Action and Freedom

In course of the development of Hume's theory of the passions, culminating in the doctrine of Sympathy, two points call for special notice. They are, one, that Hume makes a gradual shift to, what may be called, a dispositional analysis of the passions on the basis of his view of "the whole bent or tendency" of the passions "from the beginning to the end" and the other, that since the passions are related to their corresponding behavioural signs it is possible to have an inferential awareness of the other person's state of mind. The correspondence between the passions and their manifestation in terms of behavioural signs is based upon the conative quality of the passions themselves. There is a special class of the passions, i.e., the other-directed passions such as love, hatred, malice etc. which are "attended" by certain specific propensities of action or on the part of the feeling agent as a matter of fact. However non-logical the necessity might appear between the passions and their behavioural expressions it cannot be ignored, given the human condition. And though Hume does make a distinction between "pure emotions" and those that call forth special feelings, or he puts it, "immediately exciting us to action" (op.cit., p.357), yet the passions like pride and humility are, strictly speaking, cannot be "completed within themselves"(ibid.). Hume himself speaks of "the port and gait" (ibid., p.326) of swans, peacocks and the turkey, and considers it as "proof" of their pride. However unsatisfactory the examples chosen might be, it is clear that even the so-called "pure emotions" have

their manifestation in behaviour. In the Enquiry Hume explains that he does not use the word 'pride' with its common meaning. By 'pride' he designates "the sentiment of conscious worth, the self-satisfaction proceeding from a review of a man's own conduct and character" (p.314). So even in the case our feelings about ourselves, just as it is about others, are implied the standards of worthiness prevailing in society, and can very well be conceived of as causes of behaviour. The causal relation between the passions and their corresponding behavioural expressions is what is assumed both by the principles of comparison and sympathy. The difference between the two principles lies in that in sympathizing with other's feelings we know his feelings by giving ourselves up to them, where as in comparing we know them in subordination to our own. But in both the cases a special relationship between the passions felt by others and its expression in behaviour-sign is assumed. Moreover, Hume is emphatic in saying that the causes of the passions must "be constant and inherent in him (the other person's) person and character" (op. cit., p.348, italics not in the text) and the pleasure or the uneasiness which produces the passions in we 'proceed' from an 'action' of the other person, who is its "cause and author" (ibid., p.349). The action and the agent, Hume says, are "sufficiently"(ibid) connected. Man's actions exhibit "a particular fore-thought and design" (ibid.). In so far as "the action arise from the person"(ibid.) the passions are not ineffectual stirrings of emotions, they are conatively potent.

Now, given that actions and their agents are there, the question arises are the actions free or determined? This leads us immediately on to an ancient and vexed problem of philosophy. The problem consists in encountering two of our commonsense beliefs in conflict with each other, namely, that all our actions are causes and that man is a responsible agent. The former is the thesis of determinism and the latter that of the libertarians. Determinism places actions due to human agency in a class with events in general and seek to explain actions in causal terms without any reference to human agency or deliberate human intervention or non-intervention in the course of nature. The libertarians, on the other hand, define the concept of action as deliberate human intervention or non-intervention in the course of nature. For them, action is necessarily not an event like eclipse or earthquake, and the term cannot be understood without reference to persons who are responsible agents. Action, for that matter, is human action. It is obvious that both the views, the deterministic and the libertarian, cannot be held together, yet each of them appears plausible when considered severally. Action is an extremely problematical idea and engenders many paradoxes in moral psychology. It would be convenient to take the term as denoting a proper sub-class of behaviour, which, again, covers a rather wide range of phenomena. But 'behaviour' is a natural word to employ for categorising a certain kind of animal movement, and I would like to leave the word unexplained, taking it as basic. A very common kind of human behaviour is called <u>action</u>, and episodes of this kind of behaviour is called <u>acts</u>. We

speak of the magistrate's action, and in this sense 'action' can be taken to signify something done, while 'act' generally signifies a doing. Apart from our locutions about physical transactions involving inanimate objects, actions are spoken of as purposive. Again, 'action' directs our attention to what happens, to the movements made and the results thereof. Then it is something overt. There is a sense in which we speak of mental acts, e.g., trying to remember, say, the French word for 'love'; perhaps we cannot speak of mental actions. An action is not an activity like gardening, walking or teaching, which may be engaged in or cultivated. An act is performed, begun and terminated at specific times. We can and do talk of failure or success of either acts or activities, but perhaps not of actions as such. Actions can be identified as being of certain kinds and described in certain respects. It is not the case that there are no over-lapping of 'action', 'act' and 'activity'. What is important is not to get the notions smudged so as to overlook their differences. However, 'action' as purposive overt behaviour is a sophisticated notion than its cognates. With this rough and ready account of the notion of action, I propose to turn to Hume's view on the matter.

Hume does nowhere say what he means by the term 'action', though it is clear that for him, the term 'action' entails personal agency. Let us take his celebrated example of the acorn destroying the oak by outgrowing it. Now this botanical event is not an action, since the charge of parricide cannot be brought against it. "Actions" says Hume, "may be laudable or blamable"(ibid.,p.498)

and events cannot be so evaluated. Actions "may cause a judgment" (ibid.,p.459) and are in their turn caused by the will, and are thus "signs of motives" (ibid.,p.479). A moral judgment is an evaluation of the motives of the agent via his actions. That our actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of our character is brought home by Hume's interchangeably using "action or character" (ibid., p.469). An action can be an object of moral evaluation only if the agent is morally responsible. Sometimes it is possible to distinguish the notion of moral responsibility from that of causal responsibility. The relation between the two types of responsibility is asymmetrical. If an agent A is morally responsible for his action, he is causally responsible too, but not vice versa. Deaths due to earthquake may be lamented but the natural phenomenon can be in no way be morally responsible for the sorrowful state of affairs. On the contrary, Brutus kills Caesar, and the Roman senator was both morally and causally responsible for the emperor's death. Brutus' causal responsibility lies in the series of bodily movements that he might have had to make, e.g., lifting his hand, holding the dagger, swooping it down and thrusting it into Caesar's skin, etc.; but his moral responsibility consists in his motive. Without further elucidating the distinction between moral and causal responsibilities, we might now say that an event is an action, if and only if, both moral and causal responsibilities for its happening is ascribable to a person. The concept of action co-implies the concept of personal agency. Actions are, for Hume, properly speaking, "actions of the will" (ibid.,p.405).

Let us now move from this brief and roughly stated account of Hume's concept of action to his views about liberty and necessity. The passions, direct and indirect, or the feelings that we have about good and evils, and those about ourselves and others, cause us to act. But what does it mean 'to act'? Or, since all actions are "actions of the will", what is the will? The notion of the will is not elaborately discussed by Hume as one can find in Kant. But he does define the will as a faculty of exertion, and says that it is closely allied to the direct passions like desire and aversion. "Desire arises from good consider'd simply, and aversion is deriv'd from evil. The will exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body" (ibid., p.399). The passage is significant owing to Hume's interchangeable use of "mind or body". The actor or the agent is a person, of whom both the predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics and predicates ascribing states of consciousness respectively, are predicable. Hume is neither a physicalist nor a Cartesian, and for him, persons are neither exclusively bodies as it was with Hobbes, nor are they minds only, as they were with Descartes. Because the concept of a person is identified by both the sorts of predicates it attracts, action and willing are coordinated in the life history of the moral agent. However, the will is not a passion, though it does share some of the characteristics of indirect passions. On page 399 of the Treatise Hume describes the will as one of the "immediate effects of pain and pleasure", and in that sense, we may take the will as a direct passion. Norp Smith upholds this interpretation. But though

Norp Smith does have the textual support in holding the will as a direct passion, Hume's statement is not enough clear. He says, "it [the will] be not comprehended among the passions" (ibid.) and that, as already noted, it is one of the "immediate effects of pain and pleasure". Now a direct passion is, by definition, one that arises in the individual immediately by original impressions. Then what does Hume mean by saying that the will is not a passion? The division of the passions into direct and indirect is in accordance with their origination, and does Hume intend to reserve the term 'passion' for the indirect ones alone? It does appear so, though he does not say anything to that effect. The indirect passions being simple impressions are indefinable, almost in the manner of Moore's dogma[1], since they are unanalysable. It is this indefinability what the will shares with the indirect passions. Despite their indefinability the indirect passions like pride[2] and humility, love and hatred etc. are describable (see Treatise, p.277) in terms of their "nature, origin, causes and objects" (ibid.,p.329), and the description could be dispensed with only because of our familiarity with the passions. About the will Hume remarks that " 'tis impossible to define, and needless to describe any farther". But what does he mean by the term 'will'? And Hume's answer is the following: "by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression

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1. Could Moore have derived his notion of indefinability of a term in the sense of its unanalysability from Hume? Of course Moore does not mention Hume's name either in the Principia Ethica or in the Ethics.

2. Hume in fact defines 'pride' in Enquiry, page 314.

we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new notion of our body or new perception of our mind." (Ibid.,p.399, italics in the text). It is in fact a definition, since we define the terms, and not the objects or things designated by the terms. So Hume's notion of indefinability is in fact the notion of unanalysability of any simple entity whatsoever. In Hume's case it is the indirect passions, in Moore's case it was the non-natural properties. Anyway, Hume's definition of the will, as I would call it, has two main features, one, that the will is an internal impression, and the other, that to will is to "knowingly give rise to any new notion of our body, or new perception of our mind". If we take common examples of willing such as moving one's hand or calling up an image in one's mind it is the second part of the definition that is more important than having a particular impression which we come to experience only in consequence of willing. Nothing can be a better chosen instance of willing than the ability of performing a voluntary act. But somehow either Hume intends to explain away the will, or owing to his commitment to an empiricist theory of knowledge he is constrained to admit an entity only if we could have an impression of it. But the matter, as it stands, is that it is the impression, Norp Smith very rightly remarks, and not the 'knowingly' giving rise affair that Hume proceeds to deal with, to the effect that "voluntary actions are treated like other perceptions and ideas of the mind" (op. cit.,p.495). If the will is an impression, and "like any other passion in the mind" as Norp Smith points out, in so far as its unanalysability is concerned, wherein then does the will's difference from the passions lie?

But for Hume to echo the will as impression is advantageous, because then, like any other impression, the will as well could be explained in causal terms. He introduces the notion of "necessary actions" (op.cit.,p.400). What he really means by the phrase is opaque, perhaps that actions as effects are determined by their causes. Actions are not sui generis, rather caused: "we conclude one body or action to be the infallible cause of another"(ibid.,p 400). Of course, everything depends on what does Hume mean by 'cause'. The word 'cause' is often employed whenever questions of explanation arise. 'Explanation for', 'cause of', etc., are near synonyms over a wide variety of cases. Hume often thinks of a cause as a happening which explains a subsequent happening. He also often talks about 'cause' and 'causation' as if they were co-extensive with explanation. It may not be altogether implausible to interpret his phrase "determination of the mind" to mean 'explanation', since the sense of 'cause' is, at times, relative to forms of explanation. Even the word 'reason' is used in the sense of facts knowledge of which might explain. In the case of explaining human behaviour there are a number of items which one might mention to explain. Dispositions, emotions, motives, sympathy,etc., are a few of the explanatory factors. All of these are causes in the sense of occurrences or happenings that explain the subsequent occurrences or happenings. They operate by occurring or happening. As explanatory factors they are present in the phenomena to be explained, and mention of their presence might explain the actions done. It remains, of course, an open question whether explanatory

items or causes are necessary or sufficient to explain an act. But what is clear is that by calling those facts, occurrences, etc., 'causes' in view ("determination of the mind") they are items of a kind, mention of which might explain actions performed by human agents.

It remains to be added that Hume's anti-thesis of the "actions of the mind" and the "actions of matter" designate entities nowadays what we now-a-days call event and human action respectively. His set of synonymous expressions for human action consists of the following: besides "actions of the mind", "actions of the will" and "voluntary action". Voluntarity, for Hume, is built into the notion of human action. In this sense, he is echoing Locke, for when the exercise of the power of the will was the distinguishing characteristic of voluntary action. Whether in performing a voluntary action one performs two separate actions -- the act of willing to perform the action and the action itself -- remains open to interpretations in view of Hume's account of the relationship between mind and body. At least, the matter cannot be very readily decided.

The phrase "necessary action", in the present context, calls for elucidation. The term 'necessary' belongs to the causal discourse, and characterises the type of connexion that is felt by the mind in its passage from observed sequences of "constant conjunction" to the habitually expected state of affairs: " 'tis from the constant union the necessity arises" (ibid.). An action could be called necessary in the sense that its occurrence could be explained in terms of

"the constant union and the inference of the mind" (ibid., italics in the text). Events or what Hume calls "actions of matter" are usually so explained, as items in causal sequences, as being indifferently either causes or effects, according as we regard them in their relation to their consequences or in connexion with their antecedents. An action then is necessary, for Hume, only if it is causally explicable. The "actions of matter", he says, "are..regarded as instances of necessary actions" (ibid); and he asks whether the "actions of mind" could be said to be necessary in the specified sense of the word as well.

Hume's position is somewhat unique. He does not propose a reduction of the "actions of the mind" to the status of the "actions of matter" as any physicalist or behaviourist would do, though he extends his criterion of determinism over the domain of the "actions of the mind" without reservation. He holds that the "actions of the mind" are "necessary" in the same sense as those of the "actions of matter", and says that "our actions [i.e., actions due to personal agency] have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances" (ibid., p.401). This is Hume's premise for inferring the necessity of the "actions of the mind", and he seeks to prove the truth of his premise on a "general view of the common course of human affairs" (ibid.). The "common course of human affairs" is marked by a "uniform and regular operation of natural principles" (ibid). What are the "natural principles" is not easy to decide, for Hume does not mention it explicitly; but from the examples that he discusses it appears that by "natural principle" he intends to

designate statements of a posteriori sort about natural relation. Obviously, the paradigm of such a "natural principle" would be the principle stating the necessary connexion between cause and effect. The natural relation between cause and effect is characterized by two factors: uniformity and regularity; and in terms of these two factors Hume defines the concept of necessity. "Necessity is regular and certain" or "uniformity forms the very essence of necessity" (ibid.,p.403). The proposition "Like causes...produce like effects" is a second order instance of a necessary principle. That "Men can not live without society" is another instance of necessary principle. In fact, Hume goes on to observe that man's social existence and behaviour exhibit a uniform and regular pattern. Uniformity is "a general course of nature in human actions" (ibid.,p.402). Despite the diversity and difference in men's stations in life and circumstance in their sexual and social positions, geographical and political state of affairs, they act in a uniform pattern. Men's acts are in a uniform and regular way conformable with their characters as human beings, as members of their age, group and sex, their vocational group, as members of their nation. "The different stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and uniform principles of human nature" (ibid). Again, "There is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate. There are also characters peculiar to different nations and particular persons, as well as common to mankind. The knowledge of these characters is founded on the observation of an uniformity in actions, that flow from them;

and this uniformity forms the very essence of necessity"(ibid., p.403). Now from "the general view of the common course of human affairs" Hume claims to have shown that "actions have a constant union and connexion with the situation and temper of the agent" (ibid). The uniformity of human actions is a logical condition for asserting the necessity of human actions. But what sort of a logical condition? Sufficient or necessary, or both? The structure of Hume's argument is not enough perspicacious. He says that the 'knowledge' for that matter, belief that human actions are necessary is "founded" on the "general view" that human actions are uniform. He uses logically provocative phrases such as "flow from them". In fact, he does not argue, simply puts the matter equivocally in another terminology; as if it were the case that "necessity" meant "uniformity". Anyway, for Hume, there does not arise any question of denying the uniformity of human actions in order to escape the conclusion that human actions are necessary. If the relation between the premise of uniformity and the conclusion of necessity were that of a conditional proposition, then the premise could be denied only if the conclusion could be shown to be false. That is to say, it could have been the case had Hume's argument been a substitution instance of modus tollens. It is doubtful whether it has that form. Again, if uniformity of human action implies its necessity, the consequent cannot be escaped by denying the antecedent, as Hume says, for that would involve a fallacious logical move. But Hume does say that the argument that human actions are necessary can be eluded "by denying that uniformity of human actions, on which it is founded"(ibid). It could be so only if

Hume had in mind some relation like entailment or strict implication. If uniformity of human actions entails the necessity of human actions, then of course the latter cannot be rejected without denying the former. Such a strong claim, perhaps, cannot be put forward on Hume's behalf.

Granted that human action is necessary in the sense that it uniformly exhibits a constant union with the agent's motives and circumstances, it remains to be shown that the necessity of human action is the same as the necessity of cause and effect relation. Hume says that "in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxim, as when we reason concerning external objects" (ibid.). The constant conjunction of phenomena generates a propensity in the mind to expect similar occurrences in future when familiar conjuncts are presented. The so-called necessary connexion is felt in the mind or "in the imagination", and in all cases of probable reasoning the mind is guided by custom. The process of non-demonstrative inference, for Hume, is in fact, a process of habitual expectation. The probability of the inferred state of affairs may vary in degree, but "the mind balances the contrary" instances, and restores the feeling of necessary connexion between constantly united phenomena. The constancy of union is the formal ground of causal inference on the basis of which "a connexion in the imagination is established". The idea of necessary connexion is derived from the impression of constant conjunction or union of two particular phenomena in experience. How the same formal criterion of necessity is observed in the case of human actions. "No union can be

more constant and certain, than that of actions with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the operations of body"..(ibid.,p.404). Just as the union of phenomena determines us to infer the existence of one from that of another, similarly from the union of motives and actions, inference i.e. prediction of actions from motives becomes possible. Here we seem to have another way of saying the same things. To say that human actions are necessary is equivalent to saying that human actions are predictable. Various objections can be raised against Hume's view that human actions are predictable since they are uniform and hence, necessary. Protagonists of popular version of libertarianism often appeal to the Heisenberg principle of certainty. The principle is alleged to state that it is impossible to predict the future state of affairs of the universe because we can never determine what the past is. If the causes cannot be fully known, the effects cannot be fully predicted. F. Waismann has said that the principle renders the present even unknowable, let alone the future. The objection does not seem especially relevant. No one would deny that we are often able to predict the actions of our friends, or the thoughts or emotions they will experience in certain circumstances. Having seen how they have reached on frequent occasions in the past, we have built up an idea of their characters, and this knowledge can be used as a guide to their future behaviour. If such expectations were not usually fulfilled, all social life would become impossible. An uncharacteristic behaviour falsifying a prediction does not prove that it does not follow from the agent's character.

May be that the predictor was unacquainted with a facet of the agent's character that explains his behaviour. Again, it may be argued that all actions cannot be explained on the same logical level. Compulsive behaviour can be explained in causal terms; but to explain intelligent, purposive behaviour we have to use the concepts of reason and motive. We have stated earlier that Hume's notion of cause is often co-extensive with 'explanation'. Furthermore the onus would rest with the libertarian to show that motive language is not causal language. If a motive can be no different from any character trait as far as the determining of action is concerned, in that case, in Hume's sense of 'cause', the two languages become inter-translatable in the context of human action. Motives are a special class of reasons which apply to actions which are performed with a particular end in view. To give the motive for an action is to give the reason for that action, i.e., to explain that action. Though to give the reason is not necessarily to give the motive, yet this fact does not require us to hold that a motivated action is causally inexplicable. There is another point worth mentioning. To say that an agent is reliable is, to a large extent, to admit that his behaviour is predictable. Perhaps it is not possible to assert that an agent is reliable and yet his behaviour is not predictable. To say that so-and-so is reliable is to imply a sort of unasserted prediction based on our past acquaintance with him. Or, in other words, prediction in human affairs can apply to those events about which we have been able to form expectations because we have witnessed other similar examples in the past. Accuracy of our past observations

concerning the character of the agent and his actions may be questioned, but this fact in no way goes to invalidate the predictability thesis as a principle. That we do expect agents to behave in a particular fashion is no less true that the feeling of 'freedom' that we often experience, e.g., the certainty that I feel that I can lift my arm whenever I please. More about such matters later.

Any attempt to predict the possibility human actions on the basis of the motive and character of the agents themselves would be to offer, what Hume calls, moral evidence in support of the view that human actions are necessary. Moral evidence, he says "is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation"(ibid). By virtue of a constant union of men's actions and motives it becomes arguable that should a man with a specific character be placed in a specific situation his acts will follow by natural necessity in exactly the same way as the effects of any other set of causes.

