


A complete record of
UNITY TALKS

- ★ RAJINDRA PRASAD JINNAH
- ★ GANDHI JINNAH
- ★ NEHRU JINNAH
- ★ BOSE JINNAH
- ★ SAPRU JINNAH
- ★ VICEROY JINNAH
- ★ AGAIN GANDHI JINNAH

Edited & Compiled by:
DURLAB SINGH



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LAHORE

EDITOR'S NOTE

The present volume is a collection of correspondence that passed from time to time between the various Congress leaders and Mr. Jinnah—the Muslim League Qaid-i- Azam. These letters have been collected in a book form, quite in a dispassionate manner with a view to educate the readers about the most intricate of problems in India to-day. It will not only help the people to understand the root cause of the present communal problem in India but also facilitate the examination of the cases of the respective parties and will ultimately enable the readers to conclude as to who is responsible for the present communal deadlock in India.

The book was originally intended to be sent in the market in small pamphlets form. I published the correspondence between Rajindra Prasad and Gandhi Jinnah (1937-38), Nehru-Jinnah, Bose-Jinnah, Viceroy and Sapru-Jinnah, and then again Gandhi-Jinnah in five different pamphlets. But several friends suggested to me to bring all the pamphlets in one single volume so that any future historian or any student of Indian communal problem when out to study his subject or write his thesis could make use of it as a reference book. Hence the present compilation.

I had a mind to make the task of the reader more easy and the subject of the book more comprehensible by appending all the relevant facts and statements but the Government's paper economy measures stood in my way and I was obliged to turn out the book within a specific date in what ever form it was ready. But I have every hope that the necessity of the second edition would soon be felt when I will be able to make the book perfect and up-to-date in every respect.

I need offer no apology to my readers for the printing of the book and the quality of paper used because this is a disease today completely beyond any remedy. The lot of general book publishers in India and especially of the political publishers is by no means an easy one. Not only is there an acute scarcity of paper but a persistent reluctance on the part of the printers to undertake any book of political nature. As such we don't find any other alternative but to content with whatever quality of paper or printing available. We however, promise with our readers that when the war is over and when India is a free country (although it is a wishful thinking) and when the "ammunition for war" is no more required we will provide our readers with the best possible stuff at comparatively cheap prices. In the mean time, of course we will earnestly request our readers, not for our own sake, not for the sake of the business that we do but for the sake of the cause we represent to lend their whole hearted co-operation to us and help the development of Hero Publications into a really National House. Let us know our weaknesses and short comings, acquaint us with our defects, send us your suggestions and we can assure you that we will mend ourselves, improve our quality and accept the suggestions with gratitude and pleasure.

DURLAB SINGH

13th January, 1945.

Certain Facts and Figures

POPULATION STATISTICS

According to 1941 Census Report

Distribution of Muslim Population in British India

	Total area In sq. miles.	Total popula- tion (in lakhs).	Total Muslims.	Percentage of Muslims
Madras ...	126'166	493'42	38'96	7'90
Bombay ...	76'443	208'50	19'21	9'21
Bengal ...	77'442	603'06	330'05	54'73
U. P. ...	106'247	550'20	84'16	15'30
Punjab ...	99'089	284'19	162'17	57'07
Bihar ...	69'745	363'40	47'16	12'98
C.P. & Berar ...	98'575	168'13	7'84	4'66
Assam ...	54'951	102'05	34'42	33'73
N.-W.F.P. ...	14'263	30'38	27'89	91'79
Sind ...	48'136	45'35	32'08	70'75
Orissa ...	32'198	87'28	1'46	1'68
Ajmer-Merwara...	2'400	5'84	'90	15'40
Andaman and Nicobars ...	3'143	'34	'03	23'70
Baluchistan ...	54'456	5'02	4'39	87'50
Coorg ...	1'593	1'69	'15	6'73
Delhi ...	574	9'18	3'05	33'22
Panth Piploda ...	25	'05	'03	'60
British India	865'446	2958'08	793'95	26'84

**Distribution of Population in Indian States
and Agencies**

	Total population (in lakhs)	Muslim population	Percentage of Muslims to total population.
1. Assam States	33
2. Baluchistan States	97.5
3. Baroda	7.2
4. Bengal States	3.21
5. Bihar & Orissa States	4.1
6. Bombay	9.0
7. Central India Agency	4.6
8. Central Provinces States	9.4
9. Gwalior	5.9
10. Hyderabad	10.4
11. Kashmir (including Jammu)	77.7
12. Madras States Agency	6.0
Cochin	6.8
Travancore	6.0
Other Madras States	4.5
13. Mysore	6.1
14. N.-W.F. Agencies	50.0
15. Punjab States	9.1
16. Punjab States Agency	35.2
17. Rajputana Agency	9.7
18. Sikkim	0.1
19. United Provinces States	25.1
20. Western India States Agency	13.0
Total	90.86	12.66	13.9

**Distribution of Muslim population in Muslim
Majority Provinces**

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

Proportion of Muslim Population by Districts.

Districts	Total population (1941) (in lakhs).	Percentage of Muslims to total population.
Hazara ...	7·96	94·94
Mardan ...	5·07	95·50
Peshawar ...	8·52	90·34
Kohat ...	2·89	92·00
Bannu ...	2·96	87·06
Dera Ismail Khan...	2·98	85·78
Total	30·38	91·79

BALUCHISTAN

Br. Baluchistan ...	5·02	87·50
---------------------	------	-------

SIND

Districts	Total population (in lakhs)	Percentage of Muslim population to total population.
Dadu ...	3·89	84·8
Hyderabad ...	7·59	66·9
Karachi ...	7·14	64·0
Larkana ...	5·11	81·8

Nawabshah	5'84	74'7
Sukkur	6'93	70'9
Thar Parkar	5'81	50'2
Upper Sind Frontier	3'04	90'4
Total	45'35	70'7

PUNJAB

Districts	Total population (in lakhs)	Percentage of total population		
		Hindus	Muslims	Sikhs
Hissar	... 10'06	64'85	28'33	6'03
Rohtak	... 2'56	81'60	17'22	'15
Gurgaon	... 8'51	77'42	32'49	'7
Karnal	... 9'94	66'93	30'58	2'00
Ambala	... 8'47	48'41	31'64	18'44
Simla	... '38	76'38	4'73	2'67
Jullundur	... 11'27	17'57	45'17	26'44
Ludhiana	... 8'18	20'36	36'92	41'69
Ferozepore	... 14'23	19'62	45'08	33'68
Kangra	... 8'99	93'23	5'09	'57
Hoshiarpur	... 11'7	40'00	36'64	16'92
Lahore	... 16'95	16'81	60'69	18'29
Amritsar	... 14'13	15'35	46'50	36'14
Gurdaspur	... 11'53	24'55	50'23	19'18
Sialkot	... 11'90	19'41	62'10	11'70
Gujranwala	... 9'12	11'84	70'39	10'87
Sheikhpura	... 8'52	9'11	63'62	18'85
Gujrat	... 11'04	7'61	85'60	6'35
Jhelum	... 6'29	6'48	89'51	3'12
Rawalpindi	... 7'85	10'50	80'00	8'16
Attock	... 6'75	6'39	90'52	2'97

Shahpur	... 9'98	10'02	83'87	4'81
Mianwali	... 5'03	12'23	86'17	1'37
Montgomery	... 13'29	14'36	69'07	13'91
Lyallpur	... 13'96	11'61	62'82	18'81
Jhang	... 8'21	15'71	82'58	1'49
Multan	... 14'84	16'31	77'98	4'15
Muzzaffargarh	... 7'12	12'69	86'52	'83
Dera Ghazi Khan...	5'81	10'86	88'90	'17
Baloch Trans- Frontier Tract	... '40	'8	99'2	...
Total	... 284'00	28'00	57'00	13'00

BENGAL

Districts	Total population (in lakhs)	Percentage of total population	
		Hindus	Muslims
Burdwan	... 18.9	81'44	18'56
Birbhum	... 1'05	73'31	26'69
Bankura	... 12'9	95'41	4'59
Midnapore	... 31'2	92'41	7'59
Hooghly	... 13'8	83'83	16'17
Howrah	... 14'5	78'73	21'27
24-Parganas	... 35'3	66'35	33'65
Calcutta	... 21'1	74'00	26'00
Nadia	... 17'6	38'33	61'67
Murshidabad	... 16'4	44'44	55'56
Jessor	... 18'3	38'84	61'16
Khulna	... 19'4	51'50	49'50
Rajshahi	... 15'7	24'21	75'79
Dinajpur	... 19'3	49'43	50'57
Jalpaiguri	... 10'9	76'01	23'99

Darjeeling	...	3·8	97·37	2·63
Rangpur	...	28·8	29·21	70·79
Bogra	...	12·6	16·64	83·36
Pabna	...	17·1	23·10	76·90
Malda	...	12·3	45·72	54·28
Dacca	...	42·2	33·19	66·81
Mymensingh	...	60·1	23·44	76·56
Faridpur	...	28·9	36·20	63·80
Bakargunj	...	35·5	29·37	71·63
Tippera	...	38·6	24·22	75·78
Noakhali	...	22·2	21·54	78·46
Chittagong	...	21·5	26·20	73·80
Chittagong Hill Tracts	...	2·5	96·5	3·5
Total	...	603·0	41·54	54·73

ASSAM

Districts	Total population (in lakhs)	Percentage of total population		
		Hindus (including tribes)	Muslims	
Cachar	...	6·5	61·49	38·51
Sylhet	...	31·2	39·29	60·71
Khasi and Jainta Hills	...	1·2	98·69	1·31
Naga Hills	...	1·9	99·72	·28
Lushai Hills	...	1·5	99·93	·07
Goalpara	...	10·1	53·77	46·23
Kamrup	...	12·6	71·00	29·00
Darrang	...	7·4	83·58	16·42

Nowgong ...	7.1	64.81	35.19
Sibsagar ...	10.7	95.18	4.82
Lakhimpur ...	8.9	95.02	4.98
Garo Hills ...	2.2	95.35	4.64
Sadya Frontier Tract	.6	98.56	1.44
Baliapar Frontier Tract	.01	99.06	.94
Total ...	102.00	66.28	33.72

**Table giving population of Muslims and Non-Muslims
in Pakistan Area according to Rajaji Formula.**

N.-W. Pakistan

Area	Total population (in lakhs)	Muslims	Hindus	Sikhs
Punjab—17 North				
Western districts	169	124	28	17
Sind ...	45	32	13	...
N.-W.F.P. ...	30	28	2	...
Baluchistan ...	6	5	1	...
Total ...	250	189	44	17
Percentage of Total Population ...		76	17	7

N.-E. Pakistan

Bengal—16 districts ...	401	287	114	...
Assam—Sylhet ...	31	19	12	...
Total ...	432	306	126	...
Percentage of Total Population ...		71	29	...
Total Pakistan				
N.-W. Pakistan ...	250	189	44	...
N.-E. Pakistan ...	432	306	126	...
Total ...	682	495	170	...
Percentage of Total Population ...		73	24	...

C. R. Formula

Basis for terms of settlement between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League to which Gandhiji and Mr. Jinnah agree and which they will endeavour respectively to get the Congress and the League to approve :—

- (1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim Government for the transitional period.
- (2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join either State.
- (3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

- (4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence, and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.
- (5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.
- (6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India.

Lahore Resolution of the League, March 1940

“ It is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, *viz.*, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial re-adjustment as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safe-

guards shall be specifically provided in the Constitution for them and other minorities, for the protection of their religious, cultural economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them. The session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of Constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions, of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary."

THE CONGRESS STAND

Congress Working Committee's Resolution on non-Accession of Provinces

"The acceptance beforehand of the novel principle of non-accession for a province is also a severe blow to the conception of Indian unity and an apple of discord likely to generate growing trouble in the provinces, and which may well lead to further difficulties in the way of the Indian States merging themselves in the Indian Union. The congress has been wedded to Indian freedom and unity and any break in that unity, especially in the modern world when people's minds inevitably think in terms of ever larger federations, would be injurious to all concerned and exceedingly painful to contemplate. Nevertheless, the Committee cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared and established

will. While recognizing this principle, the Committee feel that every effort should be made to create conditions which would help different units in developing a common and co-operative national life. The acceptance of the principle inevitably involves that no changes should be made which result in fresh problems being created and compulsion being exercised on other substantial groups within that area."

"Each territorial unit should have the fullest possible autonomy within the union, consistently with a strong national state. The proposal now made on the part of the British War Cabinet encourages and will lead to attempt at separation at the very inception of a union and thus create friction just when the utmost co-operation and good will are most needed. This proposal has been personally made to meet a communal demand but it will have other consequences also and lead politically reactionary and abstruccionist groups among different communities to create trouble and divert public attention from the vital issues before the country."—*Resolution of the Congress Working Committee dated April 2, communicated to Sir Stafford Cripps, and released to the Press on April 10, 1942.*

Jagat Narain Lal Resolution of the Congress

(31st May, 1942, A.I.C.C. Allahabad)

The A.I.C.C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component state or territorial unit to secede from the Indian

Union or federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different states and provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal"

* * * * *

Government's Policy of Divide and Rule

(in the words of eminent British statesmen.)

Writing to the Duke of Wellington from Simla on October 4, 1842, after the fall of Kabul and Ghazni, Lord Ellenborough, then Governor-General of India observed :—

"I could not have credited the extent to which the Muhammadans desired our failure in Afghanistan, unless I had heard here circumstances which prove that the feeling pervaded even those entirely dependent upon us. The Hindus, on the other hand, are delighted. It seems to me most unwise, when we are sure of the hostility of one-tenth, not to secure the enthusiastic support of the nine-tenths which are faithful."

* * * * *

Again Ellenborough to Wellington on January 18, 1843 :—

"I cannot close my eyes to the belief, that the race (Muslims) is fundamentally hostile to us and, therefore, our true policy is to conciliate the Hindus."

* * * * *

As early as 1821, a British officer, signing himself 'Carnaticus' wrote in Asiatic Journal :—

"Divide *et impera* should be the motto of our Indian administration, whether political, civil or military."

The same thing was put in as outspoken a language by Lt. Col. John Coke, Commandant at Moradabad, who about the time of what the British historians have called the 'Sepoy Mutiny of 1857' wrote :—

"Our endeavours should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the different religions and races, not to endeavour to amalgamate them divide *et impera* should be the principle of Indian Government."

* * * * *

Lord Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay, in a minute dated May 14, 1859 wrote :—

"Divide *et impera* was the old Roman motto and it should be ours."

* * * * *

Sir John Strachey, an eminent British Indian civilian and writer on India, said :—

"The existence, side by side, of hostile creeds among the Indian people, is one of the strong points in our political position in India."

* * * * *

Lord Morley, evidently took the same view. 'I won't follow you again into your Muhammadan dispute' said he in a letter to Minto. 'I respectfully remind you once more that it was your early speech about their extra claims that first started the (Muslim) hare.'

* * * * *

The *bona fides* of the bureaucracy in India has been suspected by responsible British statesmen. Mr.

Ramsay MacDonald, late Premier of Britain, spoke thus of the wide-spread suspicion :—

“Sinister influences have been, and are, at work on the part of the Government ; that Muhammadan leaders have been and are inspired by certain British officials, and that these officials have pulled and continue to pull wires at Simla and in London and of malice afore-thought sow discord between the Muhammadan and Hindu communities by showing to the Muhammadans special favours.”

* * * *

Sir Bampfylde Fuller, late Governor of the Curzon created Province of “ East Bengal ” in an oft-quoted address picturesquely referred to the British Government in India as having two wives, Hindus and Muslims of which the Muslim was the “Favourite wife.”

* * * *

Writing in the “ *London Times*, Lord Oliver, Secretary of State for India in the Ramsay MacDonald Government, said :—

“ No one with a close acquaintance with Indian affairs will be prepared to deny that on the whole there is a predominant bias in British officialdom in favour of the Muslim community, partly on the ground of closer sympathy but more largely as a make-weight against Hindu nationalism.”

* * * *

In a recent article contributed to the Foreign Affairs, London, Sir John Maynard, a retired senior

Member of the Executive Council of the Punjab says :-

“ It is, of course, true that British authority could not have established, could not now maintain itself, but for a fissiparous tendency of which the Hindu-Muslim antagonism is one manifestation. It is also true that the mass rivalry of the two communities began under British rule. Persecuting rulers made their appearance from time to time in the pre-British era, levying tribute on unbelievers or, punishing with fanatical zeal the slaying of kine. But the Hindu and Muslim masses before they had eaten of the tree of knowledge and become religion-conscious worshipped peacefully side by side at the same shrines.”

* * * *

“ I should advise Simon,” wrote Lord Birkenhead to the Viceroy, “to see at all stages important people who are not boycotting the Commission, particularly Muslims and the depressed classes. I should widely advertise all his interviews with representative Muslims. The whole policy now is obvious. It is to terrify the immense Hindu population by the apprehension that the Commission is being got hold of by the Muslims and may present a report altogether destructive of the Hindu position, thereby securing a solid block of Muslim support, and leaving Jinnah high and dry.”

HISTORY OF THE UNITY TALKS IN A NUT SHELL

*Efforts made to solve the Hindu Muslim problem the —voluminous correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, the subsequent talks between the latter on the one hand and Mahatma Gandhi and Shri Subhas Chandta Bose on the other—proved abortive. Mr. Jinnah insisted that an essential precondition to any agreement between the two organisations was the recognition by the Congress that the Muslim League was the sole, authoritative and representative political organisation of the Mussalmans of India. The Congress on the other hand was the representative organisation of the Hindus and was to negotiate with the League on their behalf. Such a position is not true to facts and Congress could not accept it, forgetting its own national character and repudiating its past history and of the many Muslims within the Congress fold and several Muslim organisations, representative of large sections among Muslims, as the Shias and the Momins, who repudiate the leadership of the League.

*Extracts from the report of General Secretary Indian National Congress March 1939 to February 1940.

In their resolution, on the platform, and in the press, the Muslim League carried on a regular propaganda against the Congress, especially the Congress Government in the 8 provinces. The latter were accused of a set design to establish Hindu Raj and crush the culture and religion of the Mussalmans of India and annihilate their political and economic rights. The accusers were repeatedly challenged to produce instances of the Communal tyranny and domination. Vague and indeterminate allegations, one sided stories, distortions and exaggerations were the only answer given to this challenge. Singing of *Bande-Mataram*, flying of the national flag on public institutions, popularisation of Hindustani and such like activities were instanced as attempts to crush Muslim culture. These activities were nothing new. The national flag had ever since 1920, been the symbol of national solidarity and opposition to foreign rule. It was not in opposition to Islam. *Bande-Matram* had come to be the national song by historical associations since the early years of the present century and had been in vogue ever since the partition. The Muslim agitation against it was a new phenomenon. Here too the Congress authorised only that portion of it to be sung to which no possible objection could be raised. The common language, the Congress advocated, was Hindustani as popularly spoken in Northern India and written either in the Nagri or the Urdu script. All these activities were old but the League opposition to them were new. Yet everywhere, where there was

opposition, Congressmen and Congress government avoided conflict.

The Council of the Muslim League appointed a special Committee to collect all such and other vague charges against the Congress government. A report was produced popularly known as the Pirpur report. Shortly afterwards Shri Vallabhai Patel, the chairman of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee directed the Congress ministries to enquire into each allegation and submit a report. The Congress governments issued communiques giving detailed replies to these charges proving their baselessness. But despite the denials there was no abatement in the Muslim League propaganda. The incessant circulation of vague and disproved charges of a very serious nature roused passions and embittered relations between the two communities.

The declaration of war in Europe in September and the crisis arising therefrom in India served to lend increased importance to the communal problem and bring it into special prominence in political discussions relating to war-issues. It was recognised by Congress leaders that in a crisis like the present it was essential that India should present a united front and compose all her internal differences. To this end the working Committee which met at Wardha in September last to consider the situation, telegraphically invited Mr. M. A. Jinnah to join in the discussions and help to evolve an agreed decision on the critical situation facing the country. Mr. Jinnah however could not come.

The Working Committee of the Muslim League which met in Delhi a little after, passed a resolution on the war crisis which repeated the charges against Congress Government in the provinces. It was stated that autonomy in these provinces had resulted in the domination of Hindus over Muslim minorities whose life and liberty, property and honour were being assailed every day. Babu Rajendra Prasad, the president wrote to Mr. Jinnah that these charges were wholly unfounded and based on one sided reports that might have reached the League. The governments concerned had carefully gone into these allegations and denied them. If the charges were persisted in, it was but fair that they should be inquired into and either substantiated or disproved. The Congress president suggested that if he (Mr. M. A. Jinnah,) agreed, Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of Federal Court might be requested to go into the matter. In the event of his not being available some other person of similar standing might be approached. To this Mr. Jinnah replied that he had placed the whole case before the Viceroy and had requested him to take up the matter without delay as he and the Governors of the Provinces had been expressly charged under the constitution with the responsibility of protecting the rights and the interests of the minorities.

There was no indication that the Viceroy was conducting an enquiry in the charges. The atmosphere of tension was however kept up through wide circulation of these unproved charges and the war

crisis was utilized by interested parties to further accentuate the situation. We have dealt elsewhere in this report with the war crisis. The crisis as it affected India was political and the war aims which the Working Committee called upon the British Government to declare, had nothing to do with the communal problem. The British Government, however, was not slow to take advantage of internal quarrels. To avoid this being done to the detriment of the country, Pandit Jawaharlal resumed personal contacts with Mr. Jinnah. The communal problem apart, the working committee was anxious to evolve a common approach to the political issues connected with the war crisis. Pandit Nehru's talks with Mr. Jinnah however did not lead to desired result. The communal problem was not discussed at all in these talks. Mr. Jinnah wanted to postpone it for a later date in Bombay. Pandit Nehru expressed his readiness to resume talks whenever it suited Mr. Jinnah.

It was expected that with the resignation of Congress Ministries the communal tension would decrease and favourable atmosphere created for efforts to compose all internal differences. The resolution passed by the Working Committee emphasised that the freedom that the Congress contemplated for the country included the full recognition and protection of the rights of all minorities to which the Congress had always pledged itself. They also emphasised that the easiest method of arriving at a

solution of the communal problem was provided by demand for a constituent Assembly. It would present the various parties and interests in the country according to their exact numerical strength and set at rest the otherwise interminable controversies with regard to the representative character of this or that organisation. Muslims would have representation on it to the full extent of their numerical strength in the country, through separate electorate, if they so desired. Seats may be reserved for other accepted minorities. It would be the special responsibility of the constituent Assembly to frame safeguards to the satisfaction of the minorities. Matters where agreement was not possible would be referred to a previously agreed Tribunal. The settling of details was an easy matter if once the proposition that all communities desired independence, with a constitution framed by the constituent assembly, was accepted. This was the most democratic method conceivable in the circumstances for arriving at an agreed solution.

While the Congress was popularising the idea of constituent assembly and the country was looking forward to the resumption of talks between Pandit Jawaharlal and Mr. M. A. Jinnah, the latter sprang a surprise on the country in the shape of "Deliverance Day" to be observed by the Mussalmans of India on Friday December 22, 1939. Mr. Jinnah appealed to the Mussalmans to observe the day as one of thanksgiving that the Congress Government had at last ceased to function. Meetings were to be

held to celebrate the "Day of Deliverance" from 'tyranny' oppression and injustice during the last two and a half years when the Congress ministries, it was alleged, did their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture and interfered with their religions and social life and trampled upon their political and economic rights while the ministries were condemned, the Governors were asked to inquire into the alleged charges and grant redress.

The 'Deliverance Day' coming as it did on the eve of Nehru-Jinnah talks and at a time when the country was passing through a serious political crisis took the country by surprise. Gandhiji in a statement to the press addressed an earnest appeal to Mr. Jinnah to call off the "Deliverance Day" Mr. Jinnah, argued Gandhiji had taken upon his shoulders the tremendous responsibility of being both the accuser and the judge. On the one hand the Governors were requested to examine the allegations, on the other hand the vast mass of Muslims were asked to cite the allegations before God, as if they were proved facts and on that account to thank Almighty for deliverance. Would it not be right and proper to wait for the Governor's opinion before the deliverance day was observed? Sardar Vallabhai Patel, Chairman of the Parliamentary Sub Committee, in a statement to the press repudiated the unfounded allegations made by Mr. Jinnah. He stated that when the Muslim League through the Pirpur Committee first made the charges

against the Congress ministries, he instructed them to enquire into each allegation and submit a report. These reports showed that the charges were entirely unfounded. Some months later, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, the Congress president offered to submit the charges if specified to an independent tribunal for enquiry but Mr. Jinnah spurned the offer, stating that he had placed the charges before the Viceroy. When Mr. Jinnah had repeated the charges, Sardar Vallabhai had instructed every Premier to invite his Governor's attention to them as they were also affected by the charges and he was informed that the Governors considered the charges as unwarranted. He was therefore constrained to characterise the charges as wild, reckless and intended to endanger communal peace. The repetition of the unproved charges was all the more deplorable in that Pandit Jawaharlal and Mr. Jinnah were about to meet to explore the possibilities of a communal settlement.

The chorus of disapproval coming even from Muslims made Mr. Jinnah to change his position. He said that he had no quarrel with the Hindu Community. The Deliverance Day was to be observed by minorities who had all been oppressed by the Congress Governments. All along Congress had been identified by him with the Hindu Community, and Congress rule as a Hindu rule. Mr. Jinnah by widening the scope of the day of deliverance tactically admitted that Congress, whatever it may be is not a Hindu organisation. As a matter of fact if the Congress as a national organisation with

a political and economic programme had not participated in the provincial elections, there would have been only denominational representatives in the Assemblies. The Congress saved the country from this catastrophe.

The statement of Mr. Jinnah about the celebration of 'Deliverance Day' created embarrassing situation for Pandit Jawaharlal who was to resume talks with him in Bombay. The statement revealed a wide gulf between the Congress and the Muslim League with regard to the vital political issues facing the country. Also the distrust of Mr. Jinnah was so deep as to make all unity talks useless. Pandit Jawaharlal wrote to Mr. Jinnah to this effect and asked if there was some common ground for discussions to yield fruit. Mr. Jinnah replied that no common ground was possible first "so long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India", and second "that we (the League) cannot endorse the Congress demand for the declaration as laid down in the resolution of the Working Committee, confirmed by the All India Congress Committee on October 10, 1939". The preliminary condition emphasised by Mr. Jinnah involved repudiation by the Congress of all those Muslims who are in the League. "There were" replied Pandit Nehru, "a large number of Muslims in the Congress who have been and are our closest colleagues. There are Muslim organisations like the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the All India Shia Conference, the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the All India Momin Conference,

etc., apart from trade unions which have many Muslims as their members. As a general rule many of these organisations and individuals have adopted the same political platform as we have done in the Congress. We cannot possibly dissociate ourselves from them or disown them in any way."

In these circumstances and with this background the talks were dropped. As in 1938 so also now, it was not made known to the Congress what precisely the demands of the Muslim League were. The communal problem remained enmeshed in the fog of irrelevant and impossible "conditions precedent."

Rajendra Prasad Jinnah Talks (1935)

It was in the beginning of 1935 when an attempt was made for the first time by Babu Rajendra Prasad, the then President of the Indian National Congress to negotiate with Mr. M.A Jinnah with a view to arrive at a certain agreed solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. The bogey of communal award had worked a havoc in creating unprecedented communal tension in the country and the Congress president was extremely anxious to put an end to it and present a united front to the British Government. Naturally, therefore he started unity talks with the League president on January 23rd and continued uptill 1st of March 1935. Patriotic India was full of hopes while the negotiations were going on in Bombay because by that time Mr. Jinnah's bitterness and personal egoism had not come before the public. But suddenly on the 1st of

March the news came that the talks were terminated without any result and the following joint statement signed by Babu Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Jinnah was published in the papers:—

“We have made an earnest effort to find a solution of the communal problem which would satisfy all the parties concerned. We regret that inspite of our best efforts we have not been able to find such a formula.

We realize that communal harmony and concord are essential for the progress of the country and we can only hope that forces will arise which will make a future attempt more fruitful.”

The reasons why the negotiations failed are very interesting. The official version of the Congress was laid down by the Congress Secretary in the Congress Bulletin of March 20, 1935 as follows:—

“As far as Babu Rajendra Prasad and Mr. Jinnah were concerned the prolonged negotiations brought about a substantial measure of common agreement, and left to themselves they would have reached a settlement, which they have every hope would have been endorsed by the Congress and Muslim League. But their attempt to make others outside the two organisation agree to the same failed. Accordingly negotiations were abandoned.”

And the controversy that had arisen as a result of a certain speech of Mr. Jinnah delivered by him on

May 21, 1937, brought more facts to light as to how the negotiations failed,

Mr. M.A. Jinnah in the course of his speech said that "In 1935 he spent four or five weeks holding conferences with B. Rajendra Prasad (the then president of the Congress) and trying to get the Muslim viewpoint accepted at least by the Congress leaders, if not by the Hindu Mahasabha. But he did not succeed."

These remarks naturally called forth a reply from some responsible Congress leader Acharya J. B. Karpalani, the General Secretary of the Congress contradicted this speech in the course of a statement to the press but was in return subjected to severe rebuke by the Qaid-e-Azam in the following words:—

"Mr. Kriplani referred to my Bombay speech of May 21, in which I said that in 1935 I spent four or five weeks holding conferences with Babu Rajendra Prasad, the then president of the Indian National Congress, trying to get the Muslim point of view accepted at least by the Congress leaders, if not by Hindu Mahasabhites. But I did not succeed. With reference to his speech I am accused that I have a short memory and in support of this accusation the Congress Secretary relied on a press message as his authority. Surely a man who has arisen to the position of the Secretary of Indian National Congress ought to know better than rely on press reports.

The statement which I made in my speech is absolutely true and I repeat it.

"At times it is very difficult to say who are true Congress leaders, for the line of demarcation between the two with regard to a large number of them is very thin indeed.

"Neither Babu Rajendra Prasad nor I had any authority to come to a binding agreement as the talks were naturally subject to confirmation by the Congress and the Muslim League. Babu Rajendra Prasad tried to ascertain the concensus of opinion among Congress and Hindu Mahasabha leaders regarding the formula, which he himself has approved but it was found that not only the Hindu Mahasabha leaders rejected it out of hands but even a certain section of influential Congress leaders were deadly opposed to the formula, which therefore had to be dropped as it was useless to proceed further."

