

CHAPTER - 2

THE CONCEPT OF METAPHOR IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The term 'metaphor' is derived from '*metaphora*', a Greek word comprising *meta* (over) and *pherin* (carry), and literally means 'carrying over'. The word *meta* means to go beyond. So, the term metaphor literally means: (a) to carry over (... something), (b) to go beyond the given. It refers to a particular set of linguistic process whereby aspects of one object are 'carried over' or transferred to another object, so that the second object is spoken of as if it were the first. In other words, the essence of metaphor lies in understanding and experiencing one kind of object in terms of another. There are various types of metaphor and the number of 'objects' involved can vary, but the general procedure of transference remains the same.

"Awake! for Morning in the Bowl of Night

Has flung the stone that puts the stars to flight." ¹

Or

"It's what's under the bonnet that counts." ²

Metaphor is traditionally taken to be the most fundamental form of figurative language. Figurative language does not exactly mean what it says. Cars do not wear bonnets. Night is not a bowl of water and morning does not throw stones into it.

Language which means (or intends to mean) what it says and which uses words in their standard sense as used by the ordinary speakers of the language, is said to be *literal*. Figurative language deliberately *interferes* with the system of literal usage by its assumption that terms literally connected with one object can be transferred to another object. The *interference* takes the form of transference or 'carrying over' with the aim of achieving a new, wider and special or more precise meaning.

Inevitably, figurative language is usually descriptive and the transferences involved result in what seem to be 'pictures' or 'images'.

"An aged man is but a paltry thing,

A tattered coat upon a stick ..."³

However, the term 'imagery' is essentially misleading, when it is used to refer to figurative language. The term 'imagery' presupposes that its primary appeal is to the eye. Here the case is slightly different. The appeal of figurative language may include the visual sense, as the above metaphor certainly shows, but its essential mode is linguistic and as such, its appeal goes much further. In this case (the given example), an extensive non-visual response involving myth and symbol in terms of the relationship of birds and scarecrows is required.

The various forms of 'transference' i.e., turning language from literal towards figurative meanings are called *figures of speech*. Metaphor can be regarded as the fundamental 'figure' of speech because it manifests the basic pattern of transference involved.

Truly speaking, the use of metaphors involves a deliberate deviation by the speaker from the actual or conventional meanings of the words or expressions. Nevertheless, it is possible for a hearer to understand what the speaker wants to say in his metaphorical statement.

In Indian tradition, the Sanskrit term '*Rūpaka*', a kind of *Alamkāra*, bears the corresponding concept of Western 'metaphor'. In '*Rūpaka*' one object is deliberately superimposed on another. The technical term 'superimposition' corresponds to Sanskrit '*Āropa*', which is derived from '*Rūpa*'.

In India, we can trace the use of metaphor or *Rūpaka* back to early Vedic times. Yāska, the pioneer etymologist, in his *Nirukta* pointed out and recognised the use of this *Alamkāra* in the Vedic literature. He refers to the function of superimposition under the name *Upamā* in explaining a hymn from the *Rgveda Saṁhitā*:

atiṣṭhantīnāmāniveśānānāmī
kāṣṭhānāmī madhye nihitam śarīram /
vṛtrasya ṇinyamī vi caranyāpo
*dīrghamī tama āśayadindrasātruh //*⁴

Yāska explains this verse by saying that the *Nairuktas* (etymologists), take *Vṛtra* as clouds while the *Aitihāsika* i.e., historians or compilers take *Vṛtra* as the name of a demon, the son of *Tvaṣṭṛ*. According to Yāska, *Vṛtra* and *Indra* refer to water (rain water) and light (lightning) respectively and their battle refers to

rainfall by *Upamā*. Yāska's commentator Durgācārya explains the term *Upamā* as *Rūpaka*. During the time of Yāska, there was no science of rhetoric (*Alamkārasāstra*) and as such, specific names for specific figures had not come into vogue. However, the example he cited clearly shows not only the existence of metaphor but also its popularity even during early Vedic times. Other instances of the use of metaphor can also be found in Vedic literature. A good example of this figure is found in the *Sūryasūkta* where the sun is said to be the soul of all moving and static objects.⁵

Yāska has clearly recognised the function of superimposition in another aspect. According to him, there is a palpable incongruity in identifying natural phenomena as sentient deities with human shapes and feelings. Yāska in the seventh *Adhyāya* (sixth and seventh *Pādas*) of his *Nirukta*, has delved deep into the question whether gods have definable forms (*Sākāra*) or they are formless (*Nirākāra*). If they are *Sākāra*, are they conscious like human beings (*Puruṣavidha*) or are they lacking in human consciousness (*Apuruṣavidha*)? Durgācārya, while commenting on Yāska, explains that there are three schools of thought in interpreting the Vedas.

The first school i.e., *Ātmavit pakṣa* believes that the knowledge of *Ātman* is the sole significance of the study of the Vedas. The problem of *Puruṣavidha* or *Apuruṣavidha* gods does not arise for them, as the single consciousness can have neither form nor shape. The second, the *Daivata* or *Nairukta* school holds that the significance of the Vedas lies in the proposition of the gods by means of sacrifice. The third, the *Yājñikapakṣa*, is of the opinion that the significance of the Vedas lies in the superimposition of consciousness on unconscious objects, thus conceiving of gods who can be praised. Yāska, though technically belongs to the *Nairukta* school, appears to be totally in sympathy with the view of the *Yājñikapakṣa*.

From the earliest days of civilization man has superimposed human features and sense on natural phenomena as well as animals, birds and even inanimate objects like stones, chariots etc. They are endowed with human thoughts and feelings and are imagined as gods. Yāska has gone deep into the *Puruṣavidhatva* of deities and after him, his commentator Durgācārya also analyses this process of superimposition. This superimposition also found expression in art

and literature. Kālidāsa's Yakṣa begs the rain cloud to carry a message of hope to far-off Alakā where his gentle spouse pines in grief.

*Santaptānām tvamasi śaraṇam tat payada priyāyāḥ
 sandeśam me hara dhanapatikrodhaviśleṣitasya
 gantavyā te vasatiralakā nāma yakṣeśvarāṇām
 bāhyodyānasthitaharaśiraścandrikādhautaharmyā //* ⁶

The trees and animals in the forest welcome Rāma with open arms as a friend. ⁷

Consciousness is superimposed upon these objects and creatures and this superimposition comprises *Rūpaka* or metaphor. This metaphor may be of two types: (i) metaphor in the form of *Upamāna* (in the case where *Upamāna-upameya* relation exists) and (ii) metaphor, which is imagined or implicated.

This is self-evident that *Rūpaka* or metaphor is based on an element of identity. Metaphor remains in the representation of the subject of description (*Upameya*) which is not concealed as identified with well-known standard (*Upamāna*) – '*Rūpakam*

rupitāropād viṣaye nirapahnave'.⁸ The subject is an entity on which something is superimposed. When the face is identified with the moon (*Mukhacandra*), face is *Viṣaya* or subject upon which *Candratva* is superimposed. In other words, *Viṣaya* or *Upameya* is face, which is identical with the 'moon'. In this case the distinction between these is not concealed in spite of having excessive similarity.⁹ The ascription of the identification between two objects whose difference is not concealed (*'Atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropah'*) is called *Rūpaka*.

The phrase '*Nirapahnava*', which appears in the definition, is of great significance because it differentiates metaphor or *Rūpaka* from illusion and *Apahnuti*. In the case of *Rūpaka* the distinction between *Upamāna* and *Upameya*, though known, is not concealed but in the case of illusion the distinction between them is not ascertained at all (*Bhedāgraha*). In *Apahnuti* an object is denied to be what it really is and something else is ascribed to it (e.g., This is not face but the moon - *Nedaṁ mukhaṁ kintu candra*) while in *Rūpaka* there is no such denial.¹⁰ As the *Viṣayī* imposes its forms (*Rūpa*) on the *Viṣaya*, it is called *Rūpaka*. Though two objects possess different

opposite properties and their distinction is completely known, yet sometimes there is hypothetical ascription of identity in order to show their extreme similarity (*Kālpānikābhedaṛopah*).¹¹ Here is a beautiful example of *Rūpaka* from *Āyurveda* - “*Vāyupittakaphebhānām śarīravanacāriṇām eka eva nihantānsti lavaṇādrakakeśarī*” (that is, the lion in the form of salt with wet ginger is the only killer of the elephants in the forms of wind, bile and cough roaming about the forest in the form of body). In this case, we find so many metaphors as body is identified with forest, wind etc. with elephants and salt etc. with lion. In these cases, both the counterparts of the metaphor are mentioned.