We may now pause for a while to consider some of the points that arise from Hume's argument that human actions are necessary. In the first place, Hume defines 'necessity' in terms of 'uniformity' and this uniformity is observable in the operations of nature. We have the experience of similar objects in constant conjunction with the consequence that the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other. This is the genetic account of our idea of necessity. Now if the necessity that we feel in the mind and entertain the consequent belief that "Every object is determin'd by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion"

(ibid.,p.400), necessity of the causal sort, or of that encountered with or resorted to in connexion with causal reasoning would be paradigmatic. At least, it is so with Hume. The next move made by Hume is to extend the idea of necessity to cover the domain of human actions. The idea of necessity in the sense of a feeling consequent upon our experience of constant conjunction of similar objects could be said to hold in the case of human actions only if it were shown that man's motives and actions are also constantly conjoined. Hume said that he would "prove"(ibid.,p.401) it, but in fact, as has been rightly noticed by Ardal (op.cit.,p.85), he does not do any such thing. Nor does he point to any case of constant conjunction of motives and actions of human beings, granted that it could be so done. He is honest, though, to take into account the alleged irregularity and uncertainty of human conduct. What then is the status of the assertion that human actions are necessary? At this point, Hume resorts to his distinction between demonstrative and probable reasoning. In the domain of matters of fact demonstrative certainty could not be hoped for, all that we might aspire after is a statistical average of evidential probability. On this issue, the force of natural evidence is as much non-demonstrative as that of moral evidence. In all cases of arguments from experience any movement from restricted generalization ('All known X's are F') to unrestricted or universal generalization ('All X's are F') will and does involve a fallacious deductive step. We could certainly move from 'All known X's are F' to 'All X's are F' only if the necessity were logical, and, embodied in the structure of things. But Hume denies the existence

of logical necessity in the non-linguistic world or the domain of matters of fact. In the circumstance, the status of the conclusion inferred from the observed constant conjunction of similar objects would be one of belief. It is as much a matter of belief that human action are necessary as to hold that every event has a cause. The idea of cause entails the idea of necessary connexion with the effect, and since "there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause"..."the common distinction between moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature (ibid.,p.171, italics in the text). It has been one of Hume's intentions to "cement together" (ibid.,p.405) the natural and the moral evidences on the basis of one definition of 'necessity'.

It may be worth-while to consider the value of uniformity for viewing human actions. The main source from where Hume gets his moral evidence strengthened is history[1], because, "nothing more interests us than our own actions and those of others, the greatest

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1. The student of human nature has more to learn from history. Hume appears to suggest that science of human nature must draw from or at least should be ready to learn from history of human acts. His references to Greek and Roman history are significant in this respect. He believed that there are "constant and universal principles of human nature" (Enquiry,p.83) that can be discovered from history. This can be done because "Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places"(ibid.). A study of history shows "men in all variations of circumstances and situations", and thus acquaints us "with the regular springs of human action and behaviour"(ibid.). Professor W.H. Walsh, in a conversation, has drawn my attention to this very interesting point about Hume. If I have understood Professor Walsh aright, he meant to say that, for Hume, since the conceptual apparatus of mankind has remained unchanged and shall remain so, an understanding of historical characters in their situations and circumstances would not be dissimilar to understanding the behaviour of living persons. But there is a sense in which such a view amounts to a denial of history itself. No Marxist, for example, would accept Hume's view, which presupposes that the objective correlate of human behaviour does not change.

part of our reasonings is employ'd in judgments concerning them" (ibid., p.409). In fact, history, says Hume, would be impossible without making inferences about the behaviour of other people. In the Enquiry the list of studies that depends on moral evidence is enlarged so as to include, besides history, politics, morals, and literary criticism. The chief function of history is "to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature"(Enquiry, p.83). The discovery that motives are "the regular springs of human action and behaviour" is a part of the wisdom of mankind: "The same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes"(ibid.). How why is it that "mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity?" Mainly because the concept of necessity renders actions intelligible, just as it does a brute matter of fact. Events in nature are not episodic merely, they acquire intelligibility only if they could be construed as items of a causal sequence. We often explain people's behaviour by reference to emotions in the sense of motives or inclinations, or what Hume would call "calm passions" that are, he says, "settled principles of actions" as distinguished from more agitations (the calm/violent dichotomy is not always intended, in the Treatise, to be based on the criterion of intensity of the passions). Philosophers have taken motive-explanations or reason-explanations to be non-causal. For Hume this would not be the case. The idea that human actions can be divided into those which are explicable by reference to reasons and those which are explicable by reference to causes does not stand up to scrutiny. Some explanations can be found which are not clearly classifiable

one way or the other. Again, reasons do not operate in the absence or to the exclusion of causes; they function in a context in which causes are also functioning. We shall take up this matter later. In the present context it may be allowable to say that to explain an action by reference to the agent's motions is to subsume it under a propensity or behaviour-trend. Many of the concepts in terms of which we describe human behaviour are dispositional, and, according to an influential view on this matter, such words are generic or determinable. That is to say, 'X love his wife' ('love' is a dispositional emotion-word for Hume, and the passion has a 'bent' and 'tendency') does not have any episodic use. On the contrary, the statement can be construed as an explanation or interpretation of X's episodic behaviour. As a dispositional statement the sentence is a tendency-stating assertion. The description that X loves his wife or 'X is a loving husband' makes a wide range of different actions predictable. There is nothing harmful in thus putting the case, only if the argument is not tailored to advocate a non-causal view of the relation between dispositions and actions. A departure from the so-called generic view of dispositional terms would called for on a determinist's part. The dispositional verb 'love', it may be agreed, does not have a corresponding episodic use, yet the range of different actions predictable from the description that X is a loving husband can be identified as forming a class inasmuch as they would be episodic explicable in terms of X's love for his wife. In other words, a disposition is <u>regulative</u> of its determinable episodes, while these, in their turn, constitute the class

or satisfaction-range determining, as it were, the truth of a dispositional account or explanation of human actions. The sentence 'X loves his wife' would be vacuous if there did not exist identifiable episodes that satisfy the description 'X is a loving husband'. In fact, it is these episodes that fill the history of X's marital relationship with dynamistic interest. On the other hand, if the episodes were not explicable by reference to X's love for his wife, they would hardly have been intelligible. Hence, intelligibility on the part of the episodes and significance on the part of dispositional accounts of human action require a causal relationship between the two.

Intelligibility of episodes lies, in other words, in their predictability. This predictability may be merely epistemic without being logical. Logical predictability could hold only if the necessary connection were real or structural to the sequence of events. But Hume does not allow this to be the case on any account. He says that "in no single instance the ultimate connexion of any objects is discoverable, either by our senses or reason...we can never penetrate so far into the essence and construction of bodies"(op.cit., p.400). The necessary connexion between constantly conjoined events is felt by the mind "in the imagination". The imagination is an epistemic constitutive factor in our probable knowledge, and hence the observed regularity of sequences, or for that matter, uniformity of nature and human actions renders it credible. The credibility of the necessity of human actions is a necessary condition of the epistemic predictability of human acts. The felt necessity may not offer

us any logical assurance, yet it is a practical guide to our making judgments alike in the case of natural phenomena and human actions. Often freedom is taken to be the unpredictability of our actions. But this tends to create an opacity of understanding of our fellow-beings in their reaction to social reality.

Now that human actions are caused, does it imply that they are not free? Does freedom, or as Hume has it, liberty belong to the will or to the agent? That liberty and necessity are consistent with each other is a view that has had a long history in the British moral thoughts. Hobbes, for instance, in the Leviathan argued in its favour. He categorically remarks that "when the words free, and liberty, are applied to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop....So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word free will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do" (op. cit., ed. D.D.Raphael, I. p.55). That freewill is an improper terminology is a view not only held by Hobbes but also accounted for in another context in the following manner. What is it that make us call an act voluntary? 'Liberty', for Hobbes is to be conceived in a negative way as an absence of impediments and only those

actions can be called voluntary which are performed by an agent who "hath time to deliberate" and "the action follows his opinion of the goodness or harm of it" and follows "immediately the last appetite" (ibid.,p.66). To deliberate is to ask oneself whether he should do a thing or not, and deliberations consist of "an alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will" (ibid.,p.67). He distinguishes the will from intentions and inclinations which "change often", but the will being the last is one. The will, since "nothing taketh beginning from itself" is also caused by other things, and "of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause" (ibid.). In brief, then, for Hobbes, the concept of voluntary actions is to be analysed in causal terms, actions are causally determined by the will, though there is no question of the will's being free, unless, of course, one chooses to abuse the term. It is the agent, properly speaking, who can be said to be free. The view has passed into the main stream of British philosophy, and we shall find Locke too expressing the same opinion. He says that voluntary is not opposed to necessary, and considers the question whether man's will is free as "altogether improper". For him to ask that question is as insignificant as to ask whether virtue is square. Volition, says Locke, "is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular action. And what is the will, but the faculty to do this?" (ibid.,p.146). Now since, for Locke, both the will and freedom are powers, to ask whether the will is free, is, in effect, to ask "whether one power

has another power"(ibid.). The absurdity arises from one's overlooking the fact that a power can only belong to an agent. Hence, Locke thinks that "the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free" (ibid.,p.147, italics in the text). Again, Locke sees willing or choosing as an action, and man's freedom consists in doing or not doing that what he wills, and it is also true that man cannot forbear volition. Hence man is not free with regard to volition. He puts the point as follows: "the act of volition...being that which he cannot avoid, a man in respect of that action is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together and a man can be free and bound at once" (ibid.,p.148). Man's freedom, for Locke, consists in the absence of external compulsion. I choose a certain line of action and there is nothing in the conditions in which I attempt to perform the act which restrains me in any way. In this sense I am free. But am I free to will? Why do I choose this action rather than another? Can I remain inactive? On the whole, it seems that Locke feels that we are not free to will, that we are determined as to what we do will.

We, in fact, shall leave the account of Locke's position rather half-way, without deciding as to what, according to him determines our will, the greatest good in view or some preceding uneasiness. But for our purpose in view, the account will be sufficient in relating Hume's concept of the will to the tradition of British moral thought. Two points emerge from our consideration of Hobbes' and Locke's views about liberty and necessity. One is that they are not incon-

patible with each other; and the other is that every human action is causally related with man's will. There is, of course, difference of emphasis between Hume on the one hand, Hobbes and Locke on the other. For Hume, the most engaging question is whether man's actions are free, rather than whether the will is free. The feeling of the inappropriateness of the expression 'freedom of the will' is not so marked in Hume as it is in Locke, or in Hobbes. In respect of man's freedom Hobbes and Locke do not think in identical terms, but both agree that freedom cannot be a property of the will. We shall have occasion to note other shades of difference between these thinkers when we have completed an examination of Hume's concept of the will.

Hume's concept of the will has echoes of Locke's. The verb 'to will', for Hume, is "knowingly to give rise" to any action of mind or body. Both Locke and Hume take willing to consist in knowingly exerting oneself. The adverb 'knowingly' stands for voluntary or intentional character of the action given rise to. For Hume, to say that an act is voluntary is to give a causal account of the way the act comes about, or, in other words, the intentionality of an act implies a causal statement. The statement that an act a is voluntary on the part of an agent A would be analysable, from Hume's point of view, into a causal statement that the act a is knowingly given rise to by A, or a was initiated by an act of A's willing. It may be recalled that for Hume actions are intentional, and in this context his phrase "actions of the mind" is significant. A logical connexion between will and action can hold only when 'action' implies

intention. A man may be said necessarily to want to do things he does on purpose, since he does not necessarily want to do the things he does inadvertently, accidently, by mistake, that is, unintentionally. Now supposing the relation between will or intention and deed is logical, can it be causal as well? There is no reason to suppose that the former exclude the latter. It might be said that an agent's intention that p cannot be adequately described unless it includes a description of p. In this case the relation between 'A intends p' and 'p' is logical. But does it prevent that A's intention that p cannot be recognised independently of p ? Otherwise discovery of error and failure would become impossible. And if it be the case that A's intention that p can be a state of affairs distinct from and independent of p, there would be nothing to preclude the existence of a causal relation between these distinct and separate states of affairs. Hence the argument that since the nature of intention cannot be specified independently of its effects, the logical relation between the two excludes any possible causal relation between them does not cut much ice. The purpose of our contention will be immediately evident. If the relation between intention and action can be both logical and causal, ascriptivism and causal analysis of actions can, then, as well go together. It seems hardly plausible to say that Hume explains away the intentional aspect of actions at the cost of their causal analysis. From the regularity of men's volitional decisions, we can speak of motives in a causal context. To judge that an agent is morally responsible for an action, he must

not only have brought that action about, but he must also have done it knowingly (that sometimes it is correct to judge that the agent is wrong to bring about an action even when he does not do so knowingly is admitted). Any sudden, unexpected, unpredictable action which does not come from the agent is not something for which the individual can be held morally responsible. And there must be some connexion between the individual and his action before he can be held responsible for it. All determinists, from Hume to Hill, have such a course of reasoning as an "interpretation of universal experience". It has been remarked that in Hume's account the causal side gets the upperhand, the intentional aspect of an act, designated by 'knowingly' is either explained away or left completely out of consideration. Kemp Smith had noticed it. In recent times P.T.Geach has made a similar observation about Hume's definition of the 'will'. (Whether Hume really defined the will could be and, in fact, has been questioned. H.A.Prichard, for example, holds that the character of willing is sui generis, and says that "the activity of willing is indefinable". Obviously, no act could be defined, but a term or a concept can be. We submit that Hume did define the concept of the will, since he was stating what he means by the term. Again, the will could be indefinable if it were an indirect passion, which can simple impression, would be indefinable. But the will is not an indirect passion, though it is stated to share some of the characteristic features of the indirect passions. For Prichard's views see his essay 'Acting, Willing, Desiring' in Moral Obligation, p.187.) Geach writes about Hume's

definition of will that he "concentrates on the supposed internal impression" and deals with the causal relation between this and the "new action" or "new perception" on the same lines as other causal relations between successive events. Like a conjurer, Hume diverts our attention; he makes us forget the words "knowingly give rise to" which are indispensable if his definition is to have the least plausibility" (The Philosophical Review, LXIX,1960,p. 225). Geach's position seems to verge on a non-committal analysis. It is not clear whether Geach wishes to abolish the notion of volition or the reduction of the voluntary into the causal. He is mainly fighting against the view called 'ascriptivism', which holds that to say that an act a is voluntary is not to describe how the act came about, but, on the contrary, to adopt a moral or legal attitude and thereby ascribe responsibility for the act to the agent. The ascriptive and descriptive strata of language are logically independent, i.e., the truth or falsity of the one in no way determines the truth or falsity of the other, because descriptive language is in a quite different logical realm from ascriptive language. Now Hume's view about the will may be called in Geach's own phrase "voluntary causality", but to hold the view that Hume was not an ascriptivist is to court over simplication. There can not be any dispute about the fact that Hume belongs to a tradition of modern thought, beginning more or less with Descartes, which attempts to reduce agency to causation. According to this tradition, to describe an event as a man's action is to assert that the event was caused in a certain way. This, of course, does not mean

that Hume did not have in mind the notion of responsibility. Ascriptivism, or the methodological analysis of the notion of voluntary acts as ascribing responsibility can be traced back to Aristotle. In his Ethics Aristotle lays it down that praise and blame attach to voluntary action, i.e., actions done not under compulsion and with knowledge of the circumstances. In Book III Aristotle discusses the conditions of responsibility for actions. The agent can be held responsible for his acts only if his actions were voluntary, that is, if he were not compelled to act the way he did. Aristotle's definition of compulsion is strict: actions are involuntary only when the cause is in external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing. While knowledge of the circumstances and absence of compulsion are the necessary conditions of voluntary actions, choice discriminates character better than actions (voluntary ones) do. Choice, according to Aristotle, is the adoption of action decided on after deliberation about means. And consequently we are responsible for bad as well as for good actions. Now ascriptivism and a causal analysis of voluntary actions, are two different things though as we contended earlier, neither of them need exclude the other. Kurt Baer has pointed out, ascriptivist account of human actions or the social practice of bringing people to account is a result of an evaluative attitude. We bring people to account only when their actions have any relevance to obligatory social rules or directives. On the other hand, the causal analysis is primarily epistemological, it is concerned with the intelligibility of actions as events. Whether there can be any act which does

not come within the purview of social practice is not the question, nor would Hume consent to such a view, since he is so much emphatic on the social nature of man. His main interest in analyzing liberty and necessity is not to demonstrate the incredibility of ascriptivism as Gench seems to suggest, rather to bring the concept of action within the perspective of a unified methodological category of cause defined as felt necessary connexion. If Hume is a determinist, his determinism is methodological (Ardal, op.cit.,p.87; O'connor calls him a 'soft-determinist'. See the latter's Free Will p.72-3). He held that our actions are determined in the sense that they are the outcome of psychological influences and mechanisms, but this view was never meant to deny that praise and blame could be ascribed to human actions. A moral judgment is not rendered futile by the fact of the will's being determined. And whether it can be determined independently of the agent's consciousness of right and wrong is as incredible an issue as that every human action is uncaused. Neither of these squares with the everyday convictions about moral responsibility. Neither Hobbes nor Hume had any such intention. Hobbes' definition of free agent is frankly Aristotlean, he defines liberty as "the absence of external impediments". He mentions also the factor of deliberation, as Aristotle does, in the process of voluntary acting. Again, the point of ascribing responsibility, or as Hobbes puts it, "praise, dispraise, reward and punishment" (op. cit.,p.64) does of course arise, but only from a socio-political point of view: "what is it also to praise, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for somebody else, or

for the state and commonwealth"(ibid.). Hume, it is well-known, always looked to the character of the agent as the proper object of evaluation. Ascriptivism and "voluntary causality" are not indifferent to each other. It is not always that ascriptive and causally descriptive language belong to two logically different language sets, though sometimes the intentions of the two kinds of analyses may be different. I do not in the least wish to suggest that simply on that ground the two can have no relationship whatsoever. For example, I may discover why I did a particular act, and my discovering so does not prevent me from feeling remorse or joy according to the nature of the act. Similarly, we may know why someone did an act, and at the same time, bring him to account. Ascriptivism and reducing agency to causality are not mutually exclusive affairs, but depends on what attitude we take, evaluative or epistemic.

So far we have been trying to understand Hume's position in the light of Leach's remarks. The causal analysis of voluntary acts did have its critics. Even within the tradition of British moral thought, Cudworth held Locke's sort of determinism to be "childish argumentation" (op.cit.,p.133) and Reid worked out a strongly voluntaristic account of man's freedom. But before we can consider these views we should see what Hume has to say on the concept of liberty.

After having shown that human actions are caused, or in other words, subsuming the concept of agency under that of causation, Hume now will have the task of explaining the concept of liberty or

freedom. Like Hobbes or Locke, for Hume, the adjective free can not be applied to actions. Does Hume, like Locke, treat the question 'whether man be free' in a paradoxical manner? The concept of liberty or freedom is a metaphysical concept, designating some power or ability of exertion that belongs to an agent. In a sense, agency and liberty is synonymous. If by liberty meant some occult power, then obviously Hume would have no room for it in his system. About occult power he was allergic. Writing in connexion with the metaphysical notion of cause as power, he found it "obscure and uncertain" (Inquiry, p.62). Part of Hume's analysis of the idea of necessary connexion is concerned with showing that the idea of power or efficacy is not derived from reason nor any single experience. He points to a synonymous family of terms, which result in absurdity when any one of them is defined in terms of others. His argument is simple, but potent. If the idea of power is one that we really have, in that case we must look the impression from which it may have been derived. "If it be a compound idea, it must arise from compound impressions. If simple, from simple impressions" (op. cit., p.157). Again, the idea of power cannot be derived from any unknown quality of matter. This is impossible because an idea can not be derived from any thing else than from an impression, and we "never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power" (ibid.,p.161). But can it not be said that we have an idea of power "in general"? In that case, it must have "some particular species of it", and "no power cannot subsist alone, but is always regarded as an attribute of some being

or existence, we must be able to place this power in some particular being"(ibid.). But these requirements of "conceiving a particular power in a particular body" is not fulfilled in experience, nor is it demonstrable. The inevitable conclusion then is that "we deceive ourselves in imagining we can form any such general idea"(ibid.,p.162). Or, in other words, since the legitimacy of the alleged idea cannot be shown, when we talk of the idea of power, we only use words without any determinate idea. The corollary that is drawn from the polemical dialectic is that we have no idea of any being endowed with power.