Babu Rajendra Prasad's reply to Mr. Jinnah's statement:

"I have read Mr. Jinnah's statement of July 3. In the conversation which I had with Mr. Jinnah in 1935 we were able to evolve a formula. I accepted it not only in my personal capacity, but as the president of the Congress, and offered to have it ratified by the Congress. I was keeping in touch with prominent Congressmen while the conversations were going on and had received universal support for it for them. There were several members of the Congress Working Committee at Delhi at the time and they were in full agreement with

me. There was absolutely no difference among Congress men and I was successful in obtaining the support of the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha of the Punjab also. But Mr. Jinnah insisted on having the signature of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya and other leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha. This I was unable to secure and the matter had to be dropped. It was not dropped because Congressmen were not agreeable, but because those leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha on whose signatures Mr Jinnah insisted were not agreeable. It is not correct to say even that a certain section of influential Congress leaders were deadly opposed to the formula which, therefore, had to be dropped.

"I had gone further and told Mr. Jinnah that the Congress and the League should accept the formula and the Congress would fight those Hindus who were opposed to it as it had fought them during the recent Assembly elections quite successfully in most of the provinces. But this was not considered enough by Mr. Jinnah and as it was impossible to fulfill his demand that the Hindu Mahasabha should also join, the matter had to be dropped. I dare say that Mr. Jinnah will himself recall all this conversation if he charges his memory a little. I kept full notes of the conversation from day to day and they are in the Congress office."

The results of the provincial elections made the Qaid-I-Azam more furious and the acceptance of the offices by the Congress more bitter and hostile. While the Congress leaders were anxious to evolve certain

agreed formulae, the League President feeling his helplessness always tried to find out some opportunity to fell upon the Congress leaders and accusing them of establishing Hindu Raj. Certain negotiations were going on behind the scene between Mahatma Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah through Mr. B. G. Kher. when suddenly in the course of a rejoinder to Dr. Rajendra Prasad Mr. Jinnah published the Mahatma's letter from Teerhal which was, of course, of a purely private nature and never meant for publication.


Here are some extracts from his rejoinder—

“In the meantime the Congress policy was that the Mussalmans should join the Congress unconditionally and sign their pledge. After the Congress was flushed with its majority in six provinces, it deliberately decided to non-co-operate with the various Provincial legislatures, and they have in forming the Ministries vindicated the justice and fair treatment to the minorities urged and promised by Mahatma Gandhi very recently by having made a good feast of all the loaves and fishes that are at present available for the Congress party in the various legislatures and getting a stray Mussalman to exchange a pledge over-night to accept ministry the next morning. I regret that I should be obliged to point out these matters and that I should have to resort to a *post-mortem* inquisition. As to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's statement which appears side by side with that

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of Babu Rajendra Prasad on the 20th July, what can I say to that busy-body president? What does he know of what took place between me and Babu Rajendra Prasad? He seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose in everything except minding his own business....."

Gandhiji's First letter to Mr. Jinnah

Further Mr Jinnah went on in the same tone and tried to show in his lengthy statement that he was anxious to find out certain solution of the communal problem and he therefore sent a message to Mr. Gandhi when he was at Teethal to which he received the following reply from the Mahatma on May 22, 1937.

Dear Mr Jinnah,

Kher has given me your message. I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and in such distress I cry out to God for light.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. Gandhi.

1937
Immediately after that in the Lucknow Session of the Muslim League Mr. Jinnah delivered a fighting speech which the Mahatma regarded "a declaration of war" and came forth with innumerable allegations against the Congress leaders. This attitude on the

part of the League leader compelled a letter from the Mahatma and thus began the first series of correspondence between Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. But before actual correspondence is given it will be interesting for the readers to know certain extracts from the Lucknow speech of Mr. Jinnah. Here are some of them;—

“The Muslim league stands for full national democratic self Government for India. A great deal of capital is made as it phrases more for the consumption of ignorant and illiterate masses. Various phrases are used such as *Puran Swaraj*, *Self Government*, *Complete Independence*, *Responsible Government*, *Substance of Independence* and *Dominion Status*. There are some who talk of complete independence. But it is no use having complete independence on your lips and the Government of India Act 1935 in your hands... .. These paper declarations, slogans and shibboleths are not going to carry us any where.....

“The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Mussalmans of India more and more by pursuing a policy, which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the Government in six provinces where they are in majority they have by their words, deeds and programme shown more that the Mussalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands. Wherever they are in a majority and wherever it suited them they refused to co-operate, with the Mus-

lim League parties and demanded unconditional surrender and signing of their pledges.

“The demand was insistent, abjure your party and forswear your policy and programme and liquidate Muslim league.....That any individual Mussalman member who was willing to unconditional surrender and sign their pledges was offered a job as a minister and was passed off as a Muslim minister, although, he did not command the confidence or selfrespect of an overwhelming majority of the Mussalman representatives in the legislatures. These men are allowed to move about and pass off as Muslim ministers for the “loyal” services they have rendered to the Congress by surrendering and signing the pledge unconditionally and the degrees of their reward is the extent of their perfidy. Hindi is to be the national language of India and that *Bande Matram* is to be the national song and is to be forced upon all. The Congress flag is to be obeyed and revered by all and sundry. On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand that Hindustan is for the Hindus ; only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism, whereas the Hindu Mahasabha does not mince words.

“The result of the present Congress party policy will be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war and strengthening of the imperialistic hold as a consequence. I dare say that the British Govern-

ment will give the Congress a free hand in this direction and it matters very little to them, nay, on the contrary, it is all to the good, so long as their interests, imperial or otherwise, are not touched and the defence remains intact, but I feel that a fearful reaction will set in when the Congress has created more and more divisions amongst Indians themselves, and made the united front impossible

“The Congress High Command speaks in different voices. One opinion is that there is no such thing as Hindu-Muslim question, and there is no such thing as minority question in the country. The other high opinion is that if a few crumbs are thrown to the Mussalman in their present disorganised and helpless state, you can manage them. They are sadly mistaken if they think that the Mussalman can be imposed upon... The third opinion is that there is no light to be seen through the impenetrable darkness, but the Congress goes on acquiring strength and power, so that past promises of the blank cheques remain unfulfilled and unsigned.....

“Do not be disturbed by the slogans and the taunts such as are used against the Mussalman, *Communalists*, *toadies* and *reactionaries*. The worst *today* on earth, the most wicked *Communist* today amongst Muslims when he surrenders unconditionally to the Congress and abuses his own community becomes the nationalist of nationalists to-morrow. These terms and words and

abuses are intended to create an inferiority complex amongst the Musalmans and to demoralise them ; and are intended to sow discord in their midst and give us a bad name in the world abroad. This is the standard of propoganda which can only be treated with contempt...

"The League is not going to allow the Mussalmans to be exploited either by the British Government or any other party or group inside the legislatures or outside. The Congress with all its boasts has done nothing in the past for the Mussalmans. It has failed to inspire confidence and to create a sense of security amongst the Mussalmans and other minorities. The Congress attempt under the guise of establishing mass contact with the Mussalmans is calculated to divide and weaken and break the Mussalmans and is an effort to detach them from their accredited leaders. It is a dangerous move and it cannot mislead anyone."

Gandhi—Jinnah Talks (1937-38)

Sheogaon, Wardha

Oct 19, 1937

Dear friend,

I carefully went through your speech at Lucknow and I felt deeply hurt over your misunderstanding of my attitude. My letter was in answer to the specially private message you sent me. It represented my deepest feeling. The letter was purely personal. Were you right in using it as you did ? Of course as I read it, the whole of your speech is a declaration of war. Only I hoped you would reserve poor me as a bridge between the two.

I see you want no bridge. I am sorry. Only it takes two to make a quarrel. You won't find me one even if I cannot become a peacemaker. This is not for publication unless you desire it. It is written in all good faith and out of an anguish heart.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi

Bombay.
Nov. 5, 1937.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I received your letter of October 19 1937, on my arrival here. As regards publishing your letter from Teethal last May, I am of opinion that I am fully justified in doing so : but your letter means something different from what I understand to mean. Surely it was open to you to offer your explanation to the public. The letter was not marked as it is usual to do so when its publication was not desired by the writer, and my message to you was not private. Even now you don't indicate how I misunderstood your attitude or the contents of that letter. You merely say 'I felt deeply hurt over your misunderstanding of my attitude'. I am sorry you think my speech at Lucknow is a declaration of war. It is purely in self defence. Kindly read it again and try and understand it. Evidently you have not been following the course of events in the last twelve months. As to reserving

you as a 'bridge' and 'peace maker' don't you think your complete silence for all these months identified you with the Congress leadership, although I know you are not even a four anna member of that 'body.' In conclusion, I regret to say I find nothing definite or any constructive proposal in your letter under reply except it is written in all good faith and out of an anguish heart, which I reciprocate.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Shegaon, Wa dha,
Feb. 3, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Pandit Nehru to'd me yesterday that you were complaining to Maulana Sahib about the absence of any reply from me to your letter of 5th November in reply to mine of 19th October. The letter was received by me when I was pronounced by the Doctors to be seriously ill at Calcutta. The letter was shown to me three days after its receipt. Had I thought it necessarily called for a reply even though I was ill I would have sent one. I re-read the letter and I still think there was nothing useful that I could have said in reply. But in a way I am glad you awaited a reply and here it is. Mr. Kher told me definitely he had a private message from you. He delivered it to me when I was alone. I could have sent you a verbal message in reply but in order to

give you a true picture of my mental state I sent you a short note. There was nothing to hide in it. But I did feel, as I still do, that the way in which you used it came upon me as a painful surprise.

"You complain of my silence. The reason for my silence is literally and truly in my note. Believe me, the moment I can do something that can bring the two communities together nothing in the world can prevent me from so doing. You seem to deny that your speech was a declaration of war, but your later pronouncements too confirmed my first impression. How can I prove what is a matter of feeling? In your speech I miss the old nationalist when in 1915 I returned from my self-imposed exile in South Africa. Everybody spoke of you as one of the staunchest nationalists and the hope of both the Hindus and Mussalmans. Are you still the same Mr Jinnah? If you say you are, inspite of your speeches, I shall accept your word.

Lastly, you want me to come forward with some proposal. What proposal can I make except to ask you on bended knees to be what I thought you were? But the proposals to form the basis of unity between the two communities surely have got to come from you.

This again is not for publication but for your eyes. It is the one of a friend not of an opponent.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

New Delhi,
15th Feb, 1938.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have received your letter of 3rd February, which was redirected, here. I did not complain to Maulana Sahib about the absence of any reply from you. I only mentioned the fact as he was anxious that we two should meet any how. I am glad to hear from you. My message to you through Mr. Kher, as I informed you in my last letter, was not private. It was only when Mr. Kher went to see you at Wardha that I did say he should not mention the matter any one except you and that if you yourself were inclined in the first instance to take up the matter, it will be more than half the battle won. On his return to Bombay, Mr. Kher told me it was difficult for you to give a reply as you were restricted not to disclose it to anyone or consult anybody else. There upon I said it was not intended to be a secret and that he was free and you were free to put your heads together and let me know, whether at that juncture, you were inclined to take up this matter with your powerful overwhelming influence which you exercise over the Congress. Then he saw you again at Teethal and from that moment it ceased to be a private matter between two individuals and he brought me your reply in writing which I have to publish because you know of the controversy between

me and Mr. Rajendera Prasad and Pandit Nehru in the Press, where it was sought to make out that I was putting every obstacle in the way of a Hindu Muslim settlement. As your letter was not marked confidential I used it. Besides, what is wrong in my saying that I approached you on my own accord and that was the reply I received from you? I cannot understand why you feel so much about it. You say I complained about your silence. Well, I do, but you further proceed to say, "Believe me, the moment I can do something that can bring the two communities together nothing in the world can prevent me from so doing? Now what am I to gather from this? Am I right in interpreting that the moment is not come.

"With regard to your opinion on my speech at the Lucknow session and my late pronouncements which you are pleased to call a declaration of war, I can only repeat this was in selfdefence. Evidently, you are not acquainted with what is going on in the Congress press, the amount of vilification and misrepresentation and falsehood that is daily spread about me. Otherwise, I am sure you would not blame me.

With regard to your saying that when in 1915 you returned from South Africa every body spoke of me as one of the staunchest of nationalists and the hope of both the Hindus and the Mussalmans and you ask me the question "Are you still the same Mr. Jinnah?" and proceed further to say "If you say you are, inspite of your speeches, I shall accept your word." And you

say in my speeches you miss the nationalist. Do you think you are justified in saying that? I would not like to say what people spoke of you in 1915 and what they speak and think of you to-day. Nationalism is not the monopoly of any single individual. In these days it is very difficult to define it, but I do not wish to pursue this line of controversy any further.

You conclude by saying "Lastly, you want me to come forward with some proposal. What proposal can I make except to ask you on bended knees to be what I had thought you were? But the proposals to form the basis of unity between the two communities have surely got to come from you." I think you might have spared your appeal and need not have preached to me on your bended knees to be what you had thought I was. As regards the formation of proposals which would form the basis of unity, do you think this can be done by correspondence. Surely, you know as much as I do, what are the fundamental points in dispute. In my opinion it is as much up to you to suggest ways and means of tackling the problem. If you genuinely and sincerely desire and you feel the moment has come for you to step in with your position and influence you are prepared to take the matter up earnestly, I will not fail to render all assistance I can."

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Sheogaon, Wardha
24th Feb: 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I thank you for your letter. I have read your letter to Jawaharlal also. I observe both the letters invite not written replies but personal discussion. I do not know whether it will take place in the first instance between you and Jawaharlal or now that Subhas Bose succeeds, between you and the latter. If you desire before this there should be a talk between you and me, I would be delighted to see you in Sheogaon anytime which is convenient to you before 10th March, after which, if health permits, I might have to go to Bengal. So far as I am concerned, just as on the Hindu Muslim question I was guided by Dr. Ansari now that he is no more in our midst, I have accepted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as my guide. My suggestion therefore to you is that conversation should be opened in the first instance between you and Maulana Sahib. But in every case, regard me as at your disposal.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

New Delhi,
March, 3, 1938.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have received your letter dated 24th February. I am sorry for the delay in replying as I was not well. In your letter I missed a note of response whether

you are of the opinion that you see the light now and the moment has come, and secondly, if so, whether you are prepared to take the matter up in right earnest; and thirdly, I find there is no change in your attitude and mentality when you say, you would be guided by Maulana as Dr. Ansari is no more. If you pursue this line, you would be repeating the same tragedy as you did when you expressed your helplessness because Dr. Ansari, holding pronounced and die-hard views, did not agree and you had to say although you were willing but what could you do. This happened as you know before you went to the Round Table Conference. At the Round Table Conference, the tragedy was repeated by you when you seemed to be willing to accept provisionally certain terms but you there also expressed you were helpless as Hindus...were unwilling and you as representing the Congress, would have no objection if Hindus and Mussalmans come to an agreement.

"We have reached a stage when no doubt should be left. You recognise the All-India Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Mussalmans in India, and on the other hand you represent the Congress and other Hindus throughout the country. It is only on that basis we can proceed further and further and devise a machinery of approach. Of course, I shall be glad to see you although I shall equally be glad to see Pandit Jawa-

harlal or Mr. Bose as you may desire. The matter as you know will not be clinched without reference again to you by either of them. Therefore, I will prefer to see you first. In any case, I am sorry to say I cannot come to Sheogaon to see you before 10th March. I have to go to Bombay and also I have fixed various other engagements of my tour, but we can fix up a time and place that may suit us both.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Sheogaon-Wardha,
March 8, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I thank you for your letter. I hope you have completely got over your indisposition. Your letter revives painful memories. I will not discuss, at this stage at any rate, the various debatable points raised in your letter. Suffice it to say that I am at your disposal. If you cannot come to Sheogaon, and my health should permit, I will gladly go to Bombay to meet you when you are there. At present I have to go to Bengal and then for a while to Orrissa. This will take me through the whole of this month. The earliest, therefore, we can meet will be in April.

Two questions arising from your letter demand a reply. You ask me whether I have now seen light. Much to my regret I have, to say "no". If I had, I

would proclaim the news from the house tops. But that limitation does not debar me from taking advantage of the slightest opportunity of finding a way out of the present difficulty. You expect me to be able to speak on behalf of the "Congress and other Hindus throughout the country." I am afraid I cannot fulfill the test. I cannot represent either the Congress or the Hindus in the sense you mean, but I would exert to the utmost all the moral influence I could have with them in order to secure a honourable settlement.

Yours sincerely
M. K. Gandhi

New Delhi,
March 17, 1938.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of march 8 and I thank you for it. As you do not wish to discuss the various points mentioned in my letter and the two questions that you have answered are far from hopeful, I am helpless. However, as you say 'Suffice it to say I am at your disposal' I gather you would nevertheless like to take advantage of the slightest opportunity of finding a way out of the present difficulty. In these circumstances I beg to inform you I shall be glad to see you at Bombay some time in April as suggested by you.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Calcutta,
March 24, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Many thanks for your note. As soon as I reach Sheogaon, I shall seek the first opportunity of waiting on you at Bombay "

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

New Delhi,
Mar, 26 1938.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I thank you for your letter of 24th and I shall have to see you after my return from Calcutta about 25th of April at Bombay.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Telegram from Gandhi ji to Mr. Jinnah.

Delhi April 15.

"If on return Bombay you can break journey Wardha for one day you will spare me strain undertaking journey Bombay. I need some uninterrupted physical rest if possible. Any event could Maulana Azad accompany me interview. Please wire wardha which reaching tomorrow."

Calcutta April 16

Mr. Jinnah's Reply

Extremely sorry unable change programme now. Will receive you Bombay 25th or thereafter as arranged. Would prefer see you alone.

Gandhiji's telegram.

Wardha April 18,

"Thanks 25th happens Monday will reach Bombay
28th if not inconvenient"

Calcutta April 19

Mr. Jinnah's telegram

Thanks will gladly receive you 28th my house.
Wire time care Isphani Calcutta.

Wardha. April 20

Gandhiji's telegram.

"If not inconvenient would like reach your house
eleven thirty a. m."

*Printed by Pt. Devi Prashad at Shukla Rajput Press
and published by Hero Publication Lower Mall Lahore.*

NEHRU JINNAH CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Jinnah,

1874 Jan. 1938.

I have read the statement you issued recently to the press with care. I am afraid we approach the question from different viewpoints and I feel that your approach is not very helpful. But I entirely agree with you that an argument carried on through the medium of the press is not desirable. Indeed I had decided not to issue press statements on the subjects, but after your Calcutta speech in which you mentioned my name and issued some kind of a 'challenge' to me, I felt that a public statement was unavoidable. Hence my statement, in which I tried to avoid unnecessary controversy.

You know perhaps that for some months past I have been in correspondence with Nawab Ismail Khan on this subject and I have been anxious to find out what the points of difference and agreement were. I am afraid I do not know this yet and your last statement does not help. I would feel grateful to you if you could kindly throw some light on this and let me know what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration. I think this will help us all and lead to an avoidance of needless controversy. We can then come to grips with the subject. As I have said in my last statement, we are eager to do everything in our power to put an end to every misapprehension and to endeavour

to solve every problem that comes in the way of our developing our public life along right lines and promoting the unity and progress of the Indian people.

I am leaving for Lahore to-day. From there I go to the Frontier Province and return to Allahabad in about ten days' time. Kindly address your reply to Allahabad.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.

Little Gibbs Road,
Malabar Hill,
Bombay, January 25, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th January, 1938.

I must say that it is very difficult for me to understand it. I fail to see what you are driving at. It does not suggest any useful proposal of a concrete character besides approaching me and informing me that "we approach the question from different viewpoints," and you further say, "I feel that your approach is not very helpful." You further refer to my Calcutta speech and say "in which you mention my name and issued some kind of a challenge to me, I felt that a public statement was unavoidable. Hence my statement." But you do not even now give me the purport of my speech and what was the challenge which compelled you to say.

what you did, in your statement which you consider unavoidable.

I know nothing of your being in correspondence with Nawab Ismail Khan referred to in your letter.

Finally I note your request that I should let you know what exactly are the points in dispute which require consideration.'

I am glad that you agree with me that the arguments carried on through the medium of the press are not desirable. But do you think that this matter can be discussed, much less solved, by and through correspondence? I am afraid that is equally undesirable.

I may state for your information that I received a letter from Mr. Gandhi dated the 19th October, 1937, and I replied to him on the 5th November, 1937, and I am still waiting to hear from him.

I reciprocate the sentiments expressed in the last but one paragraph of your letter at end of it.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Wardha, February 4, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 25th January reached Allahabad on February 1st after I had left. It has been forwarded to me here and reached me yesterday.

I am sorry that my previous letter was difficult to understand. My purpose in writing it was, as I stated,

to find out what our points of difference and agreement were. Presumably there are points of difference as you have repeatedly criticised the Congress policy and practice. If these points of difference are noted down and our attention drawn to them, it would make their consideration easier. It is possible that some of them may be due to misapprehension and this misapprehension might be removed ; it is equally possible that some are more fundamental and then we would try to find a way out or, at any rate, know exactly how and where we stand. When there is a conflict of opinion, a clarification of the opposing opinions is an essential preliminary to their consideration.

I might mention some relatively minor matters which have apparently led to misapprehension. In one of your speeches you referred to being told by some one that a cheque of rupees five lakhs was recently given to the Congress. I am not aware of this and presumably I ought to know. Indeed, to my knowledge, no one has given even a cheque for Rs. 5,000 to the Congress for a considerable time.

In the same, or possibly another speech you referred to the non-co-operation days and stated that while the Aligarh University was forced to close down and many non-co-operated from it, not a single student non-co-operated from the Benares University. As a matter of fact a very large number of students did in fact non-co-operate from the Benares University. As a result of this a non-official university, the Kashi Vidyapitha, was

established in Benares, as also the Gandhi Ashram. Both of these still exist. In the same way the Jamia Millia came into existence in Aligarh and this now flourishes in Delhi.

You have referred in your speeches to the Congress imposing Hindi-Hindustani and trying to crush Urdu. I presume you were misinformed for I am not aware of any attempt on the part of the Congress to injure Urdu. Some time back I wrote an essay on "The Question of Language" which represents, I believe, the Congress view-point. It was approved by Mr. Gandhi and by many people unconnected with the Congress and interested in the advancement of Urdu including Moulyi Abdul Huq, Secretary, Anjuman-e-Taraqqi-e-Urdu of Hyderabad. I do not know if you have come across this essay. In any event I am asking my office in Allahabad to send you a copy. If you disagree with the argument or conclusions of this essay, I shall be grateful to have your criticisms.

I might mention that the Congress Ministry in Madras is endeavouring to introduce the study of Hindustani in the State schools in the Province. They are having primers and text-books prepared especially for the purpose by the Jamia Millia. These primers, etc., are to be in two scripts—Devanagri and Urdu—but in identical language, the students having the option of script.

I mention these instances to show how misappre-

ensions arise. But the real questions at issue are more important and it is in regard to these that clarification is necessary. I presume you are acquainted with the Congress resolution and statement on minority and fundamental rights and regarding communal questions. If you so wish it, I can have these sent to you. Many of these were collected together in a comprehensive resolution passed by the Working Committee in Calcutta towards the end of October 1937. About the Communal Award the Congress position has been repeatedly made clear.

The Congress policy as laid down in these resolutions may be incomplete or wrong. If so we shall gladly consider suggestions to complete it or rectify it. Personally I do not see what more can be done by the Congress regarding religious or cultural matters. As for political (communal) questions, the Communal Award, unsatisfactory as it is, holds the field for the present and till such time as it may be altered by mutual agreement of parties concerned.

In considering wider political questions, the Congress has adhered to certain principles and policies for a number of years, though minor variations have taken place from time to time. Our present policy in the legislatures and outside was defined by a comprehensive resolution passed by the Working Committee at Wardha last year. I was very glad to find from Nawab Ismail Khan and Chowdhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman that the U. P.

Muslim League, or the U. P. Muslim League Parliamentary Board, accepted this programme. This included our objective of independence, our demand for a constituent assembly, our general attitude to the Constitution Act and the Federation, and our methods of work inside and outside the legislatures. It referred also to our agrarian and labour programmes. Thus there appeared to be a very large measure of agreement between us, not only in regard to fundamentals, but even regarding many details.

In view of this agreement it distressed and surprised me to find that there was so much conflict. I have tried therefore to find out what this conflict is about. I do not see how I can make any proposal, concrete or vague, when I do not know what the points in issue are. It is true that reading your speeches I have come across various statements to the effect that the Congress is trying to establish Hindu Raj. I am unaware of how this is being done or who is doing it. If any Congress Ministries or the Congress organisation have made mistakes, these should be pointed out to us.

A report of your Calcutta speech appeared in the newspapers at the time and is no doubt available to you and for me to give you a purport of it seemed hardly necessary. In this you state that you are fighting the Congress leadership which is misleading the Hindus. Further you have said that you want to bring the Congress High Command to its senses. May I suggest

that those who are privileged to advise or lead the Congress have no desire to fight anybody except British Imperialism? In any event, if we mislead or misbehave we have a right to inquire from our critics where and how we have done so.

Further in your Calcutta speech you said : "I have long long ago, months ago now, thrown out a challenge to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and I throw out a challenge now,—let him come and sit with us and let us formulate a constructive programme which will give immediate relief to the poor." It was to this 'challenge' that I referred in my last letter. I do not remember on which previous occasion you had issued a similar challenge to me.

It is always helpful to discuss matters and problems face to face, and as I have said previously, we are always glad to do so. A short while ago you met Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, one of our most respected leaders, than whom there is no one better fitted to explain the Congress view-point in regard to the minorities problem or any other matter. Whenever necessity arises every one of us will willingly welcome a talk. But even such a talk is likely to be vague and infructuous if some clarification of ideas does not take place previously. Correspondence helps in this process and sometimes is even preferable as it is more precise than talk. I trust therefore you will help in clarifying the position by telling us where we differ and how you

would like this difference to end. You have also criticised the Congress in vigorous language, as you were no doubt entitled to do. But are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate those criticisms in private at least, if not in public ?

I have inquired from Mr. Gandhi about your letter to him dated the 5th November, 1937. He received it in Calcutta when he was lying ill there and he felt that it needed no answer. Your letter had been in answer to his and the matter seemed to end there for the time being. He was good enough to show me his letter and yours and it seemed to me that no particular reply was called for. I understand that he wrote to you yesterday.

I hope to be in Allahabad by the 9th February.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.

8 - B, Harding Avenue,
New Delhi, February 17, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 4th February. You have now flung at me more complaints and grievances of trifling character. Evidently you rely on that section of the press which is bent on misrepresenting and vilifying me, but I am glad that you say 'I mention these instances to show how misapprehensions arise. 'But the real question at issue is more important and it is in regard to this that clarification is necessary.' Therefore I don't think any useful purpose will be served!

to carry on correspondence with regard to the various matters mentioned in your letter. You will please not introduce matters which you may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan or Chowdhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman or anybody else. These again will lead to reference and cross-references and the matter will never end.

As regards my Calcutta speech, the word, 'challenge' is obviously due to the imagination of the reporter for the very context shows clearly that it was an invitation. However the discussion of all these matters in correspondence will lead us nowhere. I do not believe in the doctrine which you lay down 'but are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private at least if not in public': I for my part make no such distinction. I am prepared to substantiate anything that I have said publicly, provided it is correctly reported. The crux of your letter on the real vital point of the Hindu-Muslim unity is a repetition of what you said in your previous letter, namely, that you want me to note down 'the points of difference' and discuss them through and by means of correspondence—a method which I made it clear in my last letter, is highly undesirable and most inappropriate. I welcome your suggestion when you say 'whenever necessity arose every one of us would willingly welcome a talk.' If you think that necessity has arisen and anyone of you is willing, I shall be glad to see you. You prefer talking at each other whereas I prefer talking to each other. Surely you know and you ought to know what are the fundamental

points in dispute.

I have received a letter from Mr. Gandhi and I have replied to him, a copy of which I am enclosing herewith.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah,

Gulshan Villa,
Omer Part,
Bombay, February 25, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 17th February reached me at Haripura. I had no intention of flinging any complaints and grievances at you. In my attempt to find out what your complaints were I read your speeches as reported in the newspapers (usually by a news agency) and noted down some of the points on which you had laid stress. I am glad to know that you have been misrepresented, but you have not pointed out where the misrepresentation comes in, nor, so far as I know, have you issued any statement to the press correcting the misrepresentation. May I suggest that it will be worth-while to correct these errors so that the public might not be misled? A clear and authoritative statement from you will help us also in understanding what you stand for and what you object to.

I note that you do not wish me to introduce in our correspondence any matters which we may have discussed with Nawab Ismail Khan or Chowdhry Khaliq-uz-Zaman. I did not know that they represented any different viewpoint from yours. I thought it necessary to draw your attention to the repeated attempts I have been making to find out what the political and communal policy of the Muslim League is and wherein it differs from that of the Congress. You will remember saying last year that the Muslim League had an entirely different policy even on political matters from that of Congress. Since then the League has changed its objective and its economic outlook and has thus approached nearer to the Congress. I am anxious to find out what the real meaning of these changes is. Without this clarification it is difficult for us to understand the present position.

You say that you do not believe in the doctrine that I lay down, namely : 'but are we not entitled to ask you to substantiate all these criticisms in private at least if not in public.' Further you say that for your part you make no such distinction and are prepared to substantiate anything that you have said publicly, provided it is correctly reported. If you will read my sentence again you will no doubt observe that I have not laid down any such doctrine as you imagine. I would indeed welcome a public treatment by you, of the criticisms made by you. But if you yourself were

unwilling to write to the press on the subject, as you indicated in your letter, I put it to you that we were at least entitled to request you to substantiate the criticism in private.

If you have made no criticisms of the Congress, and the press reports are entirely wrong, then of course no question of substantiation arises. All that need be done is to contradict the press reports. But if criticisms have been made, as presumably they have been, then I would request you to justify them publicly or privately as you might choose. Personally I would prefer the former method.

I am afraid I must confess that I do not yet know what the fundamental points of dispute are. It is for this reason that I have been requesting you to clarify them. So far I have not received any help in this direction. Of course we shall willingly meet you whenever opportunity arises. Our president Subhas Bose, or Maulana Abul Kalam Azad or I or any other member of the Working Committee can meet you at a suitable opportunity.

But when we meet what are we to discuss? Responsible people with organizations behind them can hardly discuss anything in the air. Some clarification of the issues, some clear statement of what is wanted and what is objected to, is always desirable otherwise we may not come to grips with the subject. You will remember the argument about what transpired at

Delhi in 1935 between you and Babu Rajendra Prasad. There has even been a difference of opinion about the facts. It would be unfortunate if we repeated this performance and then argued about it later.

