Mill in his book, *A System of Logic*¹¹ also mentioned the denotational as well as the connotational aspects of proper names. Wittgenstein in his celebrated book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* developed his picture-theory of meaning with regard to propositions whose constituents are nothing but names. Even though Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* did not mention specifically the distinction between the ordinary proper name and logically proper name but his understanding of name in his *Tractatus*, I do reckon, actually goes in favor of logically proper name. While defining the concept of the name Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* says, ‘A name denotes an object’¹². The meaning of the name is the meaning of the object. This wave continues further in the philosophical writings of Saul Kripke who developed the concept of a name as a rigid designator. The designator (reference) of a name is rigid according to Kripke in the sense that it (name) designates the same object in every possible world¹³. Thus, it seems to me that reference is an important force of semantics.

¹¹ Mill, John Stuart, *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*, Cambridge University Press, 1843.

¹² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. by D. F. Pears and B. McGuinness, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.

¹³ Kripke, Saul, *Naming and Necessity*, Routledge, 1980.

But when we come to Frege, we have a slightly different innovative interpretation in Fregean semantics. This actually makes Frege a great contributor to the modern interpretation of semantics. Frege, like other semanticists, does not rule out the referential aspect of language. But what Frege does, unlike others, is that he gives more importance to the sense of the proper name. He understands sense with regard to the mode of presentation. According to Frege, any linguistic term, such as phrase, clause, or singular name would be treated as a name having sense. A name having sense generally has reference. However, Frege ensures sense rather than ensures reference *in the brute sense of the term*. Frege identifies various degrees of reference, such as direct reference, indirect reference, etc. Thus, Frege's theory is distinctly known as the sense theory of reference where the sense of proper name has been ensured without exception. Contrary to the sense theory of reference, there develops a *no-sense* theory of reference. It states that reference is the hallmark of meaning. Proper names have only references but they do not have sense. The debate between sense theory of reference and no-sense theory of reference is philosophically fascinating as it not only appears as two different paradigms of semantics, but rather it equally dissected all semanticists into two different distinct wings.

Thus, Frege's problem of meaning is deeply associated with the sense of proper names or the mode of presentation of proper names. To solve the problem of meaning after Frege we have to concentrate more on the sense of a proper name, rather than on the reference of a proper name. Frege elsewhere hinted that the mode of presentation of a proper name generally ensures the reference of that proper name. In this sense, I can presume that for Frege sense is primary and reference is secondary. Even though the

problem of meaning cannot be solved after Frege just by forfeiting the concept of reference, Frege puts more emphasis to ensure the sense of a proper name and then try to ensure the reference of a proper name.

The sense of a proper name is nothing but the meaning of a proper name. The sense or the meaning of a sentence cannot be grasped fully without the concept of thought. According to Frege, thought is independent of language and also independent of humans. However, we cannot grasp the meaning of the sentence (sense) under consideration without thought. Thus, in a sense, the complete sense of a sentence actually hinges on thought. Therefore in the **Third Chapter** of my thesis, I propose to analyse and examine the philosophical implication of the concept of thought after Frege and it would be entitled: **Frege's Concept of Thought and its Philosophical Implication.**

Even though Fregean semantics in general and his problem of meaning, in particular, is primarily concerned with his celebrated concept sense and reference (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*) actually hinges on the very concept of thought. Thus the philosophical implication of Fregean thought plays an important role in solving the *problem of meaning*. However, it would be really challenging how Frege justifies the relevance of thought to solve the problem of meaning. Many would say that thought is nothing but a replica of the traditional concept of Ideas developed by empiricists – Locke, Berkeley, and Hume during the 18th century. The concept of idea has been popularised in philosophy in various ways. Frege gives a lot of emphasis on thoughts. The problematic area is that is thought differs from ideas? I do think *thoughts in general* are not different from ideas. If it would be the case then it would be a herculean task to justify the

relevance of thought towards determining the problem of meaning, because in such a case thought would contain psychological matters as well. We know that Fregean semantics is anti-psychological in nature. Thus when we talk of the relevance of thought in Fregean semantics, we have to set aside the relevance or the content of psychology from the very concept of thought. Thus my understanding of Fregean thought is somehow or other detached from psychology. If his thought is detached from psychology then he has to understand thought in a stipulated manner which eventually detaches thought from ideas when dealing with the problem of meaning within the sphere of Fregean semantics.