But there is a sense in which Hume uses the concept of power, demystified of course. Power is a quality perceptions, not of objects. Mind, says Hume, "has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects" (ibid.,p.167) and "the same propensity is the reason, why we suppose necessity and power to lie in the objects we consider, not in mind, that considers them" (ibid.). The "real model" (ibid.,p.165) of the idea of power is a mental propensity, which, after having experienced constant conjunction of resembling things in a sufficient number of instances, is felt as "a determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant" (ibid.). In this sense, power is an impression of reflexion, which is a product of custom. Power is necessity. Now the will is thought to have a power of producing effects in the form of actions. Like every other causal relation, there is no real connexion between the two. The epistemic status of the will is that of a cause, and like other causes, it bears no discoverable connexion with its effects.

Hume seems to suggest a distinction between the two ways of looking at human actions: the agent's view and the spectator's view. The latter may be said to include one's view of one's own past actions as well. The agent can become a spectator of his own actions as he can be of the actions of others. It is from the spectator's view that actions could be said to be necessary, because the necessity is nothing but a determination of the mind of the spectator. Hume's notion of "moral evidence" is founded on a two-fold data, one, that "our actions have a constant union with our motives" (ibid.,p.401) - the testimony of any agent qua spectator; and the other, that our "knowledge" of other's characters is based on an inference concerning a constant connexion of their actions with their motives. In both cases the necessity arises in the mind of the spectator as a result of experiencing actions having "a constant union and connexion with the situation and temper of the agent". Power, which is, for Hume, another name of necessity, does not lie in the will of the agent, but in the spectator's mind. To say that the actions of the will arise from necessity is to have recourse to an ipso facto belief that actions are results of human motivation. And this belief is presupposed in making judgments about human actions. The spectator's view of necessity is very clearly stated by Hume in the following observation: "The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of the mind, is not properly a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action, and consists in the determination of his thought to infer its existence from

some preceding objects" (ibid.,p.408).[1]

But what happens from the agent's point of view? "The will," says Hume, "seems to move easily every way, and casts a shadow or image of itself, even to that side, on which it did not settle" (ibid.,p.315). These words about the will's power is repeated by Hume on page 408 where he gives an account of the agent's feeling about his own abilities. The feeling is there, but it does not prove that the agent is really indetermined the way he feels. The feeling is characterized by Hume the "false sensation of liberty" or "illusion of the fancy" (ibid.,p.314). The justification of Hume's so calling it lies in the consideration that the passage from the feeling of freedom or liberty to the fact of it cannot be logical. The "false sensation of liberty" writes Hume, "makes us imagine we can perform anything"(ibid.), but from the feeling that we are free it does not follow that we are free. As agents we "feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions, and imagine we feel that the will itself is subject to nothing" (ibid.,p.408), yet the evidence of the feeling could not be taken as, what Hume calls, "an intuitive proof of human liberty". Perhaps

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1. Another stronger assertion on this point: "the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of causes is neither plac'd in the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances, 'Tis here that the real power of causes is plac'd, along with their connexion and necessity". Treatise, p.165.

Hume was reacting against the Cartesian tradition of thought concerning the will. Descartes, in his fourth Meditation argues that we experience our will "as being without limits" (op.cit.,p.85). The will, says Descartes, is the most perfect of our faculties, and it is the only faculty "which is not small and circumscribed in me" (ibid.). The power of will, according to Descartes, "consists in this, that we can either do or not do something, or rather only in this that when we affirm or deny, pursue or avoid the things that are presented to us by the understanding, we do so without feeling that our choice is imposed upon us by any external force"(ibid., p.86). Descartes' conviction that one could experience one's will as "without limits", i.e., "genuine free will" was reasserted in his The Passions of the Soul. In Article 41 he writes that "the will is by nature so free that it can never be constrained" (ibid., p. 128). It is interesting to note that Leibniz in his Theodicy found the Cartesian thesis unacceptable. Referring to Descartes he remarks, "the reason M. Descartes had advanced to prove the independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the magnetic needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would think that it was turning independently of any other cause, not being aware of the imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter" (tr. E.M.Huggard, ed. Diogenes Allen, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1966, part one, 50). Leibniz's example would

naturally remind one of Spinoza's metaphor of stone. In a letter he wrote that if we imagined a stone suddenly endowed with consciousness, it might think that it was falling of its own volition, since it would not perceive the cause of its movement; but it would not be free not to fall, even if it imagined that it was (Letter 58. The Correspondence of Spinoza, ed. A. Wolf, 1929).[1] The similarities in the arguments purporting to denying freedom of the will are striking, though the differences among Hume, Leibniz and Spinoza are hardly to be overlooked. Hume's determinism, if his views could be so called, depends on his own view of necessity, defined in terms of a determination of the mind in consequence of an experience of constant conjunction of similar objects in the past. For Leibniz, the determination is logical, and nothing could be farther away from Hume's intention. By calling Leibniz's determinism 'logical' I mean that according to him the notion of an individual contains in itself all that the individual is to do or to become. Man, held Leibniz, is a kind of spiritual automation, and in this specific sense every action of a man issues from his own nature, and is not imposed on him from without. The soul has in itself the principle of all that it does, or in his own words, "the soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of

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1. Another well-known example: "an infant thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child thinks that it freely desires vengeance, or a timid child thinks it freely chooses flight" Ethics, Everyman edition, p.38. Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein to the effect that he imagined some leaves blown about by the wind saying, "Now I'll go this way...now I'll go that way". Intention, p.6.

all its passions" (op. cit., p.65). This is a corollary of the doctrine of the pre-established harmony. A related point may be raised in this connexion. Leibniz distinguished between the truths of fact and the truths of reason. Only the latter are necessary. Actions are not necessary in that sense, they are, rather, contingent, because taken by themselves, there is no contradiction in conceiving them otherwise. So, for Leibniz, the acts of men are all determined, though not necessary. But how far the contingent character of human acts is viable may be doubted. Let us clarify this point with the help of one of his own examples. If the monad that constitutes Julius Caesar has once and for all built into it, as it were, the attribute 'crosser of the Rubicon' (this predicate being, like all the others, contained in the subject), how can it be said of Julius Caesar that he freely chose to cross the Rubicon? For, under Leibniz' Schema, the decision was necessarily a 'part of him'. Leibniz might have answered that it was logically possible that Caesar should not have crossed the Rubicon; hence there was no necessity about his decision to cross the river; for "nothing is necessary of which the opposite is possible" (Discourse on Metaphysics, XIII). The suggestion here is that 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is a truth of fact, not a truth of reason, to say 'Caesar did not cross the Rubicon' is not to contradict oneself. But if 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' is analytic, then its negation would be self-contradictory. This is another matter, and we are not concerned with it in the present context. But this answer merely glosses over the difficulty. For if God chose the universe which was the best

and most perfect of all possible universes, and Julius Caesar (together with all his attributes) is a constituent of the universe that God in fact selected as being the most perfect, then it is hard to see how Caesar's decision was in any meaningful sense open, or 'up to him'. The mere possibility that God might have selected another universe in which there was a deutero-Caesar who did not cross the Rubicon is hardly enough to bestow any genuine freedom or avoidability on Julius Caesar's actual decision. The distinction between being determined and being necessary is hardly satisfactory. So far Leibniz' position is concerned, to say that there is an individual $\underline{a}$ who chooses P (any decision or course of action), i.e., '$(\exists x)x = \underline{a} \rightarrow \underline{Pa}$' is in fact asserting a necessary proposition, because the mere fact in the best of all possible universes that '$(\exists x)x = \underline{a}$' necessitates that '$\underline{Pa}$' will be true. The contingency of '$(\exists x)x = \underline{a}$', which Leibniz in all cases might take care to point out, is a doubtful one, how far it is viable remains an open question. It is impossible that $\underline{a}$ could choose anything but $\underline{P}$. '$(\exists x)x = \underline{a} \rightarrow \underline{Pa}$' is a modally necessary proposition.[1]

But both Leibniz and Hume share the following premises in their argument against freedom of the will: that our sense or feeling of freedom is not sufficient evidence for establishing that we are

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1. "Leibniz has admitted that God created human beings such that they will act in certain specified ways; how then can they act in any ways other than those in which they do act?" G.H.R. Parkinson, in his Leibniz on Human Freedom (Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 2,1970,p.17), mentions this possible objection. He has also given Leibniz' possible reply to the objection, which does not appear convincing.

really free, and that we are often ignorant of the causes on which our choice or decision depends. Both of them seek to preserve some kind of spontaneity on the part of the human agents. And neither of them, Hume's case we shall examine below, succeed in doing it.

Spinoza and Hume had a common Stoic heritage, which is evidenced in their common acceptance of determinism. Spinoza, like Hume did not deny that we often feel free. For example, he writes in the Appendix of the Part I of his Ethics, "men think themselves free inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and desires, and as they are ignorant of the causes by which they are led to wish and desire, they do not even dream of their existence" (Everyman edition, p.30). Hume would have argued and does in fact argue in this view. But the determinism of Spinoza is again different from Hume's. For Spinoza, the determinism is born of metaphysical necessity. The proposition that there is no free will has been proved by Spinoza in the following way. "The mind is a fixed and determined mode of thinking, and therefore cannot be the free cause of its actions, or it cannot have the absolute faculty of willing and unwilling: but for willing this or that it must be determined"(ibid., p.24-5). It is obviously that Hume's notion of necessity is outrageously anti-metaphysical. But the fact remains that for both of them freedom in some form is felt and its appearance is due to our ignorance of the causes of our actions.

Let us now go back to Hume. For him, necessity is opposed to chance, which is the denial of causes of actions. When he says that

chance implies a contradiction and is "directly contrary to experience" (op. cit.,p.407), what does he really mean? The answer could be found in his distinction between the liberty of spontaniety and the liberty of indifference. The former is opposed to "violence", or external compulsion, while the latter, "means a negation of necessity and causes". The distinction is of some importance. Of both sorts of liberty, we have "false sensation", but what characterizes the liberty of indifference is that we come to have an experience of it, as Flew has remarked, owing to "interplay between our dual roles as agents and as spectators" (op.cit.,p.154). For the spectator the concept of necessity or the causal interpretation of actions as due to motives is a methodological imperative. As spectators we seldom feel any "looseness" or "want of determination" between the agent's motives and his actions. But as agents "in performing the actions themselves we are sensible of" "a looseness or indifference" (op.cit.,p.408). The feeling is not denied by Hume, though he points out, it cannot be regarded as "an argument for its real existence" (ibid.). He does not clarify his notion of the liberty of spontaniety. In the Enquiry he writes, "By liberty...we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute" (p.95). A few points may be noted as regards the account of the liberty of spontaniety. First, it is conceived

as the absence of violence or external physical compulsion. To be free is not to be externally or physically compelled. A moment later we shall find that the account overlooks other forms of compulsion. Secondly, supposing that an agent is not compelled in the sense put forward, according to the account there cannot be any gap between the will as a causal power and its exercise. A lot of misunderstanding has arisen on this issue. Hume's general thesis is that "power has always a reference to its exercise, either actual or probable" (op.cit.,p.313). Though generally the distinction between power and the exercise of it is invalid, Hume holds that it is admissible in morals. He says, "the distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt a power and the exercise of it, is entirely frivolous, and that neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possest of any ability, unless it be exerted and put in action. But tho' this be strictly true in a just and philosophical way of thinking, 'tis certain it is not the philosophy of our passions" (ibid., p.311). The domain of the passions could be treated as an exception to the law of entailment between power and its exercise, only if the power of the will were conceived to "consist in the possibility or probability of any action" (ibid.,p.313). Now granted this proviso, Hume's account is entangled in compromises and revisions. The original ardour of his view that necessity is the law of human actions comes to lose much of its force. To take his own example."I do not think I have fallen into my enemies [sic] power, when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side, while I am unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate

is as strong a restraint as of any iron, and that I am in perfect safety as if he were chain'd or imprison'd" (ibid.,p.312). Certainly the enemy had the liberty of spontaniety since he was not "a prisoner and in chains". Why then was the gap between his power and its exercise? Obviously because besides "violence" or external compulsion, there may be other forms of compulsion, e.g., the psychological ones like "the fear of the civil magistrate". Hume was not oblivious of this fact; in fact, he puts it quite clearly, "we ascribe a power of performing an action to every one, who has no very powerful motive to forbear it" (ibid.,p.313). In Hume's terms the enemy had both power and a "very powerful motive to forbear it", that is, the fear of the civil magistrate. The initial conception of the liberty of spontaniety falls short of psychological causes, which can and does restrict freedom just as much as physical causes. On the one hand, necessity requires that power will always imply its exercise, but this view was modified in deference to the passions; on the other hand, the liberty of spontaniety conceived as opposed to violence was found insufficient to explain the non-exertion of power. These are the two distinct trends of thought in Hume which do not leave his picture of man's freedom in its sharper outlines.

Hume has been, in effect, following Hobbes' dictum "that a free agent is he that he can do if he will, and forbear if he will; and that liberty is the absence of external impediments" (op.cit.,p.68). It may be argued that liberty is the necessary condition of the agent's acting, but it may not be sufficient. But once we allow the thesis that power implies its exercise in the case of the

passions, as Hume does, the agent's forbearing the act what he wills must have to be accorded some status in the causal scheme, because his *not* forbearing what he wills does, in fact, bring about the act together with his having the power to do it. One's forbearing what one wills is not implied by the so-called absence of external impediments. Hence the two conditions of an act, the agent's liberty *and* his *not* forbearing what he wills cannot be subsumed under one concept of "absence of external impediments". Herein lies a difference between Hobbes and Hume. Hobbes does not seem to consider this point despite his distinction between *sufficient* and *necessary* causes of actions. It might have been that Hobbes regarded liberty as both the sufficient and necessary causes of human actions, and as we have tried to show, it cannot be the case. "I hold that to be a *sufficient cause*, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the *effect*. The same also is a *necessary* cause" (*ibid.*, pp.67-8). If we recall the fact that Hobbes recommended the use of the word 'free' in respect of bodies only, it will be possible to see why he interprets *liberty* in the physical sense of the term. For Hobbes liberty is "the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent" (*ibid.*, p.67). From this definition it would follow that all human actions are caused by notions external to them. Now granted that there is liberty for an agent in the sense that he is physically free to do what he will, it remains to ask whether this liberty alone would also be sufficient to have him acted the way he willed. Hume's enemy in the

example was physically free, and yet, on the psychological side, he did not exert his power. There is a morally relevant sense of liberty which he lacked. He was constrained by the fear of civil magistrate. The difference between 'can' and 'may' illustrates the point. Granting that power does not necessarily imply its exercise in the domain of the passions. Nero could have said that his enemy could strike him, but he might not.

By admitting that entailment between power and its exercise is not the philosophy of the passions, Hume, in effect, has considerably softened his deterministic thesis. But it should not be supposed that the admission amounts to espousing a weaker relationship between the will and any action that it might determine, and for that matter, a non-causal view of human actions. Rather, it makes the will's determination of actions a defensible affair. That is to say, determination of actions is often modified by reasons for forbearing to do what is willed; cases of exceptions can, and often are, taken into account. If the reasons for forbearing to do what is willed are made explicit, and looked upon as an aspect of willing, the relation between power and its exercise, or in other words, will and action, would hardly remains in any manner loose. The position becomes regulated. When somebody does not act in the way we expect him to act, we look for the constraints that might have prevented him acting in the way expected. When getting to know the constraints, i.e., his reasons for forbearing to do what he willed, we come to have an explanation of his unexpected performance. We now see a pattern, that is, we take him to have acted in the way

expected provided the constraints were absent. Such explanations can be post eventum as well as predictive.

Notwithstanding the exceptions owing to possible constraints, the determination of actions by the will renders the liberty of spontaneity somewhat trivial; though an explanation provided on that basis need not always be uninformative, because what could be counted as a reason for forbearing a willed action depends on the specific situations in which the agent may find him placed.

How trivialization of the concept of the liberty of spontaneity was inevitable if one should like to show that human actions are necessary. In order to be compatible with causal necessity the liberty of spontaneity cannot be contra-causal, a privilege which the liberty of indifference alone is said to enjoy. In fact, the liberty of indifference, the strongest libertarian thesis, is the full-blooded freedom. Either we have it or do not have any freedom at all. The disjunction is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Once freedom in the strong sense of indifference has been denied, spontaneity on the part of the agent does not make any point, because, after all, it is the spectator's view that matters ultimately: "whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform...the desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never free ourselves from the bonds of necessity. We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character"(op. cit.,p.400). Granted that the liberty of spontaneity is all that we have, and the liberty of indifference is impossible, the question

arises, since spontaneity is compatible with necessity, whether neurotic behaviour is spontaneous and necessary or compulsive. Psychologists often speak of 'compulsive neurosis', and it has been clinically found that the neurotic even acts against his own desires. The inconsequential nature of the liberty of spontaneity becomes apparent in such cases as these. Ardal has made a similar point when he remarked that a kleptomaniac would not have the liberty of spontaneity according to Hume's definition, but a thief had, since his actions did follow from the determination of his will. Nor can the kleptomaniac could be said to have the liberty of indifference, because even the actions of mad men, says Hume, are not "removed from necessity" (ibid.,p.404). The resulting paradox is something that Hume would have to put up with, unless it is regarded as the reductio ad absurdum of his denial of the liberty of indifference.

Before we take up other questions concerning Hume's concept of spontaneity, we may ask a question about the status of the feeling of the liberty of indifference. There is a specific feeling that the agent becomes "sensible of". Hume says that this is a false feeling. Some of our feelings can, of course, be false like that of a phantom leg. Perhaps the import of Hume's phrase "false sensation" is similar to that. What characterizes the feeling of the liberty of indifference is that it is felt by the agent alone. We become "sensible of" it only "in performing actions" (ibid.,p.408, italics not in the text) and "in reflecting on human actions" (ibid.). This feeling is the prerogative of the agent. If the feeling were a real one, it could have been felt by the agent and the spectator alike.

Since it is not so felt, it could be called a "false sensation" or even "an illusion of the fancy" (ibid.,p.314). To say that a feeling is a false sensation amounts to declaring it to be neither a passion, which is a "real existence" nor an item in the causal sequence. Again, if it is asked, why is it that the spectator's judgment is more important than the feeling of the agent? The answer could be that the spectator might be more experienced or competent; for example, a psychiatrist is better-suited to make an assessment of the patient's mental state than the patient himself. The spectator's view of human action has the merit of objectivity, based as it is on the knowledge of the agent's character and the uniformity of human nature.

It is possible for a man to be ignorant of or mistaken about his motives, reasons or purposes in acting, to know what he wants and not to know what there is about it that he wants. And it is possible for other people to know this better than he does himself. So far this is alright. But there may as well be cases where both the agent and the spectator could be in doubt or uncertain as regards the motive of the agent. For example, when one registers one's name as a conscientious objector in wartime, it may be quite uncertain whether one does so motivated by pacifist considerations or fear of death. On the spectator's side, it may be argued that we may look for some generalization of which the agent's, in this case, the conscientious objector's behaviour may serve as an instance. His conduct may have to be examined in order to ascertain whether avoidance of danger or pacifism is a regular feature of his

action. Or in other words, attribution of motive as a causal determinant of an agent's behaviour or action would succeed only if the action could be shown as an instance of behavioural regularity. It is here presupposed that human actions explicable by causal determination are implicitly general, and that generalisations about human motives can be made. Hume says that inferences concerning human actions "are founded on the experienc'd union of like actions with like motives and circumstances" (ibid., p.409).

There is another point. Is the spectator's view necessarily exclusive of the agent? Cannot the agent adopt a spectator's view about his own actions? Hume thinks it possible to "fix on some steady and general points of view", and "place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation" (ibid., p.582). I do not know if he would accede to such a possibility with regard to the so-called spectator's view. But there does not seem to be any reason to suppose that an agent cannot be a spectator of his own actions. It may be difficult, though not altogether impossible. Just as "the language of morals" corrects "the language of self-love", in like fashion, we may be said to deliver ourselves of the illusion of enjoying the liberty of indifference by adopting a spectator's view about our own actions. This seems feasible.

