

Chapter I

General Introduction and Ontological Presupposition of the Concept of Human Existence in the light of Indian Philosophy

The basic foundations of Indian doctrines are found in the *Upanisadic* principals. The systems of Indian Philosophy are systematic speculations on the nature of the Reality, which are unopposed to the teachings of the *Upaniṣads* containing various aspects of truth. The orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy are based on the logical reason subordinated to the authority of the *Vedas*, which are believed to be intuitive perceptions of seers of truth. So the orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy are based on rational speculation in harmony with the *Vedas*, and aims are achieving the highest good or *niḥśreyasa (mokṣa)* capable of being attained in human life.

The nine systems of Indian Philosophical thought have been conventionally classified into two broad divisions of the orthodox (*āstika*) and the heterodox (*nāstika*). This classification has been made on the basis of whether or not a system believes in the infallibility of *Vedas*. Out of the nine systems of Indian Philosophical thought six major systems have discussed and acknowledged the authority of *Vedas*. These six orthodox schools are Nyāya, Vaiśeṣikās, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. All these six systems of Indian Philosophy are collectively known as ‘*Ṣaḍdarśana*’. The Schools consider the *Vedas* as infallible, derive their own validity from the authority of the *Vedas* and hence, they are called orthodox (*āstika*). The schools of Materialism, Buddhism and Jainism, fall in

category of *nāstika* (heterodox) systems as they repudiated the authority of the Vedas.

The systems of Indian Philosophy have started with the existence of certain categories- eternal and non-eternal as found in Nyāya, *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* in Sāṃkhya, Brahman in Advaita Vedanta etc. which have an indirect bearing towards the status of human existence. The atoms of earth, water, fire, air, ether (*kṣīti-ap-tejo-vāyu-ākāśa*) along with Time (*kāla*), Space (*dik*), Self (*ātman*) and *Manas* or mind comprise of eternal substances. Many of these are particularly try to prove for the existence of all eternal substances like, earth (*kṣīti*), water (*ap*), fire (*agni*), air (*vāyu*), ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*), space (*dik*), soul (*ātma*) and mind (*manas*) and non-eternal substances in terms of two broad divisions of the *orthodox* (*āstika*) and the heterodox (*nāstika*). In Indian Philosophy especially the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣikas are allied systems (*samānatantra*) of Philosophy. Both of these systems are saying that they have the same end in view, namely, liberation of the individual self. According to both, ignorance is the root cause of all pain and suffering; and liberation, which is the state of their absolute cessation, is to be attained through the right knowledge of reality. There are, however, some differences between the two systems on two fundamental points. While the Nyāya accepts four independent sources of knowledge, namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony, the Vaiśeṣika recognises only two, viz. perception and inference, and reduces Comparison and verbal testimony to perception and inference. Secondly, the Naiyāyikas give us a list of sixteen *padārthas* which, according to them, cover the whole of reality and include those accepted in the other system. The *Vaiśeṣikas*, on the other hand, recognise only seven *padārthas* and comprehend all reals under them. 'These seven categories of reality are (a) *dravya* or substance (b)

gūṇa or quality, (c) *karma* or action, (d) *sāmānya* or general (e) *viśeṣa* or particularity, (f) *samavāya* or the relation of inherence and (g) *abhāva* or non-existence.

Dravya or substance is defined as the substratum where actions and qualities inherence and which is the coexistent material cause of the composite things produced from it.¹ Substance signifies the self-subsistence, the absolute and independent nature of things. The category of substance at once unfolds the pluralistic realism of this system. Substance is the substratum of qualities and actions. Without substance we cannot have qualities and actions for they cannot hang loose in the air, but must be contained somewhere. Substance is the basis of qualities and actions, actual or potential, present or future. Nor can substance be defined apart from qualities and actions. Ultimate substances are eternal, independent and individual and are either infinite or infinitesimal. All compound substances (*avayavidravyya*) which are made of parts and arise out of the simple ultimate substance are necessarily transient and impermanent and subject to production and destruction. But simple ultimate substances which are the material causes of the compound substances are eternal and not subject to production and destruction. The *dravyas* are nine and include material as well as spiritual substances. The Vaiśeṣikas have been admitted nine substances as told earlier though they believe atom etc. yet they are not materialist in the true sense of the term due to their acceptance of soul, which is a spiritual one.

