The Principle of Sympathy: Communication of Passion

In some of the foregoing sections I have tried to suggest the case that Hume does not subscribe to the idea of the contents of people's minds as shut off from each other by insurmountable barriers, so that what is experienced is eternally private and inexpressible. In the Enquiry he points out that we already possess a common evaluative language. The publicity and shareability of our language of evaluation is a pointer to the fact that we do communicate, or there does occur an exchange of feelings of approval or disapproval. He writes "The very nature of language guides us almost infallibly in forming a judgment of this [universal?] nature".(P.174) Expressions of esteem and affection or of hatred and contempt or of praise or blame are found in all languages. The possibility of such a language arises from the social nature of man. Hume might have said with F. Waismann that "the term 'communication' is in no wise problematic so long as we use this word practically"(The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, p. 245). The word "practically" is important, because Hume does not make a claim for having given convincing answers to such questions as 'What is the nature of communication?', nor does he claim that perfect communication in all its aspects is ever possible. He is modest enough to say only that we start by knowing the feelings of another person, and then, with them as evidences, declare his possessions, attributes, and conditions as good or evil. We may turn to a fuller explication of the concept and the argument that he offers for its employment.

When we use the phrase 'concept of sympathy' what we intend to ask is the 'meaning' of the term. The difficulty in giving a precise meaning the term had for Hume is owing to the inconstant way he wrote about it. Apart from the fact that Hume nowhere defines the term, he describes it in more than one and often incompatible ways. For example, if 'sympathy' were a name of a special kind of feeling, then to ask for its definition would have made no sense, because, passions as simple impressions are indefinable, and this is a view which Hume adheres consistently to. But he does speak of sympathy as a feeling. On page 370 of the Treatise he speaks of the "passion of sympathy", though elsewhere he resorts to the usual nomenclature "principle". The commentators are also divided on this issue. Macnabb says that sympathy is a "calm, regular and general passion" (op.cit.,p.166), on the other hand, Kemp Smith denies it. He writes, "Sympathy is not itself a passion or emotion", it a name "for the 'manner' in which this or that ideally entertained emotion... comes to be experienced" (op.cit.,p.170). Further, Kemp Smith gives a convincing reason for his view, namely, if sympathy were a passion, it would have appeared in Hume's classificatory inventory of passion, just as the mode of experiencing is not a part of the constituents of experience. To a great extent sympathy is a psychological schema for experiencing the feelings not originally felt by ourselves. But, above all, as Hume himself says, it is a "principle", or should we say, a hypothesis for explaining the phenomenon of becoming aware of the feelings of others at a second order level. Sympathy is a principle in the sense of an original tendency or a natural disposition of human beings in

so far as they are capable of communicating their "sentiments from one thinking being to another" (op. cit.,p.363). "Man,"says Hume, "has the most ardent desire of society" (ibid) and no passion that man can feel would be benefit of reference to other persons. This statement may be explained as follows. Love and hatred, we are told, have necessary reference to other selves, they are other-regarding passions by virtue of their objects. But what about the so-called allegedly non-dispositional self-regarding passions like pride and humility, which have the self as their object? They are no less social than love and hatred. Hume tells us that the particular causes of pride and love, and of humility and hatred are much the same, they differ only in the different relation between the man who feels the passion and its cause. And as we have said earlier, pride and love, or humility and hatred are passions of a man who evaluates either himself or others, but the passions can come about only in some kind of society, and society alone provides us with a standard of worthiness. "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others"(ibid.,p.292) says Hume. The inherent sociality of our passions is based on the principle of sympathy. For Hume, sympathy is the constitutive[1] factor of our social passions. There is a certain shareability about our feelings, a communicable aspect is there about our emotional reactions.

1. On the Leibniz's pre-established harmony among windowless monads is regulative. But, for Hume, the individuals in society are not windowless. They affect one another by their feelings and actions, and that they can do so is due to the operation of sympathy. Since communication of sentiments is a fact, which is explained in terms of sympathy, it is in that sense constitutive. The role of imagination in the transition of passions, on the other hand, is regulative, for Hume.

It is apparent then that 'sympathy' is used by Hume as a technical term, it does not necessarily mean a favourable attitude of mind, or disposition to agree or approve. As a hypothesis, Sympathy is a general supposition put forth to account for the phenomena of the communication of sentiments. Let us see how it does its work.

"All human creatures are related to us by resemblance. Their persons, therefore, their interests, their passions, their pains and pleasures must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an emotion similar to the original; since a lively idea is easily converted into an impression" (ibid.,p.369). In this passage Hume gives the reason why is it necessary to entertain the principle of sympathy. He seems to argue from a general case to a particular one. If it is true that all human creatures are related to us by resemblance, and that we have a lively idea of everything related to us, then it can be asserted that the lively idea is convertible into an impression. This manner of reasoning leads him to state what he means by 'sympathy' in terms of its operation: "Sympathy [is] nothing but a lively idea converted into an impression" (ibid., pp. 385-6).

Sympathy or "the communication of passions" (ibid.,p.398) is the name Hume gives to what, for him, is one of the most important operations of human nature, and a few of the most eloquent rhetoric in the Treatise are those which describe its importance.[1] As regards

1. 'Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The sea and rivers roll as he pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him: He will still be

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the importance of Sympathy we may note two passages from the Treatise for our purpose. On page 363, he says that Sympathy is "the sole or animating principle" of all our passions like "pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust". The list is by no means satisfactory, because it does not mention most of the direct and indirect passions we have been told about; and also due to the fact that it is difficult to conceive ambition as a passion. It is more a character-trait or desire than a simple impression. Again, revenge is the name of an act and may be taken as issuing from the passion of anger. However, in another passage on page 593, he says that the 'principle of sympathy is of so powerful and insinuating a nature, that it enters into most of our sentiments and passions'.

The conversion of an idea into an impression or the process or operation of sympathy is strictly speaking conversion of an idea of impression into an impression resembling that of which we have only the idea. And the reason for such a conversion is the liveliness or vivacity of the idea of impression. An enlivened idea can easily be felt by the mind as if it were an original impression. We can appreciate the operation of Sympathy if we remember that Hume compares this process of conversion to reflection in a mirror: "the minds of men are mirrors to one another" (ibid.,p.369) and all that is so mirrored in Sympathy is not passions alone "but also ... senti-

(Continuation of footnote from previous page)

miserable, till you give him some one person at least, with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy.' Treatise, p.363. It may be interesting to note that in Buddhism the person who can be said to be enjoying bliss is one who is lonely as a rhinoceros, yet the capacility of transforming one's self into that of one's neighbour's - parātma-parivartana, as they say, is regarded as a high moral achievement. The Buddhist idea of parātma-parivartana has a strikingly close affinity with Hume's notion of sympathy.

ments and opinions"(ibid.). And this is important. Not only can I feel what my friend or neighbour feels but I can share their thoughts and beliefs as well. This of course does not mean that there can be a complete identity of thinking, for in that case communication becomes meaningless. What Hume does imply is that the domain of sympathy extends over our affective, conative and intellective life. Another possible misconception that there is multilateral reciprocity among all men. This is not what Hume intends to assert when he says "So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree". (ibid.,p.592) He makes it clear that "my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sentiments, and my way of thinking." (ibid.) Sympathy or communication, properly speaking, breaks or prevents the isolation of the individual,[1] no one is separate and lonely but caught up in a sympathetic exchange of emotions and judgments. "Whether we judge of an indifferent person, or of my own character, my sympathy gives equal force to his decision: And even his sentiments of his own merit make me consider him in the same light, in which he regards himself."(ibid.)

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1. Cf. 'No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of main' - John Donne, Devotions, no. 17. The Buddhists consider parātma-parivartana eliminating selfishness or egotism. It is a decisive factor in overcoming the barrier of selfishness, and a successful parātma-parivartana brings in its wake love, compassion and joy. Parātma+parivartana is the process essentially delineating and effective communication, while for sympathy as a feeling the Buddhists have the synonym adosa.

The *modus operandi* of communication is, to put it briefly, "first as an idea, then as an impression"(*ibid.*,p.369). The idea that a certain person is having such and such impression or passion is "at first known only by its effects"(*ibid.*,p.317) and by effects Hume means "those external signs in the countenance and conversation which convey an idea of it" (*ibid.*). While discussing the view that Hume's theory of the passions is Cartesian I sought to point out that his notion of passions is not that of a closed mental state, sealed in such privacy that no body could have any access to it. Pre passions have their behavioural counterparts, if not all passions, most of them have public expression. It would be a improbable conjecture that universal shamming of the passions can take place. It is not only difficult but rarely people do conceal their passions, that is to say, expression of peoples' emotional reactions find almost involuntary manifestations. These manifestations like smile, tears, facial gestures, words and deeds are in a peculiar way revelatory of their feelings. From the manifestations of feelings as signs, which all persons living in society can observe, we can become non-intimately conscious of the signified impressions by getting our ideas of them enlivened. My friend's deportment signifies his passions, and on observing it I come to form an idea of his feelings. It is an idea for me of my friend's feelings because I do not feel his passions with as much liveliness and vivacity as he does. Then from the "external signs" of the passion felt by my friend it is possible for me to form an idea of it only because he and I are men and so much do all men resemble each other in mind and body that the mere experience of the signs can be converted into an idea. It

appears that even if one grants that universal scanning is not possible, the programme of taking the deportment of the other person as a trustworthy sign of his passional experience might remain problematic. It is one thing to say that our emotions have expressions in our overt behaviour, and it is a different thing to say that a passion must have the particular expression or behaviour pattern that it usually has. Just as from the fact that a calf must have a body, it does not follow that a calf should have the body it has, similarly, from the admission that emotions have overt bodily expressions, it does not follow that an emotion must have the expressions it has. In that case, Hume's 'signs' become unfaithful. We cannot trust a sign, not because it may have been designed to deceive, but because an emotion often stands to its expressions in one-many relation. Emotional expressions are instinctive as well as learnt. In the case of learnt ones an individual agent's choice and decision may enter in such a creative way that signs simpliciter become ambiguous. And hence a merely enlivened idea would misplace sympathy. From the spectator's point of view signs need be interpreted. Often even on observing behavioural signs it remains significant to ask such questions 'What he is up to?' or 'Does she love me?' Many of our sophisticated emotions defy the spectator's straight-forward reading, because, as agents, we might refuse to be sentimental in our expressions. I need telling my lady that I love her in spite of my having displayed the signs of my emotions. Since Hume does not mention whether experience of signs sets in motion any interpretative process it might be the case that the spectator would come to have an enlivened idea of a signified impression that the

agent was not having at all. A simple sign such as a smile may stand inscrutably for love, greeting, sarcasm, embarrassment and even despair, and it is often not too easy to decipher the emotion or feeling it signifies. The relation between the possible range of emotions and the sign here is many-one. What we need for sympathising with an impression is an approximately one-one relation between an enlivened idea and its corresponding impression expressed through signs. Such a biunique condition, though not altogether impossible, is yet often difficult to fulfil. Hume would not, I believe, discount foregoing considerations. Initially, his account of sympathy is not very informative. It presupposes his distinction between ideas and impression and, on the face of it, controverts his general thesis, ideas are derived from impressions. But sympathy as transition of passions has a stronger claim, namely, that it entails experiencing the same emotional experience as the person sympathized with is experienced. If this be the case, the contention can obviously be questionable.

The uniformity of human nature is taken by Hume as a basic unproven assumption. It is by virtue of the uniformity again that I can come to feel the way my friend has felt. Hume says that the conveyed idea is "converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection"(ibid.). Perhaps Hume is a trifle over-stating the case. For sympathy is by no means a perfect communication, and it cannot perhaps be so claimed without hazarding various epistemological objections. Hume himself

maintains that no impression can be as lively or vivacious as that "of ourselves (which) is always intimately present with us" (ibid.). And, by definition, nothing can be experienced as "intimately present with us" as our own "impression of ourselves". So what Hume seems to emphasize is that within the limits imposed on us by the nature of the case, the impression converted from an idea of other person's passions via the signs through which that was formed is felt as if it were an original impression of one's own passion. This modification is called for by a number of considerations. The signs are not always the familiar ones and the ideas formed may also vary in their respective liveliness and vivacity. It is easier, in spite of the uniform human nature, to have a sympathetic understanding of one's friends' feelings than those of a stranger's. And the signs themselves are very complex phenomena and may often be conditioned by one's culture and tradition. Signs again may be subject to individual variations, some signs may be strong, and others weak, some may be good (in an instrumental sense of the term, of course) while others poor in merit. It seems that Hume was aware of these difficulties, and it led him to formulate the different relations that are or may be operative in a sympathy-situation.