To come back to Hume's notion of spontaneity. The notion is not quite modern in philosophy, and it dates back to Aristotle. It is mentioned by Descartes in his Principles, and even Leibniz uses it in order to characterize voluntary action. What is meant by the term? Man, says Aristotle, "is a moving principle or begetter of

his actions, as of children" (op.cit.,p.59). Something is said to be 'spontaneous' if the principle of action is in the agent. But all spontaneous actions need not be 'free', unless the course of action is chosen by the agent deliberately. Responsibility could be ascribed to the agent of the spontaneous action only if the course of action was chosen by him. Aristotle makes the class of free actions a proper subset of voluntary or spontaneous actions. Leibniz repeats this Aristotlean view. Hume's view of spontaneous liberty has similarities to the classical view, but it may be doubted whether his concept of spontaneity would ever imply choice as an undetermined determinant of human actions. As we have pointed out earlier that the will <u>qua</u> impression, to Hume, is only an item in the causal sequence, and thus the question of its playing the role of an uncaused cause does not arise. It is a hazardous conjecture whether Hume's notion of the liberty of spontaneity could be interpreted to be 'free' in the sense of 'self-determined'. Hume uses the word 'choice' only once, and there too, he makes it interchangeable with the will; and the context in which he does it is no less significant for his disavowal of the classical meaning of the word 'free'. He is considering what is it that makes parricide different from the oak sapling's destroying the parent tree? "'Tis not sufficient to reply, that a <u>choice or will</u> is wanting. For in the case of parricide, a will does not give rise to any <u>different</u> relations" (op.cit.,p.467, the first set of italics is not in the text), though to a "different cause" than the other. Now, whether the choice or will is free in the sense that we are to will the

will, is a question that Hume does not discuss. That such a conception of free will leads to an infinite regress has been shown, in recent times, by Ryle and earlier by Leibniz, when he remarked in the Theodicy that we will to act, we do not will to will. The will, for Hume, is an internal impression, and for this very reason, the question of voluntariness or the involuntariness of the volition or the will, or in other words, the questions about the anterior acts of will do not arise. An impression is a primary datum of our emotive life, and Hume does not deny that an impression is caused. The will is not strictly a passion, direct or indirect, and in that case it must be, in Hume's scheme, an impression of sensation, and impressions of this category, he tells us, "arise in the soul originally from unknown causes" (Ibid., pp.7, 84), and elsewhere we are told, "depend on natural and physical causes" (Ibid., p.275).

A word about Hume's phrase "internal impression" used for the will. What does Hume mean by the word 'internal'? Does he mean that an impression can be 'internal' in the sense that it does not arise from any antecedent perception? Impressions of sensations are said to be 'original' in this sense. An impression of reflexion is called 'direct' when it arises immediately from pain and pleasure. Desire is a direct impression of reflexion. When Hume says that will is a direct passion does he mean that the will is unobstructed desire? But again he holds that the will is not strictly a passion, though both the passions and the will are indefinable. What could be the criterion of indefinability to Hume? I suppose it must be, to put the matter in his own terms, distinct-

ness, separability, or, apparently intransitive character of the passions. Does Hume's notion of the will satisfy these conditions? It appears that his notion is intentional, and hence transitive. Can we become conscious of the internal impression called the will without being conscious of what is believed to be the good or the absence of the evil together with an awareness of the possibility of their attainment by an act of ours? If that be the case, willing cannot be an isolated affair without reference to its intentional coordinates. Hence, the impressional character of the will, in so far as it is called a passion or passion-like; and secondly, its internality or directness -- are not very clear. It may be that the will is said 'direct' in the sense of their unaccountability (see Treatise, p.439) or owing to its appearance from "unknown causes" (ibid., p.7). This is then a genetic epithet. Or, shall we use Hume's own phrase that the will is a 'direct' passion in the sense of an "original existence"?

Hume upholds a variant of the causal theory of human action. That every human action is caused is a proposition that can be supported by identifying the concept of human action with events, and appealing to the generalized universal statement that every event is caused. But Hume does not deny the difference between events and human actions. An instance of it can be readily had in his affirmation that in parricide we have a "different cause". Another version of the causal theory might start from the concept of necessity and lay down the general proposition that whatever follows necessarily on its cause is caused, whichever interpretation of 'necessity' may

be put on the word. Human action could then be said to be caused in the sense that it too follows necessarily on its cause. Hume's argument seems to be modelled on our second version of the causal theory. A defender of freedom need not unequivocally deny that every event is caused, as Hume seems to suppose him to do. The libertarian may reject the equation of events and human actions instead. It is also possible that he might agree with Hume that no feeling could be taken as constituting an 'intuitive' proof of human freedom. Kant seems to my mind to be such a protagonist of human freedom. In the first instance, like Hume, he refuses any proof value of our inner experience, or of any psychological state insofar as freedom is concerned. In his the Metaphysic of Ethics Kant says that "It is not enough...to prove it [freedom] from certain supposed experiences of human nature" (tr. Abbott.,p.30). But thus far only. Hume in no case would go along with Kant in holding that freedom is to be presupposed as a property of the Will of all rational beings. Hume calls in question the very notion of rational Will itself. Kant's picture of the moral world is a double decker one, the two worlds of necessity and freedom differ so much in their status that it becomes quite strenuous to conceive any struggle between them. It is also possible to argue that 'will' is an implicate of an agent self or the self as actor. What does it mean to say that our acts are determined though our wills are free? The Kantian will does not determine the acts, but itself. What sort of a will is this that determines nothing but itself. There is a shadow of unreality about the acts in the Kantian world, such that

the rational will as a cause is a cause without effects. A cause, in order to be a cause should be on the same ontological level with its effect. The Kantian will is not a member of the world of appearances wherein the acts occur.

Hume's type of causal theory of human actions may be further specified. A causal theory of human action may imply a foreknowledge about the future. A human agent, if he claims to know in advance what he would be going to do, then he is not free to do it or not to do it. Hume would hardly endorse any such version of the causal theory. One's future actions are members of the class of possible actions, to claim to have a fore-knowledge of those actions would be equivalent to claiming a priori knowledge of a set of possible states of affair, which is impossible, or hypothesi. So Hume would reject any argument against human freedom based on the possibility of human fore-knowledge of what a man will do. According to Hume, our knowledge of the future is nothing but a habitual expectation, and given this view, every fore-knowledge, in the strict sense of term, is ruled out. An act, says Hume, is an existence, and we "can never demonstrate the necessity of a cause to every new existence, or new modification of existence" (ibid.,p.79), because "all actions and sensations of the mind" are not derived from reason (ibid.,pp. 189 and 190). A recent variety of Hume's argument on this issue appears in R.M.Hare's criticism of 'Certainism in morals'. In The Language of Morals (pp. 32 and 39) Hare argues that conclusions concerning 'matters of substance' cannot be derived from self-evident rules. And even if

it be argued that the fore-knowledge may be probable, Hume would like us to recall that "there is no probability so great as not to allow of a contrary possibility" (ibid.,p.155). If the alleged fore-knowledge were possible on the part of the agent, then the phenomenon of acting against one's interest would not have taken place at all, and, Hume tells us that "the greatest possible good does not always influence" men, and they "often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and desires" (ibid.,p.410). If it be true as Hume claims, in that case the aim of action would be the cause, a final cause, as Aristotle would have called it. But no final cause can explain human action, because, actions originate as a result of our passion's pursuing good and avoiding evil. And the passions would vary in their intensity depending on the remoteness or nearness of the good or evil. "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (ibid.,p.479). If the passion is calm enough, action may not take place at all. Hence a fore-knowledge of future good *simplicitor* cannot either cause or explain human action, apart from the fact that the notion of fore-knowledge itself is suspect.

What about the spectator? Before we answer the question, an earlier remark of ours calls for partial amendment. We observed that one of the merits of the view that human actions are necessary, was epistemic predictability, and predictability meant causal explicability of human actions. Now causal explicability could operate in both ways, from cause to effect, and from effect to cause.

The necessity of human actions, as Hume seems to argue, is more regressive in character, i.e., we normally infer the cause of the actions. Hume does give one or two examples of forward-looking predictions. For example, "A prince, who imposes a tax upon his subjects, expects their compliance" (ibid., p.405, italics not in the text). The action here is merely expected, and is this expectation is another name of necessity? Hume does say that "nor is there any thing but strong motives, which can give us an absolute certainty in pronouncing concerning any of his [the agent's] future actions" (ibid., p.313). Yet, I believe, my way of looking at Hume's version of causal theory as essentially involving regressive inference is not basically incorrect. But the way Hume defines his notion of "moral evidence", i.e., "a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation", it becomes clear that the "inference" is regressive, or in other words, it is post eventum; it takes place in the minds of the spectators only after the actions have been performed by the agent. The inference is directed towards a state of mind of the agent that may be no longer there, as the actions themselves, which are "by their very nature temporary and perishing" (ibid., p.411). Considering these points, I find 'predictability' an unhappy term, and would like to retain it on two grounds. First, no better term is available. And, secondly, Hume does not distinguish between regressive inference and 'prediction' in the strong sense, i.e., an inference about future states of affair. To Hume, of course, the direction of inference has the same logical form, but the time

actions involved in the two cases is different. Hume's causal theory of human actions could then be said to provide predictability in the sense of intelligibility of human acts. He himself says that he seeks to invest the will with an "intelligible quality" (ibid., p.410) which he calls "necessity".

The spectator, since he is obviously engaged in inferring, can not be said to possess any fore-knowledge either. For him the actions of other men are "signs" of their character: "actions are only signs of certain principles in the mind and temper" (ibid., p.477) of the agent. By a sympathetic process of knowing, the spectator becomes aware of the agent's mental state, and only by virtue of the "communication of sentiments" he arrives at his conclusions concerning the agent's actions. The conclusion, properly speaking, is a belief about the explicability of the actions of the agent. Thus we may say that on no grounds, either on the part of the agent or that of the spectator, any fore-knowledge is available for the causal conditioning of human actions. This feature of Hume's version of the causal theory of human acts is important to bear in mind.

Without projecting the theoretical order into the realm of practice, it can, I suppose, be held that in some sense knowledge is inseparable from action. The agent must know that he is acting when he is acting and what his purposes are. What one is upto or about in a piece of knowledge that the agent should have as a necessary condition of his action, as well as by the spectator should he be to identify others acting. This knowledge may be practical,

the term is inoffensive, and it implies the possibility of explaining the agent's actions (either by himself or by the spectator) by reference to his awareness. This is intentionality of human actions in terms of projects. William James has suggested that the will is always directed to an idea (Principles of Psychology, Chap. xxvi) and consciousness is by its very nature impulsive. Goal-directed action, or actions following from motives or done with a purpose in view, in short, volition is discerned in human action in connexion with the agent's awareness of his world. All this is not fore-knowledge in the sense we have been talking about. But given the awareness on the agent's part, can he not have an intimation of the line of action that he would be undertaking or should undertake? It is admitted that in spite of his awareness of the world, which includes the agent's items of belief, true or false, he does not act. There may be reasons for his forbearing or inhibiting his behaviour. But, ceteris paribus, when he acts, some idea of what he is about become necessary if his action is to be called an intended one. We shall say something more about on a later occasion.

The terms 'will' and 'volition' are related especially to the execution of human actions. Whether or not Hume believes that in the case of an agent "the mind of a man consciously bent on doing something" (H.L.A. Hart, in Freedom and the Will, ed. Pears., p.46), it can be safely affirmed that the mind experiences a class of passions that are predominantly conative. Our other-oriented passions are the members of that class. These passions as Hume tells us, have a "bent or tendency" of leading us to act in certain manner.

The passions are the motives of our actions. Together with the understanding, the passions make up human nature, and are requisite in all its actions (see Treatise, p. 493). Given that the passions are the springs of action, where does the will come in? Does the will stand somewhere between the passions and our actions? Hume says that actions have a constant union with motives, and any inference that is made concerning actions is from one to the other. If this be the case, what is then the need of entertaining the concept of the will? Ryle has shown that the will is an artificial or technical concept of no utility. This view was, in fact, to an extent, held by Hume. He said that the notion of the will "enters very little into common life, and has but small influence on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking" (ibid., p.312). This is evidenced moreover by Hume's defining the will as an impression, though, he says that the impression called the will is not a passion, either direct or indirect.

Yet, I do not wish to say that Hume would like to find himself in the company of those philosophers who hold that the doctrine of volitions is "a mare's nest of confusions" (A.I.Melden, 'Willing,' Philosophical Review, vol.69, 1960, p.84). Traditionally, the will is conceived as a necessary condition of something's being an action. The idea that a human action is a bodily movement following from or caused by the will or a volition runs from Hobbes through Locke to Hume. It is found in Mill and remained dominant in nineteenth century and early twentieth century philosophy. Prichard himself, in his essay, Acting, Willing, Desiring, quotes from William James,

Cook Wilson and Stout. Austin also has subscribed to the view of the will or volitions as antecedent desires of our bodily movements which immediately follow from our desires for them. It is only with Prichard that philosophers in recent times have begun growing conscious of the difficulties that beset the doctrine of the will. The view that an action is preceded or caused by the will has well-known difficulties, and these are set out by Holden, Ryle, Wittgenstein and others. They hold in some fashion or other, that it is pretty difficult to characterise the alleged antecedent cause of action, called the will. Though we speak of 'acts' of will, yet willing does not have the qualities of an act; nor can it properly be regarded as an instrument with which movements are made. Nor is it, or can it be identified with decision, intention, etc. And, above all, the relation between the will and action that follows it, appears to be both logical and causal. Some of the difficulties of the doctrine of the will Hume was well aware of, namely, he was conscious of the artificiality of the notion of the will. He only differed from Ryle and Holden also, in not putting the notion to the class of concepts devoid of any utility. His notion of the will is not very far removed from the notion of the exercise of a power to make actions take place, or happen, if a particular happening is an action. Hume could also be taken to hold that we acquire such a power <u>directly</u>; we are not in a position to tell how to exercise it, except exercising it, on occasions that call for its exercise. This may be one of the reasons why Hume said that philosophers who seek to define the will "are wont to perplex rather

them clear up this question" (ibid.,p.399). We are intimately conscious of our emotions and feelings, our experiences of pain and pleasure, and this consciousness is seldom without a conative element. In our attempts to attain "the good or the absence of the evil" our desire remains tied to intention, and intention to an awareness of what we may, at the moment, be aiming at. When good is "consider'd simply" (emphasis added), we merely desire; but when it is accompanied by the consciousness of its attainment "by any action of the mind or body", we are said to be willing. To Hume, will is unimpeded desire.

What is the relation between the will and the motives? Hume speaks of motives influencing the will, and points to the passions as motives to "any actions of the will" (ibid.,p.413). Again, on page 415 he seems to place the passions on the same footing with the volitions and on page 416 he remarks that the passions are exerted in action. If we care to recall his statement that the will 'exerts itself', it is possible or at least not unlikely for one to become suspicious whether the will is not a passion.

But what is a motive that influences the will? A motive could be the agent's purpose, what he aims at, what he thinks good. It is supposed to be an exciting cause that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way. It has also been said that a motive is that which influences a person's volitions. Sometimes, the term 'motive' is applied to a result or object which is desired. It must be admitted that the term is highly elusive, and not much unanimity is found amongst philosophers. Some of them think that motive is

that what explains an action. Actions are done 'out of....'. Names of motives are answers to questions of the form: Why did X, an agent, do a particular act, a? Ryle seems to have advanced such a view (op. cit., pp.85 and 89). An act is a behaviour consequent on a disposition, and which satisfies a law-like proposition. Motives, as dispositions can be so analysed as to satisfy such an analysans. But Anscombe holds that a motive is an aim or purpose. G.E.Grice appears to support the purpose-view of 'motive'. He says that to have a motive for an action is to believe that some end will be furthered by doing it together with a want on the part of the agent to further that end. The belief together with the want constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions of having a motive.

What Hume means by 'motive' cannot be so simply put, because he hardly mentions the term nor does he enter into any discussion on it in the manner of present-day philosophers. On the contrary, in accordance with his interest in the moral worth of the character of man, he uses the term in connexion of his views on moral judgment. Actions are "only signs of certain principles in the mind and temper" of the agent, and it is on this ground that possibility of inferring actions from agent's character arises. By 'character' Hume means 'something durable and constant in man', and it is what gives his actions moral quality. Actions are virtuous only as signs of some virtuous quality of the agent's personal character. Actions are produced by motives. Hume makes it clear that evaluation is of motives *via* actions. When we praise

or blame any actions we regard only the motives that produced them. "The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But those actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them"(op. cit.,p.477). This is an important passage, and we find in it what may be called the object of moral judgment. We also notice that Hume views the motives as the efficient causes of actions. But what entity of our psychic life could be such a sort of cause? The obvious answer appears to be the passions, the indirect ones. As efficient causes of actions the motives are reasons for actions, and it is worth noticing that Hume uses 'reasons' and 'motives' as inclusive disjuncts. On page 479 of the Treatise the phrase "reason or motive" occurs. Of a benevolent agent it could be asked: Why did he do it? And the answer could be: Because he felt benevolent towards the other man. We may presently overlook the complications such as the notions of moral obligations, the sense of duty, artificial and natural virtues etc. On the whole, Hume's stand is that "Our sense of duty always follows the common and natural course of our passions" (ibid.,p.484).

Now a passion can be a "reason or motive" of an action only if it is conative. In our example above, benevolence is a passion characteristically marked by its conation, a desire for the happiness of the other, as Hume has, in fact, put it. The question that now arise is: If a conative passion is a motive of an action,

the action is caused or 'necessary' in Hume's sense of the term, but what about the motive itself? Is it itself caused? Given the causal explanation of the passions as Hume does offer, the answer should be affirmative. The passions have their causes. But it does not follow that we are certainly compelled to have the feelings we have. This point needs a little clarification. Hume distinguishes between the cause and the object of passions. What entitles us to say that we are not compelled to have the passion we experience is that passions being matters of fact are contingent states of affair, and thus could have been otherwise. Or in other words, given that X an agent feels a passion (P_1) at the time t_1, it does not make sense to ask why should X feel (P_1) at t_1? It does not make sense not because that (P_1) and t_1 will have to be jointly true for the mental history of X. He could have another passion, say (P_2) at t_2. But that does not mean that (P_1) is uncaused. It is only as a matter of fact that X feel (P_1) at t_1. This freedom, as distinguished from compulsion, is a part of the meaning of the liberty of spontaniety.

Another feature of Hume's account of motives is that, and this is a crucial one, a motive is a motive in reference to the agent's view of the good. That is, in other words a motive is not value--neutral. Without this factor the account of motives as conative passions would have been bald enough. An agent undertakes a course of action only if he has a motive for it; and to have a motive for that action is to be actuated by a particular direct passion, either desire or aversion. This becomes clear if we recall Hume's description of desire or aversion as arising from considering good or evil.

The description holds equally in the case of volition. Does he distinguish between volition and motive? I would like to suspend the judgment for a while. 'Willing', 'desiring' etc. are mental conduct terms and could be defined with precision only if they are regarded as names of mental states or unconnected psychic episodes. Hume's official doctrine of the passions as simple impressions seems to lend support to such a possibility. We have earlier attempted to show that the official view underwent change yielding gradually to a more or less dispositional analysis of the passions since Hume's coming to speak of "bent or tendency" of the passions and distinguishing the so called "pure" emotions from those that are not complete in themselves, and lead us to actions. Like Ryle Hume would not say that in using mental-conduct terms we are implicitly making law-like or hypothetical propositions only to the exclusion of episodes of our mental history. Human conduct, I doubt, for Hume, would be divisible into a set of labelled actions within and without the 'machine'. Hume would, rather like Stuart Humphire, say that every action is a part of the agent's "manner of life and of a set of attitudes to experience" (Thought and Action, p. 222). Our mental history does consist of impressionistic episodes, but there is no chaos of atomistic unrelatedness, there runs a thread of continuity through them forged by the imagination, the memory, custom and the laws of association. The passions do not simply occur, rather they are integrated in their ownership by the agent, the "intimately present" impression of the self. Again, the self is a social self, the moral world is essentially non-solipsistic, and our passions also

have a social import. These facts are significant and important for an understanding Hume's notion of motives as causes of actions. Actions are, for Hume, symbolic of our motives, and the symbol and symbolized are in a constant union. The 'will' is not conceived by Hume as a solitary psychic episode unrelated with what it intends to do. Only on this ground the spectator can evaluate an action through the motive that produced or initiated it. The verb 'to will' is an achievement word, intentionality is built into it, the intended action may be frustrated by conditions or factors beyond the agent's control, but that is a contingent affair. If Hume's notion of the will is to be conceived as a process, it would include the intended action or the idea of the action in it, or else it is no will. This means Hume's notion of motivation is a conscious process -- "Knowingly giving rise to" an action. To will, for Hume, is not to act in idea. The intended effect and the actual effect do not fall apart as a matter of fact, though it may ~~fall~~ apart as matters of fact. This assertion takes us back to our remark made earlier in connexion with Hume's denial of any foreknowledge of what the agent is going to do. And we should like to restate our position in a slightly different form. Now if the acts of the will are intentional, does it not presuppose on the agent's part that he has a foreknowledge of what he is going to do? For example, should an agent X desire a certain thing P, then X will do Y, the means for bringing about P. In this case that X will do Y follows in a sense from X's desiring P, and what is more, granted that X has the liberty of spontaniety, the knowledge that he is going to do Y does in no way seem impossible.