There are some cases of metaphor, which are imagined or implicated. Here metaphor is a kind of inferred or imagined entity because there is no other way out to make the sentence meaningful.

We express our ideas and feelings by means of language. Again, without the use of sentence this expression is not possible. A sentence is nothing but a combination of significant words (*Padas*). But a mere combination or concatenation of words cannot constitute

a significant sentence. Such a concatenation can be a sentence if it satisfies certain conditions namely: (a) expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*), (b) compatibility (*Yogyatā*) and (c) contiguity (*Sannidhi* or *Āsatti*) as causes of the comprehension of meaning.

Ākāṅkṣā : The term in ordinary usage means 'desire'. But desire is a property of conscious entities and a word surely is not anything conscious. What then is this *Ākāṅkṣā*, which has been regarded as a condition for understanding a statement? In Annambhaṭṭa's language – *Padasya padāntaravyatirekaprayuktānānubhāvakatvam ākāṅkṣā*, i.e., the inability of a word to produce, without another word an apprehension (*Anubhava*) of the relation between what is signified by these two words. Let us take for example a statement like "Bring a pot". Here the term 'bring' is not able to produce without the term 'pot' (and vice versa) the awareness of the relation between what is signified by these two words. The words in a sentence should be so related as to convey a coherent idea. There should not be the absence of the completion of the sense. If a person utters the word 'horse', the listener will at once be inquisitive to know more about the horse. But if it is said

that the horse is running, the desire to know will be satisfied. *Ākāṅkṣā* is thus a kind of 'syntactical demand'. A collection of terms uttered together as 'a cow, a horse, an elephant, and a man' do not lead to any understanding of a statement, just because there is no syntactical demand existing between the several terms of the collection.

Yogyatā : In the language of *Tarka-Samgraha - Arthābādhaḥ yogyatā* i.e., the absence of incompatibility (*Bādha*) among what is signified by the several words of a statement. There must not be any factual bar to the presence of the intended relation among the significates of the several terms. For example, "He is seeing with his eyes". Here we find no incompatibility among what is signified by the several words of the statement, which is accordingly admitted as a source of '*Śabda-bodha*'. The most oft-quoted example of incompatibility is, "He is sprinkling with fire" (*Vahninā siñcati*). There is no syntactic incompatibility but 'sprinkling with fire' seems to be entirely absurd; as 'the power of sprinkling' or 'being sprinkled' is not possible with fire.

Sannidhiḥ: ‘*Padānāmvilambena uccāraṇam sannidhiḥ*’ i.e., the utterance without delay of the several terms that constitute a statement. For example, a statement like “A horse is a quadruped” spoken in a normal manner i.e., the several words uttered without any undue time-gap among them. It would obviously be a source of knowledge. The same words, however, uttered at long intervals of time, say of one hour (a horse ... is ... a ... quadruped) will not be a source of any verbal knowledge because of the absence of the required *Sannidhiḥ*.

Among these, the knowledge of *Ākāṅkṣā* and *Sannidhiḥ* are highly essential in comprehension of the primary, implicative and suggestive meaning. So far as *Yogyatā* is concerned, it is the cause for the comprehension of primary meaning (*Śakyārtha*). In the example “He is sprinkling with fire”, there is lack of *Yogyatā* due to not having consistency in meaning. Though in this sentence there is no *Yogyatā*, it at least points out that it is an impossible phenomenon. We may quote a line from the *Meghnādvadha* by Madhusūdan Dutta - “*Phuldal diyā kātīlā ki vidhātā śālmali tarubare?*” i.e., does God cut the silk-cotton tree called *Śālmali* with

the petal of flower? In fact, the petal of flower cannot cut the hard tree like *Śālmali* and it lacks the semantic compatibility. Nevertheless, it has got a power to refer to secondary or metaphorical meaning. The sentence implies that the cutting of the said tree by flower-petal is an impossible phenomenon, which is attained through the non-realizability of *Yogyatā*. In the same way, the statement "I am building castle in the air" refers to an absurd phenomenon through implication arising from non-realizability of *Yogyatā* (*Yogyatānupapatti*). In this case, a sense or meaning is apprehended. When one makes the above statement, the hearer understands the metaphorical meaning of the statement.

There are many terms that refer to some absurd entities (*Alika*) just like *Bandhyāputra* (barren woman's son), *Ākāśakusuma* (sky-flower) etc. According to Naiyāyikas, these are non-categories (*Apadārtha*) as they do not come under the purview of the accepted seven categories. These are meaningless expressions. Nevertheless, we mean something with these words – the meaning we grasp is metaphorical and not literal.

Some usages of words give rise to a secondary sense. This will also be included in the range of metaphorical use. The words in such cases are not put forward in their direct conventional meaning but come to acquire some secondary meaning. This indirect sense is known as *Lakṣaṇā*. According to Annambhaṭṭa, *Lakṣaṇā* is the property of a term as *Śakti* is, but there is a difference. Though *Lakṣaṇā* like *Śakti* may be described as a signifying power, its reference to its significate is indirect. It is thus unlike *Śakti* whose reference to the significate is direct. In case of *Lakṣaṇā*, a term signifies something indirectly i.e., through the mediation of that property which has been described as *Śakti*. In Annambhaṭṭa's language, *Lakṣaṇā* is the relation to a *Śakya* (*Śakyasambandhaḥ Lakṣaṇā*). A *Śakya* is what is signified by the *Śakti* of a term and a *Lakṣya* is what is signified by the *Lakṣaṇā* of a term. Thus, we have the distinction between a *Śakya* and a *Lakṣya* or a *Śakyārtha* (= *Vācyārtha*) and a *Lakṣyārtha*. To illustrate this 'indirect sense' of a term, the author cites a sentence "*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*" i.e., the milkman's colony is in the Ganges. In this statement only one of the term viz., *Gaṅgā* has been employed in an indirect sense. In its direct

sense, the term stands for a river. Here in this sentence it has been employed to mean the bank of the river *Gaṅgā* and not the river itself. The bank has a close proximity to the river and it has been meant by the term '*Gaṅgā*' indirectly owing to this relation of proximity, which the banks bear to the stream of water. The river is meant by the term *Gaṅgā* and the riverbank by the indirect signifying power of the same term.

We have to observe now how this indirect sense finds currency in literature. In our daily life also, we notice definite instances when people make themselves understood in such a manner as to employ a particular word secondarily (in a sense not popular through convention). In the oft-quoted example of *Mañcāḥ krośanti*, what occurs is that the idea of shouting is found to be incompatible with the platform. The listener is thereby forced to resort to some sense nearest in relation to render the statement meaningful. The result of all these deliberations is that '*Mañca*' drops its conventional sense and in the fitness of things adopts the sense of "people standing on the platform (*Mañca*)". The word gives up its original sense and adopts another, which is most compatible

and applicable. As this goes beyond the given, this may be taken as metaphor. There are other instances of 'meaning-shifting' and 'expansion of meaning'. We can take '*Kuśāla*' into consideration. It must have happened long ago, that a preceptor must have asked his disciple to bring the *Kuśā* grass. The student discarded all other unwanted grass and collected only *Kuśā*. Apparently this word means 'one who brings the *Kuśā* grass' or the 'grass chopper'. Now it has come to acquire the sense of 'skilful', as it must have required some dexterity at the hands of the person who chopped only *Kuśā* discarding all other grass. This conforms to the fact that these two meanings are not entirely dissimilar and unconnected. Only the skilful can play the lyre and chop the grass with perfection. If we use the word, nobody would bother with its conventional sense, which would more naturally be understood. These and others like these have denounced their conventional or derivative sense, so much so, that they are of necessity interpreted in their secondary meaning. This is known in Semantics (Science of meaning) as the 'widening of meaning'.

