

**THE RELATION BETWEEN *PURUṢA* AND *PRAKṚTI*: A CRITICAL  
ANALYSIS\***  
SWAGATA GHOSH

**I**

This paper is an attempt to revisit the prevalent notion of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* as admitted by the *Sāṃkhyācāryas*. The paper attempts at explaining the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* in accordance with the Sāṃkhya metaphysics, but it also holds a critical position to reconsider certain aspects. The Sāṃkhya school of philosophy is considered to be one of the oldest schools of the orthodox system of Indian philosophical tradition. Compared to the other philosophical systems the issues relating to this particular school have been somewhat less dealt with, yet it has a number of interesting areas which provide considerable food for thought. The true essences of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* have been discussed along with the primary emphasis on their relation. Various arguments that essentially constitute discussions as held by the Sāṃkhya community themselves have been put forward to establish the said relation. Next, the analogies given in order to explain the nature of this relation have been re-evaluated from a critical paradigm.

**II**

The Sāṃkhya school of philosophy admits two fundamental realities (*tattva*) - the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti*, of which the former is conscious yet inactive and the latter is unconscious but active. The *Puruṣa* is attributed as eternal (*nitya*), pure (*śuddha*), conscious (*buddha*), free (*mukta*), unchangeable (*kūṭastha*) and capable of not being transformed (*apariṇāmī*). The *Prakṛti* too is eternal, but it is capable of being transformed (*pariṇāmī*) and it is the

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primordial cause (*ādikāraṇa*) of the creation of the world (*jagat*). *Prakṛti* consists of three *guṇas* - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. When the *Prakṛti* is not in the state of creation, the three *guṇas* remain in the state of equilibrium. However, due to the proximity of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*, the equilibrium gets disturbed and the creation of the world commences, which is referred to as the transformation (*pariṇāma*).

Now, various questions may arise regarding the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the Sāṃkhya, that is, the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, which acts as the basis of the entire Sāṃkhya system as a *mokṣavādī* school.

From the elementary notion of Sāṃkhya philosophy, it is evident that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are completely different entities. So the natural question arises: Can there be any relation between two such entities at all? And if any relation is admitted, then what can be the nature of that relation? Also, what might be the significance of such a relation in the context of liberation?

In the 20<sup>th</sup> *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* -

*Tasmāttatsaṃyogādacetanaṃ cetanāvadivaliṅgam/  
Guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteva bhavatyudāsīnaḥ* //<sup>1</sup>

According to the *Sāṃkhya* system, the manifested evolutes of *Prakṛti* are dependent entities, whereas *Prakṛti* itself is subtle and independent. Now, the non-agency of the *Puruṣa* and the independence of the *Prakṛti* clearly depict that *Prakṛti* acts as the agent. However, we know that for a thing to be an agent there must be consciousness in it. But to consider unconscious *Prakṛti* as an independent agent of an action is contradictory to our cognition.

We know that agency can only be the property of a conscious being and thus, it is said that ‘*Cetanaḥ ahaṃ karomi*’. An agent would first acquire the direct knowledge of an object and its material causes; then he would desire that and subsequently, he would have the volition to attain it. The statement

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<sup>1</sup> *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 20

which expresses the intention of the agent is, *Cetanaḥ ahaṃ cikīrṣan karomi*. Here, the term *cikīrṣan* means ‘desire to do’. From this it is evident that, the coexistence of knowledge, desire and volition in the same locus (*adhikaraṇa*) constitute the agency of that - *Upādānagocarāparokṣajñāna-cikīrṣā-kṛtimatvaṃ karṭṛtvam*<sup>2</sup>.

According to Vācaspati Mīśra, the fact that agency is constituted by the coexistence in the same locus (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of volition and consciousness, is known through experience. However, by the term ‘*cikīrṣan*’, the co-locatedness (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of the desire to act along with the other conditions is also to be considered. Hence, we can say that clear and distinct knowledge of object, desire to act and volition towards it, together constitute the property called agency.

