Chapter - I

CHAPTER - I

PRE - MARXIAN ETHICS

Three stages in the development of morality

To approach the difficult subject of the development of human conduct it is simply better to go back to the life of the lower animals, especially those living in social groups like ants and bees. It is in the life of these lower animals that we find a life nearest to the purely instinctive level. Right or wrong, good or bad — these terms may not be applied to the behaviour or actions of these little tiny insects but one thing is clear and explicit that they certainly exhibit in their instinctive actions a very high degree of co-operation towards a certain end, however proximate or remote, it may be, that is the end of the well-being of the group they belong to. They are concerned mainly with three things - food, protection and reproduction, i.e., in one word 'life', not the life of the individual but the life of the group as a whole. The gregarious or social instinct along with other general tendencies connected with it, this behaviour which we call instinctive behaviour, renders the animal's action such a perfection that it is directed quite unerringly towards the well-being of the group without the presence of any laws and law-givers, without any standard of good behaviour. It is very interesting to note the fact that among these tiny little creatures the welfare of the group or the species is the highest goal or summun bonum of their actions and the good behaviour (which is instinctive) is the condition of the well-being of the

society of bees or ants. Ants or bees do not have any moral laws, nor duties, nor conscience, nor any moral sense. The conduct of the animals at the level of the instinct cannot be regarded as right or worng, good or bad. It is said to be neither moral nor non-moral, neither right nor wrong - the conduct to which moral predicates are not really applicable at all. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that in some dim way the animal carries out its instinctive impulse in action as the right thing to do.

At the instinctive level the conduct of the primitive man is governed by his fundamental needs and instinctive drives and these tendencies McDougall called innate tendencies. The development of conduct in a primitive society takes place mainly in two directions — (i) Conduct becomes more social and co-operative, (ii) Conduct becomes more rational as man uses his rationality more and more in satisfying his needs.

The isolated man can do very little to protect himself against his enemies and some of his innate tendencies like the gregarious instinct, the sex instinct imply the existence of other people and his having relations with them. This leads to the division of labour between men and women — the man does the work of hunting, protects the group from common enemies, i.e., man does the outdoor work while woman gathers vegetable foods and does the work inside the home. Further division of labour, specialization in different fields of labour are the marks of a developing society.

When the conduct of man becomes rational, it is used chiefly in the choice of means for attaining ends. At this lowest level man shows the capacity, however rudimentary, of judging his own behaviour —

this capacity of judging being entirely alien to the animal kingdom. Now the man is not only a rational being but a moral being too, consciously reflecting upon right and wrong behaviour, approving or dis-approving, voluntarily choosing and suffering regret for wrong doing and with this rational behaviour arise morality, conscience and ethical judgment.

Recent historical investigation and sociological studies have shown that the life of primitive man is a group-life and the individual in a primitive society derives his rights and obligations from his membership within the group. One of the main features of the early group life is its feeling of solidarity. The members of the group, bound by the ties of blood, thought of themselves only in terms of the group to which they belonged - they looked upon themselves as one living whole. When one suffered all suffered, when one was injured all felt to be injured not in sentimental phraseology, but in real fact. When the individual enjoyed rights, he enjoyed these rights by virtue of his membership of the group. The primitive group was communistic in character in the possession of property - the individual owned the property only as a bonafide member of the group.

Collective responsibility is another fundamental characteristic of early group life. Whether protecting the group from the enemies or outside intruders or avenging of any injury done to one of its own members the entire responsibility lies with the group, the primitive social organization and not with the particular individual member. At this stage or level man considers those forms of conduct which are approved by the customary modes of behaviour of the group-life or the social group to which he belongs. At this level the bad action is the action that is

'not-done' and the good action is the action that has been 'always done'. 'What is done' is 'ought to be done' — this is, in short, the customary morality approved by the group. The actions of these primitive people are to a great extent customary and show little signs of forethought with regard to the remote consequences — moral consciousness has not yet been fully developed, it is still in the rudimentary level. Their actions, moral opinions, if any, are guided and governed by moral opinions of the group. The customary morality is the flowering of man's social instinct and the innate tendencies of sympathy, imitation and suggestion which are closely bound up with the herd-instinct. It is because of this common instinctive basis that it is impossible to make a sharp distinction between the level of custom and the level of instinct. Even after the mankind have to a considerable extent emerged from the primitive groups, the influence of custom in the determination of conduct continues for a long time to be of paramount importance.

A striking feature of customary level is that it is not merely a political unit for the protection of its members but also a economic unit generally providing the individual members of their own needs. The conception of private property or private ownership has not yet come into being - all property is public property, and collective ownership is commonly agreed upon in the possession of property. It makes scope for a certain amount of specialisation and division of labour. It also works as a moral unit, for a wrong done by any member of the group is a wrong for which the whole groupt or the tribe is held responsible and when a wrong is done to a member of the group, the group or the tribe, as a whole, holds itself responsible for avenging the wrong done to one of its members.

The individual has no right to do any action on his own choice — he has to obey the group-cumtom. It is the group opinion which determines his behaviour. He is also aware of the fact that he is an individual only in so far as he is the member of the group and apart from the group he has no existence, no protection whatsoever - he will be left out absolutely without protection if he dis-obeys what the group thinks to be right. Again there is an irrational belief that if an individual does something forbidden by the custom, supernatural powers will inflict a punishment of illness, accident or even death upon him. Ritual, especially religions ritual, is a most powerful ally of customary morality. Rituals are generally performed on the great occasions of group-life-at the time of child-birth, marriage and death, at the time of harvesting of crops and declaration of war. The individual has no alternative but to submit to the authority of the tribe or group in the observance of rituals. Often the group takes recourse to or employs physical force to compel the unwilling individual to observe its rituals and thereby assumes its authority over its members belonging to the group. Routine and ritual play a fundamental role in the group life. Thus the standards of customary morality are too rigid, stringent, rigorous, making no allowance of individual circumstances and taking little or no account of the motive of the doer of an action. They provide no room for individual choice which is the very characteristic of developed morality. It is to be noted here that human actions are not wholly instinctive although the social instincts are still present and play a fundamental role even in the most developed modern society as when a mother instinctively defends her child or a man instinctively loves the company of his fellow beings. In the customary level pressure is brought upon the individuals to do or

not to do certain things with an eye to the common good or well-being of the society.

With the happenings of all these in the primitive society one thing stands out clearly that judgment may be passed upon one's own conduct or that of others as it is supposed to bear upon the common good. Not the individual good but the common good shall be the criterion for judging an action to be right or wrong - hence arises the moral judgment.

In course of man's social development, there have grown, through a period of history, relatively larger groups from the innumerable small groups of primitive society. Two important characteristics of this development are :

(1) It is a passage from relatively simple groups to the exceedingly complex groups - the development is marked by an ever-increasing complexity of organisation. The primitive groups are simple organisations having a relatively few simple customs and traditions handed down from the ancestors but modern groups are tremendously complex organisations having multiform institutions such as the family, the church, the state, industrial groups accompanied by an ever-increasing intricacy of their internal organisations. With the growth of population, the problem becomes very grave and serious.

(2) The development is marked by the progressive emphasis on the individual. Previously, apart from the group, the individual is no individual at all, i.e., he has no significance or importance as an individual. But in the course of social evolution the individual becomes more and more important. Now he has rights of his own, he can assume

responsibility by dint of his individual capacity, he can actively choose an action, he may worship gods or not. The moral authority is inside the individual - it is his voluntary will that guides him-he does his duty only at the dictate of his own conscience. In short, the individual is granted importance and intrinsic worth. It is to him a new birth, something positive is achieved. Customs and moral standards are being constantly revised. When we get rid of human slavery, we see that there are other forms of slavery which are also wrong as that is exhibited in child or women labour in factories or the exploitation of the poorer classes. Now it is what conscience commands that appears to be the obvious and proper thing to do. Antigone in Sophocles' drama refused to obey the order of the king, because her conscience did not admit it. Socrates, the great individualist, died a tragic death as he was true to his conscience.

At this level of conscience moral authority is not outside the individual - the standards of morality are now actively chosen by the individual after a greater or less amount of deliberation. Morality now tends to become the sphere of the individual alone.

Apart from historical events, viz., development of christianity as an universal religion and its emphasis on the value of the individual, breaking up of Greek city states in the 4th Century B.C., the renaissance with its rich unfolding of individual human capacities, the development of morality depends upon the two fundamental tendencies of human nature : hormic and mnemic tendencies, liberal and conservative tendencies. The mnemic tendency favours to remain in the ways of past and the hormic tendency favours to go forward to the unknown —

the struggle between these two tendencies within the individual arouses in him individual reflection. Another potent factor which makes this development possible is the struggle between the interests of the individual and the group.

As the individual breaks away from the bondage imposed upon him by the group and assumes greater responsibilities and privileges in his own right as a bonafide individual of a greater developed society — his solidarity with the group is loosened but his obligations are multiplied. He has attachments to various groups - to his family, to his business or profession, to his neighbours, to his church and to his state. The fact that different groups or institutions to which he belongs make different demands, sometimes conflicting demands on the individual makes the modern man realise that he himself has to decide what action he shall take in the face of conflicting demands or when such a conflict arises and this makes him self-assertive.

