

WITTGENSTEIN ON MEANING OF LIFE

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Abstract

*The key contention of this paper is to explain the concept of the higher value and its role in realizing the meaning of life after Wittgenstein. Concerning value, Wittgenstein does not hold the position of classical ethicist; instead, he understands ethics based on the linguistic and logical analysis of the world. It is a debatable question about what type of book *Tractatus* is. Some would say that it is a book of logic. Others would say it is a book of ethics and religion, etc. However, such opinions regarding the book show its multifarious philosophical dimensions. This paper consciously tries to determine the profound significance of the concept of higher value (mystical). At the outset, Wittgenstein does not show his concern concerning ethical and religious values; rather, he is concerned with determining the sense of the world or reality through the language-reality relationship. However, it doesn't provide him with intellectual and philosophical satisfaction. Therefore, he turns his mind towards the limits of language and the world, which takes him into a realm of nonsense and mysticism. It also helps him realize higher values (mystical) and allows him to determine the meaning of life and the world. This also takes him to a certain ineffable truth about which he possesses silence. For him, ethics, aesthetics, and religion pertaining to value are interconnected as they are concerned with the same view about the world as *sub specie aeternitatis*. Wittgenstein distinguishes between absolute value and relative value. What is relative is accidental and related to the factual world. On the other hand, what is absolute is non-accidental lies beyond the limits of language and the world. Thus, what is non-accidental is transcendental. As it is transcendental, it is inexpressible. Thus, for Wittgenstein, value is deeply connected with happiness, i.e., the meaning of life and the world. Hence, the paper makes a conscious effort to show the philosophical significance of the concept of higher value by employing linguistic and logical analysis of the world and how it is deeply connected to the meaning of life and the world.*

Keywords: *Inexpressibility, value, absolute, transcendental, ethics, aesthetics, religion, meaning of life, accidental*

Introduction:

There is controversy among the philosophers regarding what type of book *Tractatus* is. Some philosophers believe that *Tractatus* is the book of logic and language, so they call it the treatise on language and logic. The reason is that *Tractatus*

impresses different philosophers like Logical Positivists, Russell, Moore, Anscombe, Stenius, Pitcher, and many others. The impression is made possible by applying language and logic, which is considered a powerful tool of analytic philosophy. On the other hand, other philosophers interpret the book as ethical and religious due to its deep ethical and religious significance. However, Wittgenstein considers the book ethical in his letter to his friend Ludwig von Ficker. He further writes, "I have divided my work into two parts. I put everything in detail regarding the first one, but I avoided writing about the second part, which is the most significant one. He again says I have adequately put the whole thing by remaining silent about it."¹ Therefore, the above remark says that Wittgenstein recognized the later part of the book as important as it is concerned with ethics, religion, and, thereby, value. In this regard, C. Barrett rightly observed, "It is not primarily a work on logic and language; rather, it is an ethical book."²

Logic and Value:

However, if the book's purpose is ethical for Wittgenstein, then the question is, how does Wittgenstein shift himself from logic to ethics and religion, which pertain to value? In reply, we can say that Wittgenstein, at the outset, took logic as the primary tool of the *Tractatus* because we know that the totality of facts is the world and logic draws the limits of the factual world as logic constitutes the structure of the world (my world). Thus, based on the limits of language and a logically constructed world, one can cross the boundaries of the factual domain and feel *das mystische*, a mystical (inexpressible) feeling that bears higher value. In other words, this ascertainment of the totality of facts is very important to transcend the factual domain to realize the temperament of the *Mystical*. Thus, logic helps the mystic transcend this logical space to understand what lies outside of the limits and where the value lies. That is why, in this regard, Wittgenstein says, "Ethics contain value...is to be considered as a condition of the world like logic."³ Therefore, mystics only have language for the factual world but not for the religious and ethical domains. So, for Wittgenstein, if a mystic wants to say something, he must either say it within factual discourse or remain silent. This is to be considered the best possible means to give dignity to the discourses of ethics and religion and thereby value that is higher. Therefore, we can say that Wittgenstein starts the book *Tractatus* based on the linguistic and logical analysis of the world and then takes it towards the realm of ethical and religious value. Therefore, Wittgenstein

¹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 'Letter to Ludwig von Ficker'.