The crucial factor in the operation of sympathy is the transfusion of liveliness to the ideally entertained emotion. What is the source of the liveliness, which converts an idea into an impression? We are told by Hume that nothing can go beyond the liveliness of our impression of ourselves: "our consciousness gives us so

lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it"(ibid.). And this paradigm of liveliest impression that we could have, our impression, would naturally transfuse its intensity into any idea that may come or happen to be associated with it. The impression of the self guarantees that we have a vivid conception (Hume's terminology) of every object related to us. The strength of the relation between an object and the self is a factor of two other types of relation, resemblance and contiguity. Of all the objects that can be so related by resemblance and contiguity to the self, none leads to a stronger relation than the passions or sentiments of others. Hence the "very remarkable resemblance" between the passions and sentiments of others and our own "must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiment of others"(ibid.,p.318). But resemblance is not the only relation which produces this effect for "the sentiments of others have little influence when far removed from us, and require the require of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely" (ibid.). All these relations convey the impression of the self to the sentiments and passion of others and this "makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner". The self, by which a complex set of impressions which we call our self at a given time of our conscious existence, and it need not be anything unchanging, is the source of vivacity or liveliness. Anything less vivid than an impression cannot have the power of converting an idea to the vivacity of an impression. But it must also be added that the process of raising an idea to the vivacity of an impression can turn out to be the case, only if

the ideally entertained emotion is shewed to be owned by somebody who is in some way related to us. The idea of the passion felt by another human being can be raised to the status of an impression by the enlivening influence by me because the person concerned is in a special way related to me, or my impression of self. To generalise the case, it is possible to assert that the emotions of a human being can and does affect any other human being because some relation holds between all human persons. "Whatever object...is related to ourselves must be conceived with a like vivacity of conception" (ibid.,p.317) and since "nature has preserv'd a resemblance among all human creatures ...that any passion...in others" would "find a parallel in ourselves" (ibid.,p.318). We find that the second stage in the operation of sympathy, i.e., the conversion of an idea into an impression rests on the notion of self as a source of livelinness and the fact that the relation of resemblance hold between all human beings, and that of contiguity between some of them. Another remark about the two kinds of perceptions involved in sympathy. If it is true, as Hume sets it out in Book I of the Treatise, that all ideas are borrowed from impressions and that the two differ only in the degree of force or vivacity, does not Hume maintain almost the converse of the thesis in saying that "a lively idea of any always approaches its impression"? The word "approaches" is certainly a vague term, and what warrant is there for the claim that a lively idea of a passion approaches so much to its impression that it can be converted into it? This assumption is central to Hume's account of the operation of sympathy, and yet it is based on a dubious assertion that emotions as objects of ideas enjoy a

special status compared with the many other possible objects of ideas. Perhaps emotions do enjoy this special status, but Hume does not argue the point, he only states it. Again, how do we identify a lively idea, what is the criteria of what constitutes it? Hume does not supply us with anything of that sort.

By the relation of resemblance among human beings Hume means "the fabric of the mind" and "that of the body", and however "the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same" (ibid.). He notes further that the resemblance enters into sympathy in a two-fold way: besides "the general resemblance of our natures" there is also the particular "similarity in our manners, or character, or country, or language"(ibid.). There is no doubt that the general resemblance does "very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others"(ibid.), the particular similarities make the relation between ourselves and any object all the more 'stronger' (ibid). The second type of particular resemblance between human persons, in fact, prepares us for another sort of relation operative in sympathy, that is, the relation of contiguity. This second sort of relation is needed because, resemblance, by itself, may not be sufficient for entering into the feelings of others. The way other people feel may not affect us with that much of intensity if they happen to be, as Hume says, "far remov'd from us", and this consideration makes us reckon contiguity as another relation that influences communication of sentiments by adding new strength to it. It may be asked whether there is any justification for distinguishing between particular resemblance as

a relation and contiguity as another. There can be general resemblance among different sets of people who do not live as geographical neighbours. For example, there is general resemblance in the child-rearing process among women-folk all the world over. Is it possible, on the contrary, to have particular resemblance among people without the resembling persons being contiguous? And even if both particular resemblance and contiguity are available, does it guarantee a communication of sentiment in every possible case? People speaking the same language and with the same accent ordinarily live in contiguous territories, or people of same nationality will have to be contiguous to one another. The implication hardly seems to hold in the reverse order. A Jew and a Christian may be contiguous as neighbours and yet far removed in their particular resemblance as defined by Hume. In this respect the two relations may need be distinguished, though it need not always be like that. For the immigrants in a new country acquire both the particular resemblance and contiguity in course of their living in the country which they have immigrated to. But the main line of Hume's argument is clear enough, that is, resemblance alone cannot produce the vivacity of impression. That the liveliness of an impression derived from the impression of the self be transfused to the idea of other people's passions, the idea must be brought as close to the self as possible. Hence he says that "All these relations, when united together, convey the impression or consciousness of our own person to the idea of the sentiments or passions of others, and makes us conceive them in the strongest and most lively manner."(ibid.) The insufficiency of these relations for "entering

into the sentiments of others" becomes apparent when we consider the fact that there is a sense in which one may not care to sympathize with others' feeling even the persons concerned may be resembling and contiguous with oneself. There can be, and often are, several alienating factors that impede sympathy or communication. Every society is not human society, and if what Marx said is true, there are notions of class society, civil society or bourgeois society. Again, the alienators such as racism, economic exploitation, imperialism, and religious fanaticism can frustrate communication by a process of dehumanization despite the necessary conditions of sympathy, e.g., general and particular resemblance together with contiguity, are present. As we had earlier remarked, there seems to be a decisional element in one's knowledge of other selves, and this element Hume appears to have left out of his account.

In order that an impression may be had from an idea the self as a source of enlivening anything that is resembling and contiguous to it does not tell the whole story about communication of feelings. The entire account presupposes a specific doctrine, which Hume takes particular care to remind us. Granted that we have an idea which is resembling and contiguous to the intimately present impression of ourselves, the communication does not follow of necessity, unless we hold also that (a) the "component parts of ideas and impressions are precisely alike"(ibid.,p.319), (b) the "different degrees of their force and vivacity are...the only particulars that distinguish them"(ibid.), and (c) it is possible that the difference may be removed, e.g., by the relations of resemblance and contiguity. There-

fore, it is possible to hold that "an idea of sentiment of passion may...be so enliven'd as to become the very sentiment or passion" (ibid.). Now the doctrine of ideas and impressions, having the same component parts and their manner and order of appearance, though differing only in vivacity is neither a self-evident statement nor it is analytic. As it has been suggested that the distinction between ideas and impressions in terms of vivacity is an empirical generalisation (see D.D.Raphael, The Moral Sense, p.3) then the possibility of communication of emotions turns out to be not certain and universal but highly probable. Of course, this argument does not affect Hume's contentions much, because the domain of the passions lies outside that of necessity[1] and the relations of resemblance and contiguity are not logical but natural ones. The problem for Hume is that communication of emotion does as a matter of fact happen, and if it be the case, how are we to explain it. The only thing that we might say against him is that he explains it perhaps in a mechanical way and consequently leaves out of account the decisional element often found to be involved in such situations.

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1. The view that every idea is a copy of some impression is often referred to as the Copy Principle. The logical status of the copy principle is interesting in itself as a problem concerning Hume's philosophical methodology. Is the principle a contingent generalisation (Raphael) or a tautology (Antony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief, p.25)? A.M.Macnabb takes it to be a definition. It is true that Hume challenges anyone who disputes the copy principle to produce an idea which has no corresponding impression or an impression with no corresponding idea. Hume's celebrated missing shade of blue endangers the status of the principle as a necessary truth, and if it is an empirical or contingent generalisation, his crusade against metaphysical beliefs and ideas would be rendered ineffectual. A promising alternative could be to regard the principle a methodological device for analysis, or a rule of procedure. But that is another story.

Another important point made by Hume is that the communicated passion is a real passion. How can we be convinced of the "reality of the passion"? We get at the "reality of the passion" by the relation of cause and effect. But the relation of cause and effect by itself, cannot bring about the communication of emotion, and it needs to be assisted by the two relations of resemblance and contiguity. The cumulative effect of the assistance of the three relations of cause and effect, resemblance and contiguity is such that an idea is "entirely" converted into an impression, conveying "the vivacity of the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing of it in the transition" (ibid.,p.320). The note of sureness in Hume's language is a little baffling. The efficacy of the relations of resemblance and contiguity is no mean one, since they are potent enough for an entire conversion of an idea into an impression, except its "reality". In this sense, the relations of resemblance and contiguity may be called the necessary conditions of communication of emotions. But since the idea has to be so converted that it might be like an "original" one, i.e., as if it were a real passion of one's own, the relation of cause and effect is called forth, and could be looked on as another condition. For Hume's account of the causal relation in connexion with sympathy "in its full perfection" it might appear that he construes the relation in such a fashion as if it were a sufficient condition. He writes about the causal relation in somewhat stronger terms. He says that the relation of cause and effect converts an idea into an impression "so perfectly as to loose nothing of it in the transition". If the causal relation is a strengthening and enlivening factor, so is

"the relation of objects to ourself". Is the second relation causal? Or, that of resemblance? If I am not misunderstanding Hume, this point remains obscure whether the relation responsible for an entire conversion of an idea into an impression is causal "alone" (Hume uses the word on p.320), or both of cause and effect and of objects to ourself. And also whether the two relations together constitute the sufficient condition for communication of sentiments is left unexplicated. If "the relation of objects to ourselves" is a sub-relation of resemblance, in that case it could be taken as presupposed by the causal relation, since resemblance is employed in all arguments from cause and effect. But Hume says that sympathy is not only "exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding" but also "contains something more surprising and extraordinary"(ibid.). What could this "surprising and extraordinary" element that the relation of objects to ourself? Again, as "the conversion arises from the relation of objects to ourself" the self as the enlivening source remains constant and is presupposed by the relations of resemblance and contiguity, because only such ideas can be converted into an impression that are contiguous to and resemble ourselves. No less opaque in Hume's account is his comparing sympathy with such mental acts like inferring. He says explicitly: "sympathy is exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding". Let us clarify the difficulty involved in the comparison.

In a footnote on page 371 of the Treatise Hume says that by 'understanding' he means demonstrative and probable reasonings,

when opposed to imagination. Sympathy, as it involves the relation of cause and effect cannot be imagination, which, for Hume, is no less an operation of the understanding, in the wider sense of the word. Nor it can be a species of demonstrative reasoning, since he holds that in sympathy we are concerned with matters of fact (ibid., p.319). Then sympathy or communication of emotions must be an instance of probable reasoning, which, in Book I of the Treatise, is either "philosophical" or "unphilosophical". Probable reasoning, when it is "philosophical" includes all evidence, except mathematical knowledge, and arguments from cause and effect. But when it is "unphilosophical" it is confined to uncertain arguments from conjecture, and distinguished both from mathematical knowledge and arguments from cause and effect. In this sense sympathy cannot be regarded as a case of "unphilosophical" probability. But curiously enough, Hume gives the example of communication of sentiments by signs as a case of unphilosophical probability. He says that communication of sentiments is a kind of "discovery" of other persons' sentiments with the help of the signs that they might use. The signs are "general and universal" and its use is compared by Hume to "taking off the mask" (ibid.,p.151). The metaphor of mask, apt and telling as it is, belies its classification as "unphilosophical" reasoning, which as Hume tells us, yields only a diminished assurance.

Again, what is the nature of the conversion of an idea into an impression in sympathy? Hume says that the change is "instantaneous" (ibid.,p.317). His appeals to human nature seem to suggest that communication of sentiments is almost an involuntary process. Then he goes

on to remark that in sympathy we infer "the real existence of the object" (ibid., p.318 and the phrase "the reality of the passion" on p.320). How obviously a species of reasoning which gives only diminished assurance, as "unphilosophical probability" does, cannot be held to enable us to have "the real existence of the object". But granted that sympathy is a species of causal inference, how could it be "instantaneous"? Because inferring is a mental act, a transition from available data to a conclusion, and its process depends on a set of rules or principles that may be responsible for the validity of the inference. If Hume means by "instantaneous" that feeling sympathy with the sentiments of others is dispositional then it cannot be of the same nature as that of inferring, since inferring is a conscious process which is resorted to with a definite purpose. On the other hand, if sympathy is inferential, as Hume does suggest, then it cannot be dispositional.

Complications arise when we look at Hume's commentators. Kemp Smith seems to take the dispositional view of the process of sympathy. He writes: "Just as in the awareness of others the awareness of their existence is immediate and involuntary, i.e., not inference but apprehension naturally determined in belief, so the awareness of the inner emotional experiences of others has the character of sympathy, i.e., of a direct entering into their experiences through a no less natural and no less immediate type of process" (Op. cit.,p.176). Kemp Smith's observation is not unfounded, but there are other, even contrary, evidences as well. He seems to base his view on Hume's metaphor of mirror, i.e., "the minds of men

are mirrors to one another", and this is taken by Norm Smith to be the central teaching of Hume's doctrine of sympathy. In his discussion, he refers to the relation of cause and effect but does not take it seriously. When we come to a recent writer, Philip Mercer, we note that the process of sympathy is said to be "inductive" in nature. He has interpreted Hume as implying that "since direct knowledge of another's state of mind is impossible, we have to rely for the knowledge we do have on a method of inductive inference" (Op.cit.,p.31). Now, historically, "inductive"[1] is a latter day term, and Hume does not use it. But, it may be pertinently asked, is sympathy a generalization? No, but it may depend on generalization so as to reach a probable conclusion. As so far Hume is concerned, it is difficult to say whether he intends to establish some sort of inferential link between the observed signs and the sympathised passion. It is true nonetheless that he explicitly states that communication of passions is inferential: "No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind. We are only sensible of its causes or effects. From those we infer the passion: And consequently those give rise to our sympathy"(op.cit.,p.576). Hume's explicitness about the inferential element in sympathy is not also without an over tone of immediacy, which is rather perplexing. He says that the emotions "readily pass from one person to another",

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1. Nowadays the word "inductive" is used to cover all cases of non-demonstrative inference in which the truth of the premises, while not entailing the truth of the conclusion, purports to be a good reason for belief in it.

on being presented with signs the spectator's mind "immediately passes" to their causes. In like manner, Hume tells us, the mind is conveyed to the effects, given the causes. Now, if the causal transition is brought about by a sort of mental disposition it could hardly be called an inference, for the transition, as Hume explains it, is a two-way traffic. But an inference in the strict sense is not necessarily so. An inference, stated as a conditional need not be co-implicative. At least, ordinarily, it is not so construed. Could we not say that Hume means, when he says that sympathy is inferential, that our act of inferring the emotional experiences of others is not an inference in the strict sense, rather an identification of others' passions or sentiments on the basis of human communication? The identification is inference-like, since it can be corrigible, but that would not present any serious difficulty as it would in the case of generalizations or conditional statements in the realm of non-demonstrative inference. The immediacy is born of association, and in this respect, it could be distinguished from the directness which marks of any valid inferential process. Immediacy does not yield knowledge, for Hume, and the certainty available for demonstrative reasoning cannot be had of our belief in the existence of passions of others through sympathy. Should the latter be said to involve inference it must be an inference with a difference, i.e., an inference which is immediate, though not direct. Again, inference in the strict sense hardly appeals to association, though it might and does introduce conventions. Hume's sense of "inference" in sympathy cannot then be taken to be inference in the logician's

sense. For clarity's sake it would not be worth one's while to confound the two sense. Nor it should be said to be "inductive", as Norton does either. Kemp Smith has been partial to such passages which highlight immediate communication of sentiments, where as Norton seeks to make the case induction a putative one.