It is thus highly desirable for us to define the issues first. This is also necessary as we have always to consult many colleagues in regard to any matter affecting Congress policy. There is surely nothing undesirable or inappropriate about this defining of issues by correspondence. It is the usual method adopted between individuals and organisations. May I therefore beg of you to enlighten me ?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.

1, Hastings Road,
New Delhi, March 3, 1948.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th February. I regret to find the same spirit running through of making insinuations and innuendoes and raising all sorts of matters of trifling character which are not germane to our present subject with which you started, namely, how to find the basis of approach to the most vital and prominent question of Hindu-Muslim unity. You wind up your letter by insisting upon the course that I should formulate the points in dis-

pute and submit to you for your consideration and then carry on correspondence with you. This method I have already stated in my considered opinion is undesirable and inappropriate. The method you insist upon may be appropriate between two litigants and that is followed by solicitors on behalf of their clients but national issues cannot be settled like that.

When you say 'that I am afraid I must confess that I do not know what the fundamental points in dispute are' I am only amazed at your ignorance. This matter has been tackled since 1925 right upto 1935 by the most prominent leaders in the country and so far no solution has been found. I would beg of you to study it and do not take up a self-complacent attitude and if you are earnest I don't think you will find much difficulty in realizing what the main points in dispute are, because they have been constantly mentioned both in the press and on the public platform even very recently.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Allahabad, March 8, 1938

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of March 3rd. I am afraid our letters to each other repeat themselves. I

go on requesting you to tell us what exactly are the points in dispute which have to be discussed and you go on insisting that this should not be done by correspondence. At the same time you have pointed out that the main points in dispute have been constantly, and very recently, discussed in the press and public platform. I have carefully followed press statements and your public speeches. In my efforts to discover those points of dispute, I enumerated some of the criticisms which you were reported to have made in public speeches. In your reply you stated that you were misreported, but you did not say what the correct report should have been. Further you said that these were minor and trifling matters, but again you did not point out what the major matters were. You will perceive my difficulty. I hope I am not making any insinuations or innuendoes, as you suggest in your last letter. Certainly it is not my intention to do so, not to raise trifling matters which are not germane to the present subject. But what are these matters which are germane? It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problem. If so, I deserve to be enlightened. If you will refer me to any recent statement made in the press or platform which will help me in understanding, I shall be grateful.

It is not my desire, may I repeat, to carry on a controversy by correspondence, but only to find out what

the main points of discussion and dispute are. It is surely usual for national issues to be formulated and clarified in this way to facilitate discussion. Both in national and international matters we are frequently adopting this course.

You are perfectly right in saying that this matter has been tackled since 1925 repeatedly. Do you not think that this very history warns us not to approach it in a vague manner without clear ideas as to what we object to and what we want? Apart from this, much has happened during these past few years which has altered the position. For instance, the Communal Award. Do you want this discussed with a view to some settlement being arrived at on another basis?

It is obvious that the Congress is exceedingly anxious to remove all causes of misunderstanding and friction. Apart from wider national issues, it would like to do so because such misunderstanding comes in the way of its work. It has frequently considered the problem and passed such resolutions and put forward such proposals as it considered right. I do not wish to discuss as to whether these were right or not. That may be a matter for argument. But according to our lights we tried to do our best. If we did not succeed to the extent we hoped to do that is our misfortune and we shall gladly consider suggestions which might lead to better results.

What are the various aspects of this matter? May I enumerate them?

- (1) The Communal Award, which includes separate electorates and reservation of seats.
- (2) Religious guarantees.
- (3) Cultural protection and guarantees.

Presumably these are the three main heads. There may be some minor matters but I do not refer to them as you wish to concentrate on the main issues.

As regards the Communal Award the position of the Congress has been clarified. If it is your desire to discuss this matter, I should like to know it.

As regards religious and cultural guarantees, the Congress has given as full assurances and guarantees as is possible. If, however, any other guarantees are considered necessary, they should be mentioned. About one of the questions which you have referred to in your speeches, the Language question, I have written to you previously and sent you my brochure. I trust that you agreed with its main conclusions.

Are we going to discuss these matters or some others which I have not mentioned above? Then again the background of all such discussions must necessarily be a certain political and economic one—our struggle for independence, our anti-imperialism, our methods of direct action whenever necessary, our anti-war policy, our attempt to remove the exploitation of the masses, agrarian and labour problems, and the like. I take it that with the re-orientation of the Muslim League's policy there will not be any

great difference regarding this anti-imperialist background.

You will forgive me for repeating myself in these letters and for saying the same things over and over again. I do so because I am keenly desirous of your appreciating my view-point, which I believe is also the view-point of my colleagues in the Congress. I have no desire to take up your time and to spend my time in writing long letters. But my mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. Vagueness or an avoidance of real issue cannot lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that in spite of my repeated requests I am not told what issues have to be discussed.

I understand that Gardhiji has already written to you expressing his readiness to have a talk with you. I am not now the Congress President and thus have not the same representative capacity, but if I can be of any help in this matter, my services are at the disposal of the Congress and I shall gladly meet you and discuss these matters with you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.

1, Hastings Road,
New Delhi, March 17, 1938.

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,

I have received your letter of the 8th March, 1938.

Your first letter of the 18th of January conveyed to me that you desire to know the points in dispute for the purpose of promoting Hindu-Muslim unity. When in reply I said that the subject-matter cannot be solved through correspondence and it was equally undesirable as discussing matters in the Press, you in your reply of the 4th February formulated a catalogue of grievances with regard to my supposed criticism of the Congress and utterances which are hardly relevant to the question for our immediate consideration. You went on persisting on the same line and you are still of opinion that those matters, although not germane to the present subject, should be further discussed which I do not propose to do as I have already explained to you in my previous letter.

The question with which we started, as I understood, is of safeguarding the rights and interests of the Mussalmans with regard to their religion, culture, language, personal laws and political rights in the national life, the government and the administration of the country. Various suggestions have been made which will satisfy the Mussalmans and create a sense of security and confidence in the majority community. I am surprised when you say in your letter under reply, "But what are these matters which are germane? It may be that I am dense or not sufficiently acquainted with the intricacies of the problems. If so, I deserve to be enlightened. If you will refer me to any recent statement made in the press or platform

which will help me in understanding, I shall be grateful." Perhaps you have heard of the Fourteen Points.

Next, as you say, "Apart from this much has happened during these past few years which has altered the position." Yes, I agree with you, and various suggestions have appeared in the newspapers recently. For instance, if you will refer to the *Statesman*, dated the 12th of February, 1938, there appears an article under the heading, "Through Muslim Eyes" (copy enclosed for your convenience). Next, an article in the *New Times*, dated the 1st of March, 1938, dealing with your pronouncement recently made, I believe at Haripura session of the Congress, where you are reported to have said:—

"I have examined this so-called communal question through the telescope, and if there is nothing what can you see."

This article in the *News Time* appeared on the 1st of March, 1938, making numerous suggestions (copy enclosed for convenience). Further, you may have seen Mr. Aney's interview where he warned the Congress mentioning some of the points which the Muslim League would demand.

Now, this is enough to show to you that various suggestions that have been made, or are likely to be made, or are expected to be made, will have to be analysed and ultimately I consider it is the duty of every

true nationalist, to whichever party or community he may belong, to make it his business and examine the situation and bring about a pact between the Mussalmans and the Hindus and create a real united front; and it should be as much your anxiety and duty as it is mine, irrespective of the question of the party or the community to which we belong. But if you desire that I should collect all these suggestions and submit to you as a petitioner for you and your colleagues to consider, I am afraid I can't do it for the purpose of carrying on further correspondence with regard to these various points with you. But if you still insist upon that, as you seem to do so when you say in your letter, "My mind demands clarity before it can function effectively or think in terms of any action. Vagueness or an avoidance of real issues could not lead to satisfactory results. It does seem strange to me that in spite of my repeated requests I am not told what issues have to be discussed." This is hardly a correct description or a fair representation, but in that case I would request you to ask the Congress officially to communicate with me to that effect and I shall place the matter before the Council of the All-India Muslim League as you yourself say that you are "not the Congress President and thus have not the same representative capacity but if I can be of any help in this matter my services are at the disposal of the Congress and I shall gladly meet you and discuss

these matters with you." As to meeting you and discussing the matters with you, I need hardly say that I shall be pleased to do so.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

*Extract from the NEW TIMES, Lahore
dated the 1st March, 1938.*

THE COMMUNAL QUESTION

In its last session at Haripura the Indian National Congress passed a resolution for assuring minorities of their religious and cultural rights. The resolution was moved by Pandit Jawaharlal and was carried. The speech which Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru made on this occasion was as bad as any speech could be. If the resolution has to be judged in the light of that speech, then it comes to this that the resolution has been passed not in any spirit of seriousness, but merely as a meaningless assurance to satisfy the foolish minorities who are clammering "for the satisfaction of the communal problem." Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru proceeded on the basis that there was really no communal question. We should like to reproduce the trenchant manner in which he put forward the proposition. He said: "I have examined the so-called communal question through the telescope and, if there is nothing, what can you see." It appears to us that it is the height of dishonesty to move a resolution with these promises. If there is no minority question

why proceed to pass a resolution? Why not state that there is no minority question. This is not the first time that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has expressed his complete inability to understand or see the communal question. When replying to a statement of Mr. Jinnah he re-iterated his conviction that in spite of his best endeavour to understand what Mr. Jinnah wanted, he could not get at what he wanted. He seems to think that with the Communal Award which the Congress had opposed, the seats in the Legislature have become assured and now nothing remains to be done. He repeats the offensive statement that the Communal Award is merely a problem created by the middle or upper classes for the sake of a few seats in the Legislature or appointments in Government service or for Ministerial positions. We should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that he has completely misunderstood the position of the Muslim minority and it is a matter of intense pain that the President of an All India Organisation which claims to represent the entire population of India, should be so completely ignorant of the Muslim minority. We shall set forth below some of the demands so that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru may not have any occasion hereafter to say that he does not know what more the Muslims want. The Muslim demands are :—

1. That the Congress shall henceforth withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should

cease to prate about it as if it were a negation of nationalism. It may be a negation of nationalism, but if the Congress has announced in its statement that it is not opposing the Communal Award, the Muslims want that the Congress should at least stop all agitation for the recession of the Communal Award.

2. The Communal Award merely settles the question of the representation of the Muslims and of other minorities in the Legislatures of the country. The further question of the representation of the minorities in the services of the country remains. Muslims demand that they are as much entitled to be represented in the services of their motherland as the Hindus and since the Muslims have come to realise by bitter experience that it is impossible for any protection to be extended to Muslim rights in the matter of their representation in the services, it is necessary that the share of the Muslims in the services should be definitely fixed in the constitution and by statutory enactment so that it may not be open to any Hindu head of any department to ride roughshod over Muslims in the name of "Efficiency." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru knows that in the name of efficiency and merit, the right of Indians to man the services of their country was denied by the bureaucracy. To-day when Congress is in power in 7 Provinces, the Muslims have a right to demand of Congress leaders that they shall unequivocally express themselves in this regard.

3. Muslims demand that the protection of their Personal Law and their culture shall be guaranteed by the statute. And as an acid test of the sincerity of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and the Congress in this regard, Muslims demand that the Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to ensure that the Shahidganj Mosque is restored to its original position and that the Sikhs desist from profane uses and thereby injuring the religious susceptibilities of the Muslims.

4. Muslims demand that their right to call *Azan* and perform their religious ceremonies shall not be fettered in any way. We should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that in a village, in the Kasur Tehsil, of the Lahore District, known as Raja Jang, the Muslim inhabitants of that place are not allowed by the Sikhs to call out their *Azans* loudly. With such neighbours, it is necessary to have a statutory guarantee that the religious rights of the Muslims shall not be in any way interfered with and on the advent of Congress rule to demand of the Congress that it shall use its powerful organization for the prevention of such an event. In this connection we should like to tell Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru that the Muslims claim cow slaughter as one of their religious rights and demand that so long as the Sikhs are permitted to carry on *Jhatka* and to live on *Jhatka*, the

Muslims have every right to insist on their undoubted right to slaughter cows. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is not a very great believer in religious injunctions. He claims to be living on the economic plane and we should like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to know that for a Muslim the question of cow-slaughter is a measure of economic necessity and that therefore it does not remain open to any Hindu to statutorily prohibit the slaughter of cows.

5. Muslims demand that their majorities in the Provinces in which they are at present, shall not be affected by any territorial redistributions or adjustments. The Muslims are at present in majority in the provinces of Bengal, Punjab, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Let the Congress hold out the guarantee and express its readiness to the incorporation of this guarantee in the Statute that the present distribution of the Muslim population in the various provinces shall not be interfered with through the medium of any territorial distribution or re-adjustment.

6. The question of national anthem is another matter. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru cannot be unaware that Muslims all over have refused to accept the Bande Matram or any expurgated addition of the anti-Muslim song as a binding national anthem. If Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru cannot succeed in inducing the Hindu majority to drop the use of this song, then

let him not talk so tall, and let him realise that the great Hindu mass does not take him seriously except as a strong force to injure the cause of Muslim solidarity.

7. The question of language and script is another demand of the Muslims. The Muslims insist on Urdu being practically their national language; they want statutory guarantees that the use of the Urdu tongue shall not in any manner be curtailed or damaged.

8. The question of the representation of the Muslims in the local bodies is another unsolved question. Muslims demand that the principle underlying the Communal Award, namely, separate electorates and representation according to population strength should apply uniformly in the various local and other elected bodies from top to bottom.

We can go on multiplying this list but for the present we should like to know the reply of the Congress and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to the demands that we have set forth above. We should like Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru fully to understand that the Muslims are more anxious than the Hindus to see complete independence in the real sense of that term established in India. They do not believe in any Muslim Raj for India and will fight a Hindu Raj, tooth and nail. They stand for the complete freedom of country and of all classes inhabiting this country

but they shall oppose the establishment of any majority Raj, of a kind that will make a clean sweep of the cultural, religious and political guarantees of the various minorities as set forth above. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is under the comforting impression that the questions set forth are trivial questions but he should reconsider his position in the light of the emphasis and importance which the minorities which are effected by the programme of the Congress place on these matters. After all it is the minorities which are to judge and not the majorities. It appears to us that with the attitude of mind which Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru betrayed in his speech and which the seconder of that resolution equally exhibited in his speech, namely, that the question of minorities and majorities was an artificial one and created to suit vested interests, it is obvious that nothing can come out of the talks that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru recently initiated between himself and Mr. Jinnah. If the Congress is in the belief that this reiteration of its inane pledge to the minorities will satisfy them and that they will be taken in by mere words, the Congress is badly mistaken.

*Extract from the STATESMAN, New Delhi Edition,
dated the 12th February, 1938.*

THROUGH MOSLEM EYES.

By Ain-el-Mulk.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's Bombay statement of January 2 on the Hindu-Moslem question has produced hopeful reactions and the stage has been set for a talk between the leaders of what, for the sake of convenience, may be described as Hindu India and Moslem India. Whether the Jinnah-Jawaharlal talks will produce in 1938 better results than the Jinnah-Prasad talks did in 1935 is yet to be seen. Too much optimism would not, however, be justified. The Pandit, by way of annotating his Bombay statement while addressing the U. P. delegates for Haripura at Lucknow, at the end of January, emphatically asserted that in no case would Congress "give up its principles." That was not a hopeful statement, because any acceptable formula or pact that may be evolved by the leaders of the Congress and the League would, one may guess, involve the acquiescence of the Congress in separate electorate (at least for a certain period), coalition Ministries, recognition of the League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Indian Moslems, modification of its attitude on the question of Hindi and its script, scraping of Bande Mataram altogether, and possibly

a re-designing of the tri-colour flag or at least agreeing to give the flag of the League an equal importance. It is possible that with a little statesmanship on both sides agreement can be reached on all the points without any infringement of the principles of either, but the greatest obstacle to a satisfactory solution would still remain, in the shape of the communalists of the Mahasabha and the irreconcilables of Bengal, all of whom are not of the Mahasabha alone. The right of the Congress to speak in the name of Hindus has been openly challenged and even the Jinnah-Prasad formula which did not satisfy the Moslems and nothing on the lines of which is now likely to satisfy them—has been vehemently denounced by Bengal Provincial Conference held at Vishnupur which recently passed an extremely communal resolution, and that the latest utterances of the Congress President-elect on the communal situation generally and the Jinnah-Prasad formula in particular show some restraint. The only thing for Muslims to do in the circumstances is to wait and hope for the best, without relaxing their efforts to add daily to the strength of the League for it will not do to forget that it is the growing power and representative character of the Muslim League which has compelled Congress leaders to recognize the necessity for an understanding with the Moslem community.

1, Woodburn Park,
Calcutta, April 6, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 17th March reached me in the Kumaun Hills where I had gone for a brief holiday. From there I have come to Calcutta. I propose to return to Allahabad to-day and I shall probably be there for the greater part of April. If it is convenient for you to come there we could meet. Or if it suits you better to go to Lucknow I shall try to go there.

I am glad that you have indicated in your last letter a number of points which you have in mind. The enclosures you have sent mention these and I take it that they represent your view-point. I was somewhat surprised to see this list as I had no idea that you wanted to discuss many of these matters with us. Some of these are wholly covered by previous decisions of the Congress, some others are hardly capable of discussion.

As far as I can make out from your letter and the enclosures you have sent, you wish to discuss the following matters :—

- (1) The Fourteen Points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929.

- (2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
- (3) The share of the Muslims in the State services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
- (4) Muslim Personal Law and Culture should be guaranteed by Statute.
- (5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the mosque.
- (6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
- (7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
- (8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial redistribution or adjustments.
- (9) The Bande Mataram song should be given up.
- (10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory

guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.

- (11) Muslim representation in local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is separate electorates and population strength.
- (12) The tri-colour flag should be changed or, alternatively, the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
- (13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organisation of Indian Muslims.
- (14) Coalition ministries.

It is further stated that the formula evolved by you and Babu Rajendra Prasad in 1935 does not satisfy the Muslims now and nothing on those lines will satisfy them.

It is added that the list given above is not a complete list and that it can be augmented by the addition of further 'demands.' Not knowing these possible and unlimited additions I can say nothing about them. But I should like to deal with the various matters specifically mentioned and to indicate what the Congress attitude has been in regard to them.

But before considering them, the political and economic background of the free India we are working for has to be kept in mind for ultimately that is the controlling factor. Some of these matters do not arise

in considering an independent India or take a particular shape or have little importance. We can discuss them in terms of Indian independence or in terms of the British dominance of India continuing. The Congress naturally thinks in terms of independence, though it adjusts itself occasionally to the present transitional and temporary phases. It is thus not interested in amendments to the present constitution, but aims at its complete removal and its substitution by a constitution framed by the Indian people through a Constituent Assembly.

Another matter has assumed an urgent and vital significance and this is the exceedingly critical international situation and the possibility of war. This must concern India greatly and affect her struggle for freedom. This must, therefore, be considered the governing factor of the situation and almost everything else becomes of secondary importance, for all our efforts and petty arguments will be of little avail if the foundation is upset. The Congress has clearly and repeatedly laid down its policy in the event of such a crisis and stated that it will be no party to imperialist war. Peace, therefore, and Indian independence is its basic policy. The Congress will very gladly and willingly co-operate with the Muslim League and all other organisations and individuals in the furtherance of this policy.

I have carefully looked through the various matters to which you have drawn attention in your letter and

its enclosures and I find that there is nothing in them which refers to or touches the economic demands of the masses or affects the all-important questions of poverty and unemployment. For all of us in India these are the vital issues and unless some solution is found for them, we function in vain. The question of State services, howsoever important and worthy of consideration it might be, affects a very small number of people. The peasantry, industrial workers, artisans and petty shopkeepers form the vast majority of the population and they are not improved in any way by any of the demands listed above. Their interests should be paramount.

Many of the 'demands' involve changes of the constitution which we are not in a position to bring about. Even if some such changes are desirable in themselves, it is not our policy to press for minor constitutional changes. We want to do away completely with the present constitution and replace it by another for a free India.

In the same way the desire for statutory guarantees involves constitutional changes which we cannot give effect to. All we can do is to state that in a future constitution for a free India we want certain guarantees to be incorporated. We have done this in regard to religious, cultural, linguistic and other rights of minorities in the Karachi resolution on Fundamental Rights. We would like these fundamental rights to be made a part of the

constitution.

I now deal with the various matters listed above.

1. The fourteen Points, I had thought, were somewhat out of date. Many of their provisions have been given effect to by the Communal Award and in other ways; some others are entirely acceptable to the Congress; yet others require constitutional changes which, as I have mentioned above, are beyond our present competence. Apart from the matters covered by the Communal Award and those involving a change in the constitution, one or two matters remain which give rise to difference of opinion and which are still likely to lead to considerable argument.

2. The Congress has clearly stated its attitude towards the Communal Award, and it comes to this that it seeks alterations only on the basis of mutual consent of the parties concerned. I do not understand how any one can take objection to this attitude and policy. If we are asked to describe the Award as not being anti-national, that would be patently false. Even apart from what it gives to various groups, its whole basis and structure are anti-national and come in the way of the development of national unity. As you know it gives an overwhelming and wholly undeserving weightage to the European elements in certain parts of India. If we think in terms of an independent India we cannot possibly fit in this Award with it. It is true that under stress of circumstances we have

sometimes to accept as a temporary measure something that is on the face of it anti-national. It is also true that in the matters governed by the Communal Award we can only find a satisfactory and abiding solution by the consent and goodwill of the parties concerned. That is the Congress policy.

.3. The fixing of the Muslims' share in the State services by statutory enactment necessarily involves the fixing of the shares of other groups and communities similarly. This would mean a rigid and compartmental State structure which will impede progress and development and no community should have cause to complain. At the same time it is generally admitted that State appointments should be fairly and adequately distributed and no community should have cause to complain. It is far better to do this by convention and agreement. The Congress is fully alive to this issue and desires to meet the wishes of various groups in the fullest measure, so as to give to all minority communities, as stated in No. 11 of the Fourteen Points, "an adequate share in all the services of the State and in local self-governing bodies having due regard to the requirements of efficiency." The State to-day is becoming more and more technical and demands expert knowledge in its various departments. It is right that, if a community is backward in this technical and expert knowledge, special efforts should be made to give it this education to bring it up to a higher level.

I understand that at the Unity Conference held at Allahabad in 1933 or thereabouts, a mutually satisfactory solution of this question of State services was arrived at.

4. As regards protection of culture the Congress has declared its willingness to embody this in the fundamental laws of the constitution. It has also declared that it does not wish to interfere in any way with the personal law of any community.

5. I am considerably surprised at the suggestion that the Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj mosque. That is a matter to be decided either legally or by mutual agreement. The Congress prefers in all such matters the way of mutual agreement and its services can always be utilised for this purpose where there is an opening for them and a desire to this effect on the part of the parties concerned. I am glad that the Premier of the Punjab has suggested that this is the only satisfactory way to a solution of the problem.

6. The right to perform religious ceremonies should certainly be guaranteed to all communities. The Congress resolution about this is quite clear. I know nothing about the particular incident relating to a Punjab village which has been referred to. No doubt many instances can be gathered together from various parts of India where petty interferences take place with Hindu, Muslim or Sikh ceremonies. These

have to be tactfully dealt with wherever they arise. But the principle is quite clear and should be agreed to.

7. As regards cow-slaughter, there has been a great deal of entirely false and unfounded propaganda against the Congress suggesting that the Congress was going to stop it forcibly by legislation. The Congress does not wish to undertake any legislative action in this matter to restrict the established rights of the Muslims.

8. The question of territorial redistribution has not arisen in any way. If and when it arises, it must be dealt with on the basis of mutual agreement of the parties concerned.

9. Regarding the Bande Mataram song the Working Committee issued a long statement in October last to which I would invite your attention. First of all it has to be remembered that no formal national anthem has been adopted by the Congress at any time. It is true, however, that the Bande Mataram song has been intimately associated with Indian nationalism for more than thirty years and numerous associations of sentiment and sacrifice have gathered round it. Popular songs are not made to order, nor can they be successfully imposed. They grow out of public sentiment. During all these thirty or more years the Bande Mataram song was never considered as having any religious significance and was treated as a national song in praise of India. Nor, to my knowledge, was

any objection taken to it except on political grounds by the Government. When, however, some objections were raised, the Working Committee carefully considered the matter and ultimately decided to recommend that certain stanzas, which contained certain allegorical references ; might not be used on national platforms or occasions. The two stanzas that have been recommended by the Working Committee for use as a national song have not a word or a phrase which can offend anybody from any point of view and I am surprised that any one can object to them. They may appeal to some more than to others, Some may prefer another national song ; they have full freedom to do so. But to compel large numbers to give up what they have long valued and grown attached to is to cause needless hurt to them and injure the national movement itself. It would be improper for a national organization to do this.

10. About Urdu and Hindi, I have previously written to you and have also sent you my pamphlet on "The Question of Language." The Congress has declared in favour of guarantees for languages and culture. It wants to encourage all the great provincial languages of India and at the same time to make Hindustani, as written both in the Nagri and Urdu scripts, the national language. Both scripts should be officially recognised and the choice should be left to the people concerned. In fact this policy is being pursued by the Congress

Ministries.

11. The Congress has long been of opinion that joint electorates are preferable to separate electorates from the point of view of national unity and harmonious co-operation between the different communities. But joint electorates, in order to have real value, must not be imposed on unwilling groups. Hence the Congress is quite clear that their introduction should depend on their acceptance by the people concerned. This is the policy that is being pursued by the Congress Ministries in regard to local bodies. Recently in a bill dealing with local bodies introduced in the Bombay Assembly, separate electorates were maintained but an option was given to the people concerned to adopt joint electorate, if they so chose. This principle seems to be in exact accordance with No. 5 of the Fourteen Points, which lays down that "Representation of communal groups shall continue to be by means of separate electorate as at present, provided that it shall be open to any community, at any time, to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint electorate. It surprises me that the Muslim League group in the Bombay Assembly should have opposed the Bill with its optional clause although this carried out the very policy of the Muslim League.

May I also point out that in the resolution passed by the Muslim League in 1929, at the time it adopted the Fourteen Points, it was stated that "the Mussalmans will not consent to joint electorates unless Sind is

actually constituted into a separate province and reforms in fact are introduced in the N.W.F. Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other Provinces." Since then Sind has been separated and the N. W. F. Province has been placed on a level with other Provinces. So far as Baluchistan is concerned, the Congress is committed to a levelling up of this area in the same way.

12. The National tri-colour Flag was adopted originally in 1920 by the Congress after full and careful consultation with eminent Muslim, Sikh and other leaders. Obviously a country and a national movement must have a national flag representing the nation and all communities in it. No communal flag can represent the nation. If we did not possess a national flag now we would have to evolve one. The present National Flag had its colours originally selected in order to represent the various communities, but we did not like to lay stress on this communal aspect of the colours. Artistically I think the combination of orange, white and green has resulted in a flag which is probably the most beautiful of all national flags. For these many years our flag has been used and it has spread to the remotest village and cottage and brought hope and a sense of all India unity to our masses. It has been associated with great sacrifices on the part of our people, including Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, and many have suffered lathi blows and imprisonment and even death in defending it from insult or injury. Thus

a powerful sentiment has grown up in its favour. On innumerable occasions Maulana Mohammad Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali and many leaders of the Muslim League to-day have associated themselves with this flag and emphasised its virtues and significance as a symbol of Indian unity. It has spread outside the Congress ranks and been generally recognised as the flag of the nation. It is difficult to understand how any-one can reasonably object to it now.

Communal flags cannot obviously take its place for that can only mean a host of flags of various communities being used together and thus emphasising our disunity and separateness. Communal flags might be used for religious function or over any public building meant for various communities.

May I add that during the past few months, on several occasions, the National Flag has been insulted by some members or volunteers of the Muslim League. This has pained us greatly but we have deliberately avoided anything in the nature of conflict in order not to add to communal bitterness. We have also issued strict orders, and they have been obeyed, that no interference should take place with the Muslim League Flag, even though it might be inappropriately displayed.

13. I do not understand what is meant by our recognition of the Muslim League as the one and only organisation of Indian Muslims. Obviously the Muslim

League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such; But we have to deal with all organisations and individuals that come within our ken. We do not determine the measure of importance or distinction they possess. There are a large number, about a hundred thousand, of Muslims on the Congress rolls, many of whom have been our close companions, in prisons and outside, for many years and we value their comradeship highly. There are many organisations which contain Muslims and non-Muslims alike, such as Trade Unions, Peasant Unions, Kisan Sabhas, Debt Committees, Zamindar Associations, Chambers of Commerce, Employees' Associations, etc., and we have contacts with them. There are special Muslim organisations such as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, the Proja Party, the Ahrars and others, which claim attention. Inevitably the more important the organisation the more the attention paid to it, but this importance does not come from outside recognition but from inherent strength. And the other organisations, even though they might be younger and smaller, cannot be ignored.

14. I should like to know what is meant by coalition ministries. A ministry must have a definite political and economic programme and policy. And other kind of ministry would be a disjointed and ineffective body, with no clear mind or direction. Given a common political and economic programme and policy co-operation is easy. You know probably

that some such co-operation was sought for and obtained by the Congress in the Frontier Province. In Bombay also, repeated attempts were made on behalf of the Congress to obtain this co-operation on the basis of a common programme. The Congress has gone to the Assemblies with a definite programme and in furtherance of a clean policy. It will always gladly co-operate with other groups, whether it is in majority or minority in an Assembly, in furtherance of that programme and policy. On that basis I can conceive of even coalition ministries being formed. Without that basis the Congress has no interest in a Ministry or in an Assembly.

I have dealt, I am afraid at exceeding length, with the various points raised in your letter and its enclosures. I am glad that I have had a glimpse into your mind through this correspondence as this enables me to understand a little better the problems that are before you and perhaps others. I agree entirely that it is the duty of every Indian to bring about harmonious joint effort of all of us for the achievement of India's freedom and the ending of the poverty of her people. For me, and I take it for most of us, the Congress, has been a means to that end and not an end in itself. It has been a privilege for us to work through the Congress because it has drawn to itself the love of millions of our countrymen, and through their sacrifice and united effort, taken us a long way to

our goal. But much remains to be done and we have all to pull together to that end.

