

CHAPTER- II

CĀRVĀKA MATERIALISM: EPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF CĀRVĀKA

Our discussion in the previous chapter shows that materialism was prevalent in India even before Cārvāka.

The advocates of this school hold that wealth and desire are the only ends of man. It is meaningless to believe in the existence of any transcendental object like self or God. This is evident from the saying viz., *"While there is life, live joyously because no one can escape from death, if the frame of ours will burn, how it can return again?"*¹

According to Garbe, this theory had several adherents from the pre-Buddhist times to the present day. The Lokāyata admits perception as the only means to knowledge and rejects inference, testimony, comparison and other ways of knowing accepted by the theist philosophers. To the Cārvāka thinkers, the four elements of matter are only real. When a body is formed by the combination of these elements, the consciousness is produced there just like intoxicating liquor is produced by mixing of non-intoxicating material ingredients. After death, the body is burnt and consciousness returns again into nothingness. They do not believe on merit and demerit. This system exhibits

itself as the crudest Eudemonism for this system is of the view that the enjoyment of maximum quality of sensual pleasure is the sole desirable good.

Cārvāka philosophy began to make progress during the epic period and the time of Buddha. In those days Buddhist witchcraft and science, scepticism and faith, license and ascetism were mingled together. Institution was replaced by enquiry, religion by philosophy. Opinion was against opinion and ideal against ideal. Political life was unstable due to the impact of the outside invaders and the intense greed and lust of the princes ruling at that time. In a word, the entire society became unstable; we find the description of that period in the writings of Radha Krishnan.

"Due to the failure of state and society, the faith of the people began to shatter like a dream. This was an age of moral weakness and there were the materialist with the world of sense and the Buddhist with their valuable psychological teaching and high ethics." ¹

Thus the Cārvāka philosophy started to influence the people when the social and cultural life of the people became unstable. In 600-400 B.C., the Ionians, the Atomists and the Sophists flourished in Greece. Dale Riepe says. "The heretical thinkers like Cārvākas opined

that the epics, Vedas and Upanishads should be rejected. There is no God, no immortal soul. There will be nothing after the death of the body.”² The Cārvākas had their own epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. Let us now discuss the epistemology of the Cārvāka which emphasizes that perception is the only source of knowledge.

According to Cārvāka, "perception is the only valid source of knowledge" *"Perception is a definite and true cognition of objects produced by sense object contact."*³

To explain the perception is of two kinds, internal and external. In external perception cognition is produced by five sense organs and in the internal perception the cognition is produced by the mind. Thus all knowledge is derived from the senses. Mādhavāchārya, in order to explain the Cārvāka view wrote in, his *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, "the enjoyment of sensual pleasure is the only end of human life." He pointed out that this cannot be called the end of man as it is mixed with pain. So we have to enjoy pure pleasure as much as we can ignore pain which accompanies it. *"A man who uses fish takes its scales and bones having taken as much as he wants, desists. So nature is sympathetic towards us and gives pleasure, we must not abandon pleasure due to pain."*⁴

It may be remarked here that the Cārvāka view has a close similarity with the view of the ancient Greek thinker, Lucretius. 400 years ago, the Greek philosopher Lucretius asked, "Does reason wholly spring from the senses? Unless they are true, all reasons become false." Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American Pragmatism said, *"Being a pragmatist or radical empiricist, I do not believe in anything that I do not perceive, I far from believe the whole of that."*⁵

According to the Cārvākas, the world is real because it is perceived by the five sense organs. The things which are not perceived by the sense organs are not real. Heaven and Hell cannot be perceived and therefore these are not real.

The visual sense organ perceives everything. The tactual sense organ perceives softness, hardness, heat, cold, roughness and smoothness. The gustatory organ perceives taste. The olfactory organ perceives disagreeable and agreeable odours. The auditory organ perceives sound. The world is an aggregate of perceptible things and qualities. From this, one might emphatically say that the Cārvākas may be said to advocate naive realism and empiricism.

The Cārvāka thinkers have refuted the validity of inference on the following grounds.

- a) The inference presupposes a universal relation (vyāpti) between the middle term (linga) and the major term (sādhya). But this vyāpti is only an assumption. No source of valid knowledge can guarantee it. It might be remarked in this context that in European logic Hume's denial of the universal and necessary relation is the nearest parallel idea to this.

- b) Again the inference of fire (sādhya) from smoke (linga) can be valid only when it is established that all cases of smoke in past, present and future are cases of fire (vyāpti). But no source of valid knowledge can justify the universal relation between smoke and fire. For perception is limited to particulars, and, therefore, it cannot establish this universal relation required. Inference itself being dependent on vyāpti cannot generate it. Testimony which is based on perception cannot also be the basis of vyāpti. So inference is not possible.

The Cārvākas thus do not regard inference as a valid source of knowledge. Inferential knowledge is probable and not certain as we cannot obtain certain knowledge by inference in all cases. As regards deductive

inference, it involves the fallacy of “petitio principii” or “Arguing in a circle as the conclusion itself is assumed” in the premise or premises the material truth of which is just assumed. Induction tries to prove what deduction takes for granted i.e. the material truth of the premises but it is not authorized to do it as the process of generalization involves a leap from the known to the unknown. The Naiyāyika points out that in an inference like, “All smoky things are fiery; we are authorized to make a leap from the known (smoke in the hill) to the unknown (fire in the hill) because of our previous knowledge of the universal invariable relation (vyāpti) between smoke and fire. But the Cārvākas state that the universal invariable relation between smoke and fire can never be established for all the cases of relation between smoke and fire either at present or in the past or in the future cannot be perceived. So we are not authorized to pass from the known to the unknown on the basis of invariable relation (vyāpti) which is regarded by Naiyāyika as the ground of inference. This relation of vyāpti can never be known with the help of another inference for then there would be the fallacy of “infinite regress”. It might be mentioned here that there is difference of opinion among Cārvākas themselves regarding the usefulness of inference. Purandara in 700 A.D. states that *“Inference is valid in regard to the perceptible world, but it is not valid in regard to super*

sensible entities."⁶ But the other Cārvākas deny the validity of inference in both perceptible and super sensible entities.

Some Cārvākas hold that "Inference may be accidentally true. But truth is not the essential characteristic of inference. It is an accident of inference. In fact probability is the guide of life."

Further the Cārvākas brought other objections against the possibility of a valid inference.