In fact, Hume appears to overdo the case of causal relation. Even though the relationship between ideas and impressions is governed by the relation of cause and effect, and particularly the conversion of ideas into impressions, to say that in sympathy an idea is converted into an impression is an imprecise way of putting the affair. Because the uniqueness of communication of sentiments lies in the fact that in sympathy "the mind passes ... from the idea of ourselves to that of any other object related to us" (ibid.,p.340). This is an exception to the general rule that "we are at times intimately conscious of ourselves, our sentiments and passions, their ideas must strike upon us with greater vivacity than the ideas of the sentiments and passions of any other person" (ibid.,p.339). For this reason Hume himself has observed that the self-regarding passions such as pride and humility are easier to experience than the other-regarding ones like love and hatred. It is only because "Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing" (ibid.,p.340) that the passions of love and hatred and communications of sentiments become possible. There is nothing wrong in saying that in sympathy there occurs a conversion of an idea into an impression, but this is a partial account of the case. All cases of conversion of ideas into impre-

sions need not be cases of communication of sentiments. To take Hume's own example. On page 576 he gives an example in order to argue that given the causes of an emotion the mind is conveyed to the effects by means of a conversion of an idea into an impression. Obviously the example of "terrible operations of surgery" is not a case of communication of sentiments. In this case, no passion passes from one person to another. There seems to have been an indecision in Hume's mind as to the exact nature of sympathy -- whether it is a consequence of causal inference or, as he himself says, "all the affections readily pass from one person to another" (ibid., emphasis added). On the one hand, we have the metaphor of mirror, on the other, arguments in support of a causal account.

We may now pass on to considerations of a different nature, e.g., the scope of sympathy. Hume says that "Sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but ... we often feel by communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being, and which we only anticipate by the force of imagination" (ibid., p. 385). On Hume's account we can only sympathize with feelings which we ourselves have already experienced. The sympathized feeling is generally identified as one of the kind I have had before. This is consistent with Hume's empiricist point of view. But the concept of the future must be uncomfortable for an empiricist, since he cannot be committed to anything that has not been given in experience. How can he significantly talk about the future? Sympathy requires that the objects of the passions,

in this case, the enlivened ideas of the passions of other people, or for that matter, the people themselves be "contiguous to us, either in space or time" (ibid., p. 427). Contiguity in space is a relation easier to conceive, since spatial configurations are "capable of being at once present to the sight or feeling"(ibid., p. 429). Time, the idea of which is formed from the succession of ideas, consists of parts like space, but no two parts of time can be coexistent. From "the incompatibility of the parts of time in their real existence" follows their separability in the imagination. This itself presents the passions of the past with a loss of vivacity. Another consequence of the phenomenon is that the power of the past ideas over our will is generally less, since their succession in time is unalterable by our actions. As agents, we are constively impotent in respect of the past, which, as the existentialists aver, constitute our facticity. All this is understandable. On the contrary, Hume notices that "the progression of the thought" from the present to the past is "contrary to nature", but "when we turn our thought to a future object" there is an "easy progression of ideas", and consequently, a greater influence on the will and passions, because the seemingly natural order of having ideas "makes it conceive its objects in a stronger and fuller light" (ibid.,p. 431). This account appears to presuppose the notion of the future instead of explaining it. Even saying that the notion is conjured up by passing "from one point of time to that which is immediately posterior to it"(ibid.) does not necessarily yield the notion, since the relation of immediate posterity

can hold between any two parts of the past. Is, then, the seemingly natural passage of thought responsible for the notion? Hume, to all intents, takes the "easy progression of ideas" to characterize the succession of ideas in non-past time. The two facts that we "follow the succession of time in placing our ideas" (ibid.,p.430) and that we pass more easily to posterior ideas that these which go before are more features of our mental life rather of the notion of the future. Apart from the method of thinking, the imagination needs premulgated in order to extend the method of thinking beyond perceptions, and the two could be said to contribute to our having a concept of the future. "We advance rather than retard our existence" (ibid.,p.432), says Hume. But why do we "conceive the future as flowing nearer us, and the past as retiring"(ibid.) is one of the inexplicable facts of human nature, and hence the question cannot properly be answered. Again, why do "we rather chuse to fix our thought on the point of time interpos'd betwixt the present and future, than on that betwixt the present and the past" (ibid., pp.431-2), can only be ascribed to an original constitution of the human mind. In Book I of the Treatise, where Hume discusses his notion of time, he appears to suggest that time is the succession of ideas. "Wherever we have no successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho' there be a real succession in the objects" (ibid.,p.35). It is obviously a non-Kantian notion of time, since the Humean notion of time is neither 'sensibility' or the capacity of receiving representations of objects, nor a priori. The idea of time is an abstract idea, and "nor is it

possible for time alone ever to make its appearance, or be taken notice of by the time" (ibid.). For Hume time is not only a mode of awareness but the mode of our historical being as well. Now, is the awareness of succession an organised structure? Hume would say, yes, though the so-called elements of time, past, present and time, for Hume, are not collection of "givens". The ordering principle of the succession called time, is the relation before - after. For developing a concept of future it is, then, desirable that there should be an experience of succession of ideas structured as before-after, an under-distancing of the gap between ourselves and the object, and above all, an extension of the awareness of succession beyond perceptions. Hume does not distinguish between real future and that which is posited for itself, in the manner of Jean-Paul Sartre. The anticipation or foreseeing the course of a billiard ball, a la Hume, would be an instance of real future, while a future posited in itself is isolated and cut off from all reality, it is a future detached from the present, and entertained for its own sake. It is doubtful whether Hume would call it a future all. Neither in sympathy nor in causal relationship, he would not have any room for a notion of future posited for itself. In causal relationship, for him, we are concerned with real existences. But whether Hume can altogether dispense with the notion of future posited in itself in the context of sympathy can perhaps not be very strongly asserted. If he can do that he would be required to revise his assertion that our passions concern real existence of objects.

We can look into Hume's teaching concerning causal predictions and see how does he explain the concept of the future in that context. According to Hume predictions are presumptive acts of the understanding, in the non-demonstrative sense of the term. Inferring is presuming, i.e., in arguing from a present cause to its absent effect, we argue on the basis of past experience. The guidance of experience cannot be followed up to the end, because past and present experiences can bear witness only to the past and the present. In inferring to the future, we, following the guidance of experience, presume a resemblance between the objects of which we have had experience and those of which we have had none. The truth of the presumption cannot be ascertained either by reason or by experience. Reason is of no avail because it has no jurisdiction over the domain of matters of fact, and experience cannot help us because it must be necessarily silent in respect of all that has never existed. In fact, there is no such thing as causal <u>inference</u>, instead have beliefs about the future course of events. When the mind passes from an idea or impression of A to that of B, it is through the office of the imagination which is operative in the situation, not the understanding. We, in inferring, come to have a belief about a possible state of affair. Belief is a name for the manner in which the mind comes to acquire a lively conception of an object not given to experience. Hume uses a family of genetic notions like custom, habit, and belief is just one of these. Belief consists in enlivening ideas. But it is also an attitude of the mind which carries the awareness beyond its

immediately experienced perishing states and actual events of past experience. In causal inference belief not only generates a vivid expectation but makes us disposed to feel that the inferred entity is an actual occurrence. Belief is Nature's safety-valve against scepticism, or suspension of judgment. In short, belief is not merely "a simple act of thought" but a "peculiar manner of conception, or addition of a force and vivacity"(ibid., p. 104).

Belief, on the one hand, is assisted by custom, and on the other, it operates in and through the imagination. There is the habit of the mind to transfer the past to the future. Custom is "a secret operation" (ibid., p. 104) and determines us to pass from the impression of one object to the idea or belief of another. Custom is nothing but a principle of association, while belief is particular manner of forming an idea. Imagination, says Hume, extends custom and reasoning beyond perception and continues in its course even when its object fails, to use his own metaphor, like a boat under way. One of the specific uses of the word, 'imagination' means for Hume the faculty which is at work whenever belief comes to be the distinctive mental attitude. It is the faculty-name for what he calls the "permanent, irresistible and universal" principles of the mind, and these are "the foundation of all our thoughts and actions" (ibid., p. 225). The Kantian insight that Hume expresses in talking of the imagination is coupled with his usual dispositional analysis and genetic account of our mental operations. A causal prediction like B will followed by A is equi-

valent to saying (dropping 'custom' and 'habit') when faced by an A we are disposed to expect B.

Now as in the case of belief, so do in sympathy custom and habit and above all, the imagination holds its sway. Norp Smith has drawn attention to the fact that sympathy plays an analogical role in the case of communication of sentiments as does belief in causal inference. Both belief and sympathy are manners of experiencing and have a similar character and mode of operation. He also holds "that Hume arrived at his doctrine of Sympathy before tackling, or at least before finding an answer to the problems of belief, and that it was by analogy with sympathy, both in its intrinsic character and in its mode of operation, that he later formulated his doctrine of belief" (op. cit., pp. 169-70). The analogical mode of operation of belief and sympathy might help us understanding how it is possible to feel a passion which is "not in being" or anticipate it by the force of imagination, as Hume claims. Or, in other words, how is it possible to sympathise with an unfelt feeling? Aesthetic experience largely consists of feeling unfelt feelings. As spectators of drama we experience the feelings of the characters as if we were ourselves feeling them. The agony of Lear is felt by us as unfelt. An aesthetic sentiment is unfelt because it does not have the usual behavioural concomitants. The mature spectator of tragedy may not necessarily weep. There is maintained a psychic distance from the characters of the drama, yet the spectator feels the feelings of the characters in order to appreciate its aesthetic value. Kant, for example, says

that aesthetic feeling is disinterested, i.e., without having a concern for the real existence of the object of feeling. His distinction between feeling and sensation is worth recalling. Aesthetic delight that we have in art-experience is independent of any concern for the real existence of the object. It is the form of the art-object that delights us. Aesthetic judgment, says Kant, is reflective, or non-conceptual. It seems to me that Hume's notion of unfelt feeling or anticipated passions bear or, at least, suggests a resemblance aesthetic mode of feeling. There is of course one basic difference between Kant's and Hume's account of the unfelt feelings. In Kant's case aesthetic feelings cannot be motives for any moral concern. But for Hume they are. The anticipated feelings may prompt us to actions. To this point we shall come later. Let us look into some of his examples. When he says "future pains and pleasures" (ibid., p. 389) what he means is the pains and pleasures that are not "in being". By "future" he means "possible or probable". On page 369 Hume gives the example of "a spectator of a tragedy" and says that the passions of the characters are communicated to the spectator by sympathy. In this case, he notes that the feelings so communicated "have no existence". (ibid.,p.370) Again, blushing is a sign of the feeling of shame. One may come to experience the feeling of shame as a result of realising his foolish behaviour. But why do we blush when we see somebody behaving foolishly? Hume says that it is a case partial sympathy: "we blush for the conduct of those, who behave themselves foolishly before us; and that tho' they show no sense of shame, nor seem in the least conscious of their folly. All this proceeds from sympathy; but 'tis of a partial

kind" (ibid., p. 371). Our behaviour of blushing results from our conceiving a lively idea of the passion of shame, that is, to feel the passion as if we were "really actuated by it".