Lakṣaṇā has other names - *Gauṇī*, *Vṛtti*, *Upacāra*, *Āropa*, and the sense derived is sometimes called *Bhākta*. The grammarians have maintained that there are two types of senses - conventional and the implied - *Vācya* and the *Lākṣaṇika*. The various examples cited in this connection are so suitable and applicable that they have always been employed in establishing *Lakṣaṇā*. In the example '*Mañcāḥ krośanti*', 'people standing on the platform (*Mañca*) have been referred to by the term *Mañca* itself. 'The *Vāhika* is a bull'. It is apparent that a human being cannot possess the bodily attributes of a bull, but the quality of foolishness found in a bull can be attributed to the *Vāhika* also.

Bhartrhari has divided the meaning of words as *Gauṇa* (secondary signification) and *Mukhya* (primary signification) and has shown two fold *Upacāra* (imposition) as pertaining to *Śabda* and *Artha*. Those who take one word as capable of expressing several meanings; that is to say, find only one word like 'Go', which is applicable to both cow, and *Vāhika* have their theory based on the assumption of restricted or accidental meanings. It must, however,

be remembered that a word does not simultaneously express more than one meaning.

The Mīmāṃsakas do not approve of *Lakṣaṇā*. In cases of words like 'Kusāla' and 'Praviṇa' where the rhetoricians admit of *Rūḍhi Lakṣaṇā*, the Mīmāṃsakas say that the usage is so strong that it rises up again and again and gives rise to *Rūḍhārtha*. *Lakṣaṇā* does not become stronger than *Abhidhā*. Sabara points out clearly that though the direct sense of a word is found unsuitable to a context, the word cannot yet abandon it for good. The *Lakṣyārtha* cannot be entirely different from the *Vācyārtha* attained just by the stretch of imagination. If the word is to have any connection with its *Lakṣyārtha*, it can only have it through its *Vācyārtha*. This is, in other words, the *Tadyoga* of Mammaṭa.

The Mīmāṃsaka, further, does not very much appreciate the idea of bringing in *Lakṣaṇā*. He does so, as a last resort. Just because *Lakṣaṇā* sets aside the *Mukhyārtha* (the primary meaning) it is a *Doṣa* or fault no doubt, but *Ānarthakya* (meaninglessness of a sentence), *Adrṣṭakalpanā* (imagining something, which is not at all

seen), *Vyavadhāna* (great gap between words or within sentence) and *Vākyaabheda* (difference of sentence) are greater demerits (*Doṣas*). *Lakṣaṇā* is to be preferred to them at least.

Mammaṭa is the massive pillar on which stands the firmament of almost all the branches (except dramaturgy) of literary criticism. He has studied closely the views of his predecessors, assimilated them and embodied them in his *Kāvya Prakāśa* in a very clear and lucid manner. Mammaṭa says:

Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito 'tha prayojanat

Anyo'rtha lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā.

Three conditions are essential for *Lakṣaṇā* and they are *Mukhyārthabādha* (sublimation of the primary meaning), *Mukhyārthayoga* (connection with primary meaning) and the support of *Rūḍhi* or *Prayojana* or end-in-view. The implied sense must be related to the primary sense; it must be different from the primary sense and it must be promulgated by some popular usage or underlying motive. Moreover, the process, which has bearing upon the indicated sense, is called Indication. The word *Āropita* is significant in this definition. It explains the difference between

Abhidhā and *Lakṣaṇā*. One is conventional whereas the other is got at by implication.

Karmani kuśalaḥ and *Gaṅgāyāmi ghoṣaḥ* have been cited by Mammaṭa to explain the *Lakṣaṇā* of both types arising through usage and motive. “A person is skilful in doing a work”. This is the implied sense of the sentence “*Karmani kuśalaḥ*”. The primary meaning of the term *Kuśala* – “a cutter of *Kuśa* grass” – is applicable in the present context. What actually is comprehended through *Lakṣaṇā* is the idea of an expert who is similar to the cutter of *Kuśa* grass in point of discrimination. This *Lakṣaṇā*, he points out, is based on usage because the term *Kuśala* itself has gained currency to convey the idea of the expert. Viśvanātha criticizes the observation of Mammaṭa. He maintains that the idea of the expert itself constitutes the conventional meaning of the term *Kuśala* and consequently, it does not stand in need of taking the help of Indication for its expression. Regarding the sense of the cutter of *Kuśa* grass, he is of the opinion that it merely forms the etymological meaning of the term, which is not identical, in all cases, with its conventional meaning. This happens because, while etymology is regulated by the

convenience of grammarians, convention is regulated by usage and practice.

According to the *Ālamkārika*, *Abhidhā* or *Śakti* is a power belonging to words, while *Lakṣaṇā* is a function belonging actually to the primary meaning and not to the word-unit. He says that when the explicit idea of a term becomes incompatible with the concepts of other terms used in the proposition, the explicit idea itself conveys the secondary sense through the function of Indication belonging to it.

Like the *Ālamkārikas*, the *Mīmāṃsakas* also consider *Lakṣaṇā* as a function belonging to the primary meaning, conveyed through the function of denotation. However, the doctrine of the *Naiyāyikas* presents a different picture. They do not accept the proposition that incompatibility of the primary meaning with the concepts of the other terms used in the sentence paves the path for *Lakṣaṇā*. They point out that this proposition leaves out of the scope of *Lakṣaṇā* in such expressions as “Admit the sticks” (*Yaṣṭhiḥ praveśāya*) or “Protect the curd from crows” (*Kākevhyo dadhi rakṣyatām*) because

there is no syntactical incompatibility (non-realisation of relation). But here the implicative meanings are 'Admit the holders of sticks' and 'Protect the curd from crows as well as non-crows' (from all destroyers). Therefore, *Anvayānupapatti* (non-realisation of relation) cannot always be the reason or seed of *Lakṣaṇā*. Hence, it is admitted by the Naiyāyikas that the non-realisation of intention; but not of relation is the root of *Lakṣaṇā*. The importance of the application of *Lakṣaṇā* lies in the fact of removing the non-realisation of intention (*Tātparyānupapatti*) of the speaker,¹² which is also supported by Nāgeśa.¹³

Now what is to be understood by the term '*Tātparya*'? The desire of the speaker (*Vakturicchā*) is *Tātparya*.¹⁴ It has been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *Tātparya* (*Tatpratīticchayā uccaritatvam*).¹⁵ When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *Tātparya*. The term *Uccaritatva* is superfluous here because in the written statement of the dumb persons there is *Tātparya* though the statement has not been uttered. Hence, it is better to accept the

former definition (i.e., the intention of the speaker is *Tātparya*), which is also supported by the grammarians.¹⁶

If a speaker intends to express that fish lives in the water and utters the same sentence (i.e., *Gaṅgāyāmi ghoṣaḥ*), the implicative meaning is to be accepted on the term '*Ghoṣaḥ*' denoting fish secondarily in order to bring the realisability in *Tātparya*. If a speaker, on the other hand, possesses an intention to make others aware that the milkman colony exists on the bank of the *Gaṅgā* and utters the same sentence, the implicative meaning has to be accepted in the term *Gaṅgā* as per the intention of a speaker as well as for the realisability of *Tātparya*. As per the intention of the speaker the implicative meaning of the terms *Gaṅgā* and *Ghoṣaḥ* are to be taken as the bank of the *Gaṅgā* and fish respectively. Hence, the realisability in respect of *Tātparya* but not relation is the seed of *Lakṣaṇā*. Moreover, this point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence *Kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām* (i.e., protect the curd from the crow etc.) in which there is obviously *Tātparyānupapatti* (non-realisation of the intention of the speaker) but not *Anvayānupapatti* (i.e., non-realisation of the relation). The

statements like 'We do not smoke here', 'Thanks for not smoking' etc. have no incompatibility in the relation (*Anvayānupapatti*), but there is the incomprehensibility of the intention of the speaker which leads to the implicative meaning like 'Please do not smoke'. In order to incorporate all types of *Lakṣaṇā*, it is better to accept the non-realisation in respect of *Tātparyā* as *Lakṣaṇā* but not otherwise.