² Barrett, C., *Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, p. 96.

³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks 1914-16*, G. H. Von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe (ed.), G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), New York, Harper and Row, 1961, p. 77e.

suggests that we must remain silent regarding the things that contain higher values that really matter in our lives.

Wittgenstein on Inexpressibility of Value:

The inexpressibility of value in Wittgenstein's philosophy arises through the limits of language and world. He understands the notion of value from ethical, and religious perspectives. That is why Barrett says, "Wittgenstein possesses great interest in values, and whether ethical, religious, or aesthetic was not incidental to his thinking but central to it."⁴ His ideas on value are found in his writings, such as *Lectures on Ethics*, *Lectures on Religious Beliefs*, and *Tractatus* and *Culture and Value*. Now the question is, in what sense is the concept of value inexpressible? Wittgenstein is a linguistic philosopher who takes language as the means to know reality (world). For that, he developed the idea of 'my language and my world' to determine the sense of the world. That is why Wittgenstein says in *Tractatus*, "*The limits of my language imply the limits of my world.*"⁵ The remark says that Wittgenstein admits two sides (inside the world, i.e., my language and my world) and outside or another side of the world by drawing the boundary of it. Here, the term my language means Wittgenstein's understanding of propositional language, and my world covers the totality of facts. For Wittgenstein, everything can be spoken in terms of true and false within the boundary of the factual world, i.e., my world. True and false are the two senses of a proposition, also known as *bipolarity* or *ab-function*. Here, 'a' stands for 'truth pole' and 'b' stands for 'false pole'. Therefore, with the help of *ab-pole*, a proposition appears as *a-p-b*. This is called *ab-function* or bipolarity.

Now, the question may arise: what about the other side (i.e., outside my language and my world) of the world? According to Wittgenstein, the other side of his language and world cannot be put into language; hence, it is beyond truth and falsity. So, it is considered as ineffable. Therefore, any attempt to put them into language results in nonsense. What is nonsense is non-truth functional because it lacks factual sense. Nonsense, for Wittgenstein, is not unimportant or un-illuminating; instead, nonsense is important or illuminating. That means he understands nonsense as important or illuminating nonsense. Therefore, nonsense is significant to Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein understands ethics and religion as nonfactual value concepts that are called nonsensical. They are nonsensical as they belong outside my language and my world. They are not plain or unimportant nonsense; they are important nonsense. The pertinent question is, in what sense are they called important or illuminating

⁴ Barrett, Cyril, Op. cit., P. ix.

⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (trans.), London, Newyork, Routledge Classics, 2001, p. 68.

nonsense? Or, how can that which is nonsensical also be important? According to Wittgenstein, ethics and religion are value concepts that have something in them that differentiates them from mere or plain nonsense. They deal with absolute value, i.e., an important discourse of human life. Ethics and religion, as illuminating nonsense, play significant roles in realizing the meaning of life. They help to lead a good life. They help to lead a happy life. They determine the eternal value of the world by way of determining the eternal value of life. That is why Wittgenstein says they are important or illuminating nonsense. Wittgenstein intends to protect ethics, religion, and aesthetics from intellectualism or philosophical theories, calling them nonsense (important). This would be the best way to provide dignity to the discourses of ethics and religion, thereby valuing them as illuminating nonsense. Therefore, regarding such discourse, one should remain silent. Wittgenstein says, "Propositions fail to express anything concerning the higher."⁶ For Wittgenstein, what gives us the meaning of life, or happy life, are values of ethics and religion, which are illuminating, nonfactual, transcendental, and consequently inexpressible. That is why, concerning the inexpressibility of value, Wittgenstein says those who still try to speak or put in writing regarding ethics, religion, and thereby value have to go against the realm of language.