So far we have tried to show that the notion of unfelt passions or feelings that are not "in being" is not empty. But how does Hume account for it? Hume's answer is: by imagination. He says that "the vivacity of conception is not confin'd merely to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas" and gives us "a lively notion of all the circumstances...whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid., p. 386). Just as in the case of belief we are dispositionally led to posit the existence of entities not yet given to experience, but presume on the basis of our past or present data of associated ideas and impressions, similarly, on the strength of the history of our affective life we are dispositionally led to feel or anticipate a passion either for ourselves or for others. The future occurrence of a passion is nothing but a dispositional projection of a feeling on the basis of our past feeling-habit or affective custom. Ordinarily, the enlivening source in communication of sentiments is our impression of self, but on the whole, whether we come to feel a passion presently felt by others or that they might feel in future, the state of affairs is governed by the imagination, which induces us to "consider" others by liberating us from our usual, if not natural, self-centredness. Hume makes it clear when he says that "the imagination is necessitated to consider the person nor can it

possibly confine its view to ourselves"(ibid., p. 346). Again, the imagination which is "our natural temper" gives us "a propensity to the same impression (i.e.,passions), which we observe in others" (ibid., p. 354). It is no wonder, then, that it will facilitate the transition of the enlivened idea to the future. The passions are simple impressions, and qua impressions they come under the same belief-forming process of imagination. Communication of sentiments is itself a sort of belief-forming process. We start with an idea that the other person feels a particular passion (asserted on perceiving the so-called signs) is the case. This idea through being associated with an impression (of self), can be so enlivened as to become a belief that the other person is feeling a particular passion is the case. There seems to be nothing objectionable in so putting the matter, especially in view of the fact that, for Hume, belief is a lively idea or impression. In making a causal prediction, i.e., in asserting a belief in the future occurrence of an event, we are aided by the imagination in entertaining a vivid expectation and taking the inferred entity as if it were an actual occurrence. Correspondingly, in sympathizing with an anticipated passion the imagination makes us feel as if the anticipated passion were an actually felt one.

Two points may now be made. First, to have said that we can, in sympathy, feel passions of others that are not "in being" is virtually to modify the initial statement that communication of sentiment is confined to actual passions of others. But now it no longer does seem so. Any passion, actual or possible, felt by

others may be felt by ourselves. By a "possible" passion is meant a passion that is likely to be felt any person is so far as he is a human being. Aesthetic passions are a special class of possible passions. The mad agony of Lear over Cordelia's death is not surely one that a father might experience when his daughter dies, but nonetheless it is a passion, and a possible one. We do not doubt its credibility. We have already noticed that Hume gives the example of communication of passions by the actors in drama. Ardal thinks that in this case "there is no emotion to be communicated" because "an actor portraying an emotion on the stage need not necessarily feel the emotion he portrays" (op. cit., p.52). Despite the evidence of the James-Lang theory of emotions, it is not really important whether the actor really feels the emotion he portrays, rather that he does portray (by signs, i.e., by gestures and verbal utterances in keeping with the aesthetic intention of the playwright) an emotion, and that the spectators do feel it. What is communicated is a possible emotion and it is identified as that. When I hear my neighbour lamenting his daughter's death and when I witness Lear's volcanic speech, in both the cases I can feel the emotion, though in my neighbour's case I reckon it as an actual one (unless, of course, he is charming, which is unlikely) and in the latter case I feel a possible emotion. The difference in reckoning the two sorts of presentation of the same emotion would evoke different reactions in my behaviour. In one case, I might go to console my neighbour; in another, I may come have a realization about human destiny.

Secondly, it has been said in recent times that in Hume's account of sympathy the sympathizing agent does not imaginatively put himself into the position of another person. Mercer says that "there is no question for Hume of sympathy involving an agent's imaginative realization of another's feelings" (op.cit.,p. 36). And Ardal remarks that in Hume there is "no suggestion that in sympathizing one imaginatively puts oneself into the other person's place" (op. cit., p. 45). Such remarks may be either charges or descriptions. As charges, Mercer's and Ardal's comments are unfounded, and if meant as descriptions of Hume's account of sympathy, then it is inaccurate. Hume does speak about "entering" into the original passions of other persons (op. cit.,p.359) and this act, though physically impossible unless persons are disembodied selves can only be possible in imagination. On page 360 of the Treatise again, entering into somebody's sentiment is made equivalent to sympathising with the idea of his passion. Speaking of our appreciation of other people's property and the role played by sympathy in such situations Hume writes "We enter into his interest by the force of imagination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion in him"(op.cit., p.364). Another related point is that had the sympathising agent not imaginatively put himself into the position of another man, how could Hume say that in sympathy we "conceive a lively idea of the passion [of another person], or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person [who is not aware or capable of feeling it] were really actuated by it" (ibid.,p.371). Hume's example of our blushing for the conduct of other's foolish behaviour is so remarkably close

and parallel to Adam Smith's example of our blushing for "the impudence and rudeness of another, a passion of which he himself seem to be altogether incapable"(British Moralists, II, p.204, ed. D.D.Raphael) that it appears unfair enough to say that Hume was not alive to the question of one's imaginatively putting oneself into another's position. In fact, Ardal makes his comment by comparing Hume's view with that of Adam Smith's, and T.D.Campbell (in his Adam Smith's Science of Morals, pp.95-6) does the same thing only, perhaps, at the cost of ignoring striking similarities between the two thinkers. Both Hume and Adam Smith hold what may be called the spectator's view of sympathy. By the 'Spectator's view' I mean a notion of sympathy which amounts to saying, as Shaftesbury actually said, that the mind is "spectator or auditor of other minds"(ibid.,I, p.173)[1], and there is no reason to suppose that the notion of spectator or the sympathising agent who conceives himself to be in the position of any other person with whose feelings he may be sympathising is to be found in Adam Smith alone and not in Hume. Campbell says that in a specific sense "sympathy is not a success word"(op.cit.,p.96). This specific sense of sympathy is not peculiar to Adam Smith. Hume speaks of the future passions of other persons, or passions which have no existence and even of the past -- in none of these cases sympathy is an achievement word in the sense that our conceiving ourselves in other person's position does not result in a coincidence of two sets of feelings, the original ones and the sympathetically felt ones.

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1. Hume speaks of the sympathising agent as "beholder" and "spectator". See Treatise pages 362 and 364.

I would like to take further liberties in interpreting the Ryleam notion and proceed to show why in some cases 'sympathy' cannot be a success word in a tentative manner. There can be interpretative uses of emotion statements. I can be in an emotional state and realise it but not know its significance, that is, cannot able to identify it. My friend may tell me, on the basis of his sympathizing with my emotional state, that I am in love with so and so, and go on to support with evidence his interpretation of my emotional state. Provided I am honest and do not endorse my friend's interpretation, my friend's sympathizing, in that case, is not an achievement. A statement of the form 'He loves her' can be an interpretation of his behaviour, and if the situations do not answer to the emotion statement, the speaker's sympathetic understanding of the (third person) subject's emotional state becomes corrigible, and not an achievement again. If the statement is a report, in that case like all reports, those based on sympathy, can also fail. In such cases 'to sympathize' is a verb of failure, rather than one of success.

The word 'sympathy', for Hume, is a process of converting an idea into an impression. The process may have been gone through but without success. An encounter with the other person's emotional sign-behaviour does not by itself guarantee that I will be in a position decode his personal experience. 'To sympathize' is then an "episodic verb" that describes, in Ryle's words "items in the inquisitive life of human beings" (op. cit.,p.145) and which at times meets with success. It is a "try verb", since, on Hume's analysis,

we are not, and cannot be, directly conscious of the states of mind of another person.

Campbell is emphatic on Adam Smith's situational view of sympathy, i.e., his view that "Sympathy...does not arise so much from the view of the passion as from that of the situation which excites it." (op.cit.,II,p.204) Let us recall Hume's example of the murder of the infant prince (see Treatise,p.371). What we find there is "the wretched situation of the person" that, Hume says, "gives us a lively idea and sensation of sorrow". Again, in sympathising with a miserable person it is the "circumstances"(op.cit., p.386) that induces sympathy, and evoke my interest in him.

In citing evidences I do not intend in the least to imply that there is no difference between Hume's and Adam Smith's respective concepts of sympathy. Indeed there are differences. What I would like to draw attention to is their striking similarities, not only in their pattern of thought, but in common examples, metaphors and even in turns of phrases. Before I move on to other points about Hume's concept of sympathy I would like to dispose of another critical comment closely related to those we have been considering. Mercer says that Hume "nowhere suggests that when we are sympathising (as opposed to merely entertaining the idea of the other's state of mind) we are at all conscious of the fact that our feelings are, as it were, 'not really our own'." (op.cit.,p.35) But is it true? When Hume says, as Mercer himself has quoted,that in sympathy our idea of another's passion is converted into "the very passion itself", what he actually means is that the sympathet-

ually felt passion, aided and enlivened as it comes to be by our impressions of self and imagination, acquires an almost closely resembling liveliness of the original passion. And Hume said to that effect, as Mercer seems to suggest that Hume really did, in that case assertions based on communication of sentiments like 'X is sad', or 'Y is envious' etc., would be either impossible to be asserted, or would become equivalent to first person pronouncements or avowals. There is not, and cannot be a class of sympathy statements. On Hume's terms the class of emotion statements has two sub-classes, one, the first person avowals and two, the sub-class comprising of second and third person emotion statements. That there can be second and third person emotion statements is accounted for by sympathy. None of the two sub-classes includes the other, though the sub-class of second and third person emotion statements presuppose the sub-class of first person ones. For Hume, avowals are non-transferable statements, since they are verified by immediate experience of the speaker, but assertions about the mental states of other persons have a lesser degree of confirmability, since they are read off from the exhibited signs and come to be felt by a vivacity that is borrowed from diverse sources, e.g., impression of self and imagination, and are conditional upon the relations of contiguity, resemblance and cause and effect. Speaking about indirect passions Hume says (op.cit.,p.276) that they proceed from the same principles as the direct ones,i.e., "arise immediately from good and evil", and he would never say this about communicated sentiments. The word that he uses for the process of sympathy is "instantaneous"(ibid.,p.317) yet the conver-

sion of an idea into an impression, he says, "proceeds from certain views and reflections". By "certain views and reflections" Hume means the impression of self and the relations needed as conditions of the conversion. Let us have a look into some of Hume's own statements which very clearly distinguish between the original passions of other persons and the sympathetically felt ones. On page 389 he says that the imagination renders "present to us" the mental state of others and "operates as if originally our own" (italics not in the text). Again, "Riches give satisfaction to their possessor; and this satisfaction is conveyed to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity" (ibid.,p.362). The two passions, the original one felt by some other person and that which is felt by the spectator have a resemblance in an approximating vivacity, but they not indistinguishable. One is felt as an impression the other is a converted idea. The relation between the two passions has been brought about in a letter that Hume wrote to Adam Smith: "the Sympathetic Passion is a reflex Image of the Principal" (Letters,I, 313). An image and that which something is an image of are two separate entities. But there is a statement that occurs in the Treatise : "When we sympathise with the passions and sentiments of others, these movements appear at first in our mind as mere ideas, and conceiv'd to belong to another person...the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent".(p.319). This is a misleading way of putting the matter. What Hume intends to say is that we conceive the "sympathetic passion" "in the strongest and most lively manner". If we bear in

our mind Hume's initial distinction between direct and secondary passion, we might say that the original passions may be either direct or secondary, though the sympathetic ones will, of necessity, will be secondary, i.e., felt by the mind only after a "preceeding thought or perception"(ibid.,p.276). As we tried to put it earlier the sympathetic passion is a part of a statement of belief, such as "I believe that X is in pain", which we could not make unless we had the idea that X is in pain. On the other hand, the original passion is either a first person avowal to the effect that somebody is in a particular mental state or, is exhibiting certain bodily behaviour appropriate to the mental state. Hume does of course give the critic much scope by his way of writing, part of his unhappy vocabulary is due to his thesis that any idea is but a copy of an impression, and that they differ only in vivacity and in no other respects.

We may now turn to Hume's account of the different kinds of sympathy. In cases where we are sympathising with a "real" emotion of another person, 'to sympathise' could be taken as an achievement verb. But there is another sense, as Campbell suggests, a non-'success word' meaning of sympathy when we come to feel the possible passions of another person. A possible passion is one which "neither belong to ourselves, nor at the present moment have any real existence" (ibid.,p.386). A real passion, on the contrary, belongs to ourselves and has a real existence at the present moment. Brentano speaks of the category of the emotions as mental states which go beyond perception and belief. In a manner, Hume's notion of

possible passions anticipates Brentano's category. When we reflect on the sufferings of the unborn victims of a thermo-nuclear war, it is the possible passions that we could be said to be sympathising with. It is a sort of modal awareness. As compared with the real passions, the possible ones are such for which the element of intentionality remains vague. In so far as the identification of a real passion is to be made, there can be a hearer's sense, and a speaker's sense, of 'identify'. Borrowing Strawson's phraseology once more, a real passion can have identification with in history, whereas, a possible passion can have it in a weak sense, or within a story. In sympathising with the passions of the people of the past, we have possible passions that are identified within history, though in a weak sense. With those of the future, perhaps no similar claim can be made, and hence the possible passions of such sort can be identified within a story. Similarly identified are the passions of literary characters, in epics, drama, odes and ballads, with which we sympathise in as much as do with persons alive, dead or yet unborn. In either case, the possible passions colour our attitudes, even though the element of belief involved in the passions of the past is likely to be different from those of the future. Now, to feel such passions is to have what Hume calls "extensive sympathy", a communication of sentiments in which we are able to form "a lively conception of all circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid.). Such an extension of sympathy in the temporal order becomes possible because the vivaciously conceived idea of another person's passion "diffuses its influence over all the rela-

ted ideas", and "If I diminish the vivacity of the first conception, I diminish that of the related ideas" (ibid.). Now all this appears to be an application of Hume's more general thesis that "lively passions commonly attend a lively imagination" (ibid., p.427) and that "the mind has always a propensity to pass from a passion to any other related to it" (ibid.,p.339). But the distinctive feature of extensive sympathy is to enter into the sentiments of others "with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern" (ibid.,p.386). How is the factor of "concern" derived? Does it follow from Hume's concept of sympathy? No. Because the technical sense which he gives to the word no commitment is entailed by communication of sentiments. Hume thinks that we cannot have any idea without feeling some kind of emotion, and an idea of a passion has some uniqueness insofar as "it gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception" (ibid.,p.393). If this be true, then the "concern" must have been derived from the vivacity of the conception of another's passion. It is the intensity with which I feel his passion that compels me to be concerned about him. Concern can only be a property of a passion, and since sympathy is not a passion, the notion of concern cannot be entailed by the concept of sympathy, by which Hume means the manner of communication of sentiments or in general, the process of conversion of ideas into impressions. But all passions do not make us concerned,for instance, self-regarding passions like pride or humility. Of course, when and if we come to smell an intention of another person towards hurting my pride, I may be said to feel concerned. In sympathising with my adversary's passions I naturally take care as not to let my self-esteem injured.