Personally the idea of pacts and the like does not appeal to me, though perhaps they might be necessary occasionally. What seems to be far more important is a more basic understanding of each other, bringing with it the desire and ability to co-operate together. That larger co-operation, if it is to include our millions, must necessarily be in the interests of these millions. My mind therefore is continually occupied with the problems of these unhappy masses of this country and I view all other problems in this light. I should like to view the communal problem also in this perspective for otherwise it has no great significance for me.

You seem to imagine that I wanted you to put forward suggestions as a petitioner, and then you propose that the Congress should officially communicate with you. Surely you have misunderstood me and done yourself and me an injustice. There is no question of petitioning either by you or by me, but a desire to understand each other and the problem that we have been discussing. I do not understand the significance of your wanting an official intimation from the Congress. I do not ask you for an official reply on behalf of the Muslim League. Organizations do not function in this way. It is not a question of prestige for the Congress or for any of us, for we

are keener on reaching the goal we have set before us, than on small matters of prestige. The Congress is a great enough organisation to ignore such petty matters, and if some of us have gained a measure of influence and popularity, we have done so in the shadow of the Congress.

You will remember that I took the initiative in writing to you and requesting you to enlighten me as to what your objections were to the Congress policy and what, according to you, were the points in dispute. I had read many of your speeches, as reported in the press and I found to my regret that they were full of strong attacks on the Congress which, according to my way of thinking, were not justified. I wanted to remove any misunderstanding, where such existed, and to clear the air.

I have found, chiefly in the Urdu press, the most astounding falsehoods about the Congress, I refer to facts, not to opinions, and to facts within my knowledge. Two days ago, here in Calcutta, I saw a circular letter or notice issued by a Secretary of a Muslim League. This contained a list of the so-called misdeeds of the U. P. Government. I read this with amazement for there was not an atom of truth in most of the charges. I suppose they were garnered from Urdu press. Through the press and the platform such charges have been repeated on numerous occasions and communal passion have thus been roused and bitterness

created. This has grieved me and I have sought by writing to you and to Nawab Ismail Khan to find a way of checking this deplorable deterioration of our public life, as well as surer basis for co-operation. That problem still faces us and I hope we shall solve it.

I have mentioned earlier in this letter the critical International situation and the terrible sense of impending catastrophe that hangs over the world. My mind is obsessed with this and I want India to realize it and be ready for all consequences, good or ill, that may flow from it. In this period of world crisis, all of us, to whatever party or group we might belong and whatever our differences might be, have the primary duty of holding together to protect our people from the perils that might encompass them. Our differences and arguments seem trivial when the future of the world and of India hangs in the balance. It is in the hope that all of us will succeed in building up this larger unity in our country that I have written to you and others repeatedly and at length.

There is one small matter I should like to mention. The report of my speech at Haripura, as given in your letter and the newspaper article, is not correct.

We have been corresponding for some time and many vague rumours float about as to what we have been saying to each other. Anxious inquiries come to me and I have no doubt that similar inquiries are

addressed to you also. I think that we might take the public into our confidence now for this is a public matter in which many are interested. I suggest therefore that our correspondence might be released to the press. I presume you will have no objection.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.
Little Gibbs Road,
Malabar Hill,
Bombay, April 12, 1938.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
Allahabad, (U. P.)

Dear Pandit Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th April, 1938. I am extremely obliged to you for informing me that you propose to return to Allahabad and shall probably be there for the greater part of April and suggesting that, if it would be convenient for me to come there, we could meet, or, if it suits me better to go to Lucknow you will try to go there. I am afraid that it is not possible for me owing to my other engagements, but I shall be in Bombay about the end of April and if it is convenient to you, I shall be very glad to meet you.

As to the rest of your letter, it has been to me a most painful reading. It seems to me that you cannot even accurately interpret my letter, as you very honestly say that your "mind is obsessed with the International situation and the terrible sense of impending

catastrophe that hangs over the world," so you are thinking in terms entirely divorced from realities which face us in India. I can only express my great regret at your turning and twisting what I wrote to you and putting entirely a wrong complexion upon the position I have placed before you at your request. You have formulated certain points in your letter which you father upon me to begin with as my proposals. I sent you extracts from the press which had recently appeared simply because I believed you when you repeatedly asserted and appealed to me that you would be grateful if I would refer you to any recent statements made in the press or platform which would help you in understanding matters. These are some of the matters which are undoubtedly agitating Muslim India, but the question how to meet them and to what extent and by what means and methods, is the business, as I have said before, of every true nationalist to solve. Whether constitutional changes are necessary, whether we should do it by agreement or conventions and so forth, are matters, I thought, were for discussion, but I am extremely sorry to find that you have in your letter already pronounced your judgment and given your decisions on a good many of them with a preamble which negatives any suggestion of discussion which may lead to a settlement, as you start by saying, "I was so much surprised to see this list as I have no idea that you wanted to discuss many of these matters with us; some of these are wholly

covered by previous decisions of the Congress, some others are hardly capable of discussion," and then you proceed to your conclusions having formulated the points according to your own notions. Your tone and language again display the same arrogance and militant spirit as if the Congress is the sovereign power, and, as an indication, you extend your patronage by saying that "obviously the Muslim League is an important communal organisation and we deal with it as such, as we have to deal with all organisations and individuals that come within our ken. We do not determine the measure of importance or distinction they possess" and then you mention various other organisations. Here I may add that in my opinion, as I have publicly stated so often, that, unless the Congress recognises the Muslim League on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement, we shall have to wait and depend upon our inherent strength which will "determine the measure of importance or distinction it possesses." Having regard to your mentality it is really difficult for me to make you understand the position any further. Of course, as I have said before) I do not propose to discuss the various matters, referred to by you, by means of or through correspondence, as, in my opinion, that is not the way to tackle this matter.

With regard to your reference to certain falsehoods that have appeared about the Congress in the

Urdu press, which, you say, have astounded you, and with regard to the circular letter referred to about the misdeeds of the U. P. Government, I can express no opinion without investigation but I can give you any number of instances of falsehoods that have appeared in the Congress press and in statements of Congressmen with regard to the All-India Muslim League, some of the leaders and those who are connected with it. Similarly I can give you instances or reports appearing in the Congress press and speeches of Congressmen which are daily deliberately misrepresenting and villifying the Muslim composition of the Bengal, Punjab, Sind and Assam Governments with a view to break those Governments, but that is not the subject-matter of our correspondence and besides no useful purpose will be served in doing so.

With regard to your request that our correspondence should be released to the press, I have no objection provided the correspondence between me and Mr. Gandhi is also published simultaneously, as we both have referred to him and his correspondence with me in ours. You will please therefore obtain the permission of Mr. Gandhi to that effect or, if you wish, I will write to him, informing him that you desire to release the correspondence between us to the press and I am willing to agree to it provided he agrees that the correspondence between him and myself is also released.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Anand Bhawan,
Allahabad, April 16, 1938.

M. A. Jinnah, Esq.,
Little Gibbs Road,
Bombay.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of April 12th has just reached me.

I am exceedingly sorry that anything that I have written to you should have caused you pain. It seems to be true that we approach public problems from different standpoints and inevitably I try to place my viewpoint before you and seek to gain your appreciation of it. To say anything that might pain you would defeat my own purpose, even apart from its impropriety. At the same time I owe it to you and to myself to endeavour to place frankly before you how my mind works and what my views are on the subject-matter under discussion. Our view-points might differ, but I do believe that the margin of difference can be lessened by a frank approach on either side. I have sought to make this approach in all sincerity and with every desire on my part not to say anything that might come in the way.

In my last letter I dealt with the various points mentioned in the extracts you had sent me as I presumed that, as you had drawn my attention to them, they might, to a large extent, represent what you had in mind. As you know I have been trying to get at

these points of difference and when I saw something concrete I wanted to give my reaction to it. I tried to state what the Congress opinion has been in regard to them. There is no finality in day-to-day politics although certain principles are supposed to govern politics. It is for the Congress, if it so chooses, to vary any policy. All I can do is to state what the past and present policy is.

I regret that you think that I write in an arrogant and militant spirit and as if I considered the Congress as the sovereign power. I am painfully conscious of the fact that the Congress is not a sovereign power and that it is limited and circumscribed in a hundred ways and further that it may have to go through the wilderness many a time again before it achieves its objective. You have referred to my obsession with the International situation and the sense of impending catastrophe that possesses me. If I feel that way, as I do, I can hardly grow complacent or imagine that the Congress is sovereign. But when I discuss Congress policies, as a Congressman I can only repeat what these are and not bring in my own particular views on the subject, if these happen to be at variance with Congress resolutions.

You point out to me that the Congress press has contained numerous falsehoods in regard to the Muslim League and some of its leaders, as well as the provincial governments of Bengal, Punjab, Sind and Assam. I entirely agree with you that falsehoods; mispresen-

tations and insinuations are to be deprecated and countered wherever they might occur, in the Urdu, Hindi or English press, or whatever the political complexion of the newspaper. There is no such thing as the Congress Press over which the Congress has control, but it is true that many newspapers generally support the Congress. But whether we can influence them or not, we certainly want to stop all such false and misleading statements and to express our disapproval of them. In this matter I can only beg of you to point out specific instances so that we might take necessary action.

I note what you say about the publication of our correspondence. I have not got with me copies of your correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi. I am therefore writing to him to seek his permission as suggested by you.

I am afraid it will hardly be possible for me to visit Bombay in April or May. Early in June I intend sailing for Europe. In case I go to Bombay earlier I shall inform you so that we might have the opportunity of meeting. I understand that you will be meeting Mahatma Gandhi in the near future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru.

**JINNAH BOSE
TALKS .**

JINNAH-BOSE Talks

(1938)

In the course of the talks between the Congress President and Mr. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, Mr. Jinnah suggested any agreement that might be arrived at should be based on a clear understanding of the position of the Congress and of the Muslim League. He proposed that the conversations should proceed on the following lines :—

“The All-India Muslim League, as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Indian Muslims and the Congress, as the authoritative and representative organisation of the solid body of Hindu opinion, have hereby agreed to the following terms by way of a pact between the two major communities and as a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question.”

After further consideration a somewhat different wording was suggested by him as follows :—

“The Congress and the All-India Muslim League, as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, have hereby agreed to the following terms of a Hindu-Muslim settlement by way of a pact.”

This second statement, though shorter, apparently

embodies the same idea which is given in the first, that is that the Congress should represent the Hindus and the Muslim League, the Mussalmans.

Congress Attitude

The Congress cannot possibly consider itself or function as if it represented one community only even though that might be the majority community in India. Its doors must inevitably be open to all communities and it must welcome Indians who agree with its general policy and methods. It cannot accept the position of representing one community and thus itself becoming a communal organisation. At the same time the Congress is perfectly willing to confer and co-operate with other organisations which represent minority interests.

It is obvious that the Mussalmans of India, although a minority in the whole country, form a very considerable part of the population and their desires must be considered in any scheme affecting India. It is also true that the All-India Muslim League is an organisation representing a large body of Muslim opinion which must carry weight. It is for this reason the Congress has endeavoured to understand the viewpoint of the League and to come to an understanding with it. The Congress, however, would be bound to consult other existing Muslim organisations which have co-operated with the Congress in the past. Further in the event of other group or minority interests being involved, it will

be necessary to consult the representatives of such interests.

On May 15, Mr. Bose addressed the following letter to Mr. Jinnah.

26, Marine Drive, Bombay.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Last night I gave you a note explaining our position. You asked me what constructive proposals we had to make. I think the note is self-explanatory. Having made known the Congress reaction to your suggestion, according to us it remains now to proceed to the next stage, namely, appointment of respective committees which will jointly settle the terms of understanding.

Yours sincerely,

Subhas C. Bose

On May 16, Mr. Jinnah, wrote to Mr. Bose as follows :

Little Gibbs Road,
Malabar Hill, Bombay.

Dear Mr. Bose,

I acknowledge the receipt of a note you handed over to me on behalf of the Congress on the 14th and also I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 15th of May, 1938. The matter will be placed before the Executive Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League at a meeting to be called in the first week

of June and I will communicate to you the decision as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

On June 6, Mr. Jinnah wrote to Mr. Bose :—

Dear Mr. Bose,

I am enclosing herewith the unanimous opinion of the Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League as promised by the note given to me by you on behalf of the Congress on the 15th May, 1938.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Resolution No. 1.

The Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League has considered the note handed by the President Mr. Subhas C. Bose, on behalf of the Congress to Mr. Jinnah, the President of the All-India Muslim League, on the 14th May and his letter of the 15th May, 1938, and find that it is not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India.

Resolution No. 2

The Council have also considered the letter of Mr. Gandhi, dated the 22nd May, 1938, and are of opinion that it is not desirable to include

any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed committee that may be appointed by the Congress.

Resolution No. 3

The Executive Council wish to make it clear that it is the declared policy of the All-India Muslim League that all other minorities should have their rights and interests safeguarded so as to create a sense of security amongst them and win their confidence and the All-India Muslim League will consult the representatives of such minorities and any other interest as may be involved when necessary.

The following telegram was sent by the President to Mr. Jinnah on June 21.

Returned yesterday. Received Letter. Thanks. Regret delay acknowledgement. Subhas Bose.

On June 27 Mr. Subhash Chandra Bose addressed the following letter to Mr. Jinnah :—

38/2 Elgin Road, Calcutta.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Your letter of the 6th instant forwarding the resolutions of the Executive Council of the Muslim League reached Calcutta duly, but as I was on tour, I did not get them till my return on the 20th instant. I telegraphed to you the next day, acknowledging the receipt of your letter.

The Working Committee of the Congress will meet at Wardha on the 9th July. Your letter and the resolutions of the Muslim League will be placed

before the Committee and I shall acquaint you with its decision as soon as possible thereafter. I had been to Wardha and have just returned from there.

With best regards,

Yours Sincerely,
Subhas C. Bose.

The following telegram was sent by the President to Mr. Jinnah on June 24.

Papers report you intend publishing notes of your conversation with Gandhiji and myself. Hope you will not publish without obtaining approval first. Subhas Chandra Bose.

Mr. Jinnah replied to the above telegram on June 25 as follows :—

Subhas Bose
Wardha

Your telegram

Newspapers referred absolutely untrue.

Jinnah.

Working Committee's decision

Mr. Bose addressed the following letter to Mr. Jinnah from Wardha :—

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

The Working Committee has given all the attention it was possible for it to give to the resolutions of the Council of the Muslim League which you were good enough to enclose with your

letter of the 6th June 1938. The first resolution of the League Council defines the status of the League. If it means that before we proceed to set up a machinery for considering the terms of settlement of the communal question, the Congress should recognise the status as defined in that resolution, there is an obvious difficulty. Though the resolution does not use the adjective "only" the language of the resolution means that the adjective is understood. Already the Working Committee has received warnings against recognising the exclusive status of the League. There are Muslim organisations which have been functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of them are staunch supporters of the Congress. Moreover, there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen, some of whom exercise no inconsiderable influence in the country. Then there is the Frontier Province which is overwhelmingly Muslim and is solidly with the Congress. you will see that in the face of these known facts, it is not only impossible but improper for the Congress to make the admission, which the first resolution of the League Council apparently desires the Congress to make. It is suggested that status of organisations does not accrue to them by any defining of it. It comes through the service to which a particular organisation has dedicated itself. The Working Committee, therefore, hopes that the League Council will not ask the Congress to do the impossible. Is it not enough that the

Congress is not only willing but eager to establish the friendliest relations with the League and to come to an honourable understanding over the much-vexed Hindu-Muslim question? At this stage it may perhaps be as well to state the Congress claim. Though it is admitted that the largest number of persons to be found on the numerous Congress registers are Hindus, the Congress has a fairly large number of Muslims and members of other communities professing different faiths. It has been an unbroken tradition with the Congress to represent all communities, all races and all classes to whom India is their home. From its inception it has often had distinguished Muslims as presidents and as general secretaries who enjoyed the confidence of the Congress and of the country. The Congress tradition is that although a Congressman does not cease to belong to faith in which he is born and bred up, no one comes to the Congress by virtue of his faith: He is in and out of the Congress by virtue of his endorsement of the political principles and policy of the Congress. The Congress therefore, is in no sense a communal organisation. In fact, it has always fought the communal spirit because it is detrimental to the growth of pure and undefined nationalism.

But Whilst the Congress makes this claim, and has sought, with more or less success, to live up to the claim, the Working Committee would be glad if your Council would come to an under-

standing with the Congress in order that we might achieve national solidarity and wholeheartedly work for realising our common destiny.

As to the second resolution of the Council, I am afraid that it is not possible for Working Committee to conform to the desire expressed therein.

The third resolution, the Working Committee is unable to understand. So far as the Working Committee is concerned, the Muslim League is a purely communal organisation, in the sense that it seems to serve Muslim interest only and its membership too is open only to Muslims. The Working Committee also has all along understood that so far as the League is concerned, it desires and rightly, a settlement with the Congress on the Hindu-Muslim question and not on questions affecting all minorities. So far as the Congress is concerned, if the other minorities have a grievance against the Congress, it is always ready to deal with them as it is its bounden duty to do so, being by its very constitution an organisation representative of All-India without distinction of caste or creed.

In view of the foregoing I hope that it will be possible for us to take up the next stage in our negotiations for reaching a settlement.

It is suggested that as the previous correspondence has already been published, it would be

wise to take the public into confidence and publish the subsequent correspondence between us. If you are agreeable, these documents will be immediately released for publication.

Yours sincerely,

S. C. BOSE.

On August 2. Mr. Jinnah addressed the following letter to Mr. Bose :—

Malabar Hill, Bombay Aug. 2.

Dear Mr. Bose,

I placed your letter dated the 25th of July, 1938, before the meeting of the Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League.

The Executive Council gave its earnest attention and careful consideration to the arguments which were urged in your letter for persuading it not to claim the status it has done in its resolution number 1 already communicated to you.

I am desired to state that in defining the status, the Council was not actuated by any motive of securing an admission, but had merely stated an accepted fact.

The Council is fully convinced that the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organisation of the Mussalmans of India. This position was accepted when the Congress-League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at Lucknow and ever since till 1935 when Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad conversation took place, it has not been questioned. The All-India

Muslim League, therefore, does not require any admission or recognition from the Congress nor did the resolution of the Executive Council at Bombay. But in view of the fact that the position—in fact the very existence—of the League had been questioned by Pandit Jawahar lal Nehru, the then president of the Congress in one of his statements, wherein he asserted that there were only two parties in the country viz., the British Government and the Congress, it was considered necessary by the Executive Council to inform the Congress of the basis on which the negotiations between the two organisations could proceed.

Besides the very fact that the Congress approached the Muslim League to enter into negotiations for a settlement of the Hindu Muslim question, it presupposed the authoritative and representative character of the League and as such its right to come to an agreement on behalf of the Mussalmans of India.

The Council are aware of the fact that there is a Congress Coalition Government in N. W. F. P. and also that there are some Muslims in the Congress organisations, in other provinces. But Council is of opinion that these Muslims in the Congress do not and cannot represent the Mussalmans of India, for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant and that as members of the Congress, they have disabled themselves from representing or to speak on behalf of the Muslim community. Were it not so the whole claim of the Congress alleged in your letter regarding

its national character would falt to the ground.

As regards "the other Muslim organisations," to which reference has been made in your letter, but whom you have not even named, the Council considers that it would have been more proper if no reference had been made to them. If they collectively or individually had been in a position to speak on behalf of the Mussalmans of India, the negotiations with the Muslim League, for a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question would not have been initiated by the President of the Congress and Mr. Gandhi.

So far as the Muslim League is concerned, it is not aware that any Muslim political organisation has ever made a claim that it can speak or negotiate on behalf of the Muslims of India. It is therefore very much to be regretted that you should have referred to "other Muslim organisations" in this connection.

The Council is equally anxious to bring about a settlement of "the much vexed Hindu-Muslim question", and thus hasten the realisation of the common goal, but it is painful to find that suitable arguments are being introduced to cloud the issue and retard the progress of the negotiations.

In view of the facts stated above, the Council wishes to point out that it considered undesirable the inclusion of Mussalmans in the Committee that might be appointed by the Congress, because it would meet to solve and settle the Hindu-Muslim question and so in the very nature of the issues involved, they would not command the confidence of either Hindus

or the Mussalmans and their position indeed would be most embarrassing. The Council, therefore, request you to consider the question in the light of the above negotiations.

With reference to the third resolution, it was the memorandum of the Conference referred to in your letter dated the 15th of May, 1938, in which mention of other minorities was made and the Muslim League expressed its willingness to consult them if and when it was necessary in consonance with its declared policy.

As regards your desire for the release of the correspondence, including this letter, for publication, the Council has no objection to your doing so.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. Jinnah.

On August 16, Mr. Bose addressed the following letter to Mr. Jinnah :—

38/2 Elgin Road, Calcutta.
August 16, 1938.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Many thanks for your letter of the 2nd August 1938. I regret the delay in replying to it. As the issue is a very important one, I desire to place your letters before the Congress Working Committee at its next meeting in September. Thereafter you will hear from me again.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) (Subhas Bose)

Working Committee's Resolution

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

The working committee have considered your letter of October 10, 1938 and regret the decisions contained therein. Since the committee do not find it possible to agree with the council of the Muslim League as to the basis of the negotiation and since the council insist that an agreement as to the basis is a *sine qua non* of any negotiations between the Congress and the League, the working committee regret that they are not in a position to do anything further in the direction of starting negotiations with the League with a view to arriving at a settlement of the Hindu Muslim question.

I am sorry for the delay in replying to your letter but I did not want to say anything till the working committee met and considered the matter.

Since the previous correspondence has been published already, I am taking the liberty of issuing this to the press.

Yours sincerely

Subhas C. Bose

NEHRU-JINNAH TALKS

(1939—1940)

NEHRU-JINNAH TALKS

1939—1940

Bombay, Jan. 7.

Mr. M. A. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, has released the correspondence between himself and Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru. While releasing the correspondence Mr. Jinnah says :

“ I regret to find that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru during his recent tour in the Punjab and elsewhere has thought it fit to attack me in a manner unworthy of any responsible leader. He accuses me of being bent upon the preservation of British domination over India which I can only characterise as not only unwarranted but mean. The reasons for his refusing to continue his talks with me, as given by him, are far from correct, are misleading and unfair.

“ I would not further comment upon his reckless and irresponsible pronouncements, but I shall rest content with releasing the correspondence between us on the subject. This will show the reasons for his refusing to proceed further in the matter and I leave it to the public to judge the impossible attitude that is being taken up by him and the Congress.”

The following is the full text of the correspondence :

Copy of the letter from Pt. Nehru to Mr. M. A. Jinnah dated December 1, 1939, from Allahabad.

"My dear Mr. Jinnah,

When we met last in Delhi, it was agreed that we should meet again to discuss various aspects of the communal problem. You told me that on your return to Bombay you would write to me, suggesting some date for such a meeting. I have been looking forward to your letter since then. I hope that whenever it is convenient for you to fix a date, you will kindly let me know.

"Sir Stafford Cripps is coming to India soon and is likely to spend two or three weeks in this country. He is on his way to China. I do not yet exactly know when he will reach here, but probably he will come in about a week's time. During his brief stay in India he would like to meet you if that is possible. I do not know his programme at all, nor do I know what cities he intends visiting. But I take it that he will go to Bombay. Could you kindly let me know if you are likely to be in Bombay about the third week of this month or later? This information might help him to arrange his programme. He is coming by air and will land in Allahabad.

Your sincerely, Jawaharlal Nehru.

Copy of the letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru dated Dec. 4, 1939 from Bombay.

My dear Jawahar,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 1st

December and I thank you for it. As at present advised I hope to be in Bombay for the next two or three weeks, and if it is convenient to you I shall be very glad to see you and fix up any date that may suit you. Please, therefore, let me know what date and time will suit you.

“ As regards Sir Stafford Cripps I received a letter from him and I have already replied to him care of your address, as directed by him, and as I have already stated I shall be here in Bombay and he is arriving at Allahabad on the 8th, as I understand from his letter. I shall be very glad to see him when he is in Bombay. On hearing from him I shall fix up also the date and time that may suit him.

Yours Sincerely,

(Sd.) M. A. Jinnah.

Copy of the letter from Pandit Nehru to Mr. Jinnah dated December 9, 1939.

My dear Jinnah,

Two days ago I sent you a letter informing you that I intended going to Bombay soon and hoped to meet you there. Yesterday morning I read in the newspapers your statement fixing December 22 as a “Day of Deliverance” and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress Governments have at last ceased to function. I have read this statement very carefully more than once and have given 24 hours’ thought to the matter. It is not for me in this letter to enter into any controversy about facts or impressions or conclusions.

You know my views about these, formed, I hope, in all earnestness and with all desire to find the truth. It may be that I am mistaken, but I have sought more light and that light has not come. But what has oppressed me terribly since yesterday is the realisation that our sense of values and objectives in life and politics differs so very greatly. I had hoped after our conversations that this was not so great. But now the gulf appears to be wider than ever. Under these circumstances I wonder what purpose will be served by our discussing with each other the problems that confront us. There must be some common ground for discussion to yield fruit. I think I owe it to you as well as to myself to put this difficulty before you.

You were good enough to show me in Delhi a letter you had received from Bijnor. I enquired into this matter and I am informed that the version of facts given to you is not correct and is wholly misleading. If you would care to have an explanation of what happened I could obtain it for you from Bijnor. For this purpose I would like to have a copy of the letter you showed me in Delhi.

Yours sincerely, (Sd.) Jawahar lal Nehru.

Copy of letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Pandit Nehru dated Dec, 13, from Bombay.

" Dear Jawahar lal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 9th December. I did not know where to address my reply to you as your movements were reported in the press to be

uncertain. The latest announcement that you are arriving in Bombay on the 14th of December and I am, therefore, sending this letter to your Bombay address. I quite agree with you that 'there must be some common ground for discussion, some common objective aimed at for that discussion to yield fruit' That is the very reason why I made it clear in our conversation at Delhi in October last to Mr. Gandhi and yourself, first, that so long as the Congress is not prepared to treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, it was not possible to carry on talks regarding the Hindu-Muslim settlement, as that was the basis laid down by the working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, and second, that we cannot endorse the Congress demand for the declaration, as laid down in the resolution of the Working Committee confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee on 10th October, 1949, apart from the nebulous and impracticable character of it, till we reach an agreement with regard to the minority problem. The Muslim League was also not satisfied with the declaration made by the Viceroy. If happily we could settle the Hindu-Muslim question, then we would be in a position to evolve an agreed formula for a declaration by His Majesty's Government that would satisfy us. Neither the first nor the second suggestion of mine was acceptable to Mr. Gandhi or to yourself at Delhi, but you were good enough to express your wish that you would like to meet me again and I

said that I would be always glad to see you in reply to your letter of the 1st December, expressing your wish to see me in Bombay. I informed you that I shall be in Bombay till the third week of December and I shall be glad to see you, and I can only say that if you desire to discuss the matter further, I am at your disposal.

“As regards your reference to that Bijnor incident I am sure that you will agree with me that it requires a thorough judicial examination and enquiry before any conclusion can be arrived at, and it is hardly worth our while to deal with one instance, for in my judgment the whole working of the constitution and our charges against the Congress Governments must be thoroughly examined by a Royal Commission.

Your sincerely, (Sd.) M. A. Jinnah.

Copy of the letter from Pandit Nehru to Mr. Jinnah dated Dec. 14, 1939 from Bombay.

“My dear Jinnah.—Thank you for your letter of the 13th December which was delivered to me in the forenoon to-day on my arrival here. I sent you my last letter from Allahabad after reading and giving full thought to your statement about the celebration of ‘a day of deliverance and thanksgiving’ by the Muslims. This statement had distressed me greatly, as it made me realise that the gulf that separated us in our approach to public problems is very great. In view of this fundamental difference, I wondered what common

ground there was for discussion and I put my difficulty before you. That difficulty remains. In your letter you have emphasized two other preliminary conditions before any common ground for discussion can arise. The first is that the Congress must treat the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India. The Congress has always considered the League as a very important and influential organisation of the Muslims and it is because of this that we have been eager to settle any differences that may exist between us. But presumably what you suggest is something more and involves some kind of repudiation by us of our dissociation from other Muslims who are not in the League. There are, as you know, a large number of Muslims in the Congress, who have been and are our closest colleagues. There are Muslim organisations like the Jamiat-UI-Ullema, the All-India Shia Conference, the Majlis-i-Ahrar the All-India Momin Conference etc. apart from trade unions and peasant unions which have many Muslims as their members. As a general rule, many of these organisations and individuals have adopted the same political platform as we have done in the Congress. We cannot possibly dissociate ourselves from them or disown them in any way.

"You have rightly pointed out on many occasions that the Congress does not represent everybody in India. Of course not. It does not represent

those who disagree with it, whether they are Muslims or Hindus. In the ultimate analysis it represents its members and sympathisers. So also the Muslims League. But there is this vital difference that while the Congress by its constitution has its membership open to all who subscribe to its objective and methods, the Muslim League is only open to Muslims. Thus the Congress constitutionally has a national basis and it cannot give it up without putting an end to its existence. There are many Hindus, as you know, in the Hindu Mahasabha who oppose the idea of the Congress representing the Hindus as such. Then there are the Sikhs and others who claim that they should be heard when communal matters are considered.

"I am afraid, therefore, that if your desire is that we should consider the League as the sole organisation representing the Muslims to the exclusion of all others, we are wholly unable to accede to it. It would be equally at variance with facts if we made a similar claim for the Congress, in spite of the vastness of the Congress organisation. But I would venture to say that such questions do not arise when two organisations deal with each other and consider problems of mutual interest.

Your second point is that the Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from the British Government. I regret to learn this, for this means that, apart from communal questions, we differ entirely on purely political grounds. The

Congress demand is essentially for a declaration of war aims and more especially for a declaration of Indian independence and the right of the Indian people to frame their own constitution without external interference. If the Muslim League does not agree to this, this means that our political objectives are wholly dissimilar. The Congress demand is not new. It is inherent in article 1 of the Congress and all our policy for many years past has been based on it. It is inconceivable to me how the Congress can give it up or even vary it. Personally I would be entirely opposed to any attempt at variation. But this is not a personal matter. There is a resolution of the All-India Congress Committee, endorsed by a thousand meetings all over India, and I am powerless to ignore it.

"It thus seems that politically we have no common ground and that our objectives are different. That in itself makes discussion difficult and fruitless. What led me to write my last letter to you also remains—the prospect of a celebration of a Day of Deliverance by the Muslims, as suggested by you. That raises very vital and far-reaching issues, in which I need not go now, but which must influence all of us. That approach to the communal problem cannot be reconciled with an attempt to solve it.