However, such definition of agency is not accepted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. It is because their basic metaphysical presupposition is that *Puruṣa* is conscious, but it is inactive, and hence, it cannot be an agent. *Puruṣa* is devoid of any desire or volition. Again, *Prakṛti* is unconscious matter; though it has desire and volition in the form of the modes of the internal sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti*), yet it is devoid of knowledge. So, how can there be co-locatedness among the trio - knowledge, volition and desire? Then either we have to admit volition in *Puruṣa* or knowledge in *Prakṛti*. Otherwise it would not be possible to determine an agent of the vast creation called world (*jagat*). Now if it is admitted that knowledge (*jñāna*) resides in *Prakṛti*, that knowledge would also be present in all the evolutes of *Prakṛti*; and so, entity of greater dimension (*mahat*), five elements (*pañcabhūta*) etc. would all be considered as conscious (*jñānavān*). This again contradicts our natural cognition of the worldly matter. Also, if *Puruṣa* is regarded as an agent then its essential nature (*svarūpa*) of being inactive would be hampered.

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<sup>2</sup> *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Viśayaparicchedaḥ, p.135

To resolve the issue, we find that in the 20<sup>th</sup> *Kārikā*, it has been claimed that the essence of agency is not constituted by the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* of volition (*kṛti*) and consciousness. Rather, they emphasize that agency and knowledge or consciousness never co-exist, they always reside in different loci. Such a claim is endorsed by the term *tasmāt* in the *Kārikā*. Thus, usages like ‘I, being conscious and desirous to do, am doing’ (*cetanaḥ ahaṃ cikīrṣan karomi*) are erroneous.

The Sāṃkhyas hold that *Prakṛti* or the three *guṇas* are unconscious, and yet they are the agent; whereas *Puruṣa*, in spite of being conscious, cannot be regarded as the agent. The very idea of *Puruṣa* as the agent is incorrect, because if agency of *Puruṣa* is admitted, then we would have to accept transformability (*pariṇāmitva* or *vikāritva*) of *Puruṣa*. Hence, it is to be admitted that volition (*kṛti*) is the property of *Prakṛti* only.

Here, again it might be asked that only the presence of volition does not lead to agency, consciousness is mandatory, then how can unconscious *Prakṛti* be the agent? In answer to this the *Sāṃkhyācāryas* hold that *tat saṃyogat acetanaṃ cetanāvat iva*, that is, the unconscious behaves like the conscious or the unconscious appears to be conscious, due to its relation or its proximity with *Puruṣa*. And thus, the agency of the unconscious *Prakṛti* is established. Though they admit that knowledge or consciousness is a pre-condition of being an agent, but here, admitting agency of the *Puruṣa* becomes paradoxical due to its essential nature (*svarūpa*). Hence, there being no other alternative, agency is to be attributed to the unconscious *Prakṛti* or the three *guṇas*. Thus, clearly it is claimed that due to the proximity of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*, the unconscious appears to be conscious.

At this point, the next vital issue which comes up is: what is meant by this proximity of *Puruṣa* with *Prakṛti*? And if it indicates some kind of relation between the two, what would be the nature of that relation? Often, we find that this proximity is being termed as contact (*saṃyoga*), but such a usage only leads to more complexity rather than simplifying matters. Since, *Puruṣa*

and *Prakṛti* are both ubiquitous (*bibhu*), so the contact between them cannot be caused by the volition of either of the relata (*anyatarakarmajanya samyoga*). We know that *samyoga* is defined as attainment preceded by non-attainment (*aprāptipūrvikā prāpti*). But, if two entities are ubiquitous, then there cannot be non-attainment between the two. Then, can the question of *samyoga* in this sense at all arise? Moreover, since the former *samyoga* is not possible, the question of contact generated by the volition existing in both the relata (*ubhayakarmajanya samyoga*) does not arise at all. Also, the Sāṃkhyaś do not admit whole (*avayavī*) over and above parts (*avayava*), so contact caused by another contact (*samyogajanya samyoga*) is also impossible in this case.