This is self-concern that is, in a sense, entailed by self-esteem. But concern for others does not seem to follow from the so-called self-regarding passions. It is only the other-regarding passions that can make feel concerned about others. Again, the feeling of concern is not a merely passive state of mind, or "pure emotion", it is a dispositional attitude of the mind, and can be found to accompany only those passions that have a tendency or an end or which "carry the mind to something further" (ibid.,p.367). Some passions are characteristically conative, and "follow'd by or rather conjoin'd with" such passions as those that are attended with a desire and excite us to action. Viewed as a conative disposition Hume redefines the notion of the passion of love as "the desire of happiness to another person and hatred that of misery" (ibid.). Now, this is in partial modification of his earlier description of love (or hatred) as that passion of which the "object" is necessarily the other person causing an agreeable or disagreeable feeling as the case may be. Hume's assertion that the ideas of happiness or misery of the "objects" of love and hatred do not form a part of these passions is scandalous enough, but is not as disdainful as it appears to be. It depends on what he means by the word 'desire'. 'Desire', for Hume, is a passion, and that also a 'direct' one (ibid.,p.438). So is aversion, love and hatred are 'indirect' passions. Hence, the passion of love and the desire for the loved one's happiness are conceptually unrelated. Even though Hume's argument can be made sense of, yet it is difficult to resist feeling that he is torturing the common usage of the words. Anyway, Hume is quite clear in saying that the desire for

the happiness or misery of other persons "arise only upon the ideas of the happiness or misery of our friend or enemy being presented by the imagination" (ibid.,p.367). To love is not to entertain the idea of someone's happiness, rather to have him as the "object" of my feeling. The word 'love' is so much overlaid with emotive and conative associations (which Hume does not of course deny) that it seems paradoxical to think that love is unrelated (by the logical behaviour of the words) to the desire of happiness of the person loved. Accordingly, Hume would have to say that to hate somebody is not necessarily to wish his misery, since the idea of his misery is something adventitious to the impression of hatred. We love somebody at the same time desiring his happiness or hate him while wishing his misery, only if the ideas of the loved or hated persons happiness or misery are "presented by the imagination". Hume intends to assert that it is not analytic to say that to hate somebody is to wish his misery, just as 'X loves Y' does not entail that 'X desires Y's happiness'. It is conceivable that somebody may be hated without his misery being wished or loved without his happiness being desired. However consistent Hume's analysis may be, one feels uneasy to accept it. In ordinary language hatred or the emotion of hate is an emotion of extreme dislike or aversion. To hate someone is to hold that person in very strong dislike, or to bear malice to him. Malice is active ill-will or hatred, and generally we do not distinguish between the two, as Hume, in fact, does. Malice, for Hume, is an indirect passion, which "imitates the effects of hatred"(ibid., p.372). It is "the contrary appetite' of pity (ibid.,p.382) and

is described further as "the unprovoked desire of producing evil to another" (ibid.,p.377). In that case, how does it come to be related to hatred? Obviously not by any mechanism of association, rather by "a natural and original quality"(ibid.,p.382) of the mind. Malice is related to anger, anger to hatred, just as pity or "a desire of happiness to another" (ibid.) is related to benevolence, and benevolence as "a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd" (ibid.) attends love by "the original constitution of the mind" (ibid.,p.368). Some explanation may be offered by way of clarifying the mysterious-sounding phrase before we take up the consideration of the relation between sympathy and benevolence.

Hume called all those "unskilful naturalists" who forsake philosophical economy and have recourse to "a monstrous heap of principles" "in order to explain every different operation"(ibid., p. 282) of the mind. In fact, he devised the principles of association, particularly the so-called double association of impressions and ideas with a view to explaining all the phenomena of the indirect passions. But as he progressed with his description of the passions (which are unanalysable on account of being simple impressions) he espoused more and more number of ultimates, besides those of the associative ones, which govern the domain of our emotive life. A motley of custom, general rules, imagination for transition of passions (i.e., the succession of passions belonging to one individual and the way in which one passion may give way to or give rise to another passion) and sympathy (for explaining the communication of a passion from one individual to another) was

presented. Kemp Smith has remarked that "All impressions of sensation, and as regards impressions of reflexion, the various appetites and passions moral and aesthetic, approvals and disapprovals, custom as an agency capable of generating a quite new feeling, the propensity in the mind to spread itself over external objects, these — with sympathy in the moral sphere and belief in the theoretical sphere standing ready to yield support to one and all of them — are the sort of factors which Hume was prepared to regard as ultimate, and to which he freely resorted in circumventing the obstacles that beset his path" (op.cit.,p.59). Now, without either disputing or subscribing to the view expressed above may we not find a justification for Hume's numerous concessions to his original plan and premises. Starting with his initial premise that all indirect passions are simple impressions pride and humility were shown to be "pure emotions" and the passions of love and hatred were described as parallel to pride and humility, differing only in their respective objects. But it was soon found that the analysis was inadequate, because some passions are characteristically conative, have a "tendency" or an "end", and lead us to action. The earlier account of love and hatred was modified by a dispositional account. It was found also that passions may be related to one another not only through their characteristic sensations but also through their characteristic conations. Love and hatred are attended by respectively, benevolence and anger. For a similar reason pity is related benevolence and anger to malice. The passions were taken as atomic psychic entities, any connexion between them was sought to be explained with the help of the princi-

ples of association. But soon it was found that ideas come to be enlivened, and the enlivening source was found in the impression of self. Not all and any idea could be so enlivened but those that were resembling and contiguous to ourselves. It was also found that the passions were not isolated mental events, they were divested with a social dimension. From the social nature of man communication of sentiments emerged as a special phenomenon, and the principle of sympathy was evoked for the purpose of explaining it. The passions, originally conceived as distinct existences, come to be related by various means, by association, by imagination, custom and general rules, by sympathy. At first, the passions were passive consequences, but later on, if not all, at least the most social or other-regarding ones, were declared to be dynamic. The passions linked by associative relations are left far behind by these that are the products of a "mental chemistry". In a sense, Passmore's remark is true that "a species of sentimentalism gradually replaces Hume's associationism" (op. cit.,p.128). Of course, it all depends on whether the statement is intended as an evaluation or a descriptive judgment. Without attempting an assessment of Hume's methodological success or failure it can certainly be said that there has been an honest and undogmatic endeavour on his part to modify his position with a view to accommodating new sets of facts which have not been accounted for by the initial premises. It is in this light that Hume's numerous concessions to his avowed aims might as well be seen. We, then, find that though he started with the thesis that passions are simple impressions, the paradigmatic ones being pride and humility, as "pure emotions", yet he was led to giving a dis-

positional account of love and hatred even if the parallelism between the two sets of passions, the self-regarding and the other-regarding ones could not be adhered to any further. If it might be argued that love and hatred are not purely dispositional passions, it can nonetheless be asserted that these are the ones that involve a tendency to have special feelings. The contrast Hume draws between the passions that are "pure emotions" and those that involve a direction and tendency to action suggests a re-statement, and a more adequate view, of the passions of love and hatred. We have earlier tried to show that pride and humility are no less social passions than love and humility, because pride and humility can be experienced only in a society where there already is some criterion of excellence and worthiness present. One may also wonder how far Hume is right in suggesting that pride and humility are "pure emotions" and that they do not essentially involve any tendency to action. Does he not himself speak of the signs that a proud peacock displays? Pride as self-esteem may be expected to show itself in confident behaviour while humility as self-debasement manifests itself in diffidence.

And now coming back to our original point, we might say that Hume is giving a two-level analysis. On one level, taken "abstractedly" (op.cit.,p.368) as he says, to love somebody does not entail wishing his happiness, just as to hate him does not necessarily imply wishing his misery. On the other, love and benevolence, hatred and anger are conjoined "by the original constitution of the mind"(ibid.), and this consideration seems to be upper-most

in his mind. What does he really mean by the phrase "original constitution of the mind?" There are passions like desire, hope or fear, which are dependent upon antecedent mental experiences, just as the conative characteristics of a class of passions extend and in some cases even pre-determine the range other passions, though not their origin. The conjoining of love and benevolence, hatred and anger may be seen as resulting from the nature of the passions. They are linked by a natural relation, but the absence of any logical relationship between them does not in any way weaken the connexion. This is a believed order wherein the passions, though not entailing, yet determine one another in an expected and established manner. The order of the passions has a necessity other than the logical.

Hume's position may be understood in another way. The statement " 'X loves Y' implies 'X desires Y's happiness'" could be analytic if and only if the implicate would express at least a part of the meaning of the implicans. But even then, the analyticity of the statement cannot raise it to logical immunity, because an analytic statement may not be a logical truth. For example, 'All bachelors are unmarried' is analytic but is not an instance of logical truth. On the contrary, 'it is raining or it is not raining' is a logical truth, though hardly could be said to be analytic. I do not intend to enter into the debate whether logical truths can be non-analytic. What I am trying to emphasize is that the demand for logical certainty of relationships between passions does not make a good case. Because statements about relationships

between passions are so-called contingent propositions, which may also be termed a posteriori propositions, in the sense that their truth or falsehood is dependent on our affective experience. The passions are just not the sort of entities about which a priori assertions could be made. In most cases to say, as the critics often do, love and benevolence (for Hume) are contingently related or the connexion between sympathy and concern is psychological and not logical is either to assert a triviality or to make a descriptive statement. So far Hume is concerned the fact that the assertions of relations between passions are not instances of logical truth does not take away their validity nor diminish their evidential value. They are validated by principles which constitute the constant element in human nature. The 'original constitution of the mind is a set of non-rational synthetic principles which are reason-like in their invariability and operations. These alone have legislative powers over the passions.

To return to Hume's account of the different kinds of sympathy. We have already noticed that Hume distinguishes between benevolence and pity. His distinction is remarkable for its precision. Pity, he says, is a concern for the misery of others, without any friendship to occasion this concern. Thus even strangers can be pitied. But benevolence can be felt towards those who are loved. It is the lively idea of the miseries of others which is responsible for our experiencing the passion of pity for them. More important is the fact that pity, like benevolence, is a secondary passion, arises from the original impression of pain or uneasiness produced by the

lively or enlivened idea of another's suffering. But for the conative aspect of pity, sympathy with uneasiness involving the sympathising agent himself in uneasiness, does not relate to hatred. We do not hate the person we pity, simply because pity is also a "concern", "a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery" (ibid.,p.369 and p.382). Benevolence is described by Hume, embarrassingly enough, in almost identical terms with pity. Both pity and benevolence conatively share a desire for the happiness of the person sympathized with and an aversion to his misery. In spite of the conative similarity, there must have been a "logical difference", as Ardal (op.cit.,p.67) very rightly points out, between pity and benevolence. Though Hume has carelessly obscured the difference by talking of pity and benevolence "as to be indistinguishable" (op.cit.,p.382), yet an admission that they are different is not all too imperceptible. Ardal could have looked for Hume's very significant assertions that "pity is an uneasiness" (ibid.,p.361) and "benevolence is an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain" (ibid., p.387). No man is ever pitied for his pleasure, rather for his afflictions. One's being in a state of misery is a necessary condition of his being pitied. As regards benevolence, Hume makes it quite clear that sympathising with somebody's pleasures or miseries alone would not become sufficient for the passion of benevolence. He says " 'tis requisite we should feel these double impressions (of his pleasures as well as of pain)... nor is any one of them alone sufficient for that purpose" (ibid.,p.387). There is another important factor. The "object" of benevolence is

a person who is loved, and this particular condition is absent in the case of pity.

Now love, benevolence and pity are related by a common conative concern, which, Hume says, is "a natural and original quality". Mercer (op.cit.,p.18-9) does not think that pity necessarily implies a concern for the welfare of the other person. But Hume does, in fact, describe pity as a feeling of concern. Without questioning Mercer's interpretation, it may be pointed out that there is certainly a sense of 'pity' which implies concern. When the psalmist says "Like a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him" (C ciii,13), there is a clear implication of concern, otherwise it is idle on the part of a father to pity his children. Tennyson speaks of pity "for a horse O'verdriven" (In Memoriam lxiii) which undoubtedly points to a desire for the animals' relief. Hobbes defined pity as a special kind of grief "for the calamity of another", which obviously could not be idle. Hume's stipulation of 'pity' as a feeling of concern does have sanction of usage, and the Shorter Oxford Dictionary describes pity as "a feeling of tenderness aroused by the suffering or misfortune of another, and prompting a desire for its relief". Curiously enough, Mercer (op.cit.,p.39) himself brings out the conative aspect of pity in order to show how Hume could hold pity being related to benevolence.

