SECOND CHAPTER

The method and merits of Russell's Philosophical Analysis of Language:

In the previous chapter we have outlined the history of analysis and thereby have noticed the position of Russell in the history of philosophical analysis. Although Moore was supposed to be the beginner of philosophical analysis, but it was Russell who himself led the classical method of analysis. The most important aspect of Russell philosophical analysis is that it exemplifies the so-called modern analytic philosophy. We have also noticed in the previous sequel that though in the course of twentieth century, various forms of analysis came into consideration, but the classical method of analysis as propounded by Russell was the root of all other methods of analysis. Russell himself seems to conceive the method of analysis as an inescapable exercise in philosophy. For him the method of analysis is the one and only one root through which the real or true form of philosophy can be grasped. That is why Russell appears to conceive the method of analysis as the most resolute method of his thought. In his book **My Philosophical Development,** Russell outlines his method of analysis in a very specific manner. Russell says, "My method invariably is to start from something vague but puzzling, something which sees indubitable but which I cannot express with any precision. I go through a process, which is like that of first seeing something with the naked eye and then examining it through a microscope. I find that by fixity of attention divisions and distinctions appear where none at first was visible, just as through a microscope you can see the bacilli in impure water which without the microscope are not discernible. There are many who decry analysis, but it has seemed to be evident, as in the case of the impure water, that analysis gives new knowledge without destroying any of the previously existing knowledge."[6] The above quotation of Russell gives rise to voluminous clues of what he understands by the method of analysis and why it is supposed to be necessary for having better insight of philosophy.

Russell, unlike many others, conceives analysis in a broader perspective. For him the method of analysis is not only relevant to the structure of physical things, but it is equally relevant to concepts. Russell goes on to say that one of the most negative impact of

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[6] Russell, Bertrand: My Philosophical Development, George Allen and Unwin ltd., 1959, p.133.

philosophizing is that philosophical investigation starts from curious and unsatisfactory state of mind in which one feels complete certainty without being able to say what one is a certain of. For Russell analysis is a deeper level of philosophizing, it is a philosophical method through which one can have a better understanding of the concepts what he is thinking of. He compares the process of analysis just like 'the process that results from prolonged attention is just like that of watching an object approaching through a little fog.'[7] When the method of analysis starts, it appears just like a vague darkness, but gradually everything seems to be clear and distinct. Russell inclines to say that those who distrust analysis as a philosophical method would wish us to be content with the initial dark blur. According to Russell, the method of analysis is irrevocable in philosophy simply because in order to understand his philosophy, one has to apprehend his philosophical method of analysis beforehand. Philosophy, Russell opines, should start with the method of analysis. In the process of analysis, Russell has a strong inclination on beliefs. Russell says, "Belief in the above process is my strongest and most unshakable prejudice as regards the method of philosophical investigation."[8]

Russell's method of analysis is purely a deductive system. It is a kind of method in which language is hierarchically analyzed. The method of analysis, says Russell, sets in motion by attention to component parts by way of detecting connections and by the ordering and organizing of the complex. The objective of this method of analysis is to have clarity and precision instead of vagueness and fuzziness. This is made possible by replacing or reducing simples in place of complexes and also by replacing scientific questions in place of belief, which is indeterminate and unshakable prejudice. The doctrine, which Russell has employed in his method of analysis, is called logical atomism by means of which Russell wishes to arrive at the sort of last residue what he calls 'logical atoms' instead of physical atoms. Logical atoms at times may be called particulars. Logical atomism is a kind of analysis, Russell says, which is purely logical in character and which is by no means hinges on physical analysis. Russell elsewhere defends his method of analysis by the following remarks: "It is rather curious fact in philosophy that the data which are undeniable to start with are always rather vague and ambiguous. You can, for instance,

[7] Ibid. p.133.
[8] Ibid., p.133.

say 'There are a number of people in the room at this moment'. That is obviously in some sense undeniable. But when you come to try and define what this room is, and what it is for a person to be in a room, and how you are going to distinguish one person from another, and so forth, you find that what you have said is most fearfully vague and that you really do not know what you meant. That is a rather singular fact, that everything you are really sure of, right of is something that you do not know the meaning of, and the moment you get a precise statement you will not be sure whether it is true or false, at least right off. The process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consists mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of shadow."[9]