Earth, water, fire and air really signify not the compound transient objects made out of them, but the ultimate elements, the supra sensible eternal part less unique atoms which are individual and infinitesimal. Ether

is not atomic but infinite and eternal. These five are called elements (*bhūta*) and are physical. Each of them possesses a peculiar quality which distinguishes it from the rest. It has also been pointed out that the five categories or substances like earth etc. is possessing the special quality of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound (*rupa-rasa-gandha-sparsa-sabdah*). These qualities are grasped by five external sense organs like eye etc. respectively. Time and space (*kāla* and *dik*) are taken as eternal substances (*nityadravyas*) having unity (*ekatva*), eternality (*nityatva*) and all pervasiveness (*vibhutva*). These are not capable of being perceived and finite. By virtue of this they are not having any constituents and divisions. Time is known through the cognitions of past, present and future and of 'younger' and 'older'. Space (*dik*) is also understood through our cognitions of 'east' and 'west', 'here' and 'there', 'near' and 'far' and is other than ether (*ākāśa*) which is the substratum of the quality of sound (*sabdagunakam*). There are memberless individual selves (*jīvātmā*) and each is a different individual, eternal and all-pervading spiritual substance. It is the substratum of the accidental property of Consciousness (*caitanya*). Consciousness is not the essence of the self. It is not even an inseparable quality of the self. It is regarded as an adventitious attribute possessed by the self. It is adventitious because the self does not possess this quality during deep sleep. The quality of consciousness must reside somewhere. It is not the property of the body or the senses or even of mind. It resides in the self. Other important qualities possessed by the self are desire (*icchā*) and volition (*yatna*). *Jñāna*, *icchā* and *yatna* are cognition, affection and conation respectively. The fact that the self is the substance of these qualities is directly known through expressions: 'I know', 'I am happy', 'I want to do this' etc. Mind (*manas*) is also regarded as a substance. It is the internal sense (*antarindriya*). It is atomic;

but unlike the first four atomic *dravyas*, it does not give rise to compound objects. It is many and each is eternal and imperceptible. Each self has a mind. It is the organ through which the self comes into contact with the objects. Its existence is inferred from the fact that the self must perceive internal states of cognition, desire and conation through an internal sense, just as it perceives external objects through external senses. Moreover, in the perception of external objects the mind is selective and active. We do not perceive colour, touch, taste, smell and sound simultaneously, even though all the external senses may be in contact with their objects. Perception requires attention and attention is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. Hence in perception, the self must fix the *manas* on the object of perception with which the external sense is already in contact. *Manas*, therefore, is a substance and it is atomic and part less and can come into contact with one sense only at one time.

The place of mind in the philosophical systems of India is briefly discussed. The philosophies selected are - Vedas, Upaniṣads and six systems of philosophies (*ṣaḍdarśanas*), Gīta and materialistic school of Cārvāka. That mind is of subtle physical nature and that self is postulated as higher than mind in the hierarchy is being pointed out. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical system, *manas* (mind) is located in the so-called ‘inner-sense’ which may be compared to the brain to some extent. As a dualistic school, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika separates the matter and spirit. The spirit called self occupies the central place in this philosophical system and it is of nonmaterial substance, a permanent entity and is imperceptible. As opposed to this are the materials- derived entities like external sense organs. These sense organs as well as the inner sense serve as instruments of perception.

The external sense organs with their data from the external world transmit the impressions to the inner sense and from there they are conveyed to the Self; similarly for the internal experiences (*psychological*) the instrument is the inner sense from where the impressions are relayed to the *Self*. Self is thus the perceiver, cognizer, integrator of all impressions, a thinker and a controller. Thus mind itself is considered as the tool or an instrument ultimately leading to the function of perception, thinking, controlling and so on. The inner sense called *antahkarana* is not wholly material or spiritual in composition. It has got no perceptibility but inferrability is there. Such type of *pramāṇa* called inference or *anumāṇa* is a fundamental means of knowing in Nyāya Philosophy, along with perception (*pratyakṣa pramāṇa*) and verbal testimony (*śabda pramāṇa*). Thus the presence of *manas* can only be inferred just as self which also is imperceptible. This theory of knowledge (epistemology) is the important contribution of the Nyāya system. Mind is material in nature and serves as an instrument for external as well as internal sensations but the self is the ultimate substrate of knowing.²