Then the question persists that in what sense has the term ‘*samyoga*’ been applied in the *Kārikā* ‘*tasmāt tat samyogat*’? It is just an indicator of a relation? And if it is so, what kind of relation can it be? Is it like the relation between fire and heat? Now, if the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Triguṇa* be a natural relation like that between fire and heat, then the *Puruṣa* can never be liberated. We never find fire devoid of heat, so if the relation be such in the present case, then the *Puruṣa* can never differentiate between itself and *Prakṛti* leading to the impossibility of liberation of *Puruṣa*. Next, it may be asked: Is the relation in question like that between the eyes and color? It is not like that either; because, the eyes can perceive the color due to its own potency or power, but we do not find any such potency in either *Puruṣa* or *Prakṛti* to establish relation between them. Admitting any such potency would again lead to the question of non-liberation of *Puruṣa*. Again, the question arises: Is it like the relation between fish and water? Now, if the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is to be described in such terms, then we have to admit subject-object relationship (*viśayaviśayibhāva*) between the two. The relation between fish and water is not a mere contact (*samyoga*), it is not the case that earlier the fish was unrelated to water and then later it came in contact with water. So, the subject-object relationship between fish and water cannot be considered in

explaining the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. The subjectivity (*viśayitva*) of *Puruṣa* is eternal and undifferentiated (*avyāvṛtta*), and the objectivity (*viśayatva*) of *Prakṛti* is also such. So, admitting that relation between them would also lead to non-liberation of *Puruṣa*.

The obscurity regarding the term *saṃyoga* in case of the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Triguṇa* thus remains. However, to salvage the situation from such unclarity, Vācaspati Miśra claims that here the primary sense of the term *saṃyoga* is not to be considered at all. Rather it has been used in a secondary sense, where *tat saṃyogaḥ* means *tat sannidhānam* (proximity).

Now, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, we find, *Asaṅga hi ayam puruṣaḥ*<sup>3</sup>, that is, *Puruṣa* is always unattached and indifferent. It is unrelated to any other thing. And any question of its relation to some other only refers to proximity (*sannidhāna*). Just like the *ākāśa* is in proximity to the pot, so is the case with the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. Due to such relation the unconscious *Triguṇa* appears to be conscious, and the non-agent *Puruṣa* appears to be the agent. The attributes of *Puruṣa* as an agent and the consciousness of *Prakṛti* are unreal; they are just reflections (*pratibimba*) or super-imposed (*āropita*) properties due to their proximity (*sannidhāna*). Such appearance is again due to the non-ascertainment of the difference (*bhedāgraha*) between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Due to such a state, the bondage present in the inner sense organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) appears to reside in the *Puruṣa*, and hence *Puruṣa* is termed as bound (*baddha*). In essence consciousness and agency reside in different loci, that is, consciousness in *Puruṣa* and agency in *Triguṇa*; but as both the entities are ubiquitous (*bibhu*), they represent the property of one another due to their proximity (*sannidhāna*).

Now in the 21<sup>st</sup> *Kārikā*, Ācārya Īśvarakṛṣṇa speaks of the interdependence between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. In the previous *Kārikā* it has been established that there is a relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, but the intriguing part remains: how can it be possible for two such completely

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<sup>3</sup> *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4/3/15

different entities to be at all related in some way or the other? The consciousness and non-agency of *Puruṣa* is in direct contradiction with the unconscious agency of the *Prakṛti*. So, two such realities cannot be related to each other unless they fulfill one another's purpose in the process. Such a sense of complementation has been termed as 'apekṣā', which means *sva-sva-kāryajanana-sahakāritva*, that is, helping each other to achieve its respective accomplishment of action. They each seek the help of the other to accomplish their purpose. Thus, they may be said to be in the relation of the helper and the helped (*upakārya-upakārahāva*). This point has been expressed in the 21<sup>st</sup> *Kārikā*, which says:

*Puruṣasya darśanārthaṃ kaivalyārthaṃ tathā pradhānasya/  
Pangvandhavadubhayorapī saṃyogastakṛtaḥ sargaḥ//*<sup>4</sup>

From the above *Kārikā*, we find that the *Pradhāna* or the *Prakṛti* wants to be perceived by the *Puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* being the primordial cause (*ādikāraṇa*) is the possessor of three *guṇas* (*guṇamayī*) and is, thus, the producer of all the objects of desire or need. It is termed as *nikhilabhogyaprasavinī* and the *bhogyā*, meaning that which gives birth to all enjoyable entities and that which is to be enjoyed respectively. But the enjoyable entities have no value unless there is an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Here, the *Puruṣa* is the enjoyer (*bhoktā*), and the property of being an enjoyer (*bhokṛtva*) of the *Puruṣa* helps in the realization of the property of being enjoyed (*bhogyatva*) of the *Prakṛti*. Thus, the *Prakṛti* awaits its perception by the *Puruṣa* in order to attain its fruitful end. That is why, though the *Puruṣa* is of opposite nature to *Prakṛti*, yet it desires or waits to be related to the *Puruṣa* for its own realization.

Now, another vital question which arises at this juncture is that, the *Puruṣa* has no such need as the *Prakṛti*, then why would it want to be related to the *Prakṛti*? Just the need of the *Prakṛti* would not propel the *Puruṣa* to be related to the *Triguṇa*; it must possess a desire or need of its own as well. Certain fulfillment of mutual need or desire can only lead to a relationship. We

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<sup>4</sup> *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 21

find answer to this in the *Kārikā*, where it has been said *puruṣasya kaivalyārtham*. This phrase explains why the *Puruṣa* awaits the *Prakṛti* as well, *Puruṣasya apekṣāṃ darśayati* <sup>5</sup>. Though the *Puruṣa* is essentially unbound and indifferent, yet if it remains so, the *Prakṛti* would lose its significance; so, both await each other. Vācaspati Miśra explains why and how *Puruṣa* awaits *Prakṛti* as follows- *Tathāhi bhogyena pradhānena sambhinnaḥ puruṣastadgataṃ duḥkhatrayaṃ svātmanyabhimanyamānaḥ kaivalyaṃ prārthayate*.<sup>6</sup> It means that the *Puruṣa* awaits the *Prakṛti* or the *Pradhāna* for its own liberation. Cessation of the three kinds of sufferings is known as *kaivalya*. Such *kaivalya* is the ultimate aim of *Puruṣa*.

Indian thinkers have coined many terms to denote liberation like *aparvarga*, *mukti*, *nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*, *kaivalya* etc. The nuances acquired by the Indian thinkers have got specific import. The term *kaivalya* used in the sense of isolation is at par with the Sāṃkhya metaphysics. The term is originated from the word *kevala*, which indicates the liberation in the sense of loneliness or isolation arising out of the knowledge of discrimination (*vivekajñāna*) alone.

Now, again a question may be raised that *Puruṣa* being eternally liberated (*nityamukta*), that is, the most desired liberation being its true essence and it being ever free from sufferings, why would it at all await *Prakṛti* for its liberation again? Vācaspati replies to this by saying that *Pradhāna* is useful to *Puruṣa*. From time unknown, *Puruṣa* is unaware of the distinction between itself and the *Prakṛti*. So, the *Puruṣa* thinks that the sufferings residing in the *Prakṛti* (*prakṛtigata duḥkha*) are actually its own. *Puruṣa* is undoubtedly free from all sufferings at all times, but due to its inability to distinguish between itself and *Pradhāna*, it considers sufferings existing in *Prakṛti* (*prakṛtigata duḥkha*) to be its own sufferings. This happens because of the inherited or self-credited (*ābhimānika*) relation, due to which

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<sup>5</sup> *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 198