It has been emphasized by them that impressions made by inferential knowledge are not as vivid (*aspaṣṭatvāt*) as those produced by perception. Inference also has to depend on other things for the determination of its object. The Cārvākas do not regard inference as a dependable source of knowledge. If a man acquires knowledge about an unperceived object, it is based on (*aitihya*) general belief. "*None of the knowledge produced is certain as far as the object part is concerned. But knowledge which is not certain with reference to the object part cannot be valid since the effect in the inferential cognition is not a kind of valid knowledge. The instrument (Karaṇa) by which it is produced cannot be a source of valid knowledge.*"⁷

Inference depends upon the perception of a mark and the recollection of invariable concomitance. Inference is called anumāna, because it is a kind of knowledge (māna) which we get after (anu) some other knowledge or perception.

According to the Cārvākas, the instrument for acquiring valid knowledge is the sense organ. But it reveals the relation of one thing with another in an individual case but not of a class. Knowledge acquired by invariable concomitance of class is based on general belief. So inferential cognition is not valid and its instrument invariable concomitance would not be a pramāṇa. Inference has to depend on other things for the determination of its object. It has to depend on perceptual statements. Inferential knowledge is not directly produced by its objects. Again, inference is not concrete (avastu viṣyatvāt) and so is often contradicted.

So there is no proof which may establish that every case of the presence of the reason (hetu) should also be a case of the presence of the probandum (sādhyā) i.e., there is no proof establishing the invariable and unconditional concomitance between the middle and the major terms.

Thus according to Mādhavāchārya, Lokāyata epistemology gives emphasis only on perception. Vādideva Sūri says that inferential processes are only secondary (gauṇa). The Lokayata gave primary importance to sense perception. Manibhadr in his commentary on *Saddarśanasamuccaya*__ showed reasons why the Lokāyata gave emphasis on sense perception. *"Valid knowledge which is non-erroneous is ascertained to be the only one produced by the senses. That is, perception is the only source of valid knowledge"*⁸

This view of the Cārvākas has, however, not been accepted by other thinkers. Hiriyana says, firstly, Cārvākas regard perception (pratyakṣa) as the only source of valid knowledge and reject inference (anumāna) as the source of pramāṇa because there is no ground to believe on the basis of inference in vyāpti. Our belief in the validity of inference is due to associations established during observation which is purely a psychological process with no implication.

Secondly, to deny the validity of inference as a source of valid knowledge is to deny the possibility of all thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all affirmations and denials, proofs and disproof.

Thirdly, the Cārvākas can understand the views of others and make their views known to others by inference. Is it not self-contradictory?

Fourthly, perception which is regarded by the Cārvākas as *pramāṇa* turns out to be false on many occasions. The earth is round but we perceive it as flat. In such case, knowledge obtained through perception is false.

Fifthly, it is through inference that the Cārvākas prove the invalidity of inference as a source of *pramāṇa*. Thus the very refutation of inference by the Cārvākas is itself based on inference. Hiriyana says, "*It would then refute itself for what is rejected would be admitted in the very act of rejecting it*"⁹

Sixthly, according to the Cārvākas, inference is sometimes true, sometimes false. So inference cannot be the source of knowledge. Then how can one accept as unconditionally true the Cārvākas' statement that perception is the valid source of *pramāṇa* as this is arrived at through inference. Besides, all perceptions are not authoritative and dependable; some perceptions are found to be illusory.

Lastly, since we cannot perceive the thoughts and ideas of other persons, one must admit that they can be

known only through inference. To accept the validity of perception and at the same time and from the same stand point to refute the validity of inference is a thoughtless self contradiction.

“The Cārvāka was satisfied to refute the views of his opponents. He neither tried to state his view formally nor tried to convince others of its rightness.”¹⁰

Thus we find that Cārvākas position is self refuted and nonsense. It is not a system of philosophy. Perception itself is found to be untrue. It might be mentioned here that this Cārvāka position is the Crude Cārvāka position.

According to the author of *Nyāya Manjarī* Jayanta Bhatta, “The more sophisticated Cārvākas (he calls them, Suśikṣita Cārvākas) maintain that there were two kinds of inference such as "Utpannapratīti" which is the inference about which knowledge is already existent and the other one is utpādya pratīti which is the inference where knowledge is non-existent (inference about God, Soul after life etc).”¹¹ Hiriyana comments on this: *“It is commonly assumed by the critics that the Cārvākas denounced reasoning totally as a pramāṇa: they seem to have rejected only such reasoning as was ordinarily thought sufficient by others for establishing the*

*existence of God, of a future life, etc. Such discrimination in using reason alters the whole complexion of the Cārvāka view. But this is only a stray hint we get about the truth. What we generally have is a caricature."*¹²

S.N. Dasgupta sums up Purandara's views as, "He acknowledges the usefulness of inference in determining all worldly things where perceptual experience is present but regarding transcendental world such as God, Soul, and life after death, law of Karma, inference cannot be explored. The difference between transcendental truths and ordinary experiences is due to that we make inductive generalizations by observing a large number of cases of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. The transcendent spheres such as God, soul and life after death cannot be perceived until these are existed. So in such cases agreement in presence cannot be observed. In transcendental world no case of *hetu* (reason) agree with the presence of *sadhya* (probandana) can be observed. So in such sphere, inductive generalization cannot be made"¹³

We find in Vedānta philosophy also that Venkatanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, criticized the Cārvāka refutation of the validity of inference by pointing out that Invalidity of inference cannot be known by perception.

*“Anumānāpramāṇatvam nādhyakṣenaiva gamyate
Nānumanena tenaiva tadvirodhaprasangatah
Na vyāptir nirṇayāyogād iti vyāptam idam na vā
Vyāptam cet svīkṛtā vyāptir na vyāptam cenna
dūṣaṇam.”*

The Cārvāka argues that no inference is possible owing to the absence of any reason (hetu). Inference of a particular instance viz., the probandum (eg. fire) from a particular instance of the probans (eg. smoke) is not possible because the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between particular instances of the probans and the probandum can never be known. The Cārvāka gives a reason (hetu) or probans to prove the invalidity of inference. So he must admit the invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum in order to prove the invalidity of inference. If he admits the invariable concomitance between them then there is no invariable concomitance between particular instances of the probans and particular instances of the probandum in his inference. So he contradicts himself when he tries to prove the invalidity of inference by an inference through a reason (hetu). The Cārvāka argues that all reasons are initiated by conditions (upādhi). Then the reason cited by him to prove the invalidity of inference also is cited by conditions and cannot

therefore prove the invalidity of inference. If the reason cited by him is held to be not cited by any condition then it is wrong to assert that all reasons are not initiated by conditions nor is known by inference because this inference would then be valid. Invalidity of all inferences cannot be proved by valid inference, because it is self contradictory. They say that inference prompts positive action (pravṛtti) and negative action (nivṛtti) because it is doubtful.