"I feel, therefore, that it will serve little purpose for us to meet at this stage and under these conditions with this back ground. I should like to assure you, however, that we are always prepared to have free and frank discussions of the communal or other problems

as between the Congress and the League. I note what you say about the Bijnor incident. It has been our misfortune that charges are made in a one-sided way and they are never inquired into or disposed of. You will appreciate that it is very easy to make complaints and very unsafe to rely upon them without due inquiry.

Yours sincerely, (Sd.) Jawaharlal Nehru.

Copy of the letter from Mr. M. A. Jinnah to Pandit Nehru 15th December, 1939, Bombay.

Dear Jawaharlal,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th December, 1939, and I am sorry to say that you have not appreciated my position with regard to the second point. I did not say that the Muslim League cannot endorse the Congress demand for a declaration from British Government. What I have said was that we cannot endorse the Congress demand for declaration, as laid down in the resolution of the Working Committee and confirmed by the All-India Congress Committee of the 10th October, 1939, for the reasons I have already specified in my letter.

“ If this resolution of the Congress cannot be modified in any way, and as you say that personally you would be entirely opposed to any attempt at variation of it and as you make it clear that you are wholly unable to treat with the Muslim League as the authoritative and representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, may I know in these circumstances what do you expect or wish me to do ?

Your sincerely, (Sd.) M. A. Jinnah.”

*Letter from Pt. Nehru to Mr. Jinnah dated 16th
December, 1939.*

My Dear Jinnah,

Thank you for your letter of December 15th. I realise the difference you have pointed out. Of course the Muslim League cannot oppose the idea of any declaration. What the Congress had asked for was an enunciation of war aims and a recognition of India's independence and the right of her people to frame their constitution, a right that must necessarily be inherent in independence. All these are basic principles which flow from our objective of independence, and as the Muslim League has the same declared objective, there should be no difference of opinion about them. In the application of these principles many important matters will no doubt have to be considered. But so far as the basic demands are concerned, they are of the very essence of Indian nationalism. To give up or to vary them materially is to knock down our case for independence.

In regard to the war also the Congress has repeatedly declared its policy during the last eleven years. The present declaration is a logical outcome of that policy. I have personally had some share in shaping this policy and I have attached importance to it. You will appreciate that it is exceedingly difficult, apart from the question of desirability, to vary such long-established and fundamental policies. These policies are political in their essence and, I would venture to say, are the only policies which flow from

a demand for Indian freedom. Details may be considered and discussed, their application should be worked out in mutual co-operation and, in particular, the interests of various groups and minorities should be considered carefully and protected. But challenge the very basis of that declaration is to demonstrate that here is a great difference in political outlook and policies. This, as such, has nothing to do with the Hindu-Muslim problem. It is because of this that I feel that there is little in common in our political objectives.

“ May I say again that no one on our behalf, so far as I know, challenges or minimises the authority, influence and importance of the Muslim League. It is for this reason that we have been eager to discuss matters with it and to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the problems that confront us, Unfortunately we never seem to reach even the proper discussion of these problems as various hurdles and obstructions, in the shape of conditions precedent, come in our way. These conditions precedent, as I have ventured to point out to you, have far-reaching significance. I do not know why they should be allowed to obstruct all progress or prevent us from considering these problems. It should not be difficult to remove these hurdles and come to grips with the subject itself. But as these hurdles continue and others are added to them, I am compelled to think that the real difficulty is the difference in political outlook and objectives.

“ At the present moment, the decision to have an India wide demonstration on December 22 has added a psychological barrier which effectively prevents

mutual approach and discussion. I regret this exceedingly and have earnestly wished that you would see your way to remove this barrier which is leading and can only lead to illwill. I still hope that you may be able to do so.

" I do wish to assure you that for my part I do not want to leave any stone unturned which can lead to mutual understanding and settlement. But you will not have me, as I do not want to have you, leave integrity of mind and purpose in pursuit of anything. Nothing worthwhile can be gained that way. I have deep political convictions and I have laboured in accordance with them these many years. I cannot leave them at any time, much less now when the world is in the throes of a terrific crisis.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) Jawaharlal Nehru.

JINNAH-RAJENDRA PRASAD TALKS

1939

Birla House, New Delhi,

October 5, 1939.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

In the resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, passed recently in Delhi, reference has been made to Provincial Governments. It is stated that provincial autonomy in several provinces has resulted in the domination of the Hindus over the Muslim minorities whose life and liberty, property and honour are in danger, and even their religious

rights and culture are being assailed and annihilated every day under the Congress Governments in various provinces. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has also informed me that you mentioned this matter to him in the course of recent conversation.

We feel that these charges are wholly unfounded and are based on misapprehension and one-sided reports that might have reached you and the League. The Governments concerned have inquired into the matter whenever such charges have been made and has denied them. On a previous occasion we expressed our willingness to have any specific instances investigated by an impartial authority. We feel strongly, and am sure you will agree with us that such charges, when seriously made, should be inquired into and either substantiated or disproved. We would like this course to be adopted in regard to any specific instances that are put forward. If you agree we could request the highest judicial authority in India, Sir Maurice Gwyer, Chief Justice of the Federal Court, to inquire into this matter. In the event of his not being available some other person of a similar status and Judicial might be approached.

I shall gladly place this matter before the Working Committee of the Congress and get them to pass a formal resolution to this effect.

I am leaving for Wardha to-day and shall be obliged to you if you will send an early reply. I shall be in Wardha for about a week.

Your sincerely,

(Sd.) Rajendra Prasad.

8-B, Hardinge Avenue,
New Delhi.

Oct. 10, 1939

Dear Dr. Rajendra Prasad,

I am in receipt of your letter dated 5th of October 1939. I beg to inform you that I have already placed the whole case before the Viceroy and Governor-General and have requested him to take up the matter without delay as he and the Governors of the provinces have been expressly authorised under the constitution and are entrusted with the responsibility to protect the rights and interests of the minorities.

The matter is now under His Excellency's consideration and he is the proper authority to take such action and adopt such measures as would meet our requirements and would restore complete sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Mussalmans in those provinces where the Congress Ministries are in charge of the administration.

In these circumstances I do not wish to discuss further the various statements made in your letter as it is unnecessary to do so, but I must say that some of them are wholly inaccurate.

Yours sincerely,

(Sd.) M. A. Jinnah.

APPENDIX I.

*Appeal For the observance of Deliverance Day, issued from
Bombay, 2nd December, 1939.*

I wish the Musalmans all over India to observe Friday the 22nd December as the "Day of Deliverance" and thanksgiving as a mark of relief that the Congress regime has at last ceased to function. I hope that the Provincial, District and Primary Muslim Leagues all over India will hold public meetings and pass the following resolution with such modifications as they may be advised, and after Juma prayers offer prayers by way of thanksgiving for being delivered from the unjust Congress regime. I trust that all public meetings will be conducted in an orderly manner and with all due sense of humility, and nothing should be done which will cause offence to any other community, because it is the High Command of the Congress that is primarily responsible for the wrongs that have been done to the Musalmans and other minorities.

RESOLUTION: "This public meeting of the Musalmans of (*name of the place*) records its opinion that the Congress Ministry has conclusively demonstrated and proved the falsehood of the Congress

claim that it represents all interests justly and fairly, by its decidedly anti-Muslim policy. It is the considered opinion of this meeting that the Congress Ministry has failed to safeguard the rights and interests of the Mussalmans and other minorities and interests.

“That the Congress Ministry both in the discharge of their duties of the administration and in the Legislature have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life, and trampled upon their economic and political rights, that in matters of differences and disputes the Congress Ministry invariably have sided with, supported and advanced the cause of the Hindus in total disregard and to prejudice of the Muslim interests.

“The Congress Government constantly interfered with the legitimate and routine duties of District officers even in petty matters to the serious detriment of the Mussalmans, and thereby created an atmosphere which spread the belief amongst the Hindu public that there was established a Hindu Raj, and emboldened the Hindus, mostly Congressmen, to ill-treat Muslims at various places and interfere with their elementary rights of freedom. This meeting, therefore, expresses its deep sense of relief at the termination of the Congress regime in various provinces and rejoices in observing this day as the “Day of Deliverance” from tyranny, oppression and injustice during the last two and a half years, and prays to God to grant such strength, discipline and

organisation to Muslim India as to successfully prevent the advent of such a ministry again and to establish a truly popular ministry which would do even justice to all communities and interests.

" This meeting urges upon His Excellency the Governor of (*nama of the place*) and Council of Advisers to enquire into the legitimate grievances of the Musalmans and the wrongs done to them by the outgoing Congress Ministry, and redress the same at the earliest moment in accordance with the announcements that have been made by the Governors in taking over the Governments of various provinces under Section 93 of the Government of India Act of 1935 and thus assure people that the new regime stands for even justice to all communities and interests concerned."

Statement to the Press on " Deliverance Day "

A great deal of unnecessary controversy has arisen over my appeal to Muslims to celebrate December 22 as a day of deliverance from oppression and since the guilty do not admit their guilt and public memory is short, I consider it advisable to briefly trace the events that led to the reasons that prompted this appeal.

To commence with, the suggested resolution says nothing more or less than has been said on many previous occasions. The very first complaint against

Congress rule was made by me very shortly after they took office and, in my speech at the Lucknow session of the Muslim League, 1937, I complained against the compulsory singing of Bande Mataram, the question of the Congress Flag and the supplanting of Urdu by Hindi and even then I called upon the Governors to exercise their special powers.

From then onwards the Congress caucus, like the proverbial steam-roller, gathered speed and complaints of oppression began to pour into the central office. These become so numerous that the Council decided to appoint, in March 1928, the Pirpur Committee which, after an elaborate and painstaking investigation over all the Congress provinces, submitted its report at the Patna session in December 1938.

The following resolution was there passed at a full session :—

“ That having regard to the atrocities that have been committed and that elementary rights of the Muslims have been trampled upon in a systematic manner in Bihar, U. P. and C. P. and that Governments of these provinces have failed to redress their grievances or protect even the elementary rights of the Musalmans in these provinces in spite of all constitutional methods adopted so far by the Muslims, this session of the All-India Muslim League is therefore, of opinion that the time has now come to authorise the working Committee of the All-India Muslim League to decide and resort to “ Direct Action ” if and when necessary.”

During this time, in order to prevent direct action being resorted to, I was repeatedly urging both Governors and the Governor-General, in person and by correspondence, to exercise their special powers and to take executive action to safeguard the rights and interests of the minorities placed by the Constitution under their protection, and it was only on the 17th April 1939 that the Viceroy intimated that he would take up the matter.

As regards the Congress Ministries, our complaints were dismissed as false, frivolous and vexatious, and even Mr. Gandhi, before whom I placed our charges as far back as May 1933, side-tracked the question by writing "I believe Congress Committees have been advised to avoid as far as possible all occasions of friction over Bande Mataram and the Flag.....". The first two demands have come upon an unexpected public. Nevertheless they undoubtedly have to be examined on their merits, but it does not appear to me to be fair to anticipate the result of the joint committees which I hope will come into being without any hitch....."

With no redress, Muslims in certain provinces grew restive and in the C. P. ignoring the Working Committee altogether, resorted to direct action over the Vidya Mandir Scheme.

I may state here that at no stage did the Working Committee favour or encourage direct action and on request being received from Bihar in July 1919, for permission to launch direct action, the Working

Committee instructed the Bihar Muslim League to place the whole case before the Governor-General, the Governor and the Prime Minister and to report later the result of their representation. Similar advice was given to the other Muslim Leagues who contemplated similar measures.

Complaints, however, continued to pour in and on the 27th August 1939, the Council of the League at Delhi passed the following resolution :—

(a) Resolved that this Council, while deploring the policy of the British Government towards the Muslims of India by attempting to force upon them against their will a constitution and in particular the Federal Scheme, as embodied in the Government of India Act 1935, which allows a permanent hostile communal majority to trample upon their religious, political, social and economic rights, and utter neglect and indifference shown by the Viceroy and the Governors in the Congress-governed Provinces in exercising their special powers to protect and secure justice to the minorities.....”

In September, war was declared and on the 17th of that month, the Working Committee reaffirmed the above resolution as one of the fundamental conditions of Muslim support and the Viceroy, realising the gravity of the situation, pressed Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders to come to an agreement with the Muslim League in the provincial sphere on a coalition basis for at least the duration of the war.

Consequently Babu Rajendra Prasad wrote

on the 5th October that the Congress was prepared to request Sir Maurice Gwyer or some other suitable person to investigate only any specific charges which the Muslim league might formulate against the Ministries of the Congress-governed provinces.

I considered this proposal unsound and unpractical for the following reasons. First, legally and constitutionally, the Congress Working Committee has no place or power in the constitution. Secondly, the complaints of the Muslims and other minorities were directed against the governments of certain provinces who were responsible to the legislatures and the electorates and not to the Working Committee. Thirdly, the proposed resolution of the Working Committee could not confer upon the contemplated tribunal the necessary power to summon witnesses and administer oaths. Nor could the tribunal compel the production of documents that might be required and finally I wished to know to whom the tribunal was to report and who would be the final authority to take action, if any, against the ministries.

If this final authority was the Working Committee, I pointed out that, in my opinion, it was the Working Committee itself that was primarily responsible for the injustices and the wrong committed and I also could not believe that any adequate action would be taken against the ministries in view of the fact that the Working Committee had already decided that the Muslim League's charges were false and unfounded.

I also informed Babu Rajendra Prasad that I had

already placed the whole matter before the Governor-General and had requested him to take executive action without delay to safeguard and to secure justice for the minorities.

I must explain, at this stage, that I have never asked either the Governor-General or the Governors to act as a judicial tribunal as is suggested in Mr. Gandhi's appeal to me. What I asked them to do was to take executive action to redress our grievances and, by intervention, to secure justice and fair-play

Mr. Gandhi's appeal to me to await the Viceroy's opinion is, therefore based on a wrong assumption and even intervention is not possible now that the Congress ministries have resigned. For what then should I wait ?

However, just after my letter to Babu Rajendra Prasad the Congress ministries resigned to the very natural relief of Muslims and other minorities, and I immediately decided to appeal for the observance of a day to express our relief and to show its intensity in a manner that would force ears that had hitherto been deaf to listen to us. I might point out that if our appeals had been heard at the proper time, no such action on our part would now be necessary.

This appeal has been variously described as ill-timed, provocative and anti-national and that the Muslims are asked to gloat over the departure of an elected government and to welcome an official administration.

I gladly deal with these points. As regards the

time, my appeal could not appear before it did for reasons already made public, and its connection or effect on Pandit Jawahar lal Nehru's visit is dealt with by me at the end of my statement.

As regards provocation, let me point out the words of my appeal: "I trust that all public meetings will be conducted in an orderly manner, with due sense of humility and nothing should be done which will cause offence to any community———." However, to make quite clear my insistence that the day is observed in such spirit, I again state that I look to all District and Primary Leagues to ensure that the meetings are held in that spirit. Let there be no hartals, processions or any such demonstrations, but let a spirit of humility and a mood of reflection prevail. There is relief and gratitude in our hearts; not joy or triumph.

Thirdly, it is extremely unfair and unjust to contend that the Muslims welcome the present administration. It is true that we urge upon them to inquire into our grievances and to redress them, but this is only because it is in their power to do so. On the other hand, my appeal emphasises that prayers should be offered for the establishment of truly popular ministries which would do even justice to all communities and interests.

But there is one statement on my appeal that I cannot let pass coming as it does from such an authoritative source as the Chairman of the Congress Parliamentary Committee. I am told that all our charges are totally false and unwarranted, and that

was to be expected, but I must take notice of his declaration :—

“ Furthermore, every Premier at my instance had invited his Governor unhesitatingly to intervene in matters affecting the rights and the interests of the minorities whenever the Governor felt that the action of the Ministry was not correct. When Mr. Jinnah recently made the charges, I again instructed every Premier to invite his Governor's attention to them as they also affected him and I was informed that the Governors considered the charges unwarranted. ”

The above statement raises a very grave issue, for it makes the Governors accessories after the fact. Let me inform Mr. Vallabhai Patel that we have overwhelming evidence in support of our case and, far from shirking an inquiry, as is suggested, I insist that a thorough inquiry should now be made by a properly constituted tribunal invested with all necessary powers, and I now ask that a Royal Commission be appointed by the British Government, of a purely judicial personnel and composed of judges of His Majesty's High Court and under the chairmanship of one of the Law Lords of the Privy Council.

I cannot conceive any objections to this demand from the Congress or any other quarter and call upon to support my request.

Before concluding, I must deal with Mr. Gandhi's appeal and Pandit Jawaharlal's visit. I would have been inclined to respond to Mr. Gandhi's appeal had

he and other Congress leaders practised what they preached about the necessity for a cordial atmosphere in which a communal agreement might be arrived at. May I remind them that a regular crusade, beginning with Mr. Gandhi himself, is being carried on against the League since the Delhi conversations took place.

Mr. Gandhi himself, since my conversation with him in Delhi in October, has, in the *Harijan*, described the Muslim League as an agent of Imperialism; as an obstacle and an obstruction in the way of India's freedom and progress, and has stated that the Muslim League is insatiable in its demands since it can always look to the British Government to fulfil them. He even threatens the Muslims that though they may be holding up the country at present, they cannot do so for long.

Further the Congress press and organisations are carrying on propaganda all over India and abroad, discrediting the League and attempting to divide the ranks of the Muslims. Let me give one out of many examples in my possession.

Mr. Gandhi is, perhaps, not aware that a secret letter from the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, the present Congress President's own province, issued from the Sadaqat Ashram, P. O. Dighaghat, Patna, and addressed to the President of the District Congress Committee, Gaya, which was published in the *Star of India* on the 4th December and which remains uncontradicted, says :

“ You are, I hope, convinced by this time that

the one outstanding question before us, awaiting solution and thus preparing the pattern for our forward move towards our goal of self-government, is the attainment of Hindu-Muslim unity. To achieve this end it is essential that Congress minded and truly nationalist Mussalmans of Hindustan have got to become vocal so that stopper to all progress applied by the League should disappear."

It is hardly necessary for me to point out that daily propaganda on these lines has the exact result that Mr. Gandhi's fears will ensue from my single appeal.

Now to deal with the chief objection raised against my appeal that it will prejudice the communal talks taking place between Pandit Nehru and myself. Let me inform the public that rather than approaching a settlement, as has been so readily and widely assumed, such discussions have yet to commence. The discussions between him and other Congress leaders and myself were of a purely political nature and related to the political demands made by the Congress at that time. This has been stated by the Congress leaders at that time, I informed them at Delhi that I could not associate the Muslim League with any joint demand to the British Government till a Congress-League agreement had first been arrived at. I also informed them that no such agreement was possible till the Muslim League was recognised as the authoritative and the representative organisation of the Mussalmans of India, and, as this position was not acceptable to them, talks ended on this point, and on Pandit Nehru expressing a desire to see me again, I gladly agreed and I look forward to his visit.

APPENDIX II.

Letter to Mr. Gandhi

Mount Pleasant Road,
Malabar Hill,
Bombay,
January 1, 1940.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter and the advance copy of the article you have sent to the *Harijan*. I not only thank you for your courtesy but also for your anxiety to further the end you have been reading in my messages and actions. I, however, regret to have to say that your premises are wrong as you start with the theory of an Indian Nation, that does not exist, and naturally, therefore, your conclusions are wrong. I should have thought, however, that you at least would not be led away by one-sided newspaper reports and canards. There is so much in your article which is the result of imagination. It is due partly to the fact that you are living a secluded life at Segaoon, and partly because all your thoughts and actions are guided by "inner voice." You have very little concern with realities, or what might be termed by an ordinary

mortal "practical politics." I sometimes wonder what can be common between practical politics and yourself, between democracy and the dictator of a political organisation of which he is not even a four-anna member. But that is, I suppose, because you do not consider the Congress worthy of your membership.

I am glad to learn that you were not ruffled by the "Deliverance Day" greetings sent to you from Gulburga. It was indeed noble of you to join in the silent prayer "Long live Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah!" Although these are trivial matters, I nevertheless appreciate that you have realised the true inward meaning and significance of the "Deliverance Day."

It is true that many non-Congress Hindus expressed their sympathy with the Deliverance Day in justice to our cause, so also the leaders of the Justice Party and the Scheduled Castes, and the Parsis, who had suffered. But I am afraid that the meaning which you have tried to give to this alignment shows that you have not appreciated the true significance of it. It was partly a case of "adversity bringing strange bed-fellows together," and partly because common interest may lead Muslims and minorities to combine. I have no illusions in the matter, and let me say again that India is not a nation, nor a country. It is a sub-continent composed of nationalities, Hindus and Muslims being the two major nations. To-day you deny that religion can be a main factor in determining a nation,

but you yourself, when asked what your motive in life was, "the thing that leads us to do what we do," whether it was religious, or social, or political, said:—"Purely religious. This was the question asked me by the late Mr. Montagu when I accompanied a deputation which was purely political. 'How you, a social reformer,' he exclaimed, 'have found your way into this crowd?' My reply was that it was only an extension of my social activity. I could not be leading a religious life unless I identified myself with the whole of mankind, and that I could not do unless I took part in politics. The gamut of man's activities to-day constitutes an indivisible whole. You cannot divide social, economic, political and purely religious work into watertight compartments. I do not know any religion apart from human activity. It provides a moral basis to all other activities which they would otherwise lack, reducing life to a maze of 'sound and fury signifying nothing'."

More than anyone else, you happen to be the man to-day who commands the confidence of Hindu India and are in a position to deliver the goods on their behalf. Is it too much to hope and expect that you might play your legitimate role and abandon your chase after a mirage? Events are moving fast; a campaign of polemics, or your weekly discourse in the *Harijan* on metaphysics, philosophy and ethics, or your peculiar doctrines regarding *khaddar*, *ahimsa* and spinning are not going to win

India's freedom. Action and statesmanship alone will help us in our forward march. I believe that you might still rise to your stature in the service of our country and make your proper contribution towards leading India to contentment and happiness.

Lastly, I thank you for your anxiety to respect my wishes in the matter of the prefix you shall use with my name, what is in a prefix? After all, a rose called by any other name smells just as sweet! So I leave the matter entirely to you, and have no particular wish in the matter. I really do not know why you are worried so much about it. I, however, notice that the present prefix you are using is according to the usage taught to you by the late Hakim Sahib. But surprisingly enough during his lifetime and till long after his death, you addressed me as "Mr." then quite recently you addressed me as "Shree," and in between as "friend," but please do not bother about this matter.

M. K. Gandhi, Esq.,
Segaon.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. JINNAH.

BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. Jinnah had interviews with Lord Linlithgow on November 4 and November 7 1939 and then wrote a letter to His Excellency stressing upon him. "That no declaration shall, in principle or otherwise be made or any constitution be made by His Majesty's Government or Parliament without the approval and the consent of the two major communities in India viz ; the Mussalmans and the Hindus"

Lord Linlithgow in his letter of 23rd December 1939 gave him the assurance that :-

"His Majesty's government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India. You need therefore have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives their views will be underrated."

INTERVIEW

Mr. Jinnah had an interview with his Excellency Lord Linlithgow on february 6, 1940. A communique issued immediately after the meeting stated.

"In response to an invitation from His Excellency Mr Jinnah today came to see the Viceroy. The conversation which lasted for over an hour, ranged over the whole position. Mr. Jinnah urged on His Excellency the

great importance attached by the Muslim and other minorities to the safeguarding of their position in any settlement or discussions that might take place. His Excellency assured Mr. Jinnah that His Majesty's Government were fully alive to the necessity for safeguarding the legitimate interests of the minorities, and that he need under no apprehension that the importance of those subjects would be lost sight of."

JINNAH-VICEROY

Letter from Mr. Jinnah dated New Delhi February 6, 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow: -

I am herewith sending a copy of the Working Committee's resolution passed on the 3rd February, 1940, regarding the correspondence that has passed between Your Excellency and myself for your consideration.

The Working Committee of the All India Muslim League considered the correspondence that has passed between Mr. Jinnah, the president, and His Excellency the Viceroy, ending with his final reply dated December 23, 1939. The Committee is of the opinion that the reply of His Excellency is not satisfactory as certain important points still require further clarification and elucidation. The Committee therefore, empowers the president to place the views of the Working Committee before His Excellency and request him to reconsider the matter regarding the assurances asked for in the resolution of the Working Committee dated September 18 and October 22, 1939, and thereby remove all doubts and apprehension from the mind of Muslim India.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah, dated, New Delhi,
February 23, 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow.

I placed the whole correspondence that had passed between Your Excellency and myself, ending with your letter dated the 23rd of December, 1939, before the meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League on the 3rd of February, 1940.

The Working Committee, after very careful consideration, passed a resolution, a copy of the text of which I have already sent to Your Excellency with a covering letter dated the 6th of February. As was desired by Your Excellency in our conversation on the 6th instant I now beg to state briefly the views of the Working Committee which are as follows :—

The Working Committee appreciate the clarification made by Your Excellency regarding the first point and are and are glad to note that the declaration made by Your Excellency, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, on the 18th of October, 1939 does not exclude the examination of any part either of the Act of 1935 or of the policy and plan on which it is based.

As regards the second point, the Working Committee do not feel satisfied as the request made for a definite assurance has not been met, viz that no declaration should, either in principle or otherwise, be made on any

constitution be enforced by His Majesty's Government or enacted by Parliament without the approval and consent of the Mussalmans of India. We recognise Your Excellency's assurance when you state that "His Majesty's Government are not under any misapprehension as to the importance of the contentment of the Muslim community to the stability and success of any constitutional development in India. You need, therefore, have no fear that the weight which your community's position in India necessarily gives, will be underrated." But, I regret to say, this does not meet the point raised by the Muslim League, because it still leaves the position of the 90 million Mussalmans of India only in the region of consultation and counsel, and vests the final decision in the hands of Great Britain to determine the fate and future of Muslim India. We regret that we cannot accept this position.

As to the policy for Palestine, the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, wish to impress upon His Majesty's Government that a solution should be found to the satisfaction of the Arabs. The Committee are glad to note, as Your Excellency states that His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to meet all reasonable Arab demands, and they continue to be fully alive to that issue. But the eyes of the Muslim world are watching the situation keenly and definite solution should be found without delay.-

With regard to the use of Indian troops against any

Muslim Power or country, the Committee feel that His Excellency has misunderstood the position. When we asked for an assurance that Indian troops will not be used outside India against any Muslim Power or country, it was not intended that they shall not be used for the defence of the country in case of an attack on or aggression against India. While we thank Your Excellency for informing us that every precaution has been taken by His Majesty's Government, at the instance of the Government of India, to insure that Muslim feeling in India on this matter is fully respected, we feel that further clarification on the position is necessary.

It is required of the Muslim League to give assurance of whole-hearted co-operation and active support on behalf of the Mussalmans of India to the British Government for the purpose of prosecution of the war. The Committee are of opinion that before doing that they must feel confident that the future of the Mussalmans of India is not left in the region of uncertainty or doubtful possibility. Consequently, we do not consider it unreasonable on our part to ask for a definite assurance that no commitments will be made with regard to the future constitution of India or any interim settlement with any other party, without our approval and consent. If His Majesty's Government are prepared to treat with the leadership of the Mussalmans as a responsible body, then they must be trusted, especially where the question of determining their own future is concerned.

We are constrained to state that Your Excellency is unnecessarily over-anxious about the interests of other countries. It has never been our desire to unjustly harm any community. The issues that have been raised by us are due to apprehensions that the British Government may be stampeded by other powerful organisations in the country into adopting a course or agreeing to a settlement in the matter of India's constitution which may prove not only highly detrimental to the interests of the Mussalmans but may be disastrous for them.

As regards Palestine and the use of Indian troops, our demands as explained by me above, cannot in any way prejudice the interests of any other community. It is not possible in a letter of this kind to state fully the various reasons and details but, if your Excellency so desires I shall be very glad to place the views of the Committee before you in fuller details at an early date, whenever Your Excellency finds it convenient."

H. E. the Viceroy's letter. New Delhi 28th February. 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I write to acknowledge with many thanks your letter of the 24th February, in which you have been good enough to inform me of the views of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League. It shall, I need not say, have my careful attention.

Letter from Mr. Jinnah, dated New Delhi, April 8. 1940 :

Dear Lord Linlithgow :

This is just to inform Your Excellency that I am leaving for Bombay to-morrow by the Frontier Mail.

After Your Excellency's letter of 28th February, acknowledging my letter of the 24th February in which the views of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League were placed for your consideration. Your Excellency was good enough to grant me an interview on the 13th of March. In the course of the interview Your Excellency intimated to me that you were in communication with His Majesty's Government with regard to the subject matter of the letters. I was expecting to get an early reply from Your Excellency. I hope that you will now communicate to me your final answer as soon as possible to my Bombay address, Mount Pleasant Road, Malabar Hill, Bombay."

H. E. the Viceroy's letter, dated, New Delhi, 10th April, 1940 :

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I am much obliged for your letter of the 8th April.

I am not yet in a position to let you have a final answer to your letter of the 24th February, but I hope to do so before very long."

H. E. the Viceroy's letter to Mr Jinnah, dated Banbassa, 1940 :

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I was glad to gather from your letter of 24th February that my letter to you of 23rd December had

removed some of the doubts which had been felt by the All-India Muslim League. I do not read your letter as indicating that the Working Committee of the League expects anything further from me in regard to the first and the third of your points—the scope of the re-examination of the constitutional position to follow the war and policy in Palestine.

You ask, however, for further clarification of the position in regard to the use of Indian troops against Muslim Powers or countries, while explaining, as I note and appreciate, that you had no intention of attempting to circumscribe their use in defending India against attack or aggression. I presume that you do not expect a guarantee, which it would obviously be impossible to give binding us in future contingencies which no one can foree. But you need have no fear that if at any time such a contingency arose, the consideration underlying your suggestion would be overlooked. Fortunately, however so far as the present situation is concerned His Majesty's Government are in friendly and sympathetic relations with all Muslim Powers, to some of whom indeed they are bound by alliance, while with the rest they are on terms of most cordial friendship.

You represent that your second point was not felt by the Working Committee to be adequately met by the terms of my letter. You have no doubt noticed the passage in the Secretary of State's speech in the House

of Lords on April 18 in which he used these words :

"But that does not mean that the future constitution of India is to be a constitution dictated by the Government and Parliament of this country against the wishes of the Indian people. The undertaking given by His Majesty's Government to examine the constitutional field in consultation representatives of all parties and interests in India connotes not dictation but negotiation. Admittedly a substantial measure of agreement amongst the communities in India is essential if the vision of a united India which has inspired the labours of so many Indians and Englishmen is to become a reality, for I cannot believe that any Government or Parliament in this country would attempt to impose by force upon for example, 80 million Muslim subjects of His Majesty in India a form of constitution under which they would not live peacefully and contentedly."