The merit of Analysis:

According to Russell the sole aim of analysis is to have something precise and clear from something which is imprecise and vague. Russell goes on to say that when we pass from the vague to the precise through the method of analysis, there underlies always a chance of error. One cannot easily get rid of from vague undeniable things to precise things which are going to retain the undeniability of the starting point. In his book **My Philosophical Development,** Russell, however, draws our attention to the importance of our method of analysis. He apprehends the method of analysis just like a microscope, which can be employed for seeing something through the fog. It is also a method of replacing vague, uncertainty with a clear discernment of distinctions and complexities. Russell was very much aware of those philosophers who did not abide by his method of analysis. Russell inclines to say that the philosophers who have objected the method of analysis are those who have objected every scientific advance, because all advances, Russell echoes, of modern science are based on the more and more minute analysis of the material world. Russell further claims that the so- called method of analysis is the root of

[9] Russell, Bertrand: Philosophy of Logical Atomism included in Logic and Knowledge, edited by R. C. March, Rutledge, 1956, pp. 179-80.

every understanding of philosophy. He defends his method of analysis rather metaphorically. He says, "A person without musical training, if he hears a symphony, acquires a vague general impression of a whole, whereas the conductor, as you may see from his gestures, is hearing a total which he minutely analyses into its several parts."[10] The above quotation of Russell clearly indicates the importance of the method of analysis. Thus, for Russell the merit of analysis is that by advocating this method one can have a better understanding, which he cannot have in otherwise. Russell says, "The merit of analysis is that it gives knowledge not otherwise obtainable."[11] However, this does not make sense to say, Russell claims, that one's application of the method of analysis is all about. The application of the method of analysis is the only starting point of philosophizing and one who adopts the method of analysis at the starting point of his philosophizing, he thereby runs with the proper direction. Russell says, "To advance such consideration in defense of philosophical analysis is not, of course, to say that this or that philosopher has analyzed rightly. It is only to say that he was right to attempt analyses."[12] According to Russell the method of analysis is an instrument through which philosophy can be rapidly progressed. He uses his method of analysis as a weapon for rejecting the philosophy of Kant and Hegel. In his introductory outline of **My Philosophical Development,** [13] Russell seems to believe that the method of analysis is taken into account in solving philosophical problems. He conceives that 'only by analysis is progress possible' in philosophy. Urmnson's book **Philosophical Analysis** is an excellent piece of work in which the aim and merits of Russell's method of analysis is outlined. Although Russell contrasts his method of analysis with a microscope, but at the same time he seeks utmost attentiveness, visual alertness in the application of his method of analysis. This is required for having a clear, distinct and clear view of something which originally appears to be vague like a fog. Another important aspect of Russell's method of analysis is that it is by far systematic in the sense that it acts as a deductive system and in this process there underlies a hierarchy of steps. He tells us that in the application of his method of analysis the identification of the components, though important, is not all

[10] Russell, Bertrand: My Philosophical Development, op.cit. p.229.
[11] Ibid., p. 229.
[12] Ibid. , p. 230.
[13] Ibid. , p. 14.

about. It is equally important at the same time to give considerable alertness for ordering these components. This makes sense to say that in the system of his method of analysis, Russell pleas both for the identification and ordering of the components involving in the analysis. Russell elsewhere solemnly declares that although the method of analysis is the only way to overcome the so-called philosophical problems, but it may not work at times. However what is important to be noticed here is that even if it fails undesirably at times, it would still provide or facilitate further study so that what will be required to do can easily be done. When his method of analysis works or runs properly and thereby applying in his theory of knowledge as well as to the problems concerning the justification of scientific knowledge, we can see that the vague concept of scientific knowledge and the vague concept of empirical justification will have to be analyzed into more simple, clear and ordered concepts. This is how we can justify the merit of the method of analysis as expounded by Russell. Thus Russell method of analysis is considered to be a guideline of proper philosophizing. It attempts to find out the ambiguity of the concerned problems first, and then it puts forward to formulate them with a specific manner. It also helps us to know how to formulate perceptual propositions, how to state scientific hypothesis, and what assumptions we should adopt in supporting scientific generalizations. All these things will help us to minimize the risk of error at the time of doing philosophy. Urmson says, "The aim of analysis thus was to make every statement an adequate picture of the reality it referred to, and the perfect language was the tool which could make the understanding capable of complete realization."[14]