Does it lead us to assume that what is ineffable in Wittgenstein's sense is ambiguous? I think that Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians cognize the term ineffable with a background. What then is the background? Wittgenstein clearly specified what he meant by *the limits of language* and *the limits of the world*. So when he used the terms ineffable and nonsense, he used them with regard to sense, i.e. with the background of something cognized "to be the case" and "not to be the case". So I think that even though the term ineffable is ambiguous in a sense, we can get the sense of ambiguity in terms of other than sense. As far as the discourse of ineffability is concerned, how do we know that what is ineffable is divine, good, bad, or evil? Under the term ineffable, Wittgenstein includes ethics in particular and then makes it on par with religion and aesthetics. Of, course, ethics, religion, and aesthetics are integral parts of our lives, and the meaning of life cannot be determined by forgoing these. Perhaps that was the hidden reason for which Wittgenstein attributed these as important or illuminating nonsense. However, being a linguistic philosopher, Wittgenstein envisaged everything in language. That is why he was talking in favor of the grammar of language. So, to find out the answer to the question of whether what is ineffable is divine or good or bad or evil would be secondary at this juncture; rather, I intend to say that these are integral parts of language reflected and touch our steam of life.

⁶ Ibid., p. 86.

Value as Transcendental:

According to Wittgenstein's ethics, religion contains transcendental value. The question is, in what sense is value (ethics, religion) transcendental? Value (higher), for Wittgenstein, is considered as the real sense of the world, which lies beyond the world and is, hence, non-accidental. What lies inside the factual world is limited in space and time and, hence, is accidental. Therefore, it means that as value lies outside the world, so they transcend the world and are so-called transcendental. To me, Wittgenstein speaks about the transcendental of value almost in a Kantian manner. Kant says that we cannot know about the noumena or things-in-themselves, such as God, soul, immortality, etc., because what lies in the noumenal world is outside the factual world. Therefore, for Kant, transcendental transcends the categories that work as a medium to make the world intelligible. Likewise, Wittgenstein's understandings of the transcendental go outside the limits of language and world, hence being inexpressible. Therefore, Wittgenstein regards ethics and religious values as transcendental. Therefore, Wittgenstein accepts the absolutist's position of transcendence. That is why Prof. K.L. Das rightly said, "Just as Kant famously found it necessary to deny knowledge to make room for faith, similarly Wittgenstein draws a limit to what can be spoken to give respect the awesome power of the mystical bearer of higher value."⁷ For that, he distinguishes between saying and showing in *Tractatus*. He says what can be said can be said clearly in language, and what cannot be said in language can be shown. Namely, mystical contains a higher value that can only be shown, not said. It is to be shown in the way of living in which one lives one's life. Thus, ethics and religion as value concepts cannot be put into words, but still, they are worthy, not of ridicule but of the deepest respect. Similarly, Barrett writes, "They are nonsensical but in a special sense."⁸ Thus, Wittgenstein understands value as illuminating (important) nonsense that works like a ladder to reach enlightenment. In this regard, Wittgenstein perhaps said, "Ethics and religion do not only mean an inquiry into what is good, but it also includes the inquiry into what is really valuable or important. It is an inquiry into the meaning of life. Ethics and religion, therefore, play a significant role in the right way of living, which makes life worth living,"⁹ Thus, the remark says that Wittgenstein understands value as inexpressible, illuminating, and transcendental. Therefore, for Wittgenstein, the matter of value is inexpressible. In this regard, it has been said that "Wittgenstein does not abandon his view on ethical, religious beliefs

⁷ Das, K. L., Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Silence, *Manavayatan*, Vol. VIII, No. 1. 2019, P. 205.

⁸ Barrett, Cyril, Op. cit., p. 22.

⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Lectures on Ethics, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. 74, No. 1. 1965, p. 5.

with their attendant notions of the mystical, transcendental, inexpressible, viewing *sub specie aeternitatis*.”¹⁰

Two types of Values:

Wittgenstein distinguishes between Absolute value and Relative value in his Lectures on Ethics. Relative value concerns the factual world and relates to relative good, right, and so on. Therefore, what is called relative value is not considered ethical as it is accidental, instrumental, and cognitive in nature. So, that which is ethical and religious is absolute in nature, henceforth concerned with higher (absolute) value. Wittgenstein understands value as absolute or in a higher sense. In this regard, he gives three examples which bear absolute value. These are wondering or astonishment regarding the existence of the world, the feeling of being absolutely safe, and the feeling of guilt.

Wittgenstein confirms *wonderment regarding the existence of the world* in his book *Tractatus* by saying, “To see the world given *sub specie aeternitatis* means to understand it as a whole...”¹¹ In support of the above remark, Wittgenstein says in *Notebooks*, “The work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. The usual way of looking at things is to see objects from the midst of them; the view *sub specie aeternitatis from outside*. In such a way that they have the whole world as background. The thing seen *sub specie aeternitatis* is the thing seen together with the whole logical space.”¹² The remark says that it is an experience of amazement, astonishment, and a feeling of wonder concerning the world’s existence. It is so because viewing the world in terms of *sub specie aeternitatis* means viewing it from outside space and time, which is the view of the world from an eternal, absolute perspective. Hence, such experience of the world in view of *sub specie aeternitatis* is called ‘mystical’ and ‘marvel’ in *Notebooks*, and Anscombe translates it as a *miracle*. Second, Wittgenstein delivered lectures on ethics in 1929 at Cambridge, where he speaks about an experience of higher value, i.e., the *feeling of absolute safety*, which means we are in the safe hands of God (Mystical). Wittgenstein further says in his LE that “it is considered as the state of mind where one may feel completely safe. He feels safe because, in such a state of mind, one feels that no one can injure him, no matter what happens.”¹³ This feeling of being absolutely safe is beyond language, or any attempt to put them into language is futile. But we cannot deny the feeling of absolute safety that Wittgenstein had experienced while watching

¹⁰ Barrett, Cyril, Op. cit., p. xiii.

¹¹ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Op. cit., p. 88.

¹² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks*, Op. cit., p. 83e.

¹³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures on Ethics*, Op. cit., p. 5.

the play *Die Kreuzelschreiber*. Concerning the third one, i.e., the *feeling of guilt*, Wittgenstein says it is very similar to the notion of absolutely safe and wonderment regarding the existence of the world. “The feeling of guilt makes sense; it is a feeling regarding one’s own mistakes and sins. However, it does not make any sense to say that one is in a permanent state of guilt without being guilty of anything.”¹⁴ In the words of Cyril Barrett, the above two types of feelings are related to absolute value and are as common as ethical and religious beliefs. It is further said that the feeling of guilt cannot be described in language as without being guilty, the feeling of guilt is considered a contradictory feeling. It is a feeling that lies beyond the boundaries of language. It is that feeling that every religious person has taken as a distinctive mark in their life. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, “People are religious to the extent that they believe themselves to be not so much *imperfect*, as sick. Any halfway decent man will think himself extremely imperfect, but a religious man thinks himself *wretched*.”¹⁵ Regarding the above remark, Cyril Barrett says that every religious person should remain humble. They should feel as if they are imperfect. He says that Wittgenstein interprets guilt as a mystical feeling, which helps us realize that we all are insignificant without having an inferiority complex. Hence, all these experiences have transcendental bearings. Thus, the absolute sense is also considered as ethical and religious. On the contrary, the relative sense, which is also known as the trivial sense, is accidental, as the language of *my world* determines it and, therefore, lies in the domain of facts. In this regard, Wittgenstein says in his Lectures on Ethics, “Every judgment of relative value is a mere statement of facts and therefore be put in such a form that it loses all the appearance of the judgment of value. He goes on to say that even though all judgments of relative value can be revealed to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be a judgment of absolute or higher value. This means that what we can express in terms of facts and evidence cannot have any ethical value.”¹⁶ Therefore, as facts constitute the world, the world is accidental and thus concerned with relative value.