Perception also prompts positive action and negative action because it is doubtful. Just as perception is regarded as certain because it is not contradicted by a definite knowledge so inference also should be regarded as certain because it is not contradicted by definite knowledge. Naiyāyika Udayana criticizes in this way the Cārvāka doctrine of invalidity of inference. The Cārvāka maintains that inference is not valid but that probability (sambhāvanā) is the guide of life. Perception of a particular smoke produces a presumption that there may be fire. The presumption leads a person to bring fire. If he gets fire, the presumption or probability is wrongly regarded as valid knowledge. It is purely accidental (kākatāliya); the probability leads to successful activity.

Presumption is a kind of doubt which is invalid knowledge. But doubt cannot arise where one perceives smoke for then there is definite knowledge of smoke; again when one does not perceive smoke there is the definite knowledge of the non-existence of smoke. This definite knowledge is opposed to doubt. Udayana says that if there is doubt then there must be inference and that if there is no doubt then the inference must be valid. The Cārvāka refers to future time and remote places whenever and wherever there are conditions (upādhi) which may vitiate the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum. But how can the Cārvāka prove the existence of future time and remote places which are not perceived? If they are existent, their existence can be proved by inference. Therefore even the doubt of the Cārvāka as to the existence of conditions presupposes the validity of inference which proves the existence of future time and remote places.

The Cārvākas also refute verbal testimony because śabda or knowledge by testimony is based on understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person. If the words of reliable persons refer to perceptible objects, we can consider that knowledge to be valid. But if these words mean unperceived objects, eg., the incorporeal self, God, heaven, hell etc, and then knowledge derived through

such words must be regarded as invalid. Testimony refers to the words of reliable persons but whether a person is reliable or not can be known only through inference. It is on the basis of the conduct of a person that we infer if he is reliable or not. Besides, testimony is based on inference. When we accept the words of a reliable person we argue that the words of this man should be accepted, because he is reliable and words of all reliable persons should be accepted. But as inference is not a valid source of knowledge, testimony which is based on inference cannot be accepted as *pramāṇa* or valid source of knowledge.

Hence according to the *Cārvākas*, testimony is not a valid source of knowledge. The *upamāna* or comparison is not recognized by *Cārvākas* as a source of knowledge. According to them, *upamāna* is not a *pramāṇa* at all since it cannot give us any true knowledge about the denotation of the words. Before finishing the discussion of *Cārvāka* epistemology, it is essential to mention the view of *Jayarāśi Bhatta*, who might be regarded as a stalwart of *Cārvāka* scepticism. His method is called *Vitandā* as he only refuted the views of other schools and did not establish any theory of his own. He examines the theory of *pramāṇas* admitted by different philosophical schools. In the opinion of *Pandit Sukhlaji Sanghavi*, "Jayarāśi had a great respect for *Bṛhaspati*"

who is regarded as the founder of the Cārvāka school. His book is entitled *TattvopaplavaSimha*; *Tattvopaplava* means the total destruction of all *tattva* or all realities. He says, “*Bārhaspatya is anti philosophic or agnostic. He discards all the idealistic means of valid knowledge.* So far we have discussed briefly the epistemology of the Cārvākas. Let us now look at the metaphysics of the Cārvākas.

Cārvākas’ metaphysics is the direct result of their epistemological position. Materialism is a metaphysical doctrine opposed to spiritualism. According to spiritualism, spirit or self is the ultimate reality and it does not deny the existence of matter but it says spirit or self or consciousness is the primary reality. The Cārvāka is the chief adherent of materialism although the materialistic thoughts are found in the Vedas in the epics and in the early Buddhist literature.

According to Cārvāka’s materialism, the world consists of four elements namely, earth, water, fire and air. They believe in the existence of the world because it is perceived. To them, matter is the ultimate reality. It reduces everything to matter. Every object in this world is some form of matter. Every vital process of organisms and the mental processes are explained by this doctrine with the forms and functions of matter. The existence of

God, soul, pre-existence and next life are denied by them. So, this theory denies the reality and uniqueness of life and mind and denies all forms of transcendental realities. It has been held by them that whatever exists must be perceptible and God, soul etc., do not exist because they are not perceived. The absolute self or God does not exist because he cannot be perceived. The existence of consciousness is admitted by them because consciousness can be perceived by them. They say, Soul is nothing but the body. *“Cārvāka’s metaphysics” according to Riepe “is unqualified materialistic Monism.”*¹⁴

As soul is identical with the body qualities like leanness, tallness, shortness are qualities of the body; soul is admitted to be identical with the body endowed with consciousness. Consciousness is produced by the material elements; when these are destroyed, consciousness is also destroyed. When betel leaf, nut, lime, and catechu get combined they produce a red colour, though this colour is absent in any one single element.

Similarly, when the unconscious material elements of the body are modified, consciousness is produced as intoxicating liquor is produced from unintoxicating material elements. So earth, water, fire and air these

four elements though originally unconscious can produce consciousness in a body when they become combined together. Thus consciousness is the by-product of matter because it has no separate existence from the body. When the sense organs come in contact with the object, consciousness is produced in the form of sensations of colour, smell, taste and the like. How can consciousness be produced by the material elements? In answer to this question, the Cārvāka says that the sense organs and objects are mere aggregates of earth, water, fire and air which are directly perceived. An aggregate means collection of the constituent elements. It has no existence apart from the elements. If there is invariable concomitance between two things they are casually connected with each other. As consciousness is produced from the material elements, the body should be regarded as the material cause of consciousness. Consciousness is experienced in the body and is never experienced outside it. So, according to the Cārvākas, it is a property of the body. It is not a property of the soul which is distinct from the body. The famous Cārvāka thinker Kambalāsvatara (500 B.C) says "consciousness arises from the body itself through the operation of the vital functions of "pramā apramā and other bio motor faculties."¹⁵ So soul is nothing but the conscious Living Body. (chaitanya viśiṣṭa deha eva ātmān) There is no incorporeal entity like soul distinct

from the body. It is not a quality of any non-perceptible transcendental substance. It might be mentioned here that according to Hiriyana, “the *Cārvāka* does not refute the conscious or spiritual principle but he refuses to accept that it is ultimate.”¹⁶ Consciousness exists in the body and when the body is destroyed, it is destroyed too. It has been held by the *Cārvākas* that at death, consciousness cannot be said to be transferred to another body. There cannot be the same series of consciousness in two different bodies because the mental state of an ass cannot go in the body of a horse. By “reals” are meant only the four elements viz. earth, water, fire and air and things like the body, senses and the objects of senses are nothing but the combinations of these four elements. One might ask: How can the existence of the four elements be admitted if there is no knower (*grāhaka*) or the self? *Cārvāka* however replies that when a living body is formed by the combination of four gross elements viz., earth, water, fire and air, a new quality emerges which is known as consciousness. Consciousness is the power which exhilarates (*madaśakti*). Moreover, consciousness has agreements and disagreements in presence and absence with the body. The relation of cause and effect is always ascertained through elements in presence and absence and in the present case also such agreements are

available. When there is a body, there is consciousness and vice versa.