The development of moral standards, religious beliefs and practices, types of Government, industrial enterprises, systems of thoughts is due to the social evolution in which human beings participate actively. The modern man cannot remain to be a passive spectator of this whole drama of development, he takes active role in it. Man's convictions, reasoned judgments expressed in his systems of thought are not entirely free from the institutions into which he was born — yet the reflective drive is in the uppermost, in the upper rung of the ladder. For the continuance in existence, to provide itself with basic needs of bare subsistence, to provide itself with amenities of modern civilised society, the human race is forced to make provisions of all these and

this makes thinking a necessity and necessity, as the adage goes, is the mother of invention. In modern times, science has invented miraculous techniques in preparing natural products for human use. It provides us with comforts and amenities of every kind, e.g., rapid and luxurious transportation, instanteneous communication, supply of gas and electricity, sanitory disposal of waste, newspapers, television and so on. The mother of all this is work, human activity and by work we should not simply mean the physical labour but mental alertness exhibited in the primitive forms of occupation — hunting and fishing, inventiveness shown by our ancestors in inventing tools and machines, the capacity to guess plans of others, to understand another's point of view. Thinking, reasonable thinking, scientific thinking is absolutely necessary to resolve mental conflicts. Such a conflict does not arise when the members of a society are almost at the same level of ability and education, but such conflicts are inevitable in a society where work is done not for the common good, where exploitation of poorer classes is limitless.

With the industrial revolution, modern developments of technology, scientific discoveries and inventions a great specialisation of labour has been resulted. But specialized work has not eliminated the necessity of thought. It has placed upon the shoulders of a few who threaten to convert the majority of workers into mere tools. The desire to get rich, thirst for personal enrichment is predominant in a capitalist society-where all activities, either economical or social, are concentrated at one focal point, i.e., wealth. It begins with the free competition which gradually leads to a high development of productive

forces, improvement of technology, the formation of monopolies. The modern form of capitalism is marked by its emphasis on the internationalisation of production, development of common market, the arms-race, strengthening of state monopoly capitalism, selling of military products and to find a market for them in the developing countries. Contradictions are sharpening between imperialist states and the developing countries and the political, intellectual and ideological crisis is deepening. The system of exploitation is extended and refined. The class polarisation is developing, the income gap is widening, the working class or the poorer class is growing numerically. There is increasing proletarianisation of the middle classes and the intellectuals. New social antagonisms are arising.

In such a state of things individualism becomes the most general characteristic and the essence of morality. If money is the basic value of life and if making money is the sole purpose of man's business activitiy, there is hardly any need to think about morality.

If one finds the moral standards of a prevalent society not in accordance with the humanitarian ideals one may adopt new moral standards. The most powerful factor in social evolution is the outstanding individuals who think beyond their co-fellows. The poets and philosophers, scientists and great religious teachers, statesmen and social thinkers dig the channels in which future social change is to run. The desire to help the poor and oppressed and their love for humanity make social change possible. When social reformers go ahead for the overthrow of our present social system, they have in mind some ideal social order in which there will be no injustice arising from inequalities

of wealth, of social position and of political power - an ideal social order in which all our freedom and security and the comforts of modern era are to be retained and the glaring imperfections such as defeat, thwarted ambitions, disappointments, crime and misery removed.

The Development of Ethical theories - Greek, Mediaeval and Modern

So long as bees or ants are concerned there is no great difficulty in defining the welfare of the herds of animals - it is mainly the physical survival of the group. But when we turn our attention to the human society, it is found that mere physical survival is not enough, human beings have higher aims than mere physical survival. The man is not contended with food and shelter, he has other needs and desires. Besides these his efforts or strivings are directed to the realisation of certain higher values of life for bringing in a new social order for the well-being or good of all - for the individual as well as for the society. It is just here that the disagreement has arisen among the schools of writers on the theory of ethics.

The history of European ethics can be divided broadly into three periods - the Greek period, the Mediaeval period and the Modern period - each period having its own special characteristics. In the Greek period the Greek city states formed the background of moral life and the man who performed his duties as a citizen was regarded as a good man. In the mediaeval period morality was dominated by the church and the good life was identified with the religious life. When we come to the modern period we find neither church nor the state are so important in

the moral life. Morality is more concerned with the free individual and his rights and duties in relation to other free individuals.

The reflective thought on ethics, as on most other scientific subjects first took definite shape among the Greek thinkers. It is the reflective thinking which enables them to raise certain fundamental problems of ethics : what is it in an action that makes it right or wrong ? Or, what is the standard by which we can judge an action to be right or wrong ?

The earliest thinkers among the Greeks directed their attention chiefly to physical inquiries, e.g., what is the world made of ? Heraclitus (530-470 B.C.) and Democritus (460-370 B.C.) seem to have touched with some definiteness upon the ethical problems. Sometimes, they are known as the 'weeping' and laughing' philosophers. They are founders of two types of ethical thought or two modes of thinking which afterwards develop into Stoicism and Epicureanism. The antithesis may be roughly expressed as between the reason and the passion. Heraclitus distinguished between sense and reason and placed truth in rational cognition. It is by reason that we have the knowledge of the 'law of Becoming'. In the comprehension of this law lies the duty of man - man becomes resigned and contented when he understands this. He takes fire, i.e., 'bright and dry' as his fundamental physical principle and this has been incessantly struggling with the 'dark and moist principle', which is opposed to fire. The fire is the rational element in things — the more fire there is, the more life, the more movement; the more dark there is, the more cold, the more death, the more non-being. 'Strife', he says, "is the father of all things". He thinks that even in the life of man this struggle

can be found going on. The great aim in the moral life of a man is to secure the victory of the 'bright and dry'.

With Democritus, however, the fundamental moral principle is pleasure. Contrary to the view of Anaxagoras that all motion of things is produced by a world-intelligence or reason, Democritus holds that there is no reason or intelligence in the world and all phenomena are completely determined by blind mechanical causes. His ethical theory is not consistent with his metaphysics, his atomic theory in any way. He did not, however, develop a full systematic ethical theory and in its place what we have are only, a good number of ethical maxims. That one should enjoy oneself as much and vex oneself as little as possible seems to have been his principal idea. This, however, is not to be interpreted in a degraded or sensual way.

The first period of Greek philosophy has for its problem the origin of the world and the explanation of 'Being' and 'Becoming' of nature. But the second period opens with the Sophists and with the problem of the position of man in this mundane existence. While the teaching of the early philosophers was exclusively cosmological, the teaching of the Sophists was humanistic. It was that remarkable group of teachers, known as the Sophists, who have brought the ethical problems to the citizenship. To have a clear and distinct picture of their activities and teaching, it is necessary to have some knowledge of religious, political and social conditions of the time. The long struggle between the ordinary people and the nobles made an way for democrary everywhere in Greece. But this democracy is not a democracy as we understand it in our time — it is not a form of government by the people through their

elected representatives. Ancient Greece was not a single state under a single government. Every city, every hamlet was an independent state. Each had its own laws and the government was governed by these laws. Every citizen takes active role in politics, enacts the laws and transacts public business as these states are small comprising merely a handful of citizens. In these circumstances, men forgot the interests of the State in their own interests and the result was that greed, ambition, selfishness become the dominant notes of the political life of the people.

With the rise of democracy, advancement of science, philosophy, religion collapsed. Belief in God was almost ridiculed everywhere. What was regarded with awe and reverence by their ancestors was looked down upon as fit subjects for jest and mockery. Any action, however, scandalous or mean or disgraceful, could be justified by the glaring examples of the gods depicted in the epics by the poet, Homer. All morality, all norms were criticised and rejected. The age was an age of negative, critical, destructive thought.

The Sophists, though they were the most enlightened men of their time, could not rise above the age and they may be called 'the children of their time and the interpreters of their age'. They did not form a school of philosophy of their own, nor did they build up a system of philosophy in common by them all, nor did they construct a profund system of thought; they were a professional class, professional teachers. They wandered from one place to another in Greece, they delivered lectures as and when called for and in exchange they took large fees. Their tendency was purely practical and mundane — it was to attain to the high political position and for that purpose what was needed at that

time was eloquence and in the absence of it at least ready speech with a view to meeting every point with all cleverness and smartness. They were not true searchers of real truth for its own sake, they were not honest in their search for truth. They devoted all their energies only to persuade people of whatever they wished them to believe; they used their abilities to make the worse appear better and in their attempt to do this they employed strange and flowery metaphors, epigrams and paradoxes with the intention to confuse their opponents. They loved smartness and clever sayings. Protagoras, the earliest known Sophist, was the author of the famous saying : "Man is the measure of all things". This saying of Protagoras contains in it the germ of the thought of the Sophists as a whole. By 'man' Protagoras did not mean the whole mankind or human race, but the individual man and by 'measure of all things' he meant the criterion of truth of all things. What is true to the individual man is true for that individual, i.e., no truth is independent of the individual subject. Thus his philosophy demolishes all objective knowledge - it amounts to a declaration that objective truth is impossible.

The later Sophists extended their teaching to the spheres of politics and morals. If 'man is the measure of all things' is true, we can not assume objective truth whatsoever. This teaching, if applied to the moral sphere, makes morality purely and fundamentally a subjective, private affair — there can be no objective moral code and it amounts to a saying : what seems right to an individual is right for that individual and what seems wrong to an individual is wrong for that individual. If there is no such thing as the objective right or the existence of an objective norm of goodness and justice with which we may judge the

laws of the State as good or just what then, according to the Sophists, is the standard of judging a law to be good and just ? To Polus and Thrasymachus the law of force is the only law which nature admits of. What does it mean ? It advocates the doctrine that 'might is right'.