Now, it has been profoundly elaborated the concept of *Ātman* in Indian Philosophy and tried to keep the proof of the existence of *Ātman* in various grounds of Indian Philosophy. The individual self stands inherently proved and is always immediately felt and known. One is absolutely certain about the existence of one's own self and there can be neither doubt nor denial regarding its existence. The individual self is the highest thing we know and it is the nearest approach to the Absolute, though it is not itself the Absolute. In fact, the individual self is a blend of the real and the unreal, a knot of the existent and the non-existent, a coupling of the true and the false. It is a product of ignorance. But its essence is the light of the Absolute. Its

real nature is pure consciousness, self-shining and self-proved and always the same. It is called the ultimate witness or the *Sākṣī* and as such is one with the Absolute. The senses, the mind, the intellect, feeling and will, the internal organ are all products of *Avidyā* and they invariably surround the individual self and constitute its 'individuality'. But the self really is above them, being the Absolute.

The word '*Ātman*' refers to the meaning is life-breath and then steadily acquired the meaning of feeling, mind, soul and spirit. *Saṅkarācārya* quotes an old verse giving the different connotations of the word '*Ātman*'. The verse says that '*Ātman*' means that which pervades all; which is the subject and which knows experiences and illuminates the objects; and which remains immortal and always the same.³

The true self has been the main topic of investigation in the *Upaniṣads*. Socrates of ancient Greece has also persistently advocated the supreme necessity of 'Know Thyself'. With reference to this three *Upaniṣads*- the *Chāndogya*, the *Māṇḍūkya* and the *Kaṭha*, may be taken into account for our discussion. The dialogue between Prajāpati and Indra, narrated in the *Chāndogya*, there is the development of the concept of the self from the *Jāgrata* (waking) or the bodily self *Svapna* through the dreaming or the empirical self and the self in *Susupti* deep dreamless sleep to the fourth or *Turiya* stage (Absolute Self). The gods and the *demons*, the dialogue tells us, sent Indra and Virochana respectively, to Prajāpati, to learn the teaching about the self. The teacher asked them to undergo penance for thirty-two years to qualify themselves to receive the teaching. After fulfilling the prescribed condition, both come to Prajāpati who teaches them that the self is that which is seen when one looks into another's eye or into water or a

mirror. Virochana was satisfied and went away. But Indra began to think thus: How can the self be the reflection of the body? Or, how can it be identified with the body itself? If the body is well adorned and well dressed, this self also is well adorned and well dressed. If the body is beautiful, this self also is beautiful; if the body is blind or lame or crippled, this self also is blind or lame or crippled; in fact if the body perishes, this self also should perish together with it. There is no good in this. Being dissatisfied, Indra enquires with Prajāpati again and tells him his confusions and misunderstanding. Prajāpati replied him that he seen in dreams roaming freely is the self. Indra, again persists on doubting thus: Though this self is not affected with the defects, faults and perishing quality along with the body, yet it seems as if it is afraid, terrified, chased, struck, and conscious of pain and to be weeping. There is no good in this also. Indra again returns to Prajāpati and tells him his doubts. This time Prajāpati teaches him that the enjoyer of deep dreamless sleep is the self. But Indra feels his difficulties. The self, he thinks, in deep sleep reduces itself to mere abstraction. There are no objects to be felt, to be known, to be enjoyed. This self appears to be absolutely unconscious- knowing nothing, feeling nothing, willing nothing. It is a zero, a cipher. There is no good in this too. And again he approaches Prajāpati and tells him his doubts. The teacher is now very much pleased with the ability of the disciple. And now follows the real teaching: Dear Indra! The body is not the self, though it exists for the self. The dream-experiences are not the self, though they have a meaning only for the self. The self is not an abstract formal principle of deep sleep too. The eye, the body, the mental states, the presentation continuum, the stream of consciousness- are all mere instruments and objects of the self. The self is the ground of waking, dream and sleep states and yet it transcends them all.

The self is universal, immanent as well as transcendent. The whole universe lives and moves and breathes in it. It is immortal, self-luminous, self-proved and beyond doubts and denials, as the very principle which makes all doubts, denials and thoughts possible. It is the ultimate subject which can never become an object and which is to be necessarily presupposed by all knowledge.⁴