This statement, I am sure you will agree, has removed any possible doubts on this point."

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated, Matheran May 18, 1940 :

Dear Lord Linlithgow.

I am in receipt of your letter of the 19th April, 1940. And I thank you for it. I hope you will excuse me for the delay in replying to it before now as I was uncertain as to what course I should adopt in the matter especially as the appointment of the personnel of the Working Committee was pending. But I now beg to inform you that I propose to place the matter before the Working

Committee constituted for the ensuing year for their consideration and will communicate their views to Your Excellency as soon as possible."

H. E the Viceroy's letter, dated Simla, 22nd May, 1940:

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 18th May. I note your intention to place my letter of the 19th April before the Working Committee for their consideration, and to let me have their views as soon as possible."

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated Bombay 17th June, 1940

Dear Lord Linlithgow.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the resolution passed by the Working Committee on the 16th June at its sitting in Bombay and if you desire to discuss it further or require my presence I shall be glad to meet you."

Proceedings of the meeting of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League held on 15th, 16th and 17th of June 1940 at Bombay.

Resolution. The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, while being of the opinion that further clarification contained in the letter of His Excellency the Viceroy, dated the 19th of April, 1940, with regard to the assurances asked for by the All-India Muslim League is not satisfactory, endorses the following from the statement issued by the President, Mr. M. A. Jinnah to the press on the 27th of May, 1940:

"Up to the present moment, we have not created any difficulty nor have we embarrassed the British Government in the prosecution of the war.

"The provinces where the Muslim League has a dominant voice have been left free to co-operate with the British Government pending their consideration with regard to the assurances we have asked for, and in particular that the British Government should make no declaration regarding the future constitutional problems of India and the vital issues that have been raised in that connection without our approval and consent.

"Nevertheless, without prejudice to the adjustment of the larger issues later on, we were even willing as far back as November last, to consider the proposal of the Viceroy to bring about an honourable and workable adjustment in the provincial field, which would have been followed up with our representatives being appointed to the Executive Council of the central Government to the extent permissible within the framework of the present constitution and existing law.

"But this proposal was summarily rejected by Mr. Gandhi and the Congress.

"A similar attempt was again made by His Excellency early in February, which met the same fate. Since then it seems that the Viceroy has been waiting for the Congress to pass its word."

"With regard to Mr. Amery's statement and the

broadcast appeal of His Excellency the Viceroy, may I say that it is up to the British Government to show trust in Muslim leadership. There are many ways of doing so and as confident friends seek our whole hearted co operation, and we shall not fail. "

"The Working Committee looks with alarm at the growing menace of Nazi aggression which has been most ruthlessly depriving one nation after another of its liberty and freedom and regards the unprovoked attack by the Italian Government against the Allies as most unwarranted and immoral at a time when France was engaged in a brave struggle against very heavy odds.

"The grave world situation demands serious efforts on the part of every Indian for the defence of his country and the Working Committee calls upon the Government of India to prepare the country in an organised manner to meet every eventuality. The Committee is constrained to state that the proposals for the defence of India indicated in the statements of their Excellencies the Viceroy and the Commander-in Chief as well as the statements of some Provincial Governors are wholly inadequate to meet the urgent requirements of the situation. The Committee therefore authorises its president to enter into communication with His Excellency the Viceroy with a view to explore the possibility of devising prompt and effective measures to mobilise the country's resources for the purpose of intensifying war efforts and the defence of India.

The Committee is of the view that unless a satisfactory basis for close co-operation is agreed upon on an all India basis and not province-wise between the Government and the Muslim League and such other parties as are willing to undertake the responsibility for the defence of the country in the face of imminent danger the real purpose and objective will not be served and achieved. The Working Committee is of the opinion that in view of the immediate grave danger that is facing the country real purpose will not be served by the Mussalmans and others merely by joining the proposed provincial and district war committees with their present scope and functions.

Viceroy's letter to Mr. Jinnah, dated, Simla
June 20, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

Many thanks for your letter of June 17th and for the resolution enclosed passed by the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League on 16th June. I shall be very glad to have a talk with you and I suggest, if that is convenient for you, we might do so on the morning of Thursday, 27th June. Perhaps you would be kind enough to let me know whether the date suits you. Then I will suggest a time.

Mr. Jinnah's letter, dated, Bombay, June 22
1940

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 20th June,

1940, and I shall be arriving at Simla on the morning of Thursday, June 27, as desired by Your Excellency.

I may suggest that any time in the afternoon may be fixed provided it is convenient to you.

Letter to Mr. Jinnah, dated, Simla, June 30, 1940

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

H. E. mentioned that in your recent conversation with him you had touched on the possibility of a War Advisory Committee at the Centre in connection with any expansion of the Governor-General's Council but he did not discuss this in any detail with you. He asks me to say that if there are any further details which you would like to let him have as to what you have in mind he would be very glad to have them;

Yours Sincerely

(Sd.) G. J. Laithwaite.

Mr. Jinnah's letter, dated. Simla, first July, 1940.

Dear Mr. Laithwaite.

As desired by H. E. I am enclosing herewith a rough note of the points I discussed with him on the 27th June, 1940 in the course of my interview.

Note: That no pronouncement or statement should be made by His Majesty's Government which would, in any way, militate against the basic and fundamental principles laid down by the Lahore resolution about division of India and creating Muslim States in the northwest and eastern zones. And it may be stated that that ideal now has become the universal faith of Muslim India.

That His Majesty's Government must give definite and categorical assurance to the Mussalmans of India that no interim or final scheme of constitution would be adopted by the British Government without the previous approval and consent of Muslim India.

In view of the rapid developments in Europe and grave danger that is facing India, it is fully realised that everything should be done that is possible to intensify war efforts and mobilize all the resources of India for her defence for the purpose of maintaining internal security, peace and tranquillity and to ward off external aggression. But this can only be achieved provided the British Government are ready and willing to associate the Muslim leadership as equal partners in the Government both at the centre and in all the provinces. In other words, Muslim India leadership must be fully trusted as equals, and have equal share in the authority and control of the Governments, Central and Provincial.

Provisionally, and during the period of the war, the following steps should be taken to comply with the formula, namely Co-operation with the Government with equal share in the authority of the government :—

(a) That the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be enlarged, within the framework of the present constitutional existing law, the additional number to be settled by further discussions but it being understood that the Muslim representation must

be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority of the additional members as it is obvious that the main burden and the responsibility will be borne by the Mussalmans in that case.

(b) In the provinces where Section 93 has to operate, non-official advisers should be appointed, number to be fixed after further discussion and the majority of the non-official advisers should be the representatives of Mussalmans and where the provinces can be run by combination of parties or coalition naturally it would be for the parties concerned to adjust matters by agreement among themselves.

(c) There should be a war council consisting of not less than 15 members including the president to be presided over by His Excellency the Viceroy. I do not like the expression War Consultative Committee. This Council should regularly meet to deal with and review, the general situation as it may develop from time to time and advise the Government with regard to matters in connection with the prosecution of the war generally and, in particular, fullest development of the defence possible, and finance, and to make a through economic and industrial drive. In this body it will not be difficult to secure the representation and full co-operation of the Indian Princes, and as far as I can judge they would have no difficulty in joining it. It is through this body that the association of

the princes can be secured. Here again, the representation of Muslim India must be equal to that of the Hindus if the Congress comes in, otherwise they should have the majority.

Finally the representatives of the Mussalmans on the proposed war council and the Executive Council of the Governor-General and the additional non-official advisers of the Governors should be chosen by the Muslim League.

Viceroy's letter to Mr. Jinnah, dated, Simla
July 6.

Dear Mr. Jinnah.

I am much obliged for the private and personal memorandum headed 'Proposal' which you were kind enough to send me in your letter to my Private Secretary of 1st July. I note the points taken in paragraph one of that memorandum and in the first sentence of paragraph 2, both of which you emphasised in our recent conversation. I welcome also the amplification, as putting me in fuller possession of your mind, of that conversation represented by the balance of your letter. But certain of the points taken suggest that there may be some slight mis-apprehension, which you will, I think, agree that it would be desirable that I should clear without delay.

As regards the expansion of the Executive Council, this would, as you rightly observe in your memorandum be within the existing constitutional scheme. In

other words any Council so expanded would work as a whole and as a single Government of India. It is not a case of striking a balance between the different interests or of preserving the proportions between the important parties. As you yourself indicated in the course of our conversation, there are parties other than either Congress or the Muslim League who may fairly claim to be considered for inclusion and there is a very definite limit of numbers to any possible expansion. At the same time I readily accept the importance, in the event of any expansion, of securing adequate representation of Muslim interests and that is a point which I would bear in mind. There is however as you will see from my explanation, no question of responsibility falling in greater or less degree on any particular section. Responsibility will be that of the Governor-General-in-Council as a whole. Again it will be clear that under the existing law and practice it must remain with the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Governor-General, to decide upon such names as we may submit to His Majesty the King for inclusion in the Governor-General's Executive Council, and such persons cannot be the nominees of political parties, however important though it may of course be assumed that both the Secretary of state and the Governor-General would in all cases, do their utmost to select persons from the various sections of the community.

I need not remind you that under the law the whole

responsibility for Government in section 93 provinces vests exclusively in the Governor although a Governor can, of course, take advantage of the assistance of any adviser he may appoint. Whether, and if so at what point and in what strength non-official advisers from political parties should be appointed in provinces under section 93 administration, in the event of an expansion of the Governor-General's Council, would clearly call for consideration in the light of circumstances of each province. You will, I think, agree with me also that the importance of the community from which advisers are drawn in a particular province has a direct bearing.

Your idea for a war council is in my view well worth while considering, though details would have to be worked out. Here again there are, of course, many parties to be considered other than the Muslim League or Congress.

As regards section 111 of your memorandum, I ought I think to make it clear that it would be constitutionally impossible for the choice of Muslim gentlemen to be appointed to any expanded Executive Council or as non-official advisers to rest with the Muslim League. But in the contingency envisaged you need not fear that any suggestions you may put forward would not receive full consideration.

Let me in conclusion thank you again for your very clear and valuable memorandum. I realise, of

course, fully that it is not merely private and personal, but that in your own words it embodies a tentative proposal. I am sure that you will agree with me that it is well that there should be no misunderstanding on the important points on which I have touched above.

Mr. Jinnah's letter, dated, Bombay, July 17.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th July, 1940 and thank you for it.

I am glad that you have noted the points contained in paragraph one of my memorandum, and also the first sentence in paragraph two. I may point out that after the first sentence in paragraph two the second sentence beginning "In view of the rapid developments" should have been marked paragraph three and paragraph three should have been marked paragraph four.

As regards the constitutional and legal position that you have been good enough to point out to me in connection with the expansion of the Executive Council and also with regard to the appointment of advisers to the Governors and the position of the Governors, working under section 93 administration, I fully appreciate it. I am glad that the idea of constituting a war council, in your opinion, is well worth while considering. No doubt the details would have to be worked out. But I do not think there is

anything in my memorandum, which cannot be given effect to by way of convention and if the Secretary of State and yourself meet us in a spirit of trust and co-operation, the legal and constitutional formalities can be met and complied with. What is required is the spirit of complete understanding.

I am, however, grateful to you for your assurance, in paragraph five of your letter with regard to the choice of Muslim gentlemen to be appointed to the Executive Council or as non-official advisers, which runs as follows: "But in the contingency envisaged you need not fear that any suggestion you may put forward would not receive full consideration." On my part I hope that I shall meet you in every reasonable way possible.

In conclusion I should like to impress upon you that the Muslim public is very anxious to know what has been the result. The Congress propaganda is going on vigorously with its work whereas I have not yet given any idea of negotiations or the talk I had with you to the public. I wonder whether you will agree that I should place before the public at least my memorandum which I had sent you, with the corrections that I have already pointed out which pointed out which are merely a matter of arrangement of paragraphs.

Viceroy's letter to Mr. Jinnah, dated Simla, July 24:—

Dear Mr. Jinnah.

Thank you very much for your letter of the 17th July in reply to mine of the 6th July. I note and have read with interest what you say in it.

I appreciate the importance to you of the point taken in the last paragraph of your letter. I should of course, see no objection whatever to your informing your Committee confidentially of what passed between us at our conversation (I may, incidentally, remark that I asked Mr. Gandhi, after my talk with him, to regard our conversation as confidential, but told him that I had no objection to his informing the Congress Working Committee in confidence of what had passed during it—a course which he has, I gather, adopted). I cannot help feeling though that it must be a point for your consideration in the first instance that to give publicity to your private and personal memorandum of your "tentative proposal" might give rise to some misunderstanding as to the position in relation to the considerations mentioned in my letter to you of the 6th July. But I am naturally anxious to give you any assistance I can though I venture to think that the suggestion I have made might prove the most convenient method of dealing with the position.

Mr. Jinnah's letter to the Viceroy dated, Bombay, Aug. 2, 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 24th July,

1940, regarding the publication of my tentative proposals placed before you. Obviously I am awaiting your reply.

So far as the Working Committee is concerned they have already got a fairly good idea of the points that were discussed between us. But the importance of the point is, as, I am glad, you appreciate it, that how long do you expect me to wait and not give any idea to the general Muslim public as to what are these proposals.

My stating to the press as to what were the suggestions that were made on behalf of the Muslim League to you and through Your Excellency to His Majesty's Government cannot prejudice anybody or give rise to any misunderstanding with regard to your position.

Letter to Mr. Jinnah, dated en route to Poona.
August 5, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I have had the advantage of recent discussion with you in regard to the general political situation in India and I have reported our conversations on that matter to His Majesty's Government, with whom also I have been in consultation as to the desirability of some further statement designed to remove misunderstandings and further to clarify their intentions in the constitutional field. I am glad to say that I have now been authorised to make the statement of which I enclose a

copy. It will be published in the morning papers of Thursday, August 8, and I would ask you to treat it as entirely secret and for your personal information until then.

As you will see His Majesty's Government have authorised me to invite a certain number of representative Indians to join my Executive Council and they have authorised me further to establish a War Advisory Council which would meet at regular intervals and which would contain representatives of the Indian States and of other interests in the national life of India as a whole. I trust sincerely that you and the organisation of which you are the President, will be prepared to join with me in the Central Government and in the War Advisory Council and I would greatly appreciate it if you are able to let me have a reply by the 21st of August at the latest. I would hope to have an opportunity of conversation with you in Bombay on August 13 and I suggest that this would be a convenient opportunity to clear the ground for your formal reply. I would only add that I am anxious that the names of the members of the expanded Executive Council should appear not later than the end of August and those of the War Advisory Council by the middle of September at the latest, and if possible earlier than that date.

Letter from H.E. the Viceroy to Mr. Jinnah, dated August 14, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I think it may be convenient for you to have in writing the information on the points below which I gave you in our conversation today. I informed you in that conversation, first that my statement clearly safeguarded the Muslim position in relation to future constitutional development, secondly that it equally provided a basis on which the Muslims could, if they so desire, co-operate at the Centre. As I explained to you in our earlier conversation I cannot yet take up the issue of the provinces but I do not contemplate non-official advisers, at any rate at this stage.

(2) You asked me the probable strength of the expanded Executive Council. I cannot, for reasons which you will appreciate yet indicate a precise figure but the total strength of the Council will be likely to be in the neighbourhood of 11. If, as I trust, the Muslim League are prepared to accept my invitation I would like you to let me have a panel of names, say 4, with a view to my selecting 2 from it for appointment to my Council. As I have already made clear to you, Sir Zafrulla Khan, if he remains in my Council, will not count against this figure. It is clearly impossible until the discussions on which I am at present engaged are complete, to indicate precisely what would be the parties represented in the expanded Council.

(3) The strength and composition of the War Advisory Council can clearly only be fixed after

the expansion of the Executive Council is complete. Here, too, I should be grateful if you would be good enough to let me have a panel of names for my consideration on the assumption that there would probably be, say, five Muslim League representatives out of a total of something in the neighbourhood of 20.

(4) As you will appreciate, I am very anxious to take very early decision in these matters and to reach finality as regards the personnel of the expanded Executive Council and of the Advisory Council at as early a date as possible, and I hope that you will be able to assist me by letting me have a very early reply.

(5) There is of course no objection whatever to your communicating the information above to your colleagues confidentially but I should be grateful if any publicity could be avoided for the present.

Mr. Jinnah's letter, dated, Mount Pleasant Road, Malabar Hills, Bombay, 24th, August 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow.

I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th August 1940 and beg to inform Your Excellency that I will place the whole matter before the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League which has been called to meet at Bombay on the 31st August and will communicate their views to you as soon as possible.

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated, Bombay 5th September 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

In continuation of my letter of the 24th of August 1940, I beg to enclose herewith the resolutions of the Working Committee of 2nd of September in reply to your letter of the 14th of August 1940.

Hoping that they will receive Your Excellency's most careful consideration.

H. E. the Viceroy's letter, dated Simla, September 25 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnah,

I duly received the resolutions of the Working Committee of the Muslim League passed at their meetings in Bombay on 2nd September which you were good enough to send me in your letter of 5th September, and I have now had the advantage of a full and free discussion of the points arising out of those resolutions with you.

I have I think made the general position perfectly clear in the course of our conversation, and it is unnecessary for me to enter into further details about it here. As regards certain specific matters I would however, put on record that I explained to you the constitutional reasons which make it essential that the choice of members of the Governor-General's Executive Council must rest exclusively with the Governor-General and the Secretary of State, with

whom it must rest to tender advice in this matter to His Majesty. I appreciate, however, the difficulties which you made it clear to me confronted you in connection with the formulation of the panel which I had earlier suggested to you and in the light of our discussion I am content that the selection of representatives, while resting with the Governor-General, should be based in the case of the Muslim League (and should they so desire of the other parties to be represented in my Council) not on a panel formally submitted but on confidential discussion between the leader of the party concerned and myself.

I have also indicated the impracticability of a final decision as to the total strength of the expanded Council or as the allocation of portfolios (a matter which must of course rest entirely with the Governor-General) until the replies of all those who may be invited to serve have been received, but I have made clear to you (as I have also to the leaders of the other parties whom I have recently seen) my attitude on both those issues.

The general position of His Majesty's Government had been made clear in my statement of 8th August and in the Secretary of State's speech in the House of Commons on 15th August. It is that His Majesty's Government regard the expansion of my Council and the constitution of a War Advisory Council as steps of the first importance in terms of the association of Indian public opinion with the conduct

of the war by the Central Government and of the constitutional machinery of the Government of India pending the post-war investigations the machinery for which has been indicated in my statement and in Mr. Amery's speech. His Majesty's Government sincerely trust that the Muslim League, like the other parties and interests which they have invited to join the expanded Council and to participate in the War Advisory Council, will respond to that invitation. Their collaboration in both those bodies will of course be entirely without prejudice to the consideration and decision after the conclusion of the war, and on the basis already indicated in my statement, of the main constitutional issue. But His Majesty's Government trust and anticipate that they and the other parties who are represented in the expanded Council and the War Advisory Council will welcome the opportunity offered to them of influencing the cause of public affairs, in the immensely important period which lies ahead, and, in so doing, will in the working throughout the period of war of those bodies, find a basis for that general co-operation with full regard to the interests of all concerned, on which the post-war constitution foreshadowed in my statement and in the Secretary of State's speech can be built.

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated New Delhi, September 26, 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th September

1940 in reply to the resolution of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League of the 2nd September which was despatched to you with my covering letter of the 5th September.

I shall place the matter before the Committee on the 28th September and let you have the reply as soon as possible.

May I now inform you that I propose to release to the press the correspondence and the memorandum submitted by me to Your Excellency on the 1st of July, and I hope you will have no objection to my doing so as I think the public are entitled to know and understand the matter in its perspective.

H. E. the Viceroy's letter dated, Simla, 25th September, 1940.

Dear Mr. Jinnsh,

You asked me yesterday to let you have a formal reply before you left for Delhi to the resolution which you were kind enough to send me earlier this month, and I accordingly send you a formal letter herewith. I have given the 'most careful consideration since we parted last night as to whether I could devise any from of words such' as you mentioned to me which would meet the purpose which you had in view. I warned you as you will remember that I anticipated the greatest difficulty in doing so and I am bound to confess with regret that I have in fact after the most careful thought found it impracticable. But, knowing your mind as I do, I have endeavoured in the last paragraph of my formal letter sent herewith to do

what I could to make the general position clear and I hope that that may be of assistance to you I trust that in the light of our talks you will now be able to let me have a definite decision once your meeting at Delhi is over, and I trust that that decision may be a favourable one for matters have now reached a stage at which is essential that a definite conclusion should be reached."

Mr. Jinnah's letter dated, New Delhi September 26, 1940.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I thank you for your letter of the 25th of September and I extremely regret that you are unable to meet me on the point which I raised during the course of our conversation on the 24th, though in the discussions you appreciated and recognised that it was a vital point so far as the Muslim League was concerned, namely, that in the event of any other party deciding later on to be associated with your Executive Council to assist in the prosecution of the war it should be allowed to do so on terms that may be approved of and consented to by the Muslim League party, as we were entering into, so to say, a "war contract"

I thank you for your endeavour in the last paragraph of your formal letter to do what you could to make the general position clear but I am afraid it does not meet the point raised by me and I cannot derive much assistance from it."

SIR TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU & JINNAH.

Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to Mr Jinnah,
dated, Allahabad 6th February, 1941:—

“My dear Jinnah Since we met last in Bombay a few montns ago I have several times thought of writing to you but I have never been able upto the moment to make up my mind. Even now when I have decided to write to you I am writing this letter with considerable hesitation as if I cannot make things better than they are. At present I certainly do not in all conscience want to make them worse. But I believe that since 1916 when we came together in the old India Legislation Council you have known my views on the Hindu-Mohammedan question and I am, therefore, venturing to hope that you will not misunderstand my point of view.

Although I have not been taking active part in politics of the country for the last few years the old interest still survives and I follow fairly closely the trend of recent events. These have only tended to confirm me in my belief that the supreme necessity of the hour is a settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims or to put it in terms of party politics between the Congress and the Hindu Sabha and the Muslim League. It is my misfortune that owing to

some very strong convictions, I have found it impossible to join either of the first two and for obvious reasons I could not be a member of the organisation of which you are the president and yet I feel that so long as the three big organised bodies of public opinion in India remain in their present state of relationship to each other the future of this country can't be by any means bright. It is not my purpose to discuss in this letter which of the three parties is to blame. I think that a discussion of this character can never lead to any good; indeed I think instead of doing good it may do positive harm. You will remember that in August last when we met at Bombay I told you that if the Congress and the Hindu Sabha would not or were not prepared to call a conference for the purpose of settling differences there was no reason why you as the President of a great and influential League should not take the step forward. Since then I have been giving this matter my constant attention and at last I have made up my mind to make a personal appeal to you. I do not, however, pretend to sail under false colours. I represent neither the one party nor the other. I can neither offer nor accept terms. I can only appeal to you in my individual capacity—in the capacity of one who strongly and genuinely holds that the Muslims are an integral part of India and that their willing co-operation with other communities must necessarily show the condition, the nature, extent

and speed of the progress of the country. I am deliberately avoiding all reference to the controversial issues that divide the one from the other as it is not for me to settle them but for you and leaders of other parties who can influence opinion and speak for others to raise their issues and to come to a settlement in regard to them. As a realist I feel that not only you but Mr. Gandhi and the leaders of the Hindu Sabha particularly Dr. Savarkar are the men on whom the primary responsibility for a settlement of those issues lies.

Neither speeches on public platforms nor statements and interviews given by leaders can really help the situation. I think conversations or if I may use a hackneyed phrase heart to heart conversations, may possibly lead to some satisfactory results. In any case even if they do not we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that everything has been done which could be done to bring about a better state of feeling and understanding. I am, therefore, venturing to suggest on my own account without committing any other party to my views or suggestions that (1) you should agree first to meet Mr. Gandhi and then the process of private talks could be extended to others. (2) If you and other leaders then think that it would serve the best interests of the country to invite a joint conference then you all could take the necessary step. I can assure you of my personal support and co-operation in this matter. If your reply to my suggestion is

that you will be prepared to see Mr. Ghandhi and talk over matters with him, I shall write to him and press it on him that he must see you at Bombay or any other place that may suit your convenience. I hope very strongly that he will be quite willing to see you in Bombay or any other convenient place and discuss things with you. I think you two should meet first, for if the country is dear to him I believe it is no less dear to you. You may be at present identified with the Muslim League; it may be necessary of the situation that you should be leading the Muslim League. I have no kind of prejudice against the League or any connection with it and so far as you are concerned I still prefer to look upon you as I used to in the days gone by when other people also looked up to you for guidance and advocacy of the cause of India, irrespective of caste, colour or creed.

If you are willing to see Mr. Gandhi and to discuss things, I hope you will permit me to take him into confidence about what you write to me. With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,

TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU

Letter from Mr. Jinnah to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru dated Bombay, 12th February, 1941

"My dear Sapru,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 6th instant and thank you for it. I have given to it my closest attention and consideration, coming as it does from you.

The main purpose on which you concentrated is directed towards trying to induce me to agree to see Mr. Gandhi. I am sorry to find that you are under the impression that I am reluctant and opposed to seeing Mr. Gandhi or any other Hindu leader on behalf of the Hindu community, for, you say in your letter that I should agree first to see Mr. Gandhi. Then you proceed to say further, "If your reply to my suggestion is that you will be prepared to see Mr. Gandhi and talk over matters with him I shall write to him and press it upon him that he must see you at Bombay or any other place that may suit your convenience." Please remove this erroneous impression from your mind. I have always been ready and willing to see Mr. Gandhi or any other Hindu leader on behalf of the Hindu community and do all I can to help the solution of Hindu-Muslim problem.

As regards other matters referred to in your letter, I cannot do better than to send you a press cutting, giving the full text of my speech that I made in the course of the debate in the Assembly on the Supplementary Finance Bill last November, as I fear that your attention, if at all, could have been drawn only to the summary that appeared in most of the papers at the time.

This will give you some idea of the position and the point of view of the Muslim League.

I thank you for your personal reference to me which I need not say I appreciate very much.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Letter from Sir T. B. Spru to Mr. Jinnah, dated
Allahabad 19th February, 1941:

My dear Jinnah,

Thank you ever so much for your kind letter of 10th February. I regret to say that I have been having high fever for the last five or six days and am, therefore, unable to attend to any political correspondence. As soon as I get better, I shall write to you again about the matter about which I wrote to you on the sixth of February. I appreciate very much the promptness with which you have so kindly replied to me.

Yours sincerely,

Tej Bahadur Sapru.

GANDHI SIR TEJ BAHADUR

Letter from Mahatma Gandhi, Sevagram, Wardha,
25th January, 1941.

Dear Sir Tej Bahadur,

I have just finished reading your article in the "Twentieth Century." I quite agree with it that we have to settle our domestic troubles ourselves and it is without thinking whether the others will accept our joint demands or not. Having that belief, you should know that I specially went to Mr. Jinnah in Bombay and had several talks and then Subhas Babu went, but we could make no headway. You perhaps know why.

Then again, determined not to go to the Viceroy as strangers, I invited myself to his house in Delhi, and

from there we went together in his car, but only to show our differences to the Viceroy. I would go again and again if I had not the knowledge that my going would cause irritation to him. I cannot crack a joke without exposing myself to being misunderstood. My impression is that he does not want a settlement till he has so consolidated the League position that he can dictate his terms to all the parties concerned, including the rulers. I do not blame him for having taken up that position, if he has. But with this impression, it is useless for me to approach him. I often feel like writing to him, but lose courage when it comes to the point of taking up my pen. But if you have faith, why don't you see him without being asked by anybody ?

I hope you are keeping very good health.

Yours Sincerely,"

(Sd. M. K. Gandhi).

**Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru dated Allahabad
28th January, 1941 to Mahatma Gandhi.**

Dear Mahatmaji,

I thank you for your letter of the 25th of January, which I received yesterday. I am glad to know that my article in the "Twentieth Century" had attracted your notice.

I read in the papers that you had gone to Bombay to see Mr. Jinnah, but I do not know what exactly passed between you and him, there. I met Mr. Jinnah by the merest accident at Dr. Berger's Clinic in Bombay on the

6th or the 7th of August last. He came up to me and asked me to have tea with him. Accordingly, I went to him the next day, and I had a conversation with him lasting for about one hour and a half. He told me what had transpired between you and him at Delhi, and of the differences which arose between you and him in the presence of the Viceroy. My impression was that, though there was a general conversation between you and him on some of the political demands of the Congress, the communal question did not specifically form the subject of discussion.

You are, if I may say so, quite right in saying that we have to settle our domestic troubles ourselves and that without thinking whether the British will accept our joint demands or not. That has always been my view. I am afraid the communal situation has been allowed too long to deteriorate from bad to worse, and I very strongly feel that that is "the one question" to which every one of us, (and particularly you with your influence), have to address ourselves. For, so long as these differences last among ourselves, I am afraid real self government is difficult to achieve and still more difficult to maintain.

During the Christmas week, Nawab Mohammad Ismail and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan were here in connection with the session of the Provincial Muslim League. The former, who is an old friend of mine, came to see me and I met the latter at the house of a

common friend. We talked freely and pleasantly and the impression left on my mind was that, though the task of settlement would present great difficulties, it was by no means hopeless.

I had no talk with Mr. Jinnah on the question of Pakistan. I believe the word 'Pakistan' is a convenient phrase which has been adopted by the Muslim League to cover a multitude of political and constitutional ideas. If it means a partition of India, then I do not mind saying that I am very strongly opposed to it. If it means a reconsideration of certain political ideas and readjustment of some constitutional provisions, then I should not rule out their discussion. In any case, however, for the purpose of conversations intended to achieve a communal settlement, it would not be right for any party to impose on the other any kind of conditions precedent. I can not reason why Mr. Jinnah should decline to meet you. Not only would it be rude on his part to decline to meet you, but it would also put him positively in the wrong if he were to adopt that sort of attitude.