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 198

the *Puruṣa* thinks itself to be the sufferer, and usages like ‘*Ahaṃ duḥkhī*’ are prevalent. As long as such relation persists, *Puruṣa* is considered to be bound. *Puruṣa* is unaltered, indifferent and unrelated. Hence, it is always devoid of any kind of sufferings. But due to the inherited (*ābhimānika*) relation, *Puruṣa* is unaware of its distinction with the *Prakṛti*, and so it remains bound by the three kinds of suffering. *Puruṣa*, thus, tries to attain liberation from them. It is well-known to us that, an object which is already attained, act as the impediment of the desire for attaining that object. Then it can be argued that, why at all eternally liberated *Puruṣa* would desire liberation? It is said that, the *Puruṣa* wants to achieve liberation because it desires freedom from the three kinds of suffering (*trividha duḥkha*) which it experiences due to its feeling of oneness with the *Prakṛti*. Hence, the *Puruṣa* though it is eternally free (*nityamukta*), yet its desire for liberation is meaningful.

Now, it can again be asked that, even if we accept that *Puruṣa*’s desire for liberation is meaningful, but why would it await *Prakṛti* for achieving that end? Here, Vācaspati Miśra replies that, *Tacca sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātī-nivandhanam*.<sup>7</sup> *Puruṣa* tries to find means of attaining that *kaivalya* and it is achievable only by the knowledge of discrimination from *Prakṛti* in the *Puruṣa* admitted as an existent entity (*sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātī*); here the term ‘*anyatākhyātī*’ means acquiring knowledge of distinction.

*Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are mutually different. But, due to the non-ascertainment of the distinction between them, through the inherited relation with the three types of suffering, *Puruṣa* considers the sufferings to be its own. Now, with the attainment of the knowledge of distinction between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* (*anyatākhyātī*), the inherited (*ābhimānika*) relation gets destroyed and consequently usages as *ahaṃ duḥkhi* lose their import. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, this *anyatākhyātī* is also known as *vivekakhyātī* or *tattvajñāna*. *Jñāna* or *buddhi* is the evolute of *antaḥkaraṇa* or *mahattattva*. When the *mahattattva* becomes pure and potent through listening, concentration and

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199

contemplation (*śravaṇa-manana-nididhyāsana*), then the *mahattattva* transforms into *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti*. Thus, *Puruṣa*, being desirous of liberation, awaits such *mahattattva*, since it aids in attainment of the highest *puruṣārtha*. Hence, awaiting the *mahattattva* amounts to awaiting the *Prakṛti*. *Mahattattva* is the first evolute of *Prakṛti* and from that *mahattattva*, *vivekakhyāti* is produced, which instrumentally leads to liberation or *mokṣa*. Thus, to acquire the *bhedajñāna* or the *anyatākhyāti*, that is, the distinctive knowledge, it is essential for the *Puruṣa* to seek the help of *Prakṛti*. Evidently then, the *Puruṣa* awaits *Prakṛti*, which acts as its prime helper in the attainment of the highest *puruṣārtha*, and it is obvious enough that no one ignores such a helper, rather awaits such. Thus, Vācaspati mentions here, *Puruṣa* waits for *Pradhāna* in order to attain its liberation -*kaivalyārtham puruṣaḥ pradhānaṃ apekṣate*.<sup>8</sup>

Now, it may again be argued that, though we admit that the *Prakṛti* helps the *Puruṣa* in attaining *kaivalya*, but is *kaivalya* the only *puruṣārtha* for which *Puruṣa* awaits the *Prakṛti*? Just as *kaivalya* is a *puruṣārtha*, similarly enjoyment (*bhoga*) is another *puruṣārtha*. *Puruṣa* awaits *Prakṛti* for liberation and enjoyment (*bhoga*) as well. The relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is essential for enjoyment. *Puruṣa* is the eternal enjoyer; hence, the relation producing this enjoyment must also be eternal. *Prakṛti* also is the eternal object of enjoyment and it reveals itself to the *Puruṣa* for its own purpose of attaining fulfillment. Thus, it appears that the said relation is the cause of enjoyment. But here, it might be asked that how can, a relation which is the cause of enjoyment, again be the cause of liberation of *Puruṣa*? In reply, Vācaspati Mīśra says that there is a series of relations between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*. They become related to each other again and again. The relation which is instrumental for enjoyment is not the cause of liberation. Enjoyment and liberation are totally opposed to each other, so the same relation cannot be the cause of two such completely contradictory ends. Different relations are,

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 199

thus, to be admitted for the respective ends. Hence, it is claimed that though the *Puruṣa* and the *Prakṛti* are eternally related, yet they again get related to each other for *kaivalya*.