All emphasis is laid on the individual - individualism is the dominant note utterly neglecting the object; therefore thought becomes ego-centric. But like any system, it has its merits too. The Sophists were the founders of the science of rhetoric. They aroused genuine interest to the study of ethical ideas. They had introduced into Greek philosophy the problem of man and of the duties of man. 'Man is the measure of all things' - certainly, but man as a rational being, not man as an impulsive being. If 'my right is my right' or 'your right is your right' is true then there will be utter chaos in the society in which we live in and have our being. It is only as a rational being, as a potentially universal being, as a bonafide conscientious member of the society that I have rights, but as a mere ego I have no rights whatever. It is surely a fact that there can be no society without the individuals, society apart from the individuals is an abstract society, a pure fiction so to say, and similarly an individual who is the absolute lord of his own person caring little for others is no less a pure fiction. The truth lies in between the two extremes - society exists in social beings and the individual, by nature, is a social being and that alone which entitles him to the sacred rights of a 'person' in his universal and rational nature.

The period to which the Sophists belong follows upon an era of constructive thought. Socrates (470-399 B.C) was born among the Sophists, he was educated by the Sophists, he used the method of the Sophists but he was not a Sophist. There is no denying the fact that he was closely associated with them, rather he was a typical example of

them, he shared to the full the tendency of the Sophists to ask questions about matters of conduct. But he did not set himself up as a professional teacher, he took no fees for his teaching, but rather regarded himself throughout his life as a student of moral science.

The Socratic theory of knowledge is not, however, formulated for its own sake - it is a preparation for subserving ethical ends. He wants to know the concept of virtue in order to be able to practice virtue in life. His aim was not to construct a system of philosophy but to arouse in men the love of truth and virtue so that they might think properly in order to live properly. The Sophists brought to the fore-front the problem of man and Socrates falls in line with them in recognising that the proper subject matter of philosophical study is man. Added to the Sophistic influence was the Delphic inscription - "Know thyself". Get acquainted with your own self — the human self and all that it stands for. This should be the starting point of all philosophising. Socrates is, besides, dismayed at the lack of the moral perceptive in the conduct of his fellowmen. He finds complete chaos in the field of morality partly brought about by the negative teachings of the Sophists. He considers it to be his duty to make his fellowmen truly wise and morally good. So he thinks that the primary task of philosophical thinking is to find answers to the questions like :

(i) What are the attributes of good life ?

(ii) What is the rational way of living ?

(iii) How should a rational being act and live ?

(iv) What is the highest good for the sake of which all else is to be judged good ?

The chief concern of Socrates, therefore, was to discover the ethical concepts to make his fellowmen acquainted with the true meaning of virtues and duties. What are true meaning of justice, temperance, courage etc. ? What are the concepts involved in them ? Socrates thought that true knowledge of these concepts would lead to their realization in practical life. The Socratic ethics may be summed up in the four cardinal doctrines mentioned below :

A. Virtue is knowledge;

B. Virtue can be taught;

C. Virtue is one;

D. Virtue leads to happiness.

It may just be mentioned that Socrates made a lucid exposition of several individual virtues, but he did not give a final and convincing definition of the concept of virtue itself. What is goodness itself ? What is that constitutes goodness and the ultimate good for man ? It appears that he merely posed the question and could not find a suitable reply. This, however, is the most fundamental ethical problem that has ever since taxed the intelligence of moral philosophers all the world over.

Let us now study the implications of the four ethical doctrines :

A. "Virtue is Knowledge".

The doctrine has been the subject matter of conflicting interpretations. Socrates however seems to leave us in no doubt as to what he actually means. Too much logical and metaphysical analysis added to one or two vulnerable weakpoints in the Socratic teachings

have resulted in some confusion. Any way the Socratic teaching primarily means that to know the right is to do the right. Virtue consists in the knowledge of good. Knowing what virtue is, a man will be automatically virtuous. Moreover none can be virtuous without a prior knowledge of the concept of rightness. To sum up : "No man is voluntarily bad or involuntarily good." The second alternative is intelligible in the sense that in order to be judged as morally good an action must emanate from a knowledge of its goodness. Automatic actions, however good or useful in effect, are not classed as morally good. It is however difficult to accept without a protest the thesis that none can be voluntarily bad, that he who knows the good will do good. Someone might retort : "I see the good, approve of it and yet pursue the evil.' Aristotle also finds fault with the Socratic doctrine and declares quite rightly that men's actions are very often determined by passions and emotions, the 'irrational parts of the soul'. To understand however the true meaning of the Socratic doctrine we have to probe deeper into the Socratic mind.

When Socrates solemnly declared that virtue is knowledge, by knowledge he means not mere theoretical knowledge but an unmistakable conviction based on the deepest insight into and realisation of what is really valuable in life, "a conviction that he himself possessed". Moreover, being himself above the influence of passions and unbridled emotions, Socrates is unable to understand how men, knowing the right, can yet do the wrong. Socrates here pays a great complement to the ordinary man by taking his rationality at its face value. The Socratic assumption may be wrong. But if men fail to act rationally, the stigma applies none to them than to the Socratic doctrine.

Again, the anti-Socratic thesis that 'we know the right and yet pursue wrong' is to be treated with caution. Is there real knowledge in such cases, i.e., true insight accompained by a genuine conviction ? Socrates will shake his head and declare that very often knowledge is confused with 'make-believe'. When it is stated that a man believes one thing and does another, does he really believe what he says he believes ? Many people declare that it is wrong to hanker after material possessions and that spiritual uplift is the proper objective of human endeavour. And yet in practical life they are found to run after material goods as if these were supreme good for man. What do these men actually believe ? Do they believe as they speak or as they act ? Socrates would say that such men do not really and genuinely believe what they declare their belief in the goodness or spiritual uplift does not amount to the insight and genuine conviction and it is mere 'make-believe' even perhaps hypocrisy. Had they been genuinely convinced of the superiority of spiritual greatness, they would seek it and not material property. Socrates would not admit that anybody could know the good without immediately doing it. It is however impossible to accept the Socratic maxim without reservation even after giving Socrates all the credit that is his due. Aristotle's criticism seems unanswerable.

B. "Virtue can be taught".

This could follow from the first maxim. If virtue depends upon knowledge, virtue can then be taught since knowledge can be imparted by teaching. The teacher must be some one who knows the concept of virtue. One may, however, ask : what the meaning of the concept of virtue is ? We can understand individual virtues; but has the concept of virtue in general been discovered by the moral philosophers ?

C. "Virtue is one".

The proposition that virtue is knowledge leads to the further corollary that 'virtue is one'. Although we recognise several individual virtues like kindness, temperance, courage etc. their common source is knowledge or practical wisdom. This proves the unity and identity of all virtues since the intellectual discernment that conditions the right act is universally one and the same. Knowledge or practical wisdom is therefore the all-comprehensive virtue; it includes all virtues. Here we find something analogous to the Fichtean doctrine of supremacy of the 'Practical Reason.'

D. "Virtue is (leads to) happiness."

This doctrine of Socrates has led to some mis-understanding. Socrates here seems to have descended from his lofty height to the level of the common man. But there is no insincerity in him - he speaks from the courage of his conviction. In this doctrine he discovers an additional reason as to why knowledge is followed by virtue. Virtue means happiness, or well-being is the necessary result of virtue. Since a man naturallyseeks what is advantageous to him, a true knowledge of what the good is, will make him do the good and thereby attain happiness. Here then Socrates combines his psychological intellectualism with ethical eudaemonism. The result, however, is not a particularly happy one. Virtue for Socrates was the "road to the realisation of specific objects of well-being, happiness, contentment, power and honour". (Schwegler). Now, as no man can be intentionally bad or vicious, i.e., non-virtuous since to know the notion of virtue is to be virtuous, it follows that to have knowledge of the notion of virtue

means at the same time to be happy. Of course, this involves the fallacy of "Petitio principii" since it regards virtue, ex-hypothesi, as leading to happiness and then tries to prove it again.

If the end for which virtues are practised is happiness or utility, does Socrates mean thereby that happiness is the most desirable end for man - the summum bonum of life ? According to Xenophon the good in the opinion of his master always coincided the profitable or the useful. But we do not feel inclined to accept this interpretation - the whole thing appears to be un-Socratic. There are several passages in Socrates' dialogues which would give a totally different impression. Moreover, according to Xenophon, himself, who wrote voluminously about Socrates, Socrates has declared times without number that man's true fortune is to be sought not in outward goods nor in luxurious life or the merely advantageous but in virtue itself. Now if the sole end of virtue is again declared to be merely one's own advantage or virtue is identified with the useful, does it not end in a vicious circle ? The truth of the matter is that Socrates failed to find the objective determination of the conception of the good (virtue in general). At any rate he was not clear on this point. Let it be noted here that when Socrates declares that virtue leads to happiness or that doing good itself is 'eudaemonia' he means by happiness not merely pleasure or even felicity in the ordinary sense; it is the calm serene contentments of the mind, the joy or bliss, or as Schwegler puts it, "an exaltation over sensuous greeds and cravings, a freedom from desire such as lifts man nearest to God, a calm of mind whose equilibrium is never to be ruffled, a glad consciousness of undiminished strength and integrity of soul". It is necessary to keep this in mind since Socrates' doctrine has been

repeatedly misinterpreted by people who ought to have known better.

Though very little is known about him it is commonly agreed that he was very ugly having a snub nose and a considerable paunch. He was always dressed in shabby old clothes and went barefoot everywhere. His endurance was simply marvellous; his indifference to heat and cold, hunger and thurst was amazing. His mastery over all bodily passions amazed every one. He seldom drank wine but when he did it in one or two occasions, he could out-drink anybody. He was above all temptations. Before his execution when he was in prison his friends and disciples urged him to escape - a little silver at the hands of jail guards would probably settle the matter. But Socrates refused. His indifference to death at the last hour of his departure is the final proof of his mastery. When the poison cup was brought to him, he drank it without flinching - this was the end of a man, a philosopher, a perfect orphic saint, a devoted teacher, as we may say, the best of all his time and the most wise and just.