According to Pāyāsī, "Soul is identical with the body and there is no life after death. These are similar to Cārvāka materialism. Mādhavāchārya in *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* states the Cārvāka position as "Soul is only the body distinguished by the quality of intelligence".

The Cārvāka says consciousness exists when the body exists. It does not exist, when there is death of the body. *"The school of Suśikṣita Cārvāka holds that so long as the body remains there is an entity which remains, always perceives, enjoys all experiences. But when the body is destroyed no such thing exists."*¹⁷

This Cārvāka position has been however criticized from different corners. Here are some of the criticisms.

The Nyāya philosophers refute the Cārvāka's doctrine of consciousness by saying that though consciousness exists in the body, it is not the quality of the body. According to Vātsyāyana, fluidity is the quality of water. It is perceived in water. Similarly, though consciousness is perceived in the body, yet it is not its quality, but it is the quality of the soul, which is different from the body. Like complexion, consciousness exists as long as the

body exists, but it ceases to exist when the body dies. The body is composed of many parts; so if consciousness were the quality of the body then it would be the quality of many parts of the body. Therefore it is not the quality of the body but the quality of the self (ātman) which is different from the body.

Further according to the Cārvākas, consciousness is the subtle form of matter but it is not eternal and all pervading. Udayana points out that the size of the body always goes on increasing, from childhood to youth. Now if consciousness were the quality of the body, then one could recollect the incident of childhood in youth.

Moreover if the body is not the substratum of consciousness, recollection and apperception cannot be explained. If consciousness is the quality of the body, any modifications of the body will lead to the increase and decrease of consciousness. But this is never found. Therefore consciousness cannot be the quality of the body. If consciousness were the natural quality of the body, it would be found in deep sleep, swoon and even in death. According to Vijnānabhikṣu, if consciousness would exist in the separate parts of the body, then it could be produced by their combinations in the whole body. But consciousness is not found in the separate parts of the body. This proves that consciousness does

not exist in the material ingredients of the body. If consciousness does not exist in parts of the body, it cannot be produced in the whole body. Now consciousness is not found in separate parts. So it cannot be produced by their combination.

Cārvāka's doctrine of consciousness has been refuted by the Advaita Vedāntins like Sankara and Vcaspati. According to them, consciousness cannot be the quality of the body and the reasons given by them are as follows:-

a) Consciousness does not exist in deep sleep, swoon and the like though the body exists.

b) If it is granted for the sake of argument that consciousness is a quality of the body then the question arises whether it is a generic quality or a specific quality. It is not however a generic quality like magnitude, conjunction and the like. But as long as the substance exists, its specific quality exists. So it is not a specific quality. We must think it to be a specific quality of the body. It has been stated in the *śrutis* that consciousness exists in the disembodied soul after the death of the body. It proves that consciousness is not the quality of the corporeal body. It has been emphasized by the opponents of the Cārvākas that

consciousness cannot be regarded as produced by the material elements because it apprehends the four material elements and their products as objects. Consciousness is selfluminous and the material objects are revealed by consciousness. Therefore consciousness cannot be identical with the material objects. Further if the body is endowed with consciousness, it cannot account for memory, recognition, unity and continuity of consciousness which presuppose the identity of the permanent self. In dreams the body becomes inactive and there are many dream cognitions. Lastly, there is no visual perception without light, but visual perception is not the property of light. Light is the condition of visual perception. In our life there is no consciousness without the body but it is not a property of the body. So soul is different from the body and consciousness is not the quality of the body.

Cārvāka's doctrine of consciousness is also criticized by Rājaśekhara Sūri in the following way. Let us take for example the statement "I know Mādhava". This gives testimony of I or the self, the act of knowing and an object of knowledge, we cannot deny the existence of the self. The body is unconscious and is not a knower. The self is one which combines sensations of colour, sound, taste, smell and touch into the unity of an object. Our self can be known by selfconsciousness in one's own

body. Consciousness is not the quality of the body of the self. The self in a body is one permanent thing and has personal identity. It gives the unity of knowledge.

Cārvāka doctrine of consciousness has been criticized by the Jaina philosophers also. If consciousness were the quality of the body then it could never be known by introspection which is uncontradicted. Consciousness is always self-revealed in introspection; if it is regarded as known by another consciousness then it would lead to infinite regress. Again, the characteristic of the body is hardness. Self awareness is the characteristic of consciousness. The body is known by external perception through the sense organs. Consciousness is known by self-awareness which is independent of external sense organs. So consciousness is different from the body.

In the absence of material cause (upādāna kāraṇa) the material elements, the auxiliary causes cannot produce consciousness. Consciousness, the Cārvāka may urge, is produced by the material elements in the absence of its material cause just as fire is produced by wood in the absence of its material cause. But this is wrong. Invisible fire is the material cause of visible fire. So dormant consciousness is the cause of manifest consciousness when it is produced by the material

elements which are its auxiliary causes, (sahakārikāraṇa).

Śankara also tried to refute the Lokāyata "no soul theory." The main points in the Lokāyata argument are that since consciousness exists only when body exists and does not exist when there is no existence of the body. consciousness must be the product of the body. Life movements, consciousness, memory and other intellectual functions also belong to the body since these are experienced only in the body and not outside of it. To this, Śankara's reply is that life movements and memory etc do never exist even when the body exists, therefore, they cannot be the product of the body. The qualities of the body such as colour, form, etc can be perceived by everyone. Again though these are perceived so long as the living body exists, yet there is no proof that it does not exist when this body is destroyed. If consciousness were product of the body, it could not grasp the body.

Again if the self is found to manifest itself in relation with a body, this shows that the body is its instrument but it does not prove that the self is the product of the body as stated by the Cārvākas. If consciousness is produced by an aggregate of the material elements it should appear when earth, water, fire and air are

combined with one another. But it is not true. If they produce consciousness, they should possess consciousness. If the body and the sense organs produce consciousness, they must possess consciousness. Hence the body is neither the cause nor the producer of consciousness. If consciousness were the quality of the body, it would exist in a dead body, and would be perceived by the external sense organs. If it is said that consciousness cannot be perceived because of its subtlety like atoms of the body, in which it exists, then consciousness would not be perceived in a living body also. The parts and the whole body are not different from each other in nature, so it cannot be said that the qualities of the parts of the body are not qualities of the body. There is consciousness in the living body but not in the dead body. If consciousness existed in the atoms of the body it would be imperceptible in a living body and a dead body alike. Consciousness is apprehended by perception. If consciousness is a property of the body, then all could have perceived it in the same way as they perceive other material properties "But consciousness being intimately private, consciousness of one person cannot be shared by other persons". As Hiriyana observes, "*The form or complexion of our body, for instance, is perceived not only by ourselves, but also by others. A person's thoughts, feelings, dreams and memories on the other*

hand, while they are immediate facts to him are not known to any other in the same way”.