Hume speaks of sympathy being either strong or weak. This division has a built-in paradox in it. Hume says "when a sympathy with uneasiness is weak, it produces hatred or contempt by the

former cause; when strong, it produces love or tenderness by the latter" (op.cit.,p.385). It could be so, when from sympathy with somebody's pleasure there arises love and from that with his uneasiness hatred. The passions, we are told, are always either agreeable or uneasy, and the agreeableness or uneasiness of the indirect passions give force to the direct passions and increase our desire or aversion to the object. Now the state of dispositions as they are cannot explain the cases of strong and weak sympathy. But Hume produces an argument from imagination, as we might call it, to show how it is possible for us to have a lively interest in other's plight, in spite of the fact our sympathetic encounter gives rise to an uneasy feeling. Let us first grant the presupposition that "In our common way thinking we are plac'd in a kind of middle station betwixt the past and future, and ... our imagination finds ... a facility in following the course of the latter" (ibid., p.437). Then the second premise that we do "look forward to the future in sympathising with any person" (ibid., p. 386) and that we can do so by "a great effort of imagination" (ibid.). Sympathy can be imaginatively extended to the future only if the present state of affairs of the person we are sympathising with is somehow remarkable. That means that we must have some lively idea to take off in our flight of imagination. Hume produces a viable case for looking forward to the future in sympathy with any person in the following manner: "When the present misery of another has any strong influence upon me, the vivacity of the conception is not confirm'd merely to its immediate object, but diffuses its influence over all the related ideas, and gives me a lively notion

of all the circumstances of that person, whether past, present, or future; .... By means of this lively notion I am interested in them"(ibid.). Two points arise from the fore-going account,namely, that in order to feel strong sympathy, the notion of other's misery must not be feeble, but sufficiently lively. And secondly, what does Hume mean by taking or being interested in other's misery? He makes the word to mean a concern, or even a dispositional state of mind: "to concern myself in his good fortune, as well as his bad" (ibid.). This is, in fact, Hume's description of benevolence.

Hume's statement of strong sympathy, however consistent it is with his general position with regard to the imagination in particular, appears to have curious consequences. Interest or concern cannot be an idle recognition of other's state of feeling or a mere lip-service sort of endorsement, it is a commitment. But this commitment depends on the fact that the notion of other's misery must be a lively one. If, for the sake of argument, it is said that one should care about one's fellow men's miseries, that would imply a prescription. But in Hume's causal analysis it is always possible for one to say that one is unable to feel one's neighbour's pain with sufficient vivacity. At least it may be a kind of dodge that one might always use in order to escape one's duties. This example is significant in view of the fact that Hume thinks that our sense of duty always follows the natural course of our passions. Here, of course, the interpretation of the word 'natural' becomes important. What is crucial is that the liveliness of the notion or idea of other's miseries is a necessary, but not sufficient condi-

tion of strong sympathy. Hence one can escape the "obligations of interest" (the phrase is Hume's on page 314) by pointing to the insufficient vivacity of his ideas of other person's misery. This seems to go against Hume's view that sympathy "acquires strength from the weakness of its original" (ibid.,p.370), of which I can not make any sense. And, if it were the case,there would have been no need for saying that "'tis impossible we cou'd extend...sympathy to the future, without being aided by some circumstance in the present, which strikes upon us in a lively manner"(ibid.,p.386). Extended sympathy depends on the strength of the initial experience or impression we get of the other person's misfortune. There is another attendant difficulty. Since sympathy "depends on the relation of objects to ourselves" (ibid., p.322), strong sympathy may not be very easily felt and for any person who approaches us. "The breaking of a mirror gives us more concern when at home, than the burning of a house, when abroad, and some hundred leagues distant" (ibid.,p.429). It is for such reasons as these that Hume bases his account of sympathy not only on his favourite association of ideas and impressions, but ultimately on the twin premises of human uniformity and the supplementative role of the imagination. An Oxfam poster is an appeal to both.

Hume has been trying to show a relationship of sympathy with concern and the most characteristic passion that is related to sympathy is benevolence, which is a concern for the pleasures and pains of the person sympathised with. The phenomenon of sympathy, when it gives rise to benevolence as a desire of the other person's

pleasure and aversion to his pain, is renamed, by Hume, extensive sympathy. It is extensive in the sense that the sympathizing agent is not only aware of what the other person is feeling at a particular time, but also of the present state of his feeling and what *might* happen to him. Now, it is not clear whether Hume would differentiate between the awareness of the other's possible circumstances and the passion of benevolence. I say this because Hume has a tendency for equating benevolence and extensive sympathy. The phrase "strong extensive benevolence" actually occurs on page 495 of the Book III of the *Treatise*. On page 385 he uses pity interchangeably with sympathy, almost forgetting his own distinction that pity is a passion and sympathy is a principle. He writes "pity or a sympathy with pain produces love", and could we not think that in this case he uses 'sympathy' as a passion of concern? Granted that sympathy were an emotion, then sympathy would entail feeling an emotion, which the object of sympathy does not experience. Hume could be said to have realised that his account of sympathy in terms of the communication of emotion did not adequately deal with the phenomena covered by the word 'sympathy'. And hence he brings in wider considerations, especially the imaginative reconstruction of what is good or evil for another. This much is clear that benevolence in the sense of "an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain" (*ibid.*, p.387) can be experienced only if there happens to be an awareness of what the person sympathized with is feeling at a given moment of time *and* what he might feel in future. Sympathy with the other person's present and future

states of emotion is a precondition of benevolence. Or in other words, strong sympathy logically precedes extensive sympathy. Extensive sympathy is strong sympathy causing the passion of benevolence to be felt by the sympathising agent. If we remember that benevolence is a conative passion, a 'desire', it becomes easier to understand how from a strong sympathy a conative passion could subsequently arise. In fact, Hume does seek to institute some kind of causal connexion between the vivacity of the initial feelings and the "subsequent" feeling of benevolence. Let us see how could it take place. To sympathise with somebody's feelings is epistemologically equivalent to believing that the person concerned is in a particular mental state. To believe is nothing other than having a vivacious perception of an idea, and sympathy is precisely the process by which an idea is transformed in the characteristic vivacity of an impression. In Book I of the Treatise Hume has stated that a perception of pain and pleasure is "the chief and moving principle" of all our actions. Pains and pleasures can appear in the mind only as either ideas or impressions, and the latter can "actuate the soul in the greatest degree". On the other hand, belief "is nothing but a more vivid and intense conception of idea" (ibid., p.119). Now, schematically, to sympathise with somebody is to have our idea of his feelings converted into "a more vivid and intense conception". The sympathising process is a belief-generating one. Hume further mentions that belief influences actions via the passions. "The effect ... of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions.... For as the different degrees of force make all the original

difference betwixt an impression and an idea, they must of consequence be the source of all the differences in the effects of these perceptions..."(ibid.). It is no wonder, then, that a vivid conception of the actual and possible pains and pleasures of a person would bring about a conative passion. It is precisely in this way that benevolence is related to sympathy. Hume's argument is somewhat as follows: Given that belief influences action and benevolence is a conative passion, sympathy amounts to a belief about other person's feelings, and, in consequence, evokes benevolence. To sympathise, in the "extensive" sense of the term, is to feel some conative passion towards the person we are sympathising with.

Benevolence has some characteristic features. It is a case of sympathising with both the pains and the pleasures (actual and possible) of the other person. There is thus, what Hume calls, the double correspondence of impressions, a sympathy with his pleasures (actual and possible) and his pains (actual and possible). In the first case, we feel love for the person, in the second pity. The joint feeling of love and pity make us feel benevolent towards him. In benevolence there is a combination of two impressions, of the other person's pleasures as well as his miseries, and both these impressions are felt with such an intensity that an interest in his fortune results. Ordinarily, if the impression of his pain lacked in vivacity it would lead to hatred. Sympathy with pain arouses in the mind of the sympathising agent the passion of hatred on account of the uneasiness thus experienced. But in extensive

sympathy the impression is felt with such an intensity that, instead of hatred, the sympathising agent feels pity for the other person. The intensity with which the feeling of the other person's pain is communicated is responsible for a lively notion of all the circumstances of that person, resulting finally in a concern for his misery. Hume's chief intention is to show that in extensive sympathy some specially sensitive passions are aroused, and benevolence is paradigmatic of these passions like love and pity with "a bent or tendency" "leading us to action"; and this is possible only if the sympathising agent ceases to be a disinterested spectator and becomes interested in the other person's fortune. But a strong sympathy with pain alone again is not sufficient to arouse benevolence, one naturally likes to see the person pitied happy, and so there must also be sympathy with his pleasures. Here is an ambiguity in Hume's manner of exposition. He writes, "When we sympathize only with one impression, and that a painful one, this sympathy is related to anger and to hatred, upon account of the uneasiness it conveys to us" (ibid., p.387). How a weak painful impression is related to anger and hatred by "the resemblance of sensations" is understandable. But why extensive sympathy with pain be related to hatred and anger is not comprehensible. If he means weak sympathy with pain results in pain though weak sympathy with both pain and pleasure results in benevolence the whole purpose of formulating the concept of extensive sympathy is defeated. And certainly he does not mean that what he does mean is that strong sympathy with pain, by itself, is not sufficient for bene-

volence. Hence an extensive sympathy with both the pains and the the pleasures of the other person is at once the sufficient and necessary condition for the passion of benevolence. But to say this is to assert an equivalence of extensive sympathy with benevolence. It would be a sort of category mistake, because sympathy, after all, is a principle and benevolence is a passion. This difficulty is almost insurmountable since Hume does not treat sympathy as a passion, and in that case, any talk of relationship between passions on the one hand and principle of communication of passions must retain some ambiguity. A tentative interpretation would be that in order to have a special set of sensitive feelings sympathy needs to be extensive, otherwise the sympathizing agent may be left uncommitted if the feeling tone of the communicated passion is weak and encoiled.

Hume's account of the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence is beset with ambiguities. Apart from his equivocation of 'benevolence', once as an appetite that attends love (p.382), at another time, as an original pleasure and pain arising out of the beloved person's pleasure and pain (p.387), the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence is expressed in terms of a new concept "double correspondence of impressions", which is by no means perspicuous. In order to render the notion of extensive sympathy explicit we shall attempt a tentatively schematic statement. Let sympathizing be conceived as a relation S, and x and y the sympathizing agent and the person sympathized with respectively. Now Sxy may be interpreted as a dyadic relation of x's

sympathising with the feelings of y. But if Sxy is to present the case of extensive sympathy, it will have to be taken to co-imply that in case y suffers (or y is miserable, i.e., Iy) x also is in misery (Ix), and when y is happy or experiencing pleasure (Py), x likewise is in a state of happiness (Px). In both the cases of Ix and Px, y's being happy or miserable covers actual and even possible, i.e., imagined feelings of y. Then Sxy is true if, and only if (Ix.Iy) and (Px.Py) are also true. Or, in other words, x can be in extensive sympathy with y, if and only if, x is in sympathy with both y's misery and happiness. Then the conjunction of (Ix.Iy) and (Px.Py) can be said to define the dyadic relation Sxy. The sentence 'x feels benevolent towards y' can be represented by another relational expression Bxy. Hume says that extensive sympathy leads or gives rise to benevolence. But can we assert an implication between Sxy and Bxy? Perhaps not, because sympathy is a principle of communication of passions and benevolence is a passion. A principle cannot imply a passion. On the other hand, one passion can imply another passion by virtue of its conative characteristics, that is to say, a passion, if it is a dispositional one, involves to have special feelings. As regards the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence Hume writes, "In order...to make a passion run parallel with benevolence, 'tis requisite we shou'd feel those double impressions [of happiness and misery], correspondent to those of the person, when we consider...etc."(ibid.). The question arises as to which passion he is speaking about is to be kept parallel to benevolence. Does he take, unawares, the feeling ofthe double

impressions, which is sympathy, as a passion? Another ambiguity lurks in his previous remark that from the "correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his [the other person's] pleasure, and aversion to his pain"(ibid.). Is Hume investing sympathy with some kind of conative power? The correspondence is two-fold: one, between the other person's pleasure and my feeling it sympathetically, and secondly, between his pain and my feeling it by communication. From the first correspondence there would arise love, and from the second, hatred and anger. A desire for the other person's pleasure can arise from the first correspondence, and an aversion for his pain from the second. As Hume appears to suggest, benevolence can arise, only if, there occur the two correspondences, or unless one has felt the two impressions of pleasure and pain correspondent to those of the other person, one cannot feel benevolent towards him. In other words, the two impressions together constitute the sufficient and necessary conditions for benevolence. Extensive sympathy has been described by Hume as an interest-generating phenomenon. It is said to take account of "all the circumstances of [the other person], whether past, present, or future; possible, probable or certain" (ibid.,p.386). By means of a lively notion of them one gets interested, comes to "feel a sympathetic motion". What could this feeling be other than benevolence? Does not a vivacious conception of all the circumstances of the other person cover the "double correspondence of impression" spoken of in connexion with benevolence? Since Hume has already explained sympathy in terms of communication, he could not

have assigned to it the status of an emotion, and hence the distinction between extensive sympathy and benevolence. Of course, benevolence, for Hume, is a motive or cause of a certain type of action, i.e. benevolent action. He would allow only the adjectival and adverbial forms of the noun 'benevolence' by way of describing certain actions, e.g., 'he acted benevolently'. It is doubtful whether extensive sympathy could be regarded either as a motive or cause of an action. And should one insist on the fact that benevolence is an "original" pleasure etc., that is, it has no cause by way of a precedent impression, in such a case, one's experiencing extensive sympathy can in no way be regarded a sufficient reason for one's acting benevolently towards the person one is sympathising with. But does the account succeed in rendering benevolence contra-causal? On page 417 of the Treatise Hume mentions the passion as a calm desire. Now, if from the double correspondence of impression there does arise a desire equivocally characterised as is benevolence, then we are to understand either that extensive sympathy is potentially conative, or that benevolence, qua desire, presupposes extensive sympathy. There is a matter of sharing the other person's joys and sorrows in sympathy; and it is more so in extensive sympathy, when I compare his position with that of mine. In such wider relationship I am bound to feel benevolence. " 'tis evident, that, in considering the future possible or probable condition of any person, we may enter into it with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern" (ibid.). The passage plainly admits that extended sympathy inevitably involve benevolence.