This dialogue brings out the essential nature of the self and has very important implications. The empiricist Philosopher of Locke and Berkeley and the sceptics Philosopher of Hume, the flux of Heraclitus, William James and Bergson, the Copernican revolution of Kant and the abiding contribution of Hegel, the positions of Green, Bradley and Mc Taggart- all have been long before anticipated in this dialogue. The self, surely, cannot be identified with the body, senses or the internal organ, nor can it be regarded as a mere by product of matter. The bodily self or the waking self identifies itself with its contents- body, senses, mind, wife, son, daughter, sister, father, mother, brother, relation, friend. It stretches itself and identifies itself with the objects and feels as if they constitute its being, as if it is incomplete, nay, no more, without them. But in fact that which can be known as an object can never itself be the subject. It cannot be a mere bundle of the qualities. It cannot be the empirical self. Dreams have been selected by Prajāpati because here the objects have to be framed by the mind independently of the body or the senses. In the waking life, the objects are there apart from and outside of the mind which are only known and not created by it. Here the mind is helped by the senses which take the fleeting and scattered manifold of sense-impressions caused by external objects to the mind which arranges them into order and gives meaning and unity to them. But in the dreams, the

mind has to function alone and fabricate imaginary objects for itself. It is the state, therefore, of perception without sensation. The self in the waking as well as in the dream state is ever changing and therefore cannot be the real self. The self must persist throughout the changes as their knower. The ego, limited by space and time, by birth and death, is a miserable creature. Indra, not being able to find the self in the waking and dreaming states, anticipates Heraclitus, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, William James and Bergson, and also some of the Buddhists. There is only change and you can never bathe twice in the same river, says Heraclitus. Locke regards the mind as a *tabula rasa*, a blank tablet, by itself as good as nothing, on which experience writes with the fingers of sensation and perception. Therefore 'in sleep and trances the mind exists not' declares Berkeley. 'Every drowsy nod explodes the self theory' says Locke. 'I can never catch myself' says Hume, 'whenever I try, I always stumble at some sense-impression or idea.' 'The so-called "self" is only a stream of Thought;' declares William James, 'the passing thought itself is the thinker.' These empiricists, sceptics and pragmatists take the self as a mere bundle of ideas. Indra also came to the same Conclusion. The self in waking and in dreams is ever changing, tortured, chased and vanishing. There is no good in this. What we get here is only a fleeting mass of qualities, the scattered manifold of sense-impression or ideas, and no permanent self. The same conclusion is arrived at by Bradley also. Indra rightly thinks that in the deep sleep the self becomes a mere abstraction as there are no contents at all. Content less self in the empirical life is impossibility. The self, as subject, must oppose itself to an object. But in deep sleep there are no objects at all, neither real nor imaginary. Hence in the absence of the objects the self also ceased to exist. The Copernican revolution of Kant is the celebrated doctrine which he introduces in

European Philosophy that knowledge requires both sensation and thought, that ‘concepts without precepts are empty and precepts without concepts are blind’, and that every knowledge situation necessarily presupposes the self, the ‘transcendental unity of pure apperception’ which is not a category of unity, but the fundamental postulate of all knowledge which makes possible the play of categories. The abiding contribution of Hegel has been the persistent insistence that the self should not be taken as a substance but as a subject and that this subject does not mean the empirical ego but the transcendental and yet immanent Absolute Idea running through the categories which are the various stages of the development of thought. Green, Mc Taggart and others have emphasised the same point. In fact, the foundation of this true Idealism was already laid down, many centuries before Kant and Hegel, in the *Upaniṣads*. Prajāpati’s emphasis on the fact that the true self is the ultimate subject, the fundamental postulate of all knowledge, the transcendental background of the empirical trinity of knowledge, knower and known, the self-luminous and the self-proved pure consciousness which manifests itself as the subject and the object, as the self and the not-self, and which at once overreaches that division.⁵ Yājñavalkya’s declaration in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* that the self, the ultimate knower, can never be known as an object because it knows all object, and yet it does not reduce itself to an abstraction because never is the knowledge of the knower destroyed, never is the sight of the seer destroyed; that when the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when the fire is extinguished, the self alone shines in its light;⁶ the thundering assertion in the *Kaṭha* that ‘Not there the sun shines, nor the moon or the stars, not this lightning either. Where then could this fire be? Everything shines only after the shining spirit; through its light all this shines;’⁷ and in the *Mūṇḍaka* ‘The fire is its head, the moon and

the sun are its eyes, the four quarters of the sky its ears, the *Vedas* are its speech, the wind is its breath, the universe is its heart, for verily it is the immanent self of all beings;⁸ are sufficient to prove our assertion. Prajāpati teaches Indra that the real self illumines consciousness but itself is not in consciousness. The Atman is the transcendental background of both self and not-self, and none can doubt its reality.