At this point, two more questions arise, one is that, if the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* relates to one another repeatedly, how can it be determined that which relation is the cause of enjoyment and which one is the cause of liberation? Moreover, it is intriguing to think that *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti*, both being eternal and ubiquitous, they are never away from one another; rather they are always in proximity to each other. So, how can the question of the two realities being repeatedly related to one another, at all arise? In this regard, the *Sāṃkhyācāryas* have remained silent. It is important to note here, that two ubiquitous realities, can neither be away nor in proximity to one another, since the very technicality of the term *bibhu* suggests that there cannot be any issue of spatial proximity or remoteness (*daiśika paratvāparatva*) in such cases, and also, both of them being eternal, similarly there can be no question of temporal proximity or remoteness (*kālika paratvāparatva*) between them either.

However, regarding the former question raised here, the *Sāṃkhyācāryas* would reply that *Prakṛti* reveals itself or gets transformed at every moment. Hence, at each point of time, it is new and different from the previous. If things are admitted in this way, it can be said that the *Puruṣa* gets related to a new *Prakṛti* each time and thus, a series of relations are produced. Among those relations, some are the causes of enjoyment and the others are that of liberation.

### III

Now, Īśvarakṛṣṇa draws our attention to another aspect of the relation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. It has already been discussed that there is a mutual relation of the helper and the helped between the two. To explicate this, he puts forward an analogy from our ordinary life, which is expressed by the term *pangvandhavat*<sup>9</sup> in the *Kārikā*. It refers to a lame person, meaning an

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<sup>9</sup> *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 21

individual unable to walk or to move on his own and another blind person, meaning one who is unable to see; whereas, the lame person can see and the blind person can walk. Now, they decide to help each other in reaching their desired destinations. Here, the lame man being able to see, may be regarded as one who possesses knowledge (*jñānavān*) but he is inactive (*niṣkriya*), whereas, the blind man may be considered as active (*kriyāśīla*) but devoid of knowledge (*jñānahīna*). If the blind man carries the lame man on his shoulders and the lame man directs him, then both of them can reach their desired aim. Thus, they mutually await one another, because otherwise, they both would have to lead fruitless lives.

Here, quite evidently, the lame man represents the *Puruṣa* and the blind man stands for the *Prakṛti*. *Jñāna* refers to consciousness and activity refers to agency and transformability as well. By this analogy Īśvarakṛṣṇa tries to uphold that just as the lame and the blind man help each other to fulfill one another's purpose, similarly, the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* complement each other in attaining their own realizations. But certain objections come up here, which may show that the analogy is not very appropriate. First, it is to be noted that in the above analogy the lame and blind, both are conscious, whereas, on the other hand *Puruṣa* is conscious, but *Prakṛti* is not. Secondly, the lame-ness and the blind-ness refer to certain physical disabilities of a conscious being, but the inactivity (*niṣkriyatva*) of *Puruṣa* and the unconsciousness (*nirjñānatva*) of *Prakṛti* do not express any such disability, they are indicators of the absence of action in *Puruṣa* and that of knowledge or consciousness in *Prakṛti* which are their respective essences. So, the given analogy may not be considered to be a very appropriate one, but in spite of that it might be looked at as a gross analogy only, keeping in view the contradiction in terms of metaphor and entities or objects metaphorized - *dr̥ṣṭānta-dār̥ṣṭāntika virodhaḥ*.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *Vedāntadarśanam*, Tarkapāda.