Frege actually does it. In this regard, Frege classifies thoughts into various levels. He distinguishes thought into three different levels, such as apprehension, judgment, and the level of assertion. If our understanding of thought incorporates all these levels just cited then certainly thought is not related to ideas. However, when Frege brings the concept of thought towards developing his problem of meaning under the sphere of semantics, he certainly takes care of the level of thought and keeps himself aloof from the concept of ideas as developed by empiricists. For Frege, the thought process begins with apprehension, then moves to the judgemental level, and finally moves to the assertion level. Besides, he also distinguishes presupposition and assertion as the two important concepts of his referential semantics. For Frege, the presupposition is required for asserting the referential content of indirect reference, and the assertion is required for ensuring the referential content of the direct reference. Thus he uses the presupposition and assertion level of thought in his semantics and sets himself aloof from the apprehension level of thought – a level of thought which would represent the

content of psychology. This clearly suggests the importance of thought in Fregean semantics.

The very objective of Fregean semantics is to solve the problem of meaning. The problem of meaning is deeply associated with the semantic concept of truth. Accordingly, he has to maintain and ensure the semantic concept of truth within his semantics. The novelty of Frege is that, unlike the radical semanticists, Frege widens the language of semantics. The language of semantics is, of course, proper names. But Frege incorporates phrases, clauses, and incomplete parts of sentences as proper names having *sense (Sinn)*. Thus, the language of Fregean semantics is comparatively larger and diversified in comparison to the language of other semanticists. For example, Bertrand Russell thought only logical proper names as the vocabulary of the semantic language and in this regard, he favoured the logical form of the sentence instead of the grammatical form of the sentence. Wittgenstein while developing his *Tractarian* form of language gives importance to names where each name denotes an object without exception. If we compare Frege with these aforesaid semanticists, we can say that the language of Fregean semantics is comparatively liberal and wider than the others.

This is indeed a challenge to Frege to retain the sanctity of the very concept of truth as the mark of solving the problem of meaning. However, Frege successively retain the concept of truth and thereby enabled to solve the problem of meaning within his *liberal* semantic paradigm. Not only that Fregean semantics *is remembered as remarkable* within the school of semanticists because, unlike many other rigorous semanticists, Frege in fact, brings the concept of *context-principle* and the concept of the *principle of compositionality* in his semantics. It will be seen that Frege brings these concepts to

detach himself from the concept of Ideas. He successfully retained the concept of truth to solve the problem of meaning even by bringing contextual principles as well as the principle of compositionality. Not only that the philosophical influence of context principle and the principle of compositionality is prolific in the later developments of linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language. Thus we can say that, unlike other semanticists, Fregean semantics appears as a new paradigm of semantics based on which subsequent developments of semantics are built. Thus, in the **Fourth Chapter** of my thesis, I propose to analyse and examine the implications of Fregean semantics to contemporary philosophy of language and it would be entitled: **Contemporary Debate regarding Frege’s Theory: A Response.**

After developing the aforesaid task of the problem of meaning after Frege, it is my general obligation and responsibility to understand Frege from my own rationale. Frege’s theory of semantics associated with sense and reference is common and popular and every philosophical student is aware of it. But when a thesis is proposed on the same issue, then generally the question arises of what something is newly added for which the readers would be interested. Therefore, it is the task of the researcher to explore some insights of the literature available which may be claimed as something new not only to the researcher but also to the readers as well. With this promise, I will end the thesis with **Concluding Remarks** and which would appear in **Chapter Five** of the thesis.

The thesis is finally ended with **Selected Bibliography** which is far more technical and methodological rather than creative.

.....X.....