Let us see the role of *Tātparyā* in determining the meaning of an ambiguous sentence having various meanings. Consider the word 'Saindhava', which means 'salt' as well as 'a horse'. Now if somebody while taking food utters the sentence "Saindhavam ānaya", (i.e., bring *Saindhava*) then certainly in this situation the speaker intends to mean 'salt' not the 'horse' by the word 'Saindhava'. Therefore, *Tātparyā* or intention of the speaker is to be understood by the particular context or *Prakarāṇa*.¹⁷

Let us examine whether the non-realisation of the semantic compatibility (*Yogyatānupapatti*) may be taken as the root of implication or *Lakṣaṇā*. The semantic compatibility (*Yogyatā*) is the relation of the meaning of a word with the meaning of another

(*Padārthe tatra tadvatta yogyatā parikīrtita*).¹⁸ Such awareness is the precondition of the verbal comprehension. The sentence – ‘sprinkling with water’ (*Jalena siñcati*) gives a verbal comprehension due to having semantic compatibility. It is known to us that the instrumentality of water is connected with the meaning of the word ‘sprinkling’. In absence of such *Yogyatā*, verbal comprehension is not at all possible. In the sentence “sprinkling with fire” (*Vahniṅ siñcati*) there is no verbal comprehension because fire cannot be an instrumental to the action of sprinkling.

If there is the non-realizability of the semantic compatibility (*Yogyatānupapatti*), it may give rise to the metaphorical or implicative meaning. Though the sentence ‘sprinkling with fire’ (*Vahniṅ siñcati*) does not provide any verbal comprehension due to the lack of *Yogyatā* (semantic compatibility), yet it can give metaphorical or implicative meaning due to the non-realizability of the semantic compatibility (*Yogyatānupapatti*). We may take a few examples of *Lakṣaṇā*, which can be taken as arising out of inconceivability of semantic compatibility. If it is said that ‘*Gaṅgāyāmi ghoṣaḥ*’, ‘*Kaliṅgaḥ sāhasikaḥ*’, ‘*Mañcāḥ krośanti*’, ‘*Simhaḥ*

mānavakah' etc., they will give rise to meaning – 'the milkman colony is on the bank of the Ganges', 'The inhabitants of Kalinga are brave', 'The persons standing on the platform are shouting', 'The man is a lion', etc. through secondary implication. All these examples of *Lakṣaṇās* are also the examples of metaphors because in all the cases the words give up the conventional meaning and adopt a new compatible meaning.

In this connection, it should be kept in mind that *Yogyatānupapatti* may lead us to attain the implicative or metaphorical meaning in some cases but not in all. Therefore, the non-realisation of intention of the speaker (*Tātparyānupapatti*) has been taken as a root of all including the place where there is a non-realisation of the semantic compatibility (*Yogyatānupapatti*).

If the intention of the speaker is realised (*Tātparyopapatti*) the primary meaning (*Śakyārtha*) is known immediately there. The necessity of exploring any implicative meaning becomes inevitable if there is the non-realisation of the intention (*Tātparyānupapatti*) alone that may, of course, be caused by the non-realisation of

either semantic compatibility (*Yogyatānupapatti*) or expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣānupapatti*).

Now we may see how the non-realizability of expectancy leads us to the attainment of implicative meaning. A word must have an expectation with another word if the former is not found related without the association of another (*Yat padena vinā yasyānubhavadatā bhavet sākāṅkṣā*).¹⁹ The *Kāraṅkas* cannot generate relation without the help of the verb and hence there is an expectancy of *Kāraṅkas* with the verb (*Kriyāpadamī vinā kāraṅkapadam nānvayābodham janayatiti tena tasyākāṅkṣā*).²⁰ If it is said – ‘The door please’ (*Dvāram*), it will provide no meaning due to the lack of expectancy with a verb. This non-realizability of expectancy gives rise to the non-realizability of intention (*Tātparyānupapatti*). For this reason the verbs ‘close’ or ‘open’ have to be brought here through implication considering the context (*Prakaraṇa*) under which it is spoken.

So far as non-realizability of contiguity (*Āsattyānupapatti*) is concerned, it cannot be taken as a pointer to the non-realizability of

intention (*Tātparyānupapatti*) separately. If there is any such *Anupapatti* here, it is not different from the non-realizability of expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣānupapatti*). *Āsatti* is defined as the contiguity of the words (*Sannidhānan tu padasyāsattirucyate*).²¹ If a word is uttered in the morning and another word uttered in the noon, they cannot provide any meaning because they cannot be related at all due to having a long temporal gap. When the first word is uttered in the morning, there remains an expectation of the second word that though uttered in the noon, cannot be related to the first one as there is no criterion or scope to relate this. The speaker might have uttered many sentences by this time about which we are least interested. Hence, the words uttered unrelated can be described as the lack of *Ākāṅkṣā* but not *Āsatti*. When someone utters a word 'cow' in the morning, the question will be asked then "What about the cow?", "Where is the cow?" If the questions remain unreplied, we may draw our conclusion that there is the lack of *Ākāṅkṣā* or expectancy in it.

It is shown earlier that if there is the realizability of intention (*Tātparya-upapatti*) there is the primary meaning (*Śakyārtha*). If

there is the non-realisabililty of intention (*Tātparya-anupapatti*), the implicative or metaphorical meaning is to be resorted to. Hence, the *Tātparya* has got the prime role in understanding the meaning of a sentence, but not other three. The intention of the speaker or *Tātparya* is a prime factor for understanding the meaning of literal as well as metaphorical sentences.

In Indian Philosophy, corresponding concept of metaphor is *Rūpaka*. However, in wider perspective *Upamā*, *Utprekṣā*, *Vytireka*, and *Atiśayokti* can be termed as metaphor. There is *Upamāna-upameya-bhāva* (a relation between a metaphor and the object metaphorised) in every place.

Upamā (Simile):

“*Sāmyam vācyamvaidharmyam vākyaikya upamā dvayoḥ*”²²

Sense of similarity is cognised through the primary function of *Abhidhā* in *Upamā*. Instead of denoting contradictory attributes, the sense of similarity is cognised through the primary meaning between *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. The main thing in *Upamā* is *Sādharmya* or equality of attributes. For example, *Puruṣaḥ simha iva* becomes

Puruṣasimhaḥ in which the similarity of valour is cognised. Instead of saying that a man is as valiant as lion, we say *Puruṣasimhaḥ*. We know that there are differences between man and lion. Though they have contradictory attributes, *Sādharmya* (equality of attributes) i.e., ‘*Sāhasikatā*’ (valour) is cognised between *Upamāna* (lion) and *Upameya* (man). We find three examples of *Upamā* in the following verse:

“*Saurabhamambhoruhavanmukhasya kumbhāviva stanau pīnau /
Hṛdayam̐ madayati vadanam̐ tava śaradinduryathā vāle//*”

1. *Saurabha...mukhasya* – Here *Mukha* (face) is *Upameya*, *Ambhoruha* (lotus) is *Upamāna* and *Saurabha* (fragrance) is *Sādharmya* (equality of attributes).
2. *Kumbhāviva stanau pīnau* – *Kumbha* (urn) is *Upamāna*, *Stana* (breast) is *Upameya* and *Sādharmya* is *Pīnatva* (the property of being fleshy).
3. *Hṛdayam̐ madayati* ... Here *Mukha* (face) is compared with *Śaradindu* (moon of autumn). *Śaradindu* is *Upamāna* and *Mukha* is *Upameya*. *Sādharmya* is *Madayati* (passion) that is both the face and the moon have got a common feature of generating passion. In the

case of simile, both *Upamāna* and *Upameya* have got some common properties. When a face is compared to the moon (as in the case of *Mukhacandraḥ*), the absolute identity as in the case of *Rūpaka* is not recommended, but the common features like lustre (*Lāvanya*) etc. are recommended. Through the use of such *Upamāna* the poet wants to show this feature, and hence it is surely a metaphorical use in a wider sense.