Upon the death of Socrates his disciples could not grasp the great man's thought in its wholeness. Only one man among his disciples grasped his teaching and that was Plato, a writer of great genius. Among other followers there were two who founded the schools of philosophy, each partial and one-sided but each claiming to be the exponent of true Socraticism. Antisthenes founded the cynic school and Aristippus the cyrenaic school. His disciples agree that virtue is the sole end of life but each interprets his teaching in his own way.

Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic School, repeated the familiar propositions of his master that 'Virtue is knowledge', 'virtue is

teachable', and 'virtue is one' but he interpreted his teaching to mean that the independence of earthly pleasures and possessions is in itself the main end of life. Aristippus, though he proceeds from the thesis that virtue is the sole object of life, comes subsequently to a conclusion in consonance with his own temperament. No doubt 'virtue is the sole end of life' but the 'sole end of virtue is pleasure', i.e., the sole end of life is pleasure. Nothing is wicked, nothing evil provided only it satisfies the thirst of pleasure of the individual. But in the pursuit of pleasure wise men must exercise prudence, because unrestrained pursuit of pleasure may lead to pain, misery and disaster.

These two tendencies have persisted throughout almost the whole course of ethical speculation. The Cyrenaics were followed by the Epicureans who developed a conception of pleasure and founded morality upon pleasure - pleasure is the only good, it is alone an end in itself. Virtue has no value of its own account but derives its value only from the pleasure which accompanies it. On the contrary, the Cynics were followed by the Stoics who found the meaning of good life in the avoidance of the feeling of pleasure and in the rational pursuit of duty. Virtue is the life according to reason, morality being simply a rational action. The Epicureans held that good things are those that satisfy our human desires, particularly the desire for pleasure. This is the fundamental view of the moralists called utilitarians in modern times. The Stoics held that a good action is an action done in accordance with the principle of reason. This is the view of Kant and many moralists influenced by him in modern times.

Plato (427-347 B.C.) made more definite efforts to connect ethical

ideas with the general principles of philosophy and so to get beyond the one-sidedness of the opposing schools.

According to Socrates knowledge must be attained, for virtue is knowledge; and since there must be virtue, there must be knowledge and all knowledge is knowledge through concepts. But for Plato this knowledge was a metaphysical knowledge, chiefly the understanding that the real world is not the world of the objects of sense but 'a world of Ideas' which is absolutely real and that the concept is not merely an idea in the mind but it has a reality of its own, outside and independent of the mind. For example, what do we mean by 'whiteness ?' — 'whiteness' we may say is an idea or a concept in our mind. But this is not Plato's view. If we consider 'whiteness' to be an idea in the mind then, it is clear that if all minds were abolished no such thing as 'whiteness' would remain. Whiteness is not, therefore, something which is mental, nor is it in itself an object. What is it then ? It is a 'Form' or an 'Idea' — it is a substance, it is rational, it is beyond space and time, it is immutable, changeless, perfect, eternal, an inhabitant of the real world. The world of sense has no reality at all — whatever reality they have they owe to the Ideas, the world of reality. The Ideas are eternal, changeless, immutable, whereas sense objects are changeable and in a perpectual flux. Among these Ideas the most fundamental is the 'Idea of the Good' and it is in approximating to this the ideal of virtue is to be found. It is the Idea or Form of the Good from which all good things derive their goodness. And to have an understanding or a clear knowledge of the 'Good', it is fundamentally necessary to go through a metaphysical course of training and hence the highest form of virtue is attainable only by the philosophers. This philosophic virtue is the primary

and the fundamental virtue and Plato attached absolute value only to this kind of virtue. The customary or conventional virtue is noly a means to attain true virtue which can be cultivated by the good citizens. All citizens, especially the irrational masses, will not willingly or voluntarily submit to the rational laws framed by the rational men, i.e., philosophers who have known the reality. Since the work of the state must go on and the laws must be obeyed, the application of force, to some extent, is necessary.

Now what is an ideal state ? How is justice to be done ?

The *Republic,* the main concern of which is to discover the nature of justice, consists of dialogues, i.e., conversations between a group of peoples usually confined in a particular topic. The dialogues may proceed somewhat as follows. Somebody may begin the conversation in which the word 'justice' appears. Socrates, the chief figure in Plato's dialogues into whose mouth Plato puts the exposition of his own philosophy, asks him what he means by the word 'justice'. He endeavours to explain but very soon he involves in difficulties. Then other speakers come forward to his rescue giving different suggestions as to what he may have meant. Socrates then elicits from them all their views on the subject of justice and gradually exposes their mistakes and makes them contradict themselves. In the *"Republic"* various definitions of justice are suggested which Socrates shows to be inadequate. Glaucon and Adeimantus come to put forward their arguments with regard to the nature of 'justice' and they challenge Socrates to refute them. The remainder of the 'Republic' is Socrates' answer to this challenge. Faced with the necessity of defining justice

and proving its intrinsic value and superiority Socrates points out that the best way of discovering its nature is to look for it in the principles regulating the intercourse of men in socienty, i.e., in the State. It will be manifested in an ideal State the arrangements of which are regulated exclusively by a rational consideration of what is good.

The ideal state is ruled by a 'guardian class' who are chosen in virtue of their intensive education and ability to do what is just or what is right, i.e., by philosophers who have known the reality. In any circumstances they should not be tempted by considerations of self-interest — their main concern being the welfare of the state. The rest of the population is divided into two classess - solidiers and workers. The soldiers are entrusted with the duty of protecting the country from external hazards and the workers of producing for the state. Justice is to be found in the contended performance of the functions of each class with the resolute determination not to interfare in the business or affairs of other classes. Plato's ideal state is founded on a division of labour or specialisation of function which springs from the principle that everyman should do that only for which he is best fitted. From this Plato concluded that everyone should mind his own business, that the ruler should confine himself to ruling, the soldier to protecting the country, the shoemaker to making shoes, when each class minds its own business then it is justice, its opposite is injustice. Therefore, the state is just if the ruler rules, if the worker works and the soldier protects the country.

This division of classes into rulers, warriors and workers is based upon the tripartite division of the human soul, viz., the rational part, the

emotional part and the desiring part. 'Wisdom' is the virtue of the philosopher, 'courage' of the warrior and 'temperance' of the worker. The guardian of the state, i.e., the philosopher corresponds to the 'rational' part because in him the rational part of the soul is fully developed. The warrior corresponds to the 'emotional' part and workers to the 'desiring' part of the soul for they may be subjected to the sway of a variety of different desires. The harmonious co-operation of these three virtues - wisdom, courage and temperance — produces justice. Each part of the soul must perform the function proper to itself. The reason must rule the passions in the interest of the state and the emotional part must assist reason in its task by encouraging the development of nobler emotions and discouraging what is base and shameful. The rulers must not cease to be philosophers. The duty of the warrior is not only to protect the state from external enemies but also to protect the state against irrational impulsive actions of the masses, i.e., ordinary citizens.

The ideal state may be realised in practice only when the philosophers become kings or rulers, for they know reality and know also what is good in itself. So the laws of the state prescribed by the philosophers will consist of knowledge of what is good and, therefore, the laws will be best possible laws. Not being philosophers, the citizens will be ignorant of what virtue is and of why they should pursue it. They will lack self-conscious morality and by following these rules they will attain such a virtue of which they are capable of. From this it follows that morality of the ordinary citizens in Plato's ideal state is conventional. It is the duty of the ordinary citizen to live in complete and full obedience to the laws of the ideal state. The ordinary citizen cannot be trusted to

decide what is best for him or to prescribe what is good for the society to which he belongs. Thus what it amounts to is that philosophers will rule and the rest will follow them. The ordinary citizens should be educated in the primary duty of obeying the best and in this their good of life is to be achieved. Hence in morality as well as in politics, his social system involves a denial of the fundamental tenet of democracy. As C.E.M. Joad remarks : "Plato's view seems to have been that a people who were capable of putting their wisest man to death simply because he was the wisest, were not, and never would be, fit to govern themselves; hence his antagonism to democracy."[1] (Great Philosophers of the World, Ch, I, Plato P.7).

Since the highest end or summum bonum of the State is to attain true virtue this involves the encouragement of what is good for the State and the destruction of whatever is evil. Therefore the individual should have not any interest apart from the interest of the State. There will be no private property, private interests and private endeavour. All belong to the State - this involves the community of goods, community of wives and the state-ownership of the children from their birth. This is, in short, Plato's ethics of the community.

Plato frequently speaks of all moral activity aiming at, and ending in, happiness and happiness has nothing to do with pleasure. The utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill places the end of morality in happiness - it is not happiness of the individual but of the community. That an act is right which leads to 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. But the fact is that what Mill calls 'happiness' Plato would have called 'pleasure'. Happiness, in Plato, is the summum bonum which is not a

single end but "it is a compound consisting of : (i) knowledge of the Ideas as they are in themselves, philosophy; (ii) the contemplation of the Ideas as they reveal themselve in the world of sense, the love and appreciation of all that is beautiful; (iii) the cultivation of special sciences and arts; (iv) indulgence in pure and innocent pleasures"[2]. (A critical History of Greek Philosophy - W.T. Stace - Page 223, chapter XII-Plato).