Moreover, if the self is identified with the living body with the quality of consciousness it becomes different to explain recollection, the process of perception and the synthesis of different sensations. As body is changeable, consciousness being the quality of the body should also be changeable and in that case recollection will not be possible. A man fails to retain memory of his childhood. The Cārvākas claim that combination of gross material elements produce consciousness in the living body. But as it cannot be perceived, it is not proved; it is simply a guess work of the Cārvākas.

Apart from this, the subject must not be identified with the object. The soul being the subject must have a separate existence apart from the object and should not be identified with the living body. So consciousness is the quality of the soul. The Cārvāka doctrine of consciousness is criticized by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, two Buddhist philosophers. According to them, the body cannot be the cause of consciousness; it is an aggregate of atoms either with the sense organs or without them. The body as a single composite whole (avayavin) cannot be the cause of consciousness. Since according to the Buddhists, there is no whole other

than an aggregate of parts: The Buddhist denies the existence of the whole. Earth, water fire and air cannot form a single whole. The body with the sense organs cannot produce consciousness. The sense organs cannot produce consciousness, because consciousness is produced even when the motor organs are paralyzed, and consciousness appears even when the cognitive organs are destroyed one after another. The body within the sense organs also cannot produce consciousness. The body cannot be the material cause of consciousness. That is regarded as a material cause of an effect, which undergoing modifications modifies its effect. If the body has sometimes a direct bearing upon consciousness, which is produced by its material cause, consciousness does not cease if the body exists. Hence body cannot be the material cause or the auxiliary cause of consciousness.

According to C.D. Sharma, "If after death of the body, the existence of the soul cannot be demonstrated, its non existence also cannot be demonstrated. Like all material properties it must be perceived, if it is the property of the body. But it is neither smelt, nor tasted, nor heard, nor touched."¹⁸

The Jainas and the Naiyāyikas admitted permanent souls, but the idealistic Buddhists denied it. Thus

Vidyānandi on his Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika says that *"the chief cause why the soul cannot be regarded as a product of matter is the fact of certainty, continuity and universal self consciousness which is unlimited by time and space."*¹⁹

It has been emphasized by him further that *"If any consciousness requires another consciousness to have itself attested, then that would involve a vicious infinite and the first consciousness would have to be admitted as unconscious since consciousness exists even without the sense, and since it may not exist even when there is the body and the senses as in a dead body, consciousness cannot be regarded as depending on the body."*²⁰ *"Thus the self is directly known as different from the body, by the testimony of self consciousness."*²¹

The other arguments of Vidyānandi are directed against the idealist Buddhists who do not believe in a permanent self but believe in the beginning less series of conscious states.

The Suśikṣita Cārvākas, however, hold that there is one perceiver so long as the body exists, but the perceiver (pramātā) does not transmigrate, but is destroyed, when the body is destroyed. The soul is not immortal, but there is no afterworld after the destruction of the body.

But Jayanta refutes this by saying that if a self is admitted to exist during the lifetime of the body, then the self is different from the body, and since it is partless and non-physical by nature no one can destroy it. No one has seen the self to be burnt or torn to pieces by birds or animals as a dead body can be. Since it cannot be destroyed, it is immortal. The self resides neither in any part of the body nor throughout the body but is all pervading and behaves as the possessor of that body with which it becomes associated through the bonds of Karma. Jayanta defines paraloka or after life as rebirth or the association of the soul with another body after death.

Cārvākas do not believe in causal relations. Fire is hot, ice is cold. Who has created this difference? The Cārvākas regard that they are due to the intrinsic nature of the elements. So the world is the outcome of the natural laws. The doctrine by which the Cārvākas explain the origin of the world may be termed as Naturalism or *Svabhāvavāda* or *Yadṛaccāvāda*. So we find that the Cārvākas are atheists and they do away with the idea of God as the creator of the world.

The Nyaya however criticizes the Cārvāka's doctrine of accidentalism (yadṛcchāvāda) or spontaneous generation. According to Goutama, *"things are produced*

*without any cause, like sharpness of thorns, coldness of ice, hardness of stones etc. They have material causes and not efficient causes. Vātsyāyana says "that of things originate from non cause (animitta) then the non-cause being a cause, production of an effect is not uncaused and spontaneous."*²²

*Udayana states "Accidentalism (ākāṣmikatāvāda) is denial of a cause, denial of production of an effect, denial of an indefinable or unreal cause, or affirmation of nature (svabhāva) as a cause."*²³

Rajasekhara Suri refutes the Cārvāka accidentalism by stating that if effects did not depend upon causes they would either always exist or they would always not exist. According to him, time (Kāla) nature (Svabhāva), destiny (niyati) and fate (bhavitavya) are causes of all things.

Udayana and Vardhamāna criticize naturalism (Svabhāva vāda). Svabhāva is the natural property of a thing. But Nyāya does not accept this view. If Svabhāva is the nature of an effect, the Naiyāika pointed out, then it would produce its effect spontaneously. A particular effect depends upon a particular cause; otherwise it would not be produced at a particular time; so mere inherent nature cannot account for the production of

particular effects. .Effects is produced by particular causes at one particular time. "A person is happy or sad due to the laws of nature. Everything exists due to the laws of nature."²⁴ Who paints the peacocks or who makes the cuckoos sing? There exists no cause except nature." ²⁵

So the Cārvākas deny the origin of the world from five elements (pancabhūta) namely earth (kṣiti) water (ap) air (vāyu) fire (agni) ether (ākāśa). They admit the existence of first four elements viz., earth, water, air and fire as they can be perceived. They do not admit the existence of the last element, ether (ākāśa) as it is not perceived but is known through inference. The world with all its objects is composed of these four gross elements. Atoms of earth, water and fire have not been recognized by the Cārvākas because they are not perceptible. The combination of these four gross elements give rise not only to non-living material beings but also to living organisms like plants and animal bodies. At the time of destruction, both animate and inanimate objects merge into four gross elements. This theory of the world advocated by the Cārvākas is known as *Bhūtachatuātayavāda* as they admit the existence of four gross elements.