Logical method:

The method of analysis, which Russell has proposed is called logical. For him to know the true logical form of proposition is the key of understanding his method of analysis. Russell elsewhere distinguishes logic from philosophy and thereby maintains that the method of analysis being a reductive process ought to be logical. The question is: why does Russell plea for a logical method? Russell inclines to have a logical method simply

[14] Urmson, J.O. Philosophical Analysis, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 21.

because of the fact that unlike other method, if there be any, there underlies a minimum chance of error in logical method. Philosophy, of course, desires a method by means of which the true nature of proposition can be grasped. For Russell unlike the other forms of analysis the techniques of logical analysis are almost proper for having a clear vision of reality and it is very useful for analyzing philosophical concepts. The most pertinent question is: what are these techniques and how are they being adopted in philosophy? To make these questions clear, Russell draws our attention to the techniques he has adopted in his celebrated book **Principia Mathematica**. The most notable technique he has employed in his **Principia Mathematica** – the technique that is mostly useful to modern symbolic logic- is the use of an ideal (artificial, constructed, logical) language. We have already mentioned in the previous sequel that there underlies some conflict between ideal language philosophers and the classical analysts. It is important to point out here that although Russell is a proponent of classical analysts, but his important books on **Logic and Mathematics** are based on the foundation of the constructed language. In this regard, we can say that although Russell was a classical analyst, he unlike many other classical analyst, had maintained a close proximity on constructed language. We think that the relevance of ideal language is immense. We propose to examine and analyze the nature and the implication of constructed language in Russell philosophical method of analysis later on. At present, let us explain, after Russell, the ground of rejecting internal relations as propounded by many idealist philosophers.

The ground for rejecting internal relations:

Another important aspect of Russell's method of analysis is that it goes against the philosophical concepts of internal relations. Since Russell introduces a method of philosophical analysis which is based on the reductive system, he never accepts the so-called internal relations. At his early study of Leibnitz, Russell seems to conceive that Leibnitz himself advocated the doctrine of internal relations partially through the acceptance of the subject – predicate logic of Aristotle. Those who advocate internal relations seem to believe that the predicate is analytically contained in the subject. If this is taken into consideration, then one can claim quite reasonably on the basis of it that the relation of a given subject term must be thought of as internal to that term. Such kind of

relation is called metaphysical and it was found not only in Leibnitz's monadology, but also found in the absolute idealism of Bradley. Russell along with Moore seems to believe that the doctrine of internal relations is wrong and to provide a better formulation of the doctrine of relations, the new logical symbolism is required. The new logic, says Russell, attempts to uncover the elements of form in inferences where such forms are obscured by irrelevances of content, idioms of natural languages, traditional syllogistic forms etc. The objective of Russell 's method of analysis is to find out all types of defects underlying in the doctrine of internal relations and thereby make a distinction between simple and complex propositions which has a far reaching epistemological and metaphysical consequences in Russell's philosophy. The simple or atomic proposition is on a par with the categorical proposition of Aristotelian logic having a subject and a predicate term. Accordingly, an atomic proposition cannot be further anatomized into another atomic proposition, but it may, of course, be analyzed, if any one desires, into its components. The components of atomic propositions may be a term and a relation or may be a term and a predicate. The term of an atomic proposition can be varied subject to the nature of the proposition under consideration. For Russell there we find different types of relations, viz, single termed relation or a dyadic or a triadic or other relation with the corresponding number of terms.