Utprekṣā (poetical fancy):

“*Bhavet sambhāvanotprekṣā prakṛtasya parātmanā*”²³

In case of *Utprekṣā*, there is the possibility (*Sambhāvanā*) that *Upameya* seems to be *Upamāna*. The etymological meaning of the term *Utprekṣā* is *Urdhagāminī prekṣā* or *drṣṭi* i.e., sublime vision. The flight of imagination that lends excellence to poetic talent is called *Utprekṣā*.

Utprekṣā originates from the great or excess similarity of *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. In spite of their great similarity, there remain their differences. For instance, whether this is a trunk of a tree or man (*Sthāṇurvā puruṣaḥ*) this cognition is in doubt

(*Samis'aya*). This must be a trunk of a tree – this is certainty (*Niscaya*). Possibility (*Sambhavanā*) occupies the middle position between doubt (*Samis'aya*) and certainty (*Niscaya*).

In *Utprekṣā*, the superimposition of identities is the central theme. Here the *Upameya* is partially submerged under the *Upamāna* i.e., it is a case of *Sādhya adhyavasāya*. In the works of many famous poets, we find excellent examples of *Utprekṣā* –

*“Limpatīva tamo'ngāni varṣatīvāñjanam nabhaḥ /
asatpuruṣasveva drṣṭirviphalatām gatā //”²⁴*

It is as though darkness smears the limbs and collyrium is raining from the sky. Sight, as if, fails like service to an evil man. Here the actions of smearing the limbs and of raining collyrium are superimposed as belonging to darkness and the sky respectively.

Upamā and *Utprekṣā* both are due to similarity (*Sādrśya*). In *Upamā*, *Upamāna* is practical or real but in *Utprekṣā* that is impractical or imaginary. As that is imaginary there remains the possibility (*Sambhavanā*) of *Upameya* to act as *Upamāna*. In case of *Upamā* there is no such doubt (*Samis'aya*). Apart from the above

case, there is practical ground also available in *Utprekṣā* like *Upamā*. “*Tasyāḥ mukhamibhāti pūrṇacandraḥ evāparaḥ*”. In this example of *Utprekṣā*, the face of the young woman is a practical object. Poetic imagination is not possible without this. There is *Upamāna-Upameya-bhāva* in *Utprekṣā* like *Upamā*, but due to excessive similarity, *Upameya* seems to be *Upamāna*. Moreover, in *Upamā* there is no question of possibility between *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. When it is said – ‘the face is just like moon’, there does not arise any question of possibility, as it leads directly to the apprehension of common features or similarities like lustre or beauty etc. between *Upamāna* and *Upameya*. In the case of *Utprekṣā*, the activities ascribed to darkness are in the realm of possibility because between ‘darkness’ and ‘smearing limbs’ there is the term ‘*iva*’ (as if) which puts a question mark between them. Hence, it is *Utprekṣā*, not *Upamā*. When it is said that the face is as if moon, a question mark on the identity between *Upamāna* and *Upameya* is raised by the usage of the term ‘*iva*’. In spite of this *Utprekṣā* has some potentiality to indicate a specific meaning and

therefore we can consider it as a metaphorical expression in a wider sense.

Atiśayokti (Hyperbole):

“*Siddhatve dhyavasāyasyātīśoktinirgadyate*”²⁵

In *Atiśayokti*, the *Upameya* is totally submerged under the *Upamāna* (*Siddha adhyavasāya*) or in other words it is swallowed (*Nigīrṇa*) by the *Upamāna*. In case of *Atiśayokti*, the *Upameya* is totally absent and has to be grasped by implication from the context. For example—

“*Latāmūle līno hariṇaparihīno himakaraḥ*

sphurattarākārā galati jaladhārā kuvalayāt /

dhunīte bandhukam tilakusumajanmāpi pavano

*bahirdvāre puṇyam pariṇamati kasyāpi kṛtinah //”*²⁶

At the base of the vine lies the moon without the stag; streams of water like bright stars flow from the blue lotus; the air, emerging even from the *Tila* (a kind of oil seed) flower, shakes the *Bandhuka*; the good fortune of some virtuous persons approached the front door. Here the heroine’s face etc. the series of *Upameyas* are not present at all. But the series of *Upamānas* i.e., moon etc., figure solely in the verse keeping a single *Upameya* in view.

Atiśayokti or hyperbole is regarded by many as the basis of all figures of speech. Daṇḍin says –

“*Alamkārantarānāmapyekāmāhuḥ parāyaṇam*
vāgīśamahitāmuktimimamatisayāhvayām /”²⁷

Hyperbole or exaggeration, which is rightly considered as the basis of all literature, is essential for any figure of speech. When we compare the face with the moon, we undoubtedly exaggerate. We cannot deny the fact that in our everyday speech, we unconsciously slip in hyperboles as we do in metaphors. The poet has got the liberty to use language but the poet’s desire to speak or write (*Vivakṣā*), which is accepted in Indian poetics, must not cross the limit. One cannot say anything to indicate anything. One must say something, which is believable to others and within the range of public experience. If it is done, it comes under the *Alamkāra* called *Atiśayokti*. If it crosses this limit, it is no more an *Alamkāra*. That is why it is said by Daṇḍin in his *Kāvyaḍarśa* –

“*Vivakṣā yā viśeṣasya lokasīmātivarttinī /*
asāvatiśayoktiḥ syādalamkārottamā yathā //”²⁸

Vyatireka (disparity):

*“Ādhikyamupameyasya upmānāt nyūnatāthavā vyatirekaḥ.”*²⁹

Superiority (*Utkarṣa*) or inferiority (*Apakarṣa*) of *Upameya* to *Upamāna* is known as *Vyatireka*. It is of two kinds: (1) *Upameya* is superior to or credited with greater quality than *Upamāna*. (2) *Upameya* is inferior to or possesses lower quality than *Upamāna*. *“Akalamikamī mukhamī tasyā na kalamikī vidhuryathā”* i.e., heroine’s face is blemishless that is not like moon which has blemishes. Here moon is *Upamāna* and face is *Upameya*. Here face is credited with greater quality than moon.

There is a nice balance, as pointed out by the Indian rhetoricians, between identity and difference in *Upamā* (simile). When this balance tilts in favour of difference, we call it *Vyatireka* (disparity). On the other hand, if the emphasis is laid upon the identity over and above the difference, we find the figure *Rūpaka*.

It is widely accepted that metaphor (*Rūpaka*) forms the basis for most other figures of speech. Indian rhetoricians are mostly of the view that *Upamā* or simile serves as the basic figure and other

figures are merely its variations. In the following *Śloka*, *Upamā* has been compared to a skilful actress who appears in many roles to entertain the audience –

*“Upamaikā sailusī samprāptā citrabhūmi kābhedān /
rañjavate kāvyarange nr̥tyantī tadvidāṃ cetah̥ //”³⁰*

However, a careful analysis shows that it is the *Rūpaka* and not the *Upamā* that gives rise to numerous figures. In *Upamā*, two objects are said to be similar since there is some common factors between them. But how can there be a ‘common’ factor between two distinct objects? One factor belongs to A alone while another factor belongs to B alone. Hence we must conceive of a superimposition of identities between the two factors before similarity can operate. Thus *Upamā* is as much dependent on *Rūpaka* as *Rūpaka* on *Upamā*.

We have already discussed that the superimposition of identities is the central theme in *Utprekṣā*. *Atiśayokti* too concerns superimposition of identities. When we speak of the heroine’s face, – “This is the moon”, – we do superimpose the moon on the face.

From the above discussion the fact emerges very clearly that superimposition is inevitable for language. Hence, it would be redundant to analyse every figure to show how identification is the operative function in each case.

We have already seen that the Indian name for metaphor is *Rūpaka*. It is that figure where one object is superimposed on another. Now in wider sense, all the figures or *Alamkāras* mentioned above can be called metaphor.