According to the Cārvākas, God does not exist, because He cannot be perceived. So God cannot be the Creator of the world. The four material elements may be the material cause of this world, but in the absence of an efficient cause how is it possible for the unconscious material elements to give rise to this wonderful world? There is the necessity of an efficient cause to combine the material elements to give shape and design to the present world. According to the Cārvākas, the world comes into existence by the combination of four material elements and is not the creation of any designer. So the Cārvākas are atheists and they do not accept God as a transcendental Reality.

As Cārvākas are against traditionalism, they deny the authority of the Vedas. They reject the testimony of the Vedas because according to them the Vedic texts are false; the Vedic statements are false for those statements are incompatible with one another. The same statements are repeated several times; so they are tautologies. One text says. "The performance of putreṣṭi sacrifice makes a man able to have a son but the son is not born just after the performance of that sacrifice. If one performs Agnihotra sacrifice, he is destined to go to heaven.

There are three different Vedic injunctions regarding the Agnihotra sacrifice. These are, viz.

a) The sacrifice should be offered before sunrise

b) The sacrifice should be offered after sunrise.

c) The sacrifice should be offered before sunrise after the stars have become invisible. These injunctions it is obvious, are incompatible with each other. There is, according to the Cārvākas, want of agreement (Asamvāda) incompatibility (Visamvāda'), there is contradiction (Vyāghāta) among the Vedic texts. So the Vedas have no validity as a source of knowledge.

Cārvākas' views regarding the Vedas and the rituals like different sacrifices show their hatred towards the saints, priests and the traditional sense of morality. It has been held by them that there is no use of dabbing oneself with ashes. These are only the means of livelihood that Brahmins have established for themselves. They have neither understanding, nor energy. Cārvākas asked if in the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice, the animal is killed for exaltation to heaven why does not the worshipper sacrifice his own father? "The authors of the Vedas are buffoons, knaves and demons. The well known mantras of the pandits are nothing but jarphari, turphari .In an aśvamedha sacrifice the embraces of the horse must be received by the queen. What nonsense!! "

It has been held by the Lokāyata that dharma is futile. It conduces to wealth (for the priest). It has been emphasised that morning and evening rites, reciting mantras everything is done for wealth. The Vedas are full of earthly desires to hide one's own unlimited desires.

It has been held by them sarcastically that *"To drink wine and perform sexual acts with women is Agnihotra"*²⁸ The Lokāyata view on morality and dharma has been elaborated by D.R. Shāstri as *"Persons who are weak take the help of prayer. Without will power to do anything, worship is an insincere egoism to save oneself from the tortures of hell; prophets are the greatest liars among men. The Vedas are no authority. There are mantras in the Vedas which do not convey any meaning whatsoever, some mantras are ambiguous, some are absurd, some are contradictory, some repeat what is already known. As regards the other portions of the Vedas, we always find discrepancies and contradictions among them. Cases are not rare where a line of action prescribed by one text is condemned by another. Again they speak of results that are not realized. Some portions are rejected by the Vedicists themselves as interpolations. There are proper names and epithets as well as foolish statements like the ravings of a madman. Hence the Vedas are not only human compositions, but*

*even worse. The buffoon, the knave, and the demon-
these are the three authors of the Vedas. All the obscure
rites commended for the queen in the horse sacrifice have
been invented by knaves.”²⁹*

So also the custom of offering gifts to priests and of eating flesh have been commended by night prowling demons. If it were possible for the sacrifices to make one reach heaven after their performance ceased, the performers themselves perished and the requisites were used up then the trees of a forest burnt down by fire might produce abundant fruit. The exercise of religion and the practice of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Therefore the so called sacred books, the three Vedas, have been composed by rogues and can command no authority. A putreṣṭi sacrifice performed at the birth of a child may yield either of two results - positive and negative which is doubtful. When a child is born, the knaves say that it is due to the power of their incantations uttered in performing the rites. When a child is not born, they explain the event as being due to the rites being incomplete in some way or another. The priests say that a beast slain in a sacrifice will itself go to heaven. How is it that they do not kill their own old fathers in a sacrifice in order to send them directly to heaven? If the offerings in a funeral ceremony may

produce gratification to beings who are dead, then in the case of travelers, when they start it is needless to give provisions for the journey. All these ceremonies were ordered by the Brahmins as a means of their livelihood. They are worth no better than that. Hence our religious ceremonies, our endeavour to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them with prayers and offerings are vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals desirous of deceiving their fellow men in order to further their own selfish and ambitious motives. So "let us eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we may die." They have looked down upon the spiritual outlook of the other systems of philosophy because they consider matter to be the ultimate reality. They do not admit the existence of spirit or transcendental realities. It might be noted here that the fundamental characteristics of Lokāyata materialism is deha-vāda which means self is nothing but the body. The deha-vāda of Lokāyata as it has been said earlier resembles deha -vāda of original Tantrism. Lokāyata cosmogony is related to Tantrism. It meant a popular 'cult' which is characterized by rituals of worldly character. Lokāyatikas deny the authority of śṛuti and smṛti, which mock the Brāhmanical rituals and the other world or heaven. The scholars are of the opinion that Lokāyatikas are the ancient sophists, sceptics or atheists and individual philosophers, but Lokāyata does not mean a

philosophy preached by a few individuals. It is a belief or practice which is deeply rooted in the lives of the people. Lokāyatikas are against the Brāhmanical rituals which do not mean they are opposed to rituals. These rituals are rooted in the beliefs to which orthodox Brahmanism was opposed. Lokāyata is materialistic which realizes the material human body and the material universe around us. Lokāyata is an expression of this worldly attitude on one hand and on the other hand it is associated with certain type of rituals. In support of this view, there are two groups of evidences - First Lokāyata rejects other- worldliness. Secondly, commentators of Manu have said, they are nāstikas and haitukas. According to Medhātithi, Lokāyatikas are “nāstidattam nāsti hutam nāsti paralokam iti”. It means there is no (meaning of) gift, no (efficacy of) sacrificial offerings and no next world. Lokāyatikas are called the haitukas or nāstikas and were materialistic with worldly attitude.

However, in spite of the rejection of the other world, the Lokāyatikas presuppose some rituals of their own. As for example in *Svadharmā pundarīka* , there is a passage in which the word Lokāyata-mantra dhāraka and Lokāyatika are mentioned together. Kern has translated the passage which stands as follows “When he does not serve, not court, want upon adopts at

worldly spells (Lokāyata mantra dhāraka) and vagary of a world philosophy (Lokāyatika).”In *Divyavadana*, a Buddhist text, there is a phrase "Lokāyata yojna, mantresu misnatah" which means expert on Lokāyata yojana (rituals) and mantra (spell) According to Belvalkar and Ranade , "Lokāyata enjoyed extensive vogue and seductive charm in the country.” If we reject this point of view we shall be led to an absurd idea that the Indian masses were deeply influenced by the view of certain individuals and philosophers who were sceptics, sophists, atheists and materialists in the modern sense of the term.