Let us explain this point with the help of the examples. For example, 'Plato loves Socrates' is an atomic proposition. Here the word ' Plato' and 'Socrates' stand for particulars and the word ' love' stands for a relational word. The word 'love' is understood only in the context of what is related. Likewise, 'This pencil is red' is also an atomic proposition. Here the demonstrative pronoun 'this pencil' stands for a particular and the word 'red' is understood as a predicate word. In the case of an atomic proposition, the structure of the proposition itself is a component of the meaning. For example, 'Socrates loves Plato' and 'Plato loves Socrates' are made up of the same components, but they are completely different in terms of their meaning. Here the term 'love' being a relational term makes the all important difference. The order of words or particulars gives the direction of the relation. Although the meaning of the propositions under consideration is different, but both the propositions are supposed to be atomic in the sense that both of them are in isolation is contained by the smallest unit of statement

or assertion. Any analyzed unit of this proposition may not be regarded as an assertion or statement at all.

In his 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' Russell goes on to say that there underlies a metaphysical and epistemological implications in the use of an atomic proposition. The metaphysical and epistemological implications are clearly shown by the relationship between an atomic proposition and its correspondence fact. For him an atomic proposition is true if its components and structure have a correspondence with the named elements and structure of the fact. Epistemologically each constituent of the proposition must be known directly by acquaintance. This makes sense to say that each term of the proposition must be a proper name. Accordingly, the proposition ' Plato loves Socrates' fails to qualify the criterion of ' knowledge by acquaintance' as the grammatical proper names of this proposition are really disguised descriptions. Russell says, "An atomic proposition is one which does mention actual particulars, not merely describe them but actually name them, and you can only name them by means of names."[15] Russell inclines to say that although the words 'Socrates', 'Plato' etc., are originally intended to fulfill the function of standing the particulars, but they are really abbreviations for descriptions. What they describe, Russell conceives, are not particulars, but complicated system of classes. Thus, it appears to us that Russell uses the term 'name' in a typical sense. For him a name can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because one cannot name anything without having been acquainted with the name. We are not acquainted with Socrates and therefore cannot consider him as a name in Russellian sense. For Russell when we see the word 'Socrates', we are generally using a description by saying that Socrates is the master of Plato, the philosopher who drank the hemlock, the person whom logicians assert to be mortal etc. In this way, we do not use the name as a name in the proper sense of the word.

So when Russell conceives that a proper name stands for a particular (i.e., proper names = words of particulars), he has in mind a different sense of the words of particulars. When Russell tells us that a proper name is known by the principle of acquaintance, he thereby understands a name in a very narrow sense, i.e., in a very special sense of what we call the proper strict logical sense. In this regard, he only includes demonstrative pronouns,

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[15] Russell, Bertrand: Logic and Knowledge, p. 20.

viz., 'this', 'that' etc. as logically proper names which stand for particulars and with which we are directly acquainted. According to Russell , when we say , ' This is white' and if anybody agrees with the proposition by understanding the meaning of the word 'this', he thereby using the demonstrative pronoun 'this' as a logically proper name. However, instead of this, if he is trying to apprehend the proposition, he cannot simply do it. When anybody wants to apprehend this piece of chalk as a physical object, he is not using it as a proper name, instead of this, if he uses 'this' quite strictly to stand for an actual object of sense, then he understands it as a logically proper name. So the meaning of a proper name, which stands for a particular in general, is very odd as it seldom means the same thing. It is an ambiguous proper name. Russell, however, conceives the importance of proper names in the logical sense; but he does not much more concern about the use of proper name that we use and understand in our daily life.

According to Russell in the case of an atomic proposition the structure of the proposition corresponds point by point with the structure of the fact asserted. This makes sense to say that there is one to one correspondence between the structure of the proposition and the structure of the fact. The same thing has been the target of early Wittgenstein's picture theory of proposition. Only when the proposed logical conditions are sacrificed, can the structure of the proposition be said to correspond to the structure of the fact. In such a case an atomic proposition can be said to be true. This is exactly the same thing what early Wittgenstein has outlined in every part of his book **Tractatus Logico Philosophicus**. What is claimed above is that there must be one to one correlation between the structure of the proposition and the structure of the fact. If this correlation does not hold good in the case of a proposition, then he proposition under consideration turns out to be false. In other words, it can be said that when the prepositional structure does not correspond or parallel to the factual structure, then the proposition turns out to be false. So the main burden of Russell's theory of Logical Atomism is to grasp the terms, relations, and the structure of the fact so that the isomorphism between the proposition and fact is finally established.