Hume wants to show practical commitment of extensive sympathy, but his argument in this section of the Treatise is so unclear that any interpretation can be at a hazard. We may, in the present context, disregard Hume's view in the Book III that in spite of extensive sympathy one may not be willing to sacrifice self-interest. If extensive sympathy is practical, that is, if sympathy and practice are so related that the former entails the latter, it is not wholly clear how does Hume show the connexion between one's being sensitive to all the circumstances of the other person influences one's practical attitude towards the other's good and ill fortune. How does the interested concern for the other person follow from extensive sympathy? It is the conceptual relation between sympathy and practice that remains hard to grasp. In a disquieting passage on page 387 Hume speaks of "a double tendency" and "direction" of the passions. Benevolence and love have "a similarity of direction", i.e., they are equally emotive. One wonders whether the "tendency" of a passion would be different from its "direction". The word "impulse" has been use alternatively with "direction" on page 387, and it is asserted also that the character of any passion is determined not only by its "sensation", i.e., its hedonic quality, but equally by its "bent or tendency". What are we then to understand by the following passage on page 387: "A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been"? Does the phrase "double tendency of the passions" points to what has previously been called "the

double correspondence of impressions"? Does Hume mean that a strong painful impression is characterized by "the double correspondence of impressions"; and since benevolence, just such as love, is stated to involve the said correspondence, one's extensive sympathy with pain practically commits oneself to benevolence?

Harper has rightly suggested that "direction" of a passion must be distinguished from its "tendency". Obviously sympathy cannot be conative, because it is a manner of experiencing a passion instead of being itself a passion. The "tendency" of a passion can be its hedonic qualities, e.g., the tendency of benevolence would be the pleasure and pain arising from the other person's pleasure and pain. In other words, the double correspondence, which is involved in the experience of benevolence. Its "direction" would be the desire for the other person's happiness and aversion to his misery, that is, the conative of benevolence. But if so be the case, how are we to explain the alleged "similarity of direction" between extensive sympathy and benevolence in Hume's passage? Between the two there is of course a similarity of tendency, though as regards the "similarity of direction" unclarity persists.

There need not be any doubt regarding Hume's intentions. The practical commitment of extensive sympathy is one thing that he would not disavow. In the Book III he tells us that sympathy "takes us....far out of ourselves". An essentially social creature as man is, his most self-regarding passions cannot be as alienating as could be supposed. And in this respect, sympathy keeps others constantly before the mind. "We can form no wish, which has not a

reference to society" (ibid.,p.363). It has been suggested by Mercer that the practical commitment of sympathy in "undermined" by Hume because an "awareness of the subjectivity of the other person" is not required in order to enter into a communication of sentiments. While it is true that a practical concern for another requires a prior recognition of the other's existence, it seems hardly viable to hold that Hume's principle of sympathy altogether dispenses with an awareness of the subjectivity of the other person. Sympathy works as a social mirror, and man is the need of man. Social-consciousness precedes I-consciousness. A solitary man lacks both definition and description. If 'man', for Hume can be defined and described in terms of fellow-feeling, and should his description of "man as with-the-man" be considered to bear a near existentialist ring, in that case an awareness of the subjectivity of the other person would obviously be implied by any inter-personal communication. Transcendence of egoistic boundaries is achieved by, let us say, a sympathetic leap. But this is no leap of the inductive sort, it is a direct going out to others and attending to them. In "sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion....Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object ['objects' includes other selves], is in reality nothing" (ibid., p.340). This could not have been an assertion of an egoist, and not all critical assessors of Hume's psychological theory ascribe egoism to it.

I do not propose to suggest that practical determination of the will by sympathy is "logically" guaranteed in Hume's theory.

But the point I would like to press here is that if pleasure and pain felt in sympathy are efficient causes in arousing in me certain passions which have another person as their objects, in that case my desire for his happiness, arising from sympathetically generated passion, would be ultimate. The desire would not only "constitute the very nature" of the passion, but would inseparable from the passion itself. I allude in particular to a passage on page 367 of the Treatise where Hume criticizes those who distinguish between cause and objects on the one hand, and end on the other, in the case of other-regarding passions. The determination of the will by the experience of extensive sympathy, or its practical commitment is then guaranteed by human nature; and the certainty it begets is of mean order. The life of action or of engagement is more a life of natural principles. We live our nature. And on the recognition of this fact a great deal hangs.

Mercer has remarked that in showing the relationship between extensive sympathy and benevolence Hume has performed "a little sleight-of-hand" (op. cit., p.41). I would not like to say that because, it is important to bear in mind, in explicating the notion of extensive sympathy Hume seems to have intended a partial modification of his initial concept of sympathy conceived as a mechanical communication of sentiments entailing no commitment at all. In fact, his very distinction between the passions that are "pure" emotions and those that involve a "direction" and "tendency" to action marks a change in his outlook; and similarly, his transition from adaption of conceptions from mechanics

to explanation of the emotions to a dispositional analysis, at least, of certain passions, is no less crucial. If we care to compare his notion of the "double relation of ideas and impressions" with that of "the double correspondence of emotions" it will be immediately apparent that a shift has taken place in the manner of his thinking about the passions, that is to say, though he set out with the view that the passions are related by resemblance in their connection, yet having come to discuss the passions with a "bent or tendency" he is now paying attention to their similarity and correspondence in respect of impulses or directions. His apparently shocking view that love and benevolence are contingently related is not retained to the end, for we find him saying that benevolence "attends" love, they are related "by the original constitution of the mind", which, for all practical purposes, is inviolable. Love and benevolence may be logically unrelated, but in feeling love does tend to produce an interest in the happiness of the beloved. This common tendency of pity and love to make us interested in the suffering and happiness of other persons causes us to love somewhat those whom we pity. The passions such as love, pity and benevolence are the important ones in Hume's moral psychology; and on the basis of his consideration of these other-oriented passions he comes to declare that there is a more than mere causal link between the passions felt by a man and the acts done by him. At least this appear to be Hume's intention.

There is a difference between the passions felt on their own

account and the passions felt in sympathy, and this point is significant in understanding the connexion between extensive sympathy and benevolence. Sympathetic perception of the other person's feeling is an idle awareness of his mental state. Ordinarily, the experience of a passion is having an impression attended by an idea, but in the case of a passion felt in sympathy we acquire an idea attended by an impression, and by this doubling its quality is heightened. On page 363 Hume says that sympathy is the "animating principle" of such violent passions as pride, ambitions, revenge or lust, and "for wou'd they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others". This is virtually to admit that the so-called "pure emotion" pride is not as self-oriented as was initially held. And if, for a passion to be self-oriented is not coextensive with its being non-dispositional, in that case, even pride, besides its other-orientedness by virtue of having sympathy as its animating principle, ceases to be a closed passion. Again, what is it to experience a passion with a greater intensity? Obviously, it is to act in accordance with the "bent or tendency" of the passion felt. The feelings of others when known by extensive sympathy strike us with so greater an intensity as to set us in a <u>practical</u> attitude of mind. Hume says that pity is a concern <u>for</u> the misery of others, and if it be the case, the feeling of pity cannot leave us indifferent. In the <u>Enquiry</u>, Hume asks, "if the effects of misery touch us in so lively a manner; can we be supposed altogether insensible or indifferent towards its causes;....?" (p.220). A practical concern is built

into our other-oriented feelings. It would not be contrary to Hume's intentions to hold that even the self-directed passions like pride and humility must have a reference to others, though, of course, related to the self. As Kemp Smith has put this point, "It is not our own 'identical' self that is the source of pride... its source is some particular action or possession, and the major part (if not the whole) of our esteem or disapproval of this action or possession, and so of our pride or humility in its relation to the self, is derived from our sympathetic entering into the passions and emotions with which other selves respond to it." (op.cit.,p.175) Hume's initial assumption about man's essential social nature of keeping even in his self-regarding passions the consideration of others no less than the self before the mind, makes sympathy an inevitable factor in the explanation of the inter-relation of passions. And specifically, there are certain passions which perhaps could not be explained otherwise than by the principle of sympathy, and benevolence seems to offer a specific instance. In view of these considerations, Mercer's contention of circularity, or rather the question begging nature of the relation between extensive sympathy and benevolence appears to be without much significance. If one agrees that our other-directed passions are conative, i.e., involves a "bent or tendency", and that passions can be related by their dispositional resemblance, as Hume explicitly says,[1] then in extensive sympathy

1. Hume says, "impressions or passions are connected only by their resemblance, and...where any two passions place the mind in the same or in similar dispositions, it very naturally passes from the one to the other" Treatise, p.343. On this basis, is it not possible to say that extensive sympathy and benevolence are by a

Contd.....

we could be said to experience a conative state of mind which makes us feel benevolent towards the person we sympathize with. The conceptual passage from extensive sympathy to benevolence is, no doubt, very unsatisfactorily and ambiguously delineated by Hume, but the general outline of his argument seems sufficiently clear. The entire argument depends on the possibility of our having conative passions and feeling practically concerned over other's pains and pleasures, and should these considerations are conceded to, it is then possible to say that some feeling of practical concern is most likely to emerge from the experience of extensive sympathy. In order to reject the thesis that extensive sympathy leads to benevolence one will have to reject also the thesis that passions are connected on the ground of their resemblance of direction. In other words, the relation between extensive sympathy and benevolence appears as a corollary of the essentially social nature of Hume's concept of man and the connection or practical concern built into some of man's other-directed passions. The entire notion of extensive sympathy is founded on the view that a sympathized passion has a greater degree of intensity, aided as it is by imagination, premises his view that extensive sympathy leads to benevolence seems credible enough however ambiguously it might have been expounded by him.

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connected by a natural relation? It would be dogmatic to say that a natural relation, since it is not logical, has no or a mean authority over our affective life. Logic, or Reason, for Hume, has no sovereignty in the domain of the passions, at its best, it can assume the role of an occasional sunorain.

Another of Mercer's remark is that Hume's concept of extensive sympathy is "compatible with hatred or indifference" in so far it is "merely thought of as a double correspondence of impressions". It is doubtful whether the remark is justifiable and the word "merely" is crucial. Is it really the case that Hume thinks of extensive sympathy "merely" as a double correspondence of impressions? Perhaps not. On the contrary, Hume is insistent on the strength of the sympathized passion, which alone is capable of giving "a double tendency of the passions". "A strong impression, when communicated, gives a double tendency of the passions; which is related to benevolence and love by a similarity of direction; however painful the first impression might have been." (op.cit.,p.307) So take such a view as Mercer does is unduly narrow and could be held only at the cost of ignoring Hume's intentions. Extensive sympathy could be said to be compatible with hatred or indifference only if Hume's view that the "same object causes contrary passions according to its different degrees" (ibid) were shown to be false, and surely Mercer does not undertake any such task. Sympathy with a weak painful impression can give rise to hatred by "the resemblance of sensations". The distinction between similarity of direction and resemblance of sensations among passions is overlooked by Mercer. Sympathy as such could certainly be compatible with contrary passions, since it is only a non-committal awareness of others' feelings. But extensive sympathy, conceived as a unique phenomenon based upon a greater intensity of communicated feelings, is in the first place cannot have the sympathizing subject indifferent to the fortune of the

other persons and by a 'similarity of direction' leads to specific other-directed passions of practical concern. However extensive sympathy be related to benevolence, that there is a natural connexion between the two is borne out by Hume at least in one context. Our sympathy with "our relations and acquaintance" as with others in general is aided by imagination and custom. In the former case, irrespective of their fortune, ill or well, we feel concerned in sympathizing with their feelings, and "this correspondence of sentiments is the natural attendant of love, it readily produces that affection" (ibid., p.389, italics not in the text). This case, as it is put by Hume, goes to show that even to assert that sympathy and benevolence are attached by a natural and original quality would not require Hume to "revise" his whole psychology of the passions as Norcor (op.cit.,p.42) would like us to think.

The attitude of the sympathizing agent functions in a two-fold manner. "When we observe a person in misfortune, we are affected with pity and love; but the author of that misfortune becomes the object of our strongest hatred, and is more detested in proportion to the degree of our compassion" (ibid.,p.389). The "author of the misfortune" of the person we sympathize with becomes an object of our hatred because he "bears a relation...to the misfortune". The passion of pity, in this case, gives rise to two contrary passions: love of the person pitied and hatred of the "author" of his misfortune. This is possible because the sensation of the passion of pity makes us interested, on the one hand, in the welfare of the sufferer, and on the other, hate him who has caused the pitied

person to suffer. Hume holds that pity is a passion that arises "from the imagination, according to the light, in which it places its object" (ibid.,p.381). Accordingly, there is "a mixture of love or tenderness with pity", and in so far as it is "an uneasiness", in the case of sympathy, it produces hatred for the cause of that uneasiness. It is the situations of the persons considered and the relation in which they stand to the feeling of uneasiness that determine the identical sensation to produce contrary passions in the sympathising agent.