However, it may be argued in favor of the Sāṃkhyas that the charge of contradiction between the metaphor and the objects metaphorized (*darśānta-dārśāntika virodhaḥ*) does not stand in the eye of logic on account of the fact that there cannot be total affinity between them, but a partial one. When a face is metaphorized as moon, there is no absolute identity between the two. There is no affinity in terms of shape, size and other aspects of the moon, but there is similarity only in terms of glamour (*lāvanya*) between the moon and the face. If this point is kept in view, the metaphor between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and the blind and the lame man does not face any contradiction.

Now, other analogies have also been given in this context. The potency of fire to burn is pre-existent in fire, but it can only be manifested when the fire comes in contact with inflammable objects, like, branches of trees. Similarly, the *vivekakhyāti* is pre-existent in *Puruṣa*, but the *Puruṣa* becomes aware of it only after its relation or proximity with *Prakṛti*. Again from the other way round, fruits of a tree have the potency to satisfy hunger, water has the potency to quench thirst, but their potentials can only be manifested in relation to an enjoyer (*bhoktā*). Likewise, the actions of *Prakṛti*, being instrumental to serve the purpose of *Puruṣa* (*puruṣaprayojanasādhakatā*), can only be expressed due to its relation with *Puruṣa*. Hence, the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* await each other like the blind and the lame man, and the relation between them is aimed at their respective realizations.

At this juncture, it may be interesting to think that the above analogies present a notion as if *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* are something external to or different from the ordinary worldly objects and individuals. Arguing from the Sāṃkhya stance, it can be claimed that the enjoyer (*bhoktā*) referred to above is none but the *Puruṣa*, and the fruits, water etc. are nothing but the evolutes of *Prakṛti*, that is, *Prakṛti* itself. So, the analogies are not really analogies, but they are rather speaking of the two basic realities - *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* only, but in somewhat finite terms.

Finally, to emphasize on a particular issue already discussed, it has been questioned that, since the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* has been established as the helper and the helped, and hence, they await each other, then why is it necessary to admit the various evolutes of *Prakṛti*? Moreover, it has been shown that the relation between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is the cause of *Prakṛti*'s realization of enjoyability (*bhogyatva*) and liberation of *Puruṣa*. Then, quite naturally it might be asked that what constitutes the cause of the production of *mahat* and the subsequent forms of it? In reply to this, Īśvarakṛṣṇa asserts – *tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*.<sup>11</sup> This implies that the said relation itself is the cause of the creation of *mahat* etc. The above relation cannot act as the direct or the active cause of enjoyment or liberation, it can be so only through the creation of *mahat* etc. However, this does not mean that the same relation once acts as the cause of *mahat* etc. and then again that of enjoyment and liberation. It is not so. The relation only helps in the production of *mahat* etc. which then leads to their enjoyment by the *Puruṣa*, and eventually to the liberation of the self. This whole thing is meant by the phrase '*tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ*'.

Thus, we may summarize the whole content that enjoyment and liberation are the two ends of *Puruṣa* (*puruṣārtha*). The relation of proximity between *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is admitted, but it cannot be the direct cause of the two *puruṣārthas*. Due to the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of *Prakṛti*, the world is created through the production of *mahat* etc. in definite order. This leads to the enjoyment by the *Puruṣa*, but it is to be kept in mind that only those evolutes, like pleasure and pain (*sukha* and *duḥkha*), which are related to the *antaḥkaraṇa*, can be enjoyed. Hence, *mahat* etc. are absolutely necessary for enjoyment. Again, knowledge is the mode or evolute (*vṛtti*) of *antaḥkaraṇa*, and knowledge here, specifically referring to *tattvajñāna* or *vivekakhyāti* can only be instrumental to *kaivalya*. Hence, for enjoyment as

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<sup>11</sup> *Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī*, p. 202

well as *kaivalya* the production of *mahat* etc. is necessary. Thus, we can claim that there is the relation of proximity (*sannidhi*) between the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* and consequently, both attain their respective realizations or ends.

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