As an atomic proposition is structurally determined, every atomic proposition is independent of every other atomic proposition. An atomic proposition, however, is linked with a molecular proposition by the logical connectives. For instance, the molecular

proposition ' it is raining' and ' it is blowing' depends for its truth value on whether, in fact, the atomic propositions ' it is raining' and 'the wind is blowing' are true and also on the logical connective 'and'. Here the logical connective 'and' conjoins the two molecular proposition and makes the proposition as a conjunctive one which can be true only when all of its components are true in isolation. Hence, if it is to be the case that it is raining and the wind is blowing, then the molecular proposition 'it is raining and the wind is blowing' is true. Russell in his Principia makes it clear how the truth value of molecular proposition could be built up by more complicated inferences from the truth value of atomic propositions. This is the objective of Russell's method of analysis, which he elaborately explicated under the headline of 'logical atomism' and which early Wittgenstein had implemented in his celebrated book **Tractatus Logico Philosophicus**.

Metaphysical and Epistemological relevance:

One of the notable aspects of Russell's method of analysis is that it has both metaphysical as well as epistemological implications. Since Russell's method of analysis is deductive in nature, the statements that are considered in this system are remote from observation. However, the truth of the proposition could be deduced to its component proposition in such a manner so that the truth as previously claimed by the original proposition remains the same, i.e., it remains intact to its component parts. According to Russell simples can be analyzed out of facts, because their constituents as like as terms can be analyzed out of propositions. This indicates something about the correspondence of language to reality and about the nature of what there is. Russell does not commit himself explicitly to 'ultimate simples'. Russell says, "When I speak of 'simples'. I ought to explain that I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the limit of analysis." [16] When Russell understands 'simples' as constituents of facts and at times 'as constituents of propositions', it actually means that his interpretation of logical atomism is directed towards metaphysical and epistemological philosophy rather than as a tentative method of analysis.

[16] Ibid. p. 337.

Initially, Russell's method of logical atomism faces some difficulties. When Russell starts with the description of atomic propositions, he seems to believe the existence of negative and general facts. At the same times he also finds some sort of problems in incorporating non-truth functional proposition with truth functional one. For him the proposition ' I believe that it is raining' appears to resist truth functional analysis since the truth of the component ' it is raining' is not at all related to the truth of the whole proposition. Subsequently, Russell changes his analysis of perception and gives up 'knowledge of acquaintance'. However, amidst all changes, his distinction between atomic and molecular forms remains constant and it finds an important position in Russell's method of analysis.

Another important aspect of Russell's method of analysis is the theory of logical types. We shall discuss this theory in detail later on. This theory was proposed and developed in resolving a set of contradictions in terms of logical and mathematical implications. However, Russell's proposed solutions had far reaching consequences both in his own philosophy and in that of other contemporary philosophy. In his mathematical and logical practices Russell uses new notations. After an eighteen-month 'intellectual honeymoon', when Russell's method of analysis was in heyday, Russell conceived that the contradiction of classes were not members of themselves. The first contradiction arises when he asks of this class: Is it a member of itself? Is this class is a member of itself, it is a member of a class which is not a member of itself and this is a contradiction. If the class, on the contrary, is not a member of itself, then it belongs to the class of things, which are not members of themselves, and thus it is a member of itself. This is also a contradiction. Any attempt to overcome this contradiction, Russell holds, invites further contradiction. Russell conceives that one contradiction is linked with a number of other contradictions, some of which have been found in mathematics and some of which are thought to be old-fashioned puzzles. According to Russell one group of contradiction belongs to the greatest cardinal number and the other group belongs to the classical paradox of Epimendies the Cretan who said that all Cretans are liars. Russell, however, develops more than one version of the theory of types and he points out that in recent development of mathematical logic there we see a tendency to move away from the technical statement of the ramified theory of types. Russell was so influential,

Reichenback observes, in the field of contemporary analysis that all systems in contemporary philosophy by and large followed Russell in introducing rules concerning the levels of language in the syntax of their formal languages so that the so-called contradictions as cited by Russell can be avoided and the clarification of hierarchy of languages can be obtained. In short, all language systems in contemporary philosophy are the outcome of the influence of Russell's method of analysis.