Therefore, from the above discussion, we can say that by the term value, Wittgenstein actually means the higher or absolute value is beyond language and, therefore, lies beyond the world. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, “If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the

¹⁴ Pandey, K. C., *Religious Beliefs, Superstitions and Wittgenstein*, New Delhi, Readworthy, 2009, p. 100.

¹⁵ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, (ed.) by G.H. Von Wright and Heikki Nymnan, Oxford, Blackwell, 1980, p. 45e.

¹⁶ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Lectures and Ethics*, Op. cit., p. 5.

case. This is so because all that happens and is the case is accidental in nature.”¹⁷ That is why, for Wittgenstein, a judgment with absolute value lies in the fact that they are inexpressible. This inexplicability is their very essence. Concerning absolute or higher value, Wittgenstein writes, “The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world, everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it, no value exists; if it did exist, it would have no value...It must lie outside the world.”¹⁸ The nonsensicality is the essence of ethical values. So, making them sensible means they cease to be ethical or absolute. Any explanation about them is against domain of meaningful language and is a mistake in the ethical and absolute sense. For that, Wittgenstein writes in his Lectures on Ethics that ethics emerges out of our urge towards the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute value or good, which has no relation to science. Thus, for Wittgenstein, the realm of value has a higher or transcendental level, i.e., beyond the matters of fact. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s notion of value can be understood as man’s divine heritage.

The happy life or meaning of life:

After discussing the conception of value following Wittgenstein, I would like to show how higher value solves the problems of life and helps to live a happy or meaningful life. Now, the pertinent question is how to be happy. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein talks about our life’s problems; once they vanish, there will be no problem at all, and life will be meaningful and happy. So, our problems have to be solved to make our lives happy and meaningful. The solution to the problem of life and Wittgenstein’s conception of happiness or meaning of life is deeply rooted in the mystical observation of the world in the form of *sub specie aeterni*. This is the view of the world from the exterior of space and time, hence meaningful. So viewing the world as *sub specie aeternitatis* means understanding that within the world, no value exists. Therefore, finding the meaning of life inside *my world*, i.e., factual and accidental, would be completely meaningless and valueless.

That’s why Wittgenstein says that without changing anything in the world, we have to change its limits to make a completely different world. In this regard, it is said that “viewing the world in the form of *sub specie aeternitatis* changes its limits in a significant way, and thereby, the world turns to an absolutely joyful and meaningful world as a whole.”¹⁹ Therefore, the solution to life’s problems lies in the right view of the world, and thereby our life appears meaningful and happy. Understanding the world

¹⁷ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Op. cit., p. 86.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁹ Jairhurst, Jordi, The Early Wittgenstein on Living a Good Ethical Life, *Philosophis*, vol. 50, 2022, p. 1763.

under the aspects of eternity is considered a good exercise of the will that leads to living a happy or meaningful life. Therefore, the good exercise of the will is known as ethical will. In this regard, Wittgenstein says, “If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts-not what can be expressed by means of language. In short, the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.”²⁰ Such an understanding of the world is to apprehend it as timelessness. Living in timelessness is possible by living in the present, which makes seeing the world as *sub specie aeternitatis* possible. Such an exercise of the ethical will towards the world and life is the solution to the problems of life. Therefore, once the problem is solved, life becomes happy and meaningful. In this regard, it has been said that “A happy world must be an ethical and valuable world, and a happy life is an ethically meaningful and valuable life, i.e., a good ethical life.”²¹ On the contrary, the wrong exercise of the will leads to an unhappy life due to a lack of the right view of the world. So, for him, the world and life become unhappy and meaningless. That is why, in this regard, Wittgenstein rightly said, “The happy man’s world is a different one from that of the unhappy man.”²²