In his *'Republic'* Plato insists that true happiness is achieved only by justice, i.e., by keeping one's own place in an ideal State. The ruler must find happiness in ruling, the warrior in warring, the worker in working. It is not the happiness of the individual, nor of any particular class but only the happiness of the whole. That only justice can lead to true happiness is one of the main theses of the *Republic.*

To the question : who should rule ? 'If I wanted a shoe-mended, whom should I employ ?' To which some ingenious youth would answer : 'A shoe-maker, O Socrates.' To the question: 'who should mend the Ship of State ?' or who should guide the ship of the State ? Plato's Socrates would answer : "The Philosopher". i.e., the wisest and the best should rule. The wise shall lead and rule and the ignorant shall follow. Here Kant differs from Plato. "That kings should become philosophers, or philosophers kings, is not likely to happen; nor would it be desirable, since the possession of power invariably debases the free judgment of reason. It is, however, indispensable that a king — or a kingly, i.e., self-ruling people — should not suppress philosophers but leave them the right of public utterance."[3] (Kant, On Eternal Peace, Second Supplement, Werke, ed. Cassirer, 1914, Vol. VI, P. 456).

Quoted from K. Popper — The Open Society And Its Enemies, Ch. 8, P. 152).

The humanitarian theory of justice demands that the citizens should be treated impartially. The laws of the state should provide equal justice to all. There should be equal opportunity for all irrespective of caste and creed, not as a privilege but as a reward for his merit or excellence in the field. Poverty or class should not stand in the way. It is the demand that birth, family connection, money or wealth must not influence the administers of law. Equalitarian justice is against all natural privileges. K. Popper remarks that "Plato's principle of justice was, of course, diametrically opposed to all this"[4] (K. Popper : The Open Society And Its Enemies Vol. I, P. 95) "We see", says K. Popper, "here that Plato recognizes only one ultimate standard, the interest of the state. Everything that furthers it is good and virtuous and just; everything that threatens it is bad and wicked and unjust. Actions that serve it are moral; actions that endanger it, immoral. In other words, Plato's moral code is strictly utilitarian; it is a code of collectivist or political utilitarianism. The criterion of morality is the interest of the state. Morality is nothing but political hygiene.

"This is the collectivist, the tribal, the totalitarian theory of morality: 'Good is what is in the interest of my group; or my tribe; or my state."[5] 'The Open Society And Its Enemies, K. Popper, Vol. I, P.107).

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) accepted in general the ethical position of Socrates and Plato, but there is a marked difference in his philosophical outlook. Plato despised the world of sense, indulged in the abstract underlying principles beyond the common life of the senses.

Aristotle, with his profound love of facts and of the concrete, was more interested in the concrete details of the moral life; he is a practical moderator and sits down to make practical suggestions. We have in his treatise on ethics, viz., *'Nicomachean Ethics'* not a description of the ideal community or ideal state as we have in Plato's *Republic',* but an analysis of moral life as it was found in the Greek city states of his own day.

According to Aristotle what all men seek is happiness - it is an end in itself, the summum bonum at which all human actions ultimately aim. But we must not confuse Aristotlian doctrine with modern utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. For Aristotle an action is not good because it yields enjoyment; on the contrary, it yields enjoyment because it is good. According to utilitarianism the enjoyment or the feeling of enjoyment is the ground of the moral value, but, for Aristotle, the enjoyment is the consequence of the moral value. What alone is good in intself is an end in itself, is virtue. The good is happiness which is an activity of the soul. Aristotle holds that Plato was right when he divides the soul into two parts - one rational, the other irrational. The irrational part he divides into the vegetative and the appetitive. The good for man will not consist in the pleasure of the senses, the proper activity of reason is the summum bonum, the good for man. The appetitive part is essential to the account of virtue, for reason alone is purely contemplative and does not, without the help of appetite, lead to any practical activity.

There are two kinds of virtues - intellectual or dianoetic virtues and moral or ethical virtues, corresponding to the two parts of the soul.

The intellectual virtues will be found in the life of the reason, and the life of thought, philosophy. The ethical virtues will consist in the submission of the passions and appetities to the control of reason. Intellectual virtues result from teaching, moral virtues from habit. How is reason to gain control over the appetites ? Only by practice. It is by constant practice that the unruly passion can be checked and if the practice is continued, their control becomes habit. Aristotle lays utmost emphasis on the importance of habit in morality. It is extreme to attempt to uproot passions and it is extreme to allow them to run riot. Virtue means moderation — it is a golden mean between two extremes — each of which is a vice. Courage, e.g., is a 'mean' between cowardice and rashness; liberality, between prodigality and meanness; modesty, between bashfulness and shamelessness.

Our humanitarian theory of justice demands that all must have equal rights and, therefore, justice involves equality. But Aristotle thinks that justice involves, not equality, but right proportion, which is only sometimes equality.

The magnanimous man must be good in the highest degree for the better man deserves more and the best man most — greatness in every virtue should be the characteristic of the magnanimous man. According to Aristotle the highest virtue is for the few, and not for all. The highest virtue is only open to the philosopher. As regards virtue as an end or means, Aristotle holds that virtues are means to an end, namely, happiness.

A considerable part of Aristotelian Ethics is occupied with the discussion of friendship including all relations that involve affection.

Perfect friendship is only possible between the good and it is impossible to be friends with many people - one should not be friend with a person of higher than one's own. The good man should love himself but nobly. According to Aristotle pleasure is distinct from happiness though there can be no happiness without pleasure. Happiness lies in virtuous activity and perfect happiness lies in the best activity which is contemplative, because it allows leisure and leisure is essential to happiness. Practical virtue brings only a secondary kind of happiness. The supreme virtue is in the exercise of reason. The philosopher is the most god-like in the activity and therefore the happiest and best.

Though Aristotle's Ethics is consistent with his metaphysics, there is an 'emotional poverty' in his Ethics. As B. Russell points out :

"There is in Aristotle an almost complete absence of what may be called benevolence or Philanthropy. The sufferings of mankind, in so far as he is aware of them, do not move him emotionally; he holds them, intellectually, to be an evil, but there is no evidence that they cause him unhappiness except when the sufferers happen to be his friends."[6] (B. Russell, Hist. of Western Philosophy, chapter XX - Aristotle's Ethics, P. 195).

Mediaeval ideas on Ethics were much influenced by those of Plato and Aristotle and partly also by those of the Stoics and by conceptions derived from christianity. With the spread of christianity in Europe a new emphasis was given to the individual. It allows the individual to conceive of an ideal kingdom of which all are members and in which even the humblest citizen may actively participate by faith, though unable to understand with any fullness the nature of the unity

within which his life is passed. The spread of christianity helped to change the Greek outlook which had identified the good man with the good citizen and regarded ethics as a part of politics. Attention was given to the inner aspect of morality; it was the man's inner motive that indicated his true spiritual state and fitted him for the life of the heaven which was the aspiration of every good man. Yet, on the whole, Middle Ages did not encourage moral speculation and the standard of right and wrong was shifted from man to the revelation of God's law in the Bible as it was interpreted by the church. To raise any question or doubt was dangerous heresy which the church had the power to punish with a becoming severity. What remained as the function of ethics was to deduce principles and illustrations provided with the Bible and to apply these to particular individual cases. The fundamental tendency was to give emphasis on the religious aspects of morals and a good deal of attention was given to the application of these ethical ideas to the guidance of individual life.

In the Mediaeval Ages the dogmas of the church remained unchallenged in spiritual affairs and Aristotelian philosophy in things temporal. The close of the 15th Century and the whole of the 16th Century was a period of transition - so much going out, so much coming in that the previously established framework of things seemed unsubstantial. Scientific discoveries created in man new hopes and expectations, an undaunted daring spirit in man with its devout aim 'to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield'. War has been declared by the modern man against all kinds of authority - divine or temporal. The freedom of thought is the key-word. From the 16rh Century onward, the history of European thought was dominated by the Reformation - it was

the first successful attempt to vindicate personal rights against organization and it gave the signal for the rise of individualism in politics, in religion as well as in morals.

The results of Reformation and counter-Reformation in the intellectual sphere were at first wholly bad but ultimately beneficial. The thirty years' war pursuaded people that neither protestants nor Catholics could be completely victorious - it enhanced men's freedom to think for themselves. Monkish monopoly was ended, mantle of mystery was withdrawn from truth, the barrier between minister and laity was narrowed down. Everywhere prevailed a free atmosphere. After a feverish night men breathed the fresh air of the morning. Men were disgusted with theological warfare - now they turned their attention to secular learning.

Broadly speaking, the two types, throughout the history of speculation of ethical thought, come up again and again as opposing points of view - the types represented by Heraclitus and Democritus, Antisthenes and Aristippus, Zeno and Epicurus, Cudworth and Hobbes, Reid and Hume, Kant and Bentham. The main line of opposition may be said to consist in the antithesis between reason and passions - one group laying emphasis on reason and the other on passion. The one tendency laying emphasis on passion can be best illustrated and represented by such a doctrine as that of David Hume. We find him saying : "reason is and must always be the slave of the passions"; "that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason, nor their blame from a contrariety to it"; "moral distinctions, therefore, are not the offspring of reason. Reason is wholly inactive and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals."[7]

what is right to do; while the line of thinkers from Democritus, through the Epicureans, to Bentham and Mill think of the 'good' or happiness at which men aim and by reference to which their actions are to be considered as right or wrong or are to be praised or blamed. Besides these opposing schools we find another point of view which lays emphasis on the concrete personality of man.

It is generally held that the object of Ethics is to discover the good. It is assumed that there is one thing and one thing only that is good, viz., 'The Good,' and everything is good in so far as it tends to promote it or is a means to the 'Good.' Many philosophers are not unanimous with this view as they hold that a thing is good in itself, it is desired for its own sake as an end and not as a means to some other thing. The thing is to be desired or ought to be desired for its own sake and not for some other thing for the sake of which it ought to be desired. But if it is desired for the sake of other thing, it is not good in itself but good as a means to something. Quinine, e.g., is not in itself good, it is good as it promotes pleasure, i.e., relieves us of our malarial fever which causes discomfort to us. But why pleasure is good ? For its own sake or as it promotes something else that is good ? What establishes the criterion of morality by which we judge an action to be right or wrong, good or bad ? Are actions right or wrong without any reflection upon their consequences ? How is right action to be distinguished from a wrong one ?