Thus it can be said that although in spite of the fact that technical logic develops techniques other than those of the ramified theory of types, the recognition of the paradox and the recognition of the necessity of distinguishing levels of reference within the structure of a language remains important. The main objective of Russellian development of the theory of types is to resolve the antinomies of classes, which are members of themselves. Besides Russell, it was Carnap who also conceived the levels of language. Russell carries on the same idea regarding the levels of language when he goes on to analyze the meaning in his book **Inquiry into Meaning and Truth**. Here Russell has attempted to focus on the object language, i.e., the second level of propositions which have a certain relation to the object language in which logical words occur.[17]

Russell seems to believe that the most important outcome of the logical study of language is that there must be a hierarchy of languages. Here the words 'true' and 'false' as applied to the statements in any given language are themselves words belonging to a language of higher order. This entails the existence of a language of lowest order in which the words 'true' and 'false' do not occur. So far as logical consideration is concerned this language might be constructed in many ways or many different levels. Thus, identification of levels of language from various perspectives is the sole objective of his method of analysis.

Another important aspect of Russell's method of analysis is the introduction of what he calls the theory of descriptions, the method of construction or the resolution of incomplete symbols, which play an important philosophical role in Russell's theory of knowledge and also in contemporary analysis. Russell attempts to apply his theory of definite descriptions in resolving the problem of meaning of certain kind of puzzling symbols and statements. In his famous article 'On Denoting', Russell goes on to say that

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[17] Russell, Bertrand: An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1954,p.

the symbol like 'unicorn', 'round square' and 'golden mountain' which have no existence al all present a serious threat in the case of analyzing their meaning. Philosophers of analytic persuasion have expressed different opinions regarding the objects or concepts having no existence at all. One group of philosophers have said since 'unicorn', 'golden mountain' have no existence, so the question of their meaning and truth value simply does not arose. For them something is to be meaningful if it has existence. Meinong thinks the other way round. For him though the concepts cited above have no existence, they have subsistence or logical being and in this regard they are supposed to be meaningful not in the sense of cognitive value but in the sense of our inevitable part of life. Russell says that although ' unicorn 'or' golden mountain does not exist, but they are said to be meaningful in the sense that they can be logically expressed in terms of language which can be evaluated as either true or false in terms of their meaning. For Russell objects (symbols) having no existence at all seem to perform the same kind of role in sentences as are performed by the symbols such as 'horse', 'isosceles triangle' etc. The problem, however, lies in other way. Since they do not have existence, one cannot trace their meaning. That is to say that in such symbols one can fail to find out the objects referred to by the symbols. Unlike many others, Russell seems to conceive that the non-existence symbols, though puzzling, are not meaningless, nor are the propositions in which they occur are non-sensical.

Russell at his early stage follows Meinong regarding the non-existent entities. Like Meinong, Russell seems to believe that although the symbols like 'unicorn' and 'round square' do not exist, but they may be subsist and in that sense they have referents. However, subsequently, Russell was deviated from Meinong as he came to realize that such view ultimately goes against the logical common sense. Here we also find a philosophical tussle between Russell and Frege. According to Frege the meaning of a non-existence symbol is determined not by its denotation, but by its connotation. Russell, however, does not agree with this conviction given by Frege. Russell points out that the meaning of a statement about the present president of the United States lies in the man, while the meaning of a statement about the present king of the United States lies in a complicated analysis of the conceptual meanings of the symbols used. The ingenuity of Russell's analysis is that by proposing the term 'denoting phrase' he enables to show how

the symbol 'Unicorn' has acquired meaning. He further states how the statements, namely, 'The present king of France is bald' and 'Scott is the author of Waverly' can be analyzed. The assumption on which the problem and the solution is based on is that in the case of the analysis of the meaning of a proposition one has to contact each component of the proposition with a constituent of experience either directly or indirectly. In this process of analysis, when it is found that the component of a proposition is a name, then one must come to something with which one is acquainted. However, at times problems may crop-up in these symbols, which do not refer to such components of experience. Russell tells us that denoting phrases are incomplete symbols in the sense that they appear to be names, but they are actually symbols, which have meaning only in the context of the propositions in which they occur. Accordingly, Russell applies his theory of denotation to solve the puzzle arising out of the sentence: The present king of France is bald. At first glance this proposition appears to have meaning and to be false, but it is not false in the sense that the king of France has hair. This matter will again be raised in great detail later on.