But P may not be brought about, X's abilities might not be adequate, he could have been wrong in his estimation of the effectiveness of Y, some other unforeseen factors may have intervened and so on. These considerations have nothing to do with X's knowledge that he is going to do Y or with his willing or intending Y. Nor is the knowledge and the intention in any way incompatible. The case appears especially interesting in view of Hume's denial of foreknowledge on theoretical grounds. But foreknowledge need not be knowledge in the 'demonstrative' sense of the word. Could it not be, as it is sometimes suggested, a piece of non-evidential knowledge?[1] Can we not say that, given that X loves Y and love is a conative passion, implying thereby

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1. This point was suggested to me by Dr J.Cottingham of the University of Reading. I do not mean to suggest that a person always has non-evidential knowledge of what reasons he is acting on in performing a particular action. But commonly he has. There is a non-evidential knowledge that one will do or try to do, such-and-such in a given future situation. The knowledge is of what one will do in situations where, in the light of one's factual beliefs, the policy enjoins a certain action. William McDougall held purposiveness of behaviour as a characteristic of living things. Characterising voluntary actions he writes as follows: "the goal and means having been pondered, developed in imagination, and deliberately chosen among alternative possibilities, before overt action began....We rightly feel that we did not act as a mere machine, but that the action was a purposive action in which our nature was truly expressed, and we may confidently infer that the goal was foreseen, however vaguely and incompletely, the moment of action" (Motivation, ed.Bindra and Stewart, Penguin, 1966, p.163).

Hampshire and Hart in a paper in Mind, LXVII (January,1958) write, "There is a kind of certainty about human actions....which is different from the kind of certainty about those subject(s) that is based upon empirical evidence: it is a kind of certainty, or knowledge, to which the notion of evidence is irrelevant". The example they give is conspicuously telling: 'I know now what I will do'; in such cases Hampshire and Hart say, "an entirely voluntary action is envisaged".

the desire of the beloved's happiness 'attends' on the passion of love, X would, at a level of reflection, know that he is going to be benevolent to Y? Or to put the matter in other words, can act of will, a volition, be individuated independently of the bodily action that it is meant to produce? For Hume, from the spectator's point of view, it can be so individuated such that given a specific volition one can foresee what action will occur in a body, though not as a matter of logical necessity. The possibility of individuating depends on the spectator's experience of past conjunctions of will and action. But from the agent's point of view, there should not be any prima facie difficulty in foreseeing his future moves, though qua agent the data of constant union would not be available to him, it could only if he reversed his role. Individuating a volition independently of the action intended presupposes a connexion between the two, and the connexion is discovered by one's playing the role of an observer, rather than of an agent. Hume had, in effect, denied that there was anything about the act of will that allowed the bodily action to be foreseen, and on the basis of his denial we tried to show that his type of causal theory of human action excludes human foreknowledge. But the problem remains open whether did he really need doing so?

Hume had tacitly admitted that our goal or end - directed actions are guided by "reason and design". In a section called 'Of the reason of animals' of the Book I of the Treatise he remarks, "We are conscious, that we ourselves, in adopting means to ends, are guided by reason and design, and that 'tis not ignorantly or casually

us perform those actions, which tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure, and avoiding pain" (p.176). In this passage the types of actions considered are those that do not have our sense of duty as their motive, rather they are actions of policy. The word 'reason' is also non-demonstrative, meaning "a wonderful unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations" (ibid.,p.179). It is wellknown that in Hume's value theory the evaluative norm is applied with an eye to the hedonic overtones of actions. "To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness"(ibid.,p.296). These two experiences are, in fact, made the defining characteristic of virtue and vice, "not only inseparable....but constitute their very nature and essence". But the hedonic quality of an act is only a necessary criterion of any moral predicate being applied to it. An unintentional act may and at times does qualify for being called either virtuous or vicious. Moral predicates could be properly applied to acts only if they "arise knowingly, and with a particular design and intention"(ibid.,p.348, italics not in the text. Hume's definition of 'will' may be recalled). Now what do the words "knowingly" or "design and intention" mean if they do not imply foreknowledge of what the agent is going to do, of what he will do or what he now intends to do? In a section of the Book II of the Treatise Hume makes a few remarks about intentions of the agent. Actions and agents need be connected in order to be evaluated, and

it is only by intentional actions are connected "sufficiently with the person" (ibid.,p.349) who performs them. Actions "arise from" the agent inasmuch as he is "its immediate cause and author". But Hume considers this relation "feeble and inconstant" because it "reaches not the sensible and thinking part" (ibid, italics ours). On the other hand, intention, which is, for Hume, "knowledge and design" of the act before it is performed, is a part of the spectator's idea of the agent, and it is what remains "after the action is performed" (ibid.); properly speaking it is the agents' character, which is the object of the spectator's evaluation. Now these considerations regarding the agent's foreknowledge are in flagrant incompatibility with the crippled picture of "the empire of the will" that Hume has painted in the Appendix of the Treatise. He declares any argument about non-evidential knowledge on agents' part of his actions as "fallacious". The will as a cause, he says, "has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect". "So" he goes on, "fare from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body; 'tis allow'd that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou'd not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction" (p.632, italics not in the text). In view of the uncompromising manner of expression of this passage it is possible to appreciate the tension between the spectator's and the agent's views of action, the denial

of foreknowledge of bodily motion from any act of will on the one hand, and the admission of "knowledge of design" of the act on the agent's part on the other. A consequence of Hume's denial of foreknowledge of intended acts could be that to say that nothing can be said about an effect from a consideration of the cause alone, prior to the experience of their conjunction is to deny that the relation between the mental aspect and the bodily aspect of an act of will or volition is a causal one. But how far this objection is damaging to Hume's theory of the will, I am not sure. Because Hume challenges any one to reject this thesis without altering his definitions of the terms like cause and effect, and necessity etc.: "I dare be positive no one will ever endeavour to refute these reasonings otherwise than by altering my definitions"(Ibid.,p.407). And, further, Hume is not a dualist, though he seems to distinguish between mental-conduct words and words of object-language. His phenomenalist analysis of causal necessity and its application in the explanation of acts of volition certainly arouses many issues that are not merely "verbal" as he thought it to be. What interests us particularly is that given Hume's definition of 'causal necessity', does it become a logical imperative that one should deny foreknowledge of intended acts on the agent's part. Strangely enough Hume often writes as though he admitted that the effect or the intended action could be foreseen from a consideration of an act of will. For instance, 'I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desired good;....founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the propos'd effect'. (Treatise, p.417. Italics not in the text.

the words "design'd and" occur on page 416). Besides the fact that Hume himself commits himself to admitting such knowledge, is it not implied by the liberty of spontaniety? There have been thinkers who have held one or other variants of causal theory of human actions, and yet admitted foreknowledge of intended acts on logical grounds. William James misunderstood the issue and thought that to say that the concept of voluntary actions imply some foreknowledge of the intended acts would be to demand some "prophetic vision" on the part of the agent. Schopenhauer, who like Hume believed that men's actions follow upon given motives with the constancy of a law of nature, remarked about the issue of foreknowledge that "Will is the knowledge a priori of the body, and the body is the knowledge a posteriori of the will". (The World as Will and Idea, tr. Haldane and Kemp, in Freedom and Responsibility, ed. H.Morris, Stanford, 1969,p.73.) Though Schopenhauer does not subscribe to a causal theory of human actions in deference to a sort of ideo-motor theory, yet apart from his metaphysics of the will, what he says is relevent for our content. If, as Wittgenstein, provocatively says that "Voluntary movement is marked by the absence of surprise" (Philosophical Investigations, 628) there has got to be some foreknowledge of the agent's intended actions, at least, despite the differences, some "evident kinship" as Wittgenstein himself admits between the language of prediction in intending actions and doing a scientific experiment. Perhaps both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein expressed the same truth, which Hume admitting it on one hand, rejects it officially, on the other. The problem of the connexion between knowledge and freedom,

as it has been recently put, has been approached by Hume in a rather external way. The agent is seen through the eyes of the spectator, who is credited with the experience of the constant conjunction of the agent's motives and his actions. The determinist's, for that matter, the spectator's knowledge bears unfavourably on the agent's freedom. The agent can have another point of view, in the non-trivial sense of the liberty of spontaniety, which might be different from the spectator's point of view. He may often know that he will do something simply because he has decided to do it, and this non-evidential knowledge alone can rescue the liberty of spontaniety from suffering trivialization.

If human actions are predictable, from the spectator's point of view, as the physical events are from consideration of their causes, yet there is a "fundamental" difference as well. In what does the "fundamental"difference consist? Hume has remarked that the agent may <u>try</u> to show that he is really possessed of a free-will: "the desire of showing our liberty (may be in cases) the sole motive of our actions" (<u>op.cit.</u>,p.408). On being told that the agent's actions are determined, i.e., he does not have any liberty of indifference, he may become motivated to show that he is really free to do whatever he likes. As Hume puts the case, "when by a denial of it [free will] we are provok'd to try, we feel it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could have been compleated into the thing itself; because, shou'd that be deny'd, we find, upon a second trial, that it can" (<u>ibid.</u>). Hume, in

this passage speaks of two cases, one before the agent's free will has been denied, and the other, after it is denied, and he points out that the two cases of the agent's acting are by no means identical. There is a change of motives. In the second case, "the desire of showing his liberty", is the motive of the agent's actions. In the second case the agent acts with an intention of acting as if in a contra-causal manner. Macnabb commenting on this example remarks that the second case illustrates a "general truth" that "a human action is liable to be affected by any thought that the agent may have about it, including his thought that he is or is not certain or likely to do it" (op. cit.,p.201). In the light of the "general truth" the causal view of human actions becomes differentiated from a causal view of physical events. Both human actions and physical events have their causes, though the latter are not predictable,from the spectator's point of view of course, in the same way. "For", says Macnabb, "the thought that I am bound to do a certain action may touch off motives which will prevent me doing it; and the thought that another man is bound to do something may lead me to communicate to him thoughts about that action which will prevent him doing it" (ibid.). But the "general truth" about actions does in no way serve to disprove that our actions take place according to causal laws. So the logical merit of Hume's example seems to lie in the fact that the psychological case provides a sort of reductio ad absurdum proof of the determinist's thesis. In order to refute the determinists' view of our actions as caused by our motives, one may try to show one's liberty, and in doing it "the desire of showing our liberty"

becomes the motive in its turn. This contradictory state of affairs proves that the determinists' thesis was true. In other words, the libertarian might seek to demonstrate the falsity of the determinist's thesis by an exhibition of his liberty. This exhibition is a result of his desire of showing that he is free. Hence we get a contradiction: exhibition of freedom (i.e., an action not determined any motive) on the one hand, and an action motivated by the desire of showing one's freedom. Hence the assumption that one can exhibit one's freedom must be false, since it leads to a contradiction. Thus the negation of the libertarian's assumption must be true. The determinists' thesis, it may be mentioned, is essentially the spectator's view of our actions: "We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character" (op. cit., p. 408, italics not in the text).

Another feature that Hume claims for his variety of determinism is that it makes the ascription of responsibility to the agent possible, and in this sense "necessity is as essential to...morality" (ibid.,p.410). He gives a notion of "human laws" as "founded on rewards and punishments", which presupposes it "as a fundamental principle, that ... motives have an influence on the mind, and both produce the good and prevent the evil actions" (ibid). This notion of human law rests on the belief that motives are "usually conjoin'd with the action", and hence commonsense regards the motives as causes of our actions. Let us call it the commonsense view of human laws. What Hume advocates is the inherent assumption of the Rule of Law in modern times. The assumption is the general recognition of

the principle that responsibility is personal and individual. But what does it mean to say to someone that he is responsible for what he does? It is often assumed that a man's responsibility is an identifiable factor that may at any particular time be present or absent, or even diminished. To be responsible for one's actions is thought of as equivalent to being in a certain mental state. English law sometimes speaks in terms of the presence of a guilty mind (mens rea) and Homicide Act of 1957 speaks of 'mental responsibility' (See The Idea of Law by Dennis Lloyd, Pelican, 1970, p.65). We should note that from Hume derives what may be called the uniform belief of the philosophers of the empiricist tradition that determinism is incompatible with responsibility is confused and false. If it is a doctrine, then it is to be found beginning with Hobbes down to Mill, Russell, Schlick and Ayer. Sir Isaiah Berlin tells us that the doctrine was originally formulated by the Stoic Sage Chrysippus (Four Essays on Liberty, Introduction). Before we come to see how Hume reconciles his causal view of human actions with the ascription of responsibility to agents, let us consider what does the concept of responsibility mean.

It must be confessed that the concept of 'responsibility' is quite opaque. How are we to decide when a man is responsible for an action? There are sciences that study the causes of what men do, and there are problems of devising practical tests of psychological inabilities and criminal responsibility as well. But, putting aside these specialised aspects of legal and psychological inquiries, it appears that on a commonsense level the application of the word

'responsibility' is in some way connected with some form of the deterministic thesis that human action is governed by causal laws, or its denial. Whatever may be the case the general concept of human action becomes at once important.

We have on a previous occasion noted that Aristotle had rejected the view that an action is a bodily movement that is chosen or deliberated, because 'choice' and 'deliberation' do not apply to spur-of-the moment actions which we call 'voluntary'; and for which an agent is held responsible. But Aristotle's own elucidation of the term 'voluntary' is unilluminating. An action is voluntary, he tells us, if "the moving principle is in a man himself". What he means by a moving principle he does not say, and in a sense, the statement is circular, unless meant as a <u>definition</u> of the concept of voluntary action. Whether or not one accepts Aristotle's notion of answerable actions, its chief feature remains a relation between the physical movement and a mental event as its psychological cause. Traditionally the psychological cause has been called by various names like 'having the intention', 'desiring' or 'willing'. The dispositional analysis of the concept of voluntary or human actions requires satisfying a law-like proposition. H.L.A. Hart, who has given currency to the view of human action known as ascriptivism finds both the traditional and the Rylean analyses to be "wrong". As Geach has observed, Hart's version of ascriptivism disfavours the causal view, which holds that the so-called mental element is related to the action performed either in the capacity of a necessary condition, or a sufficient condition, or both. Instead Hart comes

to hold that such sentences as 'He did it' etc. are not descriptive at all, rather they are, as he calls, ascriptive, i.e., "a non-descriptive utterance ascribing responsibility". ('Ascription of Responsibility and Right' in Logic and Language (First Series), A.G.N. Flew, ed., Oxford, 1952, p.161. Professor Hart has since altered the views set out in this paper.) 'Action' then, is not a descriptive concept that could be defined through a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Further, Hart insists that the concept of action being essentially ascriptive, any reference to the mental state of the agent "eliminate or reduce responsibility" (ibid., p.145). He does not deny, of course, that the mental state of the agent may be relevant in ascribing responsibility though "by no means an essential element in all action" (ibid.,p.163). Granted that the verbs of action have a descriptive use, Hart points out that their use is confined "especially in the present and future tenses, their ascriptive use being mainly in the past tense" (ibid.,p.160). Now Hart is in effect rejecting the definition of an act as voluntary bodily movement favoured in legal theory since John Austin. Austin's attempt at definition reflects a commitment to the will. He believes that what we do (our act) is limited to what we can will. Since we can will only movements of our body, it follows that acts are willed bodily movements. Even in Jeremy Bentham, we notice the importance of the intentionality that accompanies the act. Intention or the state of the will, as Bentham puts it, is what need to be considered in order to ascribe responsibility to the agent. The whole issue seems to be divided into two mutually exclusive views: Whether or

not the mental state of the agent is worth considering in ascribing responsibility to the agent for his act. Besides, there is the question of the logical character of the verbs of action, whether they are descriptive or ascriptive. Hume, is obviously one of the tradition which Bentham and Austin belongs to, and he believes that the concept of action does have a descriptive import in so far as it is causally interpreted and in virtue of descriptive import ascription of responsibility to the agent becomes possible.

An action has to be sufficiently connected the agent, and as Hume very clearly puts it, is "deriv'd from a particular fore-thought and design" (op.cit.,p.349). Not only is the agent the "immediate cause and author" of the act, it was intended by him. Only because an action arises "from the person" "knowingly, and with a particular design and intention" (ibid., p.348), the agent could be said either praise or blame-worthy. Evaluation of conduct is aimed at the person's intentions. "A man, who wounds and harms us by accident, becomes not our enemy upon that account, nor do we think ourselves bound by any ties of gratitude to one, who does us any service after the same manner. By the intention we judge of the actions, and according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love and hatred" (ibid, italics not in the text). Hume was in a sense alive to the point made by Hart that the ascriptive use of the verbs of action refers to the past tense. This is so because of the nature of actions as phenomena. "Actions" writes Hume, "are by their very nature temporary and perishing", and this fact renders it all the more reasonable to view the actions as proceeding "from some cause

in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them" (ibid.,p.411). The concept of agency can be said to entail the concept of responsibility, only if, the concept of action be definable, for Hume, in terms of a set of causal conditions. Otherwise, as Hume says, "The action itself may be blameable....But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance."(ibid.). The concept of responsibility in Hume's terms, presupposes that actions are performed by responsible agents, and the notion of a responsible agent entails the idea of causal authorship.

There is, again, the logical distinction made by Hart between descriptive and ascriptive use of the verbs of action. He does not give any reason why a sentence like 'He did it' cannot be conceived as a report, and for that matter, descriptive. The sentence can very well be an answer to a question demanding a descriptive account or report. As Geach has pointed out in his paper on 'Ascriptivism', descriptive and ascriptive uses are logically independent, or to put it more accurately, the two uses do not conflict. But Hart seems to suggest something else besides, i.e., the verbs of action have the ascriptive force as primary, and the descriptive force as secondary. R.M.Hare has familiarised us with a similar distinction between evaluative and descriptive meanings of value terms.[1] But the

1. See his The Language of Morals, chap.7. Geach assimilates Hare's prescriptivism as a variety of Ascriptivist thesis, perhaps, not without justification.

consequence of Hume's distinction appears to be that the primacy of the descriptive or non-commendatory force of value words is never so sufficient as to entail the evaluative or the commendatory use or meaning of the words. Now even if such a distinction as Hart has proposed could be made in connexion with Hume's view of human action, it is doubtful if the ascriptive function could be "principal" and the descriptive be secondary. Because for Hume, that responsibility could be ascribed to the agent necessarily presupposes that the action was caused by his motives. Again, much depends on whether the word 'responsible' is an evaluative word at all. It seems that in Hume's case the logical status of ascriptive and evaluative terms would be somewhat the same because in both the cases one can have their descriptive meaning as secondary. If such a simple sentence like 'He did it' has the ascriptive use of the verb in the past tense as its principal function, ascription of responsibility can itself be in some sense a judgment or evaluation. Ascription of responsibility is indeed a prerequisite of any evaluation of human conduct, though the act of ascribing responsibility is not by itself an evaluative act. As Hume has argued that to say that a word or a term is evaluative is to mean that the commendatory meaning of the word or the choice-guiding function of the term is primary, while its descriptive meaning is secondary. Now to say, an agent X is responsible for an act A is not to use the word 'responsible' in any non-descriptive manner. It could be said that to say that X is responsible for A is to make a reportive statement about the causal agency of X insofar as A is concerned. And should

this manner of arguing turns out unobjectionable, the 'principal function' of the verbs of action need not be <u>neccessarily</u> ascriptive. It is pertinent to ask what does the view that responsibility is an ascriptive and not a descriptive concept avail against determinism? Sometimes responsibility has been explained in terms involving freedom, and such arguments assume that the concept of responsibility is as clear cut as that of freedom. There may be no harm in assuming that we know that what we mean by a responsible act and agreeing that such acts sometimes occur. Supposing that we are not describing an act by calling it responsible, and also that in ascribing responsibility to an agent what we do is to assign his act a certain status or according it a certain social recognition. Hart says that responsibility is a social concept. All these may be granted. But does the non-descriptivist thesis help us in inferring that a particular act is free because it is responsible? That an act A is responsible is not a fact, rather an ascription, and one may have reasons, good or bad, for making it. Now part of the reason for calling A responsible is the freedom of the agent. And if this is so, the argument would be circular, and hence of no use. Ascriptions are decisions, social or individual, and thus are exempted from having any truth-value. Since, according to the thesis of ascriptivism, ascriptions are neither true nor false, an expression to the effect that an act is responsible cannot be used as a premise against determinism and even for libertarianism. Since both of them express truths.