It has been held by one group of thinkers that the ideal or standard lies in certain general laws and principles which exist independently in their own right without reference to individual experience and is,

therefore, absolute and unchangeable. This view has not been universally accepted. Other thinkers, in opposition to this veiw, hold that good or bad, right or wrong are only ideas which the human mind gradually acquires as a result of the consequences that experience brings, that rightness or wrongness of an action depends on its consequences or results. As they are created in the course of human experience, they are not absolute but relative to time and circumstances in their creation and in their significance. The first view is called *Intuitional view* and the second *Teleological view* - from the first view we have Intuitional theory and from the second Teleological theory.

The Intuitional view assumes two forms - (i) according to one form of it the standard of goodness is an immutable principle which lies outside the human mind and is wholly independent of it. Granted that it exists outside the human mind, but where ? one group answers that it is in the nature of things, while the other group places it in the will of God. The standard of goodness exists in the nature of the world; it is absolute and eternal; and is not relative either to the will of man or the will of God. The contrary view holds that the standard of goodness exists neither in the natures nor in the essences of things, but in the will of the God, for the will of the God there is no standard, save that will itself. (ii) The other form of the Intuitional view holds that the standard of goodness is inherent in the human mind itself. Good is good, evil is evil as man wills - not individual men but humanity, the mind of man. The standard of moral values lies within the will of mankind. The classical formulation of this intuitionist point of view is found in the ethical writings, viz., *'Fundamental Principles of a Metaphysic of Morals'* and *'Critique of Practical Reason,* of Immanuel Kant.

According to Kant moral law is unique. It is only Categorical imperative which holds unconditionally and universally. Moral laws donot depend on the ends at which men aim like the laws of the nations, or of the rhetoric or even assertorial laws. Kant denies all teleological theories of ethics which hold that an action is right because it leads to certain consequences. The supreme moral principle lays its command upon us absolutely and admits of no question - what we ought to do we ought to do. There can be no higher law by which the moral imperative might be set aside.

There is inborn in every human mind, Kant holds, a moral law which is the same for all, i.e., universal and about which there need be no dispute. Since the moral imperative is categorical it cannot be derived from the consideration of any end outside of the will of the individual; for every external end is empirical and can give rise only to a hypothetical imperative. Kant holds that the absolute imperative of duty has no reference to external ends to which the will is directed, but simply to the right direction of the will itself. We find Kant saying:

"There is nothing in the world or even out of it that can be called good without qualification except a good will."

Goodness is definable only in terms of this Categorical imperative-the universal law of the mind. "Duty consists in the obligation to act from pure reverence for the moral law. To this motive all others must give way, for it is the condition of a will which is good in itself, and which has a value with which nothing else is comparable."[9] (J. Watson, Selections From Kant, P. 241). Consequences have no significance for the determination of the goodness of conduct because "a man's will

is good, not because the consequences which flow from it are good, nor because it is capable of attaining the end which it seeks, but it is good in itself or because it wills the good. By a good will is not meant mere well-wishing; it consists in a resolute employment of all the means within one's reach, and its intrinsic value is in no way increased by success or lessened by failure".[10] (J. Watson, Selections From Kant, P. 225-226). A good will is a will which unconditionally and absolutely obeys a moral law - it acts in such a way that the resulting conduct might be done by everybody else. The good will is good intrinsically — it is 'a jewel which shines by its own light'.

All moral concepts have their seat and origin wholly apriori in the reason. The essence of morality is to be derived from the concept of law. When we act according to the idea of law, i.e., by will we are lifted out of the phenomenal world, we are free. But if we act according to our desires we belong to the phenomenal world and we are not free. The exercise of the will brings with it a capacity for free activity. The right action determined by such a principle would be the same for every individual, no matter what the tastes or inclinations or circumstances of the particular individual are. The moral law cannot tell us what the matter or content of our actions ought to be; it can only instruct us with regard to the from. But the pure form, without the matter, must be simply the form of law in general. So Kant provides us, as the content of the categorical imperative, this formulae: "Act only on that maxim which thou canst at the same time will become a universal law."

"Kant gives as an illustration of the working of the categorical imperative that it is wrong to borrow money, because if we all tried to

do so there would no money left to borrow ... . But there are some acts which Kant would certainly think wrong but which cannot be shown to be wrong by his principles, for instance suicide; it would be quite possible for a melancholic to wish that everybody should commit suicide. His maxim seems, in fact, to give a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of virtue."[11] (B. Russell — History or Western Philosophy, P. 683).

This maxim, C.E.M.Joad remarks, "gives us no guidance in the actual circumstances of daily life ..... But there are occasions in which the telling of a lie may be justified in actual life on the ground that the consequences of truth telling would be harmful. Ought we, for example, to tell the truth to a potential murderer, who asks where an innocent person whom he proposes to kill is hiding ? Most people would say that we ought not, but, whetever view we take of the matter, Kant's universally binding principle affords us little assistance."[12] (C.E.M. Joad, Great Philosophers of the World, P. 54).

According to Kant the human mind knows intuitively what is right and what is wrong and duty must be done for duty's sake. It needs no explanation and does not come from experience - the practical reason expresses itself in the form of a categorical imperative, a voice of duty, an unconditinal command of the reason. The will issues order categorically — unconditional obedience to the moral law is demanded. Respect for the dignity of the moral law is the sole motive of moral action. Royce in his book, 'Spirit of Modern Philosophy', writes :

"Kant loves to dwell on its awful sublimity ..... Absolute truthfulness, absolute respect for the rights and freedom of everyone of your fellow men, with devotion to the cause of high mindedness, of

honesty, of justice, of simplicity, of honour - such is Kant's ideal, and so far as in him lay, he was always true to it"[13] (P.133).

Kant's life reminds us of 'categorical imperative of duty' which is for him kernel of morals. Caird in his book, 'Critical Philosophy of Kant', vol. I, P. 63) quotes the following account of Kant from Heine.

"The life of Immanuel Kant is hard to describe : he had indeed neither life nor history in the proper sense of the words. He lived an abstract, mechanical, old bachelor existence in a quiet, remote street of Konigsberg .... I do not believe that the great Cathedral clock of that city accomplished its day's work in a less passionate and more regular way than its countryman, Immanuel Kant".[14]

It is not enough to say : It is your duty : therefore, do your duty. To this one may say : what is my duty ? Kant gives us a formula which may be applied to all and every situation : "So act that the maxim of thy will may always hold good as a principle of legislation." Let me suppose that a sum of money were left in trust with me. But under compelling circumstances, I spend a portion of the money to be paid back within a limited period of time. Am I right ? Should I wish it to be universalised ? May I wish this rule to become a general rule of action ?

To this rule Kant adds another : "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of another always as end, never as a means." NO child, no woman, no labouring man can ever be treated as a means to one's own pleasure or profit.

Some people may say that we are constantly using other peoples as means to our purposes - we use a porter as a means of carrying our

luggage, we use a labouring man as a means of doing our jobs for us. But this way of thinking is wrong, for Kant never stated that we should not use the services of other people or they should not use our services. Certainly moral wrong is done when we use other people as a means in a bad way as when an woman is used as a prostitute or a child is used as a cheap means of production. What does Kant mean when he says that one cannot be treated as mere means ? He tells us that we should remember that they are ends, things of value' in themselves apart from their services that they render to us.

"Kant maintained", Russell observes, "that every human being is an end in himself .... There is, however, a logical difficulty in Kant's view, since it gives no means of reaching a decision when two men's interests clash. If each is an end in himself, how are we to arrive at a principle for determining which shall give way ? Such a principle must have to do with the community rather than with the individual."[15] (B.Russell, HIst. of Western Phil., Page 194-chapter XX - Aristotle's Ethics).

If our civilization is to survive we must learn the lesson of good will and co-operation - all men have to learn to live together with responsible freedom and respect for others and with dignity. As Radhakrishnan oberves: "Democracy is the political expression of the ethical principle that the true end of man is responsible freedom. Kant's celebrated moral principle, 'So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, always as an end, never merely as a means,' is a formulation of the democratic faith."[16](Reli. & Society P. 90).

When this moral law or ethical principle is not obeyed, what will happen ? This is a problem more vital for human existence and its survival and human happiness or social well-being. Our strong inclinations may stand in the way. For example, in choosing a wife or a profession one may take one's own inclination into consideration totally ignoring the moral law or the law of reason altogether. What will happen if morality grows lax and the society no longer frowns upon the evil-doer ?.'Everybody is doing it' may encourage others to do the same thing. What will happen in a community when offenders, by dint of their position and power, escape the law, public opinion becomes lax and men are made mere means in a bad way ? In a circumstance like this virtuous and honest men will suffer. There may be a very few persons who may live a life of categorical imperative of duty in the midst of social decadence with its accompanying poverty and hunger, dirt and disease, infinite pain and incredible suffering. The eternal law of justice seems to demand that there be some compensation, relief somewhere. If it is not in this life, it must be in the life here after. Virtuous must be rewarded, if not in this world, then it must in the other world. This was the well-known argument for the existence of God and for the immortality of the soul put forward by the philosopher Kant. Kant considered it necessary to postulate the existence of God. In his *'Critique of practical Reason'* he thought that the existence of God is a necessary condition of the universe to secure the guarantee that the virtuous will be rewarded and the wicked punished. In his *'Critique of Pure Reason'* his fundamental position was that of an agnostic, but in his 'Critique of Practical Reason' he postulated the existence of God. Kant considered that human immortality is a necessary condition of attaining to a perfectly

'good will', for our human nature is in such a degree sensuous that it will require an infinite time for the 'will' to become rational and perfectly good.