A later philosopher and critic, Guṇaratna, in his commentary on the *Saddarśanasamuccaya* says, “*Cārvākas are nihilistic sect who only eat and they say there is no virtue and vice and do not believe except what they perceive. Each year men and women gather together and indulge in drinking wine and free sex. They behave like common people, so they are called Lokāyata.*”³⁰ It was not the sign of moral depravity because the deprived persons do not have a special day of the year for orgies. If promiscuity was a ritual so must have been the practice of eating meat and drinking wine. So in Guṇaratana’s writing there are three "mas" of the Tāntrikas. The five fold ritual of the Tāntrikas is called "panca makāra" or the five mas

because these practices begin with the letter 'Ma'. There are madya(wine), mamsa (meat) maithuna (sexual intercourse) mudrā (fried cereals) matsya (fish) The first three are important. Guṇaratna wanted to identify the Tantra with the Lokāyata. The Cārvākas do not recognize virtue and vice. The world is made up of four elements. According to some Cārvākas or empty space is the fifth element. So they say the world is made up of five elements. Consciousness comes out in these elements like intoxicating power. Man is nothing but body endowed with consciousness. They involve in sexual activities, drinking wine and eating meat. On special occasions they do so. According to them there is no 'dharma'. To drink and chew is their motto. They are called Cārvākas, because they chew (carv). They are like ordinary people. Their doctrine is produced by Bṛhaspati that is why they are called Bṛhaspatyas. Guṇaratna gave the name to Cārvākas as Lokāyatikas. Bāhaspatyas and Kāpālikas dab their bodies with ashes. Kāpālikas are Tāntrikas. Guṇaratna is of the opinion that they practice tāntrika rituals as "madya, māmsa, and maithuna". Tantrism was materialism wrapped in archaic fantasies. Tantrism was much older than the origin of the spiritualistic ideas. H.P. Sastri says, "Guṇaratna identifies the Kāpālikas with the Lokāyatikas. In the *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* edited by Thomas, we find two aphorisms, first referring to Lokāyatikas

and the second to the Kāpālikas. According to Sastri, these aphorisms are quite genuine. *Bṛhaspati Sūtra* said that the Kāpālikas sect is ancient sect, as ancient as the Lokāyatas with their materialistic philosophy which made the beginning of the science of economics. The Kāpālikas made the science of erotics (amator). Bṛhaspati suggested Lokāyatikas were related to Kāpālikas but Gunṇaratna identified the two. According to Sastri this science of erotics of the Kāpālikas is related to the ideal of 'artha sādhana' or the enhancement of material wealth. Tāntrika cult had the source in the archaic belief which says material production could be enhanced by the imitation or contagion of human reproduction which means 'kāma sādhana' and 'artha sādhana' are related to each other.

It is evident from the discussion so far that the Cārvākas or the Lokāyatas had no respect for the moral practices performed in the traditional society. In *Sarva-darśana-sangraha*, "*We find that their only goal of life is enjoyment of sensual pleasure.*"³¹

According to Lokāyata, "*While life remains let a man lives happily, let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt.*"³² "*Pleasure which one gets from the embrace of a woman and other objects of enjoyment is highest good.*"³³

"Anganālinganādijanvam sukham eve purusārtha." The pain that accompanies pleasure should be avoided as far as possible.

The pain which accompanies should be experienced for the sake of pleasure. It is not good to discard pleasure through fear of pain that inevitably accompanies it. "Dukhabhayanna nu kúlavedanīyam sukham tyaktum vicitam." It is foolish to abandon pleasure which is produced by the intercourse of the senses with their objects, because it is attended with pain. "Tyajam sukham viṣaya sangamajanma pumsam dukkhopasṛtam iti mūrkhā vicāranaisa." It is found in the commentary of Guṇaratna that Cārvākas are nihilistic sect, who only eat and drink and there are no virtues and vices; they do not believe, except what they perceive."

The Cārvākas have emphasized on individual welfare and not on collective good. They accept only two puruṣārthas or human values namely - attainment of worldly pleasure (karma) and the means of securing it (artha-wealth). They reject religious merit (dharma) and liberation (mokṣa). The Cārvākas do not disregard pleasure because it is not found unmixed with pain. A person should separate bones and scales from the fish to enjoy the pleasure of eating it. He should not refuse it because it has scales and bones. He should take the

trouble of separating the husk from the paddy to enjoy the pleasure of eating fine rice. It is foolish not to sow seeds of corn because there are wild animals which may devour the corns. It is foolish not to cook food because beggars may pester us for a share of food. It is unwise to refuse pleasure because of fear of pain that accompanies it. If anyone were so timid to abandon present pleasure, he would indeed be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet. "The pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects is to be relinquished because it is accompanied with pain - such is the reasoning of fools."

"The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains, what man, seeking his true interest, would fling away because covered with husk and dust?" Cārvākas do not differentiate the pleasures of the body from the pleasures of the mind but accept immediately available pleasures of tomorrow. Dale Riepe correctly said, "*The philosophy of Cārvākas fits unqualifiedly in the highest level of naturalism. Cārvāka's epistemological outlook is empirical, its metaphysics materialistic, and its ethics hedonistic.*" ³⁴

By Hedonism is meant a form of naturalistic ethics. It has failed to differentiate the indefinable quality of good. Good is unanalysable, says Prof. Sidgwick. Pleasure is

the only good. It is a mere intuition. It is a form of naturalism. "Hedonism is the doctrine that pleasure alone is good as an end. Good is a means to an end." Hedonism states, "Pleasure is the highest good and supreme end of life." This proposition is based on two assumptions, a metaphysical assumption and a psychological assumption. The metaphysical assumption is that the self is sensuous by nature. It is a series of sensations, feelings, impulses and instincts. Man has reason, but reason is subordinate to passion. Psychological assumption is that man naturally seeks pleasure and avoids pain. We do not desire an object for its own sake. We desire things or objects for the sake of pleasure. The dominant tendency in man is the gratification of sensibility. This theory states that human beings always seek pleasure. Cārvāka's hedonism might be called Egoistic Hedonism. It states that every man ought to seek his own greatest pleasure. An action is good if it promotes the agent's own greatest pleasure. The maxim of the system is "Everyone is for himself." But if a man seeks his own pleasure, how do then we explain the social feelings which we find in him? Hobbes who is an egoist hedonist explains the origin of society and the social feelings in the following way. Men are by nature egoists. The state of nature was a state of disagreement among various ideas of the people. They wanted everything for their own

preservation and enjoyment. There was clash among their interests. Gradually they wanted co-operation and help from other individuals. Hence they entered into a social contract by which each person agreed to sacrifice his own good for the sake of others, and to contribute to the good of the society as a whole for the sake of greater good. Thus Hobbes states society has an egoistic basis. Man works for the good of his fellow beings for the sake of his own larger interest. Egoistic Hedonism is of two types – a) Gross of Egoistic Hedonism. b) Refined Egoistic Hedonism.