There are aspects of our emotional life which cannot be explained by sympathy. For example, why does one feel "a joy from the grief of others" or is actuated by the desire of misery and aversion others' happiness. In fact, malice is as much a natural passion as pity and benevolence. If sympathy be the "animating principle" of the latter, how are we to account for such passions are envy or malice? For this specific purpose Hume appeals to "an original quality of the soul" (ibid.,p.372) called comparison. He mentions that "in their sentiments and opinions" men "always judge more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value". It is a fact of our emotional life that "Every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it; a great object with a great emotion, a small object with a small emotion. A great object, therefore, succeeding a small one makes a great emotion succeed a small one" (ibid.,p.374). This inter-relation of objects and emotions is in part derived from Hume's causal explanation of the generation of passions. Since emotions are apporpor-

tioned to the magnitude of the objects, there is expected to be a concomitant relation between the variative of the intensity of the passions and the magnitude of the objects. But this may not always happen, because "comparison" says Hume, "may change the emotion without changing anything in the object" (ibid.,p.374). Objects of passions appear greater or less by a comparison with others. From the principle of comparison the anti-social passions like malice and envy are derived. One feels envy or malice towards others according he compares his own happiness or misery with theirs. One's idea of one's happiness or misery is thrown into higher relief or gets enlivened only when it is compared with the happiness or misery of others. Hume explains the operation of the principle of comparison as follows: "as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others, we must make an estimate of our own, and feel a consequent pain or pleasure. The misery of another gives us a more lively idea of our happiness, and his happiness of our misery. The former, therefore, produces delight, and the latter uneasiness" (ibid.,p.375).

One characteristic feature of comparison is that it makes possible to experience severed or contrary sensations, pleasure from uneasiness, uneasiness from pleasure. The feeling of contrary sensation need not be always occasioned by comparing one's state of affairs with those of others. It may be occasioned by one's own past or future pleasures or pains. Hume invites, "the prospect of past pain is agreeable, when we are satisfy'd with our present condition; as on the other hand our past pleasures give us uneasiness,

when we enjoy nothing at present equal to them" (ibid.,p.376). Considered in this light, comparison involves both symmetrical and reflexive relations, where as sympathy involves, necessarily, symmetrical and transitive relations.

Let us now see how does Hume explain the passions of envy and malice by the principle of comparison. He says that "envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own...malice is the unprovok'd desire of producing evil to another, in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison" (ibid.,p.377). We need not go into the details of Hume's analysis of envy. What is important is that the relations of resemblance and proximity help producing a relation of ideas in comparison, and a consequent relation in impressions. The source of enlivening is the idea of self, which is augmented by the process of comparison. The chief difference between the principles of sympathy and comparison is that in the case of the latter the process is more conscious than the former, which Hume conceives as almost involuntary. Again, though both in sympathy and in comparison it is the other person who is the object of our passions, the relations involved in the operation of them, except for resemblance, are utterly diverse. There is, in comparison, no inferential movement from one's idea of another's passion to the feeling of the passion itself, though comparison results in producing passions with conative propensities. Malice, for example, is highly conative feeling: "the unprovok'd desire of producing to another" (ibid.,p.377, italics not in the text). But there seems to be some

difference between the conation related to sympathy and those with comparison. It is well known that Hume distinguishes between desire and its end. In the case of the other-directed passions like love and hatred we have a cause which excites the passions and an object to which they are directed. The cause of love and hatred are the direct passions of pleasure and pain, and their object is invariably some person or "thinking being" other than our own self. Love and hatred are passions, distinguished from pride and humility, by their dispositional properties or conations, i.e., desire to produce happiness or misery for the person loved or hated, as the case may be. Desire is a passion for good not presently enjoyed, and aversion is one for the removal of evils. This fact points to the inter-relation that exists between the direct and the indirect passions: "indirect passions...give in their turn additional force to the direct passions, and encrease our desire and aversion to the object". (ibid.,p.439) This statement, an unqualified one, should be interpreted as true of conative indirect passions only. Certainly, "pure emotions" likewise to lead to desire. In fact Hume's own example of pride, an indirect passion, leading to "the impressions of volition and desire" would mend his basic view of "pure emotions" and those that lead to special dispositions. However, besides the cause and the object, there is the end as another component of the passions. The end is that which the passions endeavour to attain, and hence the dispositional account of love[1] as

1. "...love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable, but the same." Treatise, p.367.

a desire for the happiness of the person loved and an aversion to his misery. Now turning to malice, we find that the end and the desire are not identical. The malicious agent desires to produce evil to others "in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison" (ibid.,p.377, italics not in the text). The feeling of malice is due to comparison, and to be malicious is to desire evil of another, and the process does not end at that, there is a motive, a further end, the enjoyment from comparison. Perhaps, in sympathy, when the passions like pity, benevolence and love arise in consequence, no such further end seems to be in view, except the sensations. Ardal remarks when Hume distinguishes between a desire and its end "there is no suggestion that the end of this desire is not the ultimate end of the desire, or that it can be further analysed" (op.cit.,p.73). Obviously, in the case of malice as a desire the end is further analysable. If the motive were not "to reap a pleasure from the comparison" the end of the desire, i.e., producing evil to another, would not have been sought.

The question next arises: how are the two principles of human mind, comparison and sympathy, related? Hume says that "comparison is directly contrary to sympathy in its operation" (ibid.,p.593). 'Sympathy' seems to sympathize with the feelings of <u>others</u> and 'comparison' is always comparison with <u>ourselves</u>. In spite of the "close and intimate...correspondence of human souls"(ibid.,p.592) comparison takes place "on all occasions" and "mixes with most of our passions" (ibid.,p.593). How are we then to decide which of the two principles would govern our emotional life? One answer,

says Hume, is to be found in "the particular temper of the person, for the prevalence of the one or the other" (ibid.,p.594). Surely it may be case, but in view of the mighty influence sympathy is said to have on human nature, personal temper appears weak enough for the decision. Another answer, and a better one, is suggested by Hume, and in this connexion he gives the famous analogy of the man at peril in sea. The epistemological point that emerges from the analogy may be stated as follows. When an idea is less vivid then comparison ceases to operate, and when it acquires greater intensity it makes us sympathetic. "Sympathy being the conversion of an idea into an impression, demands a greater force and vivacity in the idea than is requisite to comparison" (ibid.,p.595). All this is perfectly consistent, but doubts linger on as to the involuntary nature of sympathy emphasized by Hume. Shall we then say that we are operated upon by sympathy only if an iden acquires sufficient vivacity for its conversion into an impression? In any case both sympathy and comparison appear conditional upon the degree of vivacity of the ideas concerned, and this conditional nature of sympathy and comparison as regards their prevalence goes to impair their status as principles of human nature.

Sympathy and comparison are said to be contrary to one another in operation. Can there be no point of concurrence between the principles? Hume says that it is possible to bear malice against oneself and one's present fortune, "and carry it so far as designedly to seek affliction and encrease [one's] pains and sorrows" (ibid.,p.376). Hume calls such an affair of disposition "irregular

appetite for evil". What is important for our purpose is the example that he gives. An extension of malice against oneself may be undertaken "upon the distress and misfortune of a friend, or person dear to him" (ibid.). Now, the distress of a friend or an endeared person can be known by sympathy, and in consequence, with a desire to lessen his distress I may court discomfort and poverty, lest he might feel more distressed by comparing his state of affairs with mine. Patriots often go for voluntary poverty. In such cases as these it is difficult to decide whether the practical concern is due to sympathy or to comparison, or both. And if this is true, the relation of contrariety between sympathy and comparison ceases to be weakened.

Both sympathy and comparison, despite their contrary operations are subject to general rules. The concept of general rules is important in the Treatise and in the Enquiry. What does Hume really mean by general rules?

A rule is a prescriptive linguistic expression, and at times a rule may have deberiptive force as well. The prescriptive nature of rules is all too familiar, though the descriptive aspect of rule is what is often lost sight of. It is with both these aspects of rule that Hume speaks of in the Treatise. When, for example, he says, "our adherence to general rules...has a mighty influence on the actions and understanding" (ibid.,p.374) he does not of course mean to indicate way in which our actions and understanding ~~is~~ should operate, rather the way our actions and understanding do actually operate. Again, the conflict of imagination

and judgment is resolved by him into the conflict of two sorts of general rules. What he calls "the more general and authentic operations of the understanding" (ibid.,p.150) involves general rules of the prescriptive sort, and "wise men" follow it. Now having distinguished two sorts of general rules, we may say that Hume's moral psychology being primarily a descriptive study, the general rules he speaks of or refers to in Book II of the Treatise are mostly of the descriptive sort, they are rules of the mind and not, to borrow a phrase from Descartes, rules for the direction of the mind.[1]

One of the effects of custom on the imagination is the formation of rules of a certain sort. By 'general rule' Hume means a generalising propensity of the imagination which extends the scope of judgments or opinions to a new set of conditions. In our causal thinking 'general rules' are involved in this sense of the term. The propensity of the imagination to generalise is governed largely by the degree of resemblance of the conditions, though not solely dependent on it. A general rule, for Hume, is an imaginative propensity. The imagination and the passions, we have already noticed, are intimately related, and it is no wonder that the passions will be subject to the generalising propensities of the imagination. The modus operandi of the general rules in the generation of passions is similar to that of in the formation of belief. "Custom readily

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1. Stuart Hampshire thinks that Hume lacks any distinction between rules to which any thinking must conform and mere habits and uniformities in our thought and behaviour. See David Hume, ed. D.F. Pears, p.3. This is challenged in T.L.Hearn's paper in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol VIII,1970. For us a settlement of this issue is not imperative.

carries us beyond the just bounds in our passions, as well as in our reasonings"(Ibid.,p.293). This is said of the descriptive general rules. A little below the passage Hume refers to the general rules of the prescriptive sort which guide us in preferring one passion to another: they "guide us, by means of general established maxims, in the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another"(ibid.,p.294). General rules as they do have an influence over the passions are then of two sorts, one "carries us beyond our just bounds" and the other sort "guides" us "in the proportions we ought to observe". General rule, in both its descriptive and prescriptive aspects governs sympathy. In the descriptive aspect a general rule influences the imagination and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passions of others, even though we are presented with only the signs of the passion. In other words, a general rule as a propensity of the imagination functions in a supplementative fashion, just as it does in generating belief. The prescriptive aspect of general rules serves as a corrective of the variability of sympathy. In asmuch as sympathy depends upon relations it is variable, and if sympathy is to become a source of moral sentiments, it must remain steady and overcome its variableness. General rule corrects the variations in our sympathies and so give steadiness to our sentiments of morals. "In order...to.. arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view; and always, in our thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation"(ibid.,p. 581-2). As regards comparison, the general rules hold only in their

descriptive operation. Having been given in the past constant conjunction of two objects, the mind customarily expects the one when the other is presented. The influence of general rules is described by Hume in the following terms: "we naturally fly to the conception of the second [on being given the first] and form an idea of it in as lively and strong a manner, as if we had infer'd its existence by the justest and most authentic conclusion of our understanding"(ibid.,p.374). The general rules condition a fact of our mental life that there happen to be a correspondence or concomitant variation in the intensity of emotions and the magnitude of objects. This correspondence is presupposed by the principle of comparison which, in effect, changes the emotion "without changing any thing in the object". From the account of the dominion of general rules over the two principles of sympathy and comparison, it is, by now obvious, that general rules govern comparison in an indirect way than it does sympathy. In the former case, the general rule hold in both of its aspects, though in the latter, the question of prescriptive role of general rules does not arise at all. But could we not suggest that Hume's second example of "irregular appetite for evil", i.e., "When a criminal reflects on the punishment he deserves, the idea of it is magnify'd by a comparison with his present ease and satisfaction; which forces him, in a manner, to seek uneasiness, in order to avoid so disagreeable a contrast"(ibid.,pp.376-7) is a remote case of the prescriptive aspect of the general rules, because a notion of ought is involved in the comparative process undertaken by the criminal. He,in fact,

reverts back to a correspondence of emotion and object. I am not sure of this suggestion, but it does seem worth considering.

One of the remarkable features of Hume's account of sympathy is that its end-product is an interest in the welfare of the other person. Since sympathy is a principle of human nature, in that respect an interest in human welfare is an aspect of human existence. If that sounds to be a taller claim, it could be put in milder terms, that is to say, constituted as we are, we can never become absolutely indifferent to the happiness and misery of other human beings. In the Enquiry, Hume speaks of "a warm concern for the interests of our species" (p.225). It is interesting to note that even Kant, who ordinarily held that the facts about human nature do not suffice to determine man's duty, admitted that an interest in the happiness of others can be a part of our nature, and such an interest is present in at least some men as a sympathetic disposition: "We have an instinct to benevolence, but not an instinct to righteousness" (Lectures on Ethics, p.194). Though in the Critique of Practical Reason(152,157) Kant mentions sympathy as 'burdensome' when precedes the consideration of what is duty, the anti-feeling crusade was not altogether there in such pre-critical works of his like the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime; and we across him in that work deciding in favour of feeling as the source of moral ideas as much as in the manner of some of British moralists whose legacy Hume in fact inherited. In the Metaphysic of Morals Kant derives the duty of sympathy because it is "one of the impulses which nature has implanted in us so that we may do what the thought of duty alone would not accomplish" (126).

these are perhaps the [illegible] passages in [illegible], just as there are [illegible] passages in [illegible].