In the *Māndūkya Upaniṣad* also we find a similar analysis of consciousness. We are told that the self in the waking states enjoys gross objects; it has the consciousness of the external world and is called ‘*Viśva*’. In the *Svapna* or dreaming stage it enjoys subtle objects, having consciousness of the internal world and producing its own imaginary object is called ‘*Taijasa*’. In the stage of *Suṣupti* or sound sleep no object, neither gross nor subtle, and no subject is there. On account of this the subject-object duality is transcended leading to call it as ‘*Prājñā*’. In sleep we have absence of pain, desires and dreams. We realise the shadow of the Supreme Bliss. It is called shadow because we do not enjoy the positive bliss. Ignorance persists in its negative aspect of concealment in this state, although its power of projection is arrested. Ignorance and unconsciousness remain in this state and therefore a higher positive state is necessary. This is the fourth state of the self, a state of pure consciousness where, like the deep sleep, there is no subject-object duality, but unlike it there is enjoyment of positive bliss. All the ignorance vanishes here. The self shines in its own light as the ultimate subject without reducing itself to a mere abstraction. This is the true self, the foundation of all existence and the presupposition of all knowledge. It cannot be fully described for descriptions are possible only in the empirical state of subject-object duality. It can be realized directly and

intuitively. It is called ‘*Turīya*’, the Fourth, or ‘*Amātra*’, the Measureless. It is calm, non-dual, blissful and all-consciousness where all plurality is merged. *Aumkāra* with its parts A-U-M, the waking, dreaming and sleeping states, is its symbols. This self is the common ground of all these states. It manifests itself in these three states and yet in its own nature it transcends them all.

In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, the *Ātman* is said to be the ultimate reality. The objects are the roads, the body is the chariot, the senses are the horses, the mind is the reins, the intellect is the charioteer, the ego is the enjoyer and the *Ātman* is the *Lord* sitting in the chariot. The sense organs are further compared to good and bad horses, which Plato in his dialogue ‘*Phaedrus*’ has also considered them in the same way. The *Kaṭhapaniṣad* further emphasizes that the sense organ are higher than the objects, the mind is stronger than the senses, the intellect is superior to the mind, the subtle reason (*mahat*) is superior to the intellect, the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) is obviously better than the subtle reason, and the Pūruṣa (*ātman*) is higher than the Unmanifest, and there is nothing higher than the Pūruṣa which is the ultimate end, the highest reality. Objects, senses, mind, intellect, reason-all exist for the self and serve its purpose. It is the self that is immanent in them and gives them life and meaning. But these cannot be identified with the self, for it transcends them all. This is the core part of the teaching imparted to Nachīketā by Yama. The self is immortal, self-proved and self-luminous and can only be directly realized by transcending the empirical subject-object duality.

Classification of Ātman: Jīvātman and Paramātman

Ātman is a general term used to indicate the ultimate reality. *Ātman* can be classified into two. One is *jīvātma*, another is *paramātma*. *Jīvātma* refers to the ultimate reality of you and me. *Paramātma* refers to God. There is only one *paramātma* - that is Brahman or God. *Ātman* is a very abstract term and hence it is something which is devoid of all describable elements. It has no name, it has no form. It has no body. It is not the Mind. It is beyond knowledge, beyond ignorance. It is the core identity and the ultimate reality. As for example, *Paramātma* is like ocean, *ātman* is like water, *jīva* is like sponge, and *jīvātma* is just a name for the water inside the sponge. *Paramātma* is soul of souls, *Ātman* is soul (but universal and only one), *jīva* is the feeling of being just a part, and *jīvātma* is the portion of universal soul which is felt inside that *jīva*. *Paramāthman* is *jīvātma* covered in *Māyā*. Once *māyā* is lifted or understood from *jīvātma*, it becomes *Paramātma*. Ultimately, *Paramātma* will rejoice with Para Brahman to achieve liberation.

Ātmān originally meant “breath” and then came to be applied to whatever constitutes the essential part of man, his self or soul. The distinctive meaning of *Brahman* is the ultimate source of outer world while that of *Ātman* is the inner self of man. Though they seem to be having independent significance, they were used interchangeably. The source of the central essence of the individual is distinguished from the physical form leading to the development of the word *Ātman* as the meaning of soul or self. *Ātman* as the soul or self is the inmost truth of man; the method of unveiling the truth was subjective and often it was based on introspection.