Hart's view that responsibility is a social concept would have the determinist's approval. If it is meant that responsible actions

are controllable by the usual social incentives of approval, we shall have Hume for it. Let it be noted that he says something that comes near what Hart calls defeasibility of ascriptive terms. The adjective "responsible" accorded to a given action is capable of being withdrawn in the light of further evidence. On page 411 of the Treatise, we read, "The action itself may be blameable;.... But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance" (italics not in the text). If the passage has something in line with defeasibility, it is not conceived on the denial of the descriptive import of the notion of responsibility. Again, what is significant for Hume is that he does not use responsibility as a criterion of voluntary actions, as it is done by some libertarians. On the contrary, necessity or "necessary connexion of cause and effect in human actions" (or even "acting according to the determination of the will") is, to Hume, part of the condition for assigning responsibility. Could we say that the employment of the whole family of ascriptive and evaluative terms has a pragmatic justification which is consistent with determinism. Indeed it implies a belief that our actions are very largely determined. If everything one did depended only on pure chance or on nothing then the so-called action-guiding force of the evaluative and ascriptive terms would be ineffectual. Ascription of responsibility is allied to social praise and blame, and utility or disutility of actions normally

correspond to utility of praise or blame of it.

Further, when Hume tells us that "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others" (italics not in the text), shall we not take it to mean that to an extent ascription of responsibility together with employment of evaluative discourse is an empirically controllable matter? Education of normal moral agents consists of praise and blame, rewards and punishments. An individual is characterized as a responsible moral agent if he behaves in the manner in which a normal moral agent behaves. And it may quite well be a mistake to claim that men cannot be genuinely responsible for any of their acts just because there are conditions inherent in the psychological (even biological) structure of human beings under which such responsibility manifests. It is a fact that men deliberate and decide between alternatives, and yet all the conditions which make it possible for men to function as moral agents may often be not within their control on occasions. The conditions under which men deliberate and choose cannot be taken as evidence for denying that deliberative choices do occur.

How far the descriptive-ascriptive distinction is viable can be questioned. Because what an action sentence (i.e., one in which a verb of action occurs) purports to describe or ascribe would depend upon the situation in which it is made. There seems to be no reason to suppose why any verb of action cannot be taken to be used either descriptively or ascriptive, or both. But what is more important in Hart's thesis that ascriptive use of the

verbs of action dispense with the notion of causal agency altogether. The concept of action, owing to its ascriptive character, is not definable in terms of causal or a set of sufficient and necessary conditions, says Hart. But there can be ascriptions of causality as such as that of responsibility. A low pressure in the North Sea can be responsible for a storm in England just as much a man's intention or motive can be responsible for any event or state of affair. May be that the sense of responsibility in the cause of the storm in England is not the modal moral sense of the word. But this is not the question. And if it be insisted that the idea of person as agent should rank as a moral-cum-legal concept, even in that case causal agency can be ascribed in the sense of responsibility. There appears to be a causal sense of 'responsible', which is presupposed by our evaluation of others' conduct. There can be and, in fact, are causal inquiries that are often answered by an indifferent action sentence of the type: 'So-and-so was responsible for a particular state of affair'. If that be the case, it will be quite harmless to say that ascriptions of causality whether to persons as agents or to impersonal sources of agency equivocally employ the language of responsibility. And it was one of Hume's central thesis that the equivocation was true conversely as well. In the case of human actions causal responsibility lies with the motive of the agent, and that the notion of responsibility is not ascribed to physical events is but a contingent linguistic convention. In animistic societies ascription of responsibility would be equivocally made to both personal and impersonal sources of agency.

There is another objection against Hume's causal theory of human actions brought by Hart and Honore in their Causation in Law. Hart and Honore on page 9 of their book alleged Hume to have implied in his causal theory that "even singular causal statements which appear to be confined to the connexion between two particular occurrences are in fact covertly general; their causal character is derivative and lies wholly in the fact that the particular events with which they are concerned exemplify some generalisation asserting that kinds or classes of events are invariably connected". And on page 52 they give this argument : "The statement that one person did something because, for example, another threatened him, carries no implication or covert assertion that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow". They say that particular causal statements imply generalisations, or to put the matter in other words, particular causal statements are regarded as instantiations of universal causal generalisations. But all general statements are by no means causal, and the causal generalisations are a sub-class of the class of general statements. Now the universal general statement $(x)[Ax \rightarrow Bx]$ has its instantiation in the proposition '$Aa \rightarrow Ba$'. Hume thought that motives as causes of actions also imply generalisations as much as the proposition '$Aa \rightarrow Ba$' does. Hart and Honore appear to argue that if it were the case, that once a man, for example, has acted in a particular way under threat should have guaranteed that given the conditions again he will act in a similar fashion in future. No such guarantee is available. The argument is calculated to reject Hume's

thesis that "actions of the mind" just as any other action "are to be regarded as instances of necessary actions" (ibid.,p.400). Two points can be made about the objection. It is true to an extent that threatened people do not always respond in the same way, and much depends on the nature of threats and agents' beliefs and attitudes, which may change at the time of subsequent threat. A guerilla organization engaged in subversive activities in an area may be threatened of dire consequences by the local government. The threat may be successful and some members of the guerilla organization may surrender. But next time may not obviously be the same story, the leadership of the party may become more efficient and the members more trained. The government would of course expect that its threat to operate as it did on previous occasion, when the guerilla organization would launch a fresh offensive. The relative force of the threat needs be evaluated before it could be concluded that people do not respond similarly whenever they are threatened. And secondly, ignorance of predictive laws on the part of the predictor does not inhibit causal explanation. Hume seeks to defend the thesis that in order to know that a particular causal statement is true one needs to know that some law covering the events at hand exists. Or, that the statement 'A caused B' may be said to be true if and only if there are descriptions A and B such that the statement obtained by these descriptions for 'A' and 'B' in 'A caused B' follows from a true causal law. Causal laws are distinguished by the fact that they are inductively confirmed by their instances and they satisfy counter-factual and

subjunctive causal statements. Often one case is enough to persuade us that a law exists. Even without inductive evidence, we are often led to believe that a causal law exists. Causal necessity, for Hume, is nothing but a determination in the mind of the spectator towards making an inference, and there cannot be, on Hume's terms, any a priori specification about the number of instances required for the inference to be properly made. Hart and Honore appear to have overlooked this basic fact about Hume's causal theory. What Hart and Honore are calling in question is the thesis that for the singular causal statements, the concept of cause involve the concept of law. Do we by asserting a particular causal statement commit ourselves to asserting any other generalization of which our particular sequence of events is an instance? The causal relations may be instances of some universal laws, but they need not be instances of any law indicated by the statements or believed by the makers of the statements. All these may be granted. But does this entitle us to say that Hume's view of the origin of causal beliefs is faulty. I should say that it has a good deal of truth. Hare and Honore appear to be undecided as to whether their offensive is against Hume's view of the analysis of causal statements or his view of the origin of causal beliefs. Hume's view is frankly a 'regularity' thesis. I doubt whether Hume ever intended that causal explanation is to be interpreted as the deduction of statements about particular events from general statements about sequences of events. Causal relations are not matters of direct observation. The only reason we can have for believing

that an act A is the effect of a motive or passion M is that we have observed or have reason to believe that actions of some type to which A belongs have been regularly followed by motives or passions of some type to which M belongs. And 'regularly' does not mean here 'invariably'. Our judgments like 'Othello killed Desdemona, because he was jealous' are based on approximate regularities concerning "the union betwixt motives and actions", and that such generalisations admit of many exceptions have been noticed by Hume himself. We read on page 404 of the Treatise : "No union can be more constant and certain, that of some actions with some motives and characters; and if in other cases the union is uncertain, 'tis no more than what happens in the operations of body, nor can we conclude any thing from the one irregularity, which will not follow equally from the other" (italics not in the text). The argument that since some actions are not caused by some motives, hence no actions are caused by any motive is obviously fallacious.

Formulating general laws of behaviour is no easy matter. Because of the immense complexity and variability of the factors which determine human behaviour in any given case, it is not possible to say that all men or all men of a certain description will always behave in specified circumstances in a specified manner. The notion of syndrome thereby becomes relevant. And more so to a student of human nature, since for him, it is on the approximately repeated patterns of human behaviour that his explanations rest. His concern lies with what usually happens. An explanation need not be void of

worth only because it does not hold <u>necessarily</u> of all cases. Giving us the typical pattern or syndrome of motive and action connections, the predisposing factors of behaviour, etc., is the task Hume has addressed himself in his programme of methodological determinism. In view of the great <u>practical</u> importance the task is indeed a commendable one.

Back to the question of responsibility again. There are various factors that are commonly taken to excuse one from responsibility for what one does. Decisions to hold someone responsible can be criticised or defended in the light of different attitudes. To say that someone is morally responsible for what he does may be to say that he can legitimately be praised or blamed if either of these responses is appropriate to the action in question. In legal context, to say that someone is responsible for an action may be to say that he is liable to the normal legal consequences of it. Aristotle discusses the question of excuses under the two heads of 'ignorance' and 'compulsion'. There may also be pleas of self-defence or of provocation. These may be used either as justification or in mitigation on the agent's part. Hume's ideas about excuses are confined to a few passages at the end of his discussion on <u>liberty</u> and <u>necessity</u>. "Men are" he says, "not blam'd for such evil actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be their consequence" (<u>ibid</u>., p. 412). Elsewhere, he seems to suggest mental illness as an excuse as in the case of 'mad-men' on page 404, and finally 'compulsion' is interpreted as the loss of the liberty of spontaniety, or being in prison or in chains. 'Hasty

temper', he thinks can be an excuse since it "operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character" (ibid.). But it must be observed that whether something, a fact in the situation or in the character of the agent, would be considered as an excuse depends on the judge's view of the gravity of the offence. Aristotle, for example, thought matricide as an inexcusable offence. Hart's list contains inadvertance as a plea for excuse. A man may be excused for treading on a snail on the plea of inadvertence, but the plea will have no force if someone tread on a baby.[1] Hume's example of acting "casually" seems to be what Hart calls the plea of inadvertence. Again, Hume's case of "hasty temper", if it is interpreted as sudden irresistible impulse, is open to question. It remains to be asked and settled whether some one acting on hasty temper really acted that way or simply did not resist the impulse.[2] Of course in a causal explanation of a man's action irresistible impulse may be generally recognised as an excuse, since the temper being 'hasty' does not form a part of the agents' character.

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1. Austin writes in his 'A Plea for Excuses?' "We may plead that we trod on the snail inadvertently; but not on a baby -- you ought to look where you are putting your feet." The example illustrates the case that it is characteristic of excuses to be unacceptable. Acceptability of excuses depends on the standards and codes invoked by the defendant. The word "inadvertence" itself constitutes a plea, says Austin.

2. Austin believes that one may act at once on impulse and intentionally, since an intentional act is not necessarily deliberate. Austin's view contains a good deal of psychological insight.

But does the notion of excuse fit in with the causal theory of human action? We have noticed that Hume, in advocating what may be called intentional morality, insisted ascription of responsibility should be reasonable. By 'reasonable' I mean 'just'. We often speak of just or unjust praise or blame. An ascription of praise or blame to an agent may be just or unjust in accordance with what the judge demands of the actor and in what degree. Decisions concerning excusable circumstances involve matters of degree and the practicability of the standards of worthiness prevalent in the society of which both the judge and the agent are members. Again, our approval or disapproval of other people's actions depends also on our attitude towards them, and Hume has put it, more than once, that we do not judge men's actions, but their characters, of which their actions are signs. A definitive assertion on this issue may be quoted: "by asserting that actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal passions or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration of these principles they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal" (ibid., p. 412). To admit an excuse is to deny the proof-value of the agent's action, to reject a plea for excuse is to take an action as a 'proof' of the agent's intentions. It is at this point that the notion of non-intentional acts comes in. An action is non-intentional only if it disavowed as having been intended, or judged as such. And the question of intentions becomes relevant only in the social context, i.e., in view of the acts' consequences, or as Hume would put it, when it arouses either a feeling of pain or of

pleasure in the spectator. It may also be said that in order to give a proper description of what we are doing reference to intentionality has to be involved. But this must be something different from the intention of the agent or what he means to do. The two -- the intentionality involved in describing a human act and the intention of the agent are not unrelated. The latter becomes describable in terms of the former, which is the spectator's point of view. This would be the case only if description of an act is something necessarily public, or depends on the proper use of interpersonal rules of language. The agent's intentions become accessible to us through his avowals (the cases of shamming, etc., excepted) and his behaviour of 'signs' of his behaviour. Hume would agree that the agent's intention is a relevant fact which should be taken into account in connexion with any explanation or description of human act. What perhaps he would not concede to is that it may be possible for the agent to reflect on his own intention. Hume would say that even though the agent can never be mistaken as to his own intentions, he can be mistaken as to the proper description or explanation of his act, he might delude himself with the myth of the liberty of indifference. Hence the spectator's point of view. Men, qua agents, are potential actors; they, together with the spectators, are placed in the same social theater, though they often do but may not share the same point of view.

From Hume's remarks concerning responsibility of agents it appears that he links the question of reward and punishment thereto. Hart wants to disentangle the question of ascribing responsibility

from the moral therapy of praise and blame. He does not deny the connection between the two questions, but warns against possible confusions. He says that "assigning responsibility in the way we do assign it tends to check crime and encourage virtue"(op. cit., p. 166) is a matter for society, and not for "the wretched individual in the dock". Whether such an individual of Hart's description could exist so alienated would be doubted by Hume, for whom man is identified by his social nature. And secondly Hume's mention of repentence wiping off crime seems to imply the therapeutic value of evaluation (op.cit.,p.412). And he holds that the question of responsibility, its assignment and dispensing justice, i.e., reward and punishment are closely allied. Responsibility is implied by causal necessity of actions, and it is on the ground of necessity that reward or punishment is justified. Thus, for Hume, the notion of responsibility is closely allied to the notion of desert. To praise or blame a person for an action is to imply that it is something for which the person is responsible. Praising and blaming actions are grading them morally plus an ascription of responsibility to their doers. And his theory of punishment, as can be formulated on the basis of his scattered assertions, seems to be more of retributive in nature than deterrent.

What is the emergent picture of the agent in Hume's scheme? Is it possible to say of him that he could not have acted otherwise than he did? That is, how far, to put the question in general terms, freedom is reconcilable with determinism? There is a

sense in which, for Hume, the problem of reconciling 'liberty' with 'necessity' does not arise at all. It is the sense in which the liberty of spontaneity is trivial, and the spectator's view that all human actions are caused by motives is supreme. Or in another way, to Hume, freedom <u>is</u> necessity in a stipulated meaning of the term 'liberty' or 'freedom'. Both these words are used by Hume not only as names for a characteristic of actions, but more significantly, as dimensions in which human actions are assessed. To him, to have acted freely is, in Austin's words, to have "acted <u>not</u> un-freely", i.e., in an unconstrained fashion. But there is another sense in which the problem appears worth considering and pertinent. It has been held, and perhaps not without good reasons that, for Hume, there is no philosophical problem of free will, and he describes the whole dispute as purely verbal in character, involving only confusions in the meanings of words. Causation, he held, is essentially constant conjunction, there is no 'real' connexion between causes and their effects. Besides the factor of constant conjunction, there is a determination felt by the spectator to infer one of the conjuncts from the presence of another. He has argued that human actions have always been associated with motives with the same constancy and regularity that one finds between any causes and their effects. Human actions are caused, then, in the same way that everything else is caused. But far from concluding from this that no human actions are free, Hume concludes the opposite, for he considered it the very nature of a free action that it springs from the motive of the agent. Hume can be said to

have, therefore, defined 'freedom' as being able to act according to the determinations of one's own will, and this definition presupposes that one's free actions are caused. In the Enquiry we are told: "By liberty we can only mean a power of acting according to the determination of the will" (VIII,i,73). Hume tells us the liberty of his conception is "hypothetical" and belongs "to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains". He is saying in effect: (a) everyone who is not subject to external constraints, e.g., chains, prison walls, is free; (b) the fact that human behaviour is causally determined makes no difference to this freedom. Therefore,(c) a man can be both free and determined. This is essentially the view put forward by Hobbes, namely, "Liberty and necessity are consistent" (Leviathan, chap. XXI). One's actions are not unfree if they are caused, but if they are caused by something other than the determinations of one's own will. Freedom is determination by the will. It is a disquieting situation indeed. The actions of a causally determined agent are 'free' only in a technical sense. Is it not a far cry from the ordinary man's notion of freedom? By 'free action' Hume means such an action that is in keeping with one's preferences, desires and volitions; the ordinary man, on the other hand, means one that is avoidable. To say that a given action is free means that the agent could have done otherwise given the very conditions that obtained. The moral 'can', for the ordinary man, is an absolute power word, somewhat 'categorical' as distinguished from Hume's sense of the word, which he says is

"hypothetical". Hume's version of 'avoidability'[1] as he would have it is as follows: an agent could be said to have done otherwise if something within him were different. For Hume, to say that an agent is obliged to perform a certain action does not logically presuppose that he can (categorically speaking) perform it, rather he can if he wants, prefers, or wills to. The Humean agent has freedom both to do and to forbear doing a certain action under a specified set of conditions. Hume unhesitatingly reduces the conjunction 'freedom and determinism of the will' to the equation that freedom is determinism of the will. There is no indeterminism in psychology as there is none in physics. And the denial of indeterminism does not imply the denial of freedom. No action springs from undetermined choice. The thesis that there is no genuine antithesis between liberty and determinism can now be rounded off. Hume would reject the assumption that freedom is contrasted with causality and that a man cannot be said to be acting freely if his action is causally determined. There are laws that compel as there are that describe. And a determinist only seeks to comprehend human behaviour under laws which describe. Hume would have agreed with one of his latter-day followers, Moritz Schlick, who maintained the so-called problem of free will arises from the fallacious assumption that compulsion is an ingredient of

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1. The phrase is Stevenson's in his Ethics and Language, chapter XIV. Moore maintains, obviously following Hume, it is not the case "that right and wrong depend upon what the agent absolutely can do, but only on what he can do, if he chooses". Ethics, p. 103.

law as such. If predictability is not the same as coercion or compulsion, no antithesis can be said to be there between liberty and predictability. Mill wrote in his Logic (ii, p.416) "the doctrine called philosophical Necessity is simply this: that given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act may be unerringly inferred". The word "unerringly" may be disquieting, and one may quite like to modify the claim. Even then, the fact would remain that it is predictability in either a strong or a weak sense that the determinist asks for. Again the question of the freedom of the will is taken to be one concerning the truth of such a statement as 'I could have acted otherwise'. Whether such statements can be truly made is taken to decide the issue between the libertarian and the determinist. The determinist is sometimes thought to deny that a man could truly say 'I could have acted otherwise'. The determinist would lay down conditions to be fulfilled for making the assertion 'I could have acted otherwise' significantly. Further, to have acted as I did does not fight shy of being explicable. And if such a point can be made that explicability entails predictability, then the libertarian claim gets reconciled with the postulate of determinism. Of course the libertarian might point out that his issue is not whether one can truly say that one could have acted differently, rather whether one could have chosen or decided differently. Our actions are behavioural evidences of preceding choices. This matter is crucial. Actions are said to be avoidable depending on the fact is

the agent had not made a certain choice, his action would not have occured. How can we say that our choices are caused? Sartre says that conscious deliberation is always faked, the deliberation which precedes decisions is irrelevant. To Hume the argument would not prove difficult. We are free insofar as we follow our own desires and inclinations and implement our own decisions. The fact that such desires, inclinations and decisions are states and events each with its own causal history and explanation does not make them any less unfree or our own. Only constraining cause is the kind of cause that is inconsistent with free choice. On page 404 of the Treatise Hume speaks of actions of men "deriv'd from...their motives, temper and situation". Actions are the outcome of all sorts of psychological and external influences. And so could be the case with choices. 'Why did I choose to do one thing rather than another?' can be answered by referring to my character. Just as we are often said to act in character, so do we choose. My choice depends upon my character. Hume uses 'choice' alternatively with 'will' on page 467, and hence a choice is asmuch accountable by motives and desires forming the character of the agent as is the will. 'I could have acted otherwise' and 'I could have chosen otherwise' -- both could be said with truth, since one is an alternative manner of saying the other, and neither of them admits of categorical interpretation. Thus if our choices and decisions are effects they, as much as our actions, could be shown to have followed, according to some rule or other, from a given cause.