Aristotle, in the early period, while giving a philosophical treatment of metaphor describes it under the art of poetry as a means by which the poet provides knowledge through artistic imitation. He describes it also under the art of rhetoric as having a philosophically crucial role in the making of persuasive arguments. Metaphor is the means of achieving insights in both cases. Aristotle says in his "Poetics", "A noun is a composite of sounds with a meaning; it is independent of time and none of its individual parts has a meaning in its own right".³¹ He goes on to say, "Every noun is either a word in current use or a foreign loan-word, a metaphor or

an ornamental word, a poetic coinage or a word that has been expanded or abbreviated or otherwise altered".³² According to him, a metaphor is a *noun*. Defining metaphor he says, "Metaphor is the application to one thing of a name belonging to another thing; the transference may be from the genus to the species, from species to the genus; from one species to another or it may be a matter of analogy".³³ According to him, metaphor is said to be based on *similarities* between two things. "...the greatest thing, by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is one thing that cannot be learned from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity of dissimilars. Through resemblance, metaphor makes things clearer".³⁴

Aristotle gave prominence to metaphor based on analogy because perhaps he regarded analogy important for reasoning. He had already hit upon the cognitive role of metaphor, which is comparatively of modern interest. The metaphor provides us with a way of learning something novel about the world, or about how the world can be seen and understood. He pointed out a kind of cognitive feature in cases where metaphor is used when a proper

name already exists; it is a means of remarking on a previously unrecognised similarity. Aristotle says, "... it is by induction of particulars on the basis of similarities that we infer the universal".³⁵ He saw in metaphor a powerful conceptual tool as he firmly believed that similarity is the basis of metaphorical transference and granted to the perception of similarity a crucial cognitive role.

We can call it *substitution view of metaphor* where a metaphorical expression is used in place of some equivalent literal expression. A metaphor of the form 'S is P' (e.g., Lisa is a tigress) is an indirect way of presenting the intended literal meaning 'S is R' (Lisa is fierce).

This substitution view is a special case of *comparison view of metaphor* where a metaphor consists in the presentation of the underlying similarity or analogy. The comparison view holds that the metaphorical statement can be replaced by an equivalent literal *comparison*. When a speaker uses the metaphorical statement 'S is P' his intended literal meaning is 'S is like P, in the following respect' (i.e., Lisa is like a tigress in being fierce). Most of the

developments of the Aristotelian tradition have treated metaphor as decoration or comparison.

However, there is a distinction between substitution view and comparison view. This distinction can be explained by taking an example like Tom is an ass. According to the former view, the sentence means approximately the same as 'Tom is stupid', whereas, according to the latter the sentence means approximately the same as Tom is like an ass (in stupidity). In the latter translation as in the substitution view, the metaphorical sentence is taken to be standing in place of some *literal* equivalent. Nevertheless, the comparison view includes an elaborate paraphrase in as much as the original sentence is interpreted as being about asses and also about Tom.

Max Black argued that an objection against the comparison view is that it suffers from a "vagueness that borders upon vacuity". Another defect of this view is that metaphorical sentence can never be equivalent in meaning to literal statements of similarity, for the meanings of the two types of statements are different.

The comparison view does not explain how we are to compute the meaning of any given metaphor. The view fails to explain how we are able to find out the relevant similarities in each instance. Further, we should notice that for many metaphors there simply are no literal similarities between objects as needed by this comparison view. There are some metaphors like *orientational* metaphors, which are grounded on correlations within experience and not on similarities. This kind of orientational metaphor does not structure one concept in terms of another. This type of metaphor gives a sense of a spatial orientation, e.g., *Happy is up*, which actually means "I am feeling up today".

It can be said that comparison view makes at least two mistakes: first, the view assumes that since similarity often plays a role in our comprehension of a metaphor, it is the essence of the meaning of the metaphor; and secondly, the view takes similarity as the main basis for the act of comprehension. Although similarity often plays a role in the comprehension of metaphor, yet metaphorical assertion is not necessarily an assertion of similarity.

Another well-known view on metaphor is the *interaction view*. This view, it is believed, is free from the chief defects of the substitution and comparison views of metaphor. It also offers some new and important insights into the uses and limitations of metaphor. Let us take the sentence, "The poor are the Negroes of Europe" as uttered in context of discussion on European poor. Now, as we know that the substitution view would tell us that in this metaphorical sentence something is being *indirectly* said about the poor of Europe, the comparison view would say that this sentence presents some comparison between the poor and the Negroes. Now, I.A. Richards disapproves both the views. He says that our thoughts about European poor and (American) Negroes are active together and interact to generate a meaning which is a result of that interaction – "In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction".³⁶ Richards further says that metaphor is "fundamentally a borrowing between an intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts".³⁷ It is true that in the given situation

the focal word "Negroes" gets a *new* meaning, which is neither its meaning in literal uses, nor the meaning which any literal substitute would have. The *frame* of the metaphor or the new context imposes extension of meaning upon the focal word. In the metaphor "S is P" (e.g., Tom is a gorilla), the system of associated "commonplaces" of S interacts with those of P to produce emergent metaphorical meaning. The "associated commonplaces" are the properties and relations that are commonly believed to be true of a person, object etc., even if they do not really apply. For example, "is fierce", "is prone to violence", "is nasty" and so on, might be commonplaces of "gorilla" involved in our comprehension of the metaphor, regardless of the fact that gorillas may not really be fierce in the way they are believed to be. In fact, understanding a metaphor is not a matter of comparing actual properties of objects – rather it is based on what the terms of the metaphor call to mind for us.

Max Black's chief contribution was on the notion of *interaction*. According to him, we use one entire system of commonplaces (e.g., that of the gorilla) to *filter* or organize our conception of some other system (e.g., that of Tom). The

“interaction” is a screening of one system of commonplaces by another to produce a novel perspective on some object. Black holds that this projection of one system onto another is an intellectual action, which is not reducible to any mere comparison of objects to mark their similarities. It can be said then that it is possible to justify claims about the indispensability of metaphor for cognitive insight.

Max Black’s essay on metaphor tried to develop the thesis that metaphor has an irreducible cognitive force. His above thesis grows out of and often in opposition to the views of I.A.Richards, Monroe Beardsley and others who have contributed to the interactionist theory articulated by Max Black. This account can be called a *perspectival theory*. As *perspectival* implies a subject who observes from a stance, we can say that metaphor provides the linguistic realisation for the cognitive activity by which a speaker of a language makes use of one linguistically articulated realm to obtain an understanding of another experiential or conceptual realm, and similarity by which a hearer grasps such an understanding.

Max Black in his article on metaphor holds that the metaphorical sentence can be called the *frame* and the words used metaphorically can be called *focus*. The frame “imposes extension of meaning upon the focal word”.³⁸

Richards in his use of “vehicle” does not make clear whether the term is to apply to the idea given by the focal word or to the contextual and conceptual inferences relating to the focal word. Black uses *subsidiary subject* to indicate the former and introduces “a system of associated commonplaces” for the latter. By isolating the latter, Black makes explicit what Richards only hints at viz., that a metaphor not merely invokes two subjects but in the case of vehicle or subsidiary subject, involves a “system of associated commonplaces”. This system serves as a “filter” or “lens” and is used to organise our view of the principal subject (tenor). These two subjects like principal subject and subsidiary subject are best regarded as “systems of things”. For Max Black the metaphors actually work by applying to the principal subject a system of *associated implications* characteristics of the subsidiary subject. We can think of a metaphor as a screen and the system of *associated*

commonplaces of the focal word as the network-lines upon the screen. We can also say that the principal subject is *seen through* the metaphorical expression. In other words, the principal subject is actually projected upon the domain of the subsidiary subject. Black's claim is that the use of one complex system of implications to select, emphasise and organise relations in another field of implications is a *distinctive intellectual operation* that is not reducible to any mere comparison between elements within the two fields. No literal paraphrase will grasp the cognitive insight provided by the metaphor.

Martin Warner argues that metaphors are not mainly of stating truths or of conveying information through assertions. On the contrary, metaphor has a unique "hortatory" or "suggestive" illocutionary force, by which it can be used to help the reader see one thing in terms of another.³⁹

Our standard language is based on the *dictionary meaning*, which is called *primary meaning* whereas metaphorical expressions are associated with *secondary meaning*. In metaphors there is a kind

of *shift* from the literal approach. It is to be noted that there is an extreme view that does not give any preference to the metaphorical language. This view rather ignores the importance of the metaphorical language and gives prominence to what is called the *literal-truth-paradigm*. This paradigm claims that the human conceptual system is essentially literal and that the literal language is the only instrument by which one can express meaning precisely and can make truth-claims. According to this paradigm, metaphor tends to confuse by using words in other than their *proper senses*. In metaphorical utterances what the speaker means differs from what he says. Let us take two sentences for illustrating this. First, a sentence uttered metaphorically, and second, a sentence that displays literally what the speaker means when he utters the first sentence metaphorically. Thus, (i) Robin is a stone (metaphor); (ii) Robin is an unemotional and unresponsive person (paraphrase).