Therefore, the realisation of the mystical means having the feeling of *das mystiche*, which is an inexpressible feeling. It means that mystical is the sense of the world, bearer of absolute value. That is why Wittgenstein says in 6.41 of *Tractatus*, “The sense of the world must lie outside of the world.”²³ He further says, “Indeed, there are things, but putting them into language is totally impossible. However, they make themselves manifest and are known as mystical.”²⁴ Therefore, here, Wittgenstein suggests that to get the happiness or meaning of life we have to look not inside the world but outside of it. That means he is directing us towards the mystical. That is why Wittgenstein in 6.44 further says it is not how things are in the world that is mystical but that it exists. In this regard, perhaps Wittgenstein rightly said, “One cannot find the way out of the riddle of life within the space and time but outside of it.”²⁵ Wittgenstein further says the world and life are one, which means living in eternity and overcoming life’s problems. It also helps to adopt the alien will on which we appear dependent. That is why it is said that “specifically it lies in our ability to renounce influence on the

²⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Op. cit., p. 87.

²¹ Jairhurst, Jordi, Op. cit., p. 1763.

²² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Op. cit., p. 87.

²³ Ibid., p. 86.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 89.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 87.

world and align our phenomenal will with the alien will on which we appear dependent.”²⁶

Conclusion:

It thus reflects from the aforesaid discussion that Wittgenstein’s concept of value is indifferent to higher values of life. He says that value lacks temporal existence, meaning it belongs in the transcendental realm because that which is absolute or higher is lofty and eternal. Thus, it has to be taken as the eternal reality. This eternal reality is the basis of happiness or the meaning of life. Instead of talking regarding our ethical, religious life, Wittgenstein maintains silence in his early philosophy because they are transcendental. In this regard, I want to say that Wittgenstein’s concept of value has an affinity with the notion of value in Advaita Vedanta. To clarify this point, Rajendra Prasad remarks, “It has to be assumed that an accidental thing cannot bear an absolute value. Wittgenstein is not alone; Advaita Vedanta also favours this. He further said that there are metaphysicians who are of the view that that which is accidental, impermanent, and contingent lacks absolute value. This seems to be thinking behind the Advaita Vedanta claim that *Brahman* alone, being unbeatable in the past, present, and future, i.e., *trikalabadhita*, is the *absolute value*.”²⁷ It means that according to the Advaitin view of value, like Wittgenstein, lies at the transcendental level. That is why Wittgenstein rightly pointed out that *Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language... and this running up against the limits of language is ethics*. This is so because a proposition can only express what is accidental, i.e., matters of fact. Hence, in the words of R. K. S. Choudhary, “Like Advaita Vedanta, Wittgenstein’s ethics is not primarily concerned with means value, but with the end value. From an axiological point of view, both are in favour of the theory of intrinsic value and equally against utilitarian and pragmatic theories of value.”²⁸ Therefore, regarding the ineffability of value, Wittgenstein shows a metaphysical matrix of value in light of Advaita Vedanta. In this regard, it has been said that “the fundamental idea between reality and value is that all things are dear after all for the sake of the self, i.e., *atmanastu kamaya*.”²⁹ Likewise, Wittgenstein said, “Things acquire significance only through their relation to my will.”³⁰ Thus, for Wittgenstein and Advaita Vedanta, the metaphysical self (*Atman*) is the bearer of higher value. This leads us to the good and bad exercise of the will. Good exercise of the will leads to the realisation of the higher value. Accordingly,

²⁶ Jairhurst, Jordi, Op. cit., p. 1763.

²⁷ Prasad, Rajendra, On Wittgenstein’s Transcendental Ethics, *JICPR*, vol. No. 1, 1989, p. 4.