Ordinarily determinism implies that an agent cannot say that he could have chosen otherwise, and this is compatible with his freedom of action, and libertarianism is the contention that freedom requires the ability to choose otherwise as well. But if choice is effective choice, that is, to choose is undoubtedly to have done what is chosen, and as Hume suggests by his phrase "choice or will" no wedge is driven between doing and choosing. Again if doing is choosing-to-do, then to say that an agent could have done otherwise though he could not have chosen otherwise is self-inconsistent. Choice and action are, for Hume, virtual synonyms, in the sense that to speak of choosing X is to speak willing to do X.

The problem of freedom has been construed as the problem of power or effort. Moore, in his Ethics, has analysed the power word 'can' in the context of past actions, and it would not be foolish to suggest that what he has done is in fact to have stated a position along Hume's lines. It is held that an agent is free only if he could have acted differently. To say that one could have acted differently is equivalent to saying that one would have done otherwise if he had chosen to. Moore, in effect, pioneered the type of analysis that was brought into vogue by C.L.Stevenson and P. Nowell-Smith. The advance that was made by Stevenson's or Nowell-Smith's analysis was the consideration of conditions in conceiving the notion of avoidability. Both of these attempts have been taken as standard reconciliationist view of the subject or the problem of freedom and determinism. The Humean legacy exemplified in the

analyses of Stevenson and Nowell-Smith has been, with appropriateness, called instances of a hypothetical analysis in view of the importance ascribed to the if-clause in the analysesns of the can-statements. The greatest critics of the hypothetical analysis have been Austin (in his 'Ifs and Cans' in Philosophical Papers) and C.A.Campbell (in 'The Psychology of Effort of Will', P.A.S., XL, 1940). Without going into the details of Austin's treatment of the can-statements, namely, whether it could be analysed with or without an if-clause, or whether 'could have' is a past conditional or past indicative, it might be asserted that Austin did not defend any particular thesis, libertarian or deterministic. On the contrary, he was on the whole, critical of the reconciliationist analyses in terms of hypothetical if-clauses, though did not take sides. Nowell-Smith thought that Austin was giving an indeterminist account of the word 'can' interpreted as to stand for abilities. This is consistent with Hume's premises, though there is a methodological difference between Hume and his modern followers. He tried to deal with the problem from a phenomenological standpoint, exploring the nature of conative or volitional experience, whereas his modern followers are concerned to analyse the notions involved in the dispute. To say this is of course not to mean that Hume did favour or did not himself do any conceptual analysis. "I dare be positive no one will ever endeavour to refute those reasonings otherwise than by altering my definitions, and assigning a different meaning to the terms of cause and effect, and necessity, and liberty, and chance" (ibid.,p.407, italics in

the text). There is much evidence in support of the assertion that to the question how the two beliefs, namely, that human actions are causally determined and that human actions are free, can both be true, Hume found the answer in analysing what is meant by saying that one's action may be caused and yet be free. And it seems true to say that Hume's intention has been more phenomenologically oriented than that of a conceptual analyst's.

Hume's thesis has been that to say that a man acted freely is to say that he was not constrained, or that he could have done otherwise if he had chosen. He held that the "liberty of spontaneity ... which is oppos'd to violence" should be contrasted with the non-existent "liberty of indifference...which means a negation of necessity and causes" (op.cit., p.407). The main trend of the thesis has been put forward by all those subscribed to the view that from the fact that one's action is causally determined it does not follow that the agent is not free. This is how Ayer summed up the position (in his Philosophical Essays, p.270). Or, Nowell-Smith remarked that freedom implies causality ('Freewill and Moral Responsibility', Mind, LVII, 1948, p.46). They have also held that the absence of causal laws governing action does not give the moralist what he wants, or in other words, freedom is the absence of constraining causes, not that of determining causes, which is presupposed by ascription of responsibility.

The position has been found unsatisfactory by those who favour the categorical analysis of the word 'can'. C.D.Broad, argued

that 'Obligability entails substitutability' (see his essay 'Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism' in Ethics and the History of Philosophy, London, 1952). Freedom, for Broad, must be 'categorical' if the phrase 'ought implies can' is to make any sense. Largely in sympathy with Broad was C.A.Campbell, who advocated a categorical interpretation of 'can', and which is incompatible with determinism. Tenability of Campbell's thesis depends on his notion of the self of the agent, the maker of decisions; and in this sense 'self' is not replaceable by the Humean notion of 'character'. We speak of actions as being "in character" while still holding the agent responsible. 'Character' is usually a determinist word, though it may be a blanket word to refer in general to our likes and dislikes, principles, habits, traits and so forth. It does not normally indicate precisely what we will do, but rather the sort of thing which in a particular situation we are likely to do. Thus it may leave plenty of room soft-determinism. It can also be pointed out that Campbell's analysis presupposes such a notion of the self, which, to my belief, is transcendent in character, so much so that it can hardly be considered a reply to the Humean position. To make Campbell's position more explicit it should be mentioned that he claims that it is the self that is the cause of free actions Humeans enjoy "freedom of a kind not compatible with unbroken causal continuity". He lays it down that an act is a "free" act in the sense required for moral responsibility only if the agent is the sole cause of the act; and could exert his causality in alternative ways. An appeal

is made to our conscious experience of making decisions, and Campbell complains that determinists decline to recognise the testimony of what he calls "practical self-consciousness". How Campbell's contention that a moral agent acts in a "contra-causal" ways would at once be rejected by Hume, since for him an altogether different concept of man is involved. Again, the evidence of our own inner awareness of making choices hardly justified that the self is a special kind of a cause (it may be another thing to say that the agent-self is a cause, and Hume says that the agent is "immediate author" of his actions); and its evidential value remains poor indeed. It is not clear how out of a number of possible choices one could have been substituted for a particular choice made at a certain time. Ryle's example of "might-have-been" is relevant in the present context. And so is his remark: "What does not exist or happen cannot be named, individually indicated or put on a list..." (Dilemmas, pp. 25-6). If such a thing cannot be characterised as having been prevented, it cannot be mentioned as having been chosen either. The fact that agency can be exerted in alternative ways can hardly be established by an appeal to experience. Again Campbell's notion of the self is conceived as a continuant or as that which undergoes states and in which events occur. Such a notion of the self of the agent is alien to Hume's workea-day idea or ever-present impression of the self. There is a possibility of misconception. Hume appears to have held two different notions of the self, one in his epistemology and another in his moral psychology. The self as a "bundle of perceptions" is essentially non-Cartesian,

and "the ever present impression of our self" spoken of in the Book II of the Treatise may seem to reinstate the Cartesian notion of the self as a permanent psychic substance. But it is not that, Mercer has shown that the import of such expressions as "ourself is always intimately present to us" (ibid.,p.320) or "the idea, or rather impression, of ourselves is always intimately present with us" (ibid., p.317) etc. is to vindicate the commonsense belief in personal identity and not to demonstrate the existence of a simple immutable self through introspection. There is no question of Hume's not revising his moral psychology in the light of his theory of knowledge. Further, Hume thought that a causal theory of action was presupposed by any theory of responsibility, for an undetermined action would be one which it would be impossible to praise or blame, since it would be connected with nothing permanent in the agent's nature. Philippa Foot (in her essay 'Free Will as Involving Determinism', The Philosophical Review, LXVI, No.4, 1957) thinks Hume was 'wrong' in asking for something "permanent or durable" in the agent's character so that he could be praised or blamed or for that matter, responsibility could be ascribed to him, since Hume was already committed to an impermanent view of the self. It appears to me that she misconstrues Hume's intentions, because Hume's search was for the character-traits of the agent, and by his phrases such as "the characters and disposition of the person" or "durable and constant" (ibid., p.411) elements in the agent nothing was meant which could be taken as contradicting his phenomenological discovery of the self as a bundle of perceptions.

Now I must answer the question I posed earlier: What is the picture of the agent in Hume's causal theory of human actions. Without subscribing to the categorical analysis of the power word 'can' or committing myself, for the present moment to a transcendent, continuant view of the self, I cannot help feeling the truth of Campbell's remark that Hume was looking at the problem "from the standpoint of the external observer; the standpoint proper to, because alone possible for, apprehension of the physical world" ("Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?" Mind, LX, No. 240, 1951, p.462). Whether Hume's orientation was 'wrong' I cannot endorse, but given his premises, as he himself says, his conclusions do follow.[1] The older advocates of freedom like Reid and Clarke favoured an absolute or categorical analysis of the concept. Reid did not deny that human beings are influenced by motives, or that they influence action, but he refused to credit motives with causal status. Motives, he held, are not the sort of entities that could be said either to act or acted upon. Motives, Reid thought, "may be compared to advice, or exhortation, which leaves a man still at liberty" (British Moralists, ed. D.D.Raphael, II, pp.276-7). This pres-

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1. Moritz Schlick writes, "this pseudo-problem (of the freedom of the will) has long since been settled by the efforts of certain sensible persons; and above all,...with exceptional clarity by Hume." Problems of Ethics, Dover, 1962, p.143. Perhaps Schlick was echoing Schopenhauer who approvingly mentions Hume, among others, who have demonstrated the 'complete and strict necessity of the acts of will with the appearance of the motives'. On the Basis of Morality, tr. E.F.J.Payne, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965, p.109.

criptivist view[1] ignores the fact that motives, as McDougall says, are the "springs of action", and secondly, does not touch Hume's causal theory in any effective manner. Granted that motives are exhortory experiences (that appears to be highly unsatisfactory a case to admit, because "advice or exhortations" are linguistic phenomena, and it is difficult to conceive motives as that), its constant conjunction with actions of similar nature will lead the spectator to infer the one from the other. Reid, in fact, overlooks Hume's definition of cause or the nature of the causal relation. He does not meet Hume on the latter's empirical grounds. And at this point I would like to make my second answer to the question.

Causal determination of human actions by the agent's motives does not imply that the agents are instinctive automata. It is possible to combine a sensitive regard for the value of human personality with determinism. A determinist need not deny that we often change our character, or we do make decisions, we resist temptations or subdue impulses. It will depend on his view of the nature of man. The spectator may yet conclude, as Hume says, about the causes of the actions performed by us as agents, or even about our future behaviour from a consideration of our motives and situations, though the inference or the prediction has no "real" nece-

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1. Thomas Reid appears to conceive 'freedom' as much the same way as R.M.Hare does in latter's Freedom and Reason. Both Reid and Hare seem to hold that moral decisions are dictations of psychology, there is so much of what we freely choose, commendations are not efficient causes, moral exhortations carry weight only the agents are in a good position to make the decisions that they do make.

osity; and this follows from Hume's stipulation of the concept of cause. The inferences or the predictions about the agent's actions made by the spectator are particular causal statements which imply universal laws, but they are by no means instances of paradigm predictions or inferences as we come across in mathematical or logical deductions. Causal determination of action is the spectator's view of the agent's actions, and Hume nowhere says that given a set of motives, actions of particular sort will be entailed. Again, predictions are predictions, they are modal utterances, and as such remain on the verge of possibility. Inference as regards a possible action or a prediction about it leaves it open what in actuality happens. Predictions are instanced by what in fact occurs, and what in fact occurs is a "free occurrence", as Paul Weiss has put it, and predictability of a state of affairs does not entail its occurrence. And in Hume's view of our knowledge of the world this position seems perfectly plausible to be held. "A true sceptic", says Hume, "will be diffident of his philosophical doubts, as well as of his philosophical conviction; and will never refuse any innocent satisfaction, which offers itself, upon account of either of them".(op.cit.,p.273). My second answer to the question of the status of the agent is a kind of "innocent satisfaction" that Hume would not refuse.

Lastly, I would like to consider a view about the reconcilability of 'freedom' and 'necessity', advanced by Professor D. D. Raphael in his Moral Judgment. This view, in part, is a critique of Hume's basic position, and otherwise, a reconstruction of Hume's

distinction between the 'agent' and the 'spectator'.

Raphael's critique of Hume's position may be briefly stated as follows. There are two kinds of talks that are confused, the "talk of forces" and the "talk of human volitions". According to Raphael the talk of forces is characterised a "positivist interpretation" of observable phenomena, no assertion of this talk says anything about the "character" of the events, it simply states regularity of sequence of classes of things; and seeks to explain the relation between regular sequences in terms of mathematical commensurability, and spatio-temporal considerations. The so-called 'causal' laws can be stated without employing the concept of 'cause', which is an unanalysed notion, as it is used in scientific discourse. Now the "talk of forces" conceived as a language bears no resemblance to another language with which it is often confused, that is, the talk of human volitions. In the talk of human volitions the questions of mathematical commensurability and spatio-temporal considerations are out of place, they do not arise at all. As a language, the talk of human volitions is animistic, and the "basic meaning" of the term 'cause' as "free activity" marks it off from the talk of forces. The two talks are so non-identical that no extension of the categories of one language to the domain of another is possible. Statements of one talk cannot be translated into that of the other. Our attempts of interpreting regularity of sequence of classes of things in terms of 'cause' is a sign of animistic hangover, in somuchas the "basic meaning" of the term 'cause' is derived from human actions. Our idea of ourselves as agents is one of efficient

initiator of change, and on the analogy of our own idea of ourselves as agents we proceed to explain the regular sequence of classes of things, and end up in formulating 'causal' laws. And once such laws are formulated, human actions may also be thought explicable in terms of such laws. And it is here the confusion between the two kinds of talks arises. According to Raphael, the whole problem, at the philosophical level, starts with confusing the language of science, or the "talk of forces", which describes the uniformity, or regular sequences, of nature with purposive terms drawn from the language or talk of human actions, and vice versa. "The two languages are quite different, expressing two different points of view, and there is no conflict between them" (op.cit.,p.207), says Raphael.

He charges Hume for confusing causal law in the sense of "universal regularity of sequence" and efficient cause as free activity. But is it true? Hume could have been so charged only if he had said that the problem of freewill versus determinism was a genuine one, and he did not really say that. As far as Hume is concerned there is no problem of free will, and the whole dispute has, he said, heretofore been purely verbal in character, involving only confusions in the meanings of words. Instead of maintaining that there are two different talks, one of forces and the other of human actions, he has argued that causal language must be identified not in terms of what it talks about, but how does it talk about, i.e., constant succession. The syntactical formulation of causal language, to the neglect of the semantical considerations,

is not that deplorable. And if it be so, then Raphael's second charge that Hume's account of 'necessity' is unacceptable because it is an "animistic projection" on to external world is unfair. This charge could have been valid, if Hume could be shown to have maintained a double-decker view of the world, one of mechanics and the other of psychology. The phrase "animistic projection" is specially unhappy, since it fails to do justice to Hume's complex notion of the external world, which has a custom-bred or belief-formed status. Even if an animistic notion has to be projected on to the world, the latter should enjoy or possess a different reality than the idea or ideas projected thereon. In Hume's case it is not easy to assert whether the external world is priviledged to exist independent of our belief that it exists. If existence of bodies is characterized by constancy and coherence of our impressions, and the conclusions that we draw from them are "deriv'd from custom, and regulated by past experience" (op.cit., p.197) aided by the imagination, it is hardly possible to say that there exists an objective world in any guaranteed fashion. But this is a philosopher's description. Yet beyond the sceptical reflections there exists the world of our every-day experience. For all practical purposes this world of natural belief is taken for granted. Now it can be argued that since the world of our every-day experience is itself a product of imaginative projection, what special sense could be ascribed to 'animistic projection' in the case of necessity? Again, granted that 'necessity' is a projection, then why should there at all be a projection of the specta-

tor's point of view and not that of the agent? 'Necessity', to Hume, is chiefly a spectator's word. If it were a case of animistic projection as Raphael has argued, it could likely have been a projection of the agent's view derived from his liberty of indifference. Our idea of efficiency has anthropomorphic roots, and Hume explicitly refuses to admit the notion of efficient cause. When he refuses to distinguish between "moral and physical necessity" he does not seem to be primarily concerned with effective production prevention or modification of events. Rather, he invokes causal language in order to explaining human actions. For him, "cause" is essentially a schematic word, a "determination of the mind" to view human actions in a certain way. Nothing much is gained by calling the determination animistic. In the Enquiry (footnote, p. 94) Hume says that necessity of any action is discovered by "reflecting on human actions" by the spectator. Now it can be an open question whether reflection that Hume is talking about is animistic projection. Of course, "reflecting on human actions" and "performing the actions themselves" have different feelings. But, it should not be forgotten that he discounts a great deal of the evidential value of the feeling of "looseness or indifference" that an agent might have. Hence it can hardly be said that he confuses "compulsion of passivity" with "freedom of activity" as Raphael has suggested, because Hume's "determination of the mind" or "reflection on human actions" are schematic phrases and should not be taken as standing for passive mental states.

Raphael has sought to rescue efficient causation from being reduced to universal regularity of sequence. The latter affects us as passive spectators and hence the words 'law' or 'necessity'. The mental state experienced by witnessing either regularity in a class of things or universality of regular sequence is not initiated by us, "it is not a case of acting, of our causing the change", says Raphael. On the other hand, efficient causation is free activity in the sense that "the change is one initiated by, we can act or not act, as we choose". Raphael then charges Hume of equivocating the two senses of 'cause'. This is hardly justifiable. First, it remains to be argued that the "determination of the mind" is a passive experience, or that we are "forced" to expect the second term of a regular sequence. On our expectation much of our practical programming depends, and hence it cannot be said to be an isolated state of affair. Secondly, Hume could have been charged of equivocation only if he had distinguished the two of Raphael's sense of 'cause'. On the contrary, Hume puts it very clearly that our idea of efficiency cannot only be introspectively had, but also that "there is no foundation for that distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; or between efficient causes, and formal, and material, and exemplary, and final causes. For as our idea of efficiency is deriv'd from the constant conjunction of two objects, wherever this is observ'd, the cause is efficient..." (ibid., p.171). For Hume, it is the spectator's prerogative to ascribe efficiency to an agent, and this is not on any animistic analogy. Similarly, there is for him, only

one kind of necessity, which, he says, is "the constant conjunction of objects along with the determination of the mind" (ibid.). Consequently, Hume's intentions run counter to Raphael's suggestion that the two languages, one describing events or actions as deliberately initiated, and the other, treating events or actions as falling under regular classes, do not conflict. This could hardly be the case with Hume. He would not say that both determinism and libertarianism are true. On the textual evidence it is difficult to assert that he held two points of view, from one of which men are determined, from the other free. Raphael says that the two points of view are based on "a distinction between interpreting what we find as 'things happening' and as 'persons acting'" (op.cit.,p.210). One wonders if Hume would agree to this version of his views. His own words are memorable in this context: "Let no one....put invidious construction on my words, by saying simply, that I ascert the necessity of human actions, and place them on the same footing with the operations of senseless matter. I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is suppos'd to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the receiv'd systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects." (op.cit.,p.410). For Hume, the same 'causal' language can be employed for both the "actions of the mind" and the "actions of matter". Unless the two domains of the mind and of matter are distinguished by the two

kinds of languages in order to be talked about, there cannot arise the question of confusing the two languages, or for that matter, confusing the two senses of the term 'cause'.