This *literal-truth-paradigm* holds that metaphorical or figurative use is utilized merely for rhetorical purposes. Using rhetoric truths is an art of persuasively communicating truths. They are grasped merely in literal terms and then rephrased by using

alternative formulations. Thus, as this paradigm claims, metaphorical expressions follow from the literal ones. Further, metaphors draw our attention to some similarities between two or more things, and thus the figurative meaning of a metaphor is that which captures the corresponding simile.

Now this literal-truth-paradigm is found in J.L.Austin's theory. Let us take two metaphorical sentences: "The chairman ploughed through the committee", "All the world is a stage". This kind of sentences has extra-literal meanings but Austin says metaphorical sentences do not say anything beyond the literal. Else, Austin contends that our performative utterances, felicitous or not, should be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances. Austin tries to exclude the extra force of the non-serious, the parasitic or the metaphorical expressions from the domain of the literal language. He says: "a performative utterance will, for example, be, in a peculiar way, hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem or spoken in soliloquy".⁴⁰ Austin contends that language in such circumstances is used not very seriously; rather it

is in ways parasitic upon its normal use – and this language therefore should be excluded altogether.

Let us consider the question as to how metaphors work in any cognitive enterprise. The answer perhaps depends on how the scholars develop the philosophy of language. If we take the account of metaphor as given by John Searle, metaphor can be seen apparently to be included in a philosophy of language, but this Searlean account is just a sophisticated version of Austinian account of metaphor which holds that metaphor is nothing but following from the literal.

According to Searle, the problem of explaining how metaphors work would be similar to explain how it is possible to say one thing and mean some other thing. By using metaphor one successfully communicates what one means, though the speaker and the hearer know very well that what the speaker uttered do not literally express what the speaker meant. When a person says, 'David is a bull' or 'The house is sleeping' then we know that he does not mean what he says literally. In other words, speaker's utterance meaning

diverges from sentence meaning. It is thus important to emphasise that the problem of metaphor concerns the relations between word and sentence meaning on the one hand and speaker's meaning or utterance meaning on the other. What a person or a speaker means by uttering words, sentences and expressions is called *utterance meaning* and what the words, sentences and expressions mean is called *sentence meaning*. One must note that metaphorical meaning, according to Searle, is the speaker's utterance meaning. Thus Searle says, "... the speaker means metaphorically something different from what the sentence means literally ... metaphorical meaning is always speaker's utterance meaning." ⁴¹ The literal meaning of a sentence, according to Searle, is that which, in conjunction with certain background assumptions, determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false; whereas a speaker's meaning is a function of his intentions, so that talking about a metaphor's possible meaning is talking about speaker's possible intentions. Searle says that speaker in a metaphorical sentence intends to communicate some proposition "S is R" which is different from the proposition "S is P" – the one he actually utters.

Now it is very important to explain more clearly how metaphorical utterance differs from literal ones. In order to explain this we must arrive at a characterization of literal utterances. Let us take the examples that Searle gave as those of literally uttered sentences – (a) Sally is tall. (b) The cat is on the mat. (c) It is getting hot in here. The above literally taken sentences determine a set of truth conditions relative to a specific context. Now these sentences, like most sentences, only determine a set of truth-conditions against the background of assumptions, which are not explicitly understood in the semantic structure of the sentence. Everybody knows what are the truth conditions of “The fly is on the ceiling” but not of “The dog is on the ceiling.” The difference here is not because it is a matter of meaning, but because of our factual background information, which help to determine the meanings of sentences. Where speaker’s meaning coincides with sentence meaning, i.e., in literal utterances, it is the speaker who should contribute more to the literal utterance than the semantic content of the sentences, for the semantic content only determines a set of truth-conditions relative to a set of assumptions. A successful communication is

possible if the hearer shares one's assumption. In addition, by determining a set of truth conditions, the literal meaning determines a criterion of similarity between objects. For example, all round objects are similar with respect to being round, and the like. Thus Searle says that there are three features which are to be kept in mind for our discussion of metaphorical utterance: "First in literal utterance the speaker means what he says; ... second, in general the literal meaning of a sentence only determines a set of truth-conditions relative to a set of background assumptions which are not part of the semantic content of the sentence; and third, the notion of similarity plays an essential role in any account of literal prediction".⁴²

Even though the proposition "It is getting hot in here" can be used by a speaker in just its literal sense, where utterance meaning and sentence meaning differ, the same proposition can also be used metaphorically for a remark in a context where a terrible argument is going on. The reason for this is that in metaphorical utterances what the speaker means is different from what he says. Thus according to Searle, we actually require two sentences in the case

of metaphor – one is the sentence uttered metaphorically and the other is a sentence that displays literally what the speaker means when he utters the first one metaphorically. Thus, Tom is a gorilla (metaphor). Tom is fierce, nasty and prone to violence (paraphrase).

When due to the violation of the rules of *speech act* or violations of *conversational principles of communication* or for its non-sensical feature, an utterance like “Robin is a stone” cannot be taken literally, only then we must go for an utterance meaning which is distinguished from sentence meaning. This is put by Searle as: “... the utterance, ‘Sam is a pig’ ... cannot be literally true ... The defects which cue the hearer may be obvious falsehood, semantic non-sense, violations of the rules of speech acts, or violations of conversational principles of communication. This suggests a strategy that underlies the first step : *where the utterance is defective if taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning.*”⁴³

There are some defects in Searle’s theory. Among the three stages of his strategy by which a hearer can understand a speaker’s

metaphorical meaning, as he thought himself, it is definitely crucial to give emphasis on the second one for computing possible values of R. However, Searle ought to have concentrated little more on the third strategy, i.e., when he talks about restricting the values of R, because this is equally important. When one utters a metaphorical sentence "Sam is a pig" then the question arises as to: to which the person is drawing our attention? This should be worked out. Perhaps the person is drawing our attention to certain particular characteristics of pigs vis-à-vis Sam's. Now the question is, why do we take only certain characteristics of pigs and why do we ignore others while trying to understand this metaphorical sentence? Certain salient and widely believed properties of pig, e.g., that they have tiny tails, four legs and so on are not at all relevant in the metaphorical attribution – the question is why that is not treated as relevant here? What is in fact the criterion of such restrictions? Searle has not cared much to give emphasis on this point – strictly speaking, he is not at all successful in explaining this case.

Searle maintains that "dead metaphors" are not at all metaphors. Dead metaphors are already standardized and they have

thus taken the place of the literal. They can no longer be treated as metaphorical. "The original sentence meaning", as Searle puts it, "is by-passed and the sentence acquires a new literal meaning identical with the former metaphorical utterance meaning".⁴⁴ Searle's strategy works easily in the case of dead metaphors, but it does not work so easily in the case of new metaphors. It is noteworthy that metaphors have some creative aspects and for this very reason it is not so easy to work out principles in such cases. In dead metaphors the creativity is already frozen, so there is no problem in handling the principles; but this is not the case with new metaphors where creative aspect is still young. It seems then that Searle's account of metaphor cannot explain satisfactorily the creative aspect of new metaphors.

There is another extreme view that puts emphasis on the metaphorical. This view holds that metaphor has major place in our language. Thinkers like Nietzsche and Gadamer are of the opinion that metaphor is not actually a substitute for the literal but it is more fundamental. They have put forward the thesis of primacy of metaphor and tried to establish that the metaphor is not at all

secondary and is not the cryptic substitute for the literal – rather it can very well live by its own right.