The concept of universal consciousness was universalized, i.e. the universe was described as parts of *Pūruṣa* or a giant man. To exemplify few, the departed soul was addressed in the funeral hymns as “let thin eye go to the sun, thy breath, to the wind, etc.” The notion of parallelism between the individual and the world runs throughout the literature of the later *Vedic* period. *Ātman* as the self or inmost truth of man becomes the cosmic soul or self. The concept of unity is very much concentrated with the importance in the *Upaniṣadic* teaching called *Mahāvākya* (*aham brahmṣmi*) showing identity between a *jīva* and *self*. An individual (*jīva*) as the world (*jagat*) is the manifestation of the same reality. There is essential identity between nature and man. The Vedāntic principles assert that *Brahman* is the innermost universal being characterized by pure consciousness (*Cīt*) and *Ātman* (the self) is the innermost individual being characterized by individual consciousness (*Cītta*). The essence of personality is something beyond body, life, mind and intellect. It is *Ātman*, the self. Its chief attribute is consciousness. The self exists before, in and after the various states of consciousness: wakeful, dream and sleep. Denial of consciousness means denial of everything else. Hence, mind and self are not identical. The self is knower (*kṣetrajña*), the seer (*draṣṭā*), the witness (*sākṣī*), and the immutable (*kūṭastha*). The composite whole of *cīt* and *acīt* (consciousness and matter), *kṣetrajña* and *kṣetra* (knower and known), *kartā* and *karaṇa* (doer and its instrument) is the total personality called *Jīva* and *Jīvātman* – the embodied self. *Jīva* (the individual), *Pūruṣa* (the person), *Saṃsārī* (the worldly person), *Vijñanaghana/Vijñanātma*, *Prajña*, *Ātmā/Pratyagātma*, *Sarīrī*, *Kartā*, *Bhoktā*, and *kṣetrajña* are synonymous in this cases.

Existence of Relation between word and its meaning in Indian Philosophy

Now, I will discuss the existence of relation between word and its meaning in Indian Philosophical perspective. It has been interpreted in terms of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā school of Philosophy respectively.

According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, power is not any new kind of real over and above seven kinds accepted in the school. But in the case of *Mīmāṃsā* theory, it is a completely separate category (*padārtha*) and cannot be subsumed under any of the seven categories accepted by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. According to *Takraṣaṅgraha* 'śakti is just like a God's will which is not acceptable in the *Mīmāṃsā* theory. *Mīmāṃsā* theory said that a 'word' is a kind of 'sound'. It is a substance (*dravya*) and its power to signify that is something intrinsic. On the other hand, *Naiyāyikas* said that the consciousness being on whose desire or will the meaning of relation is based on a super human being or God. In this case, we can say that the conscious being may be a human being.

According to *Takraṣaṅgraha Dīpīka*, the 'power' of a word consists in the relation between the word and what it signifies. Such type of relation according to their theory is called temporal relation (*kālīka-sambandha*) where a word and what it signifies would also have been covered by the unqualified definition. The term cow etc. have their 'signifying power' with reference only to a Universal and it is the Universal that is first presented in our mind as a characterizer (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the awareness of a particular thing arises by the implications (*ākṣepa*). This theory has been admitted to a section of people in which is not acceptable in all cases.

In *Takraṣaṁgraha Annambhaṭṭa* stated that ‘śakti’ or the signifying power of a word is consisting in a particular kind of God’s will. He has been introduced the *Nyāya* position that *śakti* is a kind of relation (*padapadārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ*) which is not any new optical category. The knowledge of *śakti* or the direct significant power of a term coming among the other things, from the practice of experienced persons (*vṛddhavyavahāra*). When a child with a curiosity to know anything, after hearing and elderly-speaker uttering the words ‘Bring a cow’ and observing the ‘Bringing a cow’ by an elderly hearer, he infers the presence of a volition (*pravṛttī*) in the later; then he assured by ‘agreement in presence’ (*anvaya*) and ‘agreement in absence’ (*vyatireka*) that the knowledge bring the volition in elderly hearer is due to the utterance of the elderly speaker. Such type of explanation gives us how the ‘signifying power’ (*śakti*) of a term like ‘cow’ comes to be apprehended by a child. In this case the author takes the help of two instances of ‘linguistic practice’ (*vṛddhavyavahāra*)- one is ‘bring the cow’ and another is ‘bring the horse and buying the cow’.

