

## CHAPTER I

### NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. R. Chisholm, "The Myth of the Given" in *Epistemology and Inquiry*, (ed.) K. Brad Wray, New York: Broadway View Press Ltd. (2002), p. 11.
2. A.R. White, "On Claiming to Know" in *Knowledge and Belief* (ed.), A.P.Griffiths, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1967).
3. J.L.Austin, "Other Minds" in *Philosophical Papers* (eds), J.O.Urmson and G. J. Warnock, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1979), p.99.
4. Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, Second edition, New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd. (1977), p.5. Emphasis author's.
5. John Pollock, *Knowledge and Justification*, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1974), p.7.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
7. Robert Ackermann, "Review" of *Knowledge and Justification*, *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.73 (1976), p.185.
8. Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge*, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1974), p.15.
9. Wesley C. Solomon, "Why ask 'Why'? An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol.51 (1978), pp.663-705, especially p.700.
10. John F. Post, "Infinite Regress of Justification and of Explanation", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol.38 (1980), p.32, pp. 40-41.
11. John Heil, "Doxastic Incontinence", *Mind*, Vol.93 (1984), p.61.
12. Alvin Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition*, Cambridge, Mass.:

- Harvard University Press (1966), p.42.
13. Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Pvt. Ltd. (1992), p.90.
  14. Gilbert Ryle, *Concept of Mind*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd. (1978), pp.125-6, 143-7, 211-12, 225-6.
  15. Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, *op.cit.*, p.15.
  16. Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge*, *op.cit.*, p.90.
  17. Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1985).
  18. Richard Folly, *The Theory of Epistemic Rationality*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press (1985).
  19. Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, *op.cit.*, p.7.
  20. William James says: "We must know the truth; and we must avoid the error ... these are our first and great commandments as would be knowers ..." in *The Works of William James: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, F.H.Barkhardt, F.Bowas and I.K.Skrapskelis (eds), Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1979), p.17. Quoted by Chisholm in *Theory of Knowledge*, third edition, *op.cit.* p.13. James also tells us: "Believe truth! Shun error! – these we see, are two materially different laws; and by choosing between them we may end by colouring our whole intellectual life. We may regard the chase for truth as paramount, and the avoidance of error as secondary, or we may on the other hand, treat the avoidance of error as more imperative, and let truth take its chance." *Ibid*, p.24.
  21. Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn., New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Pvt.Ltd. (1977), p.15.
  22. Lawrence Bonjour, "Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?",

- American Philosophical Quarterly* (1978), p. 5.
23. Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge, op. cit.*, p.79.
  24. Roderick Firth, "Epistemic Merit: Intrinsic and Instrumental", *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol.55 (1981), pp. 5-23.
  25. C.I.Lewis, *sAnalysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, La Salle III: Open Court Publishing Company (1946), p. 236.
  26. W.V.O.Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" in *Ontological relativity and Other Essays*, New York: Columbia University Press (1969), p. 75.
  27. Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge, op. cit.*, pp.187-188.
  28. *Ibid.*, p.189.
  29. *Ibid.*, p.190.
  30. David Copp, "Moral Skepticism", *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 62, 1991, pp.203-204, especially, 223-224.
  31. *Ibid.*, p.224.
  32. Copp also says that the existence of evidence that justifies a proposition does not entail that anybody knows of the justification and hence is justified in believing the proposition. For example, there may be evidences that go against the Quantum theory without its being discovered or there may be proofs of a mathematical proposition which have not as yet been recognized. Again, some people were justified in believing a theory when the evidence goes against it, the Ptolemaic theory in astronomy, for example. Although these people were justified in accepting the theory, still, what they took to be evidence for it was not in fact evidence adequate to confirm it.
  33. John Pollock, "A Plethora of Epistemological Theories" in George S. Pappas (ed.), *Justification and Knowledge*, Holland, Dordrecht: D.Reidel

- (1979), pp.93-113; William Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification", *The Monist*, Vol. 68 (1985), pp.57-89; Hillary Kornblith," "Ever Since Descartes", *The Monist*, Vol. 68 (1985), pp264-76; Paul Moser, *Epistemic Justification*, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, pp58-70; Jonathan Knanvig, "Subjective Justification", *Mind*, Vol. 93 (1984); Alvin Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986; Richard Feldman, "Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology", *The Monist*.Vol.71 (1988), pp.405-419; Peter Unger,"The Cone Model of Epistemology", *Philosophical Topics*, Vol.14 (1988), 1245-178.
34. John Pollock, "A Plethora of Epistemological Theories", *op.cit.*, p.414.
  35. R.Feldman, 'Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology", *op.cit.*, p.414.
  36. Alvin Goldman, *Epistemology and Cognition*, *op cit.*, p. 73.
  37. Peter Unger, "The Cone Model of Epistemology", *op.cit.*, p.164.
  38. William Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification', *op. cit.*, pp. 61 off.
  39. A.J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, New York: Penguin Books Ltd., (1956), p.31.
  40. R. Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*, New York: The Cornell University Press (1957), and different other books.
  41. R. Chisholm, "The Place of Epistemic Justification", *Philosophical Topics*, Vol. 14 (1986), pp. 90-91.
  42. William Alston, *Epistemic Justification: Essays in Theory of Knowledge*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, (1989), Part II. Also, his "Meta-ethics and Meta-epistemology" in Alvin Goldman and Jaegwon Kim (eds), *Values and Morals: Essays in*

- Honour of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson and Richard Brandt*,  
Holland, Dordrecht: D.Reidel (1978).
43. *Ibid.* Also see, Sandhya Basu, *Justification: Concepts and Theories*,  
Kolkata: Progressive Publishers (2003), pp. 39-42.
  44. Supervenience as characterizing various sorts of justification has been  
discussed in Ernest Sosa's "The Pyramid and the Raft" in P. French *et*  
*el* (eds), *Mid-West Studies in Philosophy, V : Studies in Epistemology*,  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1980), pp.3-25.
  45. R.M.Hare, *The Language of Morals*, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1952).
  46. Many naturalistically-oriented philosophers who want to accomplish a  
naturalistic reduction of normative properties will oppose this. Thus, a  
moral property such as *morally right* might be claimed to be  
equivalent to the natural property *maximizes utility*; an epistemic  
property, such as *epistemically justified* might be claimed to be  
equivalent to the natural property, such as *formed by a reliable-belief-*  
*forming mechanism*, and so forth. How this reductionist account of  
morality and epistemology has been torn between two incompatible  
requirements and hence, may fail, has been shown by Jeremy Randel  
Koons in "An Argument against Reduction in Morality and  
Epistemology", *Philosophical Investigations*, Vol.29, No.3, (2006), pp.  
250-274.
  47. Jonathan E. Adler, "Skepticism and Universalizability", *The Journal of*  
*Philosophy*, Vol.78, No.3 (1981), pp.143-156.
  48. R.Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edn., *op cit.* pp.11-16.
  49. Fred Dretske, "Conclusive Reasons", *Australasian Journal of*  
*Philosophy*, Vol.49 (1971), pp.1-22.
  50. Wilfrid Sellars, "Givenness and Explanatory Coherence", the *Journal*

*of Philosophy, Vol. 70, (1973), pp. 612-624.* The idiom “space of reasons” refers to two things. It (1) describes the conceptual and behavioral web of language that humans use to get intelligently around the world, and (2) denotes the fact that talk of reasons, epistemic justification and intention is not the same as, and cannot necessarily be mapped onto, talk of causes and effects in the sense in which physical science speaks of them.

51. Bruce Aune, “Epistemic Justification”, *Philosophical Studies*, Vol.40 (1981), p. 425.