You say in your letter that "he does not want a settlement till he has so consolidated the League position that he can dictate his terms to all the parties concerned including the rulers," and that you "often feel like writing to him, but lose courage when it comes to the point of taking up my pen." You are, however, a man of infinite courage and you are big.

enough to rise superior to pretty considerations of a conventional character. I see no reason why you should not write to him a perfectly courteous letter—as you always do—telling him that in the interest of the country, you should like to have an opportunity of meeting him and discussing the whole situation so as to see whether an honourable settlement which will be satisfactory to all the parties concerned, is possible. If he makes a satisfactory response, then you should take the step forward. That will heighten and strengthen your position and the position of the Congress, and of the Hindus at large. If he makes no response to your request or adopts a truculent attitude, that is bound to recoil on his head and on the party which he represents. My own belief is that the farther away the parties can be from each other, the greater is the misunderstanding and the more difficult the task of reconciliation.

You then say in your letter, “but if you have faith’ why don’t you see him without being asked by anybody?” As a private individual, I should have no objection at all to meeting him or anybody else but the real difficulty that I feel about my position is that I cannot pretend to represent the Congress or the Hindus. I can write to him, (and am quite willing to do so), suggesting that he should meet you, or that if you write to him saying that you want to meet him,

he should receive you and talk to you. I should not, however write to him without your permission. If you will permit me, I can also write to Nawab Mohammed Ismail, who, I know, is a very good man and who, I feel, will sincerely welcome peace and harmony. You may be sure that whether I write to Mr. Jinnah or to Nawab Ismail or to any one I am not going to commit you or any one to any position. I can only throw out a suggestion for the initiation of conversation. Hitherto, I have written no kind of letter on the subject to Mr. Jinnah or any other Muslim friend, and I have scrupulously avoided, during the last one year and a half, writing to the Viceroy or any British official at Delhi or Simla. The last time that I saw the Viceroy was in September, 1939. Holding the views that I do, I feel very strongly that it is no use my seeing him, or writing to him in the midst of these differences, which divide one party from another and one set of politicians from another.

It is because of this feeling that, both in the statement that I issued last month to the Press, and in my article in the "Twentieth Century": I have laid emphasis on the desirability of a communal settlement and of your meeting Mr. Jinnah. Speaking for myself, I do not attach much importance to the general criticism of British policy that the Secretary of State and the Viceroy have given a veto to the

minorities. Whether they have done so or not, it is up to us to set our house in order and once we shall have gained the strength which it will be impossible on political grounds for any one at Delhi, Simla or Whitehall to resist.

It is my misfortune that on some political questions, I differ from many of my countrymen and have very strong convictions. But I should do everything that lay in my power to pave the way for the communal settlement to which I attach far greater importance than I do to mere academic discussions of this political theory or that. In short if you permit me, I am quite willing to write to Mr. Jinnah and some other Muslim friends. I would much rather like that you took the lead at a suitable opportunity of calling a conference than that any outsider or common friends, howsoever well-intentioned, assumed responsibility for such a conference. Some friends have written to me about it, but I am not yet convinced that it would do any good for a private individual to call such a conference or to wait on the Viceroy. This must be left to you and Mr. Jinnah, and I feel very strongly that if you take the lead in this matter, good may result.

With my best regards,

Yours Sincerely,

Sd. Tej Bahadur Sapru.

**Letter from Mahatma Gandhi, dated Wardha
February 1st, 1941 to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru.**

Dear Sir Tej Bahadur,

I thank you for your kind letter. Mr. M. A. Jinnah says, I can only talk to him as a Hindu for Hindus. I cannot do it. If I write to him that I want to meet him, he won't decline to meet me. But I know the result. He will immediately distort our meeting. He thinks that I am the greatest stumbling block. I am therefore, biding my time. As soon as I see my way, I would certainly seek an interview with him and everybody else. You may have seen how he has distorted the present C. D. as anti-Muslim, but of course, you should pursue the subject after your own style with whom so ever you may think fit.—

Yours Sincerely,

Sd. M. K. Gandhi.

**Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, dated
February 6th, 1941 to Mahatma Gandhi.**

My dear Mahatmaji,

Many thanks for your letter. I appreciate your point of view. After careful consideration, I have decided to write a letter to Mr. Jinnah, and I am sending it to-day. I have taken good care not to commit you or any one or any party to any particular position on any question. I have simply suggested to him that he should be prepared to meet

you to have a talk with you if you should write to him to see him at Bombay or elsewhere. He can then see other leaders and, if you all then think that it will be useful to have a conference to settle the differences, then such a conference may be invited. I have expressly stated that I do not propose to express any opinion on any one of the outstanding questions as it will be for you and him and other leaders to discuss those issues and to come to a settlement. If and when I hear from him, I shall let you know. I have also sent a message to the same effect to another influential Muslim friend. I may also write to another friend.

With kindest regards, -

Yours Sincerely,

Sd. Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Letter from Mahatma Gahdhi dated Feb. 9,

1941 to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru :

Dear Sir Tej Bahadur,

Your letter has just reached me. It disconcerts me somewhat, I think I have told you that I am not going to write to him unless I know that he wants to come to some settlement. What I do know is all to the contrary. I wish I had a copy of your letter to M.A. Jinnah. Of course, I do not want you to do anything further so as to remove misunderstanding, if there is any.

Yours Sincerely,

Sd. M. K. Gandhi.

Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur to Mahatma Gandhi,
dated Allahabad, 12th Feb. 1941

Dear Mahatmaji,

I received your letter of the 9th of February yesterday. I was, however, surprised to know from you that my last letter of the 6th of February had somewhat disconcerted you. I see no reason why it should have.

In your last letter, you say:

"That I am not going to write to him (Jinnah) unless I know that he wants to come to some settlement." Permit me to point out that you never wrote to me like this in any of your letters. For your satisfaction, I am enclosing copies of your previous letters of the 25th of January, 1941, of the 1st of February, 1941, and also of your last letter.

In your first letter, you said:

"My impression is that he does not want a settlement till he has so consolidated the League position that he can dictate his terms to all the parties concerned including the rulers" and then you added that "I often feel like writing to him, but lose courage when it comes to the point of taking up my pen." Finally, you said to me: "But if you have faith, why don't you see him without being asked by anybody?" In my letter to you of the 28th of January, 1941, which I dare say is with you, I said, among other things, "I see no reason why you should not write to

him a perfectly courteous letter—as you always do—telling him that, in the interest of the country, you should like to have an opportunity of meeting him and discussing the whole situation so as to see whether an honourable settlement, which will be satisfactory to all the parties. As to why, I do not see Jinnah without being asked by anybody. I wrote as follows:—

“As a private individual, I should have no objection at all to meeting him or anybody else, but the real difficulty that I feel about my position is that I cannot pretend to represent the Congress or the Hindus. I can write to him (and am quite willing to do so), suggesting that he should meet you or that if you write to him saying that you want to meet him, he should receive you and talk to you. I should not, however, write to him without your permission.” In your letter of the 1st of February, you say: “M. A. Jinnah says, I can only talk to him as a Hindu for Hindus, I cannot do it. If I write to him that I want to meet him, he won't decline to meet me. But I know the result.” In the present state of feeling, I admit that it is quite understandable that he should think that you are the greatest stumbling block. Towards the end of that letter, you wrote to me. “But of course, you should pursue the subject after your own style with whomsoever you may think fit. This sentence led me to believe that I was at liberty to

write to Jinnah in my own style, and to suggest to him that he should meet you,

I am herewith enclosing a copy of my letter to Jinnah. You will find from it that, among other things, I have written to him as follows: "(a) I represent neither the one party nor the other. I can neither offer nor accept terms. I can only appeal to you in my individual capacity—in the capacity of one who strongly and genuinely holds that the Muslims are an integral part of India and that their willing co-operation with other communities must necessarily condition the nature, extent and speed of the progress of the country." Then I wrote to him (b) "I think conversations or if I may use a hackneyed phrase heart-to-heart conversation may possibly lead to some satisfactory results."

My suggestions to him are contained in the following sentences:—

"I am, therefore, venturing to suggest, on my own account, without committing any other^s person or any other party, to my views or suggestion that—(1) You should agree first to meet Mr. Gandhi and then, the process of private talks could be extended to others (2) If you and other leaders then think that it would serve the best interests of the country to invite a joint conference, then you all could take the necessary steps. If your reply to my suggestion is that you will be prepared to see Mr.

Gandhi and talk over matters with him, I shall write to him and press it on him that he must see you at Bombay, or any other place that may suit your convenience. I hope very strongly, that he will be quite willing to see you in Bombay or any other convenient place, and discuss things with you."

After careful consideration on the whole position, I do not see any reason to regret the letter that I have written to Jinnah. I could not reasonably ask him to give me the undertaking that he would certainly come to a settlement with you when you meet. The basis of a settlement is for you and him and others to decide, but, in my opinion, it would not be right for an party to impose any kind of conditions precedent on the other or to have any such assurances.

I do not wish my letter to him at all to interfere with any other line of action that may possibly be under contemplation of in progress, and I have, therefore, decided to drop the matter altogether. [If Mr. Jinnah writes to me any letter and if it is of a satisfactory character, I shall communicate the same to you. and leave it to you to come to your own decision. But, in view of your last letter to me, I shall not as I have said above, pursue the matter any further.

With kind regards,

Yours Sincerely,

Sd. Tej Bahadur Sapru

Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur to Mahatma Gandhi
dated Allahabad February 14, 1941.

Dear Mahatmaji.

I sent you a registered letter yesterday morning.

Last evening, I received a letter from Mr. Jinnah a copy of which I enclose herewith. I have not yet written to him, It is now for you to take your decision.

In view of your last letter to me I do not propose to take any further action.

With kind regards,

Yours Sincerely,

(Sd.) Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Letter from Mahatma Gandhi to Sir Tej Bahadur dated Savagram, February 16.

Dear Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru,

I thank you for two letters, I need not now discuss the points raised by you. M.A. Jinnah's letter confirms my fear. He would see me if I go "on behalf of the Hindu community."

This I cannot do. I do not represent the Hindu community, I am not even member of the Hindu Mahasabha.

But you may not now get out of the situation. You must not mind my warnings. I suggest you your writing to Q. A. Jinnah that his position is unsound, if you agree with me. If you do not, you should strive with me and persuade me that I should go on behalf of the Hindu community.

Yours Sincerely,
(Sd.) M. K. Gandhi.

Letter from Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru to Mahatma Gandhi, , dated Allahabad, February 19, 1941.

Dear Mahatmaji,

I thank you very much for your letter of the 16th instant, which was brought to me yesterday by Mr. Shiva Nath Katju. I regret to say that from the 15th of February, I have been down with high fever, though to-day it is less. I am not attending to any work at present, and shall not be able to do so for another week or so.

I have just written a letter to Mr. Jinnah simply acknowledging his letter and saying that when I am better I shall write to him.

Personally, I am not at all hopeful of success. I do not think I can persuade you to see him on behalf of the Hindu community, nor do I think I can persuade him to give up his point of view. Still, I shall think over the matter and, if anything occurs to me which may be of any use, I shall act accordingly. Meanwhile, I am taking no action.

With kind regards.

Yours Sincerely.

(Sd.) Tej Bahadur Sapru.

Letter from Sir Tej to Mahatma Gandhi dated Allahabad March 2, 41,

My Dear Mahatmaji,

To-day. I am free from fever, but I am not sure whether I will continue to do so throughout the day. Anyhow, I am better. It was a great

please to meet you and to have had an opportunity of talking to you. I have been thinking a great deal about the matters about which I talked to you.

There is one idea which I am putting before you and I should like to know your reaction. I should take no step to give effect to that idea unless it appealed to you. It is this: supposing some of us, who are meeting in Bombay on the 13th of March, decide to invite you and Mr. Jinnah and just a few other leaders at a conference to be held later on some suitable date and at a convenient place to talk over matters of difference, how will you view it? If you approve of it. I can then go, if necessary to Jinnah and discuss the matter with him and try to get his agreement. This avoids your writing to him or taking the initiative in the matter. If this attempt fails, it will be one more failure and will not make the position worse. Our conscience will be clear that we have done the best that we could to bring about a reconciliation, and it will be abundantly plain to every one in the world that you have held out the hand of fellowship. This is only a tentative suggestion, Please do not think that I am committed to it or that I shall act on it necessarily, I should like you to tell me what you think of it. The responsibility will not be yours at all. It will be that of others.

Hoping you are well and had a comfortable journey back, and with kind regards.

Yours Sincerely
(Sd.) TEJ Tej Bhadur Spru.

GANDHI - JINNAH
CORRESPONDENCE
1944

I

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 10, 1944

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

With reference to our talk yesterday (September 9), I understood from you that you had come to discuss the Hindu-Muslim settlement with me in your individual capacity, and not in any representative character or capacity, on behalf of the Hindus or the Congress; nor had you any authority to do so. I naturally pointed out to you that there must be some one on the other side with authority holding a representative status with whom I can negotiate and, if possible, come to a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question, and that for the position you had adopted there was no precedent, and that this raises great difficulties in my way.

As you know, I can only speak on behalf of Muslim India and the All-India Muslim League, as the President of the organization which I represent, and as such I am subject to and governed by its constitution, rules and regulations. I think you realize and will admit that a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question is the foremost and major hurdle,

and unless the representatives of these two nations put their heads together, how is one to make any headway with it ?

Nevertheless, I explained to you the Lahore resolution of March, 1940, and tried to persuade you to accept the basic and fundamental principles embodied in it, but you not only refused to consider it but emphasized your opposition to the basis indicated in that resolution, and remarked that there was "an ocean between you and me," and when I asked you what is then the alternative you suggest, you put forward a formula of Mr. Rajagopalachari approved by you. We discussed it, and as various matters were vague and nebulous, and some required clarification, I wanted to have a clear idea of what it really meant and what were its implications, and asked you for explanations and clarification regarding the proposals embodied in that formula.

After some discussion, you requested me to formulate in writing my points that I thought required or called for explanation and clarification, and to communicate with you and that you would reply in writing before our next meeting on Monday, September 11, at 5 30 p.m. I am, therefore, submitting to you the following points which require clarification :

(1) With regard to the preamble : In what capacity will you be a consenting party if any agreement is reached between you and me ?

(2) Clause 1 : With regard to "the constitution for a free India" referred to in this clause, I would like to know first, what constitution do you refer to, who will frame it and when will it come into being ?

Next, it is stated in the formula that "the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence." Does it mean the Congress demand for Independence as formulated in the August resolution of 1942 by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay or, if not, what is the significance of this term, for you know the Muslim League has made it clear not only by its resolutions but by its creed, which is embodied in its constitution, that we stand for freedom and independence of the whole of this sub-continent, and applies to Pakistan and Hindustan.

Next it is stated that the Muslim League "will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period." I would like to know the basis or the lines on which such a government is to be set up or constituted. If you have a complete and definite scheme please let me have it.

(3) Clause 2: Who will appoint the commission referred to in this clause and who will give effect to their findings? What is the meaning of "absolute majority" referred to in it? Will the contemplated plebiscite be taken districtwise or, if not, on what basis? Who will determine and decide whether such a plebiscite should be based on adult franchise or other practicable franchise? Who will give effect to the decision or verdict of the above-mentioned plebiscite? Would only the districts on the border, which are taken out from the boundaries of the present provinces by delimitation, be entitled to choose to join either State, or would also those outside the present boundaries have the right to choose to join either State?

(4) Clause 3 : Who are meant by "all parties" in this clause ?

(5) Clause 4 : I would like to know between whom and through what machinery and agency will the "mutual agreements" referred to in this clause be entered into? What is meant by "safeguarding defence, commerce and communications and for other essential purposes"? Safeguarding against whom ?

(6) Clause 6 : "These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility for the governance of India." I would like to know to whom is this power to be transferred, through what machinery and agency, and when ?

These are some of the important points that occur to me for the moment, which require explanation and clarification, and I hope that you will let me have full details about the various points that I have raised, in order that I may be better able to understand and judge your proposals before I can deal with them satisfactorily.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

II

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

Dear Qaid-i-Azam

September 11, 1944.

I received your letter yesterday at 3-30 p.m. I was in the midst of appointments. I hasten to reply at the earliest opportunity.

have said in my letter to you, it is implied in the Rajaji formula and I have stated publicly that I have approached you as an individual. My life mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling Power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving Independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together.

I am glad, therefore, that you did not break off our talks when I refused to assume or accept representative capacity. Of course, I am pledged to use all the influence I may have with the Congress to ratify my agreement with you. May I remind you that the Rajaji formula was designed in the first instance for your acceptance and submission thereafter to the League?

It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in outlook. But had no reference to the Lahore resolution of the League. The Lahore resolution is indefinite. Rajaji has taken from it the substance and given it a shape.

Now for the points raised by you.

1. I have already answered this in the foregoing.
2. The constitution will be framed by provisional government contemplated in the formula or an authority specially set up by it after the British power is withdrawn. The independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands. The basis for the formation of the provisional

interim government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress.

3. The commission will be appointed by the provisional government. 'Absolute majority' means a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the Frontier Province. The form of plebiscite and the franchise must be a matter for discussion.

4. "All parties" means parties interested.

5. "Mutual agreement" means agreement between contracting parties. "Safeguarding defence, etc." means for me a Central or joint board of control. "Safeguarding" means safeguarding against all who may put the common interests in jeopardy.

6. The power is to be transferred to the nation, that is, to the provisional government. The formula contemplates peaceful transfer by the British Government. So far as I am concerned I would like the transfer to take place as early as possible.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

III

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 11, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhiji,

I received your letter of September 11 at 5 p.m. today. I note that you have approached me as an individual, and I have already expressed my views about it. Please do not take it that I acquiesce in the position that you have

adopted, for which there is no precedent.* Nevertheless, I proceeded to discuss matters with you naturally because I am anxious to convert you to my point of view if possible. I urged on you that the only solution of India's problem is to accept the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan, as briefly laid down in the Lahore resolution of March 1940, and proceed to settle the details forthwith. You say the Lahore resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the resolution, but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and the fundamental principles embodied in it. I would, therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore resolution is indefinite. I cannot agree that Rajaji has taken from it its substance and given it shape. On the contrary, he has not only put it out of shape but mutilated it, as I explained in my speech which I delivered at the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League at Lahore on July 30, 1944.

You say "the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together." This in my opinion is, as I have repeat-

*In its report of the proceedings of the Muslim League session of July 1944 at Lahore, the "Dawn" in its issue of July 31 said: "On the League Council authorizing Mr. Jinnah to carry on negotiations with Mr. Gandhi, the Qai-i-Azam ruled that all the resolutions on the agenda relating to the C. R.-Gandhi formula could not be moved and the movers, accordingly, withdrew the resolutions." Similar reports appeared in other papers.

edly said, putting the cart before the horse, and is generally opposed to the policy and declarations of the All-India Muslim League, and you are only holding on firmly to the August resolution of 1942. In order to achieve the freedom and independence of the people of India, it is essential, in the first instance, that there should be a Hindu-Muslim settlement.

Of course, I am thankful to you when you say that you are pledged to use all the influence that you have with the Congress to ratify your agreement with me, but that is not enough in my judgment, although it will be a very valuable help to me.

I once more ask you please to let me know what is your conception of the basis for the formation of a provisional interim government. No doubt it will be subject to agreement between the League and the Congress, but I think in fairness you should at least give me some rough idea or lines of your conception, for you must have thought it out by now, and I would like to know what are your proposals or scheme for the formation of a provisional interim government, which can give me some clear picture to understand it.

You have omitted to answer my question as to who will give effect to the findings of the commission and also it is not clear to me what you mean by absolute majority, when you say it means "a clear majority over non-Muslim elements as in Sind, Baluchistan or the Frontier Province." You have not even replied to my question as to who will decide the form of the plebiscite and the franchise contemp-

lated by the formula.

The answer to the fourth point does not carry any clear idea when you say "all parties" means "parties interested."

You say " 'mutual agreement' means 'agreement between contracting parties.'" Who are the contracting parties once a provisional interim government is established of your conception? Who will appoint the Central or joint board of control, which will safeguard defence, etc., and on what principle, through what machinery and agency, and subject to whose control and orders will such a Central or joint board be?

You say "The power is to be transferred to the nation, that is, to the provisional government." That is all the greater reason why I would like to know full details of the provisional government as contemplated by you and of your conception.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah

IV

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 13, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhiji,

When you arrived here on the morning of September 12 to resume our talks, you were good enough to inform me that you had not had time to attend to my letter of September 11, which reached you the same day at 10-30 p.m. We met again today without having received your reply, and I

am still waiting for it. Please, therefore let me have reply as soon as possible with regard to the various points mentioned in my letter to you of September 11.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

V

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

September 14, 1944.

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

I have your letter of the 13th instant. I understood from our talks that you were in no hurry for my answer. I was therefore taking the matter in a leisurely fashion, even hoping that as our talks proceeded and as cordiality increased mutual clarification would come of itself and that we would only have to record our final agreement. But I understand and appreciate the other viewpoint. We should take nothing for granted. I should clarify your difficulties in understanding the Rajaji formula and you should do likewise regarding yours, *i.e.*, the Muslim League Lahore resolution of 1940.

With reference to the Lahore resolution as agreed between us I shall deal with it in a separate letter.

Perhaps at the end of our discussion, we shall discover that Rajaji not only has not put the Lahore resolution out of shape and mutilated it, but has given it substance and form.

Indeed in view of your dislike of the Rajaji formula, I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and

I am now concentrating on the Lahore resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement.

So much for the first paragraph of your letter.

As to the second, I do hold that unless we oust the third party we shall not be able to live at peace with one another. That does not mean that I may not make an effort to find ways and means of establishing a living peace between us.

You ask for my conception of the basis for a provisional interim government. I would have told you if I had any scheme in mind. I imagine that if we two can agree, it would be for us to consult the other parties. I can say this, that any provisional government to inspire confidence at the present moment must represent all parties. When that moment arrives I shall have been replaced by some authoritative person, though you will have me always at your beck and call when you have converted me, or I you, or by mutual conversion we have become one mind functioning through two bodies.

As to the third point, the provisional government being the appointing authority, will give effect to the findings of the commission. This, I thought, was implied in my previous answer.

Rajaji tells me that 'absolute majority' is used in his formula in the same sense as it is used in ordinary legal parlance wherever more than two groups are dealt with. I cling to my own answer. But you will perhaps suggest a third meaning and persuade me to accept it.

The form of the plebiscite and franchise must be left

to be decided by the provisional interim government unless we decide it now. I should say it should be by adult suffrage of all the inhabitants of the Pakistan area.

As to fourth, "all parties" means you and I and every one else holding views on the question at issue will, and should, seek by peaceful persuasion to influence public opinion as is done where democracy functions wholly or in part.

As to fifth, supposing that the result of the plebiscite is in favour of partition, the provisional government will draft the treaty and agreements as regards the administration of matters of common interest, but the same has to be confirmed and ratified by the governments of the two States. The machinery required for the settlement and administration of matters of common interest will in the first instance be planned by the interim government, but subsequently will be a matter for settlement between the two governments acting through the agencies appointed by each for that purpose.

As to sixth, I hope the foregoing makes superfluous any further reply.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

Mr. Jinnah To Gandhiji

September 14, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I received your letter of September 14, at 4.45 p.m. today in reply to my letter of September 11 (and not of September 13, as you state, which seems to be a mistake), and I thank you for it.

Please let me have, as soon as you can, your promised letter indicating in what way or respect the Lahore resolution is 'indefinite.'

With regard to the provision in the Gandhi-Rajaji formula that "the Muslim League endorses the Indian demand for Independence," I asked you in my letter dated September 10, "Does it mean the Congress demand for Independence as formulated in the August 1942 resolution by the All-India Congress Committee in Bombay or, if not, what is the significance of this term," to this you replied by your letter of September 11. "the Independence contemplated is of the whole of India as it stands." Hence, I again ask, does it mean on the basis of a united India? I find that you have not clarified this point satisfactorily.

As regards the next part of this clause, the formula proceeds to lay down that "the Muslim League will co-operate with the Congress in the formation of the provisional interim government for the transitional period," I requested you in my letter of September 10 to let me know "the basis or lines by which such a government is to be set up or constituted. If you have a complete and definite scheme, please

me have it," to this you replied by your letter of September 11 under reply, that "the basis for the formation of the provisional interim government will have to be agreed to between the League and the Congress." But that is not meeting my request for clarification or giving me at least the outlines of such a government, and that is what I have been asking for. I hope that you do appreciate my point when I am requesting you to let me have rough outlines of the proposed provisional interim government according to the formula, so that I may have some idea.

Of course, I can quite understand that such a provisional interim government will represent all parties and would be of a character that will inspire confidence at the present moment of all the parties. I can quite understand that when the moment arrives certain things may follow, but before we can deal with this formula in a satisfactory manner, I repeat again that, as it is your formula, you should give me a rough idea of the provisional interim government that you contemplate and of your conception.

What I would like to know would be, what will be the powers of such a provisional interim government, how it will be formed, to whom it will be responsible, and what its composition will be, etc. You being the sponsor of this Gandhi-Rajaji formula, should give me some rough idea and picture of it, so that I may understand what this part of the formula means.

In your letter of September 14, in reply to my letter of September 11, you inform me that you would have told me you had any scheme in mind. "I imagine that if we two

can agree it would be for us to consult the other parties," but that is just the point. Unless I have some outlines or scheme, however rough, from you, what are we to discuss in order to reach any agreement?

As regards the other matters which you have further explained, I have noted the explanation, and I do not think I need press you further, although some of them are not quite satisfactory.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

VII

Gandhi To Mr. Jinnah

September 15, 1944.

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

This is in terms of our talk of Wednesday, Sept. 13.

For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji formula and, with your assistance, am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore resolution of the Muslim League.

You must admit that the resolution itself makes no reference to the two nations theory. In the course of our discussions you have passionately pleaded that India contains two nations, *i.e.* Hindus and Muslims, and that the latter have their homelands in India as the former have theirs.

The more our argument progresses, the more alarming your picture appears to me. It would be alluring if it were true. But my fear is growing that it is wholly unreal. I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their

descendants claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock. If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children.

You do not claim to be a separate nation by right of conquest but by reason of acceptance of Islam. Will the two nations become one if the whole of India accepted Islam? Will Bengalis, Oriyas, Andhras, Tamilians, Maharashtrians, Gujaratis, etc., cease to have their special characteristics if all of them became converts to Islam?

These have all become one politically because they are subject to one foreign control. They are trying today to throw off that subjection.

You seem to have introduced a new test of nationhood. If I accept it, I would have to subscribe to many more claims and face an insoluble problem.

The only real though lawful test of our nationhood arises out of our common political subjection. If you and I throw off this subjection by our combined effort we shall be born a politically free nation out of our travail. If by then we have not learnt to prize our freedom we may quarrel among ourselves and, for want of a common master holding us together in his iron grip, seek to split up into small groups or nationalities. There will be nothing to prevent us from descending to that level and we shall not have to go in search of a master. There are many claimants to the throne that never remains vacant.

With this background I shall present you with my difficulty in accepting your resolution :

(1) Pakistan is not in the resolution. Does it bear the original meaning the Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan out of which the name was mnemonically formed? If not, what is it?

(2) Is the goal of Pakistan pan-Islam?

(3) What is it that distinguishes an Indian Muslim from every other Indian, if not his religion? Is he different from a Turk or an Arab?

(4) What is the connotation of the word "Muslims" in the resolution under discussion? Does it mean the Muslims of the India of geography or of the Pakistan to be?

(5) Is the resolution addressed to Muslims by way of education, or to the inhabitants of the whole of India by way of appeal or to the foreign ruler as an ultimatum?

(6) Are the constituents in the two zones to constitute "independent States," an undefined number in each zone?

(7) Is the demarcation to take place during the pendency of British rule?

(8) If the answer to the last question is in the affirmative, the proposal must be accepted first by Britain and then imposed upon India, not evolved from within by the free will of the people of India!!!

(9) Have you examined the position and satisfied yourself that these "independent States" will be materially and otherwise benefited by being split up into fragments?

(10) Please satisfy me that these independent sovereign States will not become a collection of poor States, a menace to themselves and to the rest of India.

(11) Pray show me by facts and figures or otherwise how independence and welfare of India as a whole can be brought about by the acceptance of the resolution ?

(12) How are Muslims under the Princes to be disposed of as a result of this scheme ?

• • (13) What is your definition of " minorities " ?

(14) Will you please define the " adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards " for minorities referred to in the second part of the resolution ?

(15) Do you not see that the Lahore resolution contains only a bare statement of the objective and does not give any idea as to the means to be adopted for the execution of the idea and the concrete corollaries thereof ?

For instance :

(a) Are the people in the regions falling under the plan to have any voice in the matter of separation and, if so, how is it to be ascertained ?

(b) What is the provision for defence and similar matters of common concern contemplated in the Lahore resolution ?

(c) There are many groups of Muslims who have continuously expressed dissent from the policy of the League. While I am prepared to accept the preponderating influence and position of the League and have approached you for that very reason, is it not our joint duty to remove their doubt and carry them with us by making them feel that they and their supporters have not been practically disfranchised ?

(d) Does this not lead again to placing the resolution of the League before the people of the zones concerned :

whole for acceptance ?

As I write this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India. Believe me, I approach you as a seeker. Though I represent nobody but myself, I aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India. For, I realize in my own person their misery and degradation which is their common lot irrespective of class, caste or creed. I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses. I want you to use your influence for their total welfare, which must include the rest.

In this hastily written letter I have only given an inkling of my difficulty.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

VIII

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

September 15, 1944.

Dear Qaid-i-Azam.

I have yours of September 14, received at 9-40 a.m. I woke up at 3 a.m. today to finish my promised letter on the Lahore resolution. There is no mistake about the date, for I wrote in answer to your reminder of September 13.

Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.I.C.C. resolution of 1942. But it cannot be on the basis of a united India. If we come to a settlement it would be on the basis of that settlement, assuming of course that it secures general acceptance in the country. The process will be

somewhat like this. We reach by joint effort independence for India as it stands. India, become free, will proceed to demarcation, plebiscite and partition if the people concerned vote for partition. All this is implied in the Rajaji formula.

As to the provisional interim government, I am afraid I cannot carry my answer any further than I have done. Though I have no scheme for such a government, if you have one in connection with the Lahore resolution, which also I presume requires an interim government, we can discuss it.

The formula was framed by Rajaji in good faith. I accepted it in equal good faith. The hope was that you would look at it with favour. We still think it to be the best in the circumstances. You and I have to put flesh on it, if we can. I have explained the process we have to go through. You have no objection to it. Perhaps, you want to know how I would form the provisional government if I was invited to form it. If I was in that unenviable position I could see all the claimants and endeavour to satisfy them. My co-operation will be available in that task.