Now the author is given another interpretation of a term in which is indirect signifying power of a statement. The indirect signifying power also exists in a term is called *Lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* is a relation of a term to what is ‘directly signified’ (*śākyā*) by it. When we are saying that ‘the milkmen’s hamlet is in the Ganga’ there is the presentation to our mind of the river-bank owing to its relation of the stream which is directly signified by the *Gangā*. Here the ‘direct signifying power’ of the term is not admitted with the reference to the river-bank. Similarly, when we taking the term ‘*saindhava*’, there is the absence of any direct mutual relation between ‘*salt*’

and ‘horse’. In this case, we are observing of a multiple ‘direct signifying power’.

According to *Annambhaṭṭa*, ‘*lakṣaṇā* is the relation to a ‘*śākya*’ (*śākya sambandhaḥ lakṣaṇā*). A *śākya* is what is signified by the ‘*śaktī*’ of a term and a ‘*lakṣya*’ is what is signified by the ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ of a term. In this context, we have made a clear distinction between a ‘*śakya*’ and a ‘*lakṣya*’ or ‘*śākya*’ (*vācyārtha*) and a ‘*lakṣya*’ (*lakṣyārtha*’. As for example, ‘The milkmen’s hamlet is in the *Gangā*’. In this statement only one of the term ‘*Gangā*’ has been employed in an indirect sense. In its direct sense, the term stands for a river. But here in this sentence it has been employed to mean the bank of the river *Gangā* and not the river itself. The bank has close proximity to the river and it has been meant by the term ‘*Gangā*’ indirectly owing to this relation of ‘proximity’ which the bank bears to the stream of water. The river is meant by ‘the direct signifying power’ of the term ‘*Gangā*’ and the river-bank by the ‘indirect signifying power’ of the same term.

From the above discussion here it is clear that the concept of *lakṣaṇā* and its classification is required to explain in the following way: The potency of a word to signify secondary meaning is known as *lakṣaṇā* (indication). It is also called metaphorical usage. Though the indicated meaning is different from the literal meaning, it is nevertheless based on the primary meaning. Secondary meaning arises only when the denoted meaning of a word is incompatible. The phrase *gangāyām ghoṣaḥ* (house on the river Ganges) cannot be explained by its denoted meaning, because a house cannot be situated on the stream of a river. The meaning of the phrase ‘on the river *Gangā*’ can be understood only in terms of indication.

Classification of *Lakṣaṇā*:

There are three types of *lakṣaṇā*. They are as: - (i) *jahal- lakṣaṇā* (ii) *a-jahal- lakṣaṇā* and (iii) *jahat-ajahal- lakṣaṇā*. The first kind of *lakṣaṇā* is called '*jahal- lakṣaṇā*'. (i) where there is absence of logical connection (*anvaya*) of the 'direct significate' (*vācyārtha*) of a term with other significates is called '*jahal- lakṣaṇā*'. For example, "The platforms are 'shouting' (*mañcāḥ krośanti*)". Here the term 'platform' has been used in an indirect sense. The direct meaning of the term is a kind of 'lifeless material structure'. But taken in this direct sense the sentence as a whole is non-sense. So in the case of *jahal- lakṣaṇā* 'the direct significate' of a term occurring in a statement taken alone with the other direct significates of the other terms occurring in which it does not make any sense. This type of 'indirect sense' or 'indirect signifying power' of a term is called '*jahal- lakṣaṇā*'. In other words where there is absence of logical connection (*anvaya*) of the 'direct significate' (*vācyārtha*) of a term with other significates it is called '*jahal- lakṣaṇā*'. (ii) The second kind of *lakṣaṇā* or indirect sense of a term is called '*a-jahal- lakṣaṇā*'. Where there is logical connection is not merely of the indirect significate but it also the 'direct significate' '*a-jahal- lakṣaṇā*'. For example 'people with parasols are passing'. In this case, the indirect sense indicates the composite term 'people with parasols' (*chatrīṇaḥ*). Here the statement is intended to mean that "a group of people, most of whom are 'bearers of a parasol (*chatrīṇaḥ*)' are passing". The phenomenon of 'passing' which is intended to be conveyed by this statement has a 'logical relation' not merely to those who are with parasol but also to those who have none. Third kind of *lakṣaṇā* is called