According to Nietzsche, one can refuse to separate metaphor from *proper words* and can see metaphoric understanding as pervasive in human thought and speech. He considers metaphor not merely as a linguistic entity, but rather as *a process by which we encounter our world*. He holds that we experience reality metaphorically and that there is a relation between metaphor and the world. This idea perhaps includes the Nietzschean thought that metaphor is our fundamental way of responding to the world with words. Thus, Nietzsche holds that language is fundamentally metaphorical and not primarily literal. He showed that any philosophical or non-philosophical ventures that we consider paradigmatically literal are actually guided by metaphors.

Perhaps Nietzsche saw some other important points as to why language is fundamentally metaphorical. There are disagreements regarding what should be included in the domain of literal, as the literal language itself is ambiguous. There are some who think that

the domain of the literal has a stock of meanings suggested by conventional usage within its limits, whereas religious fundamentalists would take religious texts as literal. Thus, there can be different views concerning what should be called literal. It follows that one cannot have an exact standard by which one will be able to say accurately what is literal in a language.

According to Nietzsche, literal is subsequent to and parasitic upon the metaphorical use of language. By metaphor, Nietzsche means *carrying over*. To him the very process of *knowing and perceiving* is permitted in several senses by metaphors. To him every epistemological discourse that we take to be literal is actually derived from metaphors. We can note how even perception can be taken to involve metaphor. When a nerve stimulus is first transposed into an image, it involves carrying over what was given within the realm of physiological stimuli into the domain of imagination, and in fact this is carrying over from one sphere to another. Ordering of perceptions or structurization of experience of reality involves what Nietzsche calls *Knowledge Metaphors*. These fall under three headings: Space, Time and Causality. The most important of these is

causality. The metaphorical character of causal judgements takes its birth from carrying over our experience of willing and performing an action into the realm of objects. According to Nietzsche, "The causality we are conscious of is between willing and doing – this we carry over onto all things ...".⁴⁵ We have a direct experience of causality in the case of our willing and it is this experience, which is carried over into the world of physical objects.

If we follow Nietzsche's view of metaphors, what we call "true" or a literal concept is only the *customary* metaphor. The literal is nothing other than just an instance of a *dead* metaphor, i.e., one whose metaphorical character has been forgotten. Hence, in Nietzsche we have found that some metaphorical uses are so longstanding that we forget they are metaphorical and then treat them as literal, with the word "metaphorical" being stocked for those which do not have such longevity. Thus, the fixed truths of our culture are nothing but metaphorical understandings that have become conventionalised to the point where their metaphorical nature is forgotten. In other words, truths only belong to that

metaphor which has become established, i.e., not fresh metaphors but rather the metaphors that have become "worn out".

"What therefore is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms: in short a sum of human relations which become poetically and rhetorically intensified, metamorphosed, adorned and after long usages seem to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions; worn-out metaphors which have become powerless to affect the senses...".⁴⁶ Therefore it can be said that metaphors can be true in so far as they become fixed and sedimented in our language. An important fact to be noted is that metaphorical concepts are embedded in our very patterns of thought. For example, the figurative non-literal usages like "you are a sly fox", "leaf of a book", "in the back of his mind" and so on, have all become fixed in our language and are treated as conventionally true, and since this is so, they are a part of our thought. Again, if we survey the typical domain of Philosophy we will learn that the expression "stream of consciousness" used by William James or the word "picture" used by Wittgenstein are all metaphorical by nature.

Through our frequent use they have become standardized or sedimented in our language and consequently taken a permanent place in our thoughts. Such figurative and non-literal usages are well established in our language. These are actually known as *dead metaphors* as through prolonged usage their metaphorical meaning turn into literal. Thus, it follows that this literal is derived from the metaphorical.

Gadamer's thesis concerning primacy of metaphor is somewhat clearer than that of Nietzsche. "If a person transfers an expression from one thing to the other", says Gadamer, "he has in mind something that is common to both of them, but this need not be in any generic universality. He is following, rather, his widening experience, which sees similarities. ... It is the genius of linguistic consciousness to be able to give expression to these similarities. This is its fundamental metaphorical nature ...".⁴⁷

According to Gadamer, the perception of similarities guides our extension of words from some objects to others. He says that there is a transition from the "fundamentally metaphorical" stage of

language to the stage where literal and metaphorical become contrasted by speakers and where the notion of truth becomes applicable. He holds that the transition is not a matter of amnesia, but it is brought about by a great moment in the history of mind – the *determination* to classify, regulate word, define and categorise into species and genus. Moreover, it is for this determination only that the utterances become recognisable as literal. It is conceded that a man could have a concept of the metaphorical only by way of contrast to a concept of the literal. Gadamer wants to call the fundamental nature of the language metaphorical, for he believes that the speakers “transfer” words from something to others in the light of their “widening experience, which sees similarities”.

After due consideration of the forgoing arguments we can say that metaphor should be included in the domain of the philosophy of language; the distinction between literal and metaphorical should be abandoned because both are equally important in a language.

The idea that human conceptual system is essentially metaphoric was never popular in western thought. Recently this

claim has found support, especially in continental hermeneutics. Richards, Lakoff and Johnson have argued in favour of this view. Nevertheless, primacy of metaphorical language cannot stand as it fails to give any coherent account of truth and reference, which is believed to be associated with the literal. Metaphor is not determined as true and false. It is true that to any metaphorical sentence nothing in the world corresponds. And in this sense one can say that since metaphor cannot give an account of truth and reference, – as it is an extraordinary rather than ordinary language, – it cannot be accepted that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and action also. It is, however, equally true that we can easily understand a metaphorical sentence. If somebody says that ‘*The house is sleeping*’, we know that here nothing in the world corresponds, for the house does not really sleep, because only animate objects can sleep and inanimate objects cannot. However, we still entertain such ideas as that of the *house sleeping*. Although in the metaphorical sentence “The house is sleeping” the words occurring have been combined in an unprecedented way, it still carries a meaning. Such expressions are

also found in a small Bengali poem – ‘*Hater docālā mudila nayān*’ i.e., a small thatched shop with slanting roofs in a village market has closed its eyes. In fact, when weekly village market comes to end, the shutters are downed, which is metaphorised as the closing of the eyes. The moment somebody utters this metaphorical sentence, we can rightly catch in the appropriate situation that it is not uttered literally, but we have to take it metaphorically. The same thing happens when somebody says that ‘*The ship ploughed the sea*’. Here also nothing in the world corresponds because the ship cannot plough the sea, and ploughing can only be done in the field. Yet, one can understand what this metaphorical sentence means. Here the ship does something to the sea that is *like ploughing*. It is a fact that any metaphorical expression with its particular specific contexts throws a new trajectory across fixed semantic positions and that the knowledge that it expresses have always been available. Thus, we can understand metaphorical sentences like those just mentioned, for this kind of mental exercise is definitely done by us. However, this does not in any way disconnect the metaphor from the world,

for the world is in this case conceived metaphorically. Then, perhaps, truth is not always determined through correspondence.

We have already discussed in this chapter that early Indian rhetoricians consider the metaphor as a kind of interaction between two terms. Unlike Aristotle, however, they generally held similarity to be the basis of *Rūpaka*. They generally defined *Rūpaka* as an identification of two objects as a result of superimposition (*Āropa*) of the standard of comparison (*Upamāna*) on the object compared (*Upameya*). In the example, “the face is moon” (*Mukhameva candrah*), the face, i.e., the *Upameya* has the character of the moon, the *Upamāna*, superimposed upon it because of an element of similarity that exists between the two. Although the term similarity (*Sādrśya* or *Sāmya*) is not always expressed in the various definitions, the terms ‘*Upamāna*’ and ‘*Upameya*’ clearly signify the element of *Upamā* or simile involved in the figure. Indian rhetorics recognised that apart from a purely ornamental use, an identification of this kind may serve to fill a semantic void. Actually, metaphor or *Rūpaka* is a deliberate identification of two objects brought together because of a fundamental similarity between them. In the case of

Rūpaka, as the Indian rhetoricians envisaged, there is no scope for polysemy. Both words are present in the sentence, each established in its individual character.

From the above discussion, this is amply clear that there is a distinction between the concept of metaphor in the West and *Rūpaka* in the East. But the viewpoints, in spite of their difference, seem to converge on many accounts.

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