We may now turn to Raphael's reconstruction of the solution of the problem of freewill. Drawing upon Hume's distinction between the 'agent' and the 'spectator', Raphael writes, "From the outlook of scientific observation...a man's act is 'explained' by bringing it under a regular law through comparison with similar acts in similar circumstances; it is dealt with as a 'thing' or event observed, and as liable to be correlated with similar observed events ('things happening'). From the outlook of agents (which may be taken not only by the actual agent, as Hume suggests, but also by spectators thinking of themselves as potential agents, imagining themselves in the actual agent's shoes, instead of thinking of the situation detachedly as an external object of their observation), the act is considered, not in relation to similar past acts, but as issuing from a freely choosing and responsible 'person'. The distinction between the approach of a detached, scientific observer and that of an agent, is a distinction between interpreting what we find as 'things happening' and as 'persons acting', between thinking of 'events' and thinking of 'persons'"(op.cit.,pp.209-10). This is indeed a novel way of developing Hume's view, but the passage tells us also that Raphael is a secret libertarian. In spite of his two language explanation, in course of developing his own view he resorts to ways of 'interpreting'. Does this appear consistent with his critique of Hume, or even with his proposal for keeping the

talks of forces and of human actions separate? Interpretations can be linguistic enough as languages can be interpretative. But the "talk of forces" as Raphael himself admits is reportive or descriptive, and when it is interpretative, it is "positivistic". Now once it is admitted that the two languages are categorically dissimilar, how is it possible to carry on two diverse interpretations within one language, whatever it may be, unless of course it is a higher-order or more generalised type of language than both the talks of forces and of human volitions? These doubts of course does not take away the cogency of Raphael's observations, but there is another side of the problem. He does not appear to be as thorough going in his separation of the 'spectator' and 'agent' roles, as might appear from the separation of the two kinds of talks. I do not intend to suggest that the separation of the agent and the spectator roles should or could be absolute. The interdependence of action and observation is so built into any viable notion of man that without reducing the concept of a human person to a passive observer it cannot perhaps be said that we can be in possession of knowledge of other selves without taking into consideration the fact they could not ever be observed unless they were sometimes active experimentors. Similarly, no one could ever be experimentors unless one were sometimes observers. Verbs of perception have both an active and a passive form, looking at and seeing, for instance. Again, the things that one might do intentionally include what one does an observer as well as what one does an agent. There is, it seems, a situational factor involved in the distinction. In

the Enquiry (p.89) Hume remarks, "The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others,..." We play the role of spectator or make observations with the intention of interpreting or discovering the way other people behave in human situations; and we become actors or perform actions as agents with the intention of changing the way things are in the world (which would of course include other men, and to that extent action is a social concept, and an agent is a social engineer). In the like manner, the two talks can hardly be kept in separation. Things can be done by words as well. Uttering a performative is an action. And if one does not commit what Austin calls "descriptive fallacy", there would be nothing to prevent recognising the fact that we use language in order to perform actions. The assumption that language is used only to describe what is observed is a consequence of thinking of people primarily as passive spectators. If actions can be performed by using language, then it is also a fact that people are agents as well as spectators. But this is another matter.

In fact, Raphael holds two theses, one linguistic and the other metaphysical. His metaphysical thesis derives much from Thomas Reid (ibid., p.205, also his Introduction to his edition of Price's Review, p.xl) and involved there is a view of a transcendent self or 'person'. In this manner of looking at the problem Raphael is one with Campbell. It is true that the concept of freedom loses quite a lot of its significance without a concept

of self, since it is the agent or the person who can be said to be free. Locke was right in saying that the proper question should be whether man is free. But do we have any empirical evidence of the freedom, except the feeling that the agent might feel? And against this objection the notion of a personal agent as an efficient cause does not seem to have any fair chance of survival. The so-called feeling of freedom is not a feeling in the sense of a sensation. It is merely a strong conviction that I can do what I want to do. Again, I do not experience both the feeling and the freedom. I experience the conviction that I am free to do what I choose, and I experience doing what I choose. But do I experience that my choice is the only cause of my action. What evidence is my feeling of freedom for the existence of it? As Spinoza said it can sometimes be quite illusory. A stubborn feeling of freedom of choice count as evidence against determinism, for this kind of feeling can be deceptive. Again the feeling can be irrelevant to the question of causal determination. In order to decide whether a given act of choice is causally determined we have to judge whether there is an antecedent event with which the choice is connected by a general law. And the data of introspection has no bearing on this question. Engels wrote in his Anti-Dühring : "Freedom of the will ... means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject....the freer a man's judgment is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgment will be determined; while the uncertainty founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary

choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows precisely by this that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control." (Part I, XI, p. 137, Moscow, 1969). Raphael thinks that Hume did entertain a belief in "moral freedom" as distinguished from "social freedom" (ibid., p.200). The passage he refers to in Hume's Enquiry, p.94, is a restatement in almost unaltered language of what Hume says in the Treatise, pp.314-15 and 408. It is difficult to agree with Raphael that in the said passage Hume says that "both determinism and libertarianism are true". However much the distinction between "reflecting" and "performing" points of view in relation to human acts may be correlated, it is, for Hume, the spectator's point of view which is supreme: "however we may imagine we feel liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character" (Enquiry, p.94, footnote, a slightly different version in the Treatise, p. 408). And, what is surprising is that far from concluding from this that no human actions are free, Hume concludes the opposite, for he considered it the very nature of a free action that it springs from the motive of the agent. What distinguishes free from unfree actions is the mode of causation, not the absence of causes. For Hume, there is no freedom other than "social freedom", and what Raphael designates as moral freedom would consist in the agent's feelings alone, and for which no empirical evidence could possibly be produced. Perhaps it would be truer to say that since Hume does not maintain any theory of two independent languages or talks as Raphael does, he need not distinguish also bet-

ween two sorts of freedoms, social and moral. Price, we have mentioned earlier, sought to correct or amend Hume's account of necessity by remarking that the motives were not the sort of things that could be called efficient causes, and Raphael seeks to revive the attempt. But, however trivial Hume's notion of social freedom may be, no room can be made for moral freedom in the sense of efficient causation, without of course revising his epistemology and non-transcendent notion of the personal agent. And if this be agreed upon, then Raphael's account may be said to be an independent point of view, still less an interpretation of Hume's doctrine, though he does attribute the view directly to Hume.

One final remark about Raphael's two language thesis. He is surely correct in believing that one cannot go on talking about in both the languages. To hold that the laws of human action are not as quantifiable as natural sequences, or to put in other words, they are not laws of 100 per cent regularity. Hume himself had said, "Nothing is more fluctuating and inconstant...than the will of man" (op.cit., p.313). But this fact cannot be regarded as the logical ground for maintaining that there should be two independent languages for talking about regularities of varying degrees. Arguments for dropping out one of the languages in preference to the other are not without force, since the fact that there are two languages does not guarantee that both of them are equally viable. In history there are instances of many languages being dropped out of usage, for example, the language of geo-centric universe or the language of witchcraft. I believe, when Hume sought to ascribe

"intelligible quality" to matter what he did really propose was that there be one language, whether we speak about mechanical forces or human volitions. I do not claim that this would settle the dispute of free will versus determinism. The metaphysician might still go on insisting on filling the term 'free' with his own meaning, but he can only do so on non-logical decisions, and this might leave the determinist to thinking that it could be done only because the term empty of empirical content.

Postscript : Can motives be causes of actions?

Recent writers on philosophical psychology do not look favourably on the thesis that motives are causes of human actions. This thesis is logically secondary to the contention that the concept of cannot intelligibly be applied to the explanation of human actions. Since Ryle's analysis of mental concepts, Austin, Peters, Urmson, Anscombe, Dray and Melden have discovered new categorical boundaries separating psychological concepts from the language of natural events. A psychological explanation is not a causal explanation, the two, it is held, are logically incompatible. To cite the motive for an act and to cite the cause of an event is, in either case, to answer the question 'why' but the meaning of the question is different in the two cases. It has been argued that to ask 'why?' about a human action is to make the action rationally intelligible by filling out its purpose content including the beliefs and attitudes of the agent who performs it. A motive explains an action by

identifying the agent's reason for doing it. Reasons, like causes, are said to have explanatory power, but a reason is not a cause in the sense of an antecedent event. Or to put the matter in a more radical manner, the rational explanation of an action is so incompatible with any causal explanation that in the former case we should only have description of behaviour in purposive language, while in the latter it would be inappropriate, since causally explicable behaviour could only be involuntary.

In the present context it is not my purpose to attempt a critique of the views which insist on a radical distinction between reason and causes. Without any intention of minimising the value of the conceptual insights of such views, I shall content myself with simply indicating that Hume's thesis that human actions are caused by motives is not rendered a howler by recent philosophical disfavour it has fallen into.

Some of the criticisms advanced against the view that human actions are causally explicably may be taken as directed against Hume. I propose to offer the following considerations. Usually, Hume's view that the cause and the effect are logically distinct or independent is appealed to with a view to showing that the concept of cause cannot be applied to the explanation of human actions. It is argued that a cause must be logically distinct from the alleged effect; but a reason for an action is not logically distinct from the action; therefore, reasons (for that matter any motive) are not causes of action. In one or more versions this argument, inspired by Ryle's treatment of motives in <u>The Concept of Mind</u>,

is fairly common and can be found in Kenny, Hampshire, Peters, Holden and Winch. The credibility of the argument depends on the contention that a reason makes an action intelligible by redescribing it in purposive language. We do not have two events, but only one under different descriptions. Causal relations, however, demand distinct events.

Let us consider Hume's logical independence thesis concerning the relationship between cause and effect. That the cause and the effect must be distinct existents is certainly what we have learnt from Hume. But is that the whole story about his views of the causal relation? In some needs there is nothing he wants more than to say that there is no "real intelligible connexion" between external objects. The words 'intelligible' and 'real' are hardly synonyms, and he cannot be said to be committed to a denial of the possibility or actuality of real connexion. On page 29 of the Treatise he says something that might set the idea of causal necessity in another light: "Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions are agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects". If that be so, why not likewise in the case of cause and effect? Hume does not ever contend that the ideas between which the necessary connexion or the causal relation holds are not adequate representations of objects. What then shall we decide about the intelligibility and reality of the relation or idea of necessary connexion? I am aware that it might of course be objected that the relation of cause and effect does not hold between ideas qua ideas but only between ideas qua existents. This point is in

fact raised by Kemp Smith, and hence the relation is not discoverable by comparing independently given entities. Without contending the validity of the objection it may be submitted that there can be an interpretation on which the causal relation in some sense shares in the character of knowledge. If the proposed interpretation is not a wild guess then the relation between causes and effects no longer remains to that degree open to the so-called logical independence view. Further, unless one should be inclined to discount a great deal of Hume's characterization of a relation as "that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination" (ibid., p.13) the proposed interpretation of the relation of cause and effect would not be without viability. If the necessary connexion between cause and effect is a relation (which Hume says it is) and the ideas it relates are in no way inadequate representations of objects (there is no reason why they should be so); then one can, by Hume's criterion of reference, apply the relation or idea of necessary connexion to objects.

Now then what is called "the determination of the mind" be accounted for? It is said that the determination is a specific mode of causation, in the imagination, when one adopts the attitude of the spectator in respect of objects or ideas in constant conjunction. A feeling of being necessitated is experienced, and hence a transition from a given object to its usual attendant becomes possible. The feeling and the transition need not be sharply distinguished, though a mental content and a mental activity are to be kept separate. We are in no way concerned with such nice ques-

tions. The value of this experience of necessity lies in that any assertion of causal connexion between objects is argued from it. In this sense, it would not be improper to say that the determination is a universal condition, for asserting causal relation being external objects. Hume says, "Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from causes to effects" (ibid., p.92). That the feeling of necessity is transferred to the external world is what we find in the Treatise. But this should be taken as a metaphor, for less as a confession of animistic projection. Rather, the determination is significant as a "model" (ibid.,p.165). If we take the model view of the determination of the mind seriously certain important consequences follow. There has got to be some sort of structural similarity between the model and the phenomena in respect of which it is used. If determination of the mind is a specific mode of causation and forms thereby the basis of causal connexion, then as a model it is an analogue of causal phenomena. The structural similarity between the model and the phenomena helps us in understanding and explaining the phenomena by providing us with a technique for talking about it. As an analogue model of causation "the determination of the mind is authenticated by our causal inferences. Their natural character does not mean that they have to be arbitrary. On page 484 of the Treatise Hume points it out. His reasons for the non-arbitrary character of our causal inferences is that they are based on such principles of the imagination that "are permanent, irresistable, and universal" (ibid.,p.225).

Unless I have badly mistaken the nature of Hume's notion of determination, it will be clear that it has not been his intention to say that causation is nothing but constant conjunction, as the protagonists of the logical distinctness of cause and effect appear to imply. Rather, "necessity makes an essential part of causation" (ibid., p.407, italics not in the text) is what Hume says. If causal explanation of human actions is a methodological device for Hume, the practical utility of the model of the determination of the mind cannot be underplayed. The union of determinant factors with human actions is not enough, it has got to be "certain" or reliable if explanations of human actions are to be viable. If the union is natural, i.e., peculiar to human nature (at this point another model of Hume, e.g., the model of mirror: "the minds of men are mirrors to one another", is interesting to notice) then causal explanation of human actions become reliable and practically interesting. As for assurance, in the content of practical interest, causal explanations of human actions it should be preferable on account of its non-empty character as opposed to the empty assurance of logical necessity.

Now about motives. Hume holds that human actions, when they are voluntary, are determined or have causes. To the class of causes he assimilates a variety of items, the agent's motives, temper, situation, character, and the indirect passions with "bent or tendency". Jointly or severally of these can be antecedent determinants of human actions. Whether they uniquely determine an action is another question. But it has been Hume's contention that ante-

cedent determinants settle or select the range of possibilities that an agent can choose from. To be more exact, according to him, since actions have a constant union with motives, temper and circumstances, an inference from one to the other is possible. Hume sometimes uses 'motive' and 'character' in an interchangeable fashion, when, for example, he says that character is something durable and constant in man which gives his actions moral quality, or for that matter, "When we praise any actions we regard only the motives that produced them" (ibid., p.477). To this class of "durable principles of the mind" can be assimilated what he calls the calm passions which are "the settled principles of action". Motive then, for Hume, is a name for whatever influences the will. The causal view concerning human actions is derived from the "uniformity of human actions" or from the fact that there is "a general course of nature in actions" (ibid., pp. 402 and 403). This uniformity consists in the constant union and connexion between like human actions and like motives of agents. The constance of "the union betwixt motives and actions" together with the "determination of the mind" make it possible to infer the existence of one from that of another.

The causal model invoked by Hume is an explanatory device, and if this assertion is philosophically unobjectionable his determinism can be said to be methodological. Various factors occur in explanation of human actions. Some may be antecedent factors, others may be law-like factors. And Hume employs both including teleological factors as well. It is not easy to say if he intends

any of the factors to do the explanatory job. He mentions antecedent, law-like and teleological factors as those that might influence the will, besides good and evil. Sometimes 'motive' is a general term for all the factors determining the will. He takes the word 'motive' in the philological sense meaning that which moves or induces a person to act in a certain way; and the candidates would be found in a mixed bag. He includes intention also as a factor in the causal explanation of actions. "By the intention we judge of the actions" (ibid., p.348), says Hume.

It might be objected that while it is right to say that singular causal statements imply generalisations, it is wrong to suppose that motives, desires, passions and intentions are causes of actions. Hume is said to suppose that the statement that a person did something because, say, he was angry, carries the implication that if the circumstances were repeated the same action would follow. Such an argument is put forward by Hart and Honore. Further, it may be that we do have rough laws that can be improved. Whether such laws can be made on the basis of reliable predictions is another issue. But it does not follow that Hume is essentially wrong in claiming that singular causal statements entail laws. If he is taken to mean that no particular law is entailed by a singular causal claim, then it can be defended without defending any law. In another way, we may by way of settling the claim look for some generalisation of which an action in question may serve as an instance. If a causal claim assigns a motive, the success or failure of the assignment would depend on showing it to be an instance of a regularity. In

this respect assignment of motive works in the same way as the attribution of causes. Generalisations about human behaviour need not be on the whole about behavioural regularities. That is why Hume includes interpretations of situations, temper of the agent, etc., in the set of attributive conditions. The uniformity of human actions presupposed in assignment of motives is hardly mechanical quantifiable uniformity. It is a matter of aim, purpose and value that involve both the agent and the spectator. Some prisoners, on discovering the impossibility of their escape, choose to work upon the nature of the gaoler, some upon the stone and iron. But none perhaps resist from attempts for their freedom. I think this use of Hume's own example would be permissible.

The inferences on which we base our beliefs about matters of fact are not formally valid. There should be no reason for appealing to this logical point, nor can be decisive. The relation of cause and effect is a law-like one, and when we are to deal with human actions we are not really concerned with the formal validity of such relations. When we are to formulate our predictions in non-metrical terms, as we do for human actions, the sort of inference that leads to predictions will not have to specify a class of similar actions. We hardly ever demand any detailed and delicate description capable of identifying unambiguously one and only one action whose occurrence would satisfy the prediction. There is a limit to precision, and human actions are no exception to the fact that in nature no prediction can identify a determinate event without ambiguity. It is we, <u>qua</u> spectators, who set up conventions

(this too is based on socio-cultural considerations and not an arbitrary, isolated affair) as regards what performance of an agent will be taken as satisfying our predictions about him. In the domain of human actions, predictability and determinism need not be equivalents in the strong logical sense of the terms. Predictability in practice is what Hume demands for his methodological determinism.

'Motive' is indeed a puzzling word and yet ascription of causal role to the determinants of human actions is a commonsense position. A complete abandonment of the position is urged by many recent writers. Hume has observed that a motive need not always be an antecedent occurrent. On this issue Ryle thinks that a motive is a disposition to behave, while Anscombe and Melden hold that it is intention to do the deed. But despite their differences they agree that explanations of human actions are possible in terms of motives. It may be ask: how are the explanations of human actions in terms of antecedent factors, dispositions and intentions related, and if they are compatible? Now Hume does not much distinguish between the factors in terms of which explanations of actions are offered. His inventory of determinants of actions, we have noted above, includes dispositions as well as occurrences, and the fact that they are categorically separate appears to have been glossed over by him. He has been content with some sort of relation between them. As regards the question of compatibility, however, he was keenly aware. We find him carefully distinguishing actions done from motives from those that are done without design or by accident. Even actions that can be done without any other motive than their own sake

(see Freudian, p.479) has also been taken account of.

Thus Hume's general position remains such that he assimilates the explanatory factors of human actions, namely, the agent's desires, intentions, passions and motives -- all that we now-a-days call reasons -- to causes. What does it mean to assimilate reasons for actions to causes? It is to give the necessary and/or sufficient conditions of actions to be explained. Generalisations link reasons for actions and actions, just as causes of occurrences and occurrences are linked. Both the cause-explanation and reason-explanation are signified by such words as 'because', and 'cause' and even 'reason'. Again, motive or reason explanations could not be given if there were not regular causal sequences in the world. And since actions could not be directed to ends unless one action was more likely to be followed by a certain consequence than another. This matter is important equally for the agent as well as the spectator. In this respect it would be wrong to say, as Flew has suggested, that in the spectator's world "there seems to be no room for the interests of agents".

There are philosophers who would separate reasons and causes. They argue that psychological antecedents do not explain actions. It has been observed that a cause must be describable without reference to its effect, while reasons for actions cannot be so described. Hence reasons for actions are not causes. The argument, if the assumption about the independent describability of causes from effects is not unsound, is valid, though it over-simplifies the case. Hume's candidates of 'motive' are not a homogeneous lot, they are as diverse

as dispositions and psychological occurrences, antecedent factors as well as teleological ones. Some passions like pride (when it is not a character-trait) may, qualify for such a notion of cause which can be described in isolation from its effect, though there are reasons to doubt whether pride can be so understood. When Anscombe says that motives can be "backward-looking", does not the class include feelings and emotions? And I suppose it would be pertinent to ask that. Again, what she calls "forward-looking" motives or intention, does not an explanation in its term require mention of some of the agent's character-traits, emotions, beliefs and ends in order to be intelligible? Should it not be regarded a mistake to claim that it does, surely some causal factors would have to be admitted in the explanation. That psychological antecedents of actions and the conative dispositions of the agent need then be taken into account in giving an explanation of human actions is a matter that merits admission. Hume's view that the psychological antecedents and dispositions are causally related to the agent's actions, or that they have a necessary place in causal explanation of human actions, has a methodological advantage, namely, this way of thinking renders human actions intelligible by relating them to the agent's experiences, and beliefs which determine his behaviour. Attribution of causal efficacy to people's conative attitudes seems to be in order since conation is among the causes of behaviour.

Psychological concepts are explanatory, and a reason for an action, if our explanation has to be causal, may be a kind of cause. Motives are identified in terms of the actions they motivate. But

can we, on that account say that there can be a motive before an action has been performed? Much would depend on what one means by 'motive'. Supposing that one means by 'motive' intention, does the claim that it makes no sense to speak of a motive before an action has been performed supplant the causal model of explanation of human actions? Melden has argued that the motive of an action is part of the way in which we identify the action (Free Action, Humanities Press, 1961, p.77). It is specially interesting since Melden is one among others who would never ascribe causal status to a motive. Even Ryle, who had argued that motives were not causes, Kenny noted, offered a theory no less causal. The irony, if it is one, is not plain and not without deeper reasons. The causal model of explanation is good for two purposes as far as Hume is concerned. It is employed with a view to explaining human actions, identifying the agent's motives by what he does. On the other hand, we venture to tell how our agent would behave if his motives were such and such. In either case the attribution of a motive is the sort of assertion that can be justified by showing it to be an instance of a regularity. And in this respect the concept of motive works in the same way as the concept of cause.