'jahat-ajahal- lakṣaṇā'. Where there is a logical connection of one part of the 'direct significate' with other significates after the leaving out of another part is called "*jahat-ajahal- lakṣaṇā'*". In the case of *lakṣaṇā* we can arise as an example of *Upaniṣadic* statement 'That art thou'. The *Upaniṣadic* dictum 'That art thou' explaining that the identity of finite soul with the infinite spirit. The term 'that' means 'the infinite spirit' and 'thou' means 'the finite spirit'. Both of this has been taken in the direct sense. But each of this term would signify just spirit of consciousness that is indirect sense of interpretation. This kind of 'indirect sense' has been described as '*jahat-ajahal- lakṣaṇā'*'.⁹

After the details interpretation of the above three types of *lakṣaṇā* *Annambhaṭṭa* has given another interpretation regarding '*vṛttī'* and '*vyañjanā'*'. Where the 'direct sense' in the term signify respectively to a 'burning substance' or a kind of 'wild beast' has been called '*gaunī vṛttī'*'. For example, 'the young fellow is a lion' or 'the young scholar is fire'. Here it is clear that the term have been used here in an indirect sense, not in the direct literal sense. This indirect sense is the one that has been called *lakṣaṇā*. In this context *Annambhaṭṭa* said that 'the relation to the direct significate' (*śākya-sambandha*) that constitutes '*lakṣaṇā'* in which may be either immediate or mediate. In the statement 'the milkmen's hamlet is in the *Gangā'*- it means the 'bank of a river' is in immediate relation of conjunction too the 'stream of water' that is the direct significate of the term. In other words, the statement 'the young scholar is fire' stating that the term means by its 'indirect signifying power' the properties of 'purity' and 'brightness' which are presenting in the burning substance itself that constitutes the direct significate of the term 'fire'. Now the author has

rejected the term ‘*vyañjanā*’ but *Mīmāṃsāka* thinkers has been introduced in details of this term ‘*vyañjanā*. In the *Dhvanī* school of Indian poetics the advocate by *Ānanda-varadhana* and his followers have given the details interpretation regarding the concept of ‘*Vyañjanā*’. According to advocates of the theory of ‘*Vyañjanā*’, it can be classified into two. One is base on the term (*śabda-śaktimūlā*) and the other is base on the power of what is signified by a term (*artha-śaktimūlā*). The first kind of *vyañjanā* we have already found in the example of ‘the milkmen’s hamlet is in the *Gangā*’. The second kind of *vyañjanā* named ‘*artha-śaktimūlā* is being explained and examined in details in the following ; “*gaccha gacchāsi cet kāṅta, panthānaḥ santu te śivāḥ; Mamāpi janma tatraiva, bhūyāt yatra gato bhavān*”¹⁰- here the words are supposed to be spoken by a devoted wife to her husband on the eve of letter’s departure for a distant place. In the first two sentences we have the direct anxious expression of the feeling of a devoted wife on the eve of her separation from the husband. But taken along with the third sentence, they take on a new complexion and suggest something quite the opposite of what they signify in their direct sense. Here the author actually suggesting the sense is as follows: “Beloved, my life will be gone after you departure. So please do not go”. So the *vyañjanā* theory said that it is not be obtained either through the direct or the in direct signifying power of any of the words, rather it has been obtained through a different kind of signifying power of what is mean by the statement. Such type of suggested sense here has been used as ‘*artha- śaktimūlā*.

From the above discussion it has been shown in short that the metaphysical or the ontological presuppositions are the background under which theorisation is made.

References:

-
- ¹ *Kriyagunavat samavayikaranam dravyam. Vaisesika- Sutra*, I, I, 15.
- ² Chakrabarti, K. K. (1999) *Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind* (The Nyāya dualists tradition) Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, pp. 103-113.
- ³ *Yadāpnoti yadādatte yacchātti viṣayāniha. yacchāsya santato bhāvas tasmād ātmeti kīrtiyate.*-*Shāṅkara's Com. on Katha 2. I. I.*
- ⁴ Sharma, C.D., *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi. 2003.
- ⁵ *Chāndogya* VIII. 12.
- ⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. IV. 3. 6.
- ⁷ *Kaṭha* II. 2. 15.
- ⁸ *Mūṇḍaka* II. 1. 4.
- ⁹ *Tarkasamgraha with Dīpikā*: Narayan Chandra Goswami, (Ed.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata, 1983.
- ¹⁰ Annambhaṭṭa: *Tarkasamgraha with Dīpikā*, translated and edited by Gopinath Bhattacharya, Progressive Publishers, Kolkata, 2006, p. 291