²⁸ Choudhary, R. K. S., *Wittgensteinian Philosophy and Advaita Vedanta: A Survey of the Parallels*, New Delhi, D. K. Printworld (P) Ltd, p. 140.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Notebooks*, Op. cit., p. 84e.

a happy life or meaning of life belongs to a good exercise of the will (ethical will), which solves the riddle of life through viewing the world as *sub specie aeterni*. Meanwhile, bad exercise of the will lead to an unhappy life and hence cannot solve the riddle of life due to the inability to view the world as *sub specie aeterni*. Thus, it cannot provide a happy or meaningful life. From this, it can be said that a happy or unhappy life is not to be found in the facts *in* the world; rather, it lies in our ability or inability to have the right ethical view of the world, which can alter the limits of the world in order to have an altogether different world.

Although I attempted a comparative study and brought the meaning of life of Advaita Vedanta, I certainly do not think that the development of the meaning of life of Vedanta is similar to the meaning of life of Wittgenstein. Their philosophical methodologies are not similar. Wittgenstein was a typical linguistic philosopher, but Advaita Vedanta was not. Wittgenstein, while drawing out the paradigm of the meaning of life, emphasized the grammar of language, which is not divine in nature, whereas Advaita Vedanta employed an ontological and metaphysical approach to inculcate the meaning of life. I think the comparison, though not amplified in the Tractarian sense, can be found to be relevant if we go outside the limits of language and the limits of the world Wittgenstein presumed in the *Tractatus*.

The discussion mentioned above thus reflects that the transcendental nature of value shows Wittgenstein's sympathy for the spiritual culture. He intends to share that it would be difficult for civilization to survive without pursuing eternal value. Hence, for Wittgenstein, it is the only culture that can pursue eternal value; civilization lacks eternal value. That is why perhaps Wittgenstein says that civilization is the thing that detaches humankind from what is lofty and eternal. For him, only culture can bring us what is good and valuable in life. That is why, in the words of R. C. Pradhan, it can be said that "only culture can lead us to the values enshrined in the inner life of the civilised man."³¹ The remark says that the essence of a culture is constituted only in eternal value. This is the relation between culture and value. Therefore, I can say that Wittgenstein's sympathy is for the spiritual culture that leads humankind in the right direction.

From the aforesaid discussion, I would like to conclude that Wittgenstein declared *Tractatus* as an ethical book that would possibly be called the book of *theological ethics*. This is because Wittgenstein's philosophy of mystical (mysticism) and his philosophy of silence may be conceived to be early philosophy of religion,

³¹ Pradhan, R. C., Wittgenstein and The Crisis in Modern Civilization, *Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 2000, p. 111.

though he did not mention the word religion. However, by saying the word ethics, Wittgenstein certainly incorporated religion (theology) and aesthetics under ethics. This means that Wittgenstein understands ethics and religion similarly, as both run parallel in *Tractatus* in *in a typical sense*. According to Wittgenstein, religion is concerned with the view *sub specie aeternitatis*, i.e., mystical, which leads to the eternal view of the world. Likewise, he says ethics is something that belongs to action *viewed sub specie aeternitatis*. Thus, Wittgenstein's ethics come close to religion and can be titled theological ethics. That is why D. Z. Phillips says, "In ethics and religion, we are involved in making the absolute judgment of value."³² Other remarks are mentioned in TLP 6. 44, 6.5, 6.521, 6.522, which, I think, clearly speak in favor of theological ethics as such remarks connect mystical and ethics in his *Tractatus*; thus, they go parallel. Another remark from *Culture and Value* proves the same. There, he says, "What is good is divine too. That, strangely enough, sums my ethics."³³ He further says in *Lectures on Ethics* that ethics is something supernatural. Thus, the remarks make the connection between religion and ethics, which gives the test of *theological ethics* to his early philosophy. In the end, I would like to say that the insight of religious mentality was developed in the later part of the *Tractatus* in the name of ethics and values, and it was widely reflected in his later writings.

³² Phillips, D. Z., 'Ethics, Faith and what can be said' in *Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader*, H. J. Glock (ed.), Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2001, p. 348.

³³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, Op. cit., p. 5e.