I can give you full satisfaction about your inquiry, "What I would like to know would be: what will be the powers of such a provisional interim Government, how will it be formed, to whom will it be responsible?" The provisional interim government will be responsible to the elected members of the present Assembly or a newly elected one. It will have all the powers less than that of the Commander-in-Chief during the war and full powers thereafter. It will be the authority to give effect to the agreement that

may be arrived at between the League and the Congress and ratified by the other parties.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

IX

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 17, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have your letter of September 15, and I thank you for it. I note that you have for the moment shunted "the Rajaji" formula and are applying your mind very seriously to the Lahore resolution of the Muslim League. It is my duty to explain the Lahore resolution to you today and persuade you to accept it, even though you are talking to me, as you have often made it clear, in your individual capacity. I have successfully converted non-Muslim Indians in no small number and also a large body of foreigners, and if I can convert you, exercising as you do tremendous influence over Hindu India, it will be no small assistance to me, although we are not proceeding on the footing that you are carrying on these talks in your representative character, or capacity, and my difficulties remain until you are vested with a representative status and authority in order to negotiate and reach an agreement with you.

You have stated in your letter dated September 11, that the Lahore resolution is "indefinite." I, therefore, naturally asked you please to let me know in what way respect the Lahore resolution is indefinite. And now I've received your letter of September 15 under reply.

The third paragraph of your letter is not seeking

clarification but is a disquisition and expression of your views on the point whether the Mussalmans are a nation. This matter can hardly be discussed by means of correspondence. There is a great deal of discussion and literature on this point which is available, and it is for you to judge finally, when you have studied this question thoroughly, whether the Mussalmans and Hindus are not two major nations in this sub-continent. For the moment I would refer you to two publications, although there are many more,—Dr. Ambedkar's book and "M. R. T's" *Nationalism in Conflict in India*. We maintain and hold that Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We are a nation of a hundred million, and, what is more, we are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civilization, language and literature, art and architecture, names and nomenclature, sense of value and proportion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar, history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions—in short, we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life. By all canons of international law we are a nation. Now I shall reply to your various points :—

(1) Yes, the word "Pakistan" is not mentioned in the resolution, and it does not bear the original meaning. The word has now become synonymous with the Lahore resolution.

(2) This point does not arise, but still I reply that the question is a mere bogey.

(3) This point is covered by my answer that the Mussalmans of India are a nation. As to the last part of your query, it is hardly relevant to the matter of clarification.

the resolution.

(4) Surely you know what the word "Muslims" means.

(5) This point does not arise by way of clarification of the text of the Lahore resolution.

(6) No. They will form units of Pakistan.

(7) As soon as the basis and the principles embodied in the Lahore resolution are accepted, the question of demarcation will have to be taken up immediately.

(8) In view of my reply to (7), your question (8) has been answered.

(9) Does not relate to clarification.

(10) My answer to (9) covers this point.

(11) Does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution. Surely this is not asking for clarification of the resolution. I have in numerous speeches of mine and the Muslim League in its resolutions have pointed out that this is the only solution of India's problem and the road to achieve freedom and independence of the peoples of India.

(12) "Muslims under the Princes": The Lahore resolution is only confined to British India. This question does not arise out of the clarification of the resolution.

(13) The definition of "minorities": You yourself have often said "minorities" means "accepted minorities."

(14) The adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities, referred to in the resolution, are a matter for negotiation and settlement with the minorities in the respective States, *viz.*, Pakistan and Hindustan.

(15) It does give basic principles and when they are accepted then the details will have to be worked out by the contracting parties.

(a) Does not arise by way of clarification.

(b) Does not arise by way of clarification.

(c) The Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organization of Muslim India.

(d) No ; see answer (c).

As regards your final paragraph, before receiving clarification from me you have already passed your judgment and condemned the Lahore resolution, when you say, "As I write this letter and imagine the whole working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India." I understand that you have made clear to me that you represent nobody but yourself, and I am trying to persuade you and to convert you that this is the road which will lead us to the achievement of freedom and independence not only of the two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, but of the rest of the peoples of India, but when you proceed to say that you aspire to represent all the inhabitants of India, I regret I cannot accept that statement of yours.

It is quite clear that you represent nobody else but the Hindus, and as long as you do not realize your true position and the realities, it is very difficult for me to argue with you, and it becomes still more difficult to persuade you, and hope to convert you to the realities and the actual conditions prevailing in India today. I am pleading before you in the hope of converting you, as I have done with many others successfully.

As I have said before, you are a great man and you exercise enormous influence over the Hindus, particularly the masses, and by accepting the road that I am pointing

out to you, you are not prejudicing or harming the interests of the Hindus or of the minorities. On the contrary, Hindus will be the greatest gainers. I am convinced that true welfare not only of the Muslims but the rest of India lies in the division of India as proposed by the Lahore resolution. It is for you to consider whether it is not your policy and programme in which you have persisted which has been the principal factor of the "ruin of whole of India" and of the misery and degradation of the people to which you refer and which I deplore no less than anyone else. And it is for that very reason I am pleading before you all these days, although you insist that you are having talks with me only in your individual capacity, in the hope that you may yet revise your policy and programme.

Yours sincerely.

M. A. Jinnah.

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah.

September 19, 1944.

Dear Qaid-i-Azam.

Many thanks for yours of 17th inst.

I am sorry to have to say that your answers, omitting 1, 2 and 6 do not give satisfaction.

It may be that all my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore resolution. But I contend that they are very relevant from the standpoint of a seeker that I am. You cannot expect anyone to agree to, or shoulder the burden of the claim contained in the Lahore resolution without; for instance, answering my

question 15 (a) and 15 (b) which you brush aside as not arising by way of clarification.

Dr. Ambedkar's thesis, while it is ably written, has carried no conviction to me. The other book mentioned by you, I am sorry to say, I have not seen.

Why can you not accept my statement that I aspire to represent all the sections that compose the people of India? Do you not aspire? Should not every Indian? That the aspiration may never be realized is beside the point.

I am beholden to you, in spite of your opinion about me, for having patience with me; I hope you will never lose it but will persevere in your effort to convert me. I ask you to take me with my strong views and even prejudices, if I am guilty of any.

As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ. For, I am wholly unrepentant. My purpose is, as a lover of communal unity, to place my service at your disposal.

I hope you do not expect me to accept the Lahore resolution without understanding its implications. If your letter is the final word, there is little hope. Can we not agree to differ on the question of "two nations" and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination? It is this basis that has brought me to you. If the regions holding Muslim majorities have to be separated according to the Lahore resolution, the grave step of separation should be specifically placed before and approved by the people in that area.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 21, 1944

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 19 and I have already given you my answers to all your questions relating to clarification of the Lahore resolution or any part of it, and I am glad that you admit when you say it may be that "all my questions do not arise from the view of mere clarification of the Lahore resolution," but you particularly emphasise your points 15 (a) 15 (b).

I regret to say it has no relation to the context of the resolution or any part thereof. You have brought so many matters into our correspondence which are entirely outside the matter requiring clarification, so I have perforce to deal with them. Let me first deal with your letter of September 11.

You say : "My life-mission has been Hindu-Muslim unity which I want for its own sake but which is not to be achieved without the foreign ruling Power being ousted. Hence the first condition of the exercise of the right of self-determination is achieving of Independence by the joint action of all the parties and groups composing India. If such joint action is unfortunately impossible, then too I must fight with the assistance of such elements as can be brought together."

The gist of your letters up to date is that you are wedded to this policy and will pursue it. In your next

letter of September 14, while you were good enough to furnish me with the clarification of the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, you were pleased to observe : "I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement."

In your letter of September 15, you say : "Independence does mean as envisaged in the A.-I.C.C. resolution of 1942." It is therefore clear that you are not prepared to revise your policy and that you adhere firmly to your policy and programme which you have persisted in and which culminated in your demand, final policy, programme, and the method and sanction for enforcing it by resorting to mass civil disobedience in terms of the 8th August 1942, resolution, and you have made it more clear again by stating in your letter of September 19 as follows :—"As to your verdict on my policy and programme, we must agree to differ, for I am wholly unrepentant." You know that the August 1942 resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India.

Then, again, in the course of our discussion when I asked you for clarification of the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, you were pleased to say, by your letter of September 15, as follows :—"For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji formula and with your assistance am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore resolution of the Muslim League." We discussed it in its various aspects, as you told me you were open to be persuaded and converted to our point of view. I discussed the resolution at great length

with you, and explained everything you wanted to understand, even though you have emphasized more than once that you are having these talks with me in your personal capacity, and in your letter of September 15 you assured me in the following words with regard to the Lahore resolution : "Believe me, I approach you as a seeker, though I represent nobody but myself," and that you were open to conviction and conversion.

You had informed me by your letter of September 11 as follows: "It is true that I said an ocean separated you and me in outlook. But that had no reference to the Lahore resolution of the League. The League resolution is indefinite." I naturally therefore proceeded, in reply, to ask you by my letter of September 11 as follows:—"You say the Lahore resolution is indefinite. You never asked me for any clarification or explanation of the terms of the resolution ; but you really indicated your emphatic opposition to the very basis and the fundamental principle embodied in it. I would therefore, like to know in what way or respect the Lahore resolution is indefinite," and I sent you a reminder on September 13, to which you replied by your letter of September 15, not confining yourself really to matters of clarification, but introducing other extraneous matters, with some of which I had already dealt, in reply to this letter of yours of September 15, by my letter of September 17 and furnished you with all the clarifications, informing you that you had introduced several matters which could hardly be discussed in a satisfactory manner by means of correspondence.

I have already given you all the clarifications you require so far as the Lahore resolution goes and its text is concerned. You again raise further arguments, reasons and grounds and continue to persist in a disquisition on the point, amongst others, whether Muslims of India are a nation, and then you proceed further to say: "Can we not agree to differ on the question of 'two nations' and yet solve the problem on the basis of self-determination?"

It seems to me that you are labouring under some misconception of the real meaning of the word "self-determination." Apart from the inconsistencies and contradictions of the various positions that you have adopted in the course of our correspondence, as indicated above, can you not appreciate our point of view that we claim the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit, and that we are entitled to exercise our inherent right as a Muslim nation, which is our birth-right? Whereas you are labouring under the wrong idea that "self-determination" means only that of "a territorial unit," which, by the way, is neither demarcated nor defined yet, and there is no union or federal constitution of India in being, functioning as a sovereign Central government. Ours is a case of division and carving out two independent sovereign States by way of settlement between two major nations, Hindus and Muslims, and not of severance or secession *from any existing union*, which is *non est* in India. The right of self-determination, which we claim, postulates that we are a nation, and as such it would be the self-determination of the Muslims, and they alone are entitled to exercise that

right.

I hope you will now understand that your question 15 (a) does not arise out of the Lahore resolution or of any part thereof. As to 15 (b), again it does not arise as a matter of clarification, for it will be a matter for the constitution-making body chosen by Pakistan to deal with and decide all matters as a sovereign body representing Pakistan *vis-a-vis* the constitution-making body of Hindustan or any other party concerned. There cannot be defence & similar matters of "common concern," when it is accepted that Pakistan and Hindustan will be two separate independent sovereign States. I hope I have now given all satisfactory explanations, over and above the matter of clarification of the Lahore resolution, in the hope of converting you as an individual "seeker."

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

XII

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

September 22, 1944

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

Your letter of yesterday (21st inst.) so disturbed me that I thought I would postpone my reply till after we had met at the usual time. Though I made no advance at our meeting, I think I see somewhat clearly what you are driving at. The more I think about the two nations theory the more alarming it appears to be. The book recommended by you gives me no help. It contains half-truths and its conclusions or inferences are unwarranted. I am unable to

accept the proposition that the Muslims of India are a nation distinct from the rest of the inhabitants of India. Mere assertion is no proof. The consequences of accepting such a proposition are dangerous in the extreme. Once the principle is admitted there would be no limit to claims for cutting up India into numerous divisions which would spell India's ruin. I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a Partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be.

You seem to be averse to plebiscite. In spite of the admitted importance of the League, there must be clear proof that the people affected desire partition. In my opinion, all the people inhabiting the area ought to express their opinion specifically on this single issue of division. Adult suffrage is the best method, but I would accept any other equivalent.

You summarily reject the idea of common interest between the two arms. I can be no willing party to a division which does not provide for the simultaneous safeguarding of common interest such as defence, foreign affairs and the like. There will be no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity.

Your letter shows a wide divergence of opinion and outlook between us. Thus you adhere to the opinion often expressed by you that the August 1942 resolution is "inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India." There is no *proof for this sweeping statement.*

We seem to be moving in a circle. I have made a suggestion. If we are bent on agreeing, as I hope we are, let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi

XIII

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 23, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 22, and I thank you for it. I am sorry that you think I have summarily rejected the idea of common interest between the two arms, and now you put it somewhat differently from 15 (b), when you say there will be no feeling of security by the people of India without a recognition of the natural and mutual obligations arising out of physical contiguity. My answer, already given, is that it will be for the constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hisdustan or any other party concerned, to deal with such matters on the footing of their being two independent States.

I am really surprised when you say there is no proof of what you characterize as a sweeping statement of mine, that the August 1942, resolution is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India. The resolution in its essence is as follows :

(a) immediate grant of complete Independence and setting up immediately of a federal Central government on the basis of a united, democratic Government of India with

federated units or provinces, which means establishing a Hindu *raj*.

(b) that this National Government so set up will evolve a scheme for a constituent assembly, which will be chosen by adult franchise, which will prepare a constitution for the Government of India, which means that the constituent assembly chosen will be composed of an overwhelming majority of Hindus, nearly 75 per cent.

(c) to enforce this demand of the Congress the August resolution decides on and sanctions a resort to mass civil disobedience at your command and when ordered by you as the sole dictator of the Congress.

This demand is basically and fundamentally opposed to the ideals and demands of Muslim India of Pakistan, as embodied in the Lahore resolution, and to enforce such a demand by means of resort to mass civil disobedience is inimical to the ideals and demands of Muslim India; and if you succeed in realizing this demand, it would be a death-blow to Muslim India. I see from the correspondence and talks between you and me that you are still holding fast to this fateful resolution.

From the very first day of our talks you made it clear to me, and you have repeatedly said in the course of our correspondence and talks, that you have approached me in your individual capacity, and you assured me that you were a seeker of light and knowledge and that you seriously and earnestly wanted to understand the Lahore resolution and were open to conviction and conversion. Therefore, in deference to your wishes, I made every effort all these days and in the course of our prolonged talks and corres-

pondence to convert you, but unfortunately, it seems, I have failed. And now you have made new suggestions and proposals by your letter under reply :

(1) You say : "I have therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be." I really do not know what this means, and I would like you to elaborate this proposal and give me some rough outlines of this new idea of yours as to how and when the division is to take place, and in what way it is different from the division envisaged by the Lahore resolution.

(2) You say : "Let us call in a third party or parties to guide or even arbitrate between us." May I point out that you have repeatedly made clear to me that you are having these talks as an individual seeker ? How can any question of a third party or parties to guide or arbitrate between us arise ?

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

XIV

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah.

September 23, 1944.

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

Last evening's talk has left a bad taste in the mouth. Our talks and our correspondence seem to run in parallel lines and never touch one another. We reached the breaking point last evening but, thank God, we were unwilling to part. We resumed discussion and suspended it in order to allow me to keep my time for the evening public prayer.

In order that all possible chance of making any mistake in a matter of this great importance may be removed, I would like you to give me in writing what precisely on your part you would want me to put my signature to.

I adhere to my suggestion that we may call in some outside assistance to help us at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

XV

Mr. Gandhiji to Jinnah.

September 23, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 23, May I refer you to my letter of today's date which I sent to you in reply to yours of September 22? I have nothing new or fresh to add, but I may say that it is not a case of your being asked to put your signature as representing anybody till you clothe yourself with representative capacity and are vested with authority. We stand by, as I have already said, the basis and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore resolution of March 1940. I appeal to you once more to revise your policy and programme, as the future of this subcontinent and the welfare of the peoples of India demand that you should face realities.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

September 24, 1944.

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

I have your two letters of September 23 in reply to my letters of the 22nd and 23rd.

With your assistance I am exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreement, so that the claim embodied in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore may be reasonably satisfied. You must therefore have no apprehensions that the August resolution will stand in the way of our reaching an agreement. That resolution dealt with the question of India as against Britain and it cannot stand in the way of our settlement.

I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the north-west zones, *ie*, Baluchistan, Sind, North West Frontier Province and that part of the Punjab where they are in absolute majority over all the other elements and in parts of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India.

Differing from you on the general basis, I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore of 1940, on my basis and on the following terms :

The areas should be demarcated by a Commission approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the inhabitants of the areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of the adult population of the areas or through some equivalent method.

If the vote is in favour of separation it shall be agreed that these areas shall form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination and can therefore be constituted into two sovereign independent States.

There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence internal communications, customs, commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.

The treaty shall also contain terms for safeguarding the rights of minorities in the two States.

Immediately on the acceptance of this agreement by the Congress and the League the two shall decide upon a common course of action for the attainment of independence of India.

The League will however be free to remain out of any direct action to which the Congress may regard and in which the League may not be willing to participate.

If you do not agree to these terms, could you let me know in precise terms what you would have me to accept in terms of the Lahore resolution and bind myself to recommend to the Congress? If you could kindly do this, I shall be able

to see, apart from the difference in approach, what definite terms I can agree to. In your letter of September 23, you refer to "the basic and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore resolution" and ask me to accept them. Surely this is unnecessary when, as I feel, I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance.

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi.

XVII

Mr. Jinnah To Gandhi

September 25, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 24, and I thank you for it. You have already rejected the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore resolution.

You do not accept that the Mussalmans of India are a nation.

You do not accept that the Mussalmans have an inherent right of self-determination.

You do not accept that they alone are entitled to exercise this right of self-determination.

You do not accept that Pakistan is composed of two zones, North-West and North-East, comprising six provinces, namely Sind, Baluchistan, North-West Frontier Province, the Punjab, Bengal and Assam, subject to territorial adjustments that may be agreed upon, as indicated in the Lahore resolution. The matter of demarcating and defining the territories

can be taken up after the fundamentals above mentioned are accepted, and for that purpose machinery may be set up by agreement.

You do not accept the provisions embodied in the Lahore resolution for safeguarding the minorities, and yet in your letter under reply you say: "With your assistance, I am exploring the possibilities of reaching an agreement so that the claim embodied in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore may be reasonably satisfied," and proceed to say, "You must therefore have no apprehensions that the August resolution will stand in the way of our reaching an agreement."

I have already clearly explained to you that the August resolution, so long as it stands, is bar, for it is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore resolution. You then proceed to say: "That resolution dealt with the question of India as against Britain, and it cannot stand in the way of our settlement." I am not at present concerned with Britain, but the August resolution, as I have already stated is against the ideals and demands of the Muslim League. Further, there is the resolution of Jagat Narayan Lal, passed by the All-India Congress Committee in May 1942, at Allahabad, which, in express terms, lays down as follow :

"The A.-I.C.C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component State or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different States and provinces and the country as a whole and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal."

These two resolutions, so long as they stand, are a complete bar to any settlement on the basis of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan. It is open to the Congress to revise and modify them, but you are only speaking in your individual capacity, and even in that capacity you are holding fast to the August resolution, and you have given no indication of your attitude regarding Jagat Narayan Lal's resolution. I have repeatedly made it clear after we had discussed the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, as you maintained that, to use your own language, "Rajaji not only has not put the Lahore resolution out of shape and mutilated it but has given it substance and form," and proceeded to say: "Indeed in view of your dislike of the Rajaji formula, I have, at any rate for the moment, put it out of my mind and I am now concentrating on the Lahore resolution in the hope of finding a ground for mutual agreement."

When I asked for further clarification, which you furnished me by your letter of September 15, you started by saying: "I have shunted the Rajaji formula and with your assistance I am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore resolution of the Muslim League," and thenceforward the Gandhi-Rajaji formula was not discussed any further, and the question of your representative character and authority which I had pointed out from the very commencement, therefore, did not arise, as you had given me the task of converting you to the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution, and ever since we discussed the Lahore resolution only at great length and examined the *pross and cons*, and finally you have rejected it.

As a result of our correspondence and discussions I find that the question of the division of India as Pakistan and Hindustan is only on your lips and it does not come from your heart, and suddenly at the eleventh hour you put forward a new suggestion, consisting only of two sentences, by your letter of September 22, saying: "I therefore suggested a way out. Let it be a partition as between two brothers, if a division there must be." I naturally asked you what this new suggestion of yours meant, and wanted you to give me rough outlines of this new idea of yours as to how and when the division is to take place and in what way it is different from the division envisaged in the Lahore resolution, and now you have been good enough to give me your amplification, in your letter of September 24 under reply, in which you say: "Differing from you on the general basis I can yet recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore, 1940, on *my basis* and on the following terms." The terms clearly indicate that your basis is in vital conflict with, and is opposed to, the fundamental basis and principles of the Lahore resolution. Now let me take your main terms:

(a) "I proceed on the assumption that India is not to be regarded as two or more nations but as one family consisting of many members of whom the Muslims living in the north-west zones, *i.e.* Baluchistan, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and the part of Punjab where they are in *absolute* majority over all the other elements and in parts

of Bengal and Assam where they are in absolute majority, desire to live in separation from the rest of India." If this term were accepted and given effect to, the present boundaries of these provinces would be maimed and mutilated beyond redemption and leave us only with the husk, and it is opposed to the Lahore resolution.

(b) That even in those mutilated areas so defined, the right of self-determination will not be exercised by the Muslims but by the inhabitants of those areas so demarcated. This again is opposed to the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution.

(c) That if the vote is in favour of separation they shall be allowed to "form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination." Whereas we propose that we should come to a complete settlement of our own immediately, and by our united front and efforts do everything in our power to secure the freedom and independence of the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan and Hindustan.

(d) Next you say, 'There shall be a treaty of separation which should also provide for the efficient and satisfactory administration of foreign affairs, defence, internal communications customs, commerce, and the like, which must necessarily continue to be matters of common interest between the contracting parties.' If these vital matters are to be administered by some Central authority, you do not indicate what sort of authority or machinery will be set up to administer these matters, and how and to whom again that authority will be responsible. According to the Lahore

resolution, as I have already explained to you, all these matters, which are the lifeblood of any State, cannot be delegated to any Central authority or government. The matter of security of the two States and the natural and mutual obligations that may arise out of physical contiguity will be for the constitution-making body of Pakistan and that of Hindustan, or other party concerned, to deal with on the footing of their being two independent States. As regards the safeguarding of the rights of minorities, I have already explained that this question of safeguarding the minorities is fully stated in the Lahore resolution.

You will therefore see that the entire basis of your new proposal is fundamentally opposed to the Lahore resolution, and as I have already pointed out to you, both in the correspondence and in our discussions, it is very difficult for me to entertain proposals and negotiate and reach any agreement or settlement with you as an individual, unless they come from you in your representative capacity. That was the same difficulty with regard to the Gandhiji-Rajaji formula, and I made it clear to you at the very outset, but the formula was discussed as you asserted that it had met the Lahore resolution in substance, but while you were furnishing me with the clarification of this formula, you shunted it and we confined ourselves to the Lahore resolution, and hence the question of your representative capacity did not arise regarding this formula. But now you have, in your letter of September 24, made a new proposal of your own on your own basis, and the same difficulties present themselves to me as before, and it is difficult to deal with it

any further unless it comes from you in your representative capacity.

I cannot agree with you when you finally wind up by saying: "In your letter of September 23, you refer to 'the basis and fundamental principles embodied in the Lahore resolution' and ask me to accept them. Surely this is unnecessary when, as I feel, I have accepted the concrete consequence that should follow from such acceptance." This is obviously far from correct. Why not then accept the fundamentals of the Lahore resolution and proceed to settle the details?

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

XVIII

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

September 25, 1944

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

Yesterday's talk leads me to inflict this letter on you which I trust you will not mind.

Our conversations have come about as a result of your correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his formula and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon, and my own letter to you suggesting a meeting between you and me. My proposal of yesterday is an earnest effort to meet the essential requirements of the Lahore resolution. I would like you therefore to think fifty times before throwing away an offer which has been made entirely in the spirit of service in the cause of communal harmony.

Do not take, I pray, the responsibility of rejecting the offer. Throw it on your Council. Give me an opportunity of addressing them. If they feel like rejecting it, I would like you to advise the Council to put it before the open session of the League. If you will accept my advice and permit me I would attend the open session and address.

You are too technical when you dismiss my proposal for arbitration or outside guidance over points of difference. If I have approached you as an individual, and not in any representative capacity, it is because we believe that if I reach an agreement with you it will be of material use in the process of securing a Congress-League settlement and acceptance of it by the country. Is it irrelevant or inadmissible to supplement our efforts to convince each other with outside help, guidance, advice or even arbitration?

Yours sincerely,
M. K. Gandhi

XIX

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 26, 1944

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I am in receipt of your letter of September 25. It is entirely incorrect and has no foundation in fact for you to say that our conversations have come about as a result of my correspondence with Rajaji in July last over his formula. It is equally baseless to say "and your consultations with the League Working Committee thereon." It was entirely in response to your letter of July 17, 1944, which I received

while I was at Srinagar, with a fervent request on your part to meet you and you ended that letter by saying : " Do not disappoint me." In my reply, again, from Srinagar, dated July 24 1944, I intimated to you that I would be glad to receive you at my house in Bombay on my return, which would probably be about the middle of Augst. This was long before the meeting of the Working Committee or that of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, and long before I reached Lahore, and when you arrived here and told me that you were approaching me in your individual capacity, I at once made it clear to you and informed you both in our talks and by letters, that the position you had taken up had no precedent for it, and further that it was not possible to negotiate and reach an agreement unless both the parties were fully represented ; for it is one-sided business, as it will not be binding upon any organization in any sense whatever, but you would as an individual only recommend it, if any agreement is reached, to the Congress and the country, whereas it would be binding upon me as the President of the Muslim League, I cannot accept this position. I hope you do see the unfairness and the great disadvantage to me, and it is so simple and elementary for anyone to understand.

As regards your proposal of yesterday, which you have amplified in your letter of September 24, I have already sent you my reply.

With regard to your suggestion to be allowed to address the meeting of the Council, and if they feel like rejecting your "offer" the matter should be put before open session and should be allowed to address the open session, let me

inform you that only a member or delegate is entitled to participate in the deliberations of the meetings of the Council or in the open session, respectively. Besides it is a most extraordinary and unprecedented suggestion to make. However, I thank you for your advice.

As regards your proposal for arbitration and outside guidance, I have already replied to you, and it is not merely technically but a matter of substance. I fully reciprocate your desire of securing a Congress-League settlement.

However, I regret I have failed to convince you and convert you as I was hopeful of doing so.

Yours sincerely,
M. A. Jinnah.

XX

Gandhiji to Mr. Jinnah

September 26, 1944

Dear Qaid-i-Azam,

In view of my letter to you of yesterday, left to myself, I would have refrained from dealing with your letter before our meeting today. But I have deferred to Rajaji's advice to finish the chain of correspondence.

I confess I am unable to understand your persistent refusal to appreciate the fact that the formula presented to you by me in my letter of the 24th, as well as the formula to you by Rajaji, gave you virtually what is embodied in the Lahore resolution, providing at the same time what is absolutely necessary to make the arrangement acceptable to the country. You keep on saying that I should accept

certain these which you call the basis and fundamental principles of the Lahore resolution, while I have been contending that the best way for us who differ in our approach to the problem is to give body to the demand as it stands in the resolution and work it out to our mutual satisfaction. It is on this plan that I understand Rajaji's formula to be conceived, and it is on the same plan that I have tried to work it out in the course of, and as a result of, our talks. I contend that either gives you the substance of the Lahore resolution. Unfortunately you reject both. And I cannot accept the Lahore resolution as you want me to, especially when you seek to introduce into its interpretation theories and claim which I cannot accept and which I cannot ever hope to induce India to accept.

Your constant references to my not being clothed with representative authority are really irrelevant. I have approached you so that, if you and I can agree upon a common course of action, I may use what influence I possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. If you break, it cannot be because I have no representative capacity or because I have been unwilling to give you satisfaction in regard to the claim embodied in the Lahore resolution,

Yours sincerely,
M. M. Gandhi.

XXI

Mr. Jinnah to Gandhiji

September 26, 1944.

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

I have received your letter of September 26 and I note

that you have written it with Rajaji's advice. Of course, it is for you to follow such advice as you may choose to do so, but I am only concerned for the moment with you. I note that at the last moment you have resurrected the Gandhi-Rajaji formula, although it was shunted all this time, and you proceed to say that this formula gives me virtually what is embodied in the Lahore resolution. You further say that on the same plan you have tried to formulate your latest proposals, as mentioned in your letter of September 24, and you maintain that either gives me the substance of the Lahore resolution. In your previous letter you asserted that your formula gives me the "essence" of the Lahore resolution. I see a very close family resemblance between the two, and the substance of one or the other is practically the same, only it is put in different language, and I have already expressed my opinion that, in my judgment they neither meet the substance nor essence of the Lahore resolution. On the contrary both are calculated completely to torpedo the Pakistan demand of Muslim India. I have never asked you to accept certain theses, nor have I introduced any theories in the Lahore resolution. Theses and theories are matters for scholars to indulge in.

I am sorry I have to repeat, but I am compelled to do so, that I cannot agree with you that my references to your not being clothed with representative authority are really irrelevant. On the contrary, they have an important bearing, as I have already explained to you more than once. You again repeat that if I and you can agree upon a common course of action, you may use what influence you

possess for its acceptance by the Congress and the country. I have already stated from the very beginning that is not enough, for the reasons I have already given. Your representative capacity comes into play when you are making counter-proposals, and I cannot understand how you can say that it is irrelevant. No responsible organization can entertain any proposal from any individual, however great he may be, unless it is backed up with the authority of a recognized organization and comes from its fully accredited representative. However, I need not labour this point any more, as I have already explained it in our previous correspondence.

If a break comes, it will be because you have not satisfied me in regard to the essence of the claim embodied in the Lahore resolution. It is not a question of your being unwilling, but in fact it is so. If a break comes, it will be most unfortunate. If one does not agree with you or differs from you, you are always right and the other party is always wrong, and the next thing is that many are waiting prepared, in your circle, to pillory me when the word goes, but I must face all threats and consequences, and I can only act according to my judgment and conscience.

Yours sincerely,

M. A. Jinnah.

1 to 51 printed at the Kashmir Art Press, Lahore by S. M. Ibrahim, and published by S. Durlab Singh at the Hero publication 6, Lower Mall Lhr.