No theory is above criticism. Critics point out that what is wrong with Kant's moral principle is not that it is in itself formal but it cannot be validly applied. The pure will of Kant, being devoid of particular content, has been described by Jacobi as 'a will that wills nothing'. Many have even considered Kant's principle to be too rigid, too inflexible, too stringent in its application. Can an action be morally wrong if the doer is guided by love instead of performing it from a sense of duty ? Kant does not admit the possibility of such an attitude. But Kant should have taken into consideration our nobler emotions like love, sympathy, neighbourly feeling.

Bradley, in his *"Ethical Studies"*, characterised Kant's view as 'duty for dury's sake' and contrasted it with the utilitarian view, 'Pleasure for pleasure's sake'. Kant considered that we must do our duty out of pure respect for the law of reason and not from any anticipation of pleasure. Though he does not regard happiness as the direct end, yet he believes that happiness must be included in any complete account of supreme human good - the complete well-being of a human being includes happiness as well as virtue. His moral rigorism is not in any way opposed to human happiness. He, however, thought that the moral end consists in the promotion of our perfection and the happiness of others.

"Kant's error, we may say, consisted in this, that he understood the term Reason in a purely abstract way. He opposed it to all the

particular content of our desires; whereas, in reality, reason is relative to the whole world which it interprets. The universe of rational insight is the universe in which the whole world - including all our desires — appears in its true relations ... The universe of rational insight is a universe into which they can all enter, and in which they will find their true places."[17] (Mackenzie - Manual of Ethics - P. 215).

The intuitionist view thus holds that the standard of the good is absolute and immutable wholly untouched by the vicissitudes of human frailty. The intuitionists do not agree in common as to where the standard may be said to exist. Some hold that it exists in the nature of things; some hold that it exists in the will of God; while others hold that it is in the nature of human reason. All intuitionists, however, do agree that consequences are of no moral significance - actions are proved right or wrong apriori without references to their consequences.

What Intuitionism denies the Teleological view lays emphasis. They insist that consequences are of great moral significance. According to teleologists, the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the consequences or results and not on the action itself.

Hedonism stands for those theories which regard pleasure or happiness as the supreme end of human life or the highest good. There have been many representatives of hedonism from the Greeks to the present, prominent among whom may be mentioned *Epicurus* and his school, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and J.S. Mill (1806-1879). They differ among themselves on various points in the formulation of the theory that pleasures are the end in terms of which goodness is to be measured.

Aristippus, a renowned disciple of Socrates, first proposed the view that pleasure is the highest good, that pleasure is the sole end of life. Nothing is wicked, nothing evil, nothing wrong, provided only it satisfies the individual's thirst for pleasure. Pleasure alone is the good, the end in itself, the only good and its opposite pain is evil. Virtue has no intrinsic value of its own but derives its value from the pleasure which accompanies it. What each man ought to seek is his own pleasure, not the pleasure of all human beings, As for pleasures, he held mere physical or bodily pleasures in the highest regard.

Epicurus (born in 342 B.C.), the founder of Epicurean School refined the theory. Though pleasure is the highest good, by pleasure he does not mean, like cyrenaics, merely the pleasure of the moment, but the pleasure that endures throughout the life-time. He lays emphasis on mental pleasures rather than physical pleasures and of all mental pleasures most emphasis has been given upon friendship. He does not aim at the feverish pleasures of the world but rather at a negative absence of pain, at tranquillity, quiet calm, repose of spirit undisturbed by fears and anxieties. According to him pleasure does not consist in the multiplication of wants and their subsequent satisfaction, for it complicates life without adding to happiness. Epicurus himself lived a very simple and abstemious life and advised his disciples accordingly.

In modern times a much more serious attempt to construct an ethical philosophy on the basis of happiness was made by the eminent English thinkers like Bentham and J.S. Mill. According to Bentham and Mill the criterion of a right action is to be found in the consequences of the action.

With Bentham the pleasure is the highest good, not the pleasure of the moment but of the life time, and not the pleasure of the individual but of the greatest number. This newly added qualification, 'pleasure of the greatest number', more accurately 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' marks the arrival of the social element in ethical theory. The way to secure the greatest pleasure for oneself is to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number and in doing this one can achieve happiness. For example honesty is a social virtue and being honest a man derives his greatest pleasure for he is rewarded by the public consideration and esteem. There is no contradiction between pursuing one's own greatest pleasure on the one hand and promoting the social good on the other.

Bentham, being a social reformer working for the betterment of the humanity, was in search of a universal principle and he found it in the principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number', called the 'principle of utility' and hence the name 'utilitarianism'. It is the theory that what we ought to aim at is the greatest possible amount of pleasure of all human beings or of all sentient creatures. Bentham's theory is best represented in the following classic statement of J. S. Mill.

"The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure .... pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends, and all desirable things ..... are desirable either for

the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain."[18] (J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism chapter II, fifteenth edition, 1907, PP. 9-10).

In support of his theory Mill has put forward his argument in the fourth chapter of his little book, entitled *'Utilitarianism'*.

"No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person .... desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, is good to the aggregate of all persons."[19]

He goes on to argue that happiness is the only good on the ground "that desiring a thing and finding it pleasant .... are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact : that to think of an object as desirable ... and to think of it as pleasant, are one and the same thing."

Mill introduces an important modification as he admits of a distinction between the pursuit of one's own greatest pleasure and the promotion of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, i.e., to promote the social good is the duty of all. By this admission Mill commits us to the position that it is possible to desire something other than our pleasure.

Sidgwick, in his *Methods of Ethics* (Book I, ch. IV), criticizes Mill's saying that 'desiring a thing and finding it pleasant are two modes

of naming the same psychological fact', He says that if we understand pleasure in a more exact sense it is not obvious that what we desire is always pleasure; in fact, what we desire is very frequently some objective end and not the accompanying pleasure. Even when we do desire pleasure, the best way to get it is often to forget it. If we think about the pleasure itself, we are almost sure to miss it. This is the 'paradox of hedonism'. The ambiguity in the word 'pleasure' arises as the word 'pleasure' is sometimes understood to mean agreeable feeling or the feeling of satisfaction and sometimes to mean an object that gives satisfaction. The pain of tooth-ache is not merely a feeling of disagreeableness or dis-satisfaction but a distinct sensation.

That the ultimate object of desire is pleasure is a doctrine, called psychological Hedonism, of which the best known exponent is J.S. Mill - this doctrine is called Psychological Hedonism because it affirms the seeking of pleasure as a psychological fact; it is simply an statement of fact.

It may be held that if we always do naturally seek pleasure then there will be no point in saying that we ought to desire it. Ethical hedonism teaches us that we ought to seek the greatest pleasure, whether our own or that of others. It is a theory of value, it provides us with a ground upon which one form of action ought to be preferred to others. So there is no necessary connection betwen these two theories - psychological hedonism and ethical hedonism. Mackenzie remarks : "Ethical Hedonism, however, does not stand or fall with this."[20] i.e., with psychological hedonism. (Mackenzie — A Manual of Ethics P. 168).

The confusion is largely due to an ambiguity in the word

'desirable'. Let us quote a passage from Mill to illustrate this point.

"The only proof", Mill says, "capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it ... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it."[21] (Quoted from : A Manual of Ethics - Mackenzie P. 169).

Mill uses the word 'desirable' to mean what people do actually desire. In common English use 'desirable' means 'what ought to be desired'. Mill assumes the meaning of the word 'desirable' as analogous to that of 'visible' or 'audible'. 'Visible' means 'able to be seen' and 'audible' means 'able to be heard'. Therefore, 'desirable' means 'able to be desired'. This is Mill's conclusion. When we say that a thing is desirable we do not usually mean that it is 'able to be desired' but it is reasonably to be desired or that it ought to be desired; Hence Mill has committed a 'fallacy of ambiguity of term' as the word ' desirable' is not similar to 'visible' or 'audible'. It is rather analogous to the word 'detestable' which implies not that a thing is detested but that it ought to be detested. We cannot directly infer from the premise - 'what men acutally do', the conclusion - 'what men ought to do' and in breaking the rule Mill has committed a naturalistic fallacy. According to Dr. G. E; Moore 'Good' is indefinable, i.e., incapable of definition and Mill in his attempt to define good or indoing so has committed naturalistic fallacy - it is a tendency to define good or to explain the meaning of the good by reference to a particular mode of action which may be more or les good but does not enable us to see what really 'Good' is. Mill has committed another fallacy, known as the fallacy of composition in logic,

when he says that "each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons". Mackenzie observes :

"It is inferred that because my pleasures are a good to me, yours to you, his to him, and so on, therefore my pleasures + your pleasures + his pleasures are a good to me + you + him. It is forgotten that neither the pleasures nor the persons are capable of being made into an aggregate. It is as if we should argue that because each one of a hundred solidiers is six feet high, therefore the whole company is six hundred feet high. The answer is that this would be the case if the soldiers stood on one another's heads. And similarly Mill's argument would hold good if the minds of all human beings were to be rolled into one, so as to form an aggregate. But as it is, "the aggregate of all persons" is nobody, and consequently cannot be a good to him. A good must be a good for somebody."[22] (Mackenzie, A manual of Ethics, P. 174).