Gross or sensualistic egoism was advocated by the Greek philosopher Aristippes of Cyrene. According to him, life, nature or beauty is means of pleasure. His doctrine is known as Cyrenaicism. An individual's own pleasure is the only good of life. He says, "Pleasure should be obtained at any cost. To sacrifice present pleasure is foolish. So this theory just like Cārvākas says, "let us eat, drink and be merry for tomorrow we may die."

According to him, pleasure differs only in intensity and duration. We must choose the intense one among other pleasures. We should not give preference to intellectual pleasures over sensual pleasures. This view is strikingly similar with the Cārvākas view. According to Cārvākas,

pleasure is the highest good. There is neither heaven nor hell. The body is endowed with consciousness. There is no permanent immortal soul. Enjoyment of maximum amount of pleasure is the highest aim of human life.

According to the refined Egoistic Hedonism we should not seek any and every pleasure. We are rational beings, and reason plays an important place in our moral life. If future brings higher pleasure then we have to sacrifice present pleasure. Reason guides us to attain true happiness. Similarly we should be prepared to undergo suffering in the present to get rid of suffering in future. This view has been advocated by Epicureans.

Epicureans have given importance to intellectual pleasure than bodily pleasures. Physical pleasure is not permanent; it is momentary. But intellectual pleasure is pure and refined. So we should seek intellectual or mental pleasure.

The Refined Egoistic Hedonism advocated by Epicurus is however more effective than the gross egoistic view. But the Refined Hedonism is also defective because happiness is not so much positive pleasure as freedom from pain. It regards pleasure as the negation of pain.

But morality consists in activity rather than in a painless inactive life.

According to Altruistic Hedonism, however, universal happiness is the ultimate moral standard. We ought to aim at the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." This doctrine is known as Utilitarianism, because this theory states, "actions are to be judged according to their utility or usefulness as means for the promotion of greatest happiness of the greatest number." This theory teaches to promote fellow feeling and prevents him from doing injustice to them. Bentham and Mill are the exponents of Altruistic Hedonism or Utilitarianism, but Bentham deals with the quantitative difference of pleasure and Mill with qualitative difference of pleasure.

According to Utilitarianism we ought to aim at the happiness of all persons or "greatest happiness of the greatest number" But the Cārvāka doctrine says, maximum amount of sensual pleasure of the individual in this life is the highest good. The pleasure of body or sensual pleasure, being the keenest is preferable to the pleasure of the soul.

According to Hiriyana, *"The doctrine of Cārvāka draws away man's mind altogether from the thought of a higher life and fixes it upon the world of sense."*³⁵ So this theory

is no moral theory at all. It ignores the rational restraint in which morality exists". According to this theory, indiscriminate gratification of hunger, thirst, sex and other bodily appetites constitute the highest good. But to a rational man the life of a "pig satisfied" is never acceptable.

It has been held by Cārvākas that money is desirable as a means to happiness and is desired for its own sake, or as an end to itself. It is a means to pleasure. The authors of NītiŚāstra and Kāmasūtra say that pleasure and wealth both constitute the human good. This view is accepted by the Cārvākas who deny the other worldly good. "Nītikāmasāstrānusārena arthakāmameva purusārthau manyamānāh pārālaukikam artham apahnuvanās cārvākamat manuvartamānāh."

When we satisfy our desire, we get the maximum of pleasure. Virtue consists in the enjoyment of sensual pleasure due to the gratification of desire. It is the highest virtue.

An action which gives excess of pleasure over pain is right. An action which gives excess of pain over pleasure is wrong. This is gross egoistic Hedonism like that of Aristtipus. The Brāhmanas who were the composers of the Vedas asked the foolish people to think that some

kind of food can be taken and others cannot. The faithfulness to one's wife is a virtue and adultery is a vice. The Cārvākas opinion is that the authors of the Vedas are hypocrites, knaves and demons. They are cunning priests who cheat ignorant people for self aggrandizement. According to the Cārvākas, the present is certain. The past is gone. The future is uncertain, so one should enjoy pleasures of the present moment disregarding the past and the future. Enjoy the maximum of bodily pleasures with the minimum of pain discarding the next world. Pursuit of distant, uncertain heavenly happiness at the cost of certain immediate perceptible earthly pleasures is foolish. After death, nothing remains, so enjoy earthly pleasures as much as possible.

The only thing that the Cārvākas cared for was the momentary sense pleasure, unrestricted enjoyment of sensual joys. They did not believe in sacrificing present joys to obtain happiness in the future. So they did not aim at increasing the total happiness and well being of all the people. Immediate sense pleasures were all that they wanted. It is unwise to display prudence or restraint which leads to the sacrifice of present pleasures. The Cārvākas' ethical position followed from metaphysical and epistemological doctrine that sense perception is only real and there is no transcendental

reality such as God, soul etc. To them, there are no different types of pleasure. So there must not be any restriction to anybody to indulge in sense pleasure.

The theory of Cārvākas, however, suffers from the following defects. According to this theory, we have to seek our own pleasure. But if we run eagerly after pleasure, we get less pleasure. True happiness comes from our performing duties sincerely than running after pleasure. Moreover this theory states that man is by nature egoist and selfish. But it is found that human nature is egoistic as well as altruistic. Man is more altruistic than egoistic. Both altruism and egoism exist side by side. Egoistic Hedonism is based on Psychological Hedonism. But this psychological Hedonism itself is a faulty doctrine. We desire an object which gives us pleasure after obtaining the same.

Again Egoistic Hedonism does not give a uniform moral standard; for what is pleasure to one is painful to another.

Further, Egoistic Hedonism calculates the comparative value of pleasure which is however impracticable. It is a very difficult task for our feelings vary according to our mood, temperament etc.

The Gross Egoistic theory of Cārvākas has no morality at all. It ignores the part played by reason in which morality consists. This theory states, the highest end of human life is the enjoyment of sensual pleasure. No rational being can accept this view.

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