Although Russell's theory of descriptions is designed to solve a problem in theory of meaning and also have an application in the formal system, barring these, it is also connected with an epistemological conception which Russell outlines by making a distinction between 'knowledge by description' and 'knowledge by acquaintance'. These two concepts are intimately related because it is rule for the analysis of the meaning of a proposition that 'proposition which can be understood are composed of constituents with which we are directly acquainted'. Russell goes on to say that there underlies a two terms relation between subject and object in acquaintance in which an object is directly presented to the subject without risk of error. All components of propositions, which cannot be brought back to this kind of confrontation, must be known indirectly, what he calls 'knowledge by description'. So the most important task of Russell's theory of analysis is to find out the components of propositions, which directly refer to experience, i.e., logically proper names, and then to show how their symbols can be analyzed as descriptions in terms of these names with direct denotations. At the early period, Russell seems to believe that most words, which are considered proper names by grammar, are

actually descriptions.[18] Even in the case where a proper name refers to someone with which we have direct acquaintance, the acquaintance is regarded as partial. At that stage, proper names like common names are used for convenience to refer to a class of 'appearances'. However, the problem was complicated by giving up the distinction between 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description'. The direct two-term relation of acquaintance was given up, and this makes the findings of logically proper names more difficult. However, the problem remains alive in the discussion of minimum vocabularies in Human knowledge and of logically proper names in the **Inquiry** and in **My Philosophical Development.**

Besides the method of analysis of incomplete symbols and the method of analysis of descriptions, there we also find the method of analysis of logical construction which has been outlined by Russell as a new scientific method of philosophizing in his **Our Knowledge of the External World.**[19] Here Russell conceives that the units of sense data can be used as the basis of the constructions by means of which a bridge is built up in between perception and the entities of physical science. 'Matter', 'Cause' and the other concepts of physics are to be resolved by analysis into construction from sense data. Thus the method of construction was used in constructing the aspects of common sense as well as those of science. A good example of Russell's use of the method of construction is the construction of instants of time and time series. He begins the analysis of time by describing the problem which the construction is designed to solve. According to Russell what is given in immediate experience is a number of events in time relations of being simultaneous and earlier and later than one another. For instance, one event may begin and the two events are simultaneous; then the first event may continue after the second event has ended, and thus the first may also be later than the second. This example is particularly relevant as well as valuable as it explains and exemplifies the method of construction as proposed by Russell.

Russell's use of the method of logical construction, we shall establish later on, is most desirable and effective in his own eyes. Although it is true to say that it is the general motive or outcome of all sorts of analysis is to break up of vague complex notions into

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[18] Russell, Bertrand: Mysticism and Logic, New York, London, 1963, P.216.
[19] Russell, Bertrand: Our Knowledge of the External World, Open Court Publishing Company, 1917, p. 51.

precision and clarity, but Russell's use of the method of logical construction also attempts to make a bridge between the world of science and the world of sense. It also justifies the sense in terms of reduction to the data of sense. However, in the process of using the method of logical construction some sort of difficulty may crop-up and for overcoming this difficulty Russell applies his famous principle of Occam's razor which states the avoidance of unnecessary postulations simply because it will invite a greater risk of error. The other objective in his method of analysis and which is particularly evident in his method of construction is the attempt to render scientific and common sense knowledge empirically justified. The empirical motive is also evident in the theory of descriptions, where the meaning of symbol is given in terms of its sense-data equivalents.

In the introductory chapter, we have highlighted the history of analysis in general and thereby come to know the position of Russell in the history of analysis. In the sequel we have outlined various directions or implications of Russell's own method of analysis. We have seen in the course of discussion that the relevant of his method of analysis is multifold. It has many implications and throughout this discussion it has been revealed in how many different ways Russell has attempted to involve his method of analysis in philosophizing. In the next successive chapters we propose to examine his various issues relevant to his method of analysis in turn.