With Bentham Mill accepts the principle of 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' but he makes a very important modification of Bentham's theory. He recognizes a difference in quality among pleasures; some pleasures are better not being differing in quantity, i.e., in intensity and duration but being qualitatively different. Bentham has consistently denied any such qualitative differences, pleasures being measured only quantitatively — the pleasures of art, poetry or philanthropy are no better than the pleasures of the senses. According to him quantity of pleasure being equal a push pin is as good as poetry. This Mill denied. According to him : "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."[23] (Mill, Utilitarianism, P.14).

If this be the case, it amounts to the abandonment of the strict hedonistic ethics that pleasure is the only good. Because it introduces some other standard for the right action than pleasure itself. One pleasure is desirable than another not on account of its nature as pleasure but on account of some other quality that it possesses. Thus the admission of such a qualitative difference in pleasures weakens the logical postion of Hedonism and by admitting such a difference in pleasures Mill remains no longer a hedonist and he, by implication, becomes a perfectionist.

Hedonism has been weakened also by a better knowledge of the psyschological motives of human actions. A soldier or a martyr, e.g., may undergo hardship and suffering for the sake of a noble cause involving discomforts of his own. The unselfish man, who denies himself in order to benefit others, takes a pleasure in self-denial or self-sacrifice for the cause of others. A sadist, e.g. may find pleasure by tortuing his 'object of love' or a masochist may find satisfaction by endurance of pain and self-persecution. The tyrant in the old story who would take a new wife every evening only to kill her the next morming illustrates the extreme type of sadism. By instinct, habit or custom we crave not pleasures, nor happiness but specific things - we want a wife or husband, a piece of land, a position, a child and so on. Pleasure ensues upon the satisfaction of wants and wants must be prior to the satisfactions.

There are certain things we value much, viz., devotion to ideals, self-sacrifice, courage and heroism etc. we prize innocence in children, we prize force of character in men, the ability to stand firmly against all kinds of temptations, to overcome the frailties of human life. These facts imply that there are other elements of value in a good whole of the

universe of rational insight besides pleasures or happiness.

The criterion of a right action, according to hedonists, is to be found in the consequences of the actions. But it may so happen that in doing an action I may expect good consequences but when the action is done it yields bad consequences. For example, when I save a man from drowning, my action is for the promotion of social good. The consequences of his being saved are better than the consequences of his dying. But the man whom I have saved commits a murder. The actual consequences of my action (i.e. act of rescue) will have been bad. From the view point of actual consequences I have done a wrong action but at the same time it was my duty to rescue him from drowning with a view to promoting social good. From it follows that it is not possible to know all the consequences of any action and we are not certain whether our action is right or wrong from the viewpoint of consequences, Thus it provides us with a criterion which cannot be applied wiht absolute certainty.

Further, the conception of happiness, taken by itself, fails to furnish us with a moral principle from the lack of a universal point of view. Hedonism ignores or overlooks the fact that what we really seek to satisfy is not our desire but ourselves - the value of our satisfaction depends on the kind of self to which the satisfaction is given. To consider it in this way is to consider our desires with reference to the form, with reference to the universe in which they have a place. Socrates was executed, Jesus was crucified, Gandhiji and Lincoln fell victims of a noble cause. We honour all these men, why ? Because they suffered for the good of the humanity. What they did, they did for the humanity. Are they not martyrs to their efforts for achieving something noble or

good in themselves, viz. righteousness, wisdom, freedom?

We assume that happiness accompanies the good life, but the stark fact is that there are many lives that are not happy. Socrates died in the quest for wisdom and knowledge. Should we say that wisdom or knowledge is not good unless it leads to happiness? We love and honour Socrates not because his love of wisdom is a means to reach happiness but because wisdom, with him, is an end in itself.

Perfectionism or Self-realization or Energism or Activism is the theory that the end by which goodness is to be measured is the full expression or the development of the capacities of human beings. The capacity to enjoy is one of these capacities but only one. The hedonists, according to this view, is guilty of one-sidedness in emphasing only one aspect of experience to the exclusion of other capacities - the capacity to grow, to acquire wisdom, to sacrifice one-self for a noble cause, to love and sympathise other fellow beings, to create art and to do innumerable other things which are equally valuable and worthy ends. So the perfectionists would urge that, not pleasure only, but all of the capacities of man's nature constitute the foundation of morals, the standard of goodness.

To the question : what is the highest good or summum bonum at which all human activity ultimately aims? For Plato man's highest good is a harmoniously developed personality, a condition in which every faculty functions in a perfect way, works in harmony, no one of them being in excess. Aristotle gave to this end the name 'eudaimonia' or happiness and defined it as the exercise of man's soul or the realization of a man's capacities in accordance with virtues. Happiness

lies in virtuous activity and perfect happiness lies in the best activity which is contemplative in character. Supreme virtue lies in the exercise of reason - it is intellectual. It is only in the life of reason man resembles God whose life is a life of Pure thought. God to Aristotle is essentially a thinker, the thought of thought -pure thought. The philosophers are most God-like in their activity and in their life of reason and therefore, they are the happiest and best. Rational activity is the highest good expressed in philosophical thought, in scientific research, and in the quest for truth. What alone is good in itself, is an end in itself, is virtue and the realization of virtue in a man's life is the supreme end. The idea that the end at which we are to aim is the realization of the self or the development of character, leads us at once to regard the moral life as a process of growth or development. The idea of growth or development is applied to the moral life also. Darwin and Lamarck applied this idea of development or evolution to the origin of species. According to Darwin, the development of animal species takes place by means of struggle for existence and in this struggle the fittest will survive. H. Spencer, in recent times, has extended its application to the origin of social institutions, forms of government and the like. But it is brought into prominence in the treatment of philosophical studies by Hegel. Our moral life then is, in its very essence, a process of development.

There is in the moral life of man an ideal - moral life consists in the pursuit of such an ideal and the gradual attainment of it. In all development there is a beginning, a process of development and an end. In ethics we are concerned partially with 'what is' but wholly with 'what ought to be'. "Man partly is and wholly hopes to be." It is what he hopes or wills to be that determines the direction of his growth.

According to H. Spencer evolution is a movement from indefinite,incoherent and homogeneous to the definite, coherent and heterogeneous. Long before H. Spencer Aristotle has all this; he calls it a movement from matter to form - the matter being indefinite, form definite, matter incoherent and form coherent, matter homogeneous and form heterogeneous. Coherence is the same thing as organisation and Aristotle has defined the form of a thing as its organisatin. For Aristotle, as for Spencer, the higher being is simply that which is more organized. Aristotle invented the idea as well as the word.

The process of development is from lower to the higher. Now the question crops up : What rational ground have we for calling them higher and lower ? To this Spencer's answer is man is higher, because he is more organized. But why is it better to be more organized? Spencer has no answer but when we turn to Aristotle, he has an answer. It is meaningless to talk of development, advance, higher and lower, except in relation to an end. Advance is called advance, development is called development when it is advance or development towards an end and this end, says Aristotle, is the actualization of reason. The God is reason, matterless form, Pure thought, thought of thought. The whole process is nothing but the struggle of reason to express itself, to actualize itself, to become existent in the world.

When we turn to the philosophy of Hegel, we find that his point of view is fundamentally idealistic. "What is reality? Reality, he answers, is thought, reason. The world is a great thought process. It is God-thinking ... what we call nature is thought externalized; it is the Absolute Reason revealing itself in outword form. But nature is not its final goal. Returning, it expresses itself more fully in human self-consciousness

and in the end finds its complete realization in art, religion, and philosophy."

"Such a philosophy as this takes our breath away. It seems like Idealism gone wild. It is magnificent, divine, but is it true? It reminds us of Plato, who takes us to the heavens and makes us see that our home is there."[24] (G.T.W. Patrick - Introduction to Phil-Revised ed. Idealism - P. 221).

Hegel regarded the universe as a process of development or evolution but not as a biological evolution determined by mechanical laws but as a spiritual evolution taking place according to a dialectical process and the end at which man aims is the fullest realization of his spiritual nature. Our human history has been interpreted as a gradual process of development upwards towards the realization of the truest and most perfect form of self-consciousness. Hegel conceivd the process of development as a dialectical or logical movement from thesis to antithesis and then to a synthesis which combines both the thesis and the antithesis and this synthesis may serve its turn as a new thesis. Similarly, in moral evolution there is a process of development from a goodness that is simply an outward obedience to externally imposed rules to a goodness that consists in the inward submission to the internal faculty of consciousness and these two find their synthesis in a social morality, a life 'that is gradually shared by the developing consciousness of the community in its efforts to attain the highest perfection of which human nature is capable. 'The good will' of Kant is with Hegel no longer the will of the individual imposing rules on himself, but the universal will which becomes self-conscious in the course of evolution. Hegel did not hold that goodness consists in the isolated individual seeking his

independent good by realizing more and more fully his own capacity for self consciousness - his emphasis was on the social system to which the individual belongs rather than on the individual himself.

In his *'Ethical Studies'* F. H. Bradley has pointed out that each individual has a particular 'station' in a social system to which he belongs as a teacher, as a farmer or as a labourer and the most fundamental part of his moral life consists in carrying out the duties of the particular station. Each person is regarded as having his place and function in a social system that is aiming, with more or less complete consciousness, at the realization of a perfect humanity. What is important for each individual is to find his appropriate station within the social system and to fulfil his duties that belong to that station. His true happiness lies only in this, not in the enjoyment of individual pleasure. Let us conclude with G.T.W. Patrick's observation : "Every man now and in succeeding generations demands a fair field for excercising his powers and developing his personality. This can only happen in a social order where justice prevails and where it extends beyond the narrow limits of one's own community to the whole of mankind. So fundamental are our duties to others, so ingrained by social if not bio-logical inheritance, that they seem indeed like the very voice of God in the form of human conscience."[25] (G.T.W., Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy; Revised